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Military

Chapter Four

PLA Conservative Nationalism


 

Nan Li

 

Because the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has withdrawn from the class-based politics of the Cultural Revolution and more recently from its extensive commercial activities, its policy attention should focus more on two new dimensions: first, irredentist claims-based and geostrategic concerns-driven nationalist agendas that stress security issues on the peripheries of China; and second, technology-driven force modernization to resolve these issues. This essay examines the first dimension, with particular emphasis on its conceptual basis: PLA conservative nationalism and its implications for Chinese politics and society. Specifically, it addresses the following questions: What is PLA conservative nationalism? How does such an ideology influence Chinese politics and society as the fourth-generation leaders take power? What major factors may aggravate or constrain the impact of PLA nationalism on Chinese politics and policy?

Several caveats are in order. First, this chapter is not intended to develop a theoretical argument about China's civil-military relations but rather to delineate the basic influential patterns of the new PLA ideology on politics and society. Because exploring the specific ways and areas in which the new ideology influences politics and society may contribute to the general goal of theory building, this is a worthwhile effort. Second, this is not a study of the origins of PLA conservative nationalism, but rather an analysis of the implications of the new ideology for politics and society. To the extent that examination of the origins has been done elsewhere,1 and analyzing implications is more pertinent to designing policy to mitigate the new ideology, this study is justified. Finally, this study focuses on the dominant ideology but not alternative voices. Such a focus is reasonable largely because dominant ideology has more influence on policy, which may have more important implications for formulating coping strategies.

The essay is divided into four sections. The first section defines the concept of PLA conservative nationalism. The second and third address the major influence of this new PLA ideology on politics and society. The final section examines the major factors that may mitigate the impact of PLA nationalism on policy.


What Is PLA Conservative Nationalism?

As I have argued elsewhere,2 conservative nationalism has become the dominant cognitive paradigm defining the thinking of China's security and military planners in the post-Mao era. PLA conservative nationalism has two major components: nationalism and conservatism. The central premise of nationalism is that in the post-ideology, post-Cold War era, the nation-state has become the central category that defines internal organization and hierarchy and external uncertainty and vulnerability. To the extent China exists in a competitive international environment where uncertainty and fluidity reign and relative gains matter, the survival and security of the Chinese nation have become of paramount importance. To achieve the goals of survival and security, it is first necessary to build up the Chinese economy and technology to reduce China's disadvantages relative to advanced countries. But for the development of economy and technology to proceed smoothly, it is also necessary for China to become externally secure. The external security of China defines the central role of the PLA.

To enhance China's external security, the PLA is supposed to fulfill several specific missions. First, it is to make significant contributions to China's territorial consolidation through reunification of the mainland and Taiwan. This reunification allegedly is essential to the survival of the Chinese nation because without such consolidation, China would remain divided and face the possible prospect of further fragmentation. Second, the PLA is to strive to preserve the integrity of the territories and security of the borders that are currently under Chinese control. Finally, the PLA is to enhance the security of economic resources, such as raw materials supplies, manufacturing platforms, infrastructure, and trading routes, to ensure the sustained development of the economy and technology.

For the last two missions, it is not sufficient to maintain the status quo but rather necessary to create a buffer zone through expanding a depth of defense moderately beyond the status quo. This expanded security zone is both desirable and necessary largely because, without it, China would become much more vulnerable and insecure under the condition of modern military technology, which allows longer range, more precise, and therefore more lethal military strikes. While diplomatic negotiations and promoting economic and cultural interactions may all serve to enhance China's security goal, the role of military force is indispensable and central. To the extent major challenges to China's territorial consolidation, border security, and economic resources security are military in nature, it is imperative for the PLA to develop the sufficient and appropriate military capabilities to deter such challenges and to fight and win wars if deterrence fails.

Besides nationalism, conservatism is another central feature that defines the role and missions of the PLA. Conservatism concerns the scope of the nationalist agendas. China's security goal through the prism of the PLA, for instance, stays relatively local and limited and, therefore, manageable. Such a goal deals mainly with the territorial and geostrategic issues on the margins of China, such as Taiwan, the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, the border dispute with India, the Korean Peninsula, and the ethnic and religious tension in western China, but not with ambitious superpower competition in places far away from China. Moreover, with the exception of Taiwan, the PLA has largely taken a conservative and defensive posture in handling these issues, with strong emphasis on conserving and consolidating what it has under its control rather than on acquiring what it has claimed. Even on the issue of Taiwan, arms buildup and military maneuvers seemingly are designed to achieve the immediate goal of deterring Taiwan from declaring independence, a rather limited and conservative step in the pursuit of the more ambitious goal of achieving the complete reunification.

Moreover, conservatism imbues the ways of realizing the nationalist agendas. Rather than overstretching resources stemming from revolutionary, radical changes, for instance, the PLA favors the gradual buildup of the national economy and technology, which should contribute significantly to national consolidation based on the enhanced comprehensive national power. It also favors national unity and internal social stability, the prerequisites for steady economic growth and technological development and for more effective competition in the highly vulnerable environment of external uncertainty. Finally, the PLA is highly skeptical of formal, tight alliances with foreign countries, largely because large partners in the alliance may engage in "buck passing" behavior (such as the Soviet Union with regard to the Korean War) and small partners in "free-riding" behavior (such as North Vietnam and North Korea), thus depleting Chinese resources.

