Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
January 2009
This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181). It includes a description of the comprehensive strategy of the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan. This report is the second in a series of reports required every 180 days through fiscal year 2010 and has been prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture. This assessment complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to the Congress; however, it is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Afghanistan. The information contained in this report is current as of August 29, 2008.
Executive Summary1
Against a backdrop of reinstated safe havens in Pakistan for al-Qaida, and increasing violence, the U.S. continues to work with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanstian (GIRoA) and our international partners towards building an Afghanistan that is 1) never again a safe haven for terrorists and is a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens. The U.S. continues to pursue a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign which utilizes the military, government, and economic expertise of the U.S. and the international community to diminish insurgent capacity, maintain security, and build the infrastructure and human capital necessary to achieve the Afghanistan envisioned in the strategic goals listed above. The current COIN strategy is often referred to as “clear, hold, and build.”
Security
The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated in several areas of the country since the last report. The spring and summer of 2008 saw the highest levels of violence since the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began their involvement in Afghanistan. Violence is concentrated in the south of the country (the historic heartland of the Taliban) and the east of the country, the area most vulnerable to cross-border activity from neighboring Pakistan. The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and has coalesced into a resilient and evolving insurgency. The insurgents are challenging the control of the GIRoA in areas of the south and the east, and increasingly in the west. Between January and December 10 2008, 132 U.S. personnel died as the result of hostile action, up from 82 in 2007. In 2007, 199 international personnel were killed. Between January and October of 2008 insurgent action resulted in the deaths of 265 coalition forces. Insurgent violence increased in the spring and summer of 2008 by 40 percent, most visibly in the form of asymmetric attacks as Afghan and international forces’ pressure forced the insurgents to shift the majority of their effort to targeting police and civilians, resulting in an increasing sense of personal insecurity among the populace. According to ISAF, insurgent-initiated attacks increased 33 percent for the whole of 2008. The 2008 ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) military campaign has caused setbacks to the Afghan insurgency, including leadership losses and the loss of some key safe havens in Afghanistan. Despite these setbacks, the insurgency has maintained and in some areas increased the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks and bombings. The increase in insurgent-initiated violence in Afghanistan relates directly to the perceived ineffectiveness of the government, the availability of safe havens in western Pakistan, and increased ISAF presence in former insurgent-controlled areas
Our COIN approach is effective in areas such as Regional Command (RC) – East where the U.S. and ISAF are able to concentrate sufficient forces (partnered with the ANSF), development resources, and civilian expertise. This successful COIN approach integrates military and civilian resources to create a stable and secure environment. In areas such as RC-South, where resources are not sufficiently concentrated, security cannot be established or maintained. In such areas the full military, governance, and economic spectrum of the COIN strategy cannot be implemented and the insurgents retain their hold on the local Afghan population2. The U.S. and our Allies are sharing lessons learned and best practices; however, the overall capacity of international and Afghan forces, along with other COIN resources, remains limited relative to that of the U.S.
Shortfalls in the ISAF Combined Joints Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) remain. Shortfalls limit the Allies’ capacity to fulfill all aspects of the COIN strategy. ISAF partners have, as of December 2008, provided only 42 OMLTs, out of an original requirement for 103. Further shortfalls remain for maneuver forces; rotary wing aircraft; airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms; airborne electronic warfare platforms; and two additional PRTs. Many ISAF troop-contributing countries maintain caveats on their forces in the field. The shortfalls and caveats hinder operational flexibility. The U.S. is planning the deployment of additional forces and pursuing efforts to encourage NATO Allies and the international community at large to also contribute more to the efforts in Afghanistan. The spring and summer saw some improvements in these areas; several countries announced new deployments of forces and reduced or removed caveats. ISAF currently stands at approximately 50,000 forces, of which approximately 13,000 are U.S. personnel. In November 2008, a U.S. Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force of approximately 1,000 Marines deployed as part of ISAF. In January 2009, a U.S. Army combat brigade of approximately 3.500 soldiers, the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, will deploy. Operation Enduring Freedom is a multinational force of approximately 19,000 forces, of which 18,000 are U.S. personnel.
