Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
June 2009
Executive Summary1
In 2009, the United States continues to face severe challenges in Afghanistan. However, the U.S. continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the Government of Pakistan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the international community to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al-Qaida and its extremist allies, their support structures, and their safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. This report describes the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, efforts towards achieving U.S. objectives in the country, and measures of progress along the security, governance, and reconstruction and development lines of operation.
A New U.S. Strategy
In March 2009, the Obama administration conducted a strategic assessment of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and subsequently announced a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The focus of the new strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and prevent terrorist and extremist use of safe havens in either Pakistan or Afghanistan. Our new approach will properly resource U.S. forces in Afghanistan, re-focus civilian and military efforts so that they are mutually reinforcing, create clear measures of effectiveness, and regularly evaluate progress. The focus for U.S. forces will be to 1) to provide security for the Afghan people and 2) to train Afghan security forces so that they can take an increasing role in operations. To meet our strategic objectives, the United States and its allies will pursue a fully resourced counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign which leverages the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic assets of the United States and of the international community to diminish insurgent capability, maintain security, deliver services, and build economic infrastructure and human capital. The COIN campaign consists of sequenced operations across three lines of operation: 1) Security; 2) Governance; and, 3) Reconstruction and Development. Three enabling concepts underpin this strategy: 1) taking an integrated approach that synchronizes the efforts of all key partners to achieve comprehensive effects across the lines of operation; 2) utilizing the “clear, hold and build” COIN framework; and 3) training and partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
As one of the first steps towards implementing the new strategy, President Obama nominated Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as the U.S. Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Special Representative, Ambassador Holbrooke will coordinate across the U.S. Government to achieve our strategic goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Security
During the reporting period of October 2008 to April 2009, the security situation continued to deteriorate in much of Afghanistan. Insurgents continued to attack U.S., international, and Afghan security forces and continued to attempt to influence and intimidate the Afghan population. Insurgent-initiated attacks during the reporting period were 60 percent higher than during the same period the previous year. Sixty-seven U.S. personnel were killed in action between October 2008 and May 2009, a 24 percent increase from 2007-2008. Military deaths, including international and Afghan security forces personnel, increased by 48 percent. The increased level of violence outside of the usual “fighting season” was due in part to an ISAF
decision to deny insurgents respite and to aggressively pursue them in their winter enclaves. Unseasonably warm conditions also facilitated higher levels of insurgent activity during the late winter and early spring.
Despite the increased levels of violence against security forces, total civilian casualties, including those caused by international, GIRoA, and insurgent forces, were down nine percent between October 2008 and May 2009, as compared to the same time last year, according to ISAF data. Also, the Afghan population increased its assistance to the GIRoA in fighting the insurgents. “Pro-GIRoA” events, including turn-ins of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and weapons caches as well as other anti-insurgent activities, increased slightly. However, insurgents were active in more areas throughout Afghanistan and at higher levels than they were one year ago.
In February and March 2009, the President approved increases of over 21,000 U.S. forces to deploy during the course of the year. Between October 2008 and April 2009, U.S force levels increased by approximately 11,000. In June 2009, there are approximately 57,000 U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The recently deployed U.S. forces will work to provide stability in RC-South and train ANSF. These forces will add significant capacity to under-resourced Afghan police reform programs, expediting critical police development.
Shortfalls in ISAF required personnel and materiel as defined in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements remain. However, our international Allies and partners recognize the importance of the mission in Afghanistan and increased their collective contributions during the reporting period. Although neither the International Conference on Afghanistan in March nor the NATO Summit in April 2009 yielded significant new military force contributions from NATO Allies or the international community, the two conferences did yield significant new assistance to the efforts in Afghanistan. Most notably, at the NATO Summit, heads of state and government agreed in principle to a NATO training mission for Afghan National Police (ANP). Other offers from the two conferences included increased donations of funds and some increases in individual countries’ force levels. Many ISAF troop contributing nations continue to maintain caveats on their forces, though there was a slight decrease in caveats during the reporting period.