One way to illustrate PLA conservative nationalism is to show what it is not. First of all, the new PLA ideology represents a significant departure from Maoism. The central premise of Maoism is that socioeconomic class, not the nation-state, defines internal organization and solidarity and external uncertainty and antagonism. Based on such a premise, the Maoist domestic policy would stress the formulation of rigid class categories and a class struggle-based "continuous revolution" to weed out "hidden class enemies" in the party and state bureaucracy, the PLA, and throughout Chinese society. Because Maoism assumes that socioeconomic classes and class struggle transcend national boundaries, it also justifies a proactive foreign policy of "world revolution" by providing doctrinal, manpower, and material support to the class-based radical, revolutionary movements in foreign countries. To the extent the PLA had withdrawn from its extensive involvement in the fierce domestic class struggle of the Cultural Revolution (because such struggle undermines national unity) and terminated its active support of the radical revolutionary movements in foreign countries (because such an endeavor would overstretch resources and undermine national economic development), it is apparent that Maoism is no longer the guiding ideology dictating PLA policy.

Another alternative voice in the current PLA discourse is the quasi-liberal one, which places emphasis on international institutions, diplomatic negotiations, and multilateral confidence-building measures for managing and alleviating interstate disputes. Such a voice, however, has not become the dominant PLA ideology for two major reasons. The first is that the quasi-liberal voice represents a minority among PLA thinkers and tends to be marginalized. Second, even among those who argue for policy along the quasi-liberal line, some are apparently under the influence of the conservative-nationalist voice. Some quasi-liberals treat participation in international institutions and diplomatic negotiations, for instance, as opportunities to enhance the relative gains of nation-states. Such involvement is regarded either as delaying tactics to gain preparation time for war, as a way to evade responsibility and to enjoy benefits, or as a stratagem to acquire technology and intelligence. This shows that conservative nationalism, but not quasi-liberalism, is the dominant ideology that shapes current PLA thought and practice.


Conservative Nationalism and Chinese Politics

PLA conservative nationalism influences Chinese politics in three major areas: ideology, personnel, and policy.

Ideology. In party-state ideology, the most dramatic change is the recent official endorsement of CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin's theory of "three representations" (the CCP representing the advanced productive forces, the advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of China's broad masses), and his July 1, 2001, declaration that private businessmen would be allowed to join the CCP. Some sketchy evidence exists to show that the PLA has had input into the processes leading to such change. First of all, Jiang's theory is consistent with the PLA nationalist agenda of promoting national strength and unity in that it opens up the powerful domestic institutions to the highly productive segment of Chinese society, which contributes significantly to the tax revenue, the material basis of comprehensive national power. Such a measure also means that the CCP, by becoming more representative of increasingly diverse interests, would gain a new lease on life, which is good for stability. Without such an opening, the newly gained energy and resources released by decades of economic reforms within this segment would be channeled to other organizations, which may create new class struggle, undermine the party-state rule, and fragment the nation.

Second, Jiang's theory is the result of years of discussion on political reform, which began as early as before the 15th CCP Congress of 1997. Such a discussion has been primarily sponsored and coordinated by the CCP Central Policy Research Office and has involved major bureaucracies and think tanks at the central level, including PLA institutions, such as the Academy of Military Science. The discussion explored various options of political reform, including genuine democratization such as introducing multiparty competition for political offices. The multiparty competition option, however, was considered too radical and costly and was abandoned for two major reasons: it may trigger ethnic, religious, and provincial separatism, leading to China's disintegration (largely based on a reading of the collapse of the Soviet Union due to democratization); and it may cause the collapse of the family planning policy, which would abort the central objective of increasing per capita income by controlling population growth on the one hand and promoting economic growth on the other.

While the second reason reflects the view of the State Family Planning Commission, the first reason clearly represents the perspective of the PLA.3 Rather than the radically liberal direction of multiparty competition at the expense of current political institutions, which may allegedly cause national disintegration, it now seems political reform has moved toward a more conservative and nationalist direction: opening up current political institutions to accommodate and alleviate the pent-up aspirations and frustrations associated with the rapid economic changes, which may avoid a new class struggle and enhance national unity and cohesiveness. To the extent Jiang's theory reportedly was extensively discussed by the CCP Politburo before its release, and the idea originated from two well known reform scholars from the CCP Central Policy Research Office, Teng Wensheng (office director) and Wang Hu'ning (deputy director and a professor from the Shanghai Fudan University), it is logical to assume that the theory is a collective product based on the aggregated input from major central bureaucracies, including the PLA.

Finally, the extensive interpretation of Jiang's theory in the Liberation Army Daily, not just in terms of its narrower implications for defense modernization4 but also its implications for the broader nationalist agenda of national integration and unity,5 shows a strong association between the PLA and Jiang's theory. Such association implies that the PLA is an active participant in formulating the theory as much as it is a subordinate institution in operationalizing and implementing the theory in its narrower functional specialties, or it just attempts to convert the skeptics in the PLA into true believers.

Personnel. Like ideology, PLA conservative nationalism had a role to play in personnel changes of the top party-state leadership during 2002-2003. On the one hand, such a role may remain moderate for several major reasons. First, there is no imminent CCP leadership crisis on the scale of the Cultural Revolution (causing collapse of the party-state bureaucracy) or the 1989 Tiananmen crisis (causing severe division among the CCP leadership on how to handle student demonstrations, which made it difficult to take preemptive measures). Unless a crisis of similar scale occurs and creates a political vacuum for PLA leaders to exploit, it is not likely that the PLA will play the blatant kingmaking role in party-state politics.6 Some may argue that accelerated PLA professionalization may lead to a sharp divergence in values and interests between the PLA and CCP, to the point that the PLA may develop the incentive to advance its own values and interests by launching a coup against party-state rule.

