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Somalia: Line in the Sand--Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities

Authored by LTC Eloy E. Cuevas, Madeleine Wells.

September 2010

54 Pages

Brief Synopsis

The al-Shabaab Organization, also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), and its allies have been active opponents in undermining the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all the UN efforts to support the Somali people. Al-Shabaab’s use of the internet and its control of the local news media has resulted in its increased ability to disseminate its story to the Somali public, to sympathizers throughout the world, and to the greater Islamic community. It is able to accomplish its strategic communication campaign through the use of organic websites, publication of online magazines and newsletters, and through international press conferences and interviews. The authors of this monograph identify al-Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical vulnerabilities organized according to four sources of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on diplomatic and informational options and do not address the military or economic implications at this time.

Summary

The influence of Islam on governance and clan politics has both negatively and positively affected the people of Somalia. It has facilitated justifying the removal of national, regional, and grassroots or clan leadership, especially if socioeconomic conditions and quality of life standards have been degraded or the leadership failed to ensure the safety of the people. Additionally, charismatic clan leaders have leveraged the low level of education among the Somali population to incite leadership changes. On a positive note, enforcement of Islamic law (Sharia) has been a major factor in helping to stabilize the lawlessness that has gone unchecked throughout the ungoverned parts of Somalia. By establishing courts and increasing the appointment of judges, Islamic leaders have attempted to bring normalcy to people’s daily lives, amid all the street-level battles, clan intra and interconnected struggles for leadership and influence, and the presence of foreign fighters on both sides of the conflict.

The al-Shabaab Organization, also known as the Mujahidin Youth Movement (MYM), and its allies have been active opponents in undermining the United Nations (UN)-supported African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and all the UN efforts to support the Somali people. Al-Shabaab’s use of the internet and control of the local news media has resulted in its ability to disseminate its story to the Somali public, to sympathizers throughout the world, and to the greater Islamic community. It is able to accomplish its strategic communication campaign through the use of organic websites, publication of online magazines and newsletters, and with international press conferences and interviews.

If the last 2 years is an indicator of what may happen in Somalia, the United States needs to consider undertaking a more direct role in limiting the demise of the TFG, and extending itself to counter any advances that al-Shabaab may gain. However, as military leaders and policymakers have suggested, this effort to limit the advances of al-Shabaab must be focused and involve a whole of government approach. This whole of government approach must be focused on the areas where al-Shabaab has been shown to have vulnerabilities.

The authors of this monograph identify al-Shabaab’s strategic, operational, and tactical vulnerabilities organized according to four sources of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME). After exploring the group’s inherent and apparent weaknesses, the authors then provide some suggestions on what efforts or capabilities may be leveraged in defeating and deterring the group. Such instruments do not have to be kinetic or military in nature, but can be diplomatic, economic, or persuasive. The authors concentrate on diplomatic and informational options and do not address the military or economic implications at this time.

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