Military

Commander, Undersea Surveillance CAPT Neil Rondorf's official biography reads like that of many other submariners: requisite sea and shore tours; command of USS Gurnard (SSN-662) and USS Minneapolis-St. Paul (SSN-708); then a submarine squadron. In 1996, Captain Rondorf became Head, Undersea Surveillance in the Submarine Warfare Division at OPNAV. Then in August 1999, he took command of the worldwide operating forces of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS). This five-year detour has been a change that Rondorf has welcomed, embraced, and made his own. Even his automobile's license plate reads "IUSS 00," and he himself has said, "I'm not just a submariner anymore, I'm the IUSS guy - ask me about that." Consequently, Captain Rondorf has practically circumnavigated the globe, spreading the word of IUSS's unique current and future capabilities to fleet and task force commanders.

Since its inception, IUSS has been at the forefront of acoustic sensor and processing technology. Naval historians credit IUSS, which includes the undersea Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), with significant success in monitoring Soviet submarines during the Cold War. From its shore surveillance sites today in Washington State, Virginia, and the United Kingdom, IUSS monitors thousands of ocean floor hydrophones, as well as mobile Surveillance Towed-Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships. Down from 15 shore sites in the 1990s, IUSS nonetheless continues to detect, classify, and provide timely reporting on submarines and other undersea contacts of interest, while gathering long-term acoustic, oceanographic, and hydrographic information. In fact, IUSS claims more contact holding hours since 1997 than all other anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms combined.

Captain Rondorf's experience encompasses the whole problem of ASW cueing, and he has had a unique opportunity to influence the future of the IUSS from both sides of the Beltway. In a recent interview, the IUSS "Commodore" was vocal about his priorities, his hopes for IUSS, and what he will miss as he retires after 27 years in the Navy.

Q: We in the ASW business talk about cueing being IUSS's job one. How do we maintain acoustic analysis proficiency on the watch floor while playing a long-term waiting game?

A: Just like onboard ships, we run drills, and we try to bring the drill mentality onto the watch floor. But I don't think today's technology has adequately supported the insertion of target signals into the data flow so they look real. So that's an area we have been working on and studying how other communities - like the Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion program - are doing that. I think we have a tendency to resurrect older archived targets and develop training based on those. What I want to see is the next generation of targets, too - what do the future threat signatures look like? There is some combination of historical "knowns" and current "unknowns" that we ought to be working on... because I think the future of acoustic analysis is going to depend on mastering both what we know and what we don't know.

Q: Hasn't acoustic analysis always been that? 

A: Well, I think we got pretty used to using textbook analysis on a classic set of acoustic targets over the past 15 years, and we probably became complacent. When we send MILDETS out on SURTASS ships, and they encounter diesel submarines, there's often nobody there who has seen that kind of submarine before. And that's a bit revealing - it shows us how hard we have to look for new targets. Not only do we have to go find them, but we may have to create some on our own for training. Our folks aren't as good as they need to be on some of the basics, and we may not know what we think we do.

Q: While we are talking about textbook targets, what about the people who think that IUSS is a Cold War asset that has outlived its utility?

A: Well, I think we need to maintain a certain sense of reality in the Navy. Practically, there will never be enough tactical assets to go around, unless we are opposing a very minimal adversary. It's really not a deep water-shallow water/Cold War-New World issue, but in the littoral, as in deep water, we just don't have enough tactical resources to search the world's oceans adequately in a time of crisis. The forces out there will be busy doing all their other missions just when we need them to find the submarine. Then we need a shooter. The problems of 20 years ago and the problems of today are exactly the same: limited tactical assets need cueing, and that's our job. The real challenge is to figure how to do that cueing in the future. There are several persistent strategic areas in the world where fixed systems make sense. Putting in a mobile surveillance platform for exercises or short-term crises - that makes sense, too. In an area where we have interests that come and go with the political situation, we can put the Advanced Deployable System (ADS) down for months at a time. We don't always require the long-term investment of a 20-year system. The future is uncertain, but not everything is going to require long-term surveillance.

Q: How have recent rating mergers in the operations specialist and sonar technician ratings affected IUSS operations?

A: We're finding that the combination of air, submarine, and surface experience provides an excellent understanding of what the ASW operator is looking for or trying to do. In the past we had the IUSS facility guessing what tactical ASW units needed to know and how to help them. Now with that insight right there on the watch floor, the watch officers know how platforms actually prosecute contacts, so we know exactly what the tactical units need and how to give it to them. Another thing that's become fairly obvious is that when a person leaves an IUSS facility, he or she really knows how theater ASW is conducted, how it is coordinated, and how information is passed. There's a force-multiplier there I've never seen before, and perhaps it's the real embryo of a network-centric ASW capability.

The problems of 20 years ago and the problems of today are exactly the same: limited tactical assets need cueing, and that's our job.

Q: What are the challenges on the officer side?

A: That has become a very difficult issue with ASW/IUSS no longer a core competency of the Fleet Support community. As we begin to have fleet LDOs [Limited Duty Officers] fill in behind the Fleet Support Officers, however, we are seeing a wealth of operational skills that we didn't have at our disposal before. I think the LDO option is an ideal fit, because it gives the LDO's a career-enhancing shore duty opportunity and us the combination of fleet and IUSS experience we need to build an officer corps that can lead the IUSS community into the future.

Q: What have been your top priorities since you took command?

A: Now, these are not necessarily in order of importance... but a lot of effort has gone into them. First, we need to shape a vision for cueing in future ASW. We need to get our operators to think futuristically, not only about today's business, but how we're going to handle the new SURTASS technology and the new fixed technology that comes with ADS. We need to learn how to optimize our information collection to best contribute to warfare capabilities. Also, I have attempted to get our leadership to understand the potential of IUSS in future warfare. We were mired for decades in the idea that IUSS was a Cold War asset, that it was a deep water/blue water issue. Navy leadership needs to see that this is a threat response issue, not one of deep or shallow water. My number-two priority has been trying to influence technology development for a leap forward. We're using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items for fixed surveillance, developing ADS with the best sensors and the best processing we can find, and transforming SURTASS into a twin-line, littoral sensor. But now we need to look 10 to 15 years down the road. What's going to be the target then? Is it the AIP [air-independent propulsion] diesel? A mini-sub? Something we haven't thought of yet? Trying to shape the technology in the face of those unknowns is very challenging. The last issue I've worked on was mentioned earlier... to ensure we have the people necessary for the future. We have needed to make "the system" understand that promotions and advancement are as important in the IUSS community as anywhere else. Putting in place a sustainable process for continuing to man the IUSS infrastructure has been paramount.

Q: Where do you see the IUSS in 20 years? What will you miss as you retire?

A: Well, we don't know what the world will be like in 20 years... but I think we'll continue to require ASW cueing over the long term. I see an infusion of new sensor technology and a closer cooperation with other warfare communities, particularly air ASW - in whatever form it assumes. I think we're also going to be dealing with a lot of non-submarine and non-traditional targets, but acoustics will always be needed as a discriminator. I see us on a worldwide information network that enables us to bring experts on-line to help the forward-deployed operators make that target identification. What I'll miss most is being surrounded by consummate professionals who are passionate about their work. We are trying to mold a future that none of us understands, and one thing that has made these last five years so much fun is that people have been willing to entertain "way-out-of-the-box" thinking. I think among SPAWAR, OPNAV N774, and my own staff, we have the closest claimant-sponsor-operator relationship that exists in the Navy today. It's that close teamwork that gave us the fiscal support we needed to develop technologies that really made an impact over the past couple of years. I couldn't have done it without this team. It isn't a personal accomplishment - it's been an organizational success.