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Desert Promise Storybook


Table of Contents

Middle East Orientation Map

Iran Scenario

Opposition Forces NCA Guidance (CINC's mission)
 

JTF Forces

JTF Mission Analysis MEF Mission Analysis
 



 

Middle East Orientation Map
 


 


 

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Iran Scenario
 

General Situation



    During the 1990's, Iran pursued its long standing ambition to be the dominant regional power through several means: aggressive rearmament, promotion and support of other fundamentalist Islamic nations (and disdain for secular or pro-Western Islamic nations), and a push for economic growth through a small increase in non-oil exports while attempting (unsuccessfully) to control the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf states.

    Iran developed an "offensive" military force which surpasses that of the Saudi's, viewing Saudi/U.S. security arrangements as a threat to Iran's basic security and an intrusion into its "rightful" sphere of influence. In the late 90's, Iran procured the T-72 MBT, the South African improved 155mm Howitzer, the C-801 and C-802 anti-ship missiles, and improved/upgraded existing SAMs. Iran upgraded its air force with MIG-29, SU-27, and SU-24 aircraft.

    Iran established stronger ties and increased military cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Iran continued an uninterrupted weapons buildup in Sudan to the extent of purchasing Chinese weapons and contracting Chinese support and training for Sudanese fundamentalists. Iran also established close ties, including non-aggression pacts, with the five (former Soviet) Islamic dominant republics to the North, ensuring a stable Northern border. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states increasingly incurred Iran's wrath in their resistance to its claim of Islamic leadership and regional hegemony, particularly as a result of their relationship with Washington.

    Iran's non-oil exports increased almost twofold from 1992 to 1998. Attempts to control the flow. of oil from the Persian Gulf to the United States failed. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states moderated OPEC tendencies toward "price gouging" on oil, maintaining plentiful oil supplies at reasonable prices to the West. This, particularly, has thwarted Iranian ambitions to further improve its economic condition and military capability. Saudi actions are perceived as collusion with the "Great Satan" to economically oppress Iran and, by extension, to blunt the expansion and influence of Islamic fundamentalism.

    U.S. forces maintained strong security and military assistance relationships with Saudi Arabia for the four years following Desert Storm, including U.S. access to Saudi bases and yearly combined exercises. However, in 1996, Prince Bandar (the pro-Western Saudi Defense Minister) was killed when his military jet exploded in a training flight and a conservative cousin succeeded him. The new minister canceled yearly exercises and, in the following three years, Saudi base support for U.S. forces was gradually denied. Following the Saudi lead, other pro-Western Gulf states gradually limited host nation support of U.S. forces in the region.

    The limitation of U.S. presence/forces by once very friendly Gulf states served as a cue for Iran to take a more aggressive leadership role in the Gulf. In March of 1999, at an OPEC meeting, Iran demanded new price and quantity controls on oil exports. This demand was narrowly outvoted, primarily from a Kuwaiti-organized coalition.

    In June of 1999, Iranian and Iraqi troops briefly clashed along the border over the poor treatment of Iraqi Shias in Southern Iraq. In August 1999, a second border clash resulted in more casualties and involved Iranian troops physically moving ten miles into Southern Iraq in order to "protect Muslim civilians." During the clash, Iran attacked and sank two Iraqi tankers with its sophisticated anti-ship missiles. Calls by Iran for new OPEC price and quantity controls continued to go unheeded.

    In September of 1999, the Iranian Navy began boarding vessels in the Gulf without provocation, stating the actions were for "safety and contraband" inspections. Also, small boats with armed Revolutionary Guards began harassing and firing at Gulf shipping. The U.S. reintroduced Freedom-of-the-Seas patrols in the Gulf, and deployed a Carrier Battle Group and a MEU to the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf area.

    In October 1999, Iran conducted reconnaissance flights into Saudi and Bahrain coastal airspace. Flights continued despite protest. In late October, a Saudi frigate struck a mine and had to be abandoned just off the Saudi coast.

    In November of 1999, Saudi Arabia invited U.S. forces to use two of its bases for desert training. One fighter squadron and four AWACS aircraft deployed to Riyadh, and plans were made to deploy other strike aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Iran demanded that Saudi Arabia terminate all military relationships with the U.S., that all Gulf states deny visitation rights to U.S. forces, and that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states agree to Iranian oil price levels. Iran further indicated that it was prepared to resort to "whatever means necessary" to preserve its security, its "rightful" sphere of influence in the Gulf region, and the Islamic revolution.

    Concerned about the challenge to its interests presented by the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism, in addition to its access to the Gulf region, the U.S. reiterated its commitment to the "Carter Doctrine", its intent to deal severely with "international terrorism", and its intent to hold 1tsponsor" countries directly responsible for any acts of "indirect warfare".

    Iranian broadcasts lambasted the U.S. declaratory statements as further evidence of its imperialist" intentions vis-a-vis Iran and the Islamic movement, and a further thwarting of its just status and ambitions. Reiterating its professed conviction that it has not only a right, but a duty to intervene in the internal affairs of Muslim nations to restore the "true path", Iran concluded the necessity of aggression in order to restore "discipline" in the Islamic movement and consolidate its hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf.

    In January, 2000, Iran sank a Kuwaiti tanker outside the Straits of Hormuz and mined portions of the Strait and Gulf; and threatened to fife on any unfriendly shipping until its demands are met. Soon after this, a Liberian tanker was sunk by Iranian aircraft in the Straits of Hormuz. The U.S. increased naval forces to two Carrier Battle Groups.

    In late January of 2000, an Iranian Marine Brigade, with supporting artillery and SAMs, reinforced Qeshm Island where many mobile anti-ship missiles are located. Revolutionary Guard units moved to reinforce the islands of Jazirezye Larak, Tunb al Kubra, and Abu Musa, as well as miscellaneous oil platforms. One Islamic Iranian Army Armored Division and one Infantry Division in the Bandar Abbas area were placed on alert. An Armor Brigade was moved to the port of Jask to reinforce the coastal defense forces and anti-ship missile batteries located there. The Iranian Air Force and Naval aviation increased patrols in the area.

    During the first days of February, Iranian forces attacked a convoy escorted by U.S. and Saudi combatants. Two merchants and a U.S. frigate were heavily damaged. The U. N. condemned Iranian attacks and authorized member nations to use whatever means necessary to ensure the free flow of commerce through the Persian Gulf area.
 
 

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Special Situation



    Following resolutions of condemnation by the U. N., the President of the United States directed USCINCCENTCOM to execute military operations in order to 'open and maintain the Persian Gulf SLOC, and to neutralize Iranian offensive capability that may be used to close the SLOC." Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina agreed to provide forces under U. S./U. N. command.

    On 5 February 2000, I MEF (Fwd) departed San Diego for the theater. Movement orders for the Indian Ocean and Atlantic MPSRONS, as well as Army prepositioning shipping, were given in conjunction with warning orders for deployment of I MEF and other joint forces. Five days later, a USMC brigade-sized element, built around a mechanized regiment, departed San Diego in amphibious shipping. Third MAW began deployment to airfields on the Arabian peninsula. Throughout February, Iran sank five more merchants, despite heavy escort by Coalition forces.

    In early March, an air and missile campaign was launched against Iranian anti-ship missile sites, C2 facilities, and naval bases, causing significant structural damage. However, Iranian forces defended tenaciously, inflicting significant attrition to Coalition attackers. Though overall numbers of Iranian attacks on merchants was reduced, the Iranians continued anti-ship missile and submarine attacks. U. N. leaders concluded that the campaign to date has not been successful in opening the Strait, and authorized use of ground forces in Iran.

    On 8 April, Iran recognized the probability of an immediate Coalition ground offensive, spearheaded by an amphibious assault along the southeast coast in the vicinity of Jask. I Corps headquarters dispatched the 77th Armor Division to defend the Southeast coast from Jask to Bandar Abbas, while the remainder of I Corps prepares to defend Bandar Abbas. The 773rd Armor Brigade established hasty positions in the vicinity of Jask, and other elements of 77th Division prepared extensive positions along the coastal corridor to the Northwest of Jask. Attrition has been high for units on the move during daylight, consequently, movement has apparently been restricted to night/adverse weather and survivability Situations.

    On 10 April, Iranian forces were unable to prevent the landing of U.S. Marine forces at Jask. Those Iranian forces occupying hasty defensive positions in this area were heavily attrited. The 773rd Armored Brigade suffered approximately fifty percent attrition during pre-landing and landing phases, and was decimated as units attempted to withdraw northwest. This unit no longer exists as an operational entity. Coastal Defense forces located near Jask withdrew during the night of the 10th, suffering an estimated fifty percent attrition in the move. All surviving aircraft relocated to other airfields in Southern Iran. All naval forces based in Jask are believed to be destroyed.

    On 12 April, the latest intelligence reports place the 771st Mechanized Infantry Brigade in blocking positions south in the enemy zone, with the 772nd Armor Brigade north in the enemy zone. Coastal mountains to the east contain IRGC infantry battalions. Anti-shipping missiles have been withdrawn up the coast to the protection of remaining 77th Division units. I MEF continues offensive operations in this zone.
 
 

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Opposition Forces
 

Iranian Structure


Iranian 771st Mechanized Infantry Brigade
TF 1/771
TF 2/771
TF 3/771
771st Cavalry Troop
Mech Bn 1
Mech Bn 2
Tank Bn 3
Cavalry Section A
Team A
(1Tank Plt / 2 Infantry Plt's)
Team A
(1Tank Plt / 2 Infantry Plt's)
Team A
(2 Tank Plt's / 2 Infantry Plt's)
Cavalry Section B
Team B
(1Tank Plt / 2 Infantry Plt's)
Team B
(1Tank Plt / 2 Infantry Plt's)
Team B
(2 Tank Plt's / 2 Infantry Plt's)
 
Team C
(1Tank Plt / 2 Infantry Plt's)
Team C
(3 Infantry Plt's)
Heavy Mortar
(1 Plt 107mm)
 
Heavy Mortar
(1 Btry 107mm)
Heavy Mortar
(1 Plt 107mm)
C/1/77 Arty
(6 x 155mm SP)
 
Anti-Armor
(1 TOW Plt)
Anti-Armor
(1 TOW Plt)
C/77 ADA Sect
(2 x SA-7 / 2 x ZSU-23-4)
 
A/1/77 Arty
(6 x 155mm SP)
B/1/77 Arty
(6 x 155mm SP)
 
 
771 ADA Sect
(2 x SA-7 / 2 x ZSU-23-4)
771 ADA Sect
(2 x SA-7 / 2 x ZSU-23-4)
 
 

 
 
Iranian 772nd Armor Brigade
TF 1/772
TF 2/772
TF 3/772
TF 4/772
772 Cavalry Troop
Tank Bn 1
Mech Bn 2
Tank Bn 3
Tank Bn 4
Cavalry Section A
Tm A
(2 Tank Plt's / 1 Inf Plt)
Tm A
(1 Tank Plt / 2 Inf Plt's)
Co A
(3 Tank Plt)
Co A
(3 Tank Pit)
Cavalry Section B
Tm B
(2 Tank Plt's / 1 Inf Plt)
Tm B
(1 Tank Plt / 2 Inf Plt's)
Co B
(3 Tank Pit)
Co B
(3 Tank Pit)
 
Tm C
(2 Tank Plt's / 1 Inf Plt)
Tm C
(1 Tank Plt / 2 Inf Plt's)
Co C
(3 Tank Pit)
Co C
(3 Tank Pit)
 
Heavy Mortar
(1 Plt 107mm)
Heavy Mortar
(1 Plt 107mm)
C/2/77 Arty
(6 x 155mm SP)
772 ADA Sect
(2 x SA-7 / 2 x ZSU-23-4)
 
A/2/77 Arty
(6x 155mm SP)
Anti-Armor
(1 TOW Plt)
772 ADA Sect
(2 x SA-7 / 2 x ZSU-23-4)
 
 
772 ADA Sect
(4 x SA-7 / 2 x ZSU-23-4)
B/2/77 Arty
(6 x 155mm SP)
 
 
 
 
B/77 ADA Sect
(4 x SA-7 / 4 x ZSU-23-4)
 
 
 

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Intelligence Summary


l20800Z APR 00


TO: MARFOR
SUBJECT: Area Intelligence Summary as of 0600ZApr00

1. GENERAL: Iranian forces continue to build around Bandar Abbas area in order to reinforce the islands, platforms, and southern Iranian coast at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. The Iranian objective is to control the Persian Gulf area, thus solidifying their dominance in the region and view Bandar Abbas (and specifically Qeshm Island) as their center of gravity for this action. Commercial shipping has all but stopped short of entering the Gulf area, anchoring mostly on the Omani side of the Gulf of Oman.

