Chapter One

The PLA in a Changing China: An Overview

Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is striving to cope with dramatic changes in Chinese society, shifts in the global security environment, and the revolution in military affairs. The factors affecting this process are many and varied: the social and economic revolutions under way within China; the search by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for a relevant role in a more complicated political milieu; the installation of the "fourth-generation" leadership at the November 2002 16th Congress of the CCP and the March 2003 10th-National People's Congress; China's evolving diplomacy; the growth of the country's relative military strength; and the ambitions of a politically oriented military establishment that is also undergoing a leadership shift as it seeks to create a new image and identity for itself. The outcome of this process will profoundly affect China, the Asia-Pacific region, and, perhaps, the entire world.

This book includes a collection of revised and updated papers prepared originally for an October 2001 conference entitled The PLA and Chinese Society in Transition, which was sponsored by the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. The analyses explore the context and processes governing PLA ambitions to remake itself. The six parts of the book assess likely developments in civil-military relations under the fourth-generation leaders, the impact of growing nationalism in China, evolving PLA military capabilities, key regional and global issues, the prospects for U.S.-China relations and military-to-military cooperation, and the implications for U.S. defense planning.

The contributors to this volume are a diverse group of leading American experts on Chinese military affairs from universities, research centers, government, and the private sector. Their assessments and policy recommendations are wide-ranging and reflect many of the divergences among China watchers. Several important points are worth highlighting:

• During 2002-2003, the People's Republic of China successfully and peacefully completed the largest single transfer of civilian and military power in its history. As expected, the fourth-generation leadership, headed by former State Vice President Hu Jintao, ascended uneventfully to seats of power in Beijing. Hu became both state president and CCP general secretary. Yet the third generation of leaders, led by former State President Jiang Zemin, did not leave the stage entirely. Jiang still commands potentially significant amounts of power behind the scenes. He retained his position as Central Military Commission (CMC) chairman, the nexus of party and military leadership, and placed a number of his protégées and loyal followers in other key positions, ensuring his continued influence over the course of China's evolution.
• To some extent, China's fourth-generation leaders represent unknown quantities. Still we know that many of them differ from their predecessors in several important ways. China's new leaders tend to be pragmatic technocrats. They lack extensive military and revolutionary experience. They tend to be more inwardly focused, perhaps less sophisticated in international affairs, than the previous generation. Most importantly, unlike the generation that has just stood down, this new generation was largely unaffected by the ravages of the Cultural Revolution.
• The PLA military leadership is playing an important, but not necessarily the decisive, role in its transformation. China's political apparatus continues to have significant control over the process. In this regard, the powerful position of the PLA in the CCP Central Military Commission, a key party organ, remains an important source of influence.
• The PLA is undergoing a military leadership secession of equal importance with China's civilian political transition. A new group of senior military officers has already assumed major responsibilities in military regions, general staff departments, and service branches.
• The PLA is pursuing a vigorous and multifaceted military modernization program supported by significant real annual increases in defense spending. It is expanding missile force capable of striking Taiwan, even from longer ranges. It is acquiring new multirole combat aircraft with long-range strike capabilities, improving its command, control, communications, and intelligence, and augmenting naval capabilities for perimeter defense and local amphibious operations. There are two major uncertainties in assessing future defense trends: how long can China sustain the remarkable economic expansion that has supported this defense buildup, and how much will other priorities curtail military modernization requests?
• The PLA military strategy sees the United States as its principal adversary. As a result, the PLA increasingly emphasizes preemptive, asymmetric strikes against critical American military targets, as well as active and passive defenses against U.S. long-range precision strike systems.
• Nationalism is a growing force within Chinese society as a whole and the PLA in particular. Together with continued economic prosperity, nationalism has become a major factor affecting regime legitimacy and the overall basis of state power. Nationalist issues have spurred the PLA to focus more attention on irredentist claims, as well as longstanding geostrategic claims along China's periphery.
• Even as the war on terrorism has created a new context in which Washington and Beijing could begin developing military cooperation in pursuit of mutual security interests, significant political and cultural obstacles and an overarching atmosphere of mutual mistrust continue to hamper such cooperation. Establishment of a permanent commission to support the development of bilateral defense cooperation programs is essential to building even a moderately successful relationship. Opportunities exist for realigning counterpart relationships between the PLA and the U.S. defense community. Realignment would ensure that policymakers in each government deal directly with one another rather than through intermediaries or their respective intelligence communities. Expansion of the number and types of military exchanges and dialogues could help build confidence, understanding, and practical cooperation.

How the Book Is Organized

Part I considers the political and military transitions in China during 2002-2003 and their implications for Chinese civil-military relations and U.S. foreign and defense policy. Part II examines the impact of growing nationalism on Chinese politics and the PLA. Understanding the PLA role in Chinese society requires consideration of PLA doctrine, strategy, and force structure, so Part III provides critical assessments of current and projected capabilities that are essential for informed speculation about future intentions. Part IV examines China's national security concept and military doctrine and strategy to understand the main determinants of military planning and operations. Part V assesses the record and prospects for U.S.-China military-to-military relations. Finally, Part VI advances two divergent paths for U.S.-China relations.

