Chapter Eleven

The PLA and the Taiwan Issue

Cynthia A. Watson

One crucial aspect of this analysis is that all concerned parties-the PLA, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and decisionmakers in Taiwan and Washington--will be heavily affected by personal and corporate perceptions--their beliefs about a relationship, an issue, or an event. In each case, the perception may be skewed or imprecise.

Not only are those perceptions often unclear, but also, with the recent narrowing of military-to-military contacts with the United States, PLA leadership views on an array of issues are less obvious than would be desirable to answer the questions authoritatively about the future. Complicating the resolution of different views is the lack of direct links between Taiwan and the PLA and the limited number between the U.S. military and its Chinese counterparts. This leads to decisionmaking problems, some with potentially catastrophic effects. As Taiwanese officers noted in May 2001, no mechanisms currently exist between Beijing and Taipei to cope with a crisis similar to the EP-3 incident of April 1, 2001.

The PLA as Party-Army

The PLA role does not fit the traditional Western definition in which the civil-military relationship is expected to be nonpartisan. The PLA, with its unique responsibility to protect the party rather than the state per se, thus views threats to the party and its ability to maintain power as taking precedence over more traditional security threats. The PLA sees its mission as protecting not only the physical aspects of China's territory and people but also party legitimacy.

If CCP legitimacy requires a particular supporting action, then the PLA as a party-army would execute that action as part of its core values. Defense of the CCP is as much a part of PLA patriotic spirit as marching against an enemy or preparing a ship for extended deployment. Loyalty to the CCP does not mean the PLA is not thoroughly imbued with a sense of patriotism and nationalism; it is and will continue to reach the Chinese people through various methods.

Further complicating the party-army relationship are changes in the PLA resulting from its professionalization. A more professional PLA may in fact be more nationalistic than any predecessor party-army because professional militaries have a far more acute sense of need to defend the nation than a civilian political party.¹ A more professional military also might be less personality-based and more concerned with national values.

This phenomenon also might create difficulties as the party-army attempts to keep its roots with the people while reaching toward more grandiose national goals--including modernization of its organization and armaments, a process potentially at odds with other goals in the hierarchy of national modernization goals.

Crucial to the leadership transition is the continuity in China's governance that the PLA represents. The CCP is concerned that protecting its power will increase in importance as subsequent generations of civilians, with no PLA background (hence having less credibility on military matters, particular with an increasingly professional military), continue to lead the country. Jiang Zemin is the first of these purely civilian leaders, in contrast to leaders who were seasoned military veterans, such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping.

The issue of protecting party interests versus enforcing Chinese territorial integrity would almost certainly create rifts within the leadership, but CCP legitimacy demands sovereignty over claimed territory, especially Taiwan. Furthermore, as Ellis Joffe has pointed out, the PLA can be increasingly professional while still remaining loyal to the CCP. It may be that the PLA now sees its interests as sufficiently defined independently of the CCP as to merit actions when those military interests are under attack. Professionalism, in short, may have unexpected consequences.²

The CCP view of the party-army will be just as important as the latter's view of the CCP. The lack of military experience among top civilians is also likely to influence their feelings about the PLA role and national aspirations.

The Taiwan Reunification Issue

Many senior Chinese leaders view Taiwan's status as the final, unresolved issue of the Chinese civil war (1927-1949) or even of the Century of Humiliation (1842-1949, marked by Japan's colonization of Taiwan from 1895 through 1945). They are concerned that historic Chinese territory remains outside national control. Additionally, eventual reunification is further shadowed by the possibility that the United States will not accede to Taiwan rejoining the mainland.

As a party-army, however, the PLA undoubtedly shares the view with the Chinese public and the party that the reunification of Taiwan is more important than domestic economic growth and development. In the words of a senior Academy of Military Science officer who visited Washington in 2000, Beijing would sacrifice economic growth to make sure Taiwan remained part of China. He said that China knew it might experience economic sanctions and significant disruption to current economic growth if war broke out over Taiwan, but his assessment was blunt: China would sacrifice mightily to maintain its national sovereignty.³

To summarize, the CCP might have to make some hard choices about retaining power. The choice might come down to keeping Taiwan through forced reunification or pushing economic development to keep the population on the same trajectory toward an improved standard of living. In that event, the PLA appears willing to sacrifice the living standard for national integrity. This decision would be consistent with both the thought of other militaries around the world and the PLA commitment to defending the party, with the latter believing its continued rule is necessary to maintain Chinese national integrity.

