North Caucasus Military
District:
Defending Russia's Interests
in the Caucasus
(1996-August 1999)
Dr Steven J Main
June 2000
Source: Military News
Bulletin, No 8, August 1994.
Disclaimer
The views expressed are
those of the
Author and not necessarily
those of the
UK Ministry of Defence
"If Kosovo was selected
to be the staging post for the launch of international terrorism in the
Balkans, then Chechnya is the equivalent in the Caucasus. With [outside]
assistance, enforced on the population of this Russian republic has been
created an anti-people, anti-constitutional, criminal regime.a criminal-terrorist
enclave.
This has generated a
qualitatively new threat . to national and international security, stability
and the general peace. Today Russia stands square on to the threat in the
North Caucasus, defending not only its territorial integrity and sovereignty,
the law and freedom of its citizens, but also Europe, and the whole world
from the strengthening criminal-terrorist abyss."
The men who are literally
in the front line waging Russia's present "counter-terrorist campaign"
are operating from the North Caucasus Military District (MD), Russia's
main guarantor of her security interests in the south. Not enjoying the
easiest of times in 1994-1996 during the first Chechen War, Russia seems
to have got things more right than wrong in this second military campaign
in the region. Some of the reasons for this lie in the changes which have
taken place both within this "frontline" military district and in the representative
structures and units of the other power ministries based there. This paper
examines those changes which took place within the MD during 1996-1999
and assesses their effectiveness in the light of the Chechen campaign.
It is subdivided into a number of sections, including an overview of the
relevant experience of the first Chechen war; the general military reform
process and its impact on the MD; the level of mutual training between
the units of the power ministries based in the MD. It is hoped that the
reader will gain a more comprehensive picture of exactly how the North
Caucasus MD prepared for its second military campaign in the Caucasus in
the space of 5 years.
The Experience of the
1994-1996 First Chechen War
In early 1998, two Russian
Lieutenant-Colonels published a detailed review of recent (1986-1996) military
involvement in internal conflicts in USSR/Russia. They listed a total of
16 instances (10 in the period 1986-1991 and 6 in the post-Soviet period)
when the central political power in Moscow felt it necessary to introduce
troops onto the streets of the country's cities and towns. Using four separate
categories to gauge the effectiveness of the country's Armed Forces - "cessation
of disorder"; "reduction in tension"; "regularisation" and "localisation
of conflict" - as well as a points system (0 representing no success; 1
partial success and 3 total success) - the authors reasoned that only one
operation - that carried out in the Kirghiz cities of Osh, Kara-Suu and
Uzgen in June 1990 - could be labelled "a great success." Using their methodology,
three operations were deemed to have been "a total failure": Tbilisi, April
1989; Vilnius, January 1990 and, not surprisingly, Chechnya, December 1994-August
1996. Their assessment of the current "counter-terrorist operation" in
the North Caucasus is not yet known, but one can assume that it would be
classed either as enjoying "certain limited success", or be placed in the
slightly higher category, "use of troops justified itself." Certainly,
in comparison with the first Chechen war, at least militarily, the current
campaign cannot be classed as a "a total failure", although how successful
the politicians will be in securing both long-term peace and stability
for the region is impossible to say at present.
Thus, the assumption must
be that Russia's senior political and military figures did learn from the
first Chechen War and did put into effect a number of changes, at least
at a local level, designed to ensure that the Russian Armed Forces did
not repeat the mistakes of 1994-1996. There can be very little doubt that
the experience accumulated as a result of the first Chechen War was collated
and analysed with a view not only, for instance, to strengthening the cooperation
and interaction between the various power ministries, both locally and
nationally, but also a determination to restore Moscow's writ in the republic
at the earliest possible date. After all, Chechnya in 1994-1996 proved
that there was a very real internal threat to the Russian Federation
and the response of the power ministries was less than adequate, to put
it mildly. Moscow is also very aware of the strategic and economic importance
of the region to Russia and is determined to maintain its presence in the
region, by force of arms if needs be. Nor will it brook outside "interference"
in what it considers to be a region of vital national importance.
Even before the first Chechen
War had fully run its course, it was obvious that changes were going to
be made, especially in relation to the North Caucasus MD, in order to take
into account the immediate combat experience of the troops on the ground.
In May 1996, in an interview with Interfax, the then Russian Minister
of Defence, General P Grachev, made it clear that the military experience
of Chechnya would be used to re-model the Army, especially those units
in the North Caucasus MD:
"Units in the North
Caucasus Military District will be restructured on the basis of the experience
of military actions conducted in Chechnya.the need has emerged to form
infantry units and airborne assault units capable of fighting in the mountains,
and airborne assault units to be dropped from helicopters in unfamiliar
localities. The special rapid deployment units will also undergo some changes."
Grachev also pointed out that
one of "the main problems" facing the Armed Forces in the war in Chechnya
was the Army's lack of experience in seizing towns: "Besieging towns
and preparing to take them by storm in one's own country was very hard
from the psychological point of view." Judging from reports concerning
the latest military campaign in the Caucasus, the seizing of towns would
appear to have become less of a problem for the Russian Armed Forces.
In a more detailed report,
published at the end of May 1996, concerning the impact of the overall
reform of the Armed Forces, as well as the war in Chechnya, Grachev spoke
about "the essentially newly-created forces of the Moscow and the North
Caucasus Military Districts", as well as the operational training which
had taken place during the winter of 1995, when "attention was focussed
on the study and tactical analysis of questions concerning the settlement
of military conflicts of various sizes", involving not only the MoD,
but also the Border Guards Service, MVD's Interior Troops and the troops
of the Ministry of Emergencies. Noting the resignation of Major-General
Kondrat'yev as Commander of Operational Group of Forces (Chechnya), Grachev
spoke about "the unjustifiable losses" due to "insufficient attention"
being paid by the Commander to "the experience of the war in Afghanistan."
A further sign of change
in the MD was Grachev's announcement in the article that all Federal forces
not previously belonging to the North Caucasus MD were to be moved out
of the MD by 1st August 1996, thus effectively signalling the
beginning of the end of the military campaign in the region. Of course,
by the time the deadline was due to be reached, Grachev was no longer Russia's
Minister of Defence, replaced by Colonel-General I Rodionov in July 1996.
One of the reasons behind the downfall of Russia's "best ever" Minister
of Defence was Grachev's handling of the war in Chechnya (indeed in an
interview of the new Minister of Defence, Rodionov bluntly stated that
"military
activities [in Chechnya] were initiated with bad preparation and bad planning").
On too many occasions, Grachev had the bad habit of not living up to his
boasts. Although it would be unfair to blame Grachev wholly for the low
combat capability of the Russian Army, nevertheless his poor handling of
the war in Chechnya - along with growing allegations of corruption and
even the possibility of his role in murder - was an important reason in
Yel'tsin's decision to sack him.
Rodionov was a very different
kind of man to Grachev. Formerly Commander of 40th Army in Afghanistan
when, according to one source, military activity was at its highest but
losses of both men and material were at their lowest, Rodionov's most recent
appointment had been Chief of the General Staff's Military Academy. As
such, he had written widely on reform of the Armed Forces and the general
nature of war. In relation to developments closer to home, ie the recent
experience of the Chechen War, Rodionov in a TV interview broadcast in
early September 1996, made it clear that the troops from the North Caucasus
MD would be a permanent fixture in Chechnya:
"Defence Minister
Igor Rodionov said today that units of the North Caucasus Military District
would be permanently based in Chechnya. Only the troops that, in the minister's
words, were providing temporary military assistance there will leave the
republic."
In the same interview, Rodionov
also revealed that, in his opinion, the fighting in Chechnya would go on
"for
a very long time, perhaps for years, perhaps for a decade" and that
the Russian forces based there would have to be careful not to give in
to "revenge" or "provocations".
Thus, not only was the
new Minister of Defence unconvinced about the settlement negotiated between
A Maskhadov and A Lebed at Khasavyurt in the previous month, but he also
saw the need for a permanent Russian military presence in the region, made
up of units supplied from the North Caucasus MD. At this point, it should
be noted that thanks to the war in Chechnya, the North Caucasus MD had
now effectively been re-designated as one of Russia's frontline MDs. Gone
were the days when service in the MD was viewed as a relatively easy number,
due to the temperance of the climate, the fact that, during the Soviet
period, there was little inter-ethnic tension, its borders were stable.
Now, tension in the region was high and the MD was in the forefront of
protecting Russia's geostrategic interests in the south.
The importance of the MD,
as well as the continued anxiety over Russia's position in the south, was
emphasised by a leaked report of a session of Russia's Security Council,
held on 28th November 1996:
"Ivan Rybkin, secretary
of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and Igor Rodionov, defence
minister of the Russian Federation, discussed creating a reinforced North
Caucasus Military District group using the 101st Brigade of
Interior Troops of the Interior Ministry and 205th Brigade of
the defence ministry."
Curiously enough, the 205th
Motor Rifle Brigade had come in for some criticism a couple of months earlier,
in an article examining the overall failure of the Russian Army's military
campaign in Chechnya:
"Another reason for
the Russian Army's failures in Chechnya can be considered the familiar
and ineradicable disorder in the troops and the lack of a precise structure,
line of control and even information about the whereabouts at any given
moment in time about any unit. Many officers cannot understand the previously
unseen structure of the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade which is to
be permanently based in Chechnya. It consists of the Separate 204th
Regiment and several battalions and companies. Leaving aside the fact that
there has never been such an 'organism' in the Army before - some personnel
do not know to whom it is directly subordinate and who is its higher command.
Formally, the brigade is part of 58 Army, North Caucasus MD and, obviously,
should be subordinate to its leadership. On the other hand, 205th
is under the command of the temporary combined forces in Chechnya, represented
by deputy commander North Caucasus MD, Vladimir Tikhomirov and Konstantin
Pulikovskiy, in other words, a higher command and control structure."
The confusion over issues
of command and control of the Federal grouping in Chechnya during the first
Chechen War was symptomatic, not only of poor leadership during the campaign
itself, but also of poor cooperation (vzaimodeystviye) between the
various units of the power ministries operating in Chechnya at that time,
particularly between the MoD and the Interior Ministry (MVD). As will be
detailed below, this has been an area, both nationally and within the North
Caucasus MD, that has attracted a great deal of attention since 1996 and
one which, despite some success, has still not been fully resolved. In
an early evaluation of the role of the Russian Army in the first Chechen
war, one Russian analyst was acutely aware of the impact of poor coordination
between the activities of the units of the power ministries:
"Finally, one of the
most important reasons for the failure of the Federal Group of Forces in
Chechnya was the lack of cooperation between units of different departments.
There has already been much talk about the complicated relations between
units of the MoD and the MVD. Their history began back during the New Year's
assault on Groznyy in 1994, when columns of the two departments advancing
along parallel streets did not have a unified command or communications,
and that is why, occasionally, shells would hit friendly troops . Both
Army units and MVD units believe that they alone were bearing the main
burden of the war and that the 'services' of the competitors [my
emphasis - SJM] consisted of running away from the battlefield."
Thus not only did the MoD
and MVD units not cooperate, but this could have disastrous consequences
for their men on the ground. It was more than just a problem of making
sure, for instance, that the units involved could actually talk to one
another, quite literally through the supply of the same portable radio
equipment, but that there was a culture at work which saw the units not
even in healthy competition with one another, but more importantly, a competition
which denigrated the role of one unit in comparison with another, thereby
leading to feelings of contempt and mistrust.
In short, by the end of
1996, a number of changes were either being put into effect, or were in
the pipeline, to harbour the experience of the first Chechen War in preparation
for the future. The first Chechen War proved to be the strongest indication
yet of how ineffective the Russian Armed Forces had become since the collapse
of the USSR in 1991. The decision to permanently base units from the North
Caucasus MD in Chechnya was also a sign that Russia was serious in its
desire to maintain its military hold on the region, a clear signal that
whilst in some respects it had "lost" the war in Chechnya, its defeat was
one that was not irreversible. The reform of the North Caucasus MD, as
well as of Armed Forces, would gather pace; 1997-1998 were in many respects
decisive in preparing for Russia's return to military action in August
1999.
