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Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future

CHAPTER 8 - LOGISTICS

Introduction

8.1  This was the UK's first large-scale operation since the inception of the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) in April 1999. Providing logistic support over 3400 miles by air and 5000 miles by sea to units operating in a demanding physical and climatic environment was a considerable challenge, but one which was met with notable success. In broad terms, a deployment of roughly the same size as in the Gulf Conflict of 1991 was achieved in half the time. This achievement was all the more remarkable as operational security and the requirement not to prejudice the UN process limited early planning and engagement with industry until the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) process was announced on 25 November 2002. Furthermore, the continuing evolution of the overall campaign plan in the later stages of preparation, coupled with the speed of deployment, tested the agility and flexibility of the UK's logistic support structures and processes to the full. Notwithstanding the overall logistical success, some areas for improvement have been identified in order to maximise support to future UK operations.

Logistics Planning

8.2  The Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL) is responsible for the totality ('end-to-end') of the logistic process. Since the Strategic Defence Review in 1998 however, there has been no senior independent expert logistic staff embedded within MOD's operational planning teams able to provide strategic sustainability and logistic guidance at the centre of the Department. Drawing on the experience of this operation therefore, a new post, Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Logistic Operations), was created in September 2003 to strengthen logistics representation within the Policy and Commitments staffs of the MOD. Together with CDL's continuing work on the 'end-to-end' logistics process, this will enable the Department further to improve operational logistic support to front-line troops.

Stockholdings

8.3  The DLO's remit is to supply UK forces with all the equipment they require where and when it is needed. In some cases this is achieved by stocking equipment in reserve for future use, although this is normally only cost effective for equipment required to support high readiness forces, or that cannot be purchased quickly. For example, under current planning assumptions MOD does not hold enough stock to match the requirements for a large-scale operation, but instead has mechanisms in place to purchase additional or operation-specific equipment when needed, within the assumed preparation time. Key to the success of this strategy is MOD's relationship with industry, as the Department relies on industry to provide stocks in time, often through the UOR and Operational Sustainment Funding processes.

8.4  As previously discussed, there was less time for preparation before this operation than generic planning guidance allowed for and consequently some equipment could not be bought in time. In some cases, this was compounded by the difficulty in defining the Services' requirements until the start of specific logistic planning for the operation and by the changes to the campaign plan. In other cases, individual units held fewer supplies than they should, some of which were out of date. However, although this resulted in some shortages in theatre, these were mostly in respect of personal kit and spares, and did not impact upon UK forces' overall ability to fight.

Royal Irish Regiment vehicles prepare to depart for Iraq

8.5  Some shortages of spares for both vehicles and helicopters were experienced. In the case of land forces these were resolved by creating a pool of spares, by removing parts from vehicles that were not being deployed. Such 'cannibalisation' is a pragmatic approach for deployments above small scale to maximise the availability of finite resources, especially for equipment that has been in service for some time, and has increasingly become common practice. For some older equipment, obsolescence means this is the only viable method for obtaining spares. Land forces nevertheless maintained a high level of equipment availability throughout. In the case of

helicopters, spares shortages are not easily overcome, given the long lead times for production of many components. Moreover, spares usage rates increase significantly whilst operating helicopters in a desert environment. Resource constraints precluded the provisioning of permanent packs of deployable spares. Instead, requirements were met by creating ad hoc packs using individual spares already on the shelf. Although this resulted in insufficient spares being deployed to theatre against the anticipated requirement, helicopter availability was in fact maintained at a reasonable level throughout the operation.

7 Armoured Brigade vehicles awaiting loading onto ships at Emden

8.6  Before this operation, the Department held three sets each of desert combat clothing for 9000 personnel and 10,000 pairs of desert boots, sufficient to equip those soldiers held at the highest level of readiness. Despite a huge effort by industry and the Department, by the time the operation began a number of deployed Service personnel had not received the ideal quantities of desert boots or combat clothing. However over 40,000 pairs of desert boots and some 80,000 sets of desert clothing had been sent, sufficient to equip each Serviceman and woman requiring desert clothing with enough boots and two sets of clothing. While less than the ideal scaling of three sets of clothing each, this would have been a pragmatic solution to the shortage. However, tight timelines, inadequate tracking of equipment in theatre, and some instances of incorrect boot and clothing sizes meant that not all Servicemen and women received their allocation. These shortages did not significantly impair the ability to fight, since standard, non-desert equipment was designed to be used in the temperatures experienced in theatre at the time, albeit it did not provide the same camouflage effect (hence front line troops were the priority for the available desert equipment).