On September 10, 2008, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved a proposal to expand the authorized end strength of the Afghan National Army (ANA) from 80,000 to 134,000 personnel (inclusive of an additional authorization for a 12,000 soldier trainee account). The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is scheduled to field the force of 134,000 not later than October 2013. The U.S. is examining ways to accelerate this timeline. ANA units continue to progress and to work closely with U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan. In 2007 the ANA led 45 percent of all operations. During the spring and summer of 2008 the ANA led over 60 percent of operations. As of December 2008, the ANA stood at approximately 79,000 soldiers, 52,000 of which were leading or engaged in operations side-by-side with ISAF forces. In the last report, only two ANA units were rated at Capability Milestone (CM) 1, in November 2008, there were 16 units rated at CM1. The ANA continues to demonstrate increasing competence, effectiveness, and professionalism. The five ANA Commando battalions, mentored and trained by U.S. Army Special Forces deployed in Afghanistan, are feared by the insurgents and respected by the Afghan people. In August 2008, the ANSF took over responsibility for security in the capital city of Kabul and will take charge of the Kabul Province in early 2009. However, a shortage of training and mentoring personnel is a challenge to the continued development of the ANA, particularly in the context of a larger force. As of November 2008, U.S. Embedded Training Teams required a total of 2,225 personnel. However, only 1,138 are currently assigned. As mentioned above, ISAF member countries have not provided the required number of OMLTs.
The Afghanistan National Police (ANP) is improving slowly but still lags behind the ANA in capability. The ANP is hampered by a lack of reform, corruption, a lack of trainers and advisors, and a lack of unity of effort among the international community. The Focused District Development (FDD) program is beginning to show results in improving district Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) units. In the fall and winter of 2008-2009, CSTC-A will implement new initiatives that will boost the capability of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Afghan Border Police (ABP). However, the current lack of police mentor teams, force protection for these teams, and police training infrastructure, coupled with a large number of districts make this police reform and training strategy a five-year program. Full PMT manning requires 2,375 total U.S. military personnel. As of November 2008, 886 personnel were assigned. Thirty-one of the total 365 police districts have been trained via the FDD program since its inception at the end of 2007. Districts undergoing FDD are concentrated in the east and south, near the Ring Road. In April 2008, there were no ANP units rated at CM1; as of November 2008, there were 18 ANP units rated at CM1. CM1-rated ANP units include district-level Afghan Uniformed Police units, which have between 50 and 200 police officers depending on size of the district and threat level, and Afghan National Civil Order Police units, which have between 200 and 300 police officers, depending on the type of mission. As of November 2008 there were over 75,000 assigned ANP. Currently, the focus is on developing capacity in assigned police forces. When sufficient progress has been made in building assigned capacity, the GIRoA and the international community will assess the security requirements of the country to determine what the final end-strength of the ANP will be.
The August 2008 Shindand incident in Helmand province, in which 33 civilians were killed by an air strike to defend U.S. ground forces under fire from the Taliban, has resulted in a change in operating procedures to prevent civilian casualties whenever possible and to mitigate the impact of such incidents when they do occur. Revised tactical procedures put the ANSF in front of all combined ISAF operations, put restrictions on any uninvited entry into Afghan homes, and restrict unobserved indirect fire except in cases of self-defense. In the event of alleged civilian casualties, U.S. and international forces will investigate the allegations in collaboration with Afghan authorities, acknowledge the casualties, take responsibility, apologize, and pay compensation to relatives of the deceased.
Narcotics remain a significant challenge for Afghanistan and the international community. The flourishing narcotics trade erodes the legitimacy of the GIRoA and provides financial means to the insurgency. Widespread poppy cultivation in the country calls into question the GIRoA’s resolve in tackling this criminal behavior. Afghanistan supplied 93 percent of the world’s opium in 2007, but uneven progress in reducing the amount of opium produced has been made in 2008. According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC), the total area under poppy cultivation fell by 19 percent compared to 2007, though some of this decrease may be attributable to drought conditions in much of the country. Eighteen out of 34 provinces are poppy-free, with 98 percent of the cultivation occurring in seven provinces in the south and west of the country. The province of Helmand alone accounts for 66 percent of cultivation.