Reform and the North
Caucasus MD (1997-1999)
One of the more concrete
aspects of military reform to hit the Caucasus region was the decision
to disband the Transcaucasus Group of Forces in March 1997 and replace
it with the Group of Russian Forces (Transcaucasus). This was more than
simply a change of name: according to one report, it meant a reduction
in the number of personnel by 70%, as well as the withdrawal of military
hardware from a number of Russian bases in Georgia. The new group was to
be subordinated to the command of the North Caucasus MD (still under the
command of Colonel-General A Kvashnin) and the regional branches of a number
of the intelligence directorates were moved from Tbilisi to Rostov, HQ
of the North Caucasus MD. All in all, this was an enforced measure, as
much to do with economic necessity as any significant change in strategic
thinking - on paper, in 1997, Russia's defence budget allocation was 3.83%
of GNP. In fact, the MoD only received 2.71% of GNP that year, less than
in 1996, 1995, 1994.
In a keynote address to
a meeting of Heroes of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, held in June
1997, the new Minister of Defence, Colonel-General Igor Sergeyev, outlined
what he considered to be the main structural reforms for the Russian Armed
Forces in the immediate future, including what he called the "units
of the future":
"We will manage to
gain time and turn it from an enemy into an ally only by focussing our
main efforts on the conservation of combat-ready units and formations with
a well-developed infrastructure and modern weapons and combat equipment
which confirm their combat capability in practice. As early as 1998, it
is planned to create three or four 'units of the future', with one in the
east of the country, one in the North Caucasus Military District and two
in the Moscow Military District."
In a TV interview, Sergeyev
elaborated on what these "units of the future" would look like:
"[they will be] highly
mobile formations, having a modular structure, which will be equipped,
or will start to be equipped, first and foremost, with modern weapons and
equipment."
A Kvashnin's appointment to
the post of Acting Chief of the General Staff in May 1997 left the position
of Commander of the North Caucasus MD vacant, but not for long. By presidential
decree, dated 29th July 1997, the MD's First Deputy Commander,
Lieutenant-General V G Kazantsev was promoted to MD Commander, Lieutenant-General
N Troshev, 58 Army Commander, being appointed to the post of First Deputy
Commander of the MD on the same date. Both men had seen service in the
first Chechen War and no doubt had their own views on what went right and,
more importantly, what went wrong with the conduct of operations then.
It was also important that the soon to be confirmed Chief of the General
Staff, Kvashnin, had been Kazantsev's immediate superior when both men
served in the North Caucasus MD in 1996-1997. It is extremely unlikely
that Kazantsev would have obtained such an important position without Kvashnin's
approval. Certainly, in the words of one experienced military commentator,
the appointment of Kazantsev was heavily linked with the whole reform process
of the Armed Forces:
"One thing is certain
for sure: in reforming the District, Kazantsev has been promised the support
of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
Colonel-General Anatoliy Kvashnin. They served together almost 1½
years and, without Kvashnin's recommendation, Kazantsev would not have
been able to occupy the vacant post in Rostov-on-Don."
The article also pointed out
that Kazantsev had two main tasks to perform as MD Commander:
"[Kazantsev must]
be ready to stop the sorties by the bandit formations . whilst, at the
same time, carry out a thorough re-organisation of the MD itself where,
according to the plan of military reform, will be concentrated the main
strike force of the Russian Army's Ground Forces."
These were two very clear
and distinct aims, but by no means mutually exclusive: reform of the MD,
building partly on a careful study of the first Chechen War, would mean
making it more difficult for the "bandit formations" to operate within
the territory of the MD. Kazantsev was appointed to the post as MD Commander
not simply because he knew Kvashnin personally or because he had a reasonably
"good war" in the first military campaign in Chechnya, but also because
long before the first shots had been fired in the first Chechen War, he
knew the area well, having served just under 10 years in the Transcaucasus
MD.
It was not long before
the recently-appointed Minister of Defence paid a "working visit" to the
North Caucasus MD, on 22nd-23rd August 1997. Sergeyev
flew down to Vladikavkaz, as opposed to Rostov-on-Don, in order to see
for himself a training exercise on the Tarsk mountain exercise range, where
the men taking part had to operate in mountain-forested terrain. Despite
the severe under-funding of the Armed Forces, according to the newspaper
report of Sergeyev's visit, the fact that such an exercise was being held
at all was indicative of the renewed emphasis being placed by the MoD on
the financing of military training for the Armed Forces: "For the first
time in a long time in 1997, about 10% of the funds allocated to the military
budget are being directed to military training."
This was one of the first
exercises to take place after the decision to grant the control structures
in the MDs the status of territorial commands, ie all the troops of the
power ministries operating within the confines of each district were placed
under one command, namely the MD Commander. This was designed to create
"one fist", each unit to work in close coordination with every other unit.
To that end, "commanders, deputy commanders and representatives of units
and formations of the Interior Troops and FPS [Federal Border Guard Service]
attended the exercise." That may well have been the case, but there
is no mention in the report of Interior Ministry or FPS units being used
in the exercise, training alongside their brothers-in-arms from the Ministry
of Defence. This was the first exercise of its type held in the MD under
the direct command of Kazantsev in his new role as Commander and was, in
overall terms, highly praised by Sergeyev:
"I would like to single
out the well-coordinated nature of the troops in solving the most complicated
problems. To no small extent, this was due to the work of the MD Commander,
Lieutenant-General Viktor Germanovich Kazantsev, who had a firm grasp of
every detail . Once again, were are convinced how difficult this profession
is - that of being an officer of the Ground Forces. I feel, though, that
the commanders here are not novices. They are people who have been through
a lot."
So many officers and men excelled
themselves that at the end of the exercise, Sergeyev wanted to award the
best "commander's watches"; unfortunately, there were not enough to go
round, so a number of the generals and officers accompanying Sergeyev took
off their own and gave them to the Minister, so enabling him to reward
all those who had stood out!
Not long after the August
exercise, Kazantsev outlined his own views on how the reform process would
affect his district:
"During the reform
process, the quality of the formations and units will increase sharply
. for example, let's take a motor rifle division. In the future, it will
have paratroopers. Then will appear helicopters and flame throwers. As
a result, the mobility of the motor rifle unit will increase."
In this context, he also spoke
about increasing the "technical capabilities" of the units, as well
as improving their rear support facilities:
"All this, it goes
without saying, compels us now to think seriously about improving the quality
of field training, imparting to the officers a love for method [metodika]
which, at the end of the day, raises the military preparation of the units
and formations to a qualitatively new level."
This was how Kazantsev saw
the immediate future for the reform of the troops under his direct command
up until the year 2001. In the post-2001 period, Kazantsev saw the emphasis
being placed on "changing the functions of the commands" of the
air army, air defence corps, airborne units deployed on the territory of
the MD, "thus, not only will the control of the troops be improved,
but so will increase significantly the combat, manoeuvrable possibilities
of the units and formations."
Kazantsev's views on the
way ahead for his own MD were very definite, with great emphasis on increasing
the mobility and firepower of the units. Not surprisingly, this was very
much in line with Sergeyev's thinking on the future of the Armed Forces,
with further emphasis being placed on improving their quality. Given also
the renewed emphasis on training, one can see early signs that the troops
of the North Caucasus MD were being steadied for what was to come. As Kazantsev
noted in the interview:
"The main task for
us today is to improve the military training of the troops. And this presupposes
quality training of the personnel, beginning with the command of the district
and ending with the units."
On increased cooperation with
the other units of the power ministries, Kazantsev stated bluntly:
"The President of
Russia, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has demanded
from us readiness for action in cooperation with the interior troops in
emergency situations including armed conflict on the territory of the
district [emphasis mine - SJM]. In connection with this, we have a
number of units on combat alert."
In conclusion, Kazantsev once
again underlined the importance of training for the future:
"Simply, it is obvious,
everyone must understand that we cannot live according to the old ways.
The leadership of the district understands this. The main thing now is
to study under the new conditions how to organise combat training exercises
directly amongst the units."
Kazantsev had outlined the
future direction of the reform process to be adopted in the MD - greater
emphasis on training and field exercises (reminding one of Suvorov's famous
dictum "teach the soldier what he needs to know to fight a war"); creation
of more mobile units, with more of their own independent means of fire
support; greater interaction with interior troops in particular but, by
extension, all other uniformed units deployed in the MD and, finally, improving
the "controllability" (upravlyayemost') of all sections of the MD's
apparatus, from HQ downwards.
One aspect of the reform
that was not to everyone's liking was to become fairly obvious not long
after the publication of Kazantsev's interview. This was the reduction
in the number of officers and NCOs required by the MD to carry out its
new responsibilities. In a press conference conducted towards the end of
September 1997, Kazantsev admitted that the MD was set to lose some 15,000
officers and men by 1st November that year:
"We are developing
units that are mobile and have the latest word in military equipment, commanded
by highly-skilled officers and stripped of unnecessary administrative staff
and other surplus fat at headquarters . the point of the reform is not
only to save money . in the past few years, the North Caucasus Military
District has evolved into a border district with an entirely new set of
duties dictated by Russia's present-day geopolitical situation and the
state of affairs in the North Caucasus. To be able to perform these new
duties, the command structure is being changed and the range of equipment
available is being expanded. The district's units now have every type of
modern tank artillery [sic] . this makes it possible to form units that
are radically different in structure and in combat potential - they have
fewer men but incomparably greater firepower and better defence against
incoming fire."
Kazantsev also spoke about
cooperation with other branches of the Armed Forces, as well as with units
from the other ministries:
"Officer training
now pays particular attention to interaction with all the other branches
of the armed forces including army air power . this forms the basis for
all the district's exercises, with the involvement as well of Interior
Ministry troops and border guards. We already have experience of such exercises
and will continue to rely on them in the future."
Finance was to rear its ugly
head again in the MD somewhat less predictably, when ransoms were demanded
for the release of 6 officers kidnapped by Chechens in September-October
1997. A ransom of $150,000 each was demanded from the authorities. Kazantsev
made a direct personal appeal to President Maskhadov and managed to secure
the prompt release of two of the officers; using, in his own words, "exactly
the same method", he was hopeful to secure the release of the other
four men.
Kazantsev also pointed
out that, despite the reduction in the numbers of officers and men in the
MD - here put at 12,500, not 15,000 as earlier - they were being "strengthened"
through the acquisition of "new military technology". Interestingly,
he also spoke about the "need" for the Army to have an "ideology,
a Russian path for the construction of modern armed forces": "it
is enough that we adopted an Americanised variant of the form. Now, we
are suffering." As regards his own units, he singled out the "disreputable
fame" of the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade, in relation to its
use of contract soldiers, as being another example of the inappropriateness
of the American military system.
And yet, as was to be revealed
in a later interview of the MD's First Deputy Commander, Lieutenant-General
G Troshev, contract soldiers made up between 20-30% of the total number
of soldiers and sergeants of the MD by the beginning of 1998. Troshev touched
on a whole series of matters concerning the future development of the troops
in the MD, including military training and the creation of special alpine
units. However, he began by making a number of introductory remarks concerning
the recent past of the MD, as well as its contemporary status:
"The North Caucasus
MD has changed from being a central MD to a border MD. Its forces protect
the south-western direction. The region is complex, the position here is
explosive. This was once again demonstrated by recent events in Buynaksk
[Chechen terrorist outrage] - even recently, there were no such barbaric
attacks. As a result of this action, once again civilians suffered."
Troshev pointed out that the
decision had been taken earlier to re-open the mountain training complex
at Dar'yal, an important development given the fighting that was to come
in 1999-2000:
"In 1992, during the
Osetian-Ingush conflict, the centre was destroyed, the territory was mined
and for five years, it lay deserted. But, in 1997, the decision was taken
to restore the centre. During September-November, it was restored and,
as of 1st December, training has begun there. The test range
is situated 1,500 metres above sea-level. There's a tankodrome, a firing
range and a 'mountain village'. But its most distinguishing feature is
that it is natural: natural precipices, gorges, mountain rivers, waterfalls."
In other words, the training
here would be as close as possible to real conditions. Troshev also said
that it was the MD's intention to propose to the MoD that other units also
make full use of the restored facilities on offer, "not only the North
Caucasus MD should train to carry out military actions in mountains."
