Plan Colombia: The View from the Presidential Palace
Authored by Mr. Eduardo Pizano.
May 01, 2001
25 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The author argues that confidence in an efficient, courageous and transparent judiciary goes to the very heart of the governability of Colombia, and that Plan Colombia does not address the root causes of Colombia's problems. These are weak government, inequality, absence of citizen participation, corruption and an ineffective legal system. Fundamental reforms in Colombia should begin by directly strengthening the moral legitimacy of the government, holistically enhancing socioeconomic development, and meticulously reforming the legal system, thus reestablishing the rule of law. The rule of law, in turn, is critical to the achievement of the ultimate purposes of Plan Colombia--peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state. Systemic reform requires well-conceived, long-term, and careful implementation. Unless thinking and actions are reoriented to deal with these realities, the alternative is social calamity, criminal anarchy, and civil war.
Preface
The "insider" in this monograph is indeed a brave man. A former Colombian senator who was forced to flee his country with his family when targeted by the Cali Cartel, he has returned to continue to work for a Colombia which its citizens yearn to have. He gives us reason to hope.
Violence and guerrilla movements, he tells us, are typical of the history, including recent history, of many countries. In Colombia the current waves of violence started in the 1940s, while the two major guerrilla movements, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, come out of the 1960s. Yet, he says, there is a major difference between these movements and those which have wracked other Latin American countries. That difference is drugs. In addition to the guerrillas, the more recently-appearing "self-defense" or "paramilitary" forces and their growth are also attributable to their involvement in the drug trade.
Drugs not only provide the money to sustain these violent movements; they also build a base of political support. Since the growing of coca was shut down in Peru and Bolivia, it began in Colombia, hence the involvement of thousands of peasants who earn their livelihood from it. That is a formidable political base. The FARC, therefore, he tells us, have doubled their size in the 1990s.
What can be done? The "insider," like the more thoughtful outsiders, does not have a quick or easy solution. It is obvious to him, however, that Plan Colombia must have a strong military component. Until it began to be restructured, the Colombian army was simply losing the war in serious military encounters. The author tells us that "those who suggest that Plan Colombia should not have a military component are not facing the realities on the ground. . . ." This also includes the best equipment; the army cannot continue to be outgunned by the FARC.
At the same time, he says, it is absolutely essential that, through a military criminal court, the Colombian military assure respect for human rights. This is now being done. He argues against the many "misconceptions" about Colombia held abroad, one of which is that the government and army tacitly support the "paramilitaries" since they can fight the "enemy" in ways which the army cannot. He offers a resounding defense to that persistent charge.
What else should be emphasized to help Colombia? The author tells us that "Colombia is confronting its challenges" across the board and that economic measures, especially membership in a hemispheric free trade area, would be a great help. Colombia is helping itself, goes his message, and it deserves the cooperation of the international community in return.
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