8.7  The decision (a change in policy) to equip all Service personnel whose role required it with Enhanced Combat Body Armour (combat body armour enhanced by the addition of ceramic plates) posed a challenge because there were insufficient stocks to meet the needs of a large-scale force. Through additional purchases, over 38,000 complete sets of body armour were deployed to theatre. This should have met the total requirement, but late delivery against an advancing timescale, coupled with difficulties in equipment tracking and control of issue, led to localised shortfalls. Priority was therefore given to those personnel on the ground whom commanders judged to have the greatest need, principally dismounted infantry.

8.8  There were also localised shortages of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection and detection equipment, (such as NBC suits), again caused by sizing difficulties or equipment distribution and tracking problems. Other shortages were due to poor stock maintenance - for example the inspection regime for Residual Vapour Detectors had not been followed, leading to uncertainty over serviceability. Nevertheless, through a combination of purchasing spare parts and rigorous re-testing of the equipment, the operational requirement was met. In another case, the availability of the Nerve Agent Immobilised Enzyme Alarm & Detector, which was due to be replaced, was affected by the obsolescence of the equipment. Action was taken by the DLO to recover stocks and spares from non-deploying units, and while this reduced the number of these detectors deployed to theatre, other detection systems such as the Chemical Agent Monitor were used to ameliorate the shortfall.

Deployment

Newly arrived troops load their lorries

8.9  The Iraq operation highlighted the logistic complexities involved in a large-scale operation. The deployment process is managed by many organisations, including the Permanent Joint Headquarters, the Defence Transport and Movements Agency (DTMA), the single Services, the Joint Force Logistic Component in theatre and the DLO. To support this deployment the DLO established several new initiatives including the formation of the DLO's Logistics Operation Centre (DLOC) with the task of coordinating the movement of all stocks to theatre. The DLOC was a success, providing far greater visibility and flexibility over the transport of equipment into theatre. The deployment process worked very well overall, albeit there is scope for further improvement. The Chief of Joint Operations had overall responsibility for the process, but had no direct means to command, control or direct the activity associated with it. The Department is now considering ways of strengthening this.

8.10  Planning for deployment of equipment to theatre was complicated by the switch to the southern option and the consequent speed of deployment constrained MOD's ability to construct a new deployment plan. The plan was therefore not totally coherent and comprehensive and the order of arrival of equipment was not always optimised. Some equipment used for in-theatre transport arrived late in the deployment, training ammunition arrived simultaneously with operational and sustainment stocks - in some cases very late in the deployment, and additional combat body armour arrived on the last of the ships. This reduced flexibility in preparations for combat operations, with deployed commanders finding they had insufficient control over what arrived when.

8.11  Examples of poor unit-level processes were also encountered, with a number of units not adequately equipped for deployment. Some troops were sent into theatre without standard issue equipment, while other units were slow to order the extra equipment they needed.

Transport by Air and Sea

8.12  The deployment of UK forces to the Gulf through a combination of air and sea lift was a significant success. Movement of equipment and personnel by sea allowed the build-up of a substantial force in the Gulf, with over 90% of the freight deployed by ship. Military sea lift capability benefited from the recent introduction, some 20 months early, of MOD's four new roll-on-roll-off vessels procured through the Private Finance Initiative. These ships deployed 15,000 lane metres of equipment, some 11% of the total requirement, including vital port establishment equipment, ahead of the main force. They were supplemented by the charter of 60 commercial ships. The considerable additional capacity brought by the four C-17 aircraft on long-term lease to the RAF, together with the RAF's other air transport assets, deployed about half of the personnel and stores required to travel by air, again proving their value for rapid and assured deployment. A number of commercial aircraft were also chartered.