In terms of further specialisation of the MD's troops, Troshev confirmed
that it was training "elite" units of intelligence officers and
special forces for operating in the mountains and affirmed that, in his
opinion, "in every unit", there should be a squad of men, better
trained than the rest, to fight in the mountains.
Troshev also spoke about
the deployment of one of the "constant readiness" units in the MD, namely
the Volgograd division. In effect, this was a rapid reaction unit, designed
to operate within a fairly short-time period:
"In the 1998 training
period, it will begin to train according to a new programme. All units
and sections will be able in the shortest possible timescale to solve any
military task. This will require well-trained personnel, which means training
better officers, NCOs and junior specialists. The division will also need
modern combat equipment and weapons, new rifles, new computerised communications
system. Given the conditions of our district, all of this will have to
work effectively in a mountainous environment. Such a division will have
to be mobile, in its composition will be rapid reaction units, ready in
a thirty-minute time frame to solve tasks in the same time as [the rest]
of the unit is getting up."
In general, according to Troshev,
in terms of manning levels, the MD was between "80-95%" of full
strength, with both intelligence and communication units being virtually
at full strength, "95-100%". He admitted that there were problems
with the officer corps due, in part, to the fall in the prestige of military
service, as well as the fact that many officers were quitting the ranks
simply out of economic necessity: irregular payment of salaries and the
lure of better money elsewhere for considerably less dangerous work meant
that many young officers with families had to think about a non-service
career.
Other significant changes
in the MD which Troshev was prepared to discuss publicly included the following:
"The airborne assault
brigade has been re-organised to become a regiment, the motor rifle brigade
has been transformed into a regiment and become part of 19th
Motor Rifle Division. We have also created two independent training battalions
[to train] officers for the motor rifle regiments, tank commanders, BMP
commanders . We are not waiting for someone else to train our cadres, we
are doing it ourselves."
All these changes bear testimony
to the fact that the MD was steadily putting into practice lessons learnt
during the first Chechen War, but was also striving to make sure that past
mistakes were not repeated. A visit by Colonel-General V Isakov (Chief
of Rear Services, Armed Forces Russian Federation) in February 1998 concluded
that:
"Despite objective
difficulties, as a whole the Rear Services of the district enable the troops
stationed in the North Caucasus to successfully resolve any tasks placed
before them."
However, the overall reform
process meant that reductions in personnel would still have to take place,
even in one of Russia's frontline MDs. This was confirmed by Defence Minister
Sergeyev's two-day working visit to the MD, begun on 16th March
1998. In a statement to ITAR-TASS, Sergeyev confirmed that "the reduction
of army personnel envisaged by the military reform will take effect in
the North Caucasus, as well." However, Sergeyev stated that the principle
of "combat effectiveness, rather than the number" would be applied.
In a more detailed report of his visit to the MD, the General put the cuts
in manning in the North Caucasus MD in a wider context:
"We have been forced
to spend 90% of our funds on the upkeep of the troops. And there are virtually
no funds left to renew equipment or do research and development . reform
is, of course, also a quest for internal reserves . we need to get rid
of everything that is superfluous and does not directly benefit combat
training."
This must have been music
to Kazantsev's ears, in the sense that Sergeyev was making such a strong,
pubic commitment to supporting the adequate financing of combat training.
Whilst Sergeyev's role in the first Chechen War was limited - at the time,
he was C-in-C of Strategic Rocket Forces, as a professional military man,
he would have been well aware of the shortcomings of the Russian Armed
Forces in 1994-1996 and realised the importance of more effective combat
training.
Whilst in Budennovsk, Sergeyev
was also asked if the Army would assist the militia and the internal troops
in the defence of the civilian population against terrorists. Sergeyev
answered unequivocally: "without any shadow of a doubt".
"First of all, he
[Sergeyev] told reporters that the military units in the North Caucasus
Military District remain combat effective and will, as always, carry out
both their army and police functions in the Caucasus in the defence of
law and order and ensuring the safety of citizens, particularly in the
areas bordering on Chechnya.
The agreements reached
between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence remain
in force, but there are important changes being made in the North Caucasus
Military District. The minister was particularly interested in two army
brigades with the greatest strategic importance for security in the North
Caucasus District, the 205th Motor Rifle Brigade and the 21st
Special Cossack Assault Brigade, the only unit of its kind in Russia. The
soldiers and officers in the latter have taken part in all the armed conflicts
on the territory of Russia and the CIS."
Despite its military record,
however, the Brigade was still going to be affected by the cuts: it was
to change its designation from a Brigade to a Regiment, it was then to
be subordinated to the 7th Novorossiysk Division but, even with
the reduction in manpower, Sergeyev was keen to emphasise that its effectiveness
was not going to be affected: "It should be understood that the security
of the residents of the North Caucasus republics will not suffer from the
reforms."
Sergeyev's two-day visit
did not leave him particularly "optimistic" about the situation
in Stavropol' kray, however. This feeling of pessimism had less
to do with the work being undertaken by the North Caucasus MD and more
to do with the overall security situation in the region:
"We consider the situation
in the North Caucasus as under control, although we assess developments
in individual areas as negative."
Not long after Sergeyev's
departure, another exercise was held in the MD involving a number of units,
including Interior Ministry Troops, troops of the Ministry of Emergency
Situations and Border Guards. Kazantsev was keen to downplay its aggressive
intent in relation to Chechnya:
"I want especially
to stress that during the command and staff exercises, the power-wielding
structures were not preparing either for a new escalation in the Chechen
conflict or for a worsening of the criminal situation in Dagestan. What
we were thoroughly working through here was operating against classical
armies, not partisan detachments. The essence of the exercises is to offer
moral support for efforts by diplomats, politicians and regional leaders
engaged in seeking peace and accord in the Caucasus."
Whilst not wishing to cast
aspersions on Kazantsev's noble desire to assist the efforts of others
to help build stability in the region, the statement that the exercise
was operating on the principle of combating "classical armies" rings rather
hollow. What "classical armies" had he in mind? Georgia's? Azerbaijan's?
Some other army from the outside the region? The MD had changed in response
to the changing nature of the internal threat to the Russian Federation.
In many ways, prior to NATO enlargement in April 1999, the nature of the
external threat (especially in relation to the Caucasus region) had not
significantly changed. It was as it had been.
In an article commemorating
the 80th anniversary of the creation of the North Caucasus MD,
Kazantsev pointed out that then, as now, "the main aim for our district,
like 80 years ago, is to defend the territorial integrity of Russia in
its southern borders." However, Kazantsev was much more keen to detail
what was going on now and how things had changed recently:
"In spite of the present
situation in the region, we are constantly involved in a planned programme
of combat training, as much as necessary, in order to ensure that the units
and formations of the NCMD [North Caucasus Military District] are mobile
and military capable. Today, on the Dar'yal test range, the only one of
its type in the Armed Forces, not one day passes without military exercises
taking place: firing, tactical exercises. Because, in my view, to train
a real professional in mountain [warfare] you need at least two years."
The emphasis was also placed
on training at least one smaller unit to be better equipped for fighting
in the mountains:
"We will strive to
achieve a situation so that in every regiment there is a motor rifle battalion
which has single-mindedly trained to operate in the mountains. In the future,
we will instruct all regiments and brigades in the district in this."
Training was not just for
the benefit of the units of the NCMD either, but also for the units of
the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Border
Guards, and so on. Kazantsev also made the interesting remark that there
were fewer problems between units of the power ministries lower down the
chain of command: "the lower the level, the greater the mutual understanding."
Despite the attack on a
vehicle convoy carrying a number of MD and General Staff officers in April
1998, Kazantsev, although condemning the attack as "an insolent act
planned by rebels", still adopted a fairly mild tone as regards possible
future retaliation, saying that "ways should be sought towards reconciliation,
rather than taking steps towards a new confrontation." In the same
interview to a local ITAR-TASS correspondent, Kazantsev confirmed that
the numerical strength of the MD over the past two years had been cut by
7,500 men (so much for the original planned cut of 15,000), but said that
the units of the NCMD had "acquired a new higher level of combat readiness."
He also repeated that "the units and sub-units directly involved in
carrying out training and combat tasks had been brought up to 95-100% of
their strength", and what was fast becoming a mantra:
"The task of the district's
troops is to protect Russia's territorial integrity on its southern borders
. therefore, the main attention is being paid to teaching personnel the
skills needed in conditions of mountain and forest terrain."
A number of interesting developments
took place in May/June 1998 concerning the situation in the North Caucasus,
following renewed interest in the region shown by Moscow. On 12th
May, it was announced by S Stepashin - Minister of Interior - that it had
been decided to appoint the former C-in-C Interior Ministry Troops, Colonel-General
L Shevtsov, to the recently-created post of Deputy MVD Minister with responsibility
for the North Caucasus. According to Stepashin, he had decided "to make
more expedient use" of the General's service career (Shevtsov's previous
appointment was commander of the Russian contingent of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina).
This renewed interest was underlined by Yel'tsin's decision (on 21st
May) to create a special "field team" to deal with the situation
in Dagestan. Headed by Stepashin, the "team" was to consist of the
Ministers of Justice, Regional and Ethnic Policy and "top security officials."
On 25th May, the government went one stage further, when it
announced that a "special government body to normalise the situation
in the North Caucasus" was being created, headed by the Russian Deputy
Prime Minister, V Khristenko. According to A Kokoshin, Secretary to the
Security Council, the "normalisation" process would be achieved
by "socio-economic means":
"It will be combined
with a determination to use all the forces and means possessed by the state,
including the federal and local authorities, in order to enforce law and
order in the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan."
Yel'tsin's press secretary,
S Yastrzhembskiy, stated that, at the same meeting, the Security Council
had decided "to strengthen the coordination of the power structures
in the North Caucasus." At a meeting between Yel'tsin and Stepashin
on 26th May, coordination in the North Caucasus was again discussed.
After the meeting, "Stepashin told journalists that tough coordination
among the power structures is being established in the Caucasus, both from
the point of view of interaction between them and the settlement of tasks
which might be given to them in the future." He also mentioned the
establishment of "an emergency commission . in Stavropol' . in charge
of issues of coordination and ensuring security in the entire North Caucasus
region." Unfortunately, no detail was published about the actual composition
of the new body.
So within a month, according
to available evidence, we have a "special field team", "a special government
organ" and now "an emergency commission" all tackling security issues in
the North Caucasus! Without more detail, it is impossible to say how they
interacted with one another, if at all; who were the members; what was
the representation of the MoD, MVD, FAPSI, etc, or even if they functioned
at all. And to add even more to what was becoming a virtual alphabet soup
of organs and commissions, on 6th June, a report carried by
ITAR-TASS spoke about Stavropol' having been chosen "as the base for
the Russian Interior Ministry's Operations Centre." This was created
"to
co-ordinate the efforts of all power-wielding structures in the North Caucasus
region in the fight against terrorism, hostage-taking, armed banditry and
other types of crime." As Deputy MVD Minister with responsibility for
the North Caucasus, Shevtsov was placed in charge of the new regional staff
HQ. In an interview he gave to the Interior Ministry's main daily newspaper,
Shevtsov spoke briefly about the general background and role of the organ:
"In the North Caucasus,
really, there are a large number of power structures. All decide equally
important tasks, but separately. However, the practice of recent years
has shown the necessity for a clearer and operationally co-ordinated effort
of all the power ministries. With this in mind, the Operational staff,
as a permanent working organ to lead the forces and means of the MVD, MoD,
MChS [Ministry of Emergency Situations], FSB [Federal Security Service],
FPS, FSZhV [Federal Railway Troops], FAPSI of Russia, has been brought
into being."
Asked specifically why the
MVD had been given the leadership (rukovodstvo) of the power structures
in the region, Shevtsov replied: "So decided the President of the Russian
Federation. Correctly. You see because we are talking here about the internal
security of the country, society and the citizen." He also mentioned
that, despite the fact that the Operational staff had not existed for long,
"cooperation
had improved" between the power ministries in the region and that a
number of small-scale operations, involving "specialists" from the
Operational staff had been "successful."