2. Phase I action results to date (Southern Sector).

    a. Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) batteries destroyed:

        CSSC-2 1 at Bandar E Lengeh (26 33N 54 42E)
        CSSC-3 1 on Abu Musa Island (25 53N 55 02E)
        CSSC-3 3 Vic Kuhestak (26 48N 57 02E)
        CSSC-3 3 Vic Sirik (26 31N 57 06E)
        CSSC-2 2 at Miski (25 53N 57 19E)
        CSSC-2 1 Vic Jask (25 53N 57 14E)

    b. Fixed Wing destroyed:

        MIG-29 12
        SU-24 04
        SU-27 12
        C-130 0l

    c. Naval Vessels destroyed or neutralized:

        Frigates 5
        Mining Craft 2
        Corvettes 4
        LCVP 2
        PB 4
        MC 1

    d. Ground Forces destroyed or neutralized:

        773d Armor Brigade (Vic Jask)
        IRGC Infantry Battalion (Vic Jask)

3. Iranian Forces:

    a. General. The 1st Islamic Corps, consisting of an Infantry Division (Bandar Abbas) and an Armor Division (HQ Vic Minab), controls the south central defense sector, estimated to encompass an area 140 miles around Vandar Abbas and including the Port of Jask. Force positions vicinity of Bandar Abbas and outlying islands are primarily hardened bunkers. To the south and southeast, coastal defense depends upon the mobility of armored forces that would react to any landing. Combined arms units of at least brigade strength appear to be marshaling south of the cities of Shiraz, Kerman, and Zahedan. Analysts believe that these units will move south to augment the mobile coastal defense forces in the next 2-3 weeks. Tough many CSSC-213 ASM batteries have been destroyed, other batteries remain operational. Targeting has been difficult and they remain a threat to forces afloat.

    b. Order of Battle:

        (1) Bandar Abbas Area

            GOB:    1st Islamic Corps Hq (27º25'N 56º10'E)
                    U/I Islamic Inf Div (vic 27º20'N 56º09'E)
                    U/I Rev Guard Bn (vic 27º10'N 56º11'E)
                    U/I Marine Bde (vic Qeshm 26º52'N 56º02'E)
                    U/I Artillery Regt (-) (vic Qeshm 26º52'N 56º00'E)
                    U/I Rev Guard Bn (vic Qeshm 26º47'N 55º59'E)
                    U/I Rev Guard Co (Tunb 26º15'N 55º17'E)
                    1st Rev Guard Bn (Abu Musa 25º52'N 55º02'E)

            AOB:    1st Iranian Air Wing (BA intl 27º13'N 56º22'E)
                    11th Fighter Squadron (MIG-29)
                    12th Attack Squadron (SU-27)
                    Attack Helicopter (MI-24)
                    1 Transport Squadron (MI-8)
                    1 Heavy Transport (MI-8 MOD)
                    Patrol Squadron (NAS) (C-130)

            MOB:    SAM Btry (SA-6) (Abu Musa Island)
                    SAM Btry (SA-6) (Tunb Island)
                    SAM Btry (SA-6) (Qeshm Island)
                    SAM Bn (SA-5) (Bandar Abbas NAS 27º10'N 56º09'E)
                    SAM Bn (SA-6) (Bandar Abbas NAS 27º10N 56º09'E)
                    SAM Bn (SA-2) (Bandar Abbas Intl 27º13N 56º22'E)
                    ADA Bn (S-60) (Bandar Abbas Intl 27º13N 56º22'E)
                    ASM Bn (CSSC-3) (Qeshm Island)
                    ASM Unit (CSSC-3) (Jazirey E Larak Island)

            NOB:    1-3 LSL Hengam (Bandar Abbas NAS 27º10N 56º09'E)
                    1-3 LCM LCM-6
                    14 LCMA Wellington BH7
                    1-5 LCPA Winchester SRN6
                    5-8 LCVP Rotork
                    3-4 SAAM FFG'S
                    6 PB MK III
                    8 KAMAN PTG'S
                    2 Mining Craft Naval Mining: Estimate 2 fields vic Qeshm Island

        (2) Jask Area:

            GOB:    77th Armor Div (-) (vic 27º07'N 57º06'E)
                    774th Arty Regt (vic 26º48'N 57º02'E) at least 2 Bns (155mm SP How)
                    U/I Armored Cav Unit (vic 27º07'N 57º06'E)
                    772d Armor Bde (vic 26º48'N 57º02'E)
                    771st Mech Bde (vic 26º13'N 57º13'E)

            AOB:    U/I Hello Attack Squadron (-) (MI-24 Hind)

            MOB:    SAM Btry (SA-6) (vic Kuhestak)
                    SAM Btry (SA-6) (vic Sirik)
                    SAM Btry (SA-6) (vic 25º45'N 58º20'E)
                    ASM Btry (CSSC-3) (last imaged 25º52'N 57º28'E)

            NOB:    Naval Mining: Mining reported off of Sirik Feb 00
                    by commercial shipping.

        (3) Chah Bahar Area:

            GOB:    U/I Islamic Inf Div (vic 26º12'N 60º36'E)

            AOB:    U/I Fighter Squadron (MIG-29) (25º28'N 60º24'E)
                    U/I Attack Squadron (SU-27) (25º28'N 60º24'E)
                    Patrol Squadron (C-130) (25º28'N 60º24'E)

            MOB:    ASM Btry CSSC-3 (last imaged 25º22'N 60º22'E)

            NOB:    2 Kilo Submarines
                    2 SAAM Class FF0 (Patrol Flotilla)
                    2 WPB Boghammer
                    4 PB MK II
                    6 PB MK III
                    4 LCVP LCVF

        (4) Shiraz Area:

            AOB:    54th Attack Squadron (SU-24)

            MOB:    SCUD B Btry
 
 

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NCA Guidance (CINC's Mission)



    On receipt, CINC USCENTCOM commences planning for operations in the Gulf of Oman, Persian Gulf, and on Iranian territory in order to restore freedom of navigation within these waterways and to remove the Iranian shipping threat. The President expressed much concern with stability in the Middle East. He specifically wants Pakistan kept out of this situation and expressly stated that no offensive operations occur in, on, or near Pakistan. In addition, the President remains keenly aware of media interest -- especially with the United States' recent history of intervention in Kuwait and continuing public demands for U.S. military withdraw from the Middle East. Anti-U. S. rhetoric remains high in many countries of the Middle East and our position in this theater is tenuous. The President is unsure how long the UAE and Oman will support U.S. action in Iran, especially if Pakistan gets involved. The President also seeks to localize this offensive as much as possible, and does not want to see a major strategic bombing operation in Teheran. He hopes Iran will succumb to U. N. and Arab pressure to stop anti-shipping operations in the Persian Gulf region, without the need for a massive campaign to totally disrupt the country. The President also remembers criticism surrounding the "Highway of Death" incident and does not intend to provide another opportunity for the media to portray the military (or him) in this unfavorable light. Unlike our previous military V action in 1991, when we liberated a small, weak country from aggression, we now may be viewed as the aggressor by attacking Iran. Basing rights in the UAE and Oman are essential to effective U S military action. The President wants this operation conducted quickly in order to maintain support of the Middle Eastern states and the Arnerican people. Authority for nuclear weapons is not authorized. The following tasks are to be accomplished.

    1. Disrupt current anti-shipping operations in the Gulf of Oman/Straits of Hormuz.
    2. Destroy Iranian weapons which currently threaten shipping in the Gulf of Oman.
    3. Reopen the Persian Gulf SLOC for commercial shipping.
    4. Neutralize Iranian offensive capability that may be used to close the Persian Gulf SLOC.
 


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JTF Forces
 

U.S. Troop List
 

U.S. Troop List a/o Phase IV (See JTF Intent)



    HQ, JTF 199 - CG, 18th Airborne Corps - Jask Airfield

        35th Signal BDE, USA
        Joint Communications Support Element (-)
 

    HQ, JTF 199 ARFOR - CG, ARFOR (82nd Airborne Division) - Jask Airfield

        HHC, 82nd Airborne Division
        82nd Signal BN
        DSCOM (-), 82nd Airborne Division
        1/4 Air Defense Arty (-)
        1st Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division - Tanta
        1/504th Airborne Infantry
        2/504th Airborne Infantry
        "B" Co, 3/73rd Armored BN (14 M551's)
        2/319th Artillery
        "A" Co, 307th Engineer Bn
        2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division - Tyre
        1/325th Airborne Infantry
        3/325th Airborne Infantry
        "A" Co, 3/73rd Armored BN (14 M551's)
        1/319th Artillery
        "B" Co, 307th Engineer Bn
        1st Armored Division (Equipment Afloat)
        24th Infantry Division (Mech) (Equipment Afloat)
 

    HQ, JTF 199 AFFOR - CG, AFFOR (Det, 9th Air Force) (-) - Ras Al Kahaimah airfield, Oman

        7th ACCS (ABCCC)
        23rd Wing (A-10, F-16, C-130, C-141)
        2nd Bomber Wing (B-52 G/H)
        552 Airborne Warning and Control Wing (E-3C)
        352nd Test Wing (E-8A)
        1st Fighter Wing (F-15C/D)
        33rd Fighter Wing (F-15C/D)
        36th Fighter Wing (F-15C/D)
        4th Wing, ACC (KC-10, F-15E)
        31st Fighter Wing (F-16C/D)
        52nd Fighter Wing (F-16, F-4G, A-10A)
        56th Fighter Wing (F-16C/D)
        27th Fighter Wing (F/EF-111)
        48th Fighter Wing (F-111F)
        37th Fighter Wing (F-117)
        22nd Wing (KC-l0)
        305th Wing (KC-135, EC-135)
        60th Airlift Wing (C-141, C-5)
        314th Airlift Wing (C-130)
        317th Airlift Wing (C-130)
 

    HQ, JTF 199 MARFOR - CG, I Marine Expeditionary Force - Jask

        1st SRIG (18 Force Recon Teams) (Kuhestak)
        CG, 1st Marine Division - Kuhestak
        Headquarters Battalion (100 5-ton trucks, 18 Recon Teams)
        1st Marine Regiment (48 TOW, 9 Recon Teams)
        5th Marine Regiment (48 TOW, 9 Recon Teams)
        7th Marine Regiment (48 TOW, 9 Recon Teams)
        11th Marine Regiment (5 TSQ-36, 90 M-198)
        1st Tank Battalion (58 M1A1)
        1st Assault Amphibian Battalion (187 P's, 15 C's, 6 R's)
        1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion (56 25's, 8 C's, l6 A's, 8 M's, 16 L's, 6 R's)
        1st Combat Engineer Battalion (24 Dumps)
        3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
        MWHS-3
        MAG-13(60 AV-8, MALS)
        MAG-11(48 F/A-18C, 36 F/A-18D, 12 KC-130, 10 EA-6B, 8 UAV, 3 MALS)
        MAG-16 (48 CH-46, 124 CH-46E, 64 CH-53E, 2 MALS)
        MAG-39 (36 CH-46E, 24 CH-53D, 27 UH-1N, 54 AH-lW, MALS)
        MWSG (MWSS x 4)
        MACG-38 (MTACS, MASS, MACS, LAAM, LAAD, MWCS)
        1st Force Service Support Group
        Headquarters and Service Battalion
        1st Landing Support Battalion
        1st Maintenance Battalion
        1st Supply Battalion
        1st Medical Battalion
        1st Dental Battalion
        1st Engineer Support Battalion
        1st Motor Transport Battalion (127 5-ton trucks)
 

    HQ, JTF 199 NA VFOR - COMNA VFOR (71h Fleet) - Afloat vic Jask (45 NMNNw)

