Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan

Authored by Dr Idean Salehyan.
March 2010
70 Pages
Brief Synopsis
Many insurgents groups benefit from sanctuaries in neighboring countries where they are relatively safe from state security forces. These transnational insurgencies complicate traditional counterinsurgency operations in significant ways. Most importantly, transnational insurgencies have the potential to spark conflicts between neighboring countries. This monograph examines several transnational insurgencies that have been active since the end of the Cold War. While many neighboring countries have experienced the escalation of conflict between them as the result of cross-border violence, other states have successfully cooperated in providing border security. In depth case studies of relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo as well as India and its eastern neighbors are explored. The lessons learned from this research are applied to contemporary issues facing Iraq and Afghanistan.
Summary
Many contemporary insurgencies pit governments against rebel organizations that span international boundaries, find sanctuaries in neighboring states, and receive support from rival governments. Because the military and police forces of recognized governments must respect international boundaries, militant groups often use border regions to their advantage as they seek safe havens in which to operate. Rebel groups with foreign sanctuaries are quite common as conflicts in Turkey, Colombia, Liberia, India, Sudan, and elsewhere attest. Current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the difficulties in confronting transnational rebel groups, as relations with neighboring states may pose challenges for security forces.
Once transnational rebels have established themselves on foreign soil, the conflict ceases to be a wholly domestic one and necessarily draws in regional governments. Traditional counterinsurgency strategies can only go so far in containing the threat as foreign soil is off limits to security forces. This threatens to change the dynamic of the war and lead to an escalatory process which encompasses neighboring states. The problem of cross-border militancy has the potential to raise tensions in the region, and even lead to a full-blown war between governments.
At times, states will use coercive bargaining against their neighbors to press them to evict rebel units on their territory. Troop movements along the border, cross-border strikes against rebel bases, and direct confrontations with the armed forces of the neighboring state can be used, among other tactics, to increase pressure on the rebel host. At other times, states may devise cooperative strategies to police their borders and launch joint operations against militant groups. Doing so requires clear lines of communication and effective coordination of military action. Finally, states can simply neglect the problem. Rather than direct confrontations or active cooperation, some states may find that they are unwilling or unable to engage their neighbors and will let the problem fester, perhaps for years. Gaining an understanding of best and worst practices in dealing with transnational insurgencies is critical for confronting 21st century militant groups.
This monograph examines all major rebel organizations active since 1990 to determine patterns of conflict and cooperation over transnational militant groups. Groups such as the Kurdish Workers’ Party, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, and the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, among others, are included in the analysis. The most common outcome was for transnational insurgencies to escalate into direct interstate disputes. More often than not, states fail to communicate effectively to design joint counterinsurgency strategies, which in turn lead to direct interstate hostilities. In many of these conflictual cases, one or both states deliberately provided sanctuary and assistance to rebel organizations, indicating preexisting interstate frictions. Many rebel groups took actions that provoked interstate clashes and turned simmering rivalries into full-scale wars.
While conflict over transnational rebellions was more common, states can and do cooperate to manage these threats. States recognizing a common problem along their border may engage in constructive dialogue and common counterinsurgency strategies, which help to preserve friendly relations. For instance, Iran has agreed to cooperate with Turkey on border security issues. India has also cooperated with its neighbors over insurgencies in its north eastern provinces. However, effective border regimes have been relatively rare.
Another set of countries have had militant groups operating along their borders, but have chosen to simply ignore the problem. In many of these instances, the problem of transnational militancy is compounded by states that are too weak to respond adequately to the problem—on either side of the border. State weakness led to paralysis in confronting the problem at hand and has often resulted in a collapse of central authority.
To illustrate how transnational insurgencies can escalate into international conflicts, and how states may cooperate on security issues, this monograph takes a deeper look at the relations between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the relations between India and its neighbors to the east. Following the 1994 genocide, the new Tutsiled regime in Rwanda faced considerable challenges from a growing Hutu insurgency based in Zaire, later renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The presence of a Hutu rebel force in the DRC led Rwanda to invade its neighbor twice: first to unseat President Mobutu Sese Seko and install what it thought would be a friendly regime, then to attack the newly instated Kabila government. However, this latter invasion drew in forces from many African states, cost millions of lives, and ultimately failed. After an agreement signed in 2002, Rwanda and the DRC, with help from the UN, have transformed their relationship into a more cooperative one and have taken steps to limit cross-border violence.
Since independence, India has grappled with several low-level insurgencies in its North Eastern provinces, particularly Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. Although rebels from Assam and elsewhere in northeast India have benefitted from sanctuaries in several states, Bhutan became an especially important safe-haven for rebels. After years of failed negotiation attempts to persuade rebels to leave, on December 15, 2003, the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) began major operations against Indian insurgents on their territory, with considerable assistance from India itself. This offensive was the RBA’s first military action in 140 years. Pointing to the successful bilateral cooperation with Bhutan, India called on other governments in the region to do their part in combating transnational militancy and began working with Myanmar and Bangladesh to plan similar operations. India has sought a strategy of engagement with its neighbors and has successfully coordinated actions with militaries in the region.
Moving beyond past cases, this monograph also sheds light on current dilemmas facing Iraq, Afghanistan, and their allies and neighbors. The continuing insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan will present considerable challenges for the United States and its allies for at least the next decade. A counterinsurgency strategy has been implemented, which places the emphasis on protecting civilians, building trust, and providing services—all important steps. Nonetheless, both insurgencies exhibit considerable transnational elements that complicate matters and necessitate building strong bonds with neighboring countries to contain militancy as well as prevent disputes arising between states.
Iraq’s most pressing concern with respect to transnational insurgency relates to the presence of Kurdish militants from Turkey, namely the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), on Iraqi soil, although Iranian militants also operate inside Iraq. In Afghanistan, the spread of Taliban militancy to Pakistan threatens to destabilize the entire South Asia region. As foreign forces begin to scale-back their presence in these countries, it is vital that effective border security regimes are established to contain, if not eliminate, transnational rebel violence and prevent the escalation of regional conflict.
In this monograph, concrete policy recommendations are offered to the foreign policy community. First, states must find the right balance between local and central government security capacity. Local forces in border regions—such as the Kurdish Peshmerga and the Pakistani Frontier Corps—are often better able to confront security challenges, but must be better integrated into the government’s force structure. Second, states must improve coordination between security forces, especially between units along the border. This involves traditional counterinsurgency forces, but also local police officials, customs agents, border patrol forces, and so on. Third, countries should enhance mechanisms for intelligence sharing. Current intelligence sharing institutions are in place, but must be strengthened and expanded upon. Finally, countries must promote diplomacy and commercial exchanges in the region. Cooperation must include more than exchanges among security forces, but also be backed by robust diplomatic measures and the linking of societies through trade and commerce.
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