Part I--China's Fourth-Generation Leadership

In the opening chapter, Bates Gill notes that the transition has brought sweeping change to the CCP, the Chinese state apparatus, and the PLA. Gill characterizes the fourth-generation leaders as pragmatic technocrats with little military experience and a bad taste for the extremism of the Cultural Revolution, which disrupted their formative years. He notes that the top leadership contenders--Hu Jintao, Li Changchum, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Zeng Qinghong, and Lou Jiwei--and other party chieftains share an overwhelming concern for maintaining conditions that will sustain internal growth and stability, which are the principal bases for continued CCP leadership in China. He notes that these goals must be achieved at a time when a number of difficult social, economic, and political problems are coming to a head. Gill envisions four issues dominating the attention of the Chinese leadership during this period: the politics of transition, entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), socioeconomic difficulties, and party reform.

In addition to the equities of various factions and generations within the party, Gill notes that the leadership is increasingly sensitive to the public mood. He foresees the era of collective leadership continuing. While Jiang Zemin tried to establish himself as a paramount leader, he still must lead by building consensus. Gill sees Jiang and the third generation of leaders using their networks to retain considerable power even after the formal transitions. Thus, he recommends keeping lines open to both the retiring elders and expanding contacts with fourth-generation leaders.

Gill, like several other contributors to this volume, sees China's integration into WTO as a critical challenge. While WTO is likely to boost trade, stimulate the economy, and spur enterprise restructuring, some sectors and many individuals will suffer dislocation. In addition, the leadership will have to grapple with internal corruption, income disparities between different regions, and dire health and environmental problems. Backlash related to all these problems will cause domestic turmoil during and after the leadership transition period. Finally, there is the identity crisis within the CCP, which no longer has any compelling and cohesive ideological message for the people. As Gill notes, the party leads by "a mix of coercion, delivery of economic growth, and the absence of a viable alternative." Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" call on party members to be more representative of the advanced productive forces of society (private entrepreneurs), of advanced culture in China, and of the fundamental interests of the majority of the Chinese people. Gill sees Chinese leaders focused on two external concerns during the transition. The first is balancing its cooperation with the United States on global counterterrorism efforts with its concerns for how this effort could expand U.S. regional and global influence. The second is managing cross-strait relations, where Gill sees the transition contributing to a tough but cautious approach to Taiwan's political assertiveness.

Gill notes that Washington can have little influence over transition politics. However, he advocates that U.S. policies toward China be attuned to the tumultuous economic and social challenges that the fourth-generation leaders face, with the goal of fostering broad outcomes favorable to U.S. interests. Gill urges American officials to maintain channels to all elements of Chinese leadership, to understand the troubled domestic environment the Chinese leadership is facing, and to leverage counterterrorism cooperation in ways that encourage progress on other issues, such as proliferation and human and political rights, that constrain development of a productive U.S.-China relationship.

David Shambaugh explores the changing nature of civil-military relations in China. He notes that the PLA is undergoing a leadership succession of equal importance with the political transition. He reviews the sweeping turnover of top personnel in the PLA that occurred before, at, and after the 16th Party Congress. While Jiang Zemin remained as chairman of the CMC at the Congress and Hu Jintao stayed on as vice-chair, there was much more change than continuity in the military leadership. Shambaugh argues that this transition without a purge or crisis reflects the growing professionalism of the PLA. He notes that the new CMC was streamlined from 11 to 8 members, and none of its members (other than Hu Jintao) were appointed to a position on the Politburo Standing Committee. More broadly, it is interesting to note that PLA representation on the CCP Central Committee has fallen to nearly an all-time low of 21 percent. The continuation of Jiang Zemin as chairman of both the party and state CMC creates two procedural anomalies, the subordination of the PLA to party and state command. He notes that Jiang's retention of power has clouded an otherwise smooth succession and did encounter some opposition. He also notes that Hu Jintao has no previous military credentials of his own and has not been engaged in military affairs. While the PLA will respect Hu as a party and state leader, Shambaugh argues, Hu will need to court the regional military leadership to build support for his eventual assumption of the CMC.

Shambaugh notes that while we do not possess extensive biographical data on those second-echelon officers beneath the CMC, a number of changes in leading PLA personnel took place in the military regions, general departments, and services in the year prior to the Congress. This cohort not only represents the fourth generation of PLA leaders but also the fifth. It is from this pool of officers that the senior military leadership will be drawn in the years ahead. Still dominated by the ground forces, the group has substantial field command experience and is well educated. However, they are not well traveled abroad and have little actual combat experience. Shambaugh predicts that this cadre is likely to focus on comprehensive modernization of the PLA, is unlikely to intervene in high-level politics, and wants to avoid performing internal security functions.