        LCC-19 (Blue Ridge)
        COMCARGRU FOUR (Kitty Hawk Battle Group)
        CV 63 (Kitty Hawk)
        CVW 17 (Carrier Air Wing
        COMCRUDESGRU FIVE
        COMDESRON THIRTEEN
        CG 49 (Vincennes)
        CG 62 (Chancellorsville)
        CG 63 (Cowpens)
        CGN 36 (California)
        DD 967 (Elliot)
        DD 976 (Merrill)
        FFG 33 (Tarrett)
        FFG 37 (Crommelin)
        SSN 716 (Salt Lake City)
        SSN 759 (Jefferson City)
        AOR 7 (Roanoke)
        AE 32 (Flint)
        COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP FOUR
        COMPHIBRON 11
        LHA 3 (Belleau Wood)
        LHD 2 (Essex)
        LPD 5 (Ogden)
        LPD 8 (Dubuque)
        LSD 39 (Mount Vernon)
        LSD 42 (Germantown)
        LSD 43 (Fort McHenry)
        TAVB 4 (Curtis)
        BEACHGRU One
        MARITIME PATROL SQUADRON
        VP 46 (P-3C)
        Det, VQ I (EP-3B)
        Det, VPU 2 (P-3B)
        MCMGRU TWO (Embarked in USS Inchon)
        HELMINRON FOURTEEN (8MHC-53E)
        EODMU SIX (4 MCM Dets)
        HELICOPTER COMBAT SAR/SPECIAL WARFARE SUPPORT SQUADRON
        HSL 51 (HH-60R)
        SERVICE GROUP
        T-AH 19 (Mercy)
        T-AE 26 (Kanea)
        T-AO 194 (John Ericsson)
        T-AO 200 (Guadalupe)
        T-AFS 9 (Spica)
        T-AF (Rigel)
        TAVB 4 (Curtis)
        NAVAL CONSTRUCTION REGIMENT TWO
 

    MPS -- Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One

        MV Button
        MV Lummas
        MV Lopez
        MV Williams
 

    HQ, JTF-199, JSOTF -- CG, Joint Special Operations Task Force 199 (Jask)

        Army SOF (Shimal)
        2nd Battalion (AB), 10th Special Forces Group (AB)
        1st Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger) (Kahammasa)
        1st Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
        Assault Helicopter Company (2) (MH-60L)
        Medical Helicopter Company (1) (MR-47E)
        412th Psychological Operations Battalion (AB), 18th Psyops Group
        AirForceSOF (Khasab)
        32nd Special Operations Group
        7th Special Operations Squadron (MC- 130)
        21st Special Operations Squadron (MH-53)
        67th Special Operations Squadron (HC- 130)
        Det, 16th Special Operations Squadron (AC- 130)
        Det, 193rd Special Operations Squadron (EC- 130)
        321st Special Tactics Squadron
        NavySOF (LHA-3)
        Det, NAVSPECWARGRU 2
        SEAL Team 2
        Special Boat Unit Twenty
        PC-I (Cyclone)
        PC-2 (Tempest)
 


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MARFOR (MAGTF) Task Organization


GCE Task Organization (1st MarDiv)

 
1st Marine Div - Kuhestak
HQ Recon Company, 1st Mar Div Truck Co (-)
HQ, 11th Marines
1st Battalion, 11th Marines (GS)
5th Battalion, 11th Marines (GS)
det, 1St SRIG (CI, ITT, SCAMP, RADBN)
det, LAAD Bn
Task Force Spartan
1st Marine Regiment
Tank Company
AAV Company (+)
1st LAR BN (-) (2 companies + HQ)
1st Battalion,11th Marines
Det, HQ 11th Marines (I Q-6 radar in support of flanking attack)
Combat Engineer Company
PIt, LAAD
Det, Truck Co
        Task Force Warrior
5th Marine Regiment
AAV Company (+)
2nd Battalion, 11th Marines
Combat Engineer Company
Plt, LAAD
Det, Truck Co
        Task Force Knight
7th Marine Regiment
3rd Battalion, 11th Marines
1st Tank Bn (-) (2 companies + HQ)
AAV Company (+)
LAR Company
Combat Engineer Company
Plt, LAAD
Det, Truck Co
ACE Task Organization (3MAW)


Main Air Base Fujayrah
MWHS (-)
MACG-38 (-)
MTACS (TACC)
MWCS (-)
det, MACS (MATCD) (EW/C)
det, LAAD Bn
btry, LAAM Bn
HQ, MWSG
MWSS (+) (FW and RW)
MAG-11 (-)
MALS (for MAG-11)
det, MAG-13
det, MALS (-) (for MAG 13)
det, MAG-39 (VIP transport)
det, MALS (for MAG39)
Air Facility Jask
det, MWHS
MACS (-) (TAOC and MATCD)
det, MWCS
MASS (DASC actually just north of Jask colocated with 1st MarDiv HQ)
MAG-39 (-)
MALS (one MALS from MAG-16 to support MAG-39)
MAG- 13 (-)
MALS (for MAG-13)
det, MAG-11 (UAV's)
MALS (for MAG-11 det)
MWSS (+) (FW and RW)
LAAD Bn (-)
LAAM Bn (-)
Amphibious Shipping (Belleau Wood and Essex)
MAG 16(-)
MALS (for MAG-16)


CSSE Task Organization (1st FSSG)

T-AH MERCY medical services afloat
 
FCSSA vic Jask (fully capable functional area Support to I MEF)
HQ, 1st FSSG (command element)
HQ Battalion, 1st FSSG
HQ, 1st Landing Support Battalion
1st Landing Support Battalion (-) (port/airfield PQCGIAACG)
1st Dental Battalion
HQ, 1st Medical Battalion
1st Medical Battalion (-) (MEF field Hospital 1st and 2nd echelon)
det, 1st Maintenance Battalion
det, 1st Supply Battalion
det, 1st Motor Transport Battalion
det, 1st Engineer Support Battalion
MCSSD-17 (in support of Task Force Knight)
HQ, 1st Supply Battalion (command element)
det, Supply Bn (combat essential to sustain offensive, class I, III, V, and IX)
det, Landing Support Bn (HST elements)
det, Maintenance Battalion, (Maintenance support team)
det, Motor Transport Bn (lift for MCSSD)
det, Engineer Support Bn (bridging and bulk fliel assets)
CSSD-17 (operating CSSA-7) after consolidation
det, Medical Battalion (det from casualty clearing company)
det, Motor Transport Bn (Movement Control elements to assist with, army movement)
det, Engineer Support Bn (Heavy equipment to establish deliberate defensive positions and improve CSSD infrastructure)
det, Military Police Company, Headquarters BN (assist with army transit/traffic control in northern sector)
det, Supply Bn (improve capabilities - establish field ASP, add class II and class IV)
MCSSD-11 (in support of Task Force Spartan)
HQ, 1st Motor Transport Battalion (command element)
det, Motor Transport Bn (lift for MCSSD)
det, Supply Bn (combat essential to sustain offensive, class I, III, V, and IX)
det, Landing Support Bn (HST elements)
det, Maintenance Battalion, (Forward support maintenance detachment)
det, Engineer Support Bn (bulk fuel assets)
CSSD-11 (operating CSSA-l) after consolidation
det, Medical Battalion (det from casualty clearing company)
det, Maintenance Battalion (CSSD- 11 will run area salvage point)
det, Supply Bn (improve capabilities - establish field ASP, add class II and class IV)
MCSSD-15 (in support of Task Force Warrior)
HQ, 1st Maintenance Battalion (command element)
det, Maintenance Battalion, (Forward support maintenance detachment)
det, Supply Bn (combat essential to sustain offensive, class I, III, V, and IX)
det, Motor Transport Bn (lift for MCSSD)
det, Engineer Support Bn (bulk fuel assets)
CSSD-11 (operating CSSA-l after consolidation)
det, Medical Battalion (det from casualty clearing company (CSSD-15 will run the casualty collection and clearing point for the Division))
det Landing Support Bn - (HST set up and run medical evacuation (helo) site)
det Supply Bn (improve capabilities establish field ASP, add class II and class IV)
det, Military Police Company, HQ Bn (CSSD-15 will run the Division EPW holding site)
MCSSD-17 (in support of Task Force Knight)
det, Maintenance Battalion, (Forward support maintenance detachment)
det, Supply Bn (combat essential to sustain offensive, class I, III, V, and IX)
det, Motor Transport Bn (lift for MCSSD)
det, Engineer Support Bn (bulk fuel assets)
CSSD-11 (operating CSSA-l) after consolidation
det, Medical Battalion (det from casualty clearing company)
det, Maintenance Battalion (CSSD- 11 will run area salvage point)
det, Supply Bn (improve capabilities - establish field ASP, add class II and class IV)
CSSD-19 (augmenting MALS and MWSS efforts at Fujayrah, Main Air Base)
det, Motor Transport Battalion (command element - company grade officer)
det, Motor Transport Bn (augment lift capability)
det, Supply Bn, (receive and distribute aircraft fuel and ammo to MWSS and MALS and provide other than aviation material supply support)
det, Engineer Support Bn (assist in moving fuel, improve base infrastructure)
CSSD-13 (augmenting MALS and MWSS efforts at Jask, Air Facility)
det, Supply Battalion (command element company grade officer)
det, Motor Transport Bn (augment lift capability)
det, Supply Bn, (receive and distribute aircraft fuel and ammo to MWSS and MALS and provide other than aviation material supply support)
det, Engineer Support Bn (assist in moving fuel, improve facility infrastructure)


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JTF Mission Analysis



Initial Commander's Orientation: I ultimately want to seize the port and airfields at Bandar Abbas to prevent their use by Iranian military air and naval forces, and to destroy any anti-ship missiles based there. We also need to take Qeshm Island which is another prime launch area for these missiles. I suspect we will have to demonstrate that we can control the entire coastal region in the Straits before Iran will make any concessions to the U.N.. I want any Iranian attempt to move these missiles to be met with overwhelming firepower just as soon as we detect the movement. This is going to require significant effort and coordination for reconnaissance, surveillance, and targeting. I believe we will have to use ground forces to flush these missiles into the open before we can locate and attack them. We achieved poor results in Desert Shield/Storm trying to attack mobile missiles with aircraft, and we really aren't any better equipped for this mission today.

    I want to initially project power away from Bandar Abbas, as this is the most heavily defended section of southern Iran at the moment. We need a port and airfield to conduct our MPF and APA. 9ffloads, so look at Jask for a forcible entry into Iran. Once we have the port and airfield, I want you to look at using heavy forces to conduct a flanking attack towards Bandar Abbas. I doubt the Iranians will hold still while we drive towards the city and I hope to draw them out where we can take them under fire away from the really heavily populated areas. Then I want to look at projecting more forces north and west of the city. I envision this move as forcing the I Corps commander to either commit forces piecemeal, or to commit in one direction and allow us to tie him up and gain some freedom of action near the city.

    As you know, we can expect much hostility from civilians. This operation has potential to be very costly for our troops. I want a well defined plan that will minimize our forces moving through Bandar Abbas. Unless absolutely necessary, I want our forces to stay out of the city where we can easily be trapped in narrow streets. Any force that has to move inside the city should be armored and possess heavy firepower. While I'm not advocating excessive violence against civilians, I do want any overt hostility from civilians to be firmly met by force -- and hopefilly the word will get out to leave our troops alone.

    I'm really concerned that Iran's leadership will feel compelled to make a strong showing in this conflict -- especially with all the rhetoric about Iran being the leaders of the Islamic countries. I want everyone to remain alert for indications that Iran is reinforcing with units located in the north and I want a plan to address those reinforcements well before they reach our AO.

Assumptions:
Basing rights in the UAE and Oman will permit air and naval access.
Indications and warnings will expose reinforcements moving south.
Specified Tasks:
Disrupt anti-shipping operations in the Gulf of Oman/Straits of Hormuz.
Destroy Iranian weapons currently threatening shipping in the Gulf of Oman.
Reopen the Persian Gulf SLOC for commercial shipping.
Neutralize Iranian offensive capability that may be used to close the SLOC.
Seize the port and airfields at Bandar Abbas.
Seize Qeshm Island.
Plan to interdict forces reinforcing from the north.
Implied Tasks:
Destroy or capture anti-ship weapon systems.
Neutralize Iranian naval capability.
Neutralize Iranian aviation capability.
Conduct counter-mining operations in the Straits of Hormuz$ersian Gulf.
Escort commercial ships transiting the Straits of Hormuz/Persian Gulf.
Maintain a flexible, responsive capability to attack missiles on the move.
Constraints:
Project power away from Bandar Abbas initially.
Gain control of a port and airfield.
Restraints:
Avoid strategic bombing in Teheran.
Avoid nuclear weapons use.
Avoid operations in Pakistan.
Keep light forces out of Bandar Abbas.


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JTF Mission Statement



    Upon receipt, JTF 199 conducts operations in Iran to open the Straits of Hormuz to commercial shipping and to eliminate Iranian shipping threats in the Bandar Abbas vital area.
 
