Chapter Seven

The PLA Navy and "Active Defense"

Bernard D. Cole

This chapter addresses Beijing's view of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), focusing on Chinese concepts of how the navy may be employed. These concepts are active defense, offshore, the use of island chains as strategic delineators, and blue water navy as a force describer. The PLAN ability to fulfill the missions implied by these terms is then evaluated.

China is obviously expanding and modernizing its naval capabilities. This is unsurprising in terms of classic maritime strategy, given the nation's offshore territorial disputes, concentration of economic growth in its coastal regions, and increasing dependence on extended sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Chinese Maritime Strategy

PLAN officers have studied classic maritime strategists since the 1950s, including Alfred Thayer Mahan, but current Chinese maritime strategy is usually credited directly or indirectly to General Liu Huaqing, PLAN head from 1982 to 1987 and Central Military Commission vice chairman from 1988 to 1997. Most notably, he called for expanding the navy's operations from coastal defense to offshore active defense.

Liu reportedly expressed this concept in terms of a three-stage naval development process, applied to two strategic maritime areas of vital concern to the nation. The first island chain encompasses the first of these, usually described as a line through the Kurile Islands, Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Borneo to Natuna Besar).¹

No national security goal is more important to China than the reunification of Taiwan, however, and a more reasonable definition of the first island chain would extend it well east of that island, perhaps to a point 200 nautical miles (nm) from the mainland.² This first island chain area encompasses the Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the western East China Sea; and the South China Sea, extending deep into Southeast Asia. It addresses many of China's maritime national interests: the concentration of economic investment along the coast, offshore territorial claims, oceanic resources, and coastal defense. It is ambitious in scope, extending from approximately 200 to 700 nm from the mainland, to include Taiwan and the South China Sea land features claimed by Beijing as sovereign territory.

The second island chain bounds Liu's second strategic maritime area: a north-south line from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and Indonesia. This is a much more ambitious goal than that implied by the first island chain, since it encompasses maritime areas out to approximately 1,800 nm from China's coast, including most of the East China Sea and East Asian SLOCs.

The third stage of Liu's putative maritime strategy poses the PLAN as a global force built around aircraft carriers, deployed by the middle of the 21st century. This goal would imply a PLAN many times larger and more air-capable than China's current force. Alternately, however, global naval force might be deployed in a fleet of ballistic missile submarines (FBMs) capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and long-range land-attack cruise missiles.

China currently has just one FBM, the Xia, which may not be operable. Its successor class, the Type-094, is probably under design with Russian assistance, but its completion date and class size are not known. The eventual size of the China FBM force will be determined in large part by Beijing's perception of how many ICBMs have to be deployed to form an effective nuclear deterrent against possible enemies, including the United States.³

Beijing's current naval modernization is almost always discussed in the context of Liu's theory. But what if Liu Huaqing's maritime strategy is not operative? What if "China's Mahan" is more like "China's Tirpitz," theorizing more for the purpose of domestic and service politics than for future fleet operations?⁴ We return to this question below, along with the significance of Taiwan as the target for Beijing's maritime strategy: Would the island's reunification be the end or the beginning of Chinese naval expansion?⁵

Active Defense

Liu also offered doctrinal direction, proposing:

stubborn defense near the shore

mobile warfare

surprise guerrilla-like attacks at sea.⁶

This paradigm appears to have been taken directly from Mao Zedong's writings, which may well indicate Liu was most concerned with convincing a domestic audience--perhaps the Chinese Communist Party and PLA leadership--of the need for a maritime strategy.

In fact, Mao Zedong's strictures seem to influence current PLAN operational thinking. Active defense, for instance, is a concept Mao discussed in the mid-1930s, when his army was fighting a superior enemy in relatively unconstrained geography. At the level of operational art, Mao described the advantages of operating on interior lines, which allowed him "to choose favorable terrain [and] force the [enemy] to fight on our terms." Chinese forces must "pick out the enemy's weaker units for attack," he argued, and "always concentrate a big force to strike at one part of the enemy forces." He insisted on a "war of movement" to achieve victory on the battlefield.⁷

Mao emphasized mobility, surprise, dispersion, flexibility, concentration, "the alert shifting of forces," and retaining the initiative: "the attack must be made on [our] initiative. . . . it is only by attack that we can [win]." He did not view "defense" as a passive concept.⁸ Mao"s principles still appeal to PLAN strategists: the Chinese navy holds the maritime equivalent of "interior lines" with respect to naval conflict in East Asia, would almost certainly face superior maritime and air forces in relatively unconstrained geography, and would have to depend on mobility, initiative, and surprise to achieve its objectives.