The ANSF continued to improve its capability. If provided the necessary resources, the Afghan National Army (ANA) will reach its currently-authorized end-strength of 134,000 personnel by December 2011. As part of this acceleration plan, eight infantry kandaks (battalions) are being fielded in 2009 as security force kandaks. Shortages of training personnel for the ANA persist. The United States has fielded 1,665 of the 3,313 personnel required for Embedded Training Teams for ANA. Fifty-two ISAF Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams provide the equivalent of another 799 personnel. As stated above, a portion of the increased U.S. forces in 2009 will support the ANSF development mission.
In April 2009, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase in the total number of ANP personnel by 4,800 officers, to be in place in Kabul in time for the August 2009 Presidential elections. The JCMB also approved, in principle, a further increase in ANP of 5,000-10,000 officers, to be placed in vulnerable or unstable provinces in time for the election. The increase beyond the initial 4,800 officers will be subject to available funding and training resources. The Focused District Development (FDD) program will continue to train district-level ANP. The eighth FDD cycle will begin in the spring or early summer of 2009, with police mentor team contributions from Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands. Significant shortfalls in ANP training personnel continue to hamper police development in Afghanistan.
As an additional initiative to enhance local security, the GIRoA, in cooperation with ISAF and the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has initiated a pilot Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3). This program will empower selected Afghan communities to recruit, train, and deploy their own local defensive forces. These forces are not militias, but will form, train, and deploy under the direction of the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and will be responsible to the district and provincial chiefs of police. The pilot program began in February 2009.
Opium cultivation in the country decreased by almost 20 percent in 2008 and the United Nations Office of Drug Control predicts 2009 will see a further decrease in cultivation. In November 2008 NATO changed its rules of engagement to give ISAF more flexibility in targeting drug facilities and traffickers that support the insurgency. In December 2008, the Secretary of Defense approved a change in U.S. rules of engagement to provide U.S. forces similar flexibility to target narco-traffickers and modified policy to facilitate closer cooperation and support from the military to law enforcement agencies operating in Afghanistan. The ANA CN Infantry Kandak (CNIK) provided dedicated ANSF protection for GIRoA Poppy Eradication Force for the first time in the beginning of 2009. As of April 2009, the GIRoA Poppy Eradication Force, with force protection provided by the CNIK, had eradicated twice as much poppy in 2009 than it did in the same period in 2008. However, total eradication of Poppy was down from 2007 due to weaker performance by Provincial Governor-led eradication (GLE) forces. USAID and associated Alternative Development efforts continued to show results. Nearly 20,000 poor farmers agreed to grow wheat and other crops in lieu of poppies in priority communities in Helmand Province.
Governance
The GIRoA is, and will for the foreseeable future continue to be, hampered by lack of capacity, resources, and interagency planning and coordination. Although steps have been taken to address institutional shortcomings, international donor support will be necessary for the foreseeable future to assist the GIRoA in meeting its domestic and international responsibilities. Government corruption saps the credibility of the institutions of governance and undermines Afghan and international efforts to build these institutions. Afghan ministries lack resources and are often permeated by corruption, entrenched bureaucracy, and weak management. Ministerial leadership in some Ministries has strengthened, but strong ministers have not been able to develop second- and third-tier leadership. Furthermore, strong and dynamic Ministers can obscure underlying organizational weaknesses. Domestic revenue remains very low and is failing to grow at the same rates as the government’s operating expenses. Securing cabinet-level support for increasing revenue collection will allow the government to assume greater responsibility for GIRoA operating costs may not be met unless GIRoA revenue collection and reverse the recent downward slide.
There have been small but notable examples of improvement in Afghan governance during the reporting period. Several laws intended to support economic growth have been passed in the country, both by the Afghan Parliament and by presidential decree. Several recently-appointed ministers (notably the Ministers of the Interior and of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock) have shown promise in instituting real reform in their respective ministries. Due to sustained capacity building, USAID is now able to provide up to $236 million over five years directly through the Ministry of Finance for expenditure and management by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). The Afghan Counter Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) continues to set an example for instituting the rule of law in Afghanistan. In April, the CNT convicted a significant heroin producer and trafficker.