All this reflects further institutional bifurcation of party and army. The military played no apparent role in the civilian leadership succession before or at the 16th Congress and vice versa. Not a single senior party leader has one day of military experience, and none of the new military leaders have any experience in high-level politics. This trend was evident in the third generation of leaders but is a marked departure from the former fusing of civilian and military leaderships. This bifurcation reinforces the ongoing trend toward corporatism and professionalism and a diminishment of ideological considerations in the PLA. In this context, one can begin to speak of civil-military rather than party-army relations in the PRC, with the PLA developing limited autonomy from the ruling party and possibly entering an intermediate stage in a transition from a party-army to a national army. Shambaugh has no doubts that the PLA will defend China against external enemies. However, whether it will move against internal enemies that may threaten the rule of the Communist Party will be the ultimate test of the redefined relationship of the army to the party and state in China.

Part II--The Impact of Growing Nationalism

Nan Li examines the growth of PLA nationalism, which he refers to as conservative nationalism. In the post-ideological world and competitive global economy, the central role of the state apparatus is to ensure that China can develop and prosper relative to other countries. The primary role of the PLA in this context has become to maintain China's territorial integrity, expand the depth of the country's security zone, and protect critical lines of communication. Li contends that the PLA withdrawal from the class-based politics of the Cultural Revolution and, more recently, from its extensive commercial activities further reinforced this nationalist agenda. According to Li, PLA nationalism is conservative in scope--focused mainly along China's periphery--and in pace--seeking a gradual consolidation of what the Chinese call comprehensive national power. While noting that there are liberal internationalist voices in the PLA that support multilateralism and peaceful resolution of disputes, Li contends that coBservative nationalism is the dominant paradigm in the PLA today.

This mindset, Li argues, engenders military support for forceful efforts to prevent Taiwanese independence, advance certain territorial claims, and realize other regional interests. He contends that PLA conservative nationalism has influenced recent political trends, including Jiang's theory of the Three Represents that broadened membership in the CCP to "advanced productive and cultural forces." Li sees the PLA as playing a subtle but important role in the leadership transition, with a clear profile of the kind of figures who would support their agenda. He argues that Hu Jintao fits this profile fairly well, given his strong record in fighting Tibet separatism when he served as first party secretary in that province. He notes that the PLA has also sponsored sizable media, propaganda, and popular entertainment programs with themes designed to bolster wider support for its strong national security agenda. Li concludes that growth, which would stave off a major socioeconomic crisis and support further defense modernization, could exacerbate PLA nationalism, as would further U.S. moves that were seen as backing Taiwan independence. In contrast, an economic recession, democratization, or a U.S. policy that combines a balance of military resolve and engagement could potentially constrain PLA nationalism.

Moving to Chinese society in general and the growth of nationalism, Edward Friedman argues that the goal of contemporary Chinese nationalism is to establish hegemony in Asia but that this tendency need not lead to conflict with the United States if forces that favor economic growth and international integration can prevail. He contends that a U.S. policy of cautious and vigilant engagement can, at the margin, help these peaceful forces prevail against the dominant chauvinists in Chinese politics. According to Friedman, Chinese nationalism developed as a response to the perceived fear that, following the fall of the Soviet Union, China would be targeted for containment or elimination by the United States. This concern, combined with Chinese economic growth and official efforts to stoke anti-Americanism, has contributed to the growth of nationalism. Friedman argues that the government could be riding a tiger in stirring this nationalist fervor because it could turn against the leadership in a time of crisis when their actions are not seen as sufficiently strong in defending the national interest. At the same time, Friedman notes that this nationalist, anti-American sentiment in China is not an informed opinion and hence is subject to rapid change. This argues for a cautious engagement to strengthen forces in China that favor peaceful cooperation and to demonstrate U.S. willingness to work constructively with Beijing in areas of common interest.

Part III--Military Trends

While much is written about PLA force goals and aspirations, a key uncertainty in assessments and projections remains the question of resources. Chinese defense spending is grossly underreported, and there are great uncertainties as to whether the government can maintain the steady budget increases essential for realization of force goals.

James Mulvenon surveys PLA evolution since 1949 and assesses PLA aspirations to become a modern army after a difficult two decades of restructuring, downsizing, doctrinal experimentation, and diminished institutional standing at home. He notes that prior to the 1970s, the PLA was focused inward on continental defense in accordance with the doctrine of People's War. Naval and air forces were seen as providing little more than a speed bump to likely invading high-technology armies--the United States from 1949 to the mid-1960s and the Soviet Union from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping initiated a transformation in military doctrine and force structure, turning the PLA focus outward to deal with local wars along the periphery of China. However, the army has seen only one real test of this concept since these changes were implemented, the 1987 operations along the Vietnam border. The largest mobilization of the ground forces took place during the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown on internal dissent. Since 1989, the focus of all PLA forces has been on a single dominant planning scenario: a Taiwan crisis. But this shift has also given the navy and air force increased importance and higher priority in resources for modernization.

