U.S. Support of PLAN COLOMBIA: Rethinking the Ends and Means
Authored by Dr. Stephen E. Flynn.
May 01, 2001
18 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The author argues that the U.S. emphasis on drug control in its support of Plan Colombia is misguided and akin to prescribing an antibiotic regime to combat a disease not caused by bacteria or similar micro-organisms. The illegal drug industry in Colombia is not the cause of that country s fragile socio-political system, but a symptom of and a contributor to the fragility of the Colombian state. Continuing the analogy, Flynn argues that U.S. and Colombian emphasis on combating illicit drug cultivation and trafficking leads to several undesirable side effects.
Preface
Stephen Flynn’s credibility on the issue of anti-drug policy is hard to match. Not only is he a respected scholar and a broad strategic thinker, but as a commander in the U.S. Coast Guard, he knows the problems directly from the front lines.
For those reasons, this monograph, even more than the popular film “Traffic,” is profoundly disquieting. Flynn tells us, among another things, that the policy that this country has been pursuing in Colombia at a huge cost is largely futile. If present U.S. antidrug efforts have been sold to the American public as leading to reduced amounts of drugs available on the street, such a suggestion, he tells us, is “either naive or duplicitous . . .”
What is even worse, according to Flynn, is that if the drug trade in Colombia is seriously disrupted, it will simply be pushed to Mexico. The result would be “disastrous,” with Mexico being adjacent to the United States, and with a better organized operation than presently exists in Colombia.
We live in a world of porous borders in which free trade and open-market capitalism are the order of the day. Millions of people, automobiles, trucks, and maritime containers enter this country, as Flynn points out with some remarkable statistics.
What is to be done? Flynn offers serious alternatives. The most important and most obvious is to deal differently with this country’s 5 million addicts and frequent users, who consume the overwhelming majority of drugs. How? Simply “invest in long-term treatment,” i.e., rehabilitation, which is not now the top priority.
He also advocates a costly and ambitious program of transparency and enforcement in cross-border activities. Add to that a program of spotlighting businesses which operate outside of established codes and attacking transnational crime more efficiently through effective international cooperation, which includes the press, judicial systems, and government officials on a broad scale.
If this country is unwilling to make all these investments, Flynn concludes, it should recognize that “a failed prohibitionary approach to drug control does more harm than good for it ends up serving the interests of organized crime . . .”
What is he telling us? Flynn does not go further into such issues as “lifting the prohibitions.” They will be the subject of national debate, however, as the failures of present policy are more clearly understood.
There could be a number of alternatives. One might be this: do not legalize or even decriminalize illegal drug sales, but re-focus massive expenditures on education and treatment. Then deal with the 5 million addicts as public health patients, not criminals, by offering them a prescribed drug dosage with immediate treatment (voluntary) if they will accept it. If each addict spends an average of, hypothetically, $15,000 per year, then removal of the addicts from the market would remove $75 billion from it, delivering potentially a knockout blow to illegal drug sales in this country.
Flynn’s monograph is a great starting point to wake this country’s leaders to realistic analysis and imaginative changes of program and policy. Let the debate begin soon.
Access Full Report [PDF]: U.S. Support of PLAN COLOMBIA: Rethinking the Ends and Means
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