On August 20, 2009 Afghanistan will elect a President for the second time in its history, employing an entirely Afghan-led process. The Independent Elections Commission (IEC) conducted a successful four-phase voter registration campaign in preparation for the 2009 Presidential elections. The campaign, intended to register only new voters, resulted in more than 4.6 million new registrations in 34 provinces38 percent of which were women. MoI, MoD, and ISAF provided security and registration proceeded with few incidents. As of April 2009, the international community has provided the security forces necessary for a secure election. However, there remain significant difficulties with planning, logistical coordination, funding, and resources for the election. Successful Presidential elections will depend on the continued engagement and participation of the international community. The United States will work closely with Afghanistan and its international partners to ensure a peaceful and credible election.
Human rights remain a serious issue in the country. The Shi’a Personal Status Law, signed by President Karzai in March 2009, would have required Shi’a women to have their husband’s permission to leave the house and would have legalized marital rape. After international outcry and strong domestic protest, President Karzai put the law under review to ensure that it is in line with the Afghan constitution and suspended its enforcement.
Reconstruction and Development U.S. efforts to improve economic conditions in Afghanistan continued throughout the reporting period. The Ring Road is now 78 percent complete. More than 90 percent of the Ring Road will be complete by early 2011. Road construction in Afghanistan has significantly decreased travel costs and time throughout much of the country. However, a lack of consistency in transit taxing among provinces and a lack of security have diminished the potential benefits of the highway.
Due to the continued efforts of the Afghan Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 82 percent of the Afghan population now has access to the MoPH’s Basic Package of Health Care Services, and 40,000 more Afghan infants are alive each year due to sustained reductions in infant and child mortality. Access to education continues to grow throughout the country, with more than 7 million enrolled in school on the March 22 opening day.
A report to international donors on implementation of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is due in June 2009. Political will and capacity within the GIRoA to fully implement the ANDS across all sectors have been inconsistent. Donor assistance has been limited and requires improved coordination. Of the $20 billion pledged at the June 2008 Paris donors conference, $7 billion was, in fact, previously-pledged assistance. The actual net gain at the Paris conference was approximately $13 billion.
In March 2009, the Afghan Parliament passed and President Karzai signed the Mortgage Law. The law is intended to encourage the development of the housing sector. In February 2009, President Karzai passed the Law on Negotiable Instruments by presidential decree. In March, the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament passed the Law on Secured Transactions for Moveable Property. At the time of this report, this law was in the Upper House of parliament for review. The GIRoA also amended its land-use law to support agriculture. These laws are designed to encourage private sector economic growth.
The United States is pursuing regional engagement and trade facilitation agreements to support economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At the time of this report, the U.S. Congress is considering a bill that would grant the President the authority to designate reconstruction opportunity zones (ROZs). The State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture plan to deploy over 400 additional civilian experts in support of governance and development initiatives over the next year.
Looking Ahead
As stated above, U.S. force levels will increase substantially in the coming months to help ensure the security for expanded economic and social initiatives in Afghanistan, particularly in the south of the country. The expanded force structure will also provide resources to accelerate training for the ANSF, and help to accelerate the transition of counterinsurgency efforts in the country to Afghan leadership.
The elections in August 2009 will bring about a period of increased risk to the country. Though adequate security forces for the elections have been provided, the United States will continue to work closely with the GIRoA, ISAF, and the international community to ensure that the necessary military, civilian, and financial resources are available and properly coordinated to support a free and fair election for the Afghan people.
A peaceful and democratic Pakistan is a critical partner to achieving U.S. goals in Afghanistan. The United States will work closely in the short- and long-term with the Government of Pakistan to help that country adequately secure its border areas and to deny internal safe havens to al-Qaida and other extremist organizations.
1 This third submission of the report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan covers the period between October 2008 and April 2009.
Access Full June 2009 Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan [PDF 4.29MB]
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