The battle against drug traffickers is ongoing, and will be for some time. In conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoI, the U.S. has assisted the fielding of a new counternarcotics (CN) infantry kandak (CNIK) to provide force protection for CN activities. Between January and September 2008, the GIRoA seized approximately 61,500 kg of opium, 944 kg of heroin and 265,326 kg of hashish. As cultivation moves to less secure areas in the south of the country, eradication and other CN efforts will become more hazardous. Security incidents related to eradication efforts resulted in the death of 78 people in 2008, up from 19 in 2007. The international forces present in the country provide operational support to the GIRoA in fighting the narcotics trade. At the NATO Defense Ministerial in October 2008, it was agreed that ISAF, with the GIRoA in the lead, can take a more active role in combating drug producers and traffickers.
Governance
The GIRoA is one of the weakest governments in the world. It is hampered by pervasive corruption and a lack of sufficient leadership and human capital. Afghan Ministries lack resources and are all too often permeated by corruption, entrenched bureaucracy, and weak leadership. The lack of educated staff with experience in project management constrains the ministries’ abilities to implement plans and deliver public services at all levels. Donor assistance to Afghan ministries provides invaluable support in delivering public services but inhibits the development of indigenous ministry staff. However, bright spots such as the Ministry of Public Health, the Minstry of Finance (MoF), and the Minstry of Education serve as models for the direction in which other Ministries need to go.
Afghan courts suffer from corruption, a lack of trained judges, a lack of competent staff and a lack of resources. Security is another key issue for the Justice system in Afghanistan. In September 2008 the Chief Judge of the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT), a national level narcotics court, was murdered. The U.S. continues to support the judicial system in Afghanistan by training judges and staff, providing material support, and educating the Afghan populace as to its rights under the constitution. Progress has been made in the Afghan Courts. From January to June 2008, the CNT ruled on 125 cases, finding a total of 151 people guilty and acquitting 52. The Appeals court ruled on 118 cases, finding 160 people guilty and acquitting 29. In June 2008, the National Justice Program, the strategy to build Afghanistan’s Judicial System, was approved by the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), and the Supreme Court.
To date, the U.S. has built or renovated 40 provincial courthouses, trained 744 sitting judges, and published all the laws passed in Afghanistan since 1964 in both Dari and Pashto and made them widely available. In July 2008, the Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism, a sub national justice sector-effort coordinating body, became operational. U.S. assistance to the Justice sector has gradually grown over the years, with an FY2007 budget of $67.35 million ($55 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding and $12.35 million in USAID funding) and an FY2008 budget of $92 million ($68 million in INCLE funding and $24 million in USAID funding). This level of funding, not including the substantial contributions made by DoD to establishing the rule of law, makes the U.S. the largest donor to the Afghan justice sector.
The National Assembly is an increasingly independent legislative body. In September 2008, the Assembly overturned a Presidential veto for the first time. Unfortunately, the veto was overturned in passing a law that could restrict media rights in the country. In June 2008, a delegation of National Assembly members and Afghan Ministry representatives visited Washington, D.C. The delegation met with counterparts in the U.S. Congress and executive branch departments and was able to sit in on Department of Defense (DoD) testimony to the House Appropriations committee.
Corruption remains a problem in Afghanistan and corrodes the GIRoA’s legitimacy. Between April and September, 2008, the Afghan government announced measures to fight corruption. Following the recommendations of a high-level government commission, two new anti-corruption entities were established, the High Office of Oversight, an independent oversight unit, and a special anti-corruption investigative unit within the Office of the Attorney General. The National Assembly also passed a new law on monitoring and corruption. However, public corruption remains pervasive in Afghanistan and the GIRoA is widely viewed as extremely corrupt among the Afghan populace. Furthermore, this corruption undermines international reconstruction and development efforts.