 

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JTF Commander's Intent



    The Iranian I Corps is located in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas, and is supported by the 1st Iranian Air Wing. I Corps deployed the 77th Armor Division into positions along the coast from Jask to Bandar Abbas, but held much of their force in the Bandar Abbas vital area. The Bandar Abbas vital area contains two airfields, a port, and numerous anti-air and anti-ship weapon systems, plus weapons housed on Iranian-controlled platforms and islands. I believe we can contain threats posed by Iranian air and naval forces. The entire Bandar Abbas vital area is shielded by a large civilian population however, which can support enemy forces and which is hostile to the United States. The enemy's center of gravity is I Corps. I Corps presents a formidable opponent with one heavily armored brigade and significant supporting artillery forces. We must deal with I Corps if we intend to restore the sea lines of communication. The I Corps critical vulnerability is the volume of area they need to defend against U.S. attack. Unless the enemy is reinforced, we can project power from a number of axes and the I Corps commander cannot adequately defend them all.

    Our center of gravity is the overwhelming air, land, and sea forces deployed in theater. Basing rights afforded by the United Arab Emirates and Oman allow us to position forces close to the operations area and enhance responsiveness. Our critical vulnerability is physical security of our ground forces that must attack on Iranian territory to destroy or capture the anti-ship missiles. We must move among a hostile population and attempt to locate highly mobile missile systems.

    I intend to exploit the enemy vulnerability by projecting forces from several axes of advance, and simultaneously attacking toward Bandar Abbas, to force the I Corps commander to commit his forces. We will seize the port and airfields in Bandar Abbas and the island of Qeshm, and thereby neutralize the enemy's offensive anti-ship capabilities.

    Upon completion of this operation, we will control ports and airfields in the Bandar Abbas and Jask area, military forces on Qeshm Island will be removed, the Straits of Hormuz will be reopened for commercial shipping, and U. S. forces will relinquish operations to a U. N. force.
 


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JTF Concept of Operations



    This operation will be conducted in five phases characterized by a forcible amphibious entry into Iran, attacks to neutralize enemy anti-shipping capabilities, occupation of key Iranian facilities, relief- in-place by U. N. forces, and withdrawal of U. S. forces.

    Phase One commences on order and consists of an amphibious assault to seize the port and airfield at Jask. NAVFOR conducts this assault with forces provided by MARFOR. Supporting actions include gaining and maintaining both air and maritime superiority. Both our pre-assault air attacks, which concentrate on Iranian air and naval forces at Bandar Abbas, and media deception operations will strive to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of our attack. Additionally, intensive psychological operations target civilians to attempt to reduce aggression towards U. N. sponsored military forces. JFACC focuses interdiction on military forces east of the Jask corridor and north of Kuhestak to prevent interference with the landing. Priority of Naval surface fires goes to the amphibious assault force. Priority' of air initially supports attacks on Iranian air and naval forces, then shifts to cover the amphibious landing. ARFOR provides the reserve during Phase One. Phase One concludes when the force beachhead extends to a position in the vicinity of Kuhestak and ARFOR has passed heavy forces offloaded at Jask through MARFOR lines for follow-on attacks toward Bandar Abbas.

    During Phase Two, JTF 199 conducts attacks in the Bandar Abbas vital area to neutralize enemy anti-shipping capabilities. ARFOR is responsible for attacks to locate and destroy mobile anti-ship missiles and to gain control of coastal accesses from Jask through Bandar Abbas. MARFOR provides air defense coverage in the Jask corridor throughout phases two and three, and provides sustainment support for ground forces within the force beachhead. Following the passage of lines by heavy Army forces, designated MARFOR elements conduct a supporting attack to occupy Qeshm Island and destroy anti-ship missiles. Air and naval operations continue to reduce Iranian offensive air and naval assets. Air interdiction continues to prevent reinforcement from military forces east of the Jask corridor. JFACC provides the JTF reserve in this phase by ensuring air support assets remain ready to rapidly support ground forces as missile systems are flushed out and attempt to move. Phase Two ends when U.S. forces control Iranian coastal accesses from Jask through Bandar Abbas to prevent employment of anti-ship missiles.

    Phase Three consists of our occupation of key Iranian facilities in the Bandar Abbas vital area. ARFOR maintains responsibility for operations during this phase. Key facilities include ports and airfields from Jask to Bandar Abbas. We will continue to maintain air and maritime superiority. Naval forces will escort commercial vessels through the Straits of Hormuz. Intelligence organizations remain focused on detecting Iranian attempts to reinforce this area, and will also attempt to locate remaining pockets of resistance. Priority of fires goes to security forces deployed to eliminate resistance. Phase Three concludes on order.

    Phase Four commences when U. N. forces arrive to assume control of land operations in Iran. Our focus will shift to conducting an orderly relief-in-place. ARFOR is responsible for Phase Four operations. Supporting actions include continued air and naval defensive operations, backload of MPF shipping and amphibious forces, and retrograde of fly-in-echelon forces. Support areas will systematically shrink as U.S. forces depart and U. N. forces assume responsibility for outlying areas. Priority of fires initially is to the covering force, and shifts on order to the U. N. Commander on the ground. Phase Four ends with the departure of all U.S. ground forces from Iran.

    Phase Five commences on order and involves our reduction of supporting air and naval assets. AFFOR is responsible for operations in this phase. Supporting actions include the withdraw of liaison personnel and U.S. equipment from host nation facilities, backload of support equipment, and retrograde of support personnel. Priority of fires remains with the U. N. Commander in Iran. This phase terminates when air and naval forces are reduced to the level of commitment required by our portion of the U. N. arrangement, at which time JTF 199 will stand down as an operational organization.
 


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JTF Command Relationships
 


 

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I MEF Mission Analysis



Initial Commander's Orientation: Our amphibious assault is going very well and I anticipate our force beachhead to hold. I want you to concentrate on completing our part of the JTF's first phase and plan for the second phase. Accordingly, we must develop plans to either defeat the Iranian 771st Brigade in this corridor or to push them back to Kuhestak. This action opens the secure space needed to offload the Army prepositioned equipment and get these Army forces organized for the passage of lines. We need to plan carefully for this passage of lines. If the 772nd Brigade moves south during this passage, our lives could get confusing really fast. I want a lot of coordination with our Army liaisons and I want a simple plan that everyone understands.

    We must also plan for our tasks in Phase II. We've been charged with providing air defense over the Jask4o-Kuhestak corridor, providing sustainment support to forces within the force beachhead, and conducting an attack on Qeshm Island. I'm not too concerned right now with details on the Qeshm attack, just give me a rough cut on what size force we expect to need for that attack so we issue that warning order to the MSCs quickly. I am concerned that we thoroughly plan those other elements of the JTF Phase II. Our zone is going to be busy; we have allot of interests competing for terrain, and I want a clear picture of who is using which space in our zone. Get the ACB and CSSE planners working on this so we can resolve any terrain issues quickly and the MSC's can work details of their plans.

    My priorities include maintaining tempo in our attacks, while simultaneously building our air defense network to cover our continuing attacks in this corridor, and developing a plan to push CSS out into our zone. Both our IADS and our support plan should be implemented by the time we pass Army forces through our lines, to facilitate the JTF's move into its Phase II.

    The JFACC has agreed that, as our up-front contribution to joint air operations, we can conduct our own combat air patrols in and adjacent to our zone, and we can interdict forces to the east. Anything left over between that and our close air support will be offered up for any other work the JFACC needs completed for the JTF as a whole. Get our airspace plans to the JFACC ASAP so they are incorporated in the Airspace Coordination Order.

    I want to know quickly about any anticipated shortfalls so we can work with the JFC for those missions or capabilities. The enemy has had time to lay minefields. Keep this in mind while you develop our COA.

Assumptions:
Friendly air and maritime superiority will exist near the Jask port and airfield.
Air assets can interdict forces east of the Jask corridor and north of Kuhestak.
Specified Tasks:
Extend the force beachhead to the vicinity of Kuhestak.
Conduct a passage of lines with Army forces offloading at Jask.
Provide air defense coverage in the Jask corridor during JTF Phase II and III.
Provide sustainment support to forces within the force beachhead.
Plan for attack on Qeshm Island following the Army's passage of our lines.
Implied Tasks:
Defeat Iranian forces in zone or push them north of Kuhestak.
Establish an IADS in the Jask-to-Kuhestak corridor.
Push CSS out of the port to deconflict with Army offload operations.
Establish forward CSS facilities to improve responsiveness through the FBH.
Conduct surveillance on potential enemy reinforcements in zone.
Identify force composition for attacks on Qeshm.
Constraints:
Establish air defense in Jask corridor before the passage of lines is complete.
Restraints:
Avoid amphibious operations in proximity to naval mining.
Avoid amphibious operations in proximity to anti-ship missile sites.


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I MEF Mission Statement



    I MEF continues offensive operations in zone to defeat 77th Armor Division elements or to push them north of Kuhestak in order to open the LOC between Jask and Kuhestak. On order, conduct offensive operations to seize Qeshm Island and defeat Iranian forces using that island to disrupt SLOCs in the Strait of Hormuz.
 


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I MEF Commander's Intent



    The 77th Armor Division has established hasty blocking positions within the Jask corridor and they plan to defend against our offensive until U.S. resolve is lost. The 773rd Brigade was essentially destroyed as any type of organized force during our landing. The 771st Brigade now holds defensive positions across our zone in an effort to prevent our movement northward. This unit is still recovering from our initial attack. The 1st Iranian Air Wing at Bandar Abbas and an attack helo squadron north of Jask provides air support.

    The enemy center of gravity is their fire support capability, with artillery located in prepared positions within the coastal mountains, and aircraft that escaped to airfields within striking range of our forces. The terrain in this zone favors the defense and will canalize our forces, making them more vulnerable to fires. The enemy critical vulnerabilities are the acquisition and communication assets needed to make targeting effective. If we can prevent the enemy from successfully calling accurate fires to bear on our forces, we can negate this enemy strength.

    Our center of gravity rests in our mobility and fires assets that provide us several attack options to maintain our momentum and quickly defeat the 771St Mechanized Brigade. We must use our combined fires and maneuver assets to disorient enemy forces and impede their ability to react. Our critical vulnerability lies in the limited mobility corridors for ground forces, and our immature IADS due to continuing offload. These weaknesses increase our vulnerability to enemy air and artillery fires that could restrict our maneuver. We must protect our forces from air attacks as much as possible and avoid massing forces in restricted terrain.

    I intend to exploit the enemy's weakness by maintaining our tempo with rapid attacks in zone to disorient the enemy and interfere with their ability to call fires effectively. We will quickly establish our IADS to disrupt enemy aerial observation and air support. Additionally we will prevent reinforcement of the 771st Mechanized Brigade, while locating and neutralizing enemy artillery During ground force attacks, I want continuous resupply efforts, and responsive repair and engineering support, to sustain the momentum of our assault. Once the enemy is isolated, from both reinforcements and supporting fires, we will defeat all forces south of Kuhestak to clear the LOC and we will facilitate a passage of lines by the U.S. Army 1st Armored Division and 24th Infantry Division (Mech). These units must be permitted to rapidly pass through our zone and carry momentum forward before confronting the 772nd Armor Brigade.

    Upon completion of this battle, I envision the LOC to Kuhestak is open and defended from ground or air attack, any enemy forces in our zone are defeated, and designated elements of I MEF are prepared to conduct follow-on attacks on Qeshm Island in support of JTF attacks on Bandar Abbas.
 


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I MEF Concept of Operations



    We will conduct the operation in three phases. In Phase I, Extend the Force Beachhead (FBH), the MEF conducts offensive operations against enemy forces in zone to establish the FBH farther north in the vicinity of Kuhestak. This will allow the Army the secure space it needs to offload its equipment in Jask. In Phase II, Provide Battlespace Security, the MEF will provide air defense coverage and area security in the corridor from Jask to Kuhestak to protect Army forces as they move north to continue the attack. We will conduct a passage of lines with these Army forces. Additionally, the MEF will provide sustainment support to all forces within the FBH. In Phase III, Attack Qeshm Island, the MEF will conduct offensive operations (a supporting attack), on order, to occupy Qeshm Island and to destroy anti-ship missiles located on the island. Phases II and III may run concurrently. Additional phases will be planned upon assignment of additional missions or tasks by the JTF commander.