Mulvenon explains that the army retains a critical role in defending the party and the people from internal and external enemies. However, he notes that these missions have also suffered attrition. Given the improbability of a ground invasion of China, the ground forces have exercised this function with existing equipment and have received low priority in the struggle for procurement resources. At the same time, the army role in internal security has been diminished considerably since 1989 with the transfer of a number of PLA units to the People's Armed Police. In addition, the army has not played a prominent role in the internal debate on the revolution in military affairs, thus limiting service influence over the future shape of the PLA. Mulvenon and other analysts conclude that the majority of the 100 army divisions are likely to remain low- to medium-tech forces that lack weapons with the range and precision to be used in an offensive mode against modern armies. If the army is to realize its goal of developing selected forces capable of acting swiftly to deal with contingencies along the country's periphery, Mulvenon concludes, it will have to make further reductions in force structure, continue its significant communications enhancements, procure a number of modern weapons, increase reserve capabilities, and expand training.

Bernard Cole reviews the evolution of China's maritime strategy of active offshore defenses, use of the island chains as strategic delineators, and quest for blue-water naval capabilities. He argues that while the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will increase its capabilities for active offshore defenses in a broad area around its periphery, this will not lead to development of a blue-water fleet capable of global operations. Cole traces how General Liu Huaqing, head of the PLAN from 1982 to 1987, pressed for expansion of naval operations from coastal defense to offshore active defense. Liu set a course for a three-stage naval development process focused on two maritime areas of strategic concern to the nation--the first and second island chains. The first island chain extends 200 to 700 nautical miles from the mainland to include the Yellow Sea, the western East China Sea, and the South China Sea, including Taiwan and other land features claimed by Taiwan. The second island chain is even more ambitious, encompassing maritime areas out to 1,800 nautical miles for the mainland along a north-south line stretching from the Kuriles to Indonesia, including most of the East China Sea and the East Asian sea lines of communication. The third phase of Liu's putative maritime strategy envisions the PLAN as a global force in the middle of the 21st century, built around aircraft carriers or missile-carrying submarines.

While Beijing's current naval modernization is almost always discussed in the context of Liu's theory, Cole argues that development plans and doctrinal shifts focus primarily on development of a mobile navy capable of using surprise and initiative to protect China's periphery against superior forces. He notes that the PLAN surface fleet is modernizing at a measured pace. The most notable surface developments are the acquisition of four Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers with supersonic antisurface ship cruise missiles and about a dozen modern Chinese-built destroyers and frigates armed with subsonic cruise missiles. However, these modern ships lack capable area air-defense missile systems and have limited antisubmarine systems. The rest of the surface fleet is of 1950s vintage. He notes that the PLAN Air Force has far fewer aircraft than the regular air force and most of these are older models, with the exception of 28 Russian- and French-designed helicopters. The PLAN Air Force has also been slow to acquire the systems and to conduct training for aerial refueling--a critical step in extending the reach of airpower. Cole indicates that the PLAN does not have and is not building a significant amphibious assault capability in the navy or the merchant fleet. The most formidable arm of the PLAN is the submarine force, led by four very quiet and lethal Kilo-class boats, including 23 Chinese-designed Ming- and Song-class diesel-electric boats. He concludes by noting that while the PLAN is the largest navy in East Asia and one of the largest in the world, it would have to rely on speed, mobility, and surprise in confronting a strong opponent, particularly the United States. He suggests that the PLAN is capable of undertaking limited sea denial operations and active offshore defense operations in waters within the first island chain (a few hundred miles off its coast). While capable of some blue-water presence, Cole sees global reach as a distant, uncertain PLAN goal.

Richard Fisher contends that the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is pursuing the first large-scale modernization of its forces in an effort to acquire capability for offensive and defensive operations in all weather conditions and in a modern, high-tech environment. Fisher cites Department of Defense reports to Congress on the PLA that note that, absent any compensatory actions by Taiwan, the airpower balance in the Taiwan Strait could favor the PLAAF by 2005. Fisher also estimates that the PLAAF will pose a significant threat to a U.S. carrier battlegroup by that point. Fisher describes how PLAAF equipment modernization is being supported by important doctrinal shifts, including interest in offensive and multiservice (joint) operations. He argues that plans to expand multirole combat aircraft are designed to complement the expansion of ballistic and cruise missile forces. Fisher also sees indications that airborne troops are being developed for strategic strikes and that air defense forces, which are being expanded substantially, are considered a critical component in support of offensive operations.

Fisher highlights several key trends in PLAAF equipment modernization: a new interest in modern training aircraft and simulators; plans to procure 300 to 400 new or modified multirole combat aircraft; acquisition of new types of antiair and ground attack munitions, including precision-guided bombs, missiles, and antiradar antiship missiles; greater emphasis on support platforms (tankers, electronic warfare capabilities, and both development and foreign acquisition of airborne warning and control systems [AWACS]); and plans for procuring expanded air transport assets. Fisher notes that the PLAAF has also acquired a fourth-generation fighter aircraft, the Russian Su-27, but the Chinese have had problems incorporating these aircraft into their forces. The PLAAF still has no modern, dedicated close-air support aircraft with precision-guided munitions and heavy machineguns akin to the U.S. A-10 or the Russian Su-25 and appears content to rely on older aircraft with gravity bombs and attack helicopters. However, Fisher cites reports that the Chinese plan to outfit about 25 of the 100 H-6 bombers in the PLAAF with television-guided land-attack cruise missiles to give these 1950s aircraft new offensive capabilities that could be used against Taiwan in tandem with short-range ballistic missiles in the Second Artillery. Fisher notes that while the Chinese reportedly were developing an indigenous successor to the H-6 or might acquire a new bomber from the Russians--Tu-22M (Backfire) or the Su-34--neither development has materialized. As with other services, the PLAAF needs access to modern intelligence and information to engage in effective offensive operations. Fisher notes that the PLA may be planning to procure an array of eight imaging and eight radar satellites to improve reconnaissance capabilities.