Offshore

The meaning of offshore is less obvious. First, Alexander Huang has done the most complete job of analyzing the concept, noting the distances that might be involved. These range from strictly coastal operations within 100 nm of the shoreline, to the 700 nm required to patrol the South China Sea's Spratly Islands.⁹ PLA officers and civilian commentators also have discussed the distances involved if the PLAN is no longer constrained by old-fashioned concepts of coastal defense, and their estimates fall within the band of ranges discussed by Huang.

Second, the concept of offshore may be linked to the ranges of PLA weapons systems. China's longest-range, shore-based systems include three surface-to-surface missiles: the HY-2, with a 52-nm range; the HY-4, with an 84-nm range; and possibly the C-601, which has a 54.5-nm range. ¹⁰ Increased overwater experience and expertise for the People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) and the People's Liberation Army Air Force is another relevant factor. The newest Chinese aircraft, the Su-27 and Su-30, have combat radii of 800 and 1,600 nm, respectively, although these allow very little time "on station."¹¹ The PLANAF B-6 bombers have a combat radius of 1,700 nm. FBMs, of course, imply global coverage.

Third, offshore may be defined by Beijing's insular territorial claims. The most distant of these is the Spratly Island group in the southern South China Sea, about 700 nm from the PLAN South Sea Fleet bases on Hainan Island.

Fourth, possible opponents also may bound China's naval ambitions. South Korea is just across the Bohai, Japan is almost as close, and Taiwan is within 100 nm; these fall within the first island chain. India and the United States pose geographic issues of a different magnitude since China does not have the traditional naval or air capability to threaten them credibly, except with missiles, although the American bases in Japan and South Korea fall within the first island chain. However, Beijing might consider the continental United States to be fair game in an all-out maritime campaign, employing information warfare, special operations forces, and biological-chemical attacks.

To sum up, offshore may be defined by:

various Chinese strategists

PLA capabilities

territorial claims

potential maritime opponents

or some combination of these factors.

None of these lead to a conclusive definition of offshore; it is likely that a doctrinal definition of offshore is not tied to specific distances but is derived from the operational objective at hand. For instance, the current PLAN commander, Admiral Shi Yunsheng, has been quoted as describing offshore as "not a concept of distance, denoting 'how far it is from the coast,' but covers a vast maritime space within the second island chain of the Pacific ocean, including Taiwan."¹²

Blue Water

Naval operations may be framed in terms of maritime geography, usually under four categories:

riverine

brown water

green water

blue water.

These categories designate operations ranging from inland waters to global deployments by large, relatively self-sufficient fleets. The latter three are not neatly, consistently delineated areas, but in China's case, brown water may be defined as reaching from the coast to about 200 nm to seaward. Green water refers to the ocean areas from the seaward end of brown water to a point, marked by the Caroline and other islands, about 1,800 nm from the coast. Blue water refers to the remaining global ocean areas.

Brown water is the most important maritime arena for China, as it is for any nation, since it includes coastal traffic, territorial waters, the contiguous zone, and the claimed exclusive economic zone.¹³ In these areas occur the great majority of a nation's maritime police, customs, environmental, and economic concerns. China's territorial claims heighten the importance of its brown water as a naval arena; Taiwan is the most important of these, of course, but maritime disputes also exist with Korea, Japan, and most of the Southeast Asian nations.

Beijing's most important maritime strategic concern in the green water arena is probably homeland defense against sea-based, long-range missiles. Other concerns include regional sea lines of communication, and economic resources both in the continental shelf area and even further afield, especially fisheries.

As far as the blue water realm is concerned, the PLAN is already active in terms of the naval mission of presence--that is, of sending naval units on long voyages to extend diplomatic reach and spread the nation's influence. Another blue water capability is represented in China's sea-based ICBM force, limited though it is.