Throughout May-June 1998,
thus, the central power in Moscow had embarked on a number of initiatives
to improve the work and co-ordinate the activities of all the power ministry
units operating in the North Caucasus region. The single most important
organ created during this period - for the purposes of this paper - was
the MVD's Operational staff. It was given the primary task of assisting
the coordination of activity of all the units in the region, including
units of the MoD. In some respects, this would appear to have been a perfectly
logical step; after all, the threat in the North Caucasus was of an internal
nature and, as such, was the responsibility first and foremost of the MVD.
However Interior Minister Stepashin stated that the existence of the Operational
staff:
". does not signify
that someone is preparing large-scale military activities. The situation
in the North Caucasus urgently demands overcoming narrow departmental interests
in the practical work of the force structures. The steps taken to maintain
law and order and security in the region must be complex, worked out according
to a plan encompassing the whole region led by the centre. We need to mobilise
the intellectual, economic, ideological and law enforcement potential."
But the nature of the internal
threat was changing, as was its scale. The events of August 1999-June 2000
showed that when it comes down to launching attacks against well-equipped
and well-trained large "illegal armed formations", the MVD's response is
limited, both in terms of training and equipment. This weakness had been
acknowledged in the July 1998 Law on Terrorism, which gave a supporting
role in countering terrorism to the MOD.
This role was further reinforced
towards the end of July 1998, when Yel'tsin signed "The Fundamentals (Concept)
of State policy of the Russian Federation for Military Development in the
Period up to the Year 2005." It represented the next formal step in reform
of the nation's Armed Forces and introduced a number of changes to the
MD system in Russia.
"The President of
Russia, Boris Yel'tsin, has established a single system of military-administrative
division of the territory of the Russian Federation into strategic directions:
North-Western (within the borders of the Leningrad MD); Western (within
the borders of Moscow MD); South-Western (within the borders of the North
Caucasus MD); Central-Asian (within the borders of the Volga-Urals MD);
Siberian (within the borders of the Siberian MD) and Far Eastern (within
the borders of the Far Eastern MD)."
The number of MDs was to be
cut from 8 to 6, the new 6 being accorded the status of "operational-strategic
commands." What did this mean? In a major article published in the
same month as Yel'tsin signed the Concept into law, Chief of the General
Staff Kvashnin discussed what he thought the upgrade in the status of the
MDs would mean to the country:
"One important area
of reform is the transition to the territorial principle of leadership
of all troops and forces of the Russian Federation, with military districts
being given the status of operational-strategic commands . the system of
military administrative division of Russia's territory is itself based
on the territorial principle of subordination and control and its full
implementation should make it possible to combine all branches of operational
command and control of the power structures under a single figure [emphasis
mine - SJM] . the substantial widening of the powers of the military district
commander in peacetime pursues the following goals: improving the quality
of planning of the use of the Armed Forces and other troops, military formations
and organs of the Russian Federation in the interests of defence, as well
as the organisation of collaboration, command and control and all-round
support for them . improve the quality of operational and combat training
measures for all troops."
This could be interpreted
as a bid by the General Staff to exert control over the other men in uniform,
operating within these newly-created operational-strategic commands. However,
Kvashnin was alert to this possible interpretation and was quick to state
that this was not the case:
"At the same time,
giving the military district the status of an operational-strategic command
does not mean that it will be made responsible for tasks currently carried
out by other troops, military formations and organs of the Russian Federation."
Sergeyev's stance on all this
would have done little to convince many of the other power ministers that
the MOD was not making a bid to exert greater control over their units.
In September 1997, Sergeyev had published a major article setting out the
course of reform for the Armed Forces over the next eight years. On the
reform of the MD system, he stated that:
"In 1997-1998, [it
is proposed] to give military districts the status of operational-strategic
commands [emphasis as in original - SJM] on the strategic directions,
placing on them the function of operational leadership . of units, formations
and sub-units of all the services of the Armed Forces and all other troops
on questions of defence of the country."
An article published at the
time of Concept being passed into law, examining a recent large-scale exercise
held in the North Caucasus, revealed the confusion surrounding the whole
question of who was in charge of what in relation to the security of the
North Caucasus:
"Even now it is not
clear who has the main organising role for maintaining security and defence
in the North Caucasus - the General Staff or the Main Staff of the MVD."
One commentator; however,
did try to make sense of both the new Concept and its implications for
the relationship between MoD and MVD units in any future conflict:
"The leading role
of each of the departments in resolving specific tasks has been defined.
Thus, the Defence Ministry is responsible for the country's defence on
land and at sea . the Interior Ministry stops and neutralises internal
armed conflicts . When tackling each of these problems all the power departments
will be obliged to obey the one that bears responsibility for it. For example,
if interventionists encroach upon Russian territory, all troops will be
directed by the Defence Ministry; the Ministry of the Interior will assume
command in the event of an armed revolt in a component part of the federation
. the General Staff will co-ordinate operational-strategic planning."
Judging by the outline of
the Concept contained in the above statement, the actions by Chechen forces
and their allies in Dagestan in August 1999 could have been interpreted
quite legitimately either as an armed intervention on Russian soil (MoD)
or an armed revolt (MVD), thereby leading to a period of confusion and
indecision as to who was in charge of what when the operation began. What
appears to have happened was that, initially at least, Internal Troops
Commander in Chief Ovchinnikov's men were placed in charge of the operation
to drive the "militants" out of Dagestan but, as the situation deteriorated
and it became obvious that the MVD was out of its depth, the operation
was re-defined and the MoD, in the form of the North Caucasus MD, was put
in charge of the operation. Given the plethora of government commissions
and special organs designed to tackle the security issues of the North
Caucasus alone, the fact that there was organisational confusion during
the "counter-terrorist operation" should not now be surprising. Whether
in the immediate aftermath of the "counter-terrorist operation", all those
concerned were working according to the July 1998 Concept, or simply reacting
to the developing situation, is difficult to say.
In re-defining the status
of the MDs, both the country's Minister of Defence and the Chief of the
General Staff were of one mind that, if nothing else, the reform should
mean that operational leadership of all the men in uniform be transferred,
when the occasion so required, to the MD Commander. In short, the military
were attempting to regain the upper hand over the Interior Ministry.
This would have been fuelled
partly by the experience of Chechnya in 1994-1996, when units representing
different power ministries rarely co-ordinated their activities effectively,
but there would also have been an economic imperative (too many power structures
chasing too little money to meet the security needs of the country and
the military always seeming to lose out in the race). There was also the
feeling that the Armed Forces had lost too much influence and power to
the other ministries, especially the MVD. Of course, the argument at its
surface level - the need to co-ordinate better the activities of all the
relevant organs in order to ensure the country's proper security - cannot
be dismissed and was probably one of the main arguments deployed in order
to convince Yel'tsin to sign the measure. Interestingly, in Kazantsev's
next major interview to Krasnaya Zvezda, he did not even mention
the phrase, "operational-strategic command". Had it already become a dead
duck? Had the opposition of the other power ministries become so great
that it had been allowed to slip quietly off the agenda or, much more speculatively,
was it a casualty of the August 1998 crash? After all, given the fragile
nature of the centre-periphery relationship throughout the latter half
of 1998, any measures which looked to be granting more power, more control,
especially over military affairs, to a regional leadership may have been
viewed as a little too risky a course of action to pursue.
However, this interview
did detail the training undertaken in the MD, as well as steps taken to
hold more joint exercises with units of the other ministries. In general,
the training carried out was intensive:
"During this year,
we carried out all planned command-staff exercises and sessions involving
commands from platoon to large troop formation, during which were tested
various elements in conducting military activity both in the plains and
in mountain-forest terrain."
Kazantsev also pointed out
that at the end of such training, "tactical exercises" were held,
involving firing or rocket launches, designed to check "the commander's
ability to command his subordinates." Asked specifically about the
experience of the last Chechen War, Kazantsev replied that "correctives"
had been introduced in the training schedule:
"In practice training
sessions of the troops, for example, the latter [are trained] to carry
out a special control exercise from a tank whilst, at the same time, carrying
out the tasks of a motor rifle section . Other new ideas have appeared.
For example, one of these is the use of bilateral platoon and company tactical
exercises. The experience of military operations in mountain-forest terrain
showed that the main burden is on the shoulders of small combat groups,
mostly motorised and reconnaissance platoons and companies. They are better
suited for operating in the mountains and defending road blocks. That is
why special attention is paid to this kind of training . For the first
9 months of this year, the district held more than 86% of fire practice
sessions of the units and more fire practice sessions at platoon-level
than for the whole of 1997."
Of course, Kazantsev could
not but mention the complex at Dar'yal:
"The Dar'yal training
range is our main training centre, where the troops learn the techniques
to fight in the mountains . special training courses are held here to teach
the troops how to use their weapons and equipment in mountain-forest terrain
. we continue to train units.to accompany military convoys on winding,
mountain roads. The experience and methods learned at the test range and
in practice are summed up and analysed at commander sessions, attended
by officers from all levels, including senior personnel from the MD."
In terms of the broader theme
of cooperation with the other power ministry units, Kazantsev noted that:
"Today, the North
Caucasus Military District in reality is the linking factor in the organisation
of joint training of all the troops deployed in the region. We practise
the conduct of joint command-staff exercises of the district's troops with
the control organs . of the other power ministries of the RF [Russian Federation]
on the territory of the region. During the course of such exercises, we
work out ways of stabilising the situation on the territory of the North
Caucasus and localising armed conflicts."
He had no doubt that such
joint exercises had demonstrated their success:
"It was clearly shown
[in a joint command staff exercise held in July 1998] that the fundamental
basis of its success lay in the close cooperation of the control organs
and units of all the power structures."
Despite these positive statements
Kazantsev ended his interview on a somewhat pessimistic note, when he reminded
his readership of "the difficult conditions" of the troops deployed
to Dagestan, hence the recent decision by the Military Council of the MD
to make sure that financing of the units there was given "top priority."
Cooperation & Exercises:
The Keys to Success?
The Inter-Action of
the Power Ministries in the North Caucasus MD, 1996-1999
"Our state is becoming
more and more an object for all types of expansion. Foreign intelligence
services, organised, including international, crime, separatist tendencies
in the border zones have all significantly increased. In such a situation,
to maintain national security exclusively by the Armed Forces, without
minimising in any way their role and significance, is no longer possible.
The best confirmation of this is the attempt to solve the Chechen crisis
by force."
"One of the most serious
reasons for failures of the Federal Grouping in Chechnya is the lack of
coordination of the actions of units from different departments. There
has long been talk about the difficult relations between units of the Ministry
of Defence and the MVD. Their history began back during the New Year's
assault on Groznyy in 1994, when columns of the two departments advancing
along parallel streets did not have unified command or communications,
and that is why their shells sometimes hit friendly troops."
"Studying the experience
of military activity in Chechnya [1994-1996], we have come to the conclusion
that coordination of the military efforts of combined arms units and units
of the Interior Ministry and Border Guards were the 'Achilles heel' of
the actions of the Federal forces."
It was obvious that one of
the main reasons for the poor performance of the Federal Grouping of Forces
in Chechnya in 1994-1996 was the lack of cooperation (vzaimodeystviye
can mean cooperation, coordination or interaction) between the power ministry
units on the ground. Thus, cooperation became one of the leitmotifs
in the subsequent analysis of the debacle.
In August and September
1996, articles appeared in the Russian military press calling for much
greater coordination between the power ministries in maintaining Russia's
security, external and internal. Lieutenant-General G Radionov, then Chief
of the MoD's Main Educational Directorate, even called for the power structures
to begin training their officer cadres together, thereby not only assisting
the power ministries to find a common language, but also to save the state
money, as resources could be pooled and unnecessary duplication of effort
avoided. Similarly, a senior Border Guards officer argued for joint training
for the MoD, the Border Guards and FAPSI.
On 21st March
1997, the following MoD press announcement appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda:
"In accordance with
the training plan for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, during
the period 24th-30th March this year, under the leadership
of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,
the First Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, General
of the Army Viktor Samsonov, will be held a planned command-staff exercise
in the North Caucasus Military District. One of the main tasks of the exercise
will be to work out problems in relation to the staff HQ and control organs
[organy
upravleniya] in charge of the troops."
