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Military

Initial United States Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment

Annex A: Military Plans

Background

ISAF CJ5, Plans and Strategy, conducted an analysis of the current campaign plan1, supporting plans, and orders to determine whether the strategy and means provided are adequate to accomplish the desired endstate. Many elements...REDACTION...are deemed to be adequate; however, there are gaps in the operational design.

Scope

A multidisciplinary Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG) was formed to conduct a thorough assessment of the ISAF counterinsurgency campaign strategy. The JOPG conducted a detailed analysis of both the ISAF OPLAN2 and OPORD3. Previous versions of these orders were also analyzed to ascertain the rationale for successive versions. Analysis was also conducted...REDACTION...to confirm that the ISAF OPLAN and OPORD followed the guiding principles contained in the higher headquarters frameworks. The JOPG also reviewed the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the UNAMA mandate. Other documents were also consulted and analyzed, including the draft U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. These efforts were complemented by an analysis of the seasonal, agricultural, and narcotic cycles as they relate to the historic operational cycle of insurgent forces to ensure that the subsequent recommendations were situated within a real world timeline. There was significant linkage to three other work efforts being conducted under the Initial Assessment:

  1. The "Troops to Task" Working Group determining the resource requirements and allocation of forces and capabilities.
  2. The Initial Assessment Working Group tasked with examining the overarching strategy.
  3. The ANSF Expansion Working Group tasked with determining the feasibility for rapid growth of GIRoA security capacity.

Key Findings

a. REDACTION...This OPLAN explicitly states that it serves as the campaign plan for ISAF. Contained within this OPLAN is a clear mission and intent, supported by four Lines of Operation (LoO): Security (lead responsibility), Governance (supporting effort), Development (supporting effort), and Strategic Communications (supporting effort). Associated with these LoO are ten effects. These effects are broadly phrased and are not linked with Decisive Points (DP)/Decisive Conditions (DC). This missing element of operational design is crucial, as it should be used to generate associated actions (tasks and purposes) for the OPORD. Similarly, Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)/Measures of Performance (MOP) should inform assessments, demonstrating progress along the various LoO. Without this linkage, it is exceptionally difficult to provide accurate advice to the commander to inform optimal decisions on forces, resources, and tasks to continue on the projected path to achieve the desired endstate.

b. REDACTION... The OPORD contains much detail but does not explicitly link the Regional Commands (RC) operations under a coherent, single, nationwide strategy. This is one of the critical deficiencies of the existing OPORD. The following observations are provided:

    i. The mission and intent contained in the OPORD are broadly phrased, covering all lines of operation contained in the OPLAN, but it provides insufficient guidance for Regional Commanders to achieve unity of effort.

    ii. The Shape/Clear/Hold/Build construct REDACTION... provides the rudimentary elements of an operational framework that forms the basis for the tasks contained in the OPORD.

    iii. The OPORD is exceptionally detailed and complex. Within the Main Body alone, 47 tasks are directed toward the Regional Commands and ISAF Special Operations Forces (SOF). There are an additional 50 tasks found throughout the OPORD annexes. There is no clear prioritization of the tasks within the OPORD.

c. OPLAN and OPORD Development. Analysis of the successive versions of ...REDACTION...the OPORD indicate that each refinement sought to generate increased synchronization and clarity of tasks. The various staffs that generated these modifications were attempting to refine inherited products to produce improved linkages. Viewed independently, both the OPLAN and the OPORD are good products; however, the linkage from higher strategy down to specific tasks remains tenuous. Specifically, prioritization and synchronization have become unclear. Substance exists in both the OPLAN and the OPORD, however they are now overly complex, necessitating revision and alignment.

d. Prioritization. The lack of clear prioritization of tasks in the OPORD has allowed each of the five subordinate RCs to develop OPORDs with a slightly different emphasis. Some flexibility appears to be a key part of the OPORD design, allowing for sufficient variance between RCs to align toward the specific threats faced in their region. While minor variations were anticipated, a deeper examination shows a lack of coherence within the Security LoO between RCs. The OPORD allows RCs to determine their prioritization and focus within this "lead effort" LoO, with emphasis on protecting the population, growing security capacity, and/or combating insurgents (or other Enemies of Afghanistan). The diversity of Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) further increases variance and differences of interpretation across the force. The multiplicity of priorities (e.g. Focus Areas, Action Districts, Priority Action Districts, and Focused District Development) seemingly makes "everything" important.