Force Structure

The PLAN, like all the world's significant navies, may be viewed as composed of three forces: surface, aviation, and subsurface. China's maritime force is augmented by one of the world's largest merchant marines, an organization that is the world's largest if coastal and riverine craft are included in the count.¹⁴

The PLAN surface force is modernizing at a measured pace, in line with overall naval improvements. The force is led by two Sovremenny-class guided-missile destroyers purchased from Russia. These ships were laid down by the Soviet Union approximately 15 years ago and lay idle until completed for China in 1999 and 2000. Hence, they may suffer long-term lack of hull maintenance; this class, equipped with steam-driven turbines, is also reported typically to suffer significant engineering problems.

The ship's single meaningful strength is the Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn, in North Atlantic Treaty Organization parlance) antisurface ship cruise missile with which they are armed. Eight of these large, supersonic missiles are carried on board. Because of their speed, ability to fly close to the ocean's surface, and especially the terminal flight maneuvers they are capable of executing, the Moskits are difficult weapons to counter. The Sovremenny also is armed with two twin-100 millimeter gun mounts, antisubmarine torpedo tubes and mortars, four rapid-fire gatling gun weapons for short-range air defense, a relatively short-range (25-kilometer) antiaircraft missile system, and supporting sensor and fire-control systems. The ships also are capable of embarking helicopters. China has apparently agreed to purchase two additional Sovremennys from Russia, but the status of this agreement is in question. The most significant aspect of this new acquisition is that the ships would be built from the keel up, which would give China the opportunity to modernize and improve their capabilities.

The PLAN also deploys one Luhai-class and two Luhu-class guidedmissile destroyers, all built in China. The Luhai is much larger than the Luhus, displacing 6,600 to their 4,800 tons, but all three are armed with similar sensor and weapons suites. These include antisurface ship, subsonic cruise missiles, a single twin-100 millimeter gun mount, antisubmarine torpedo tubes and mortars, eight rapid-fire gatling guns, and the same 25-kilometer-capable antiaircraft missile system. They also have flight decks and hangars for embarking helicopters. These three ships are all powered by gas turbine engines, U.S.-built units in the two Luhus and Ukranian-built engines in the Luhai. Additional Luhais are under construction in Dalian-area shipyards.

The only other modern surface ship in the PLAN inventory is the Jiangwei-class frigate, of which eight have been deployed, with additional units under construction. Displacing just 2,100 tons, these ships are equipped with the same antisurface ship cruise missiles short-range antiaircraft missile system and gun mount as the Luhus; have antisubmarine mortars and four gatling guns; and are able to embark a single helicopter. They are powered by German-designed diesel engines.

The other surface ships in the PLAN are essentially of 1950s vintage: some of the 17 Luda-class guided-missile destroyers have been modernized and should not be discounted because of their capable antisurface ship cruise missile systems. The 21 Jianghu-class frigates are not modern combatants, lacking centralized control stations, but they are equipped with cruise missiles, albeit much older models, and cannot be completely discounted. China still deploys a large number of small combatants, missile and torpedo-armed patrol boats, as well as minesweepers and fleet support ships.

The PLANAF flies older models and has far fewer aircraft than does China's air force. The most modern aircraft are the navy's 28 helicopters, primarily French- and Russian-designed craft that are very capable. The PLANAF also flies fighter, attack, and surveillance aircraft as part of its approximately 500-unit strength.

The most formidable PLAN force is its submarine arm, led by four Kilo-class, conventionally powered attack submarines purchased from Russia. The Kilo is a circa 1980 design but remains a very capable ship, armed with wire-guided torpedoes. The Chinese are also building the Ming- and Song-class conventionally powered classes of submarine, with 17 to 20 of the former and 3 of the latter currently deployed. These are not as capable as the Kilos--the Ming is an improved version of the circa 1950s Soviet-designed Romeo-class boat--but add measurably to the PLAN capability as a naval fighting force. China's inventory of nuclear-powered submarines, composed of the one fleet ballistic missile boat and five attack boats, is obsolete, and the PLAN is working to replace them, with Russian assistance, with the new Type-093 attack and Type-094 ballistic missile boats.