8.13  The charter of significant air and sea lift assets for this operation worked well, and reflected the fact that it would not be a sensible use of resources for MOD to own sufficient air and sea transport for infrequent large-scale operations. The costs of chartered air and sea lift capability were £53.5M and £70M respectively. Swift action by DTMA in approaching the charter shipping market, and in activating facilitating contracts with the charter aircraft market, enabled the requirement to be met. Although the changing threat levels in the region caused some nervousness in the civil aviation market, air charter companies maintained their support. The balance between MOD ownership of lift assets and reliance on commercial air and sea transport is kept under review.

8.14  There are strict regulations on the handling of ammunition in the UK. This includes limits laid down by the Health and Safety Executive on the quantities of ammunition that can be held and loaded onto transport ships at any one time. The scale of this deployment put a considerable strain on our existing ammunition handling facilities, leading to some delays in loading ammunition. The issue of temporary ammunition-handling licences provided some relief.

Logistic Information Management

8.15  During the operation the flow of logistics information between theatre and the UK was poor, particularly affecting the tracking of UORs into theatre. It was difficult to monitor the rates at which supplies were consumed, making it hard to determine when re-supply would be required. The lack of available information also reduced commanders' confidence in the logistics system, causing units to over-prioritise their requests and re-order equipment already en route. This added to the burden on the already over-stretched system. The processes required to identify, quantify and locate combat supplies and materiel became cumbersome, inaccurate and manpower-intensive and units frequently took shortcuts to move resources forward more quickly. This contributed to some of the stock shortfalls noted earlier.

8.16  Tproblems were caused by the continuing lack of a robust tri-Service inventory system, the ability to track equipment into and through theatre, and an information system capable of supporting this technology. This meant that commanders in theatre did not have real-time visibility of stocks held, hindering re-distribution to ensure the best use of available supplies. For example, stores such as ammunition and NBC suits held afloat were needed elsewhere in theatre as a higher priority.

8.17  The need to improve consignment tracking has been noted in post-operation reports and lessons exercises since the Gulf Conflict in 1991. Since then, MOD has sought affordable and technically reliable improvements to the capability it already has in this area. As a result of the lessons identified in 1991, two tracking systems were procured: VITAL (for the Army) and RIDELS (for the Navy). These are MOD-developed, bespoke systems, optimised for the individual Service. Both systems have been progressively improved and expanded over the years, but have been limited by their dependence on other information systems which were never designed to be part of a 'joined-up' supply chain.

8.18  For this operation, the UK decided to procure elements of the US Total Asset Visibility (TAV) system to improve stores tracking. The TAV equipment was progressively installed at nominated sites in the UK, Germany, Cyprus and in the Gulf. Its successful installation under an ambitious timescale was impressive. The tagging of consignments (i.e. containers and pallets rather than 4243individual equipment) by radio frequency signals improved the efficiency of delivery, whilst reducing the manpower required. The location of containers could then be determined remotely via secure internet access. Cross-referencing with the existing VITAL system identified the contents of each container or pallet.

8.19  TAV was introduced part way through the deployment however, with only limited numbers of systems and trained users. The system also only allowed equipment to be tracked as far forward as the major bases in Kuwait. Once the containers and pallets were broken down, and the contents transported to individual units, this visibility ended. As a consequence, large quantities of equipment, stores and supplies were reportedly 'lost' in theatre, including ammunition, body armour and NBC Defence equipment. This also made it more difficult to target high priority equipment for rapid onward distribution.

8.20  Much work therefore remains to be done. On its formation, the DLO launched a number of programmes aimed at delivering better stores- and asset-tracking capabilities. The asset-tracking component of this work is now being pursued as a new project, 'Management of Material in Transit'. In the short term the Department is extending the use of TAV, and has already increased the capability in Iraq to support the operation.

Support in Theatre

8.21  In theatre, the management of stores was carried out by the Joint Force Logistic Component which, once fully established, played a vital role in supporting deployed UK forces. Although based around an Army logistics brigade, its task was to support all three Services throughout the Gulf. Further work is being undertaken to study the mechanisms by which logistics support can be provided for a range of different operational requirements in the future.