But military professionalization may also mean that the PLA is gradually losing skills and interests in party-state politics, to the point it would rather concentrate on the narrower pursuit of functional and technical skills of the military profession than on civilian politics.7 This does not suggest that the PLA would be totally detached from civilian politics, but its involvement in them may be narrowly focused on PLA institutional issues such as the defense budget, manpower policy, and so forth rather than the broader and more ambitious issue of seizing state power. In this sense, a more professionalized PLA may increasingly resemble a lobbying group engaging in mundane bureaucratic politics in the arena of party-state, not the palace guard unit that is more interested in usurping the supreme power. As the senior uniformed CMC members retire, for instance, those who are promoted to fill their positions may remain politically weak and less capable of influencing the party-state leadership politics because their positions and influence have yet to be consolidated. Finally, the 70-year retirement age rule for both the Politburo and CMC members, if followed, may reduce the incentive for individuals to exert influence over personnel changes through irregular, abnormal channels.8

On the other hand, it is just as wrong to argue that PLA leadership has an insignificant role to play in the party-state leadership transition. This role has been subtle and implicit and has been influenced by PLA conservative nationalism. The PLA leadership, for instance, has a profile of its preferred new party-state leadership. Such a profile connotes conservative nationalism and has three major components that the PLA leadership hopes the new party-state leadership would be well prepared to strengthen: national economic and technological development to enhance comprehensive national power; internal stability and national unity; and national defense-based PLA institutional interests.

In regard to economic and technological development, it is likely that PLA leadership prefers the new party-state leadership to be dominated by technocrats (for example, engineers and science and technology specialists) who have gained administrative experience by spending a number of years of their career managing a major bureaucracy, a major enterprise, or a province; technocrats understand the nuts and bolts of economics, technology, and management. They also tend to be pragmatists who prefer the incremental, cautious, and technical approaches to solving problems and, therefore, are more likely to produce concrete results in economic and technological development. On the other hand, PLA leadership may be highly skeptical and critical if the new leadership is dominated by the ideologues or the idealists of either the neoleftist (Maoist) or the neorightist (liberal) persuasion, or those who advocate radical, revolutionary changes through mobilizational methods or inciting propaganda. To the PLA, such leadership would do more harm than good to national economic and technological development.

PLA leadership wants the new party-state leadership to be capable of promoting leadership unity, a prerequisite for national stability and unity. This means that the new leadership should possess the skills in building consensus on major policy issues by regularly consulting major bureaucracies, by negotiations, and by sharing power. This also means the new party-state leadership should apply the established rules and norms and follow a policy of promoting to important positions people from the "five lakes and four seas" (all corners of the country) based on merits, but not engage too much in factional politics based on highly parochial, personalized ties; unmitigated factional politics would trigger intensive intraleadership rivalry, cause policy paralysis, and undermine leadership unity.

Finally, on national defense-based institutional interests, PLA leadership apparently would like to see that the military is well taken care of. This means that the new party-state leadership should place equal emphasis on both economic development and national defense but should not stress the former while neglecting the latter. It is also desirable that this leadership make an effort to:

  • increase the defense budget
  • improve the living conditions of the military personnel (by raising wages, improving housing conditions, and creating employment opportunities for military dependents and the discharged)
  • consult the PLA on major national defense and foreign policy issues
  • take a hands-on approach to PLA high-level personnel changes (by reviewing the list of candidates for high-level positions, soliciting opinion from the units of the candidates, and conducting interviews).

For the PLA, a good party-state leadership is one that is benevolent, considerate, and prudent--one that makes good judgments on taking care of the PLA. This, however, does not mean that the PLA leadership would like the new party-state leadership to micromanage the PLA. On the contrary, for the most part, it prefers that the new civilian leadership provides the general policy guidelines but leaves the PLA to flesh out the details, which also means more flexibility and space for the PLA to advance its own interests. By similar logic, the PLA clearly favors the collective and technocratic style of the current party-state leadership but not the charismatic and one-person dominance style of Mao and Deng; the relatively diffused nature of power in collective leadership means more leeway for the PLA to exploit the promotion of its institutional interests. This also translates into a higher level of institutional cohesiveness. In contrast, the highly interventionist "divide and rule" tactic employed by Mao and Deng from a strong center tended to divide the PLA leadership.

The consultation between the CCP Politburo and PLA leadership concerning the leadership transition focused largely on these three issues. How well or how poorly the party-state leadership matches this PLA profile may provide a clue why some party-state leaders fared better politically than others. One of the central reasons why Deng never had the confidence to relinquish the CMC chair position to Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, for instance, is that both were quite controversial among PLA leaders. Hu historically was a propagandist who had a flamboyant style. Both Hu and Zhao also mobilized political support from outside the party (among the liberal intellectuals and students) in the intraparty power struggle, rendering them politically vulnerable to violating the newly restored party rules and norms, as well as undermining leadership unity. Both also were considered too liberal. Most importantly, both (particularly Zhao) paid too much attention to economic issues but too little to the national defense-related PLA institutional interests.

