Political Control over the Use of Force: A Clausewitzian Perspective
Authored by Lieutenant Colonel Suzanne C. Nielsen.
May 2001
51 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The author addresses the issues regarding the ideal relationship between the commander and the statesman in time of war and the balance between political control and military operational expertise by examining what Carl von Clausewitz has to say about civil- military relations and the use of force.
She looks in depth at Clausewitz s arguments, reviews his theoretical approach, and discusses four key implications of the basic idea that political purposes govern war. In conclusion, the author suggests that Clausewitz has issued both statesmen and commanders a challenge. Commanders must appreciate the necessity of subordinating military means to political ends, and statesmen must think as strategists as they make decisions about the relationship between ends and means and the achievement of their goals.
Introduction
What is the ideal relationship between the commander and the statesman in time of war? What are the optimal limits, if any exist, on political control over military operations? Is there such a thing as political guidance that crosses the line and becomes interference? Given the importance of these questions, the range of answers that have been given to them by both theorists and practitioners is striking. On the side of limiting the statesman’s role, one view is that the political leader should exercise, at most, limited control after hostilities have begun. Sun Tzu, who is believed to have written his great work The Art of War during the 4th century BC, appears to take this perspective. He argues that the decision to go to war must be a political decision, but that the general must be free to act autonomously once that decision is made. This view has survived to the modern day. Within the American military experience, perhaps the most famous advocate of this position is General Douglas MacArthur. In a speech to Congress after his relief by President Truman, General MacArthur claimed that: “Once war is forced upon us, there is no alternative but to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War’s very object is victory—not prolonged indecision.” MacArthur’s position implies that there is little room for political factors to moderate a conflict once it has begun.
There have also been those who have taken the opposing view and taken steps to ensure extensive political control over military operations. One leader whose conduct exemplified this principle was Adolph Hitler. Not only did he override the strategic advice of his generals in the early days of World War II, he also became increasingly involved in the details of military operations as the war progressed. American history also provides examples of political leaders who have taken this approach to the issue; several presidents have chosen to be active participants in the making of military strategy and the planning of campaigns. During the American Civil War, for example, President Abraham Lincoln was a very active commander-in-chief. More recently, President John F. Kennedy was deeply involved in the operational details of the quarantine during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Is such engagement appropriate oversight or troubling interference? In the case of the blockade, the Chief of Naval Operations who resisted Secretary of Defense McNamara’s repeated requests for operational details certainly thought it was the latter.
This question of the proper level of political control over military operations is crucially important, but does not seem to allow easy answers. It is important because the use of force usually suggests that significant interests are at stake—at times even state survival. Yet the range of answers given by those who have seriously thought about these issues, and those who have had to deal with them in practice, suggest that the solution is not obvious. Is there a balance to be struck between political control and military operational expertise? If so, where is the line to be drawn?
This monograph will begin to address this question by examining what Carl von Clausewitz had to say about civil-military relations and the use of force. Clausewitz, who lived from 1780-1831, was both a soldier with a distinguished record of service and a theorist of war who wrote prolifically. His major work was On War, a book in which he attempted to record “the major elements of strategy” as he saw them. Published posthumously in 1832, On War has become a military classic. Some of Clausewitz’s most enduring and powerful insights are on the relationship between war and politics. In On War, he not only firmly establishes that political considerations must drive the conduct of war, he also usefully identifies some of the dynamics which may shape the relationship between senior military and political leaders. His insights are all the more interesting given that his standard is strategic effectiveness. For Clausewitz, maintaining political control is not a question of values, but the key to success.
The following analysis of Clausewitz’s views on this subject is divided into four sections. In the first, I will provide background on Clausewitz’s approach to the study of war. This will include his views on the utility of theory, his argument that war is a unique and distinct human activity, and his emphasis on the fact that wars are the products of political forces that not only cause them, but also powerfully shape their natures. This background is not only useful for understanding Clausewitz’s arguments, but also establishes why On War is an especially useful work for the study of civil-military relations and the use of force. In the second section, I will explore the conclusion that Clausewitz draws from this that the political object must guide the conduct of war and four key implications of this idea. I will conclude this section with a discussion of Clausewitz’s views on optimality—how can one judge the quality of a state’s military strategy? In the third section, I will explore what Clausewitz says about the extent and limits of the political guidance of military operations. I will also discuss some dynamics that Clausewitz introduces that might affect the divergence or convergence of views between the military commander and the statesman. In the conclusion, I will summarize the above with an assessment of both the strengths and limitations of Clausewitz’s approach.
Before proceeding, however, some of the difficulties in analyzing Clausewitz’s work must be faced. Raymond Aron was surely correct when he wrote about On War that “You can find what you want to find in the treatise: all that you need is a selection of quotations, supported by personal prejudice.” One major difficulty is that the work was still in draft form at the time of Clausewitz’s death. In an 1827 note, Clausewitz himself foresaw the problems that this might cause:
If an early death should terminate my work, what I have written so far would, of course, only deserve to be called a shapeless mass of ideas. Being liable to endless misinterpretation it would be the target of much half-baked criticism . . .
His inability to complete this revision may explain why Clausewitz at times seems inconsistent on certain issues. In attempting to deal with this problem fairly, I will emphasize the ideas that represent later stages of his thought. In On War, his most mature views are probably reflected in the first few chapters of Book One, “On the Nature of War,” which he did revise. As for personal prejudice, the recognition of its possible existence and a conscious striving to overcome its effects may be the best
that one can do.
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