A slightly fuller version
of the announcement appeared a few days later, which mentioned that "during
the course of the command-staff exercise, questions concerning the cooperation
of the NCMD's troops with the territorially based units of the Interior
Ministry and the staff HQs of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations in
solving joint tasks will be worked on." It also provided some more
detail on the aim of the exercise:
"The aim of the exercise
is to work out the tasks of mobilisational readiness and control of the
troops under present conditions. This will include questions of cooperation
between the control organs and the commands of the troops of the MoD, MVD,
Border Guards, Military Railway Troops in the North Caucasus region . In
essence, we are talking about checking.on the ways and possibilities of
co-ordinating the training of the various power departments. In fact, the
co-ordinating role of the General Staff is being worked on."
The exercise had been planned
as far back as November 1996 and thus is the first command-staff exercise
to be held in the North Caucasus MD after the war in Chechnya, and was
planned not long after the Khasavyurt Agreement had been signed in August
1996. Needless to say, so soon after the end of the First Chechen War,
the Chechens were far from happy that such an intensive and very public
display of Russian military strength was taking place so close to the Chechen
border and accused the Russians of launching a "provocation" in
the region, as well as warning that such an exercise would only help "to
destabilise the situation" in the area.
A TV report, broadcast
by NTV on 28th March, confirmed the active involvement of the
other ministries:
"Many people are saying
that the Redut-97 command and staff exercises in the North Caucasus Military
District are the largest held in the last 10 years. Representatives of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Border Service and the other
power-wielding departments are involved in carrying out the tasks set,
as well as the staff of all the groups, formations and units which are
stationed on the district's territory."
In his initial public assessment
of the exercise, Samsonov did confirm that the exercise was "the main
event of the year" for the Russian Armed Forces, but did not say anything
directly about the precise role of the other ministries involved. However,
in a TV broadcast a week after the exercise had been completed, Samsonov
stated that:
"We always need to
learn to work in close coordination with the other departments.we have
been practising territorial defence actions here and these are closely
connected with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Border Troops,
as well as other forces."
The TV correspondent also
noted that the General Staff brought in units from the MVD, Border Guards,
and FAPSI, and a local MVD chief confirmed that a "joint headquarters"
had also been established. This shows that at least on a practical level,
the units were beginning to learn to work and train together. Given the
paucity of information on this particular exercise, it is difficult to
say much more about it, other than that it was the first in the NCMD to
begin tackling the problems associated with the poor coordination of the
activities of the power ministries in the earlier military campaign.
Kazantsev's interview to
Krasnaya
Zvezda in September 1997, when he talked about "inter-action with
Interior Ministry Troops" was interesting for a number of reasons,
on top of those previously examined. In singling out the Interior Ministry
Troops - the Army's greatest rival for the little resources that were available
to meet the country's security needs - and their future co-ordinating role
with the MoD, Kazantsev was making a number of points:
-
the very obvious one that
as well-armed units in the MD, both sides would have to work and train
together to avoid repeating past mistakes;
-
the Army was not sufficiently
strong to secure Russia's interests in the region alone and, finally,
-
the Army would now assume
a greater internal role and, therefore, would have to seek greater coordination
and cooperation with the MVD on a local level.
In early August 1997, Kvashnin
- now officially confirmed as Chief of the General Staff - addressed a
conference of Defence Ministry officials and urged the creation of a unified,
territorially-based, control system for all defence and law-enforcement
organs. Specifically:
"The North Caucasus
Military District must not comprise three Interior Troop districts or two
border districts", arguing that "each district should be run by
a collective regional agency" with the General Staff being given the status
of a "co-ordinating body."
In short, this was a preamble
to the decision to elevate the MDs to "operational-strategic commands."
The statement by Kvashnin helps to reinforce the view that the military
apparatus was getting ready to claw back some of its power and influence
lost to the other power structures, under the guise of meeting Russia's
internal and external security threats, as well as economic pressure. Defence
Minister Sergeyev's remarks made at this time that the creation of the
"operational-strategic commands" should allow the MDs to have "operational
leadership" of the other power ministry units in the MD, at the appropriate
time, was a clear sign that the military were intent on regaining lost
influence.
The elevation of the MDs
to their new status, towards the end of July 1998, was preceded by the
appearance of an important and interesting article in Krasnaya Zvezda,
written by Colonel-General L S Zolotov, then Commandant of the M V Frunze
Military Academy, the Academy for training the Army's senior officers.
The article was simply entitled "Coordination of the Power Structures"
and, ostensibly, was a review of a work to be published by the Academy,
concerning the inter-action of the various power ministries, based on the
experience of the First Chechen War. However, given the article's appearance
just before the adoption of the July 1998 Concept, the position of the
author and the content of the work, it was more than simply a book review.
It began with the sentence,
quoted at the beginning of this section, to the effect that "coordination
. of the Interior Ministry and Border Guards was the 'Achilles heel' in
the activities of the Federal forces." Zolotov pointed out that the
experience gained in WW2 had been "lost" and that "troop commanders
and staffs did not have the necessary theoretical concepts, or practical
recommendations: how to co-ordinate, in such unusual conditions, a battle
in a population centre, at night time, in the mountains, how to organise
the defence of installations, anti-diversionary activities."
He admitted that the Academy
was at fault in not preparing the necessary textbooks for the Armed Forces,
or for any of the other power ministries for that matter, despite having
a range of specialists on the staff, including men from the Interior Ministry
and the Border Guards. However, the Academy's attitude to such matters
had changed and
"the coordination
of the combined arms troops, the border guards and Interior Troops commanders
is now one of the priority areas in our work.
Experience has convinced
us that co-ordinating the activities of troops from the various power ministries
must be undertaken by the control organ [organ upravleniya] which,
before the appearance of a conflict, has in its hands all the links for
controlling their [the troops'] preparation, securing [their supplies].
In particular, this could be the administration of the military district."
In order to sweeten the pill
for the other ministries, he then argued that "the delegation of
units" to a "combined group of troops" could be "for a defined
period of time - either until the successful completion of the operation,
or for the conduct of a special operation."
He was obviously trying
to assuage any potential criticism that he was showing a bias towards recommending
his "own". He expanded further on this point. Whilst freely admitting that
all the structures were already involved in the defence of the state, operating
independently they were not equal to the task:
"Let us take, for
example, the Interior Ministry Troops. On them has been placed the main
burden in the fight against illegal armed formations. But the units and
sub-units of the Interior Ministry Troops are territorial units, their
entire system of material, military-technical supply is based on local,
stationary supply organs. They do not have heavy weapons. In conducting
reconnaissance, radio-electronic warfare, defence, fire and engineering
support, they are completely dependent on combined arms units."
Similarly, in relation to
the Border Guards:
"Their function is
to secure the state border. But when there is a threat of large-scale military
provocation on the border, the combined arms formations rush to their assistance.
An example of this is Tajikistan. In conducting special operations against
illegal armed formations, the border guards play an important role in the
isolation of the conflict zone, preventing the movement of mercenaries,
weapons, explosives, material resources, into the area. They play an active
role in the fight against diversionary-reconnaissance groups and illegal
armed formations."
However, Zolotov was also
ready to admit that it was not all one-way traffic:
"In their turn, motor
rifle, airborne and tank troops need the assistance of Interior Ministry
Troops in securing their rear, protecting it from diversionary and terrorist
attacks, helping to disarm the militants. . But, in order to operate successfully
together, shoulder to shoulder, you must know one another's tactics and
military capabilities."
Hence the Academy's latest
"fundamental" work, "Coordination of Ground Forces, Interior Troop and
Border Guard Units and Sub-Units in an Armed Conflict". It had already
been sent to the printers and was due to see the light of day at the end
of 1998. The book contained sections on "the theoretical basis for the
combat use of units and sub-units of Ground Forces, Interior Ministry Troops
and Border Guards against illegal armed formations"; analysing the
principles of coordination through the method of rendering "mutual assistance"
to one another, rather than relying on a formal chain of command; methods
of work of all the units involved in taking part in a special operation,
using a hypothetical case study of an inner-state armed conflict, etc.
Zolotov concluded that:
"Experience shows
that to the interests of coordination must be subordinated the entire system
of control of the operational group of forces created, as a rule, on the
basis of the military district, within whose responsibility the conflict
has arisen. To control the operational group of forces must be created:
a single reconnaissance/intelligence centre; a group for general operational
planning; an information group; an operational air force group; a centre
for planning target destruction. In creating such a control organ, it is
important to avoid the mistakes which occurred during the conduct of military
operations in Chechnya, that improvised 'groups', 'centres', 'administrative
organs' quickly appeared which, in their composition, included different
departmental structures. Thus, it required a long time to arrive at carefully
thought out joint decisions. As much as possible, it will be necessary
to retain the system of administration which already exists in the military
district, in the army."
Thus, in order to avoid one
of the mistakes in the last military campaign in Chechnya, Zolotov argued
for the creation of an operational group of forces, containing a number
of departments, copying what was already there at MD level but making sure
that the departments themselves did not sectionalise to represent their
own narrow interests: if this was avoided, then time would be saved and
lead to an overall increase in the success of joint missions and avoid
instances of troops being killed in "friendly fire." The basis for the
creation of the (temporary) operational group of forces (OGV in Russian),
would be the MD itself, with Interior Ministry Troops and Border Guards
being allocated specific roles to perform in support of the overall military
effort.
This was an important article,
not only in its subject matter, but also in its timing, just weeks before
the new Concept for the further reform of the Armed Forces was passed on
29th July 1998. The article stated that, having studied the
experience of the war in Chechnya, one of the main problems was the inter-departmental
rivalry which had led to uncoordinated attacks by the Federal forces and
the unnecessary loss of life through soldiers and troops not knowing who
was who. The experience of WW2, bought at a high price, had either been
forgotten or simply ignored. If Russia was to stand successfully against
the threat posed by "illegal armed formations", then independently none
of the power ministries was up to the job, but collectively they could.
The collective knowledge of the staff of the Academy, no doubt many of
whom had served in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and its hypothetical case
study, as well as its choice of terminology, would appear to indicate that
come 1999-2000, it played a role in ensuring that not all of the mistakes
of 1994-1996 were repeated.
In some respects, especially
in relation to the North Caucasus MD, the practical aspect of Zolotov's
work was already being put into effect, but then Kazantsev had his own
experience of the First Chechen War to draw on. Thus, his troops were already
cooperating with MVD units in the temporary operational grouping (MVD)
which was maintaining the security of the administrative borders of Chechnya,
North Osetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan. Asked specifically about coordination
of activities of the ministries in the MD, he stated that:
"It is not a secret
that friction has arisen between the departments. But what particularly
is odd about this, and this is strange, is that it is happening 'from the
top'. The lower you go, the more mutual understanding [you find] . We are
ready to defend the southern borders of Russia and all the power ministries
must tackle this main task together, by joint efforts."
In terms of how this could
be achieved, Kazantsev pointed out that:
"Part of Interior
Troops, in principle, could take part in front operations, whilst other
units could take part in territorial defence. This is [normally] one of
our tasks during war time. In the case of the outbreak of a local conflict,
we would jointly operate with the Ministry of Emergency Situations, MVD,
properly worked out in joint command-staff exercises and training."
Indeed, practical coordination
was examined in more detail during a very large exercise in the North Caucasus
from 27th-31st July 1998. The exercise was unprecedented
in the range of organs represented: as one newspaper commented at the time,
"in
a word, anyone who wears epaulettes" was involved, in all, some 15,000
troops. It was a real test for the Operational staff HQ of the MVD with
responsibility for the North Caucasus, headed by Colonel-General L Shevtsov,
which was nominally in command, and involved MVD Russia, North Caucasus
MD, Federal Security Service, Ministry of Emergency Situations and Federal
Border Guards. In the run up to the exercise, at one of the planning sessions,
held in Stavropol' on 3rd July, Interior Minister Stepashin
noted that "the developing situation in the North Caucasus urgently
demands unified leadership of all the forces and means concerned with the
maintenance of law and order and security in the region. Practically all
conflicts here are inter-connected."
For his part, Shevtsov
stated that one of the main aims of the exercise was "to work out the
necessary steps which may be employed to oppose the activities, on the
scale of a sizeable conflict, which have already been unleashed by illegal
armed formations of an extremist-separatist nature."