In contrast, Jiang matches this profile much better than Hu and Zhao and, therefore, has been able to consolidate his influence in the PLA. On the other hand, some PLA leaders may feel quite uneasy that Jiang has retained his CMC chair position after giving up his CCP general secretary position at the 16th Congress; holding the CMC chair position without being the CCP general secretary is generally perceived as abnormal and irregular, except in extreme circumstances. Since there is no imminent political crisis in sight, this practice could undermine party norms (such as the mandatory retirement age), revive the personality-driven politics of "attending to state affairs behind the curtain," weaken the legitimacy of the CMC, and trigger intraleadership rivalry.

Hu Jintao fits the profile fairly well. Compared to peer competitors such as Zeng Qinghong, Hu has a few other comparative advantages. Hu has served as the CMC vice chair since 1999 and can use the opportunity to cultivate relationships and authority among PLA leaders. PLA leaders also appreciate Hu's service as the first party secretary of Tibet, a frontier province, and his credential of cracking down on the religious and ethnic separatism there. Zeng, on the other hand, has not had the opportunity or the credentials to cultivate more specific political favors from the PLA. Hu's responsibilities in handling PLA divestiture from businesses and managing the popular demonstrations against the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, however, may displease some PLA officers, particularly at the lower levels. But to the extent most PLA high-level leaders agree that the divestiture from businesses would enhance PLA combat effectiveness and that popular demonstrations need to be managed so that they do not run out of hand and undermine social stability, such credentials should work favorably for Hu but should not undermine his chances in the upcoming succession.

What can PLA leaders do if the new party-state leadership does not meet the desires and needs of PLA leaders? First, the third and fourth generations of party-state leaders seemingly fit the profile well and operate within the broad, centrist paradigm of conservative nationalism. This should reduce the probability of a major political-military crisis. Also, the new party-state leadership does not have to cater to all the needs of the PLA but instead can take care of the more immediate issues, such as PLA institutional interests, to consolidate influence in the PLA. Moreover, if the PLA is unhappy with the new civilian leadership, it may send subtle messages through passive and tacit obstruction of the policy programs handed down from CCP Central, which should allow for the party-state leadership to respond and adjust. Finally, to the extent the current PRC leadership has a much higher level of political flexibility and sophistication than the dying old guard generation, both civilian and PLA leaders hıve ample time and opportunities to learn about each other's needs and to make necessary accommodations. Indeed, unless the top party-state position were hijacked by a hidden Maoist radical or a Chinese Gorbachev, routinized bureaucratic consultation and mediation among people who share a similar mindset should lower the odds of an imminent, major political-military crisis.

Policy. The influence of PLA conservative nationalism on policy has become narrowly confined to the national defense and security component of both foreign and domestic policy. In foreign policy, the PLA largely takes a more hawkish position than the civilian bureaucracies, whether the policy is about Taiwan, the South China Sea, proliferation issues, U.S. missile defense, or the current American fight against terrorism. Such a position usually reflects a paranoid mentality of a zero-sum game associated with an obsessive concern about relative gains. In early 2001, for instance, PLA leaders were able to persuade successfully the skeptical and reluctant Jiang and Zhu Rongji that a large-scale, months-long military exercise at Dongshan Island was necessary to prevent Taiwan independence. Without military deterrence, they argued, Chen Suibian's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party would gain more legislative seats in the fall election in Taiwan. Taiwan independence thus would gain new grounds, particularly at a time when Sino-American relations had deteriorated due to the plane collision incident and as the U.S. Government had increased arms sales to Taiwan and allowed Chen to make a transit in the United States in his Latin America trip. Similarly, the constraints attached to the current cautious Chinese support for the American fight against terrorism, such as providing concrete proof, acting within the United Nations framework, and avoiding civilian casualties, also reflect PLA concern. The concern is that prolonged and expansive U.S. military operations in central Asia, if not constrained, would undermine Chinese influence in the region, which in the long run would render China's western frontier unstable and vulnerable.

In domestic policy, evidence of influence of PLA nationalism is also apparent and abundant. The PLA endorses any policy program that would enhance national integration and unity. The plan to shift capital investment to western provinces gained full PLA support because it would reduce wealth disparity between regions, thus enhancing national integration. An element of this plan is to build a railway line from Qinghai to Tibet. This project was proven to be too costly and unfeasible in engineering terms. But because the PLA insisted that the proposed line would achieve the strategic goal of integrating and consolidating Tibet, it was endorsed by the CCP Central and the State Council and would proceed.

One key policy area in which PLA influence is getting stronger is mobilizing civilian resources for national defense purposes, or integrating national defense into the national economic and social development plans under the new rubric of stressing both the marketplace and the battlefield. The recent decision jointly endorsed by the State Council and the CMC to train PLA officers in civilian schools, for instance, led to the development of a contractual system where PLA scholarship-supported students from China's key universities, upon graduation, would be directly recruited as active service officers by major PLA institutions. As a result, reserve officer training programs also have been established in China's major universities and selected high schools. Furthermore, the PLA has been developing systematic programs in mobilizing the civilian infrastructure for military purposes. These programs include integrating military design and requirements into construction or modification of highways, airports, seaports, railroads, and telecommunications; modifying commercial planes and merchant ships for military purposes; and exploring the organization, methods, management, and logistics of utilizing these resources through mobilizational exercises. The PLA has also been dispatching teams of technical specialists to identify and acquire dual-use technologies in the fast-growing technology-intensive joint ventures. Finally, the PLA has been developing technology-intensive reserve units in cities and regions where technology-intensive firms concentrate, and it has been recruiting technical experts in science, technology, and engineering to fill positions in these units.