While granting the myriad of challenges that the Chinese must address to assemble, train, maintain, and pay for this modernization, Fisher concludes that the PLAAF is making serious investments and realizing important strides. He argues that the growth of the PLAAF and other forces could lead Beijing to assume in a crisis a few years hence that it has the capabilities to take decisive military action against Taiwan, particularly if the United States were seen as distracted by the war on terrorism or other global security problems. To deter the mainland, Fisher advocates a robust effort to increase Taiwan's active and passive defenses. He also argues that the United States should accelerate introduction of advanced combat aircraft, relocate certain American forces in the region closer to Taiwan, increase the survivability of certain reconnaissance and communications satellites, and accelerate deployments of theater missile defenses and land-attack cruise missiles.

Although large gaps remain in Western knowledge of the resources the Chinese are actually devoting to defense, PLA modernization plans clearly will be costly. Western analysts differ as to whether China's projected economic growth is adequate to support the ambitious PLA plans. Richard Bitzinger seeks to sort through this debate by explaining what is known and unknown (and what probably will never be known) about Chinese defense spending to clarify the limits of using this analysis to ascertain Chinese military priorities and capabilities. He argues that Western efforts to fill the gaps in official Chinese expenditure figures, while scientific and well intended, have reached a methodological dead end.

Bitzinger notes that one fact foreign analysts have known since 1950 is the official top line of Chinese military expenditures. In 2001, the Chinese announced a defense budget of $17 billion, a 17-percent increase over the previous year, which continued a 12-year trend of real growth. China's official defense budget doubled between 1989 and 2000 and increased by 58 percent between 1995 and 2000. This increase was justified as necessary to "adapt to changes in the military situation in the world" and to "prepare for defense and combat in a high-technology environment." Bitzinger cites reports that Beijing plans to fund yearly double-digit defense budget increases, such that official spending could more than double current levels by 2005. He argues that one can conclude from these trends that Beijing is seriously committed to modernizing the PLA into an advanced military force and is signaling potential adversaries that it wants these forces to gain certain strategic objectives.

Bitzinger points out that the defense budget has constituted about 9 to 10 percent of the overall state budget and less than 2 percent of gross domestic product over the past decade. Both figures have fallen significantly since the 1980s, indicating that defense spending is actually a declining burden on the Chinese economy. Similarly, the Chinese do offer a public breakdown of rough spending categories. Analysis of these trends reveals that while Beijing contends that the bulk of recent defense increases have gone to improve salaries and benefits of PLA soldiers, in fact, procurement and operations and maintenance accounts have actually grown at significantly higher levels.

However, it is well known that the official Chinese defense budget accounts for only a fraction of overall defense spending. Military research and development costs and the costs of the People's Armed Police are funded by other parts of the state budget. Arms imports are extrabudgetary purchases, militia and reserve forces are partly borne by provincial accounts, and official subsidies of the military-industrial complex do not appear in the defense top line. In addition, the defense budget does not reflect income from certain businesses that the PLA still owns or controls indirectly, despite official divestiture of most PLA businesses since 1998. Moreover, some form of purchasing power parity formula needs to be applied to Chinese defense expenditures since personnel expenses and most goods cost less than they would in the West. Among the other gaps in Western knowledge are allocations of spending to various services, numbers and types of weapons procured, and spending on training and logistics.

Bitzinger offers alternative approaches to analysis of Chinese defense budgets, including a method that focuses on assessing likely future procurement costs as a way to assess if there is a mismatch between capabilities and spending. Using this methodology, which he cautions is still fraught with caveats, he concludes that the Chinese could readily afford a modest buildup with a 5 percent increase in official defense spending and a fairly robust one with 10 percent annual growth for 10 years. At the same time, he notes that if the economy continues to grow at current rates, the defense burden on the state budget is likely to remain low. He concludes that analysts should avoid a focus on the bottom line of total defense spending and instead look for reliable indicators of where the money is going and why.

Part IV--Key Policy Challenges

David Finkelstein examines China's "New Security Concept," first advanced at the March 1997 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum as a Chinese vision for a multilateral security environment in the post-Cold War era that rejected the need to strengthen alliances and the use of force. Finkelstein concludes that the new concept is primarily a political and economic construct that has had little impact on its target audience in Southeast Asia but has helped advance China's Shanghai Cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. He sees the concept as having had little direct impact on defense planning.