"Several days" before
Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin arrived to take control of the military
side of the exercise, a working group of senior officers from the General
Staff's Main Operations Directorate and the North Caucasus MD had been
sent ahead of him. According to one "well-known" general attached
to the exercise, "the main aim is to work out the decision-making system
in case of a real aggravation of the situation in the region and a break
out of local bandit formations from Chechnya to neighbouring territory.
Localise them and then liquidate them." Officially, the aims of the
exercise ranged from maintaining law and order in the North Caucasus region
to practising evacuating the population after a large-scale fire.
It was being run in parallel
with a series of "real planned military exercises" involving troops,
pilotless planes, helicopters and tanks. According to an official MOD press
release:
"The main aim of the
exercise is to work out matters arising from the control of forces and
means of the temporary operational grouping of the North Caucasus region
[responsible] for maintaining law and order, public security, rendering
aid to the local population, liquidating the consequences of large-scale
fires, evacuating the population from sanitation-epidemic areas of the
region, conducting quarantine measures, preventing looting, possible street
disorders, terrorist acts, etc."
From the military's point
of view, its purpose was to work out the decision-making process in the
event of a re-run of the First Chechen War, the role of the power ministries
"to
localise" the conflict and then "eliminate" the bandit formations.
Certainly, the Chechen authorities were less than convinced about its "peaceful"
nature: on 28th July, the Chechen Foreign Ministry issued a
statement condemning the exercise, stating that it was "an open demonstration
of force which may destabilise the military and political situation in
the entire Caucasus region." One other brief report confirmed that
one of the exercises involving the power ministries was "disarming a
group of terrorists who had seized an administrative building", an
exercise which was partly based on the events in Budennovsk in 1995 and
in Makhachkala in June 1998.
Judging by reports of the
exercise, the MoD, in cooperation with units of the other power ministries,
conducted joint operations to free hostages, stop the activities of "terrorists",
people dealing with illicit goods, drug traffickers, etc. Thus apart from
the more obvious military component, there were a number of areas where
the main focus of attention was on anti-terrorist operations. This being
the case, it was obvious that the input of the military would be important
in evaluating future courses of action.
In a statement issued at
the end of the exercise by ITAR-TASS, a preliminary assessment was positive:
"At a meeting with
journalists, he [Stepashin] noted the good cooperation between sub-units
from different departments. He said the barrier created by poor liaison
had been broken down for good . in Dagestan, for instance, the senior operational
commander was the [local] Minister of Internal Affairs. This did not cause
any jealousy amongst the military, the Minister said.
The commander of the
North Caucasus Military District, Col-Gen V Kazantsev, considers this to
be right, since internal affairs bear prime responsibility for public security.
The army will always be ready to support them with the manpower and resources
at its disposal."
Kazantsev later stated that:
"We practise holding
joint command-staff exercises of the troops of the district with the control
organs and formations of the other power structures of the RF on the territory
of the region. During the course of such measures, we work on the problems
arising from stabilising the situation in the territory of the North Caucasus
and localising armed conflicts. Conducting joint work has produced positive
results. Confirmation of this was the joint command-staff exercise carried
out in July of this year. It was clearly demonstrated that the base of
success was the close coordination of the control organs and the units
of all the power structures."
Given the size of the exercise,
the equipment used, and the command and control arrangements - technically,
the MVD was in overall charge, but with the presence of both the Chief
of the General Staff and the MD Commander, as well as the prior involvement
of senior officers from the General Staff, this was an exercise which was
designed to test more than coordination. There was a bigger game being
played here than simply working out how best to cope with a natural or
man-made disaster. The involvement of the Chief of the General Staff was
clear proof that despite Stepashin's earlier comment that the Operational
staff was in charge of "leading" the coordination of activities of power
ministries, what was taking place was a quiet acknowledgement of the increasing
internalisation of the role of the Army, at the expense of the MVD. Stepashin,
as MVD Minister, was successful for a while in putting the MVD back into
the centre of the security picture of the North Caucasus region, but it
was not to be too long before the Armed Forces regained centre spot.
In strategic terms, the
exercise had a larger purpose. It was designed to show all and sundry that:
-
Russia had not only learnt
from its first debacle in Chechnya, but was putting those lessons into
effect;
-
It would use all means at
its disposal to maintain its presence in the region and, regardless of
the terrorist attacks of the past, present or future, or the increasing
lawlessness in the region, it would not be bullied or harassed out of it;
-
As reassurance to the Russian
population of the region: Russia was still a military force to be reckoned
with and would defend its position there with brute force, if necessary.
It would not permit a "Balkanisation" of the region.
In connection with the presidential
decree "On organisational measures to maintain law and order and public
security in the North Caucasus region" issued at the end of May 1998,
it had been decided to create as part of the MD's structure the Joint Grouping
of MoD Troops in the Republic of Dagestan, based in Kaspiysk. It too was
heavily involved in coordinating its activities with the local units of
the other ministries and the Grouping's Commander, Lieutenant-General V
Bulgakov, spoke about how the relevant units organised their co-ordinated
activities:
"We regularly hold
joint exercises with units of the Interior Troops, organs of public security.
And not only, by the way, on maps. Not to hide a sin, the reason for many
of our previous mistakes has been inter-departmental disconnections. We
did not have a unified 'fighting team' in Budennovsk, where the militants
of Shamil Basayev were able to stroll along the streets without being punished,
nor in Kizlyar, nor in Pervomayskoye, where the band of Salman Raduyev
held hostages. And, on the whole, war in Chechnya showed the unpreparedness
of joint activities of all the power structures, beginning at the tactical
level. You see, there was strength here, but it worked in an uncoordinated
fashion."
Asked what concrete steps
he had taken to resolve this problem, Bulgakov stated that:
"Twice a week, we
hold joint field exercises: shooting and tactics . such exercises have
a double benefit. On the one hand, the officers of the militia and the
commanders of our units get to know one another, find a common language,
and on the other hand - begin to more deeply understand those problems
which can be solved jointly."
Moving on from the relationship
with the local militia, Bulgakov also described the Grouping's relationship
with the MVD units based in Dagestan:
"In relation to the
units of the Interior Ministry Troops, they now have their own heavy calibre
weapons and equipment. But they do not have trained specialists . from
the newcomers we are helping them to train real specialists, both in terms
of being able to drive the equipment properly and use its firepower. And
the information which comes to us, as they say, from reliable sources,
helps us to timeously prevent even the smallest provocative actions on
the part of the militants."
An interesting relationship
seemed to be at work in Dagestan, if somewhat unorthodox. On a practical
level, it did seem to work, however: joint field training with the local
militia units would help to hone their skills and improve combat effectiveness,
whilst at the same time allow those involved a better chance of knowing
one another and knowing the other's problems and capabilities. Could this
practical relationship between the security and law-enforcement organs
in Dagestan have been one of the reasons for the distinct lack of success
enjoyed by the Chechens and their allies in August 1999? Bulgakov, however,
was under no illusion about the difficult position his men were in:
"In comparison with
the terrorists, the units of our grouping are in a less favourable position.
We know that the extremists are near, constantly studying us, manoeuvring,
choosing the moment to strike. We are static. That is why a whole complex
of measures is needed, so that our officers are constantly alert, on exercise,
on military training, teaching their men . how to survive the strike."
On 19th May 1999,
a further decree was issued concerning the security situation in the North
Caucasus. Entitled "On additional measures to combat terrorism in the
North Caucasus region of the RF", it was issued after a working meeting
involving Yel'tsin and Putin, in his dual role as Secretary to the Security
Council and Director General of the Federal Security Service. According
to Putin, who was described as the "initiator" of the new decree, its essence
was "to improve the coordination of all the forces and means at the
disposal of the federal authorities." Prior to the issue of the decree,
the two men discussed three basic questions: "FSB operations, Security
Council operations and the political situation in the country against the
background of the replacement of the government and elections in Karachayevo-Cherkessiya."
Leaving aside speculation
concerning the alleged infighting between the MVD and the FSB on the "carve-up"
of counter-intelligence work in the region, the decree outlined measures
"to
increase the financial and technical-material aid to Interior Ministry
Troops in the North Caucasus." Putin described the situation in the
North Caucasus as "bad" and, in examining the wider ramifications
of the instability in the region stated that "certain forces for instability
outside Russia are trying to solve their geostrategic problems through
the North Caucasus region." In response, one Russian commentator remarked:
"In
other words, the FSB is returning to one of its long-term favourite themes:
someone is stirring up the peoples of the Caucasus."
Whilst there can be little
denying the fact that the situation in the North Caucasus - despite all
the measures being adopted nationally and locally - was continuing to deteriorate,
little was to be gained by looking at "outside" forces as being the main
instigator of Russia's problems in the North Caucasus. Whilst it is outside
the remit of this paper, Russia does not have far to look when apportioning
blame for the present situation in the region - whilst it would be wrong
to solely blame Russia for the mess in the Caucasus, it has to accept a
fair share of the blame for what has happened and is happening there. Testament
to its failure to adequately comprehend the problems of the region is its
necessity of having to intervene militarily twice since 1994: will there
be a third time?
A number of exercises were
still to take place in the North Caucasus MD in the run up to the events
of August 1999. One of the most interesting took place at the beginning
of June 1999 and involved militia units, MVD and MoD troops operating in
the Kursk region of Stavropol', not far from the border with Chechnya.
A combination of militia, what was described as "personnel from a special
mechanised regiment" and "OMON" (special purpose militia) units
practised defending a control point. In the description of the exercise,
mention was also made of the use of a 30-minute rapid reaction unit, as
well as the use of artillery and tanks in order to repulse an "attacking
band." In his evaluation of the role of the MoD units, First Deputy
Commander Internal Troops, North Caucasus Interior Troops District, Lieutenant-General
Ye Abrashin stated that: "Without the units of the MoD, we would not
have been able to carry out the tasks placed before us."
The report also mentioned
joint patrols involving militia and airborne troops operating in the region
of Terekli-Mektel in Dagestan. Again, a number of units took part in a
variety of exercises including freeing hostages, repulsing an attack on
a motor brigade's headquarters; and disarming "bandits" aboard a bus. In
his estimation of the year's exercises to date, the Deputy C-in-C of Internal
Troops for Emergency Situations, Major-General V Dadonov, concluded that:
"All
the power ministries are now dedicated to one single aim: to maintain stability
in the North Caucasus." For his part Kazantsev, summarising the latest
round of exercises and evaluating the work of all the exercises in the
past year stated: "In comparison with such command-staff exercises of
a year ago, the level of coordination between the staffs of all the power
ministries has increased by a whole magnitude."
Thus, on the eve of a new
military campaign opening up in the North Caucasus, the level of coordination
of the military activities of the power ministries had increased significantly.
Having realised that one of the major reasons for the debacle in 1994-1996
was the lack of coordination between the different power ministry units
operating in Chechnya, the senior military leadership, especially in the
North Caucasus MD, set about trying to rectify the problem through a renewed
emphasis on combat training, joint command staff exercises and greater
inter-action between MoD, MVD, MChS, FSB, etc, culminating in the large-scale
exercise held in July 1999. Men from different units with different responsibilities
trained together and became much more aware of one another's capabilities
and weaknesses. This author is aware of 15 major command-staff exercises
between March 1997-July 1999; see Appendix 1. The admission that no one
power ministry, including the MoD, could maintain Russia's security solely
by its own efforts meant that all the power ministry units had to operate
together in the face of the growing internal threat to the stability of
the Russian Federation.
However, despite this very
real need, the issue of operational command and control of joint forces
was to be a problem, as evidenced by the initial conduct of the "counter-terrorist
operation" in August 1999. On 17th August, operational command
of the Federal Groupings of Forces was transferred from the MVD to the
MoD, the former simply not being able to retaliate with sufficient venom
to the cross border incursion. However, 10 days later, operational command
was transferred back to the MVD, for operations against the "rebels" in
Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi and Kadar. Again, though, this was deemed a failure
and, finally, operational commander was restored to the MoD on 4th
September.