8.22  The RN role in providing logistic support to land forces was described in Chapter 4. The ability to use amphibious capabilities such as helicopters, mexeflotes (motorised pontoons) and landing craft to land equipment and supplies over beaches adjacent to, but independent of, commercial ports was also a key factor in the rapid establishment of operationally capable forces.

Contractor Support

A mexeflote

8.23  About 1500 civilian contractors were deployed into the Gulf region during this operation, providing mainly equipment and technical support, often under specialist Contractor Logistics Support and UOR contracts. Military personnel do not possess all the specialised skills required to maintain an increasing amount of technologically advanced equipment. Maintenance is often now the responsibility of the original equipment manufacturer, which has led to an increase in the importance of contractor support on deployed operations. Locally employed civilian contractors also supported the UK's catering and logistics effort. The services provided by contractors were often excellent, especially given the demanding conditions and short timescales. A notable example was the armoured vehicle dust mitigation and up-armouring programme. This included the fitting of extended side skirts, improved sealing, air filters and fans, and applique armour.

8.24  Experience on this operation demonstrated that MOD cannot necessarily rely on contractor support in regions where the threat level is high. Foreign and Commonwealth Office travel advice and the conditions in the Gulf affected some contractors' willingness to provide support. Two instances were reported of contractors refusing to deploy or remain in theatre. MOD will work with companies to identify triggers for the withdrawal of their support, and consider mitigating actions where appropriate.

8.25  This operation saw the first use of contractors formally deployed under a new MOD policy for contractors on deployed operations. In general, the support offered to these contractors worked well. There were a number of problems, including the availability of only limited advice on visa requirements, shortfalls in pre-deployment training and transport to theatre, and the issue of ID cards and protective equipment; there was also inadequate legal jurisdiction. There was a lack of a central focus for contractor issues. The incident in which two Kenyan sub-contractors were captured by Iraqi forces underlined the need to give further consideration to support for sub-contractors.