Afghanistan’s human rights record remains poor and human rights abuses continue. Most abuse is committed by the insurgents but under-trained and inexperienced government elements have also committed abuses. Insurgents often attack international and Afghan forces from within populated villages or towns, increasing the potential for civilian casualties. A recent law passed by the National Assembly, mentioned above, could potentially restrict media freedom. In January 2008, a student journalist was sentenced to death for distributing printed materials related to the treatment of women under Islam. In October 2008 his appeal was adjudicated and his death sentence was commuted to 20 years imprisonment. An appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. When efforts are made to integrate women into public life by U.S. or international programs, they tend to be marginalized after foreigners leave. Improving human rights in Afghanistan remains a focus for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Through education programs and leadership engagement, U.S. officials stress the importance of human rights to Afghan officials and to the population at large.
Reconstruction and Development
Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. GIRoA estimates put unemployment rates at 40 percent with over 50 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Between 2007 and 2008, real economic growth reached an estimated 11 percent. However between 2008 and 2009 growth is expected to slow to just over seven percent. Afghanistan continues to have one of the world's lowest domestic revenue to GDP ratios, at about 7 percent of GDP (compared to 20 percent of GDP in similar low-income countries). While the GIRoA has increased its revenue collection, it cannot keep pace with increased expenditures, largely driven by security sector costs, civil servant wage increases, and subsidies for more expensive food and fuel. It is estimated that the GIRoA will cover less than 20 percent of its total recurrent expenditures, including core and external budgets, in fiscal year (FY) 2009. Inflation is high by historical standards at more than 30 percent year-on-year, attributed almost entirely to the international increase in food prices.
The GIRoA, the U.S., and the international community continue to work together towards achieving the reconstruction and development goals set forth in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS contains the strategy, with benchmarks, by which the Afghan people and the GIRoA, with the support of the international community, will address the major challenges facing the country. In June 2008, representatives from over 80 countries attended the International Conference in Support of Afghanistan in Paris and pledged over $20 billion in support to Afghanistan and the ANDS. The U.S. alone pledged over $10 billion. In comparison, attendees at the 2006 London support conference, at which representatives of the international community established the Afghanistan Compact, which set out the guidelines general and objectives of the ANDS, pledged $10 billion in total. The Afghan-led ANDS office is responsible for measuring progress towards ANDS benchmarks. The ANDS office is still developing robust procedures for measuring progress towards meeting the benchmarks. In general, slow progress is being made, with more progress in some areas than in others. For example, there has been significant progress in developing the ANA, but little progress in fighting corruption. The MoF is responsible for tracking international community assistance pledged and dispersed to Afghanistan. However, there is currently no reliable data on the total amount of international assistance that has been pledged or dispersed to the country. Since 2001, the U.S. has pledged over $32 billion and dispersed approximately $22 billion.
Afghanistan faces formidable challenges to macroeconomic growth and stability, including limited government revenue, dependence on foreign aid, inflation, and limited access to credit for most Afghans. Political will to address these issues through sound economic policymaking and structural reform has been lacking within the GIRoA. To support the ANDS and the Reconstruction and Development lines of operation of the overall COIN strategy, the U.S. will concentrate on encouraging senior GIRoA officials to embrace free market economic policies, take measures to enhance government resources, address inflation, and implement structural reforms. U.S. and international community efforts are intended to encourage the Afghan government to move towards a sustainable fiscal policy capable of generating revenue, managing resources, and operating without foreign financial support.
In 2008, global economic and climatic conditions severely strained Afghanistan’s food supply. Worldwide demand pushed prices for wheat to record highs while a drought pushed Afghan production of wheat to its lowest level since 2000. For the 2008-2009 growing season, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) forecasts wheat production in Afghanistan at 1.5 million tons, the same amount produced in 2000, down 2.3 million tons (60 percent) from last year. Swift response by the U.S. and the international community prevented what would have been a humanitarian crisis. In July 2008, the United Nations made a request for 200,000 metric tons (mt) of wheat. By October the U.S. alone had supplied 155,000 mt of wheat. Since October 2007, the U.S. Government has contributed 192,000 mt of food and commodities worth $205 million to improve food security in Afghanistan. USAID is planning on shipping a further 50,000 mt of food aid in FY2009.
