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Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future

CHAPTER 11 - POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

Post-Conflict Planning

11.1  Detailed planning for the post-conflict phase took place in parallel with the contingency planning for combat operations. Indeed, the military campaign was designed specifically with the coalition's post-conflict objectives in mind: for example, offensive operations were carefully targeted to ensure they had the least possible impact on Iraq's civil infrastructure. However, in the run up to the launch of the operation, it was important to avoid giving the impression that conflict was inevitable, as we still hoped for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Contingency planning for a post-conflict Iraq was particularly sensitive as it necessarily had to start from the assumption that a conflict would eventually take place. In consequence, involvement in the initial stages of this planning was restricted to a relatively small group within Whitehall. The Cabinet Office initially took the lead in co-ordinating work on post-conflict planning and reconstruction, but as the work grew this responsibility was increasingly transferred to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Post-conflict planning faced many complications as it was difficult accurately to predict what conditions would exist in post-Saddam Iraq. In particular, the degree to which Iraqi administrative structures would remain to provide a ready framework for continuity and the extent to which the international community would engage were unknown. It was only after the fall of the regime that the extent of Ba'ath party domination of nearly all aspects of the Iraq state and society became clear. The impact of the sudden collapse of the regime was enormous, with the removal not just of top officials, but the whole of senior and most of middle management. The sudden liberation of a population that had suffered under such a long-ruling and viciously repressive regime also led to outbreaks of anarchy, looting and crime. These effects significantly complicated the post-conflict task.

11.2  The UK's vision for the future of Iraq was described in Chapter 7 of First Reflections, along with initial planning for the post-conflict phase of the operation and the key achievements 6263of UK forces during the period to June 2003. The UK vision is for Iraq to be a stable, united and law-abiding state within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective and representative government for its own people.

Post-Conflict Operations

11.3  At the end of the combat phase of the operation, coalition forces occupied the key cities and towns in a country with an estimated population of some 24 million people, and a total land area of over 437,000 square kilometres. Prior to the conflict a major concern had been that conflict might precipitate a humanitarian crisis, possibly as a consequence of large-scale refugee flows or disruption to essential services such as water and food distribution. Coalition plans took close account of this concern. The UK Government consulted UN agencies, the US and others in preparing to deal with a range of possible humanitarian crises.

11.4  The Department for International Development (DFID) contributed £16.5 million towards the effort to pre-position medical and food supplies, shelter kits and other relief. This money also helped to establish logistical support systems, and enabled staff to deploy in readiness. These funds were largely channelled through UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement: as experts in crisis management, they were judged best placed to apply resources where they could have maximum benefit. This system worked well. The World Health Organisation, for example, pre-positioned enough emergency health kits to last a million people three months, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies likewise pre-positioned supplies for up to 300,000 potential refugees. The ICRC made preparations to treat 7,000 war wounded, provide safe drinking water for 3.1 million people and provide hospital feeding to 5,000 patients for one month. The UK Government made substantial financial contributions to all these preparations. DFID itself also pre-positioned supplies in the region. The Treasury also allocated £30 million to MOD for humanitarian aid and to meet the UK's obligations under the Geneva Convention during the conflict and immediate aftermath. DFID provided two humanitarian advisers to work alongside the UK military prior to and during the combat phase to advise on appropriate humanitarian interventions. A third adviser was deployed at the end of the combat phase.

11.5  In the event there was no humanitarian disaster. A combination of coalition preparedness and the sheer speed of the operation meant that a humanitarian crisis did not have time to develop; in most areas, for example, the fighting passed so rapidly that there simply was no time for significant refugee flows to become established. There was some disruption of essential services and UK forces were involved in the delivery of emergency supplies of water - and to a much lesser extent, food - early in the conflict. However these were short-term requirements and small in scale when viewed in the context of the size of Iraq.

11.6  Although a humanitarian crisis was avoided, coalition forces have faced major post-conflict challenges. The most immediate and visible was the period of looting that, in places, followed the defeat of Iraqi forces but in others, crucially, was concurrent with continuing combat. Looting was not unexpected, but the scale of the problem was greater than envisaged and particularly difficult for forces to address while still committed to combat operations.

11.7  Furthermore, Iraq had faced years of neglect under Saddam. Despite Iraq's oil wealth and relatively high levels of education, its people endured serious poverty. The population largely depended on food handouts; the agricultural sector operated far below capacity; almost a third of children in the centre and south suffered chronic malnutrition; and the under-five mortality rate was 131 per 1,000 live births. Chronic under-investment in essential services had also taken its toll on power and water distribution systems. More than half of Iraqis living in rural areas had no access to safe water, and deaths from diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections accounted for 70 per cent of child mortality. Hospitals, clinics, sanitation facilities and water treatment plants all suffered from chronic lack of maintenance.