    Phase I, Extend the Force Beachhead, consists of our efforts to defeat the enemy, the Iranian 771st Brigade, in zone. By defeat, I mean that they must not be able to operate at (or above) the platoon level or that they are pushed back through the Jask-Kuhestak corridor to north of Kuhestak. The main effort for this phase is the GCE. I want to maintain our tempo and build upon the success we enjoyed during our amphibious landing. Since we are vulnerable to fires while moving north through the canalizing terrain, I want the GCE to conduct an attack that utilizes more than one axis of advance. In support of the main effort, the ACE will conduct offensive air support. Prior to the GCE's maneuver north, the ACE will shape the battlespace through deep air strike's. The focus of the ACE's shaping is the enemy's abilities to target our forces and to deliver fires against them. I want his target acquisition and communication assets neutralized through physical destruction and electronic warfare. Specifically, I want EA-6Bs in the air at all times. Also, I want his fire delivery assets, his aircraft and his artillery, targeted. Coordinate with the 3rd Army (to our north) to establish a free fire area over the enemy artillery which is approximately 20 kilometers east of Kuhestak in their zone because it may be able to range our zone. As the GCE begins to maneuver, the ACE will transition into a role of providing close-in fire support. Also in support of the main effort, the FSSC will task organize responsive and mobile support packages. The FSSG must not lose focus of the main effort in Phase I as it prepares to project support forward in the next phase. The reserve is provided by the ACE. I want the capability to exploit GCE success and to destroy high value targets of opportunity, quickly, as we find them. I want the ability to deliver an even mix of anti-personnel, anti-armor, and anti-air munitions. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends when intelligence (the GCE commander) verifies that all enemy forces in zone are defeated as defined above.

    Phase II, Security, consists of our efforts to ensure battlespace security as the Army forces move north to continue the battle against the Iranian 772nd Armor Brigade. By battlespace security, I mean that the Army forces can move through our zone without a significant threat of enemy engagement from the ground or the air. The main effort for this phase is the ACE. The ACE will continue to neutralize the enemy's target acquisition and communication capabilities through command and control warfare (EW and physical destruction) as specified in Phase I. The ACE establishes an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in the Jask-to-Kuhestak corridor. During Phase II, the air defense warning condition will be "yellow". Further, I want a weapons control status of "weapons free" for any aircraft located east of the MEF Zone that are westbound into the MEF Zone. For all other aircraft, the weapons control status will be "weapons tight". Coordinate our air defense plan well with the JFACC. I envision a robust and effective IADS that minimizes the risk of fratricide. In support of the main effort, the GCE patrols our zone to locate and capture or kill any remaining enemy. I want emphasis placed upon protecting the routes that the Army forces will need to maneuver north (including passage lanes), the MEF air defense sites and assets, and the lines of communication to those air defense assets. The OCE will also conduct the forward passage of lines with the Army forces and will establish a liaison officer with the Army forces. I want a smooth passage with plenty of control measures. Also, I want the division commander to script a simple plan that we can execute with the Army to defeat the 772nd Brigade should they move south before the passage of lines is conducted. Also in support of the main effort, the FSSG will establish a second CSSA in the vicinity of Kuhestak. I want this CSSA as far forward and as close to Kuhestak as possible without being in range of enemy indirect fires. I envision a FARP collocated with the CSSA. Additionally, the FSSG will provide sustainment support to all forces within the force beachhead. Take the Army forces into consideration when you execute your planning. The reserve is provided by the ACE. I want the capability to react quickly to enemy threats in our area. Specifically, I want anti-armor munitions uploaded for the possibility of the 772nd Brigade attacking south before the passage of lines is conducted. Also, ensure the proper control measures are used to protect our aircraft during the "weapons free" periods. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends on my order. Expect this phase to last well after the Army forces have moved through our zone to take their objective.

    Phase III, attack Qeshm Island, consists of our efforts to defeat the Iranian forces on Qeshm Island. By defeat, I mean that we have occupied Qeshm Island, destroyed all anti-ship. missiles located there, and killed or captured all enemy forces, save a few stragglers. This phase may run concurrently with Phase II. The main effort f6r this phase will be the GCE. The GCE will conduct offensive operations in the form of an amphibious landing or a heliborne assault or both; however, right now, I only want a rough cut on what size force we expect to need for that attack, so we can issue the warning order to the MSCs quickly. I will share my concept of the operation as it draws nearer and as the MEF and JTF assets better define the threat. Our shaping actions in Phases I and II, the JTF 's overall actions, intelligence, and battle darnage assessments will determine what our best course of action will be in this phase. For now, I want to focus on the execution of Phases I and II. In support of the main effort, I want the ACE and the FSSG prepared to support the operations listed above. The reserve will be provided by the ACE. Priority of fires will go to the main effort. Priority of support will go to the main effort. This phase ends on my order after all enemy on the island are defeated, as defined above.

Maneuver

We will not be able to fully capitalize on our ability to maneuver effectively because of Iran's harsh terrain. Most notably, Iran is extremely mountainous. One-sixth of the country is over 6500 feet above sea level while the remaining five-sixths is virtually all above 1500 feet (Source: PCGLOBE mapping software). Although our area of operations centers around the coastal plains in the south and southeast, the mountain ranges to our north and west rise out of the plains quickly and will canalize us and force us to make use of the major roadways. We will rely on our organic air defense assets to protect our ground forces as they maneuver as best they can. Specifically, Stinger sections will be attached out to maneuver forces. Additionally, although mobility corridors are limited, there is more than one. We will divide our force and make use of at least two different axes of advance to prevent the enemy from massing his fires against our entire force at one time, in one corridor.
The MEF will deliver fires to maneuver. The GCE will bring its artillery tubes to bear on the enemy when it can and will always respond to enemy fire missions with counter battery fire. We will also use our offensive air support capabilities, specifically close-in fire support, to assist our ground maneuver forces through the canalizing terrain.

If in maneuvering it appears that the enemy has the upper-hand in observing or engaging us, the GCE will maneuver at night to better conceal itself and to remove some of the enemy's advantages. I am concerned that we will face a significant civilian population that stands to observe and report our location to Iranian forces, especially during the day.

In Phase III, the attack on Qeshm Island, the MEF will capitalize on it ability to maneuver from the sea with an amphibious operation. This operation will not be unlike the successful amphibious landing the MEF already executed at Jask.

The FSSG's ability to tailor responsive support packages to the GCE's needs will support success in the operation. The GCE and FSSG must coordinate directly to ensure the GCE maneuver can be adequately supported. The FSSG's ability to support all maneuver is as important as the maneuver itself.

Shaping
Shaping constitutes our efforts to make the battlespace one in which we can maneuver 'without enemy interdiction. We will neutralize the enemy's ability to locate us or to mass. combat power against us. Further, we will attempt to isolate the enemy and prevent him from effectively commanding and controlling his forces. Most noteworthy, the enemy has many battle-tested senior commanders and SNCOs (source: Iran Update handbook). In shaping the battlefield, we seek to deprive the enemy of capitalizing on the synergy and cohesion these leaders can muster through communicating with one another. We will accomplish this by interdicting enemy lines of communication.

Through the use of primarily organic and some inorganic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, we will acquire targets. We will shape the battlespace by flattening it into a two-dimensional battlefield, by isolating the enemy, and by attriting enemy combat power. By flattening the battlespace, I mean that we will engage in offensive anti-air warfare (OAAW) to destroy or neutralize the enemy's air and missile threat. We will specifically target enemy airfields, air defense Systems, theater ballistic missile systems (SCUDs), command and control nodes, and support facilities. We will also conduct suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to counter the enemy's surface-to-air missile capabilities. By isolating the enemy, I mean that we will utilize our EA-6Bs and radio battalion to conduct electronic warfare. By attritting enemy combat power, I mean that we will deliver as much steel as possible on as many high value targets as possible before we begin to maneuver ashore, and as long as necessary afier our landing.

We will also shape the battlespace by interdicting enemy lines of logistics. Once we have degraded enemy air defense capabilities to the point that we can establish and maintain, at least for short periods of time, air superiority farther north of Jask, we can begin to destroy his supply areas and delivery means.

Force Protection
The MEF faces several serious threats posed by both the environment and the enemy. The ability to protect our force will be extremely crucial to our success.

In terms of the environment, we face two major threats: heat and disease. It is now mid-April and we face daily high temperatures around the mid-80s. In two weeks, from May through October, temperatures will range from daily maximum highs of 95 - 101 degrees (source: Iran Country Handbook). The sun will also beat down on our Marines very intensely. I want plenty of fresh water available to our forces at all times to combat the heat and fatigue our Marines will experience. Further, I want plenty of sunscreen available to prevent our Marines from sustaining sunburns that might degrade their combat effectiveness or make them casualties. I want each Marine to receive refresher training on identifying and treating heat casualties. Also, plan frequent rest periods when moving during the hottest parts of the day.

Regardless of the maneuver advantage moving at night may provide us, I will use night movement to avoid exposing my Marines to grueling temperatures and conditions. I need input from my subordinate commanders advising me when our troops are substantially less effective because of the heat.

In terms of disease, their are several threats that can be categorized as insect-borne illness, food-borne and water-borne illness, and other hazards. Insect-borne illnesses include hemorrhagic fever, leishinaniasiss, sandfly fever, tick-borne relapsing fever, typhus, and malaria (source: Iran Country Handbook). These are serious illnesses that pose a serious threat to our force. I want plenty of insect repellent available to our Marines at all times to minimize the risk of contracting insect-borne illnesses. Food-borne and water-borne illnesses include brucellosis, echinococcosis, giardiasis, poliomylelitis, and schistosomiasis (source: Iran Country Handbook). No Marine will eat any local food: only food provided to him by his chain of command is approved for consumption. No Marine will drink any local water: only water provided to him by his chain of command is approved for consumption. Commanders at all levels will ensure that the origin and quality of their unit's sustenance is known. Other hazards common to Iran are as serious as rabies and as common as influenza. Marines should take care to avoid all animals and should at all times practice good field sanitation.

In terms of the enemy, I am most concerned about their ability to use chemical and biological weapons against us. The enemy is believed to have up to 2000 tons of chemical agents including mustard, cyanidal, and possibly sarin nerve gasses. Although unconfirmed, the enemy is expected to possess such biological toxins as anthrax and botulin (source: Iran Country Handbook). Iran possesses SCUD missiles and can deliver these weapons up to 300 kilometers away from the launch site. To combat these threats, we must ensure that we have plenty of functional NBC defense gear and that we conduct refresher training and daily briefs as to the threat. We must realize that if we are forced to conduct operations in MOPP gear, it will further complicate our heat problems and increase our water demand.

As usual, we are operating abroad and do not enjoy a "home court" advantage. Be wary of any local personal and try to avoid contact. The average Iranian is not a fan of the Western world, and although he does not hate Americans, he hates what you stand for (source: Iran Update Handbook). Expect a great deal of hostility because you have invaded his homeland.

Also in protecting the force, the MEF will execute several functions designed to protect the Army forces passing north through the MEF Zone. The MEF will establish a robust integrated air defense system (IADS) in zone to protect the Army Forces from air attack. The MEF will also conduct security patrols throughout the zone to identify and defeat any remaining hostile threat. Finally, the MEF will establish a liaison officer with the Army to ensure that the passage of lines is conducted safely and efficiently.

Support
The success of our overall mission will be determined by our ability to support all MEF activities, specifically those that protect the force. The FSSO will focus it support package around the principles of responsiveness and sustainability. I stress responsiveness because the battle will move out of Jask approximately 150 kilometers north to the vicinity of Kuhestak very quickly. I stress sustainability for two reasons. We are operating in a third-world country and therefore cannot depend on existing infrastructure to provide us much help. Secondly, while the Army forces move through our zone, they may require support from us. Our system is not designed to support a MEF and an Army, however, we must plan to do our best while both of these forces are within the FBH. My prime concern is our ability to support all forces within the FBH with enough fresh water. The FSSG will have to process (treat) and distribute a great deal of fresh (potable) water to support the force. We will not depend on any local, untreated water.

To be more responsive, the FSSG will establish a second CSSA as close to Kuhestak as possible without placing it in range of indirect fire weapons. This projection of combat service support assets will help to prevent the MEF and ultimately the JTF from reaching its culminating point before it conducts attacks in Bandar Abbas. The collocation of a FARP with the CSSA will allow the wing to conduct several types of missions such as close-in fire support, aerial resupply, and medical evacuation effectively in our northern areas.

Iran has minimal infrastructure that can be of any benefit to us. Their food and water supplies and medical facilities will be of little use to us. Iran does have limited, by American standards, roads, railways, airfields, and port facilities that can be of use to us. These transportation assets will be used as needed and suitable. The roads will be a major player.

In our zone, we will make heavy use of the two main highways, and the couple off-shoots, that run from the southeast to northwest from Jask to Kuhestak and from Rock to Kuhestak. We will use these two roads, or mobility corridors, to maneuver our forces and we will use them as main supply routes. Aerial resupply will be used to complement ground resupply if ground routes become unusable or if they can not support the required logistics throughput. This logistical inadequacy is most likely to occur in trying to keep fresh water moving to the forward deployed troops in the early part of the exercise or when the FSSG is also supporting the Army Forces that execute a passage of lines through us.