Through what channels and institutions does the PLA exercise influence over civilian policy? At the very top on the party side, two uniformed PLA members (who are also the only two uniformed CMC vice chairs) serve in the 21-member CCP Politburo, but neither sits at its powerful 7-member Standing Committee. One of the two is also a member of the CCP Secretariat, which supervises the CCP central bureaucracies and operationalizes the Politburo decisions. Moreover, about 18 percent of the CCP Central Committee members are from the PLA. One uniformed CMC vice chair is also a member of the Foreign Affairs Leadership Small Group, an informal party grouping, which includes the heads of all party and state bureaucracies involved in foreign affairs. This group discusses foreign affairs, formulates foreign policy guidelines, and coordinates policy implementation. One PLA deputy chief of staff also serves as a member of the Taiwan Affairs Leadership Small Group, which fulfills similar functions on Taiwan affairs.

On the government side, a substantial number of PLA personnel serve as delegates to the National People's Congress (NPC), China's legislature. One uniformed CMC vice chair also serves as the defense minister of the State Council, China's cabinet. This person is also a state councilor and the highest PLA representative at the regular State Council-CMC coordination conference, which mediates between the two institutions and coordinates policy. Finally, this CMC vice chair, together with a vice premier of the State Council, heads the State National Defense Mobilization Commission (NDMC), a joint State Council-CMC policy discussion and coordination institution established in 1994. The NDMC has four major offices (people's arms mobilization, economic mobilization, people's air defense, and transportation and war preparation) under it, all of which are staffed by personnel from both the related State Council ministries and commissions and the PLA four general (staff, political, logistics, and armament) departments. A PLA deputy chief of staff serves as the secretary general of the NDMC.

Some reports suggest that the number of PLA members in the CCP Politburo and Central Committee would be substantially increased at the 16th Congress because the PLA leaders demand more seats to have more say on policy. Such a forecast may be premature for several reasons. First, the current level of PLA membership in the Politburo (9 percent) and the Central Committee (18 percent) has stayed constant and stable since the early 1990s. Unless there is a major political crisis, drastic changes to this level may cause questions and criticism from the civilian side, trigger intraparty rivalry, and undermine unity. Moreover, having more military members in these institutions does not necessarily translate into more effective PLA influence on policy. During the Cultural Revolution, PLA membership in the Politburo and Central Committee reached as high as 50 percent. This led only to the expanded participation of PLA leaders in the fierce intraparty leadership factional struggle, which blew back into the PLA and caused severe division among PLA leaders. This in turn translated into policy stalemate and paralysis, not policy effectiveness. Finally, these Party Central institutions, together with the CCP Secretariat, the leadership small groups, and the NPC, focus mainly on formulating general policy guidelines rather than on day-to-day operations. Some do not even meet regularly, and others serve merely as forums for discussion or as mechanisms of automatic approval of decisions made elsewhere. In comparison, the regular State Council-CMC coordinating conference and the NDMC are becoming substantial and meaningful institutions in expanding PLA influence on policy. To the extent the NDMC has been replicated at the provincial, prefecture, and county levels--and with the mandate of both the State Council and CMC, it goes out to commandeer civilian manpower, infrastructure, technology, and properties in the name of national security--it definitely deserves more careful analysis.


Conservative Nationalism and Chinese Society

Like politics, the influence of PLA conservative nationalism on society has become narrowly focused on propagating and socializing the nationalism-based security and military values associated with national defense. For the past few years, for instance, there has been a steady increase of security and military literature in the popular media. Articles address issues ranging from China's territorial and geostrategic vulnerability to its economic, energy, ecological, and information insecurity to ways to reduce such vulnerability and insecurity. There has also been a remarkable increase in technical literature that concentrates on military strategies and tactics, expenditures, technology, and organization. Chinese military history, both premodern and modern, is another literary area that has grown substantially. Such literature involves the interpretation of major historical military campaigns and battles; the strategies, tactics, organization, and technology employed; the performance of major military units and personalities involved; and the implications for China's historical destiny. Another area that attracts extensive attention of and interpretation by media pundits concerns major current foreign security and military events and issues and their security implications for China.

The substantial political and propaganda apparatus of the PLA has also been systematically explicating the instruments and means of propagating nationalist values. For example, Liberation Army Daily, the mouthpiece of the PLA, created China National Defense Daily to facilitate the social diffusion of national defense values. This can be seen clearly in the September 25, 2001, edition, which states that access to "literary products such as novels and reportage, movies and TV shows, and operas and plays, that feature war themes" is important. "Organizing the public to visit war memorials and museums, and 'holy places, and observing memorial days and military holidays" can also inculcate national defense values. Another way is to propagate war heroes: "The names of war heroes and those who have made outstanding contributions to national defense construction can be used to entitle cities and towns, streets, city squares, and working units, as well as planes, military vehicles, and warships that are in active service." National defense model personalities can also "be organized for speech tours throughout the country, and enjoy generous government allowances and benefits." Organizing military sporting events such as "the cross-country and armed marathon competitions, and shooting competitions" should contribute to the cultivation of national defense values as well. During the conscription seasons, "regularly and repeatedly distributing the printed, audio and video materials that feature the historical evolution of military units, major military campaigns and victories, the lives of famous commanders and war heroes" should also achieve the effect. Finally, "funds can be raised either through the government's yearly allocation or society contribution" to construct "national defense education bases, and to improve the facilities, content, and means of such education." China National Defense Daily has gained wide circulation.