A Chinese leadership in transition, growing nationalism, and uncertain economic prospects complicate the handling of several key issues in U.S. policy toward China, including Taiwan, the direction of military-to-military exchanges, WTO membership, Russian arms purchases, and dual-use commercial equipment.

Taiwan remains the most sensitive and explosive issue in U.S.-China relations. Cynthia Watson explores how the PLA may approach this strategic issue in the coming years. Watson notes that the PLA has a unique responsibility to protect the CCP rather than the state per se. As a result, the PLA leadership sees its primary mission as protecting not only the country's physical security but also CCP legitimacy. However, she postulates that professionalization is changing the character of the army and may make it more nationalistic. As the CCP becomes dominated by leaders with no military experience, such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, and the PLA becomes more professional, Watson forecasts that the CCP leadership may be concerned about diverging assessments of national interests between the party and the armed forces, as well as its ability to control the PLA. Watson concludes that the changing party-army relationship and a more assertive PLA with differing policy preferences between the two institutions could complicate Beijing's decisionmaking process in a future Taiwan crisis.

Watson notes that many mainland and Taiwanese observers seem convinced that time is on Beijing's side with respect to reunification as a consequence of Taiwan's economic stagnation, PLA modernization, and Beijing's new cooperative relationship with Washington in the war on global terrorism. Another factor mitigating cross-strait and U.S.-Chinese tensions, Watson contends, is the relatively restrained approach that the Bush administration has taken with respect to arms sales to Taiwan. Nevertheless, she argues that PLA leaders see reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as so essential to national sovereignty that they would be prepared to endure likely setbacks to economic development--and attendant risks to social order--that would surely follow military action to secure reunification. She sees any wavering on Taiwan by a future CCP leadership concerned with the economic downsides as leading to civil-military tensions. Watson concludes that the PLA is likely to be a more assertive and influential actor in Chinese domestic deliberations on Taiwan and other key issues after the 16th Party Congress.

John Tkacik illuminates the contours of Taiwan domestic politics and concludes that while they are becoming more dynamic and democratic, they will remain sharply divided along ethnic lines for the foreseeable future. The main ethnic cleavages in Taiwan's political culture are between mainlanders, Hoklo Lang Taiwanese, Hakka Taiwanese, and Malayo-Polynesian aborigines. Tkacik argues that these ethnic and factional divisions will preclude the Taipei government from making dramatic moves toward or away from Beijing. Tkacik discusses how these ethnic cleavages played in voting for the three major candidates in the March 2000 presidential elections: Chen Shui-bian (Democratic Progressive Party [DPP]), James Soong (People First Party [PFP]), and Lien Chan (Kuomintang [KMT]). Chen carried down-island Hoklo areas (representing 40 percent of the vote), Soong won among mainlanders, Hakka, and aborigines (36 percent), leaving Lien with ethnic Taiwanese voters loyal to the KMT (23 percent). Former President Lee Teng-hui's tepid support for his party's candidate, Lien, led to his distant third-place showing and a subsequent shattering of the once-dominant KMT.

Tkacik predicts that the KMT-PFP electoral alliance for the 2004 presidential elections will be tenuous, while the DPP will remain handicapped by its loose organizational structure and factionalism. He concludes that because national identity is at the heart of cross-strait tensions, Taiwan politics will not permit an accommodation of the mainland demand that Taiwan become a political entity subordinate to Beijing's authority. Absent some shift by Beijing, Tkacik is pessimistic about cross-strait rapprochement. At the same time, he foresees that the inclination of the majority Hoklo-Taiwanese to declare independence will be restrained by uneasiness of the minority Hakka, mainlander, and aboriginal communities.

Eugene Rumer contends that while Sino-Russian relations improved over the past decade, these ties are being recast in light of both countries' reassessment of their foreign policy priorities after September 11, 2001, differing relationships with the United States, and related domestic considerations. While the two countries have some common interests and a shared wariness of American power, Rumer dismisses the notion of a Russian-Chinese alliance or strategic partnership as an exaggeration even before September 11. He characterizes the Sino-Russian relationship as, "at best, a marriage of convenience and, and, at worst, a latent geopolitical fault line in Eurasia."

Rumer traces how the war on terrorism has opened new channels between Russia and the United States. Vladimir Putin's decisive support for U.S. actions in Afghanistan and willingness to compromise on key arms control issues--hardly welcome in Beijing--demonstrate that good relations with Washington are a higher priority than ties with Beijing. China remains a key market for the financially strapped Russian defense industry. The two neighbors have common interests in the stability of Central Asia and in limiting U.S. influence there. However, the Russian foreign policy elite continues to harbor concern that burgeoning Chinese military and economic power could threaten Russian control of the Far East regions. Rumer concludes that Putin cannot afford to antagonize Beijing or suspend its arms sales. However, if the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington continues, the Sino-Russian strategic partnership will likely become hollow.