The MEF will utilize the airfield at Jask for some of its rotary wing assets and refueling assets but will base virtually all of its fixed wing assets and a good deal of its rotary wing assets in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) at Fujayrah International Airport at latitude 25º07' N and longitude 56º20' E. This airport will be critical to supporting the wing because it is suitable for all of our aircraft and it has no special conditions or restrictions (source: Iran Update Book). Additionally, this airport lies outside of the Iranian air defense threat, except for SCUDS, and is only approximately 160 kilometers from Jask in Euclidean distance (as a crow flies).


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Division Commander's Intent



    I see the battlespace as one that does not allow me to maneuver my forces to their full capability. The terrain is very mountainous and tends to heavily canalize ground movement. The coastal plains and valleys between the mountains are narrow, but do have good roads for movement. I echo the MEF commander's concerns about the harshness of the battlespace and will take many force protection measures to combat heat and disease.

    The MEF Zone is an "L"-shaped swatch of land approximately 60 kilometers wide by 200 kilometers long in the south eastern portion of Iran. My southern and western boundaries are the coastline along the Gulf of Oman starting at longitude 58 degrees 30 minutes in the southeast and wrapping northwest around the coast to 27 degrees north latitude. Twenty-seven degrees north latitude is my northern border. The Straight of Hormuz is west of the northern area of my zone. My eastern border, as mentioned, parallels my western border and is approximately 60 east of the coast. The JTF boundary lies along my eastern border. The 3rd Army is to my north. All of my forces are currently located ashore within the FBH.

    The Iranian 771st Armor Brigade is located in our sector in defensive positions, in depth, just north of the force beachhead and on or slightly west of the main north-south coastal highway. Additionally, there are a few battalion sized light infantry units occupying the vicinity of the major road intersections approximately 50 kilometers north of Jask. The Iranian 772nd Armor Brigade lies to the north of the 771st Brigade and has located forward elements in the MEF Zone.

    The enemy's center of gravity is his three batteries of six 155 mm guns that are arranged in prepared positions in the coastal mountains. These guns can engage us in our zone from virtually the northern area of the force beachhead to as far north as Kuhestak along all of the major mobility corridors. The enemy critical vulnerabilities are the communication and acquisition assets that he needs to effectively target my forces. I will attack his critical vulnerability, as the MEF's main effort, by coordinating a C2W plan with the ACE. Through physical destruction (deep air strikes) and EW (EA-6Bs), I will prevent the enemy from bringing, let alone massing, his artillery combat power to bear against me.

    My center of gravity is my speed and ability to effectively employ combined arms task forces. My critical vulnerability is my dependence on a robust logistics system, especially in terms of the wealth of logistics I need to keep my combined arms (mechanized) task force operational. In particular, I have a great demand for different munitions, spare parts, and fresh water. I will protect my critical vulnerability by coordinating with the FSSG to task organize robust mobile combat service support detachments (MCSSDs) that can meet my logistical and maintenance needs without compromising the tempo I build in my operations through my speed.

    The critical tasks that we must accomplish are to extend the force beachhead north to the vicinity of Kuhestak, to provide area secure in zone in order to conduct a safe passage of lines with Army forces moving north from Jask, and to conduct an attack on the Qeshm Island.

    Upon completion of this operation, I envision the end state as one in which all MEF areas are secure, all enemy soldiers and equipment in zone are killed or captured, all forces are well protected and sustained, and we are poised for further baffle if called upon. By all MEF areas secure, I mean that the MEF Zone and Qeshm Island are occupied and patrolled by our security forces. By all enemy soldiers and equipment in zone are killed or captured, I mean that no forces exist in our area that are capable of threatening us. Additionally, I mean that we have destroyed anti-ship missiles at Qeshm. By all forces are well protected and sustained, I mean that we are controlling any force protection issues stemming from the environment such as heat and disease and we are able to logistically sustain all forces located within the FBH. By poised for further baffle if called upon, I mean that the MEF has consolidated its forces, maintained its equipment, rested its forces, and is fully combat ready for the next mission the JTF may assign us.
 


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Division Commander's Concept of Operations



    We will conduct this operation in three phases. In Phase I, Attack North, the division will conduct offensive operations to defeat enemy forces in zone. We will defeat or push forces back north of Kuhestak to establish the northern boundary of the BFH in the vicinity of Kuhestak. In Phase II, Security, the division will conduct area security operations in zone. We will be focusing our efforts on protecting the MEF's air defense assets and the route that the Army forces conducting a passage of lines with us will utilize in heading north. Additionally we are tasked with conducting the passage of lines. In Phase III, Attack Qeshm Island, the division will conduct offensive operations to defeat enemy forces on the island. Our objective is to destroy anti-ship missiles and enemy forces located on the island. Phase II and III may run concurrently. In phases I and III, we are the MEF's main effort.

    Phase I, Attack North, consists of our efforts to defeat the enemy in zone. By defeat, I mean that they must not be able to operate at (or above) the platoon level or that they are pushed back through the Jask-Kuhestak corridor to north of Kuhestak. The division will conduct a two-pronged attack north along Axis of Advance Scout in the eastern portion of the MEF Zone and Axis of Advance Attacks in the western portion of the MEF Zone. The two forces will converge on Objective Tuna. I want two combined arms task forces for this maneuver. I want one task force the size of two regiments (+) and the other the size of one regiment (+). The larger of the task forces will attack north on Axis Scout while the smaller attacks on Axis Attacks. The main effort for this phase is the attack north on Axis Scout. The main effort attacks elements of the 771st Brigade. In support of the main effort, the smaller task force conducts a supporting attack against three located, yet unidentified infantry battalions located along road intersections in the western corridor. The enemy is known to have engaged in mining operations, so I want engineering support with both task forces to ensure our forces can maintain their mobility. I want the two task forces to coordinate their movement as they converge north, from the eastern and western corridors, on Kuhestak. Even though the mountain range that separates the task forces will help prevent fratricide from direct fire, I envision each task force crossing the phase lines from south to north within hours of each other. I am establishing Phase Line Ocean as your limit of advance. I do not want to overextend our lines of supply and communication or send all of our forces through the bottleneck of the two converging roads at Kuhestak. Also in support of the main effort, the ACE will conduct EW operations and close-in fire support with its airframes. The ACE will also augment the FSSG's resupply and casualty evacuation efforts as needed. The reserve is provided by the ACE in this phase. I do not want an additional reserve from the division. We have already had success during the amphibious landing in defeating the 773rd Brigade and are exploiting it by attacking north will all of our forces. Also in support of the main effort, the FSSG provides the frill garnmit of its support finctions as the force maneuvers north. Although each task force will have dedicated, task organized support packages, the priority of fires and priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends when all forces in zone are defeated as defined above and both task forces have massed at the limit of advance. I expect reports from our intelligence assets to confirm reports from the division stating our success.

    In Phase II, the ACE is the MEF's main effort. For the division, Phase II, Security, consists of our efforts to purge the entire MEF area south of the limit of advance of enemy forces, to secure the route of the Army forces passing through us, to conduct a passage of lines, and to protect air defense sites and assets from enemy ground attack. By purge the entire MEF area south of the limit of advance of enemy forces, I mean that all enemy must be located and killed or captured. By secure the route of the Army forces passing through us, I expect constant patrolling of the route to detect any enemy activity such as mining efforts. By conduct a passage of lines, I mean that I want a liaison officer established with the Army forces passing through us, I want passage lanes established (an axis), I want a passage point designated, and I want an attack plan that we can execute with the Army should the Iranian 772nd Armor Brigade attack south before the passage of lines is complete. I envision the MEF conducting a hasty defense in depth to delay the 772nd Brigade until the Army forces can complete their offload. Finally, by protect air defense sites and assets from enemy ground attack, I mean that I want constant presence at those sites and at the head of mobility corridors which allow access to those areas. The task organization devised in Phase I is maintained. I want two area security zones delineated using the phase lines as dividers. The first security zone is all of the MEF area south of Phase Line Pond and the second is between Phase Lines Pond and Ocean. Phase Line Ocean is now the FLOT. The task forces conduct area security in zone. In support of the MEF's main effort, the main effort for the division is providing security to the ACE air defense sites and to Army forces conducting the passage of lines. I want the task force in the northern security zone to provide one battalion as the division reserve to react against enemy threats. The MEF's priority of fires and priority of support goes to the ACE; however my priority within the division is to the security force in the north. During this phase, the attached Stinger assets will roam with patrols and reinforce the IADS efforts. This phase ends on my order. Expect this phase to last beyond the time that the passage of lines is complete.

    Phase III, Attack Qeshm Island, consists of our efforts to defeat enemy forces on the island. This phase may run concurrently with Phase II. By defeat, I mean that we will occupy the island, kill or capture enemy forces, and destroy anti-ship missiles located on the island. The main effort for this phase is the amphibious landing and or heliborne assault at Qeshm. The enemy strength at Qeshm is estimated at approximately a reinforced amphibious infantry regiment. After shaping the battlespace with air strikes, I envision attacking the Island with a reinforced mechanized task force. In particular, I want the smaller task force providing security in the southern portion of the MEF zone to prepare for this attack. Looking to the future, I want to attack Green Beach and/or Blue Airfield to accomplish this phase. In support of the main effort, I need the ACE and the FSSG to prepare the transportation and other support assets for an amphibious, heliborne, or combination amphibious-heliborne assault. Also in support of the main effort, the reserve is provided by the ACE . Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends on order, after we have defeated the enemy.
 


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Division Task Organization

For Phases I and II:
Task Force Spartan
HQ, 1st Marine Regiment
1st Marine Regiment
1st Bn, 11th Marine Regiment
A Co, 1st Tank Battalion
A Co, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
A Co, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mobility/countermobility/negotiating minefields)
A Co, Recon Battalion (gather intelligence/source CCIRs)
1st Plt, A Battery, LAAD Battalion (Stinger teams to protect task force from air threat)
Det, Division HQ Battalion (25 5-ton trucks, for troop and equipment transport)
Task Force Warrior
HQ, 5th Marine Regiment
5th Marine Regiment
2nd Bn, 11th Marine Regiment
B Co, 1st Tank Battalion
B Co, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
B Co, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mobility/countermobility/negotiating minefields)
2nd Plt, A Battery, LAAD Battalion (Stinger teams to protect task force from air threat)
B Co, Recon Battalion (gather intelligence/source CCIRs)
Det, Division HQ Battalion (25 5-ton trucks, for troop and equipment transport)
Task Force Knight
HQ, 7th Marine Regiment
7th Marine Regiment
3rd Bn, 11th Marine Regiment
C Co, 1st Tank Battalion
C Co, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
C Co, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mobility/countermobility/negotiating minefields)
Det, Division HQ Battalion (25 5-ton trucks, for troop and equipment transport)
For Phase III:
Task Force Spartan
HQ, 1st Marine Regiment
1st Marine Regiment
1st Bn, 11th Marine Regiment
1st Assault Amphibian Battalion
A Co, 1st Tank Battalion
A Co, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
A Co, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mobility/countermobility/negotiating'rninefields)
A Co, Recon Battalion (gather intelligence/source CCIRs)
1st Plt, A Battery, LAAD Battalion (Stinger teams to protect task force from air threat)
Det, Division HQ Battalion (25 5-ton trucks, for troop and equipment transport)
Task Force Warrior
HQ, 5th Marine Regiment
HQ, 7th Marine Regiment
5th Marine Regiment
7th Marine Regiment
2nd Bn, 11th Marine Regiment
3rd Bn, 11th Marine Regiment
B Co, 1st Tank Battalion
C Co, 1st Tank Battalion
B Co, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
C Co, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion
B Co, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mobility/countermobility/negotiating minefields)
C Co, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (mobility/countermobility/negotiating minefields)
2nd Plt, A Battery, LAAD Battalion (Stinger teams to protect task force from air threat)
B Co, Recon Battalion (gather intelligence/source CCIRs)
Det, Division HQ Battalion (50 5-ton trucks, for troop and equipment transport)


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Wing Commander's Intent



    I see the battlespace as one in which my forces can currently operate relatively freely or one in which we will soon be able to operate freely. I must remove his remaining air defense threat to enjoy complete freedom.

    The MEF Zone, or area of responsibility, is an "L"-shaped swatch of land approximately 60 kilometers wide by 200 kilometers long in the south eastern portion of Iran. My southern and western boundaries are the coastline along the Gulf of Oman starting at longitude 58 degrees 30 minutes in the southeast and wrapping northwest around the coast to 27 degrees north latitude. Twenty-seven degrees north latitude is my northern border. The Straight of Hormuz is west of the northern area of my zone. My eastern border, as mentioned, parallels my western border and is approximately 60 kilometers east of the coast. The JTF boundary lies along my eastern border. The 3rd Army is to my north. Additionally, most of my aviation assets are located in Fujayrah, U.A.E. I see this area as extremely valuable, safe, and supportive of my mission. Only enemy SCUDs can range me while at this Main Air Base.