11.8  Most aspects of government and administration had been centrally controlled from Baghdad. The almost wholesale collapse of the Iraqi administration presented coalition forces with a triple challenge of simultaneously securing, administering and rebuilding the country. The continued absence - for a variety of reasons including political concerns and the uncertain security environment - of a number of the normal participants in post-conflict reconstruction (various NGOs, development agencies, etc) meant that the military had to combine their primary role of providing security with reconstruction tasks. While this military involvement in reconstruction has been successful, it has placed a greater burden on them than would be ideal, and contributed to the need for force level adjustments.

11.9  Some £10 million was authorised by HM Treasury to fund relatively small 'Quick Impact Projects' (QIPs) in Iraq that would have a positive benefit on the force protection of the UK forces deployed. This funding was sought as a direct result of lessons learned from Afghanistan and elsewhere. To the end of October 2003 some 620 projects had been carried out or were being planned, totalling some £9.4 million. These included over 200 projects in the education sector, in schools, colleges and universities; over 50 projects in the health sector; and over 140 in the law and order field. With other projects improving water, sanitation and power provision, QIPs have had a positive and widespread local impact in helping to start security, education and health activities, thereby helping to gain the consent of the Iraqi people, and to increase security and normality in the UK area. The QIP funding scheme has also enabled the UK to be pro-active in addressing developing areas of concern and potential causes of discontent. We should look to employ similar arrangements in future operations.

Political Developments

11.10  There has been much progress on the political front, with considerable executive authority already transferred to Iraqis. The coalition plan is for a fully representative Iraqi Interim Authority to be established and progressively to assume more of the functions of government from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by US Ambassador Paul Bremer. A timetable for drawing up a new constitution and future elections has now been agreed (see paragraph 11.19).

11.11  In April, a meeting in An Nasiriyah between representatives of exiled Iraqi groups and local and tribal leaders agreed a 13-point plan, a key element of which was to dissolve the Ba'ath Party and eliminate its effects on Iraqi society through a programme of 'de-Ba'athification'. Consistent with this, following dialogue with recognised Iraqi leaders of all faiths, the CPA launched a policy on security institutions that involved the dissolution of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Military Industry, and all branches of the armed forces of the former regime, including the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard and the Security Services. New Iraqi armed forces were to be recruited and trained by coalition forces, to enable Iraq to meet its legitimate national security needs.

11.12  By mid-May, the CPA had established the Development Fund for Iraq. 95% of the proceeds from the sale of hydrocarbon products have been placed into this fund for the economic development and reconstruction of Iraq (the remaining 5% being paid as reparations to Kuwait for the 1991 Gulf Conflict).

11.13  The Coalition Provisional Authority (South) (CPA(S)) was established at the end of May to coordinate policy implementation within its four provinces: Al Basrah, Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Maysan (i.e. covering the same area as the current UK Area of Operations). A British diplomat, Sir Hilary Synnott, heads the organisation as Regional Coordinator. The authority is staffed by 37 civilian UK personnel drawn from across Government, 21 military personnel, and a number of international staff. Staffing will expand significantly over the coming months.

11.14  Further extensive CPA discussions took place with Iraqi leaders throughout June and July, both on reconstruction and humanitarian aid issues and on the constitution, powers and status of an Iraqi Interim Authority as a step towards Iraqi self-government. A 25-member Iraqi Governing Council was appointed in July, comprising 13 Shia members, 11 Sunni (five Arabs, five Kurds, and a Turcoman) and 1 Christian. The Council's key roles are the appointment of interim ministers, the provision of advice to Ambassador Bremer and the appointment of commissions to consider issues for the future of Iraq. The Council elected a representative nine-member presidency, as a precursor to the appointment of interim Ministers, and a preparatory committee for the Iraq-wide constitutional process. At the local level, on the establishment of a Baghdad City Advisory Council on 7 July, over 80 cities and towns in Iraq had a representative local council in place.

11.15  Opinion remained divided over the role the United Nations should play in Iraq. Nevertheless, UN agencies began to enter the country in increased numbers to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the reconstruction effort. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1483, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General was appointed to work with the CPA and the Iraqi people to restore local and national institutions throughout Iraq. This post was filled by Sergio Vieira de Mello, who arrived in Iraq in late May. In July, a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq was created to co-ordinate and control the work of the UN Agencies operating in Iraq. By then, 11 main UN agencies were involved in efforts to assist the Iraqi people.