The PLA propaganda apparatus also has been producing a daily half-hour military news program, aired by China Central Television (CCTV). This program serves primarily the civilian audience, not the PLA. Moreover, this apparatus has been producing television movies and plays featuring military themes for CCTV. One report claims that in the current year, military theme-based television movies and plays have occupied more than 50 percent of CCTV prime time.9 Finally, with the increasing popularity of personal computers, the Internet, and the World Wide Web, the number of cyber forums and chat rooms devoted to military subjects has been growing, and many are sponsored by PLA institutions.

Furthermore, the PLA has been providing regular military commentators for television news programs and forums on the Internet, which has created a few PLA celebrities. One of them is Zhang Zhaozhong, a navy captain who heads the science and technology teaching and research section of the National Defense University. For the past few years, Zhang has published a few nonfiction bestsellers, with titles such as Who Can Fight and Win the Next War? How Far Is the War from Us? and Who Is the Next Target?, creating a sensation known as the "Zhang Zhaozhong phenomenon" among China's book readers. The topics that Zhang comments on range from Taiwan, war in Kosovo and U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy, information warfare, naval modernization, to U.S. missile defense.10 Other PLA media celebrities include two air force senior colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, who published the bestseller Unrestricted Warfare. Qiao and Wang are particularly fond of opining on asymmetrical warfare and its implications for a hypothetical Taiwan conquest scenario, as well as the recent terrorist attacks on the United States.

What conceptual rationale does the PLA provide to justify the socialization of national security and military values? This rationale has largely been driven by the new notion of propaganda warfare. Besides a propaganda offense such as media disinformation to mislead or demoralize the adversary, the PLA theorists particularly stress the importance of propaganda defense. The general goal of propaganda defense is to "enhance national cohesiveness . . . and defeat the infiltration of the adversary's ideological and cultural values through patriotism education." Under this general goal, there are three specific objectives to accomplish. The first is to "arouse and foster the consciousness of the broad masses to love the nation and the army; and to construct the spiritual great wall through cultivating the national spirit of self-respect, self-confidence, and self-strengthening." The second is to "enhance the psychological quality of the Chinese nationals, particularly in developing the psychological ability to adapt to the high-tech war, which tends to be unprecedentedly brutal and may generate tremendous psychological pressure." The psychological preparation through patriotism education in turn can translate into "the confident, optimistic, unifying and stable state of mind among citizens and soldiers in face of powerful enemy psychological deterrence." Finally, propaganda warfare not only should be treated as a component of the political and diplomatic struggles but also integrated into specific military operations, which means "more systematic analysis should be done regarding the methods of propaganda warfare at the campaign and battle levels, with an eye toward the primary operational adversary."11

How effective are the PLA programs in socializing national defense and military values? While there is no systematic public opinion survey on the effectiveness of these programs, there are a few reasons to believe that they may achieve some level of success. The first reason is the difference in the popular appeal between the old Maoist subnational and transnational values of class struggle and world revolution and the current nationalist values. The Maoist values have been discredited largely because class struggle is too narrow, and it excludes many people (those with "bad" class backgrounds) from identifying with the Chinese nation. Similarly, world revolution is too broad and elusive for an average person to grasp. In comparison, the nationalist values, with the goal of defending and securing the land and nation where one's ancestors lived for centuries, can be much more appealing to an ordinary Chinese. Moreover, the government-imposed restrictions on the diffusion of liberal values in the mass media may also have helped to channel public consciousness toward the nationalist direction. Finally, security and military values-based propaganda may be attractive because it may help to ease a prevailing sense of insecurity and vulnerability among the populace, a sense somewhat associated with rapid socioeconomic changes.


What Aggravates and Constrains PLA Nationalism?

Several major internal and external factors may aggravate PLA nationalism. Internally, continued economic growth, coupled with an effective mechanism to transfer more money from that growth to defense modernization, should contribute to heightened PLA nationalism. The absence of a major domestic socioeconomic crisis that would fully absorb the energy and resources of the PLA can lend it a freer hand in pursuing its nationalist goal. The near absence of routine legislative oversight and executive control of the PLA,12 together with the marginalization of liberal voices and challenges, may also expand PLA influence on policy. But one major factor that has not been carefully explored before has to do with the style of PLA strategic analyses. Over the decades, the PLA hòs developed a highly positivist strategic style that strongly emphasizes a sharp dichotomy between friends and enemies and the identity of the positive and strong points of the PLA, as well as the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of the enemy.13 Such a style has the potential to aggravate PLA nationalism, leading to reckless policy choices based on gross miscalculations, which may in turn cause major policy blunders.14

What then accounts for such a strategic style? Among other things, two cultural-psychological variables may be central to understanding it. The first is the Chinese concern about "face," which relates to traditional Chinese culture and originates from the Confucian teaching on the need to maintain "ritual" (the appearance of righteousness) to sustain moral authority. To save face, or not to lose it, for instance, the incentive is not only to show self-righteousness or all the good, positive, and strong points of the self but also to show the evil, negative, and weak points of the other, to the point that such a dichotomy no longer reflects the more complex reality because it is based on an exaggeration of the strength of the self and the weakness of the enemy. The second is the residual of Maoism. Even though the PLA is moving away from Maoism in policy substance, the Maoist influence on PLA style is still apparent and cannot be quickly eradicated. A central element of Maoism, for instance, is voluntarism, which stresses the power of the mind and consciousness that can overcome obstacles of material conditions. Such an ideology would continue to influence the thinking of PLA strategists to the point that some PLA strategic analyses may reflect not the balance of forces in the real world but rather an overestimation of PLA strength and an underestimation of the adversary's abilities.

