Russia's main concern is to ensure the security of her southern borders.Instability in the Northern Caucasus makes this problem all the more acute.Moscow desires good relations with the three Transcaucasian states as she believes this will enhance her ability to maintain stability in the Northern Caucasus.She is concerned about the possibility of anti-Moscow forces in the Northern Caucasus receiving support or being able to seek refuge across the border in the Transcaucasian states.In September 1999 the Russian Foreign Ministry warned Georgia and Azerbaijan against transferring money or weapons to "bandit formations" in Chechnya.^[1]Russian planes aiming at targets in Chechnya have accidentally bombed villages in Georgia, so illustrating how conflict in the Northern Caucasus can affect Russia's relations with her Transcaucasian neighbours.

Russia would ideally like to see Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia as part of a Russian sphere of influence.One of her key concerns is the extension of foreign, particularly western influence into Transcaucasia, as this weakens and could ultimately remove Russian influence over these states.Russia is especially concerned about any possible western military presence in Transcaucasia.Russia also desires to play a key role in attempts to resolve the ethno-territorial disputes in Transcaucasia.She is again anxious to ensure that these disputes are not resolved in any way that is detrimental to Russian interests.The possible involvement of western states in the settlement processes could concern Russia, if this involvement is perceived to undermine Russian influence in the region.It was for this reason that Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov stated when he visited Georgia in September 1999 that the Russian dominated CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia should not be withdrawn.

Russia wishes to participate in the development of the region's oil and gas resources.She does not wish to be a bystander, and is concerned about the possible development of pipeline routes from the Caspian that could bypass Russia.She is keen to maintain the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline route, and is therefore concerned about the possible development of the Baku-Ceyhan route.Furthermore, as the Baku-Novorossiysk route runs through Dagestan and Chechnya, Moscow's need for stability in the Northern Caucasus becomes all the more apparent.

In Moscow's view there are two principal geopolitical challenges to Russia: the expansion of NATO influence in the region and the drift away from Moscow.Both these challenges are seen as interrelated.The expansion of NATO influence encourages the drift away from Moscow, and the drift facilitates NATO expansion.

THE EXPANSION OF NATO INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

An official Russian view of NATO policy towards the region was given by the then head of the fourth section of the CIS department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Stanislav Chernyavskiy in September 1998.^[2]

Chernyavskiy argued that the competition between oil companies for control of the energy resources of Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and the ownership of future strategic pipeline routes were attracting the interest of NATO states to Transcaucasia.He contended that Russia's inability to make significant financial investments in Transcaucasia resulted in her competitors putting the emphasis on economic penetration.He believed that an offensive was being conducted under the slogan "freedom of competition", with the formal rejection of pre-agreed "spheres of influence."

In July 1999 he wrote^[3] that Transcaucasia was the main priority for the USA in the former Soviet space, and stated that Washington wished to gain control of the energy resources of the Caspian.Chernyavskiy felt that the USA was aiming to become the regional "arbiter" in Transcaucasia, by using oil and the attempts to settle the various ethno-territorial conflicts in the region.He also saw the USA as supporting Turkish attempts to become a regional super power and export pan-Turkism into Transcaucasia and the Northern Caucasus.He noted that the USA does not rule out future NATO membership for the Transcaucasian states.

Chernyavskiy notes that both Georgia and Azerbaijan desire close association with NATO, and accepts that their disappointment with the ability of the CIS to help resolve the regional conflicts on their territory has increased their interest in the Atlantic Alliance.He recognises that Baku and Tbilisi welcome NATO's interest in the energy resources of the region, and see themselves as part of the new Europe and desire to integrate with it, regarding NATO as a foundation stone of the European security system.They also see themselves as a "connecting link of the Euro-Asiatic space", which also motivates them to seek closer ties with NATO.

Chernyavskiy sees Azerbaijan as the state in which NATO has the greatest interest in the region, as due to her economic potential, size and population, she is the most powerful state in the Caucasus.