Kevin Nealer reviews the broad economic context and the impact of trade with the United States for PLA modernization efforts. He concludes that declining exports and the impact of complying with WTO obligations will place additional demands on government resources, making it difficult to sustain projected defense budget increases. Nealer predicts that China will see increased unemployment, social dislocation, pressures on its legal system, and growing disparities in wealth between the coastal regions and the interior. He dismisses as overly simplistic the notion that Chinese access to U.S. capital markets frees up Chinese assets to support military expansion. He reminds us that the PLA must compete with other governmental components for funds in budget battles. Moreover, Nealer notes that the disclosure requirements of international capital markets have given Western observers much greater insights into the structure and functions of Chinese companies than ever before. With regard to the problem of diversion of critical civilian technology for military applications, Nealer argues for fewer but higher fences around the systems and capabilities that matter most to the United States.

Howard Krawitz explores the implications of China's trade opening for regional stability. Krawitz agrees with Nealer that WTO accession will force China to grapple with many economic and social challenges on a massive scale. He posits two scenarios for China's evolution under WTO membership. First, China could adjust well by adapting to the inflow of Western capital, management practices, and technology to strengthen the competitiveness of its enterprises. Such a confident and circumspect China could be more readily integrated into the global economic system and would likely see peace and stability as key to maintaining the country's prosperity. Second, in a worst-case scenario, implementation of WTO-mandated changes could exacerbate domestic political, economic, and social differences and make the country more ungovernable. If the Chinese public also perceived that they were not benefiting from integration into the international economic community, Krawitz postulates that conservative and nationalist backlash would likely stimulate military aggressiveness and attempts at regional hegemony.

Under the first scenario, particularly if it is accompanied by the stabilizing impact of a growing Chinese middle class, Krawitz sees the U.S.-China relationship as cooperative, productive, and mutually beneficial. Krawitz grants that a more prosperous and militarily capable China could also pursue an aggressive, nationalist course. However, he sees this as unlikely, arguing that the new generation of leaders are technocrats focused on economic development and disinclined to military adventurism. That said, he notes that the worst-case scenario is certain to lead Beijing toward a tense and confrontational relationship with the United States and neighboring countries. Krawitz concludes that helping China implement economic reforms serves long-term U.S. interests. He argues for a strategy that includes the following elements: realistic expectations about the U.S. ability to influence China; clarity and consistency, which have often been lacking in the policies and communications of both sides; and patience in spanning the gap between the cultures and worldviews of the two countries.

Part V--U.S.-China Military Relations

Paul Godwin notes that evolving PLA doctrine and strategy see the United States as China's most dangerous potential adversary with considerable ability to project and sustain high-intensity warfare on China's periphery and deep into its interior. Godwin Explores the role mutual apprehension plays in this relationship. Where the United States perceives China as the single state in Asia likely to challenge its preeminence in the region, China assumes that America seeks to contain it and will intervene militarily in any conflict that may erupt over Taiwan. Consequently, the PLA must brace itself for a long-term confrontation with the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Godwin reviews the military doctrine, strategy, and concepts of operations that PLA planners draw from as they think through the formidable challenges presented by the capabilities of U.S. forces and their operational doctrine. According to Godwin, Chinese military doctrine now stresses the need for retaining a minimum nuclear deterrent, preemptive strikes against command, control, communication, computers, and information assets, carrier battlegroups, and foreign bases, as well as passive and active defenses against long-range, precision strike systems.

Alfred Wilhelm argues that expanding U.S.-China military-to-military contacts and security cooperation is essential to overcoming mutual suspicions and building a foundation for peaceful relations between the two countries. Wilhelm, who served as a defense attaché in Beijing, recounts how bilateral security cooperation after 1979 evolved on the basis of setting aside differences and working together in pursuit of mutual interests, particularly containment of Soviet influence. In support of these common interests, the military-to-military relationship included high-level visits, functional military exchanges (including education), and military technology cooperation. He notes that the Chinese entered these interactions with suspicion of Washington's motives and took a practical, narrowly defined approach designed to extract knowledge and technology. This approach led most officers on the U.S. side to conclude that the PLA derived much more from these interactions than the United States. However, Wilhelm contends that these tentative interactions improved channels of communication between the U.S. military and the PLA, enhanced transparency, and contributed to further amiable relations, which lasted until the late 1980s. The warming of Sino-Soviet relations and strains in U.S.-China relations following the Tiananmen massacre in 1989 led to a rupture in military-to-military contacts. Attempts by the Clinton administration to revive contacts in the early 1990s were derailed by Congressional alarm with the PLA buildup and Chinese espionage, coupled with the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1997. The EP-3 incident in April 2001 both put a hold on further contacts and brought into question the ability of military-to-military ties to enhance crisis communications.