    In addition to my area of responsibility, I have an area of interest that extends about 400 kilometers in every direction from the center of the Straight of Hormuz. In particular, I am concerned about the Iranian rotary wing assets that lie north and east of the MEF Zone, anything flying south or west out of Iran, anything flying south or west out of Pakistan, and my main air base at Fujayrah, U.A.E. I have an air facility at Jask housing some rotary wing assets, some refueling fixed wing assets, my UAVs, and a minimal support package. The remainder of the wing's fixed and rotary wing assets are in the U.A.E. Because of the Iranian anti-ship missile. capability, I have brought all assets ashore at either of my two bases.

    Within zone, the enemy is known to have three SA-6 sites which have an operational range out to 24 km, a maximum altitude of 12,000 meters, and a minimum altitude of 50 meters (source: Iran Country Handbook). The first SA-6 site in the MEF Zone is located in the southeast corner about 50 km east and slightly north of Jask. It has adequate air coverage as far west as Yekdar and about 24 kilometers north from the coastline in the MEF Zone's southeast corner. The second and third SA-6 sites are located in the northwest portion of the MEF zone. One is in the vicinity of Kuhestak and the other is in the vicinity of Sirik. These two sites project overlapping air defense footprints which cover the entire western half of the portion of the MEF Zone north of Bazreh. Additionally, the footprint of these second two sites extends west about 12 km into the Gulf of Oman. The enemy also has an SA-5 site in the vicinity of Bandar Abbas. The SA-5 bas an operational range out to 150 km, a maximum altitude of 30,480 meters, and a minimum altitude of 300 meters (source: Iran Country Handbook). This SA-5 provides supporting coverage over the same area as the latter two SA-6 sites mentioned above with the addition that it can reach virtually all of the way to the eastern MEF boundary north of Bazreh. Currently, we have a clear flight path between our two basing locations and no air defense systems can range us, as a crow flies.

    The enemy has mostly older technology aircraft, older tactics, and a shortage of pilots (source: Iran Country Handbook). He does possess some quality aircraft such as his American built F-4s. Although his aircraft will provide him some formidable capabilities, he can not compete with my air assets.

    In terms of Pakistan, if any Pakistani aircraft enter Iran on an attack course toward the MEF zone, I want them destroyed before they can reach the us. I want this clearly outlined with control measures that allow our aircraft to engage these threats west of the MEF Boundary. However, I do not want to engage any aircraft within 200 kilometers of Pakistan. Take care not to allow a fight to progress within the limit I have established and certainly do not pursue any aircraft within the limit. I want to know if Irani aircraft begin to operate from within Pakistan.

    The enemy's center of gravity is his anti-aircraft artillery systems (AAA), specifically, his SA-5 and SA-6 air defense systems discussed above. Although not well integrated in most of the MEF zone, this capability can prevent us from establishing air superiority in the Gulf region.

    The enemy critical vulnerability is his reliance on acquisition and communications systems to deliver his AAA against my airframes. I will attack his critical vulnerability through C2W and anti-air warfare (AAW). BA-613s will maintain a constant presence in the air to prevent his surface-to-air systems from acquiring targets. Further, we will use our UAVs and other reconnaissance and intelligence assets within the MEF to locate and destroy his systems (physical destruction), before he can utilize them.

    My center of gravity is the Arab support I enjoy in the form of my basing privileges in the U.A.E. My aircraft are out of range of all of enemy combat power except his SCUDs which I don't see as a significant threat to my aircraft. My aircraft would not be as safe afloat because of the enemy's anti-ship missile capabilities and mining efforts in the Straight of Hormuz.

    My critical vulnerability is the mobility of the enemy's air defense assets. He is capable of greatly changing my view of his AAA threat within several hours. I will protect my critical vulnerability by dedicating several reconnaissance assets (UAVs) to locating and tracking his AAA and several air to surface assets to destroying his AAA. Additionally, while locating and destroying these assets, I will rely on my BA-6Bs to negate his ability to target my airframes.

    The critical tasks that we must accomplish are to neutralize the enemy AAA threat in zone, to attrite enemy combat forces, and to provide air defense coverage in the Jask to Kuhestak corridor.

    Upon completion of this operation, I envision the end state as one in which the enemy is unable to engage aircraft in our zone, especially the Jask to Kuhestak corridor, because it no longer possesses a AAA threat. Although I always want minimal aircraft and pilot loss, I envision us having not lost any aircraft while in base due to poor security. I see the MAW as having established good relations with our U.A.E. host and having helped our chances of further use of U.A.E. airfields. I see Pakistan having not entered the battle on the side of Iran because the Wing erred in some way. I envision the wing poised and ready to accept the MEF commander's next mission. I also envision our aircraft maintenance and support stockage levels high for aviation peculiar items.
 
 

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Wing Commander's Concept of Operations



    We will conduct this operation in three phases. In Phase I, Support the Attack, we will conduct offensive air operations to support the OCE in the MEF Zone. Prior to the GCB's movement, pre-Phase I, we will conduct shaping operations through deep air strikes. As the GCE begins to maneuver north, we will change roles from providing deep air strike missions to providing close-in fire support. In Phase II, Security, we are the MEF's main effort and will coordinate an integrated air defense system (IADS) in the Jask to Kuhestak corridor along Axis of Advance Scout. q We are the main effort because this IADS will protect heavy Army forces moving north to engage enemy forces. In Phase III, Support the Attack, we will repeat Phase I, except instead of operating in the MEF Zone, we will be attacking Qeshm Island. Additionally, while the details of Phase III are not yet decided, we may be tasked to assist in a heliborne assault of a regimental sized, mechanized task force. More information will follow. Phases II and III may run concurrently.

    Phase I, Support the Attack, consists~of our efforts to neutralize the enemy's AAA capability and to attrit enemy forces . By neutralize the enemy's. AAA capability, I mean that I want EA-6Bs in the air at all times negating the enemy's ability to detect our presence, to acquire our assets as targets, and to use its fire control radars to deliver munitions. I also mean that I want AAA command and control nodes and the SA-6s in our zone physically attacked with munitions. Additionally, coordinate with the 3rd Army to place free fire areas around the SA-5 site and artillery locations in its zone which can range the MEF Zone. By attrit enemy forces, I mean that I want us to conduct deep air strikes before the OCE maneuvers north. The following is the target order of priority: enemy artillery positions in the coastal mountains, all aircraft in zone on the air or on the ground, and finally enemy troop positions. Once the OCE begins to maneuver, we will continue deep air strikes on high value targets of opportunity, but will focus on providing close in fire support with our AV-8Bs and attack helicopters. The main effort for this phase is the EA-6Bs. In support of the main effort, I want refueling operations airborne off the coast of Jask, out of the enemy air defense threat rings. Since our fixed wing assets will be flying in from Fujayrah, they will need to refuel in the air while conducting operations in the MEF Zone. Also in support of the main effort, I want UAVs searching for the enemy's mobile air defense assets. I do not want any surprises. If at anytime the enemy's AAA threat changes to encompass our tanker or EA-6B tracks, I want those old tracks immediately abandoned and. new ones. established outside of the threat ring~ Further, I~want ~APs established in the MEF Zone and around our airfield~in the U. A.E.'to{ocus on the air threat. We are providing the MEF reserve. I want two squadrons of F-i 3s dedicated-as the MEF reserve and armed with a mix of anti-personnel, anti-armor, and anti-air munitions, that heavily favors anti-armor types. I want a third squadron of F-i 8s dedicated as my reserve with strictly air to air missiles. I do not want any of these reserves on strip alert, as CAP will handle the threat. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends when all enemy forces in the MEF Zone are defeated in the GCE commander's eyes and he declares them defeated.

    Phase II, Provide Security, consists of our efforts to coordinate an integrated air defense system (lADS) in the Jask to Kuhestak corridor. We are the MEF's main effort. By coordinate an lADS in the Jask to Kuhestak corridor, I mean several things. First, I want three of our four HAWK firing batteries and one Stinger Battery located in the MEF Zone. The fourth HAWK firing battery, along with one Stinger platoon, will be located at our main air base in the U.A.E. The two remaining Stinger platoons are attached out to the GCB in the MEF Zone. As soon as we transition into Phase II, we must quickly establish our lADS, before the Army forces move north to conduct the passage of lines. I want complete air defense coverage of the Jask to Kuhestak corridor utilizing the assigned HAWK and Stinger assets. I want to know where we intend to establish our air defense sites before we leave the deep air strike portion of Phase I. During Phase II, the air defense warning condition will start as 'yellow". A weapons control status of "weapons free" exists for any aircraft located east of the MEF Zone that are westbound into the MEF Zone. For all other aircraft, the weapons control status will be "weapons tight". Additionally, we continue to neutralize the enemy's AAA, air, and artillery threat as outlined in Phase I and permitted by the changed fire support plan. The main effort for the wing in this phase is support of our HAWK assets. In support of the main effort, the GCE provides area security to the MEF area and HAWK sites. The GCE also maintains control of two Stinger Platoons as part of the security force. Coordinate with the GCE to integrate them into the air defense plan. Also in support of the main effort, we continue to provide 2 squadrons of F-i 8s as the reserve. I still want a squadron of F-i 8s held in reserve for me. Munitions load remain the same. Also in support of the main effort, I want a LZSA/FARP established with the CSSA in the vicinity of Kuhestak. Coordinate the details with the CSSD commander. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends on order which will come some time after the Army forces have completed the passage of lines.

    Phase III, Support the Attack, consists of our efforts to support the GCE's attack on Qeshm Island. The GCE is the MEF's main effort. The wing's main effort for this phase is not yet determined. If the OCE plans a helibome assault or a combination helibome-amphibious assault, our rotary wing lift assets will be our main effort. If the OCE plans an amphibious assault, our close-in fire support assets will be our main effort. In support of the main effort, we can expect to conduct offensive air operations against the Qeshm Island before the OCE assault. Ensure that we are logistically positioned to support this attack. The OCE is considering a regiment-sized mechanized task force for the assault. The fact that this task force is mechanized means it will be heavy. Give me an idea of our current operational rotary-wing lift capabilities. This phase may run concurrently with Phase II. The reserve is provided by the wing in this phase. Plan on maintaining the two squadrons of F-i 8s as in the previous phase. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends on order or on receipt of a new mission.
 


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Wing Task Organization



    Note: The WingTask Organjzation. will not change throughout the Operation with regard country. Wing assets stationed in Iran stay in Iran. Wing assets stationed in the U.A.E. stay in the U.A.E. During Phase II, however, the Air Defense assets in Jask will move north along the Jask - Kuhestak corridor under the control of wing headquarters detachment in Jask. The same applies for a detachment from the Marine Wing Support Squadron (rotary wing) that moves forward to establish a FARP with the CSSA in the vicinity of Kuhestak.
 

Jask, Iran (Air Facility)
HQ Detachment, MWHS-3
MAG 39 (provide close in fire support and lift support)
Det, MWSG (1 MWSS rotary wing)
Det, MAG 11(3 KC-130s for refueling, 8 UAVs for recon MALS (-) for fixed wing)
Det, MACG 38 (MATC Det, MASS Det)
B Battery, LAAD BN (to provide IADS in the Jask-Kuhestak corridor)
HAWK BN (-) (3 HAWK units to provide IADS in the Jask-Kuhestak corridor)
DASC
Fujayrah U.A.E. (Main Air Base)
MWHS 3 (-)
MAG 13
MAG 11 (-)
MAG 16
MWSG (-) (3 MWSS, 2 fixed wing, 1 rotary wing)
MACG 38 (-) (1 HAWK Btry, 3d plt A Btry, LAAD, MTACS, MASS, MACS, MWCS)


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FSSG Commander's Intent



    I see the battlespace as very constricting and unsupporting. Besides the transportation support available, the port, roads, and airfield, the environment does not offer me much support. The terrain is very rugged and tends to canalize its few roads to the northwest once you leave the port Terrain management is very difficult because the mountains rise out of the coastal plains very quickly, leaving me little space with which to work. Storage is not abundant. The complicated force protection issues outlined by the MEF commander in his Concept of Force Protection will consume several of my resources. Fresh water, sunscreen, insect repellent, and medical supplies will be consumed in great volumes. Processing potable water, controlling disease, testing food and water, providing hygiene items, all in the heat and under the battlespace conditions, are also challenges that I am keenly aware of. We can handle this, but must do so wisely to maintain the responsiveness and simplicity directed by the MEF commander.