Taiwan will remain the major territorial issue for Beijing in part because of its psychological impact on Chinese policymakers. The concern about reunifying China carries with it important psychological baggage that could drive Beijing to make strategic decisions in ways difficult for foreign observers to anticipate. If foreign observers believe that September 11, 2001, had unexpected consequences on the United States and its reactions to terrorism, various steps toward Taiwan's independence could provoke similar reactions that outsiders might not see in advance.

It bears noting as well that the PLA might react differently to various steps along the continuum toward complete Taiwanese independence. An outright, formal declaration of independence probably would be the threshold at which the PLA would find Taiwan's actions intolerable. More modest steps might also provoke a reaction, but that PLA response would be conditioned by a raft of domestic PRC conditions as well, including reactions to and comfort with the new CCP leadership.

Finally, the PLA might want to consider the international context, regardless of statements to the contrary, before responding to any Taiwanese moves toward independence. Issues that might raise caution within the PLA would include Washington's particular level of interest in other events in Pakistan, Central Asia, or the overall war on terrorism. While these issues would not necessarily stop the PLA from acting to defend its national interests, any one of them might give pause. The PLA may believe Washington's concerns currently are directed toward the war on terrorism, but its focus could shift back to Taiwan with enough PLA saber rattling or overt actions.

The Strategic Equation

Mainland observers increasingly seem to believe time is on Beijing's side--and that Taiwan is reaching the same conclusion. Several factors fuel this assumption, including the significant economic slump that hit Taiwan's economy in 2000-2001. Some are discussing this economic recession in exaggerated terms, as if it were a full-fledged depression. It is a reflection of the problems that East Asian systems have faced in meeting natural economic cycles and does not resemble the unrealistic growth patterns that characterized much of the period between 1975 and 1997. Some polls have indicated increased favorable views toward reunification among Taiwan citizens as a result of the island's economic problems.⁴

A second reason for Beijing's growing self-assurance is PLA confidence in its military modernization program. Some in the PRC who hear Bush administration concerns about U.S. ability to defend Taiwan in the face of a Chinese attack are bound to feel emboldened by knowledge that PLA capability is growing. This is where Chinese parochialism can play a dangerous role: PLA members who have not traveled widely may be unaware of the serious gaps still existing between U.S. and PLA forces. Without grasping these disparities, some PLA officers think their military capable of launching attacks that would achieve reunification with Taiwan-albeit with significant casualties. While PLA capabilities are improving, particularly relative to those elsewhere in East Asia, they are not on a par with the United States and would be stretched significantly to counter any likely U.S. reaction to a military attempt to reunify Taiwan with the PRC.

Another reason for growing PLA confidence about Taiwan may be the reality that faced the Bush administration in October 2001, as it chose a coalition-building approach to countering terrorism. As an important participant in coalition building, China has taken on a new, more positive role in the U.S. calculus and finds its position enhanced. The administration is gradually easing off the post-April 2001 restrictions on interaction with the PLA (although the relationship remains far more constrained than during the Clinton administration).⁵

The PLA and CCP are likely to interpret this loosening of restrictions as a return to more normal relations, highlighted by China's role in the coalition and its presumed global leadership. Beijing may view PLA leverage on U.S. actions as increasing, with reduced U.S. focus on Taiwan as a quid pro quo for support against terrorism.⁶ President George W. Bush made clear during his visit to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Shanghai in October 2001 that there was no quid pro quo for Taiwan, but perceptions to the contrary are likely to persist, both in Taipei and Beijing.

Additionally, the Bush administration, for all of its initial criticism of Beijing and support for Taiwan, is likely to adopt the same relatively benign policies with the PRC and PLA as have prior U.S. administrations.⁷ The Bush administration chose not to sell Taiwan Aegis-equipped Arleigh Burke destroyers in April 2001, to Taiwan's chagrin and Beijing's approval. It did, however, agree to sell diesel submarines, even though no obvious source for constructing these submarines has emerged.

While the overall arms sales decision irritated both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the overarching impression may be that the Bush administration will not greatly up the ante in the arms that it offers Taiwan. The PLA certainly understands that the United States could have sold Taiwan more objectionable arms; the PLA must be pleased and may interpret this as a strengthening of its hand in the region. This turn of events may have been different from what Beijing anticipated, but the evidence indicates that Beijing is more important to the United States than is Taiwan.