Wilhelm agrees that the war on terrorism has created an immediate need and a new context for Washington and Beijing to develop durable military cooperation in pursuit of mutual security interests. He cautions that such a relationship will have to overcome important political and cultural obstacles and an overarching atmosphere of mutual mistrust. Wilhelm grants that PLA opacity in military contacts and dialogues inhibits reciprocity and the deepening of these ties. However, these impediments were overcome in the 1980s and, he argues, can be hurdled again if both sides show sufficient political will. He contends that the CCP decision in the 1990s to allow party officials to have contacts with nonsocialist foreign officials opens the door to realigning counterpart relationships between the PLA and the U.S. defense community to ensure that policymakers in each government are dealing directly with one another rather than through intermediaries or their respective intelligence communities. For example, the counterpart of the Secretary of Defense is not the Minister of Defense but the most senior military member of the CMC after the chairman, the General Secretary of the CCP. In addition, he urges that President Bush and other senior U.S. officials seek to build personal working relationships with Chinese officials in comparable positions. Wilhelm urges the two governments to create a standing defense commission with a full-time staff to support the development of a bilateral agenda and to monitor and advise the commission on bilateral defense programs. In that regard, he recommends significant expansion of the number and types of military exchanges and dialogues to build confidence and understanding through practical cooperation.

Part VI--Options for U.S. China Relations

Richard Thornton criticizes U.S. policy toward China over the past three decades for being instrumental in the growth of Chinese power. He contends that China cannot be a strategic partner with the United States and that continued American economic engagement, originally designed to help China become a counterweight to Russia, will help China realize what he characterizes as its hegemonic ambitions. Thornton contends that U.S. policies toward China should reflect the desirable strategic environment for the United States rather than American aspirations for China. Thornton holds that expansion of U.S. trade and investment in China after 1992 has greatly advanced the country's military power, but the overall economic system remains quite fragile. He sees Beijing's current strategy as making China into a great power using investment from East Asia and the United States to become stronger in order to achieve an intimidating military capability that would enable them to restructure the balance of power in East Asia to their advantage. Thornton asserts that Chinese policy toward Taiwan represents a general challenge to the United States in the Far East.

Thornton proposes a new U.S. policy designed to thwart Chinese expansion by exploiting the country's economic vulnerability. This strategy, which he likens to the Reagan administration approach to the Soviet Union, would constrict trade, limit the flow of technology, and inhibit China's ability to acquire hard currency. Thornton urges that, in tandem with this approach to restrict capital flows, the United States should maintain superior military capabilities, with an emphasis on missile defenses, to counter this key element of Chinese strategy. Thornton notes that the global economic recession, the war on terrorism, and Chinese entry into the WTO could unfold in ways that would advance his goal of precluding China from challenging the U.S. position of dominance in East Asia.

In contrast, David Lai contends that conflict between a status quo Unites States and a rising China can be avoided if the relationship is managed properly. He notes that the three policy schools for handling China--engagement, containment, and congainment, a hybrid of the two that blends economic engagement with military containment--all seek to change China into the image of the United States. He contends that the three approaches differ primarily in their means of achieving this goal. He notes that China's leaders view current U.S. policy of circumspect economic engagement and military containment with considerable suspicion.

Lai agrees that the global war on terrorism offers new opportunities to advance common Sino-American interests. He argues that many past and current elements of U.S. policy indicate a misunderstanding of China that is reflected in several areas: overstating the Chinese military threat, overestimating China's economic development, overlooking changes in China including Americanization of elements of Chinese lifestyle, and underestimating the ability of Chinese leaders to move their country forward. Lai argues for a balanced and restrained U.S. approach to relations with China that eschews labeling China as either a strategic partner or competitor. Lai also argues that U.S. intervention in internal Chinese affairs generally strengthens Chinese resistance to change. Lai contends that Chinese leaders have to stop viewing the United States as an archenemy, overcome self-imposed ideological barriers to cooperation, and limit the role of the military in domestic affairs. Lai concludes that while these changes in mindsets will take time, bilateral relations will improve, particularly if helped by the emergence of a multilateral regime for enhancing diplomatic dialogue and managing security in East Asia.

Conclusion

The analyses offered by the contributors to this volume illustrate that American China watchers are still far from consensus on the effects that growing nationalism, economic expansion, further integration into the global economy, and political transition will have on Chinese strategic behavior and military capabilities. All agree that China is a rising power. Questions relating to how quickly the country will grow, how it will apply its power, and how its leaders will choose to deal with the United States and its neighbors remain subjects of highly contentious debate. The analyses in this volume offer valuable baseline assessments of PLA force structure, doctrine, and strategy. They also demonstrate that there is a great deal of information in Chinese sources about PLA aspirations, intentions, force structure, and capabilities for those who care to mine it.

The contending assessments articulated herein reflect and have influenced significant shifts in U.S. policy toward China since 2001. The Bush administration came to office intent on undoing the Clinton administration's notion of a strategic partnership and on treating China as more of a strategic competitor. This initial policy thrust called for a much more circumspect approach to trade and investment, coupled with a military strategy designed to dissuade Beijing from seeking to challenge the U.S. position in East Asia. Then came September 11, 2001. The September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy document noted that the war on terrorism has created a new context for Sino-American relations and opportunities to pursue new forms of cooperation toward mutual security interests. The November 2002 Crawford Summit and subsequent bilateral exchanges have all emphasized the prospects for further cooperation on trade, terrorism, managing stability in East Asia, and renewal of military-to-military contacts. Given the contradictions inherent in U.S.-China relations, it seems certain that there will be several more shifts in the tone and substance of American policy toward the Middle Kingdom over the coming decade.