Progress has been made in the energy, transport, communication, health, and education sectors. At the end of August, 2008 a coalition-led operation hauled an electricity generation turbine over 100 miles to the USAID Kajaki dam project in Helmand. When installed, the new turbine will increase the generation capacity of the dam by 50 percent and eventually provide electricity to over two million Afghans. As of September 2008, USAID had constructed or rehabilitated over 2,700 kilometers (km) of road and the international community as a whole has constructed or rebuilt 73 percent of the Ring Road, reducing transport time and costs and increasing the mobility of security forces. However, the Taliban are increasingly targeting the Ring Road, attacking bridges and setting up checkpoints at which they rob and kidnap or kill Afghans whom are seen to be collaborating with the GIRoA and international forces. The Chinese won a competitive bid to develop the Aynak copper field. To support the mining operation, the Chinese government has said that it will install a significant amount of infrastructure that will benefit the region as whole, including power generation and transport infrastructure. The GIRoA estimates that the Aynak development will produce 10,000 new jobs and over $400 million in government revenue per year. Communications in Afghanistan have grown significantly. As of November 2008, over 6.5 million Afghans had cellular telephones. There were no domestic cellular services under the Taliban. Today there are over 45,000 phone lines installed, up from only 15,000 in 2001.The Ministry of Communications and Information Technology has issued four mobile telephone service and 18 internet service provider licenses. These licenses bring the GIRoA a significant amount of much-needed revenue.
More than 80 percent of the Afghanistan population has access to basic healthcare, reducing morbidity and mortality rates, and USAID has built or rehabilitated 670 clinics throughout the country and trained over 10,000 healthcare workers. In 2008, more than six million children attended school in Afghanistan, including almost 2 million girls.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) continue to assist the GIRoA to extend its authority in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts. The U.S. leads 12 PRTs, located in Parwan/Kapisa, Panjshir, Nuristan, Konar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Khowst, Paktya, Paktika, Ghazni, Zabol, and Farah. PRT funding in FY2008 from DoD, USAID, and international contributions was $273 million. Additional Commanders Emergency Response Program funds were $642,000.
Looking Ahead
Building a fully competent and independent Afghan government will be a lengthy process that will last, at a minimum, decades. Throughout this process, as the competence of the GIRoA grows, the U.S. and the international community will turn over responsibility for securing and building Afghanistan to the Afghans themselves. International and Afghan security forces will increasingly share information and the Afghans will take the lead in planning and executing more operations. Security responsibilities will increasingly fall to the ANA and the ANP. Reconstruction and development activities will fall to GIRoA ministries.
The U.S. commitment to Afghanistan is strong. In September, President Bush announced the deployment of additional U.S. forces. As of December 2008, the U.S. is undertaking a comprehensive assessment of our strategy in Afghanistan to ensure that our efforts there have effective leadership, planning, resources, and execution. It is of vital national interest to never again allow the country to become a safe haven for terrorists and to promote stability in an increasingly volatile region. Success will never be achieved through military means alone, but rather through a comprehensive approach involving all elements of U.S. and international military, diplomatic, and economic power. Where the U.S. and its Allies robustly resource COIN efforts, real progress is being made. Above all, achieving our strategic goals in Afghanistan will require a sustained effort to develop the capacity of the Afghans themselves.
1 This second submission of the Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan principally covers the period between April and September of 2008. Whenever possible, more current information has been included. The April-August "fighting season" typically includes the year's highest levels of insurgent activity; an increase in reconstruction and development and governance extension efforts; and the opium harvest and subsequent trafficking operations.
2 An exception in RC-South is Oruzgan Province, where Dutch forces have had significant success in implementing the COIN strategy.
Access Full January 2009 Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan [PDF 3.9MB]
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