The PLAN still maintains an unknown number of the old Romeo-class submarines, probably 35 to 40. These too are obsolete, but if the navy has sufficient personnel to man them, they will present a threat at sea to any opposing fleet.

In sum, the PLAN is the largest navy in East Asia--and one of the largest in the world. It includes a wide variety of surface, aviation, and subsurface units, none of them state of the art in comparison to many U.S. weapons systems. Almost all of them are capable, however, and the PLAN is a force to be reckoned with, especially in any scenario in which the United States is not directly involved.

Capabilities

The PLAN will have to rely on speed, mobility, flexibility, and surprise/preemption in a contest with a strong opponent, especially the United States. The goal will be to deploy enough naval strength to tip the balance in a limited, regional scenario.

This raises the issue of the revolution in military affairs, widely written about by PLA authors.¹⁵ Effectively managing information flow and the electronic spectrum will be key to PLAN operations. This does not mean information warfare as such, but does refer to a historical constant in naval warfare: situational awareness--that is, knowing the location of one's own and one's opposing forces.¹⁶ Achieving full situational awareness requires the "effective fusion of reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence information."¹⁷ The PLAN is not capable of accomplishing this.

Sea denial is a particularly attractive option for even a small naval power in littoral waters, if it has access to mines, missiles, small surface ships and submarines, and shore-based aircraft--as the PLAN does. An effective submarine force is key.¹⁸ The most practicable way for China to pursue a sea-denial strategy is to employ the PLAN against specific naval threats, integral to a PLA campaign plan with land-, air-, and space-based assets. This strategy would have to be strictly limited in its objectives and fully acknowledge potential opposing forces and possible negative outcomes of both success and failure--including political, economic, social, and even environmental consequences.

China has more than 50 active, medium sized or larger surface warships, but only very few of these possess modern capabilities. The two Sovremenny-, one Luhai-, and two Luhu-class guided-missile destroyers and the eight Jiangwei-class frigates are the most capable of China's ships because of their potent antisurface-ship cruise-missile batteries. Yet not a single one of these ships is armed with a capable area air-defense missile system, and their antisubmarine systems are almost as limited. Furthermore, PLAN ships might be viewed as relatively expendable in a Taiwan scenario since the nearby mainland provides ample air and missile power.

Conclusion

Is China's maritime doctrine indeed based on active offshore defense embodied in a blue water navy? Dramatic naval expansion toward a PLAN with global reach is doubtful, given current modernization priorities and the low level of threats to China's national security.

Beijing is being very selective in pursuing even a restricted slice of sea power. For instance, it does not have and is not building a significant amphibious assault capability, either in the PLAN or in its merchant fleet.¹⁹ China also is not moving rapidly to acquire the systems and conduct the training in aerial refueling crucial to extending airpower to seaward. The PLAN is a large, growing, modernizing force, but one that will have to isolate its objectives and narrow the ocean area in which it wishes to prevail.

Is the three-stage navy-building plan attributed to Liu Huaqing moving toward the development of an expansionist Chinese naval strategy? PLAN modernization during the past decade has been steady but quite slow; obviously, China is making no attempt to meet Liu's strategic deadlines. Hence, the effect of Liu's tenure is probably as much domestic as international. He should be considered more as an effective bureaucrat than an enduring maritime strategist.

Taiwan has been the predominant issue during the past 15 years of PLAN modernization. Historic instances of Chinese naval building would indicate that the PLA will continue as an army-dominant military, with just enough naval strength maintained for coastal defense--and the first island chain is a convenient way to describe coastal in this construct--and enough blue water capability to continue executing the naval mission of presence. Some form of seaborne nuclear deterrence is also likely, although the size of this force will depend on the progress of the Type-094 currently in the design/early construction stage.

The PLAN is positioned to play an increasing role in China's national security process, but one that does not require a blue water navy. Doctrinal development to support active, offshore defense appears to be occurring, evidenced in PLAN single-ship, multi-unit, and fleet-level exercises.²⁰ China wants a PLAN able to oppose successfully any East Asian force that stands in the way of achieving China's objectives in the region.²¹ The PLAN almost certainly intends concentrating its operational capabilities in waters within a couple of hundred miles of its coast: it is not in China's interest to expand the geographic scope of a naval contest.