Azerbaijan's strategic position in the centre of the Caspian region determines her growing significance in the system of American foreign policy priorities.Baku's key role in the realisation of projects of exploitation and transportation of Caspian energy resources, the clear line in establishment of alliance relations with Turkey and the West makes Azerbaijan an attractive candidate to the USA as regional leader, and a prospective base point for the strengthening of American influence in the region.^[4]

Both the USA and Turkey have extended considerable assistance to Azerbaijan in the development of her armed forces, and Baku cooperates with NATO through the PFP and through individual cooperation programmes.Azerbaijan is extremely interested in developing close ties with NATO, and in June 1998 at a meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Azeri defence minister Safar Abiev called for closer ties and said NATO should give priority to Azerbaijan over Georgia and Armenia.There has been much official discussion in Azerbaijan about the possibility of either the USA or Turkey acquiring military bases in Azerbaijan.^[5] There has also been speculation that Baku might request the closure of the Russian early warning station at Gabalinskya.The existence of a close political and military relationship between Russia and Armenia, plus the presence of Russian military bases in Armenia, have been cited as a justification for Azerbaijan desiring NATO bases.The deployment of NATO forces in Azerbaijan would be a major concern to Moscow, particularly as the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict remains unresolved.

According to Chernyavskiy, Georgia is second in importance to Azerbaijan to NATO in the Caucasus.^[6]Chernyavskiy states that Georgia has, within the framework of the PFP, stated its readiness to adapt its air-defence system to NATO standards, and to permit NATO to use airfields, training areas and ports.Georgia also desires to apply the NATO experience in peacekeeping in Bosnia to Abkhazia (this would presumably imply the deployment of a peacekeeping force from NATO states similar to SFOR in Bosnia).The current peacekeeping force in Abkhazia is from the CIS, and dominated by Russian forces, although the UN Observer Mission based in Abkhazia has representatives from other nations, including NATO members.Chernyavskiy suggests that Georgian interest in NATO peacekeeping operations signifies effective support for NATO widening.Presumably Chernyavskiy believes that Tbilisi may desire NATO involvement also in peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia and South Osetia.In July 1999 Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze was reported as saying that he favoured UN participation in peacekeeping in Abkhazia, and opposed the Russian peacekeeping presence there.^[7]The visit of US Defence Secretary William Cohen in August 1999, when he spoke of the possible accession of Georgia to NATO in the foreseeable future is also likely to be seen by Moscow as a sign of a further decline in Russian influence.^[8]

THE DRIFT AWAY FROM MOSCOW

The strivings of Georgia and Azerbaijan to move away from Moscow's orbit are having geopolitical repercussions beyond the Caucasus.Uzbekistan's moves noted above weaken Moscow's influence in Central Asia.Furthermore, similar tendencies are being displayed by Ukraine and Moldova, so that one can speak of almost the entire southern part of the former USSR as being outside of Russia's sphere of influence.Turkmenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova now all stand outside the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty, and form an unbroken belt of states in the south of the CIS.They all oppose the strengthening of the CIS.One Russian analyst notes that there is a high degree of cooperation and concord between these six states, to the extent that one can speak of an informal alliance of "the Six."^[10]It is also noted that US diplomacy has played a major role in strengthening integration processes between these nations.US support for Uzbekistan in particular is seen as crucial in encouraging Tashkent to leave the CIS Collective Security Treaty.The same analyst concludes that 

'the fate of the CIS will be resolved not by those countries which still remain within the Commonwealth, but by the participants of "the Six".The participants of the new alliance under Washington's patronage could create a powerful economic organisation, which will finally bury the CIS and change the further path of military-political and economic reforms on the southern flank of the post-Soviet space.'

THE EMERGENCE OF GUUAM

GUUAM denies that it will assume any military dimension, but the presence of these states at NATO's jubilee summit in April 1999 is seen by Moscow as a possible indication otherwise.^[12]Their interest in cooperation with NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and PFP confirms in Moscow's eyes the possibility that GUUAM may also pursue military goals.In April 1999 Georgia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan held military exercises, without Russian participation, in Georgia.The exercises were aimed at protecting the TransCaspian oil pipeline that runs through Azerbaijan and Georgia.GUUAM was also reported in January 1999 to be setting up a peacekeeping battalion.^[13]From Moscow's standpoint, GUUAM places great emphasis on NATO's support, and the failure of these states (apart from Ukraine) to condemn NATO's intervention in Kosovo has probably not gone unnoticed in Moscow, along with their non-opposition to NATO's new strategic concept.Russia might fear that GUUAM's pro-NATO orientation is creating pre-conditions for possible future NATO intervention in the post-Soviet space.This perception is rather fanciful, but it may well take hold in the minds of Russian military planners.