The Immediate Lessons
of Coordination in the "Counter-Terrorist Operation" (1999-2000)
A number of senior Russian
military figures have already publicly aired their views on the experience
of the coordination of activities in the "counter-terrorist operation"
in Chechnya and, to date, the reaction has been far from wild praise for
what has been achieved. Indeed, according to the Commandant of the Combined
Forces Academy, Colonel-General L S Zolotov,
"In the organisation
of coordination of combined arms units with the armed formations of
other troops, as in the first Chechen campaign, there were many defects."
Thus despite all the training
and exercises and positive assessment of the level of coordination between
the power ministry units in the North Caucasus MD, the operation would
appear to have revealed that there is still much room for improvement.
It will be interesting to see what further steps are taken by Russia's
military and political leadership.
Major-General (Retired)
I N Vorob'yev, opened his generic analysis by stating that:
"Among the problems
which arose during the course of armed conflicts on the territory of Russia
recently, one of the biggest has been the organisation of coordination
between troops from the various power structures in the conduct of special
operations against illegal armed formations. There are many objective and
subjective reasons for this but, arguably, the most important has been
that, since the collapse of the USSR, the unified military organisation
of the state, which went through the testing time of the Great Patriotic
War, was divided into separate parts; its own Armed forces separate from
the military formations of the other ministries and departments (MVD, FPS,
ZhDV, FSB MChS, FAPSI and others)."
The first step, in his opinion,
is to restore the principle of "centralised leadership" of the organisation
of the state's military mechanism. Russia's new Military Doctrine (April
2000) made a number of references to the "centralisation of leadership"
as being a "basic principle" of the development of the state's military
organisation. It also refers to "improving strategic planning on the
principle of unity of the use of the Russian Federation armed forces and
other troops".
Vorob'yev lists a more
specific series of problems which manifested themselves during the current
military campaign in the North Caucasus:
"Events in Chechnya
and Dagestan show that the basic reasons which made the co-ordinated activities
of the various departmental force structures taking part in the armed conflict
difficult were: the incompatibility of the legal base to the aims and principles
of their joint use; the lack of a unified control system, [the lack of
a] comprehensive supply system as well as forecasting and observing the
military-political, strategic and operational situation in potentially
explosive regions; uncoordinated departmental programme-regulation documents
for the training of troops (forces) and organs for joint activities in
the event of a crisis situation developing; the disunity in the infrastructure
of the state's military organisation."
Vorob'yev examined the wider
dimension behind solving an internal armed conflict, including the humanitarian
and political factors involved, as well as who should be the prime mover
in co-ordinating the roles of the force structures. In what he terms "special
operations" which seem to cover Russia's present "counter-terrorist
operation", Vorob'yev stated that:
"The main aim of special
operations is not to allow the destabilisation of the situation in the
country, the violation of the constitutional order, but to create the necessary
conditions for the elimination of the contradictions by political means.
In resolving an internal
armed conflict, such an operation will be carried out on the territory
of one's state and this fact will reflect on its content. The force structures
will operate in a way to avoid losses amongst the civilian population and
amongst the soldiers."
Vorob'yev also attached "the
primary role" to working out "the aims and tasks of the special
operation" to the political factor, which will be decisive in choosing
the means, forms, scale and length of military operations. This was an
interesting point to make and one worth emphasising. One of the fundamental
differences between the two military campaigns in Chechnya in the 1990s
has been, for want of a better phrase, the political will. This was different
in 1999 in many ways from the previous war of 1994-1996 not least because
this time round Russia had a leader (Putin) who, rightly or wrongly, wanted
to prosecute this war with the utmost vigour. The political leadership
in the Kremlin did not interfere in the plans of the military, nor in matters
relating to how best to organise the conduct of operations. In short, the
military, both at the centre and in Chechnya, were never in any doubt what
the Kremlin thought about this war and set about their task accordingly.
"Then the question
arises: who in the final analysis is the organiser of coordination?
It is difficult to give a categorical answer. If one speaks from the principle
side of things, then one has to rely on the fundamental documents of the
state. In the National Security Concept of the RF, the priority in solving
problems in repulsing.internal threats to national security belongs to
the Ministry of the Interior . the representative of Internal Troops MVD
and it must organise coordination. However, if an internal armed conflict
becomes large-scale and to solve it requires a large mass of troops, then
the main co-ordinator of the combat effort of the unified operational grouping
of different forces is the combined arms commander, as was the case in
repulsing the invasions by the bandit formations in Dagestan, when the
leadership of operations was placed on the Commander of the North Caucasus
MD. In other circumstances, the head of the operational grouping of forces
could be the Commander of Interior Troops MVD district."
In short, in deciding who
has primacy in running an operation, someone has to decide carefully what
criteria to adopt, in order to evaluate when and under what circumstances
an internal threat to the country can be properly handled by the MVD, with
back-up when necessary being provided by the other power ministry units,
or when the MoD should be the lead player. Given the growing internalisation
of the role of the Armed Forces, this remains a very difficult problem
for the country's senior political, legal and military figures. Definition
of the terms used to describe the operation will have important consequences
for the command structure and level of force applied.
The General Staff's main
theoretical journal, Voyennaya Mysl', continues to publish articles
analysing the experience of the "counter-terrorist operation" in the North
Caucasus. It printed a number of reports from a "round table" discussion
involving senior military officers, giving a preliminary evaluation of
the pluses and minuses of the operation so far. In examining coordination,
the two main contributions were made by Colonel-General Yu D Bukreyev,
Head of the Main Directorate, Ground Forces, and Colonel-General L S Zolotov,
Commandant of the Combined Forces Academy.
In his contribution, Bukreyev
noted that "questions concerning the organisation of coordination of
various power structures deserved particular attention." He noted that
what now had to occur was a detailed analysis of a range of issues associated
with coordination: "the ways [of reaching] joint decisions; the composition
of the troops taking part in combat actions; the time and sequence of carrying
out planned tasks; [detailed working out and agreement on] regions, borders,
installations for action; conditions, means and time in the joint use of
means of attack, as well as limitations on their use in population centres;
questions concerning the organisation of control and communications, all-round
supplies, notification and identification, etc." It was also important,
in his opinion, to ensure that in organising cooperation in the "counter-terrorist
operation", the local organs were involved, especially in exchanging
information on activities of the "illegal armed formations"; maintaining
communication facilities; guarding important facilities for civilian population,
etc. Bukreyev listed the following main conclusions:
"One. Units
and sub-units of Ground and Airborne Troops played a decisive role in fulfilling
the tasks of counter-terrorist operation.
Two. The experience
of the combat use of units and sub-units of Internal Troops MVD RF showed
that in the specifics of fulfilling their service-combat missions, they
were inadequately effective during the conduct of the first stage of the
counter-terrorist operations (the elimination of illegal armed formations).
Three. Military-capable,
well-coordinated units and sub-units with their own supply organs and the
corresponding necessary material-technical reserves must be the basis of
the created group of forces for activities in the zone of armed conflict.
Four. In the
Ground Forces, it is necessary to have in constant readiness a packet of
combat, special, rear and technical supply units.
Five. The control
system, created in peace time, should adequately ensure the solution of
issues of control during an armed conflict without changing it. The leadership
of the Unified Grouping of Troops (Forces) must be carried out by the Commander
whose troops, at that stage of the conflict, are carrying out the main
task.
Six. Of great
significance in armed conflicts are problems involving the inter-action
of command personnel and troops with the local population. Knowledge and
respect for national customs and values, close contact with representatives
of local organs of self-administration, will help the soldiers successfully
carry out their tasks, will cut down on the losses amongst soldiers and
peaceful citizens."
For his part, Zolotov also
pointed out that the issue of coordination between the power ministries
was still a big problem which, in his opinion, would only be resolved when
everyone was taught literally in the same classroom:
"As in the first Chechen
campaign, there were many inadequacies in the organisation of coordination
of combined arms units with armed formations of other troops. The main
reason.for this is that we still have not overcome the ministerial disunity
in the training of our command cadres. You see only with joint teaching
in military higher educational establishments of officers of Ground Forces,
Internal Troops MVD, Border Guard troops FPS, will we then have the possibility
of unifying views on the basics of the military art, studying the organisation
of interaction. Then it will be easier for them to find a common language
in a combat situation and jointly decide on combat tasks."
Zolotov pointed out that there
was poor coordination between units of Army Aviation, combined arms units
and MVD Troops during the "counter-terrorist operation", as well as, again,
poor coordination between artillery of combined arms units and their opposite
numbers in the MVD. In conclusion, he reminded readers that his Academy
was preparing to publish a "solid" work, examining in great detail all
the issues raised.
There are clearly still
a significant number of problems in the area of coordinating combat activities,
both at the theoretical and, more importantly, at the practical level.
On a theoretical level, there is still not a strong legal foundation, detailing
which ministry does what and under what circumstances (when is it appropriate
for the MoD to get involved in such operations and at what level? Once
involved, what should then be the respective roles of the MVD, the Border
Guards, FSB, etc?) Turf wars were a problem in the First Chechen War and
would appear to have still been an issue in the second. There is a real
possibility that unless adequate steps are taken, friction could easily
break out between the Russian Army and MVD Interior Troops in the future
in the event of such operations having to be conducted again. Although
mistakes on a practical level were not fully ironed out, it would appear
that fewer mistakes were made, and of a different type, hence the greater
success enjoyed the second time round (although as evidenced by Appendix
2 the power of superior numbers of men and firepower must have played its
part). The experience of the current operation, no doubt, will be examined
and analysed and more changes introduced, both in terms of defining the
legal obligations of each of the power ministries in resolving such conflicts,
as well as on a practical level. These will probably include further emphasis
on training more men from all units to be able to fight in the mountains
and forests of the Caucasus; beginning a proper programme for training
cadres for all the main power ministries together in the same establishments;
putting into practical effect the elevated status of the MDs to "operational-strategic
commands," by re-defining the role of the local MD Commander as the man
in operational charge of all men in uniform in his district, when
appropriate circumstances arise. These are just a few of the issues which
the government under Putin will have to resolve quickly. How it does so
will have a significant impact on how successfully it wages the next "counter-terrorist
operation" and, have no doubt about it, there will be another one.
An interesting development
which has taken place recently has been the re-organisation of Russia into
seven federal districts and the appointment of "presidential plenipotentiaries"
to head them. This has generally been seen as an early attempt by the new
Russian president to re-establish the vertical levers of power, thereby
ensuring greater Kremlin control of what is actually going on in the regions.
Given the fact that the new federal district boundaries are almost coterminous
with the MDs and that the overwhelming majority of the new federal plenipotentiaries
have been senior members of the power ministries, there has been speculation
that it will not be long before further organisational change at this level
takes place, thereby leading to a further concentration of both military
and civilian powers in the hands of these newly created presidential plenipotentiaries.
Given the earlier decision, taken in July 1998, to elevate the MDs to "operational-strategic
commands", there are grounds for speculation that in the medium-to-long-term
this may happen. In effect, in attempting to further enhance the leadership
of the president in the regions, Putin may re-create the old system of
governor-generals, introduced in Russia in the mid-19th century
when Russia was initially divided into a series of MDs, whose commanders
had authority over civilian as well as military affairs in the district.
The North Caucasus Federal
District has the same boundaries as the North Caucasus MD and, not too
surprisingly given recent events, the presidential plenipotentiary to the
Federal District is none other than General V G Kazantsev. In his first
major interview since being appointed, Kazantsev stated that his main task
was "to ensure that that there is no serious work for the military to
do in the south of the country" by tackling the three evils of "banditry,
terrorism and corruption." At the end of the interview, Kazantsev referred
to an idea which, in a slightly different format, he had expressed on a
number of occasions in the past:
"I do indeed believe
that the rebirth of the army will begin with the North Caucasus Military
District and that the revival of the country will begin with the south.
All the prerequisites for this exist in our highly abundant, highly fertile
region. The south is Russia's 'solar plexus'. If we organise normal life
[there], we will flourish."
Only time will tell how successful
both this attempt at re-creating the vertical structure of power in general,
and Kazantsev's efforts as Putin's personal representative to the North
Caucasus Federal District in particular, will be in solving the nation's
myriad of problems.