e. Synchronization. Although the OPORD attempts to generate synchronization, the variation in interpretation and prioritization of effort hinders development of the necessary synergy. Synchronization across the theater should provide a greater opportunity for the generation of collective effects across all LoO, but is not currently achieved. The lack of prioritization makes synchronization exceptionally difficult. f. Assessments. The campaign assessment construct uses a methodology to measure effectiveness of operations along the LoO described in the OPLAN. The current assessment provides a broad measure of progress that requires substantial interpretation to determine interrelationships among the various aspects within the LoO. The current campaign design does not utilize decisive points or milestones within the broad effects; accordingly, it is difficult to assess progress along a LoO. This does not assist the Commander in evaluating where changes in strategy or main effort may be required.

g. Supporting Plans and Annexes.

    i. Counternarcotics (CN). It is clear that CN efforts were not fully integrated into the counterinsurgency campaign; efforts were collaborative but not centrally coordinated. Substantial intelligence points directly at the Afghanistan narcotics industry as a significant economic enabler for the insurgency. The ISAF mandate, with its clear security focus and individual TCN caveats, coupled with the ubiquitous nature of the narcotics problem, clearly limited CN efforts by ISAF forces. CN engagement has increased significantly since the Budapest Summit which called upon NATO and TCN to grant sufficient legal authority to increase ISAF assistance to GIRoA to execute the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy. With the clarification of legal authorities, Annex RR - Counter Narcotics was integrated ...REDACTION. The RCs are currently developing supporting plans to address the 2010 opium poppy season. Though CN efforts are improving, they must be fully integrated into the overall plan.

    ii. ISAF and ANSF Partnering and Mentoring. Partnering continues to evolve. Efforts to formalize the partnership between ISAF and ANSF can be traced to June 2008. It took until Nov 2008 to develop the framework for the plan and issue the fragmentary order4 (FRAGO) directing this effort. The FRAGO sought to create a baseline for both partnering operations and reporting requirements; RCs continue to progress toward the objectives described in the FRAGO, however they are hampered by the lack of clarity expressed in the operational design.

h. Operational Environment. Elements of the operational environment dictate the operational cycle of the insurgency. It is critical to consider the seasonal, agricultural, and narcotic cycles, as well as the religious calendar and external events like Pakistani military operations in the border area, in order to refine the campaign design. Traditionally, insurgents have used the winter months to reorganize and prepare for the "fighting" season which coincides with improving weather. Generally, ISAF forces have matched the insurgent's operational cycle each year. Without a significant change, ISAF will remain in consonance with this cycle. This winter, there is an opportunity to break our inadvertent operational synchronicity with the insurgents. The new operational design must be linked to 'real world' event cycles rather than being considered in abstract and place greater emphasis on non- kinetic operations, noting that the insurgency remains active within the population even when kinetic operations are greatly reduced during the winter.

i. Command Relationships. Although indirectly related to the analysis of the campaign design, command relationships are a key element to synchronization of efforts under the lines of operation provided in the ISAF OPORD and OPLAN. Within campaign design, the link between operational design and operational management is provided by operational command; accordingly a review of operational plans should also consider the relevant command relationships. The ISAF upper command and control arrangements are undergoing restructuring concurrently with the Initial Assessment. Clarification of the relationship between the evolving Four Star ISAF HQ and the new, Three Star ISAF Joint Command (IJC) will assist significantly in the synchronization of efforts across the campaign. The transition of CSTC-A/DATES to NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A) in the same timeframe as the formation of the IJC brings an opportunity to achieve a fully coordinated new operational level command structure with associated realignment of subordinate elements (e.g. Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and Embedded Training Teams (ETTs). Realignment of these relationships necessitates an operational design that considers the new command lines provided to COMISAF. Efficient command and control alignment will enhance execution of the revised operational design.

Recommendations

a. OPLAN 38302. Retain major elements of the OPLAN as the base document that frames the ISAF Campaign Plan. The document is sufficient to complement the efforts of external agencies (e.g. GIRoA and UNAMA) along the supporting LoO of Governance and Development. Significant change may be counterproductive in the short term; specifically, the Comprehensive and Integrated Approach described in Annex W of the OPLAN is procedurally understood by critical stakeholders. The OPLAN provides the framework for the "lead effort" Security LoO to guide development of the operational design. Within the OPLAN framework, the operational design should be revised substantially to provide the benchmarks of progress to guide prioritization and synchronization of subordinate efforts.

b. Revise the OPORD. Given both the refined command relationships and anticipated direction to develop an operational design, the OPORD will require substantial revision to prioritize and synchronize the efforts across all COMISAF subordinates. The current OPORD contains elements that can be prioritized and synchronized in the short term through fragmentary orders until a new OPORD is developed and published.

c. Command Relationships. The development of the operational design must incorporate the anticipated command relationships under which the order will be executed.

d. Resourcing. Use the refined operational design as the basis to request additional resource capabilities that generate overmatch of insurgent forces prior to the historical operational tempo increase of insurgent operations.


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