Notes

 ¹See Alexander Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy: Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994), 16ff, for a good discussion of the first and second island chains. [BACK]

 ²One nautical mile equals approximately 1.2 statute miles. [BACK]

 ³Alistair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control," The China Quarterly (June 1996), 548-576. This article remains key to gaining an understanding of Chinese thinking about nuclear deterrence. [BACK]

 ⁴See, for instance, Jeffrey Goldberg, "China's Mahan," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 122, no. 3 (March 1996), 44-47. Cynthia A. Watson suggested this question. [BACK]

 ⁵One might argue that historically Chinese governments, whether the Song or the Ming, have deployed large navies to achieve relatively limited goals, and once those have been achieved, the navy has been again relegated to secondary status. [BACK]

 ⁶Discussed in Alexander Huang, "Chinese Maritime Modernization and Its Security Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond" (Ph.D. diss., The George Washington University, 1994), 225ff. [BACK]

 ⁷See Mao Zedong, On the Protracted War (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1954), 83, 88, 101; Mao Zedong, On Guerrilla Warfare, 2d ed., trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1992), 81, 119; Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings of Mao Zedong (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 97, 105, 160, 233. [BACK]

 ⁸Paul H.B. Godwin, "China's Defense Modernization: Aspirations and Capabilities," paper prepared for the Asia-Pacific Symposium, Asian Perspectives on the Challenges of China, at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, March 7-8, 2000. [BACK]

 ⁹Huang, Ph.D. diss., table 5-1, 231, lists distances from "coastal" and "inshore," to "EEZ [exclusive economic zone] + Continental shelf," which would equate to 350 nm, out to "600+ nm." [BACK]

¹⁰Norman Friedman, ed., The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 321. C-601 designates a system designed for foreign sales. [BACK]

¹¹"If War Starts in the Taiwan Seas, Where Will the U.S. Carriers Assemble?" accessed at <http://military.china.com/zh_cn/critical3/27/20010823/10087071.html& gt;, states that the Su-27 "would be able to extend the Chinese front lines 900 km out to sea." [BACK]

¹²"Jiang made the Final Decision on Adopting Offshore Defense Strategy," Hung Fang Jih Pao, August 24, 2001, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service--China (henceforth FBIS-China). [BACK]

¹³The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea defines four areas of national concern: a nation's sovereign waters is the maritime area from a nation's coastline to a point 12 nm to seaward; the contiguous zone extends to a point 24 nm from a nation's coastline; the exclusive economic zone out to 200 nm, and a nation's continental shelf may reach to a maximum distance of 350 nm from its coastline. [BACK]

¹⁴The best work in English on China's merchant marine remains Wayne S. Hugar, "The Sea Dragon Network: Implications of the International Expansion of China's Maritime Shipping Industry," (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1998). [BACK]

¹⁵See Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), and China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), for a unique and valuable sampling of these writings. A third volume is forthcoming. [BACK]

¹⁶The March 1996 arrival of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, which reportedly became known to China through the Cable News Network, showed severe PLA limitations in this vital area. [BACK]

¹⁷Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 44. [BACK]

¹⁸Ibid., 138. [BACK]

¹⁹This may be wise on Beijing's part, since only one successful amphibious landing under active opposition has occurred since 1950--the British assault on the Falklands. [BACK]

²⁰See Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the 21^st Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), chapter 7. [BACK]

²¹China's leaders might decide to engage in naval warfare despite likely third-party intervention if they believe that they have been backed into a corner--that their political position as national leaders is so threatened by a national security situation that likely war with the United States would be a justified risk. Any such belief would be intensified by the extremely defensive view--approaching paranoia--so often apparent in China's press. See, for instance, Yi Jun, Hua Shan, and Xu Shujun, "Behind the U.S.-South Korea 'RS012001' Exercise," Jiefangjun Bao, April 30, 2001, 12, in FBIS-China, for the claim that "the United States is seeking to restore the arc of blockade against socialist countries in Asia in the 1950s." [BACK]