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An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations


An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations - Cover

Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Suzanne C. Nielsen.

September 2010

73 Pages

Brief Synopsis

During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. In explaining this important case of military change, this paper makes four central arguments. First, leaders within military organizations are essential; external developments most often have an indeterminate impact on military change. Second, military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Third, the implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). To an unprecedented degree, TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. Fourth and finally, the process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades. While today’s demands differ from those of the past, this report suggests questions that may be useful in thinking about change today. Knowing the answers to these questions would enable informed judgment about the prospects for the successful implementation of a program of reforms. The consequences, for good or for ill, could be quite significant in terms of resources, lives, and the national interest.

Summary

During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. It recovered from the Vietnam War, transitioned to an all-volunteer personnel model, and refocused on a potential future war against a very capable adversary in Europe. The Army’s transformation was evident to external observers: from being seen as an organization in distress in the early 1970s, by 1991 the Army became an organization whose professionalism was the source of admiration. Drawing on the relevant literature, the author seeks to explain this important case of military change.

This paper makes four central arguments. First, leaders within military organizations are essential; external developments most often have an indeterminate impact on military change. Second, military reform is about more than changing doctrine. To implement its doctrine, an organization must have appropriate training practices, personnel policies, organizations, equipment, and leader development programs. Third, the implementation of comprehensive change requires an organizational entity with broad authority able to craft, evaluate, and execute an integrated program of reforms. In the case of the U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s, this organization was the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). To an unprecedented degree, TRADOC was able to ensure that changes in personnel policies, organizations, doctrine, training practices, and equipment were integrated and mutually reinforcing. Finally, the process of developing, implementing, and institutionalizing complementary reforms can take several decades. This suggests that stability in an organization’s mission and resources can be important.

Despite the many beneficial reforms implemented by senior uniformed leaders during this time period, there are at least two important criticisms that must be addressed. The first is that the Army failed to retain the professional knowledge about counterinsurgency it had gained at a high price in Vietnam; the second is that the Army attained tactical and operational excellence but failed to develop leaders well-suited to helping political leaders attain strategic success. While these criticisms have merit, it is difficult to examine the progress made by the Army in the 1970s and 1980s and claim that the reforms that made it possible were not beneficial. At most, one might say that they did not go far enough.

While today’s demands differ from those of the past, this paper suggests questions that may be useful in thinking about change today. What are the key constraints or parameters that civilian policymakers have established for uniformed military leaders? Do political and military leaders have a constructive relationship which facilitates the implementation of a coherent program of change? Is there an integrated approach within the Army that reaches into all key areas of force development and guides them in ways that are integrated and mutually reinforcing? Is there an organizational entity empowered and capable of being the focal point for establishing coherence in developments ranging from equipment modernization and doctrine to training and education? Knowing the answers to these questions would enable informed judgment about the prospects for the successful implementation of a program of reforms. The consequences, for good or for ill, could be quite significant in terms of resources, lives, and the national interest.


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