Externally, to the extent PLA nationalism has largely focused on the issue of Taiwan and the U.S. commitment to its defense (such as arms sales), what the United States does about Taiwan may either aggravate or constrain PLA nationalism. The immediate PLA goal is to deter Taiwan from going independent, to the point that it would accept China's principle of one country, two systems. PLA strategists are confident that if the United States is not committed to the defense of Taiwan, the PLA can accomplish this goal, which also means that the PLA has a low regard for Taiwan and a much higher regard for the American commitment. Therefore, any sign of U.S. weakness in its commitment to the defense of Taiwan (not necessarily in terms of scaling down arms salesübut just of being distracted by other issues) means an opportunity for the PLA to exploit. In this sense, the tragedy of September 11, 2001, may both constrain and aggravate PLA nationalism. In terms of constraint from the PLA perspective, the need declines to use military means, such as conducting highly visible military maneuvers to deter U.S. intervention and to intimidate Taiwan voters from voting for the Democratic Progressive Party candidates in the fall legislative election. American distraction from the Taiwan issue and its need for China's cooperation in fighting terrorism, together with China's imminent membership in the World Trade Organization and Taiwan's economic difficulties, may reduce Taiwan's leverage and produce the subtle deterrence effect on Taiwan independence, particularly with regard to whom the people in Taiwan would vote for in the upcoming election. On the other hand, the September 11 attacks may also aggravate the substance but not the means of PLA nationalism because, from the PLA perspective, the PLA nationalist goal of preventing Taiwan independence is more likely to be realized now by the "continuation of war by other means," such as the enhanced Chinese political, diplomatic, and economic leverages.

Besides factors that may aggravate PLA nationalism, a few major internal and external factors also exist that may constrain or weaken PLA nationalism. Internally, an economic recession or a weak mechanism incapable of transferring the necessary portion of the new civilian wealth to military modernization would constrain PLA nationalism. Moreover, democratization may constrain PLA nationalism in two major ways. First, if it goes badly, China may fragment, which means the PLA would either fragment along the liberal and hard lines, or along provincial, local, and ethnic lines (as happened to the Soviet Army during Russian democratization). Or the PLA may choose to stay together and launch a coup to take over the weakened national government to prevent disintegration. Either way, the PLA would be fully absorbed into an acute domestic crisis, which should weaken PLA nationalism. Second, if democratization goes well to the point at which genuine liberal and democratic institutions--such as the rule of law, a system of multiparty competition, and a free press--take hold, PLA nationalism should also be substantially constrained. The PLA, for instance, would switch its allegiance from a communist party to the constitution and become nonpartisan. With the removal of the CCP from the PLA, NPC, and State Council, more effective legislative oversight and executive control of the PLA would be established, thus curtailing the policy influence of the PLA. Similarly, the debate on security and military policy would become more civilianized and less dominated by the PLA, which should translate into reduced PLA influence. This means that it would be much easier for the liberal voices and values to challenge and contain the nationalist values of the PLA to the point at which the PLA would gradually withdraw from the policy arena into the narrower domain of the functional and technical specialties of the military profession. All these would substantially constrain PLA nationalism.

Externally, an American policy that combines a balance-of-threat strategy and an engagement strategy should constrain PLA nationalism. Currently, the PLA pursues a deterrence strategy of arms buildup and military exercises with regard to Taiwan. The most potent and threatening weapons in the PLA arsenal are the theater ballistic missiles. Therefore, a balance-of-threat strategy may focus on how to defuse this missile threat, for instance, by developing a missile defense system. Some may argue that such a strategy may play into the hands of China's hard-liners (such as the PLA) by militarizing the Taiwan issue and exacerbating an arms race, thus aggravating PLA nationalism. Such an argument is flawed for several reasons. First, it is the PLA that has militarized the Taiwan issue through its arms buildup and exercises. Second, to the extent the goal of the PLA deterrence strategy is to force the adversary to yield without the actual use of force, not doing anything to defend oneself amounts to yielding, which clearly plays into the hands of China's hard-liners such as the PLA. Third, a balance-of-threat strategy may actually strengthen the hands of China's moderates and quasi-liberals but not its hard-liners because this strategy may enable the moderates and the quasi-liberals to argue that PLA deterrence strategy is too costly and traps China into an arms race and therefore does not work. This may constrain PLA nationalism by causing the Chinese to switch from militarized means to political and diplomatic ones in handling the Taiwan issue.

The balance-of-threat strategy should also be accompanied by an engagement strategy. It does not have to be a policy of appeasement as long as it is backed by a balance-of-threat strategy that can incur high cost for cheating behavior; and it is designed in a way in which it does not provide an easy conduit for the PLA to acquire technology and intelligence. The second track diplomacy-based engagement strategy may serve to increase the transparency of each other's military intentions and capabilities and to work out ways to prevent accidents. Equally important, such a strategy may include educational programs that aim to modify Chinese domestic norms by inculcating the liberal values among China's policy elite, including values concerning the role and functions of the military in a rule-of-law-based environment. To the extent a small but expanding group of moderates and quasi-liberals does exist in China's policy circle (including the PLA) who are more receptive to new ideas and norms, an engagement strategy apparently can work to constrain and undermine PLA nationalism.