11.16  On 16 October, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a new resolution, UNSCR 1511, outlining the roles of the United Nations, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council in international efforts to bring peace and stability to Iraq. The resolution, sponsored by Cameroon, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, provided a mandate for a multinational force under unified command and reaffirmed the UN's support for the work of the Governing Council. It noted that the 25-member Council and its ministers "are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which.embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally recognised, representative government is established and assumes the responsibilities of the [Coalition Provisional] Authority." The text also called on the UN to strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government.

11.17  A Donor Conference on Iraq was held on 23 and 24 October in Madrid, opened by Kofi Annan and led by Iraqi interim Ministers and Governing Council members. Seventy-three countries attended, significantly broadening international support for Iraq's reconstruction, as well as 20 international organisations and 13 NGOs. More than $33 billion was pledged, excluding loans for export credit and technical help. These pledges included substantial grant resources for the early stages of Iraq's reconstruction, which should provide sufficient support until Iraq is able to generate more of its own revenue to meet its needs.

11.18  On the international stage, Iraq was represented by Iraqis at the UN General Assembly in September, at the Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting on 9 September at UNESCO and OPEC meetings, and at the Organisation of Islamic Conference meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 16-17 October.

11.19  Discussions between the coalition and the Iraqi Governing Council on the future political process culminated on 15 November in the announcement of a timetable for the way ahead, leading to full elections for a new Iraqi government by the end of 2005. The milestones in the process are set out in the table below. A key date in this programme will be 1 July 2004, when the Iraqi Transitional Government assumes power and the US and the UK will cease to be occupying powers. From this point on, the multinational force will be in Iraq only at the invitation of the Transitional Government. The political process will be mirrored by a programme in which Iraqi forces will assume an ever greater responsibility for the security of Iraq. However, we anticipate that multinational forces will remain to provide security assistance for some time beyond the formation of a Transitional Government.

Other Nations' Deployments

The flag of the new Multi-National Division (South East) is raised at its Basrah headquarters

11.20  As reconstruction began in Iraq, the coalition sought to broaden the number of nations contributing troops to the operation. An outline structure was agreed for a Stabilisation Force for Iraq, under which UK forces would command what became known as the Multi-National Division South East (MND(SE)). Poland agreed to take the lead in the Centre-South sector, with NATO providing logistics, communications and force generation assistance. US forces held command in the north and in the capital, Baghdad. The UK secured contributions from nine other nations to its sector (see Annex C), and they began to deploy in early July. Other nations' deployments total some 5650 personnel, and reflect the international community's increased commitment to the future of Iraq.

Coalition Operations since June 2003

11.21  First Reflections¹⁶ described the security situation in Iraq in the early months after the end of main combat operations. Around Baghdad and in the north, US forces encountered resistance from small bands of irregular forces loyal to Saddam Hussein, and launched a number of operations against subversive elements attempting to undermine stability. The UK sector in the south had been calmer, but the tragic incidents in Al Majar Al Kabir on 24 June had demonstrated the risks of localised violence. Amongst their other tasks, UK forces concentrated on anti-smuggling operations to prevent the theft of oil, and of copper wire from power lines, both of which were hampering efforts to restore power supplies.

11.22  In July, attacks on US forces increased, particularly in the Baghdad area, pointing to a growing campaign by former regime elements. A significant coalition success was achieved on 22 July. Following an intelligence tip-off, elements of US 101 Airborne Division surrounded a villa in Mosul, which was secured after a firefight lasting some five hours. Two of the bodies recovered by US forces were subsequently confirmed as Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay. On the same day, US forces in Baghdad arrested the former commander of the Special Republican Guard. In the last two days of July, US forces completed a number of successful raids on former regime targets, one of which resulted in the capture of a number of Saddam Hussein's former bodyguards.

11.23  The UK Area of Operations included the major urban areas of Al Amarah, Al Qurnah, Basrah, Az Zubayr, and Umm Qasr. In early July, 1(UK) Armoured Division handed over responsibility to 3(UK) Division, under the planned roulement of UK forces. Simultaneous with the roulement of UK formations, the UK Area of Operations was increased to take in the provinces of Dhi Qar and Al Muthanna, in addition to Basrah and Maysan Provinces. The two additional provinces had formerly been within the US Area of Operations. This reflected the increased deployment of other nations' forces, and the perceived improvement in stability and normality across the UK Area of Operations.