"FIGHTING IN THE DESERT" Expeditionary operations require forces to be suitably prepared and equipped to operate in demanding environmental conditions. The desert environment of Iraq presented the coalition with significant challenges, against which a number of equipment improvements (such as the fitting of Challenger 2 with specialist filters, fans and skirting to reduce dust ingestion) and other preparatory steps were taken. The sandstorms early in the conflict phase and, later, the extreme summer temperatures demonstrated the debilitating effects the environment can have on people and equipment: a. Acclimatisation Despite an acclimatisation programme, there were a number of heat casualties9 when 3(UK) Division replaced 1(UK) Armoured Division at the height of summer. The initially limited amount of air conditioning units meant that there was sometimes no respite from the high temperatures, particularly during the day. b. Helicopter Operations High temperatures reduced the load carrying capacity of all helicopters and created difficulties for groundcrew servicing the aircraft and aircrew attempting to rest. Helicopters parked on aircraft pans unsheltered from the heat suffered adverse effects on their systems. c. Ammunition Storage Ammunition to the value of approximately £14M was written-off because of its reduced 'life expectancy' when stored unprotected in high temperatures. d. Equipment Several equipment types, including radars, UAVs, airfield navigation aids and CIS, were less reliable in the high temperatures and dusty environment. In some cases the air conditioning did not cool equipment sufficiently and in others it caused condensation to form on sensitive electronic equipment. But for the SA80 A2, lessons regarding the maintenance regime required when operating in dusty conditions, which had been learned from operations in Afghanistan, ensured the rifle's effectiveness was second to none. e. Personal comfort Clothing, food and accommodation can all contribute to combat effectiveness in the desert environment (not least through the improvement of morale). The desert clothing and boots procured for use by UK forces during the intense summer heat are described at paragraphs 5.8 and 8.6, and the air-conditioned Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure, provided after the end of the combat phase at paragraph 5.12. In addition, the demanding desert conditions required the supply of up to 10 litres of bottled water per person, per day. Meteorology Running a global forecasting system, the UK Met Office provides forecast information for any location up to five days ahead. This service meets a range of national and international commitments, especially for Defence. In addition to this global picture, more detailed information is available for a limited area from a higher resolution forecast model. Trialled during Exercise SAIF SAREEA II, this concept was used operationally for both Afghanistan and then Iraq. The Met Office's contribution to commanders, both deployed and at home, was an important element in the drive for information superiority. As campaign planning began, early guidance was provided on Iraq's climatology, followed shortly by seasonal and monthly outlooks that allowed informed operational decisions to be made. Key climatological details included the prospect of significant rainfall over high ground (falling as snow over 6000ft) and, during the spring, blowing sand in the south - both of which could severely impact operations.10
Winter - December to March Cool days and cold nights with frosts, severe over high ground and in western deserts. Weather systems move from west to east but their associated cold fronts weaken as they move south and east. High rainfall over high ground falling as snow above 6000ft - lower at times. Hill fog over the mountains in the north.		Spring - April to May Gradual increase in temperatures - still occasional cold interludes. Often large rainfall in thunderstorms in the north and, with melting snow, can lead to flooding. Mainly north-westerly winds but vary around systems. Local lifted dust and blowing sand in the south. Extensive hill fog over high ground as warm air moves over colder land. Local overnight mist and fog patches.
Impact of Weather on Operations Temperature Low temperature in north leading to icing and possible exposure. High temperatures leading to poor aircraft performance and high heat stress. Weather Snow in the north making mountain passes difficult. Temporary risk of runway contamination. Areas of fog and mist during the colder months especially in river valleys. Widespread lifted dust and blowing sand during the summer months affecting visibility, engines and health. Areas of haze affecting slant visibility.		Impact of Weather on Operations Cloud Low cloud during rainfall in the north giving hill fog patches. Icing/turbulence in cloud mainly during the colder months. Wind Occasional strong winds near low pressure areas and the passage of fronts leading to gusty conditions. 'Shamal' winds occasionally strong leading to areas of dust/sand and isolated dust storms. Visibility Reduced in precipitation, dust, sand, mist and fog. Often poor in haze during the summer months.
Sandstorms obscuring a communications enclosure Plume Dispersion Model (inset) with corresponding satellite imagery The Defence Met Centre at HQ RAF Strike Command analysed the output from both Met ffice HQ and coalition partner forecast models to assess their quality and any inconsistencies. Output from the forecast models was forwarded to Met Office Mobile Met Unit (MMU) teams (an RAF Sponsored Reserve unit) deployed to the front line, and to a Met Office team in a prototype joint Environmental Fusion Centre supporting the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood. The Centre used this guidance to provide a UK view to the US Air Force Operational Weather Squadron in South Carolina, which produced a joint operational area forecast to meet the coalition aim of 'one theatre, one forecast'. Severe sandstorms over the region on 25-27 March were caused by an active low pressure area which was identified four to five days in advance and factored into operational planning based on UK forecast models. As the event approached, the higher resolution models were able to add more precision and accuracy and to address tactical and operational needs as well as planning. Overall the quality of advice from the coalition forecasts was excellent, and no significant weather event went unannounced to commanders. The Mobile Met Unit teams deployed mainly with operational air squadrons, in particular those operating fast jets which were vulnerable to rapidly changing weather conditions. They used the information and guidance supplied to provide operational and mission specific briefings direct to planners and aircrew. Deployed RN forecasters provided advice to the National Contingent Commander and the Maritime Component Commander, as well as to many individual RN ships. Additionally, specialist advice was provided to the Defence NBC Centre and to PJHQ for onward transmission to theatre. This advice covered both the possible movement of plumes from both actual and potential oil fires (which were a prominent feature of the 1991 Gulf Conflict) and from possible chemical attack. Using specific Met Office dispersion modelling software, guidance was provided to theatre so that forces were able to make informed tactical decisions.

⁹ 3(UK) Div heat casualties in the seven week period 15 Jul - 9 Sep: over 800 personnel required medical assistance, some 200 were returned to UK and 1 soldier died (a second death was possibly heat-related). For comparison, over 400 British soldiers died in Mesopotamia from heat-related conditions in a three week period in 1917.

¹⁰ The sandstorms of 26/27 Mar were factored into operational planning.