RUSSO-ARMENIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Armenia could not survive without Russia's protection, and the three Russian bases in the country underline Russia's commitment to Armenia's security.This gives Russia an opportunity for a foothold in the region, and in some ways counters the decline of Russian influence elsewhere in the Caucasus.It makes it impossible for Russia to be ignored both by those states such as Georgia and Azerbaijan that desire greater distance from Moscow and also by western powers (particularly the USA).

OTHER RUSSIAN ACTORS

CONCLUSIONS

The shift away from Moscow in Transcaucasia is quite marked, and indeed extends beyond this region to embrace other states (eg Ukraine, Uzbekistan) on the southern flank of the former Soviet Union.This is a challenge to Moscow's geopolitical position.In many respects this development is only to be expected.The emergence of independent sovereign states inevitably removed the control that existed during the Soviet era, and by opening up the region to relations with other states, also inevitably diluted Russian influence.

The weakness of the Russian economy means that Russian companies are unable to compete effectively with their western counterparts and so the level of direct investment from Russian firms is low and level of trade with Russian firms has declined since 1991 in comparison with western investment and trade.Russia's economic influence is therefore weaker.Western economic interest in the area (particularly in the energy sector) creates western interest in the security of the region, hence NATO's interest in encouraging cooperation with the Transcaucasian states.Russia's inability to deter either these states or the West from developing politico-military ties means that again Moscow has had to accept a loss of political and military influence.Furthermore this tendency has increased since the early 1990s.When Shevardnadze came to power in Georgia in 1992 and Aliev in Azerbaijan in 1993, they replaced strongly anti-Moscow leaderships and were initially inclined to pursue foreign policies more congenial to Moscow.However in the latter half of the 1990s, they have become more confident in displaying their independence from the Russian Federation.If Georgia ever decides to close the three Russian military bases on her territory and if Azerbaijan insists that the early-warning radar at Gabalinskaya is closed down, then Russia would suffer a further substantial blow to her geopolitical interests.These developments are currently unlikely, and if they were to occur, they would cause major crises in Russia's relations with these states.It would make little sense for Baku and Tbilisi to antagonise Moscow over these issues.

It is therefore a mistake to regard Russia as irrelevant to the region.Her geopolitical interests do face formidable challenges, and the western political, economic and military presence is likely to be of indefinite duration.Nevertheless, Russia still has a military presence in the region, and could in a worst-case scenario use its military power in covert ways to destabilise hostile states in Transcaucasia.The desire to avoid overly antagonising Russia in this region is likely to be a factor that will influence the foreign policy of both the states of Transcaucasia and of western states.Russia will therefore continue to be a factor in the region for the foreseeable future, even if her presence is much reduced in comparison with the Soviet period and immediate post-Soviet period.^[17]

Russian policy towards Transcaucasia since 1991 has been motivated by the desire to maintain a political, economic and military presence in the region.When Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov visited Georgia in September 1999, he refused to close down the Russian military bases there, a clear indication of Russia's desire for a regional presence.She is also partly motivated by the fear that both local actors and external actors (ie some Moslem states and the West) are trying to push her out of the Caucasus.To be pushed out of the Caucasus would also reduce her potential for influence in the Middle East, which is another area where Russia wishes to play a key role.Russian policy has consisted of two trends, the first being the desire to control the region as much as possible; this is an attempt to reverse the consequences of the break up of the Soviet Union by controlling the successor states.The second trend accepts the emergence of the new independent states and seeks to work with them and develop normal inter-state relationships.These trends sometimes conflict with each other.The second trend has become more prominent in the latter half of the 1990s, although the first trend still remains important.

The West, Georgia and Azerbaijan are likely to encourage the second trend, and to do what they can to discourage the first trend.They are therefore likely to avoid policy measures that would provoke or humiliate Russia, in view of her military presence in the area, and the West's desire for a stable Russia that pursues a non-aggressive foreign policy.The challenge for the West and her allies in Transcaucasia is to pursue policies that will enhance the independence of the newly independent states, without creating what Moscow would perceive as an attempt to encircle and contain Russia.

ENDNOTES

Directorate General Development and Doctrine

CamberleyTelephone : (44) 1276 412346

SurreyOr 412375

GU15 4PQFax : (44) 1276 686880

EnglandE-mail: csrc.dgd&d@gtnet.gov.uk

http://www.ppc.pims.org/csrc