CODA
The need for Russia to intervene militarily a second time in Chechnya
in such a comparatively short space of time has to be viewed as a comprehensive
failure of Russian policy in the North Caucasus region as a whole. The
use of military forces - however well or badly they performed - has to
be viewed as stark testament to the fact that, first and foremost, the
political process in the region had failed. August 1999, however, had much
less to do with "revenge" politics, for want of a better phrase, than most
commentators in the West give credit for. After all, it is quietly forgotten
now but the Chechen "militants" and their allies did launch an armed incursion
into Dagestan and Russia saw this as a direct challenge to its authority
in the region, an authority which had been severely dented, not just by
the First Chechen War, but also by the terrorist outrages in the south
of Russia since 1995; the challenge to federal rule posed by the presidential
elections in Karachayevo-Cherkessiya; the growing levels of lawlessness
in the region - personified by, but not solely restricted to Chechnya;
and the growth of religious extremism in the region. As far as Moscow was
concerned, something had to be done and done quickly.
And yet, for a time, the relationship between the command of the
North Caucasus MD and Groznyy, publicly at least, looked like it could
have followed a different path from the one which led to eventual military
confrontation in August 1999. This should not be taken to mean that the
Russian military command, at the local level, was not preparing for combat
action in the area, but had the attitude of the senior political leadership
in the Kremlin of Chechnya been different, the MD's military command could
have reacted accordingly.
In May 1998, the MD's Commander - Kazantsev - and First Deputy Commander
- Troshev - made a number of public announcements which hint at the possibility
that relations could have improved, had events not taken the turn they
did, or Moscow had shown a more positive attitude. During that month, Kazantsev
formally invited a number of regional political leaders - including A Maskhadov
- to attend the 80th anniversary celebrations of the creation
of the North Caucasus MD. Troshev confirmed that the MD command did receive
a "positive response" from the Chechen authorities. Unfortunately,
due to the recent kidnapping of Yel'tsin's most senior political representative
to the region, V Vlasov, the invitation was not followed up.
Troshev also made the point that the Chechen leadership itself needed
stability in the region:
"Maskhadov is anxious that everything in the republic should
be stable. It is important even for their own purposes. Even in order to
secede, they want peace.they want to put an end to disorder, to get rid
of weapons, to create a situation where only those who are authorised.can
carry guns."
In response to a question concerning the desire of the military to aggravate
the situation in the region:
"There are roadblocks all along the Russian-Chechen border.
The police, the Interior Troops, as well as our troops . are on duty around
the clock and today we are pressing for the withdrawal of all these troops.
Why? To begin with, these roadblocks separate Chechnya from us, we alienate
Chechnya from us, which is not right."
In the same TV broadcast, Kazantsev mentioned that a request had been
sent by Maskhadov "during our last meeting" to the MD's command
for "assistance in clearing mines". This raises a number of interesting
points: how many meetings did they have? What was discussed at these meetings?
How often did they take place? In a newspaper interview, Kazantsev elaborated
on this further, as well as the nature of the relationship both between
Rostov and Groznyy and Moscow and Groznyy:
"Let's take Chechnya, which is in the territory of the district.
Recently, there have been positive moments in the dialogue between Moscow
and Groznyy. The Minister of the Interior, A Stepashin, has held talks
on joint activities of the law-enforcement organs on the administrative
border with Chechnya. The president of Chechnya recently approached us
with a request to help clear mines. People have to work, feed their children,
but not to fight. Not that long ago, we sent humanitarian assistance to
Chechnya . we cannot always be in permanent confrontation with Chechnya.
We must find variants for normalisation, although the solution to these
matters is, of course, in the province of the politicians, not the military
[emphasis mine - SJM]."
But by the end of July 1998, Russia held its massive command-staff exercise
in the North Caucasus MD and everything was thrown backwards, not forwards.
Mutual hostility and suspicion rose to the surface and no new "positive
moments" were to be heard publicly in the subsequent dialogue between Moscow,
Rostov and Groznyy. The chance for a more peaceful development in the relationship
between Russia and Chechnya was lost and the stage set for August 1999.
Endnotes
APPENDIX ONE
Exercises known to have
taken place in the North Caucasus Military District, (March 1997-July 1999)
Date Published
aim Units, (forces)
1) 24-30/3/97 "Polish interaction
MoD, MVD, FPS
between NCMD, MVD ZhDV,
FAPSI
Civil Defence staffs" -
"Redut-97"
Leader: General V Samsonov
July 31st 1997 Lieutenant-General
V G Kazantsev takes command
2) 18-24/8/97 "To work
out methods 58 Army, MVD Troops,
of organising military
militia, air force
training, under conditions
of limited material and
motorised resources"; "58A actions against conventional enemy - criminal
groupings and subversive groups."
Leader: Lieutenant-General
V Kazantsev
3) 17-23/3/98 Front line
CPX: MoD, MVD, FSB,
"to practise operational
FPS, MChS, Black Sea
and tactical tasks in.
Fleet, Caspian Flotilla,
mountain conditions." Air
Army, PVO
Leader: Lieutenant-General
V Kazantsev
4) 8-12/7/98 "Territorial
defence, MoD, Caspian Flotilla,
emergency measures aimed
FPS, MVD Troops, at protecting administrative MChS (Dagestan) and military
installations."
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
5) 27-31/7/1998 "Polish
interaction MoD, MVD Troops,
between all forces in MChS,
FAPSI, "other
the composition of the
law-enforcement
'temporary operational
organs", FSB, airborne grouping, North Caucasus forces. region.'"
Leader: Colonel-General
L Shevtsov
6) 28/8/98 (start) "Improve
practical methods Guards motor-rifle in
command and staff formation,
FPS,
planning and organisation
and other law- of combat training." enforcement
organs
Leader: Lieutenant-General
G Troshev
7) 19/9/98 (end) "Repulse
incursion MoD, MVD from across the Troops
border."
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
8) 25-30/1/99 "Drilled
cooperation" FAPSI and
with other power others
ministries.
Leader: Colonel-General
V Sherstyuk
9) 25/2/99 (end) "Polish
interaction." MoD, MVD Troops, FPS, FAPSI
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
10) 18/3/99 (end) "Improve
practical skills MoD, Air Force of commanders in analysing PVO, Caspian
and organising comprehensive Flotilla, MVD provisions for the troops."
Troops, FPS,
58 Army
Leader: ?
11) 22/4/99 (start) "Rehearse
control of forces MoD, MVD and resources for the 'temp. Troops, FPS operational
grouping of troops.'"
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
(S Stepashin, Interior
Minister, in overall charge)
12) 5/5/99 (ongoing) "Polish
matters concerning MoD, MVD training and preparing control Troops
personnel"; "interaction
to
maintain security and
stability
of Russia's southern borders."
Two-stage exercise.
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
(S Stepashin in overall
charge)
13) End of May 1999 "Polish
matters of MoD, MVD
of interactions of all
power Troops, OMON,
ministries to maintain
Caspian Flotilla,
Russia's security and stability
FPS
in the south."
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
14) 13-16/7/99 "Decision-making
process MoD, Black Sea for commanders and Fleet, airborne staff HQs"; "interaction
forces, "other power in the conduct of a defensive structures" operation."
Leader: Colonel-General
V Kazantsev
19th July
- MVD Troops put on "increased alert". 58 Army not ordered to move
15) 21/7/99 "To check the
combat and 58 Army
mobilisational readiness,
coordination of staff HQs, their ability of command to control
subordinate units."
Leader: Lieutenant-General
A Sidyakin
Abbreviations: MoD
- Ministry of Defence;
MVD - Ministry of Interior;
FPS - Federal Border Guard
Service;
ZhDV-Railway Troops;
FAPSI - Federal Agency
for Government Communications and Information;
FSB - Federal Security Service;
MChS - Ministry of Emergency
Situations;
PVO - Anti-Aircraft Defence
Troops;
OMON - special police units.
Sources: Krasnaya
Zvezda, 21/3/1997; FBIS-SOV-97-080, 21/3/1997; Krasnaya Zvezda,
26/3/1997; Krasnaya Zvezda,, 29/3/1997; FBIS-SOV-97-091, 1/4/1997;
BBC Monitoring, 6/4/1997; BBC Monitoring, 31/7/1997; BBC Monitoring, 8/8/1997;
BBC Monitoring, 20/8/1997; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), SU/3003
S1/2, 21/8/1997; BBC Monitoring, 21/8/1997; BBC Monitoring, 24/8/1997;
SWB SU/3006 S1/2, 25/8/1997; BBC Monitoring, 17/3/1998; FBIS-UMA-98-081,
22/3/1998; BBC Monitoring, 23/3/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda, 24/3/1998;
BBC Monitoring, 2/7/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda, 25/7/1998; Interfax,
27/7/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda, 28/7/1998; Interfax, 28/7/1998; Krasnaya
Zvezda, 31/7/1998; BBC Monitoring, 31/7/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda,
6/8/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda, 28/8/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda,, 19/9/1998;
Krasnaya
Zvezda, 25/9/1998; Krasnaya Zvezda, 2/2/1999; Krasnaya Zvezda,
25/2/1999; Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, No 27, 24-30/7/1999;
Krasnaya
Zvezda, 18/3/1999; SWB SU/3518 S1/2, 26/4/1999;
Krasnaya Zvezda,
5/5/1999;
Krasnaya Zvezda, 2/6/1999; Krasnaya Zvezda,
10/7/1999; ITAR-TASS,
19/7/1999; Krasnaya Zvezda, 21/7/1999.
APPENDIX TWO
"THE RETALIATORY STRIKE"
The strength of the Russian
Armed Forces located in and around the North Caucasus, (as of early July
1999):
-
the 136th Mountain
Infantry Brigade of the Russian Ministry of Defence (Buynaksk);
-
the 102nd operations
Brigade of the Ministry of Interior Troops (Makhachkala);
-
the 205th Brigade
of the Russian Ministry of Defence (Budennovsk);
-
the 21st Airborne
Brigade of the Russian Ministry of Defence (Stavropol');
-
Independent Regiment of Interior
Ministry Troops (Kursk region);
-
19th Motor-Rifle
Brigade of 58 Army Russian Ministry of Defence (Vladikavkaz);
-
Independent Operations Division
of Interior Ministry Troops (Vladikavkaz);
-
Military airfield and staff
base of 58 Army of the Russian Ministry of Defence (Mozdok);
-
7th Airborne Division
(Novorossiysk);
-
the 20th Motor-Rifle
Division (Volgograd);
-
Special unit of the Federal
Security Service (Krasnodar);
-
Special Brigade of Main Intelligence
Department (GRU), General Staff of the Russian Defence Ministry (Rostov);
-
two helicopter regiments (Kizlyar
and Mozdok);
-
two attack air force squadrons
(Krasnodar and Volgograd)
As well as reinforced and
mobilised police units from Dagestan, Stavropol kray and North Osetia.
Source:
Izvestiya, 8/7/1999.
The respective military
strengths of the Federal and Chechen forces in 1994-1996 and 1999 are given
overleaf.
Equipment and personnel
numbers of the Federal forces* and the illegal armed formations
Date Personnel
Tanks and Vehicles Artillery**
Federal forces (1994-1996)
11.12.94 6,000 500 270
1.1.95 8,000 520 340
1.2.95 40,000 1,500 397
1.9.96 38,000 1,350 350
Militants (1994-1996)
11.12.94 20,000 134 200
1.1.95 40,000 126 190
1.2.95 5-7,000 34 28
1.9.95 40,000 48 54
Federal forces (1999)
1.12.99 100,000 1,650 480
Militants (1999)
1.12.99 20,000 14 23
* The equipment and personnel
figures do not take into account Ministry of Interior Troops, militia or
OMON units.
** Artillery systems with
a calibre exceeding 100mm, as well as ground force rocket systems.
Source:
A Korbut, "Ucheba v boyu", ("learning in battle"), Nezavismoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, No 50 (173), 24/12/1999-13/1/2000.
The Conflict
Studies Research Centre
Directorate General Development and Doctrine
Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst
Camberley Telephone : (44)
1276 412346
Surrey Or 412375
GU15 4PQ Fax : (44) 1276
686880
England E-mail: csrc.dgd&d@gtnet.gov.uk
http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc
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