Some of the Joint Helicopter Force detachment at Basrah airport

11.24  mid-July, UK forces totalled some 11,500 personnel in theatre, of which the land component accounted for some 9000. The UK maritime presence in theatre had by then reduced to five RN and RFA vessels, while the fixed-wing air component had reduced to eight Tornado GR4s in theatre, providing essential reconnaissance and attack capabilities in theatre (now further reduced to six), two VC10s, two Nimrod MR2s, two C-130Js and one HS125. The Joint Helicopter Force continued to support the ground forces, with 18 rotary-wing aircraft based at Basrah, covering the entire UK Area of Operations. At the end of July 2003 the security situation was relatively stable throughout most of the UK/MND(SE) Area of Operations.

11.25  Personnel from the UK's Operational Training and Advisory Group travelled to Iraq in July to provide a training package for US forces and to learn from US experiences in Iraq. This was a useful exercise for both parties, with over 500 US Army commanders provided with training to run peace-keeping and counter-terrorist training at unit and sub-unit level.

11.26  Events since the end of July have been characterised by an increase in the number of attacks on coalition forces, sadly involving a number of fatalities. Attacks have also targeted the UN and other International Organisations, the Shia population, and those Iraqis assisting the coalition. Precise attribution for many of these attacks is difficult or impossible, but we assess that they are the work of members of the former regime's security forces, other elements who feel they have lost out as a result of the regime's downfall, and (to a lesser extent) fighters from outside Iraq who wish to see the multinational effort fail for their own ideological reasons. On 19 August, the UN headquarters in Baghdad was brutally attacked, leading to the tragic death of the UN's Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and many others, whose sole purpose in Iraq was to help Iraq and the Iraqi people towards a better future. The attack led to a reduction in UN personnel in Iraq, as well as personnel from other humanitarian organisations. Some have now returned, and UN staffing is expected to return to full complement as soon as improved security allows, though this may be phased over a number of months. In addition, any signs of progress towards the coalition aims of returning Iraq to a secure, self-governing, democratic and peaceful nation, such as infrastructure improvements and the new Iraqi police force, have been targeted. The security situation in the UK area in south-eastern Iraq has generally been much quieter than other areas of the country. However, in an horrific attack on 12 November, suicide bombers drove a vehicle-borne bomb at an Italian armed forces compound in An Nasiriyah. The explosion resulted in 26 deaths and 46 wounded, a mixture of Italian military and Italian and Iraqi civilians.

Joint patrol in Basrah by a Royal Military Policeman and an Iraqi policeman

11.27  Nevertheless, despite these setbacks, the coalition has been making good progress - more than is often realised - on security, the political process, provision of essential services, and reconstruction. Policing is of particular importance, as effective policing will be essential to creating and maintaining a democratic, stable and prosperous Iraq. Our goal is to enable Iraqis themselves to take responsibility for their own security. Police numbers in Iraq now stand at 62,000 and will progressively rise to 71,000 by the end of 2004. There are 12,500 Iraqi police in CPA(South), taking part in joint patrols with UK Royal Military Police. In November, the coalition began a training programme for 3000 police officers every eight weeks in a facility in Jordan. This training is being conducted by British and international police trainers and officers. The CPA(S) Regional Police Academy was re-established in mid-October, and police training is being carried out there by Danish police and UK military teams. A small UK military team, headed by a Brigadier, is supporting the training of the new Iraqi Army, while Royal Navy personnel are assisting with developing the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force and the RAF are assisting with the rebuilding of the Iraqi Air Force. The Iraqi Civil Defence Corps is being trained and expanded in order to take over guarding and patrolling duties, and a Facilities Protection Service is expanding to guard Iraq's key infrastructure. HM Customs and Excise will also be deploying training teams shortly to a number of entry points to the country in order to train Iraqi customs.

11.28  Following a review of force levels by the UK Divisional commander, it was decided in September to deploy additional forces to Iraq, both to increase security operations against criminals and to act in support of reconstruction and training efforts. This peak of activity had passed by November and the two additional infantry battalions deployed have been replaced with one. As the various lines of activity (political, reconstruction, security sector reform) proceed, we may again need in the future to make other temporary deployments or re-shape our forces in the region.

11.29  MOD responds to the changing circumstances in Iraq to ensure that our troops have the appropriate equipment to carry out their tasks. Since the end of the combat phase we have constructed, through UOR action, two tranches of Temporary Deployable Accommodation, sufficient to house 5250 troops in air-conditioned tentage. To date, we have committed over £80 million to this accommodation. The security and safety of our troops in Iraq is paramount and to this end we have put in place a range of sophisticated force protection measures including over 200 armoured (Land Rover-type) patrol vehicles and specialist counter-terrorist and surveillance equipment.