    The enemy has the potential to use biological and chemical weapons. I want to know immediately, if any casualties show signs of biological or chemical agent exposure. This will greatly strain our medical assets and affect the flow of NBC defense supplies to our Marines.

    Currently, the force beachheads, and our front lines, only extend up the main coastal highway in the east about 60 kilometers. I am able to easily support the forward deployed forces via ground resupply that I centrally control and execute. However, with the MEF commander's intent of pushing our support capabilities up to the vicinity of Kuhestak, I will have to create a second CSSA in that vicinity. Until then, MCSSDs will be my most useful tool for supporting ground forces. All of my resources are currently ashore in the FBH. The wing assets at Fujayrah are self-sufficient and require no support from the FSSG.

    The MEF Zone, or area of responsibility, is an "L"-shaped swatch of land approximately 60 kilometers wide by 200 kilometers long in the south eastern portion of Iran. The southern and western boundaries are the coastline along the Gulf of Oman starting at longitude 58 degrees 30 minutes in the southeast and wrapping northwest around the coast to 27 degrees north latitude. Twenty-seven degrees north latitude is my northern border. The Straight of Hormuz is west of the northern area of the MEF zone. The eastern border, as mentioned, parallels my western border and is approximately 60 kilometers wide. The JTF boundary lies along my eastern border. The 3rd Army is to my north. My support area of responsibility includes the entire MEF Zone, including all units within it.

    The enemy in our zone lies to the north of the FBH for the most part. However, I am concerned about the enemy forces that do not. There are three infantry battalions about 60 kilometers north of Jask. I am not overly concerned with them because they lie in the sector of one of our division task forces that will attack north and defeat them. What does concern me are the rotary wing aviation and special forces assets located about 100 kilometers north of Jask outside of the MEF zone. These forces may pose a threat to our rear area security in the future. I intend to ensure we are prepared to defend against these forces.

    The enemy's center of gravity is his home court advantage and the support he will receive from all of Iran's citizens. Unfortunately for the enemy, his country is one of the "Third World" and is therefore not capable of providing the materiel he will need to compete with us on the battlefield.

    The enemy's critical vulnerability is his shortage of spare parts and equipment (source: Iran Country Handbook). His vehicles, tanks, and artillery are 20 - 30 years old and experience more downtime than the MEF's do. Some of his equipment shortages even fall into the realm of medical supplies and facilities (source: Iran Country Handbook). I will attack his critical vulnerability by sustaining my forces more quickly and effectively. The enemy can not match me in this endeavor, even on his home soil, and will come unraveled trying.

    My center of gravity is the speed in which I can provide my wide variety of logistical support to the front lines. I have over 100 operational 5-ton trucks and can move materiel quickly forward and keep up with our mechanized task force.

    My critical vulnerability is my limited number of supply routes north. I will protect my critical vulnerability by coordinating with the OCE and ACE for security of these routes and by conducting my resupply operations under the concealment of night. Further, when possible, we will coordinate with the ACE for help in the resupply effort.

    The critical tasks that we must accomplish are to provide sustainment support to all forces within the force beachhead and to support the OCE attacks in phases I and III and the ACE IADS in phase II. Our most critical activity will be the processing and distribution of fresh water.

    Upon completion of this. operation, I envision the end state as one in which he have established a solid support and sustainment system that is responsive, sustainable, and simple. I envision this system moving a tremendous volume of materiel forward to our forces along well secured routes. We should be able to move whatever we want, whenever we want, with a minimum of security. We should have CSSAs established at Jask and at Kuhestak that virtually provide complete packages of support. The only services not available at the forward CSSA near Kuhestak should be dental services, heavy maintenance, invasive medical services (surgery), and landing support. I envision no wide-spread health problems stemming from any environmental factor, no shortage of materiel, and a crumbled enemy logistics system. I also envision the FSSG poised and ready to accept the MEF commander's next mission.
 


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FSSG Commander's Concept of Operations



    We will conduct this operation in three phases. In Phase I, Support the FBH Expansion, we will support the MEF's main effort, the GCE, as they attack north to defeat the enemy in zone. The GCE is pushing the enemy back to the vicinity north of Kuhestak at a minimum. This attack is being executed to allow the FSSG to project support farther north and to clear more room in the current terrain around Jask for Army forces to unload. Phase II, Project Support, defines our efforts to establish a second CSSA to the north in the vicinity of Kuhestak. This second CSSA will better position the FSSG to provide responsive support to the MEF. In Phase I~, Support the Attack of Qeshm island, the GCE conducts an amphibious, heliborne, or combination amphibious-heliborne attack. The details are not yet established, however, I envision an operation very similar to our successful amphibious landing at Jask that got us here.

    Phase I, Support the FBH Expansion, consists of our efforts to support the OCE as they move two task forces north to defeat the enemy. One task force is a reinforced regiment and the second is two reinforced regiments. By support the GCE, I mean that I want to task organize two MCSSDs that are proportionately sized to match the task forces they will support. I want each MCSSD to offer the same well rounded complement of capabilities. There are three different supply routes that we can utilize in the zone. We will call them MSR Green, MSR Red, and MSR Blue. Two routes are completely independent while the third is a combination of the hybrid of the first two and another road. I want our MCSS[)s to utilize all of these routes as a force protection measure. Our main supply routes (MSRs) run, in general from Jask northwest to Kuhestak. I do not want to slip into a routine. Additionally, I want our supply lines active at different times during the 24 hour day, but mostly at night. The main effort for this phase is the MCSSD attached to the larger task force because the larger task force is the GCE and MEF main effort. In support of the main effort, I want to emphasize the importance of stocking and distributing force protection supplies like fresh water, sunscreen, and insect repellent. Also in support of the main effort, I want traffic control points established as we move north to ensure our supplies move forward quickly. The MEF reserve is provided by the ACE. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Although each task force has dedicated MCSSDs, the priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends when the GCE commander declares the enemy defeated in zone based on his criteria

    Phase II, Project Support, consists of our efforts to better support the MEF and JTF through projecting our support forward. By better support, I mean that we will establish a second CSSA to the north in the vicinity of Kuhestak. I want this CSSA to be as effective as the FCSSA and have all of the same classes of support with a few exceptions. I want to maintain the bulk of our medical and dental assets near the port at Jask, so that we are closer to T-AH 19 (Mercy). I also want to leave ~anding Support Battalion in Jask to prepare for the attack on Qeshin Island in~Phase III. I envi&w~ ~ amphibious operation embarkingoutofjask. Finally; the only other capability that I do not want to offer at our second CSSA is heavy maintenance. By heavy maintenance, I mean that any maintenance equipment or capability that we only have one of or that we can't contain on one 5-ton truck stays in the FCSSA. I do not foresee a need to establish RRPs. I am satisfied that the two CSSAs located only 150 kilometers apart, with the two MCSSDs resupplying at the CSSAs, are adequate support. The MCSSDs continue to support the same task forces as in phase I. In phase two, the OCE conducts security in support of the main effort, the ACE. One task force is responsible for providing security in the north and the other in the south. I want the MCSSD associated with the task force in the north to receive its support from the CSSA in the vicinity of Kuhestak when it is operational. The task force providing security in the south will continue to receive support from the FCSSA in Jask. The main effort for the MEF in this phase is supporting the HAWK Firing units that the ACE commander has declared his main effort. In support of the main effort, the OCE provides area security, focusing on the HAWK firing batteries. Coordinate with the GCE for security support and patrolling of our two CSSAs as well. This will alleviate our need for a sophisticated rear area security force. We will organize and run a quick reaction defense force, however, composed of support personnel in Jask. The main effort for the FSSG is establishing the second CSSA and supporting all units located within the newly expanded FBH. A MWSS detachment will collocate a FARP/LZSA near our new CSSA. I want the new CSSA started as soon as Phase I ends. It must be operational before the Army units unloading at Jask conduct a passage of lines to our north in the vicinity of Kuhestak. Finally, deconflict our use of our main supply routes with the Army's use of it for the passage of lines. The reserve for the MEF is provided by ACE. The individual CSSAs/and CSSDs will create their own reserves/quick reaction forces at their respective locations in coordination with any other unit's sharing their terrain. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends on my order. Expect this phase to continue for some time alter the Army has completed its passage of lines.

    Phase III, Support the Attack of Qeshm island, consists of our efforts to support the planned attack. Although details are not yet set, a regiment-sized task force will attack Qeshm Island. I envision one of the MCSSDs from Phase II deploying with a task force, roughly structured around TF Spartan (it is a regiment-sized task force whereas TF Warrior is much larger) with the addition of Landing Support Battalion from the CSSA in Jask. The rest will be nuts and bolts details. Plan for this contingency. If anything is different, I envision our requirement being reduced rather than increased. We will likely not land the full maintenance or motor transport assets with either of the MCSSDs above. The main effort for this phase will be supporting the GCE's main effort. In support of the main effort, the FSSG continues to support all units in the BFH. The MEF reserve is provided by the ACE. Priority of fires goes to the main effort. Priority of support goes to the main effort. This phase ends on order. Phases II and III make run concurrently.
 


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CSS Task Organization

Phase I:
FCSSA (Vicinity Jask)
Headquarters, 1st FSSG
1st Landing Support Battalion
1st Maintenance Battalion (-)
1st Supply Battalion (-)
1st Medical Battalion (-) (Field Hospital stays here)
1st Dental Battalion (Provided here only)
1st Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Water supply is big priority - centralized control)
1st Motor Transport Battalion (-)
MCSSD-53 (Supporting TF Warrior)
Det, Hqs, 1st FSSG
Det, Maintenance Battalion (Motor Transport, Ordinance, Electronics Maint support tm)
Det, Supply Battalion (Class I, III, IV, and IX management)
Det, Medical Battalion (Casualty clearing)
Det, Engineer Support Battalion (Bulk fuel & bridging support)
Det, 1st Motor Transport Battalion (15 5 ton trucks for materiel movement)
MCSSD-55 (Supporting TF Spartan)
Det, Hqs, 1st FSSG
Det, Maintenance Battalion (Motor Transport/Ordinance/Blectronics Maint support tm)
Det, Supply Battalion (Class I, III, IV, and IX management)
Det, Medical Battalion (Casualty clearing)
Det, Engineer Support Battalion (Bulk fuel & bridging support)
Det, 1st Motor Transport Battalion (15 5 ton trucks for materiel movement)
Phase II:
FCSSA (Vicinitv Jask)
Headquarters, 1st FSSG
1st Landing Support Battalion
1st Medical Battalion (-) (Field Hospital stays here)
1st Dental Battalion (Provided here only)
Det, 1st Maintenance Battalion (1/2 all maint stays here - all heavy maint)
Det, 1st Supply Battalion (1/2 supply assets located here - all capabilities)
Det, 1st Engineer Support Battalion (1/2 ESB assets located here- all capabilities)
Det, 1st Motor Transport Bn (1/2 Motor Trans assets located here - all capabilities)
CSSA (Vicinity Kuhestak) - Run by CSSD-19 (collocated with FARP)
Det, 1st Medical Battalion (Field Station/Casualty clearing only - no surgery)
Det, 1st Maintenance Battalion (about 1/2 all maint stays here - no heayy maint)
Det, 1St Supply Battalion (1/2 supply assets located here - all capabilities)
Det, 1st Engineer Support Battalion (1/2 ESB assets located here- all capabilities)
Det, 1st Motor Transport Bn (1/2 Motor Trans assets located here - all capabilities)
MCSSD-53 (Supporting TF Warrior) - unchanged from Phase I
Det, Hqs, 1st FSSG
Det, Maintenance Battalion (Motor Transport/Ordinance/Electronics Maint support tm)
Det, Supply Battalion (Class I, III, IV, and IX management)
Det, Medical Battalion (Casualty clearing)
Det, Engineer Support Battalion (Bulk fuel & bridging support)
Det, 1st Motor Transport Battalion (15 5 ton trucks for materiel movement)
MCSSD-55 (Supporting TF Spartan) - unchanged from Phase I
Det, Hqs, 1st FSSG
Det, Maintenance Battalion (Motor Transport, Ordinance, Electronics Maint support tm)
Det, Supply Battalion (Class I, III, IV, and IX management)
Det, Medical Battalion (Casualty clearing)
Det, Engineer Support Battalion (Bulk fuel & bridging support)
Det, 1st Motor Transport Battalion (15 5 ton trucks for materiel movement)
Phase III:
Unchanged from Phase II. I anticipate either MCSSD-53 or MCSSD-55 will support an amphibious landing with the addition of Landing Support Battalion.



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