Finally, the PLA may view its modernization as a direct threat to Washington, hence promoting an anti-China U.S. strategy. With this interpretation, the PLA could see the United States doing whatever it can to keep China in a subservient position. This might include encouraging Taiwan to seek formal independence as a manner of handicapping the PRC, instead of allowing the country to return to its natural boundaries and nationhood. If Taiwan took on that strategic a position for PLA strategists, the need to unify the country and follow a comprehensive path toward national modernization would be crucial.

Conclusions

Increasing PLA professionalism makes it less likely to swing violently among domestic factions but makes its desire to protect the Chinese national entity more likely. The lack of ties with the PLA by the new generation of leaders may be crucial. It could mean more leverage by the PLA, as well as much greater tension about its party-army character.

Taiwan is merely a portion of this story: equally important is the PLA role in responding to growing social tensions caused by World Trade Organization membership and attendant state-owned enterprise reform. The People's Armed Police should be expected to maintain civil order, but questions about their competency and attendant political nuances abound. Whether the PLA has to respond to a declaration of independence by Taiwan or a riot in the streets of Lanzhou, its ability to succeed is important to itsýprestige at home and abroad as well as to its internal prioritization of responsibilities. This emphasizes PLA importance in the domestic political environment and the cycle of questions about leadership, transition, loyalty, and professionalism that are tied to Taiwan and issues of social stability.

PLA links to the CCP are a crucial element in the Taiwan question. If the party finds it necessary to retake Taiwan through military means, the PLA will respond accordingly. If tensions develop over reunifying with Taiwan versus protecting economic achievements of the past two decades, the PLA will again likely choose the historical responsibility of keeping Taiwan part of China. The PLA is much more confident today of its abilities than in the past and may be more assertive in the forthcoming post-transition period, since it represents continuity as a major organ of state and party. Its perception of its abilities, rights, responsibilities, and challenges will play a significant part in future Chinese actions.

Notes

 ¹There is a rich literature on civil-military relations and sovereignty/nationalism concepts that far outstretches the scope of this essay. [BACK]

 ²Email discussion with Ellis Joffe, October 23, 2001. [BACK]

 ³Academy of Military delegation member, August 25, 2000, Washington, DC. [BACK]

 ⁴Based on May 2001 discussions in Taiwan. [BACK]

 ⁵Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld apparently personally made all decisions on the interactions between DOD personnel and the PLA in the aftermath of the EP-3 collision in April 2001, according to Michael Gordon of The New York Times. The Secretary has made no bones about his concerns regarding growing Chinese military threats; hence, the interactions were drastically curtailed. By fall 2001, the interactions appeared gradually to be resuming, coincident to the APEC summit in Shanghai, if nothing else. One other anecdotal indication that things are easing was that students from the National Defense University, along with many other visitors, were prohibited from scheduled visits to China in spring 2001 but an active-duty naval officer was authorized to attend a course in Beijing by October. [BACK]

 ⁶China, of course, has its own concerns about terrorism and is quite happy to see the United States adopt positions that validate Beijing's concerns about the Hui problem that periodically pops up across the country, but is a sustained separatist concern in Xinxiang. [BACK]

 ⁷James Mann, About Face (New York: Knopf, 1999), and Patrick Tyler, A Great Wall (New York: Basic Books, 1999), both argue strongly that the desire to enhance U.S. business interests' entrance into the burgeoning Chinese market overwhelms campaign rhetoric and other concerns. The case for Bush being any different from predecessors is not as straightforward as originally thought. First, President Bush gave an impassioned interview in late April 2001 with the Cable News Network in which he seemed to go well beyond the legal requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), the only law actually on the books about U.S. defense commitments to the island. Having said that, however, recall that President George H.W. Bush took a fairly gentle approach to the PRC in the aftermath of Tiananmen. Further, to Taiwan's consternation, the younger Bush merely authorized the sale of Kidd-class destroyers, not the requested Aegis-equipped ships, in the April 2001 arms negotiations. In light of Secretary Rumsfeld's clear concerns about growing PLA capability and perceived weaker U.S. ability to defend Taiwan, this does not bode well for Taiwan. In sum, the record on how the administration will behave in relation to Beijing is far from obvious. [BACK]