Notes

 1See Nan Li, From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military's Discourse on National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era, Peaceworks No. 39 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, May 2001). [BACK]

 2Ibid. [BACK]

 3A PLA interlocutor, who serves on the editorial board of China Military Science (a journal published by the Academy of Military Science), provided this information. This person also holds a position at the National Defense Mobilization Commission, a State Council-Central Military Commission coordinating mechanism for mobilizational matters. For the most recent PLA commentary on ways to prevent ethnic separatism, see Tang Min, "Minzhu tuanjie, shanhe yonggu" ("Once Unity among Nationalities Is Achieved, the Land Becomes Forever Secure"), Liberation Army Daily, October 12, 2001, 3. [BACK]

 4For discussion of the theory's implications for PLA modernization in general, and for PLA joint training and exercises, knowledge-intensive personnel development, technology, and arms development, doctrinal development, and organizational development in particular, see Guo Anhua, "Bawo qiangda zhandouli de shidai yaoqiu" ("Call of the Time to Gain Mastery of the Powerful Fighting Capabilities"); Zhang Zengshun, "Hongyang kexue jingshen, hangshi 'da'ying' genji" ("Promote Scientific Spirit, Solidify the Foundation of 'Fight and Win'"); Wei Jianzhong, "Zuohao 'jiefang sixiang' da wenzhang" ("Do Well the Great Work of 'Emancipating Thought'"); Chen Yilai et al., "Tongguo lianhe xunlian juji 'da'ying' nengli" ("Build up the Ability to 'Fight and Win' through Joint Training"); Zhou Shihua, "Rencai peiyang gengyao qianghua 'shijie yan'guang'" ("More Emphasis Should be Placed on the 'World Outlook' in Cultivating and Training Personnel"); Zhang Bibo et al., "Jianshe zhuangbei fazhan xin zuobiao" ("Construct the New Coordinate for Armament Development"); Huang Youfu et al., "Zhuigan shidai chaoliu, chuangxin junshi lilun" ("Catch up with the Trend of the Time, Innovate Military Doctrine"); and Wang Wei et al., "Kao kexue de tizhi bianzhi shifang zhangdouli" ("Rely on Scientific Organizational System and Scale to Discharge Fighting Capabilities"). All articles appear in Liberation Army Daily, July 24, 2001, 6. [BACK]

 5One commentary, for instance, argues that the theory implies the Chinese Communist Party should be the vanguard of not just the working class but also of the Chinese citizens' nation. See Wu Qiliang, "Zenyang lijie dang yao 'tongshi chengwei zhongguo renmin he zhonghua minzhu de xianfengdui'?" ("How to Comprehend that the Party Should 'at the Same Time Become the Vanguard of the Chinese People and the Chinese Nation'?"), Liberation Army Daily, August 22, 2001, 6. [BACK]

 6This is not to suggest that an acute crisis of a massive scale is totally inconceivable, particularly if one is keenly aware of the serious challenges that the current Chinese leadership faces, such as rampant bureaucratic corruption, the mass army of unemployed due to privatization of agriculture, the state-owned enterprises reforms, and the rapidly widening gap in wealth between the coast and the hinterland, and between cities and countryside. On the other hand, the recent massive crackdown on official corruption, the attempt to develop a social security system to provide unemployment and other welfare benefits, the plan to eliminate the rigid residential registration system, the program to shift capital investment from the coast to the inner provinces, and the crackdown and, therefore, lack of political opposition may somewhat reduce the probability of an imminent crisis. [BACK]

 7As the PLA continues to downsize and modernize its weaponry, it may have increasing difficulty in the future dealing even with the kind of mass demonstrations that took place in the summer of 1989; the PLA may lose the necessary manpower and low-tech arms to handle such a massive domestic unrest. [BACK]

 8If this rule is strictly followed, six of the nine uniformed CMC members, including Zhang Wannian, Chi Haotian, Fu Quanyou, Yu Yongbo, Wang Ke, and Wang Reilin, should retire at the 16th Party Congress. [BACK]

 9See Liberation Army Daily, September 8, 2001, 1. [BACK]

10Zhang is also the translator and publisher of Tom Clancy's Hunt for Red October in China. [BACK]

11Li Feng et al., "Jujiao xuanchuan duikang" ("Focus on Propaganda Warfare"), China National Defense Daily, June 4, 2001, 3. [BACK]

12The CMC, for instance, does not answer to the National People's Congress and the premier of the State Council but rather to the CCP Politburo and its Central Committee, which do not meet regularly to manage daily government affairs. [BACK]

13PLA strategists acknowledge that, unlike Western analysts who try to learn lessons about one's own vulnerabilities and the strength of the enemy in analyzing past military campaign cases, PLA analysts would skip PLA mistakes and enemy strong points and concentrate on learning the positive lessons about the PLA and the negative lessons about the enemy in such analyses. Such an open acknowledgment, however, may mean that the PLA is beginning to see this as a problem and is taking steps to change it. [BACK]

14The EP-3 incident, for instance, illustrates this potential. Before any joint investigation into the causes of the incident, the U.S. side was immediately held responsible and therefore became the imagined enemy. As a result, all Chinese leaders, including those from the PLA, refused to answer phone calls from the U.S. side. While the Americans believe that establishing bilateral channels of communication at all levels through track-two diplomacy would be beneficial to mediating differences and conflicts, particularly in a crisis, the closure of these channels by the Chinese side in a crisis shows that the latter has a very different understanding about the purpose of these channels. [BACK]

 
 
Table of Contents  I  Chapter Five



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