11.30  As part of our strategic plan for the reconstruction of Iraq, the coalition has completed over 13,000 reconstruction projects, large and small. The delivery of essential services is gradually improving. Electricity supply surpassed pre-war levels by early October, and projects are in hand in Baghdad, and elsewhere, to upgrade existing water treatment plants and build new ones to serve 11.5 million people. Food distribution systems have been restored, and a pipeline of supplies has been established to fill the food ration system well into next year. Nearly all 240 hospitals in Iraq are functioning, although some still face difficulties. With the help of UNICEF, over 22 million doses of vaccines have been provided, enough for 4.2 million children, and public health spending has increased to over 26 times its level under Saddam. In the field of education, over 1500 schools were rehabilitated in time for the new school year, and 70 million textbooks will have been printed by the end of December. Universities are also now operating. By November 68692003, DFID had committed £207 million for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in Iraq for Financial Year 2003/04. This included a £20 million contribution to the Essential Infrastructure Programme in the south-east of the country designed to provide swift improvements to power and fuel supply, and to water and sanitation systems.

Unexploded Ordnance Clearance

An RAF NCO prepares abandoned Iraqi munitions for disposal

11.31  Since the war-fighting phase of the operation, UK military Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams have been working through a list of disposal tasks that include disposing of abandoned Iraqi munitions. This list will be cleared by the end of the year. The teams will then only be required to react to newly identified tasks to clear unexploded ordnance that affect the ability of the coalition forces to do their job. A concerted task is also being undertaken to reconnoitre and clear all main routes through the UK area of any stray ammunition. This work should reduce the overall volume of unexploded ordnance in the country and prevent it from affecting operations. An American contractor has been engaged to deal with the massive problem of the many Iraqi ammunition dumps around the UK Area of Operations. Although they are currently only setting up operations, they will be in a position to start clearing the over 50 ammunition storage sites within MND(SE) before the end of 2003. NGOs are also playing a valuable role by dealing with smaller tasks of a humanitarian nature. Some groups are carrying out training programmes to enable an indigenous ordnance disposal capability, using trained Iraqis, to be raised across the country. Four different NGO groups are currently working in the UK Area of Operations. UK and Danish teams have cleared over 600,000 unexploded munitions including a large number of mines and missiles.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

11.32  The Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a joint US/UK/Australian operation comprising 1200 to 1400 personnel, continues to lead the search for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. The UK makes a significant contribution to the Group (including providing the second-in-command), which comprises both military units and analytical expertise. The ISG's priority remains the discovery and elimination of WMD; however, the Group also collects and exploits information relating to terrorism, war crimes, prisoners of war and material relating to other suspect activity by the regime. The Group is able to draw on personnel from a wide range of civilian and military organisations, and its capabilities include the debriefing of human sources, and analysis of recovered documents and computer media.

11.33  Building on the information on the Iraqi programmes that was available prior to the war, the exploitation of material recovered in theatre, and the interviewing of Iraqi scientists, technicians and other personnel, the ISG is exploiting all possible leads relating to WMD. Presenting an interim progress report on 2 October, David Kay, Head of the ISG, stated that Iraq's WMD programmes "spanned more than two decades, involved thousands of people, billions of dollars, and were elaborately shielded by security and deception operations that continued even beyond the end of [the Iraq operation]". Notwithstanding the difficult conditions under which the ISG had to operate, it had discovered "dozens of WMD-related programme activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspections that began in late 2002". These included:

• a clandestine network of laboratories within the Iraqi intelligence service suitable for chemical and biological weapons research;
   
• strains of biological organisms concealed in a scientist's home, one of which could be used to produce biological weapons;
   
• new research on agents applicable to biological warfare;
   
• testing of unmanned aerial vehicles well beyond UN limits;
   
• advanced design work for long-range missiles well outside UN limits and clandestine attempts to obtain ballistic missile technology and cruise missiles from North Korea.

11.34  The painstaking work of the ISG continues, including establishing the full extent of the methods used by the former Iraqi regime to conceal its WMD activity from the world. Gathering and collating evidence from all sources is expected to be a long and complex task. The UK will continue to provide all support possible to the search for, and destruction of, Iraqi WMD.

Conclusion

11.35  Iraq has shown the need to plan and organise in advance for the reconstruction of a failed state after major intervention. To be available in time, this will unavoidably often mean beginning work a long time ahead of a decision to undertake the military option (which, understandably, is often a step taken reluctantly at the last possible moment). It is important to understand why preparation for reconstruction does not imply that a decision for military action has been taken, any more than does military contingency planning.

¹⁶ First Reflections: Paras 7.6-7.9 page 36