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INTERNATIONAL GAME '99 – GARMISCH

An Occasional Paper of

The Center for Naval

Warfare Studies 

 by

Captain James T. Harrington, U. S. Navy

Strategic Research Department

Research Report 13-99

United States Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

 This report was prepared for the Strategic Research Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The contents of the report, however, reflect the author's views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

  

Acknowledgements

The Naval War College gratefully acknowledges the support of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and the game participants, moderators, rapporteurs and controllers.

The author additionally expresses his gratitude to Dr. Don Daniel for his guidance during this project and thoughtful review of this paper and to CAPT Mel Chaloupka, CAPT Linda DuBois, LCDR Fiona Bain and Dr. Peter Dombrowski for their assistance in preparing this report.

 


 Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

Game Play

General Observations

Policy Considerations

Appendix A, Participants

Appendix B, Scenario

Appendix C, Maps and Illustrations

Appendix D, Polling Data

Appendix E, Participating Organizations


 

Executive Summary

Garmisch Game '99

Tremors in the Transcaucasus

Garmisch Game '99, part of the U.S. Naval War College International Game series, was conducted as a capstone exercise for students of the "Leaders for the 21st Century" course at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies from 26-29 July. Ninety military officers, diplomats, civil servants and academics from 30 countries participated in this political-military simulation. Based in 2009, the scenario premised a large humanitarian disaster in the Republic of Georgia compounded by a need to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid and, later, to respond to requests from a new Georgian President to help stabilize his government. The players, simulating policy makers from their own countries, were asked to develop national positions in response to scenario events and to represent those positions in one of six international cells to which they were assigned. The scenario posited Georgia as an important transit route for Caspian oil and gas, important energy sources and investments for Europe. Further assumptions included robust Partnership for Peace interactions in the Caspian/Black Sea region, good relations between Russia and the West and a mature European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

General game observations included a European eagerness to respond to the humanitarian crisis, coupled with widespread reluctance to get involved in political or military matters that went beyond the scope of humanitarian operations. The UN, caught in the middle between U.S. and Russia vetoes, was relegated to a subordinate role in the game. Regional organizations conducted planning in the absence of a strong UN mandate, with the EU assuming political leadership. These organizations tended to act in a complementary fashion and to search for consensus and coordination. Most Europeans wanted to assume a leadership role and many were unenthusiastic about having to turn to NATO for execution. In order to maintain an EU leadership role, NATO was submerged within a CJTF command and control structure with the EU in charge politically. Russia, understandably concerned about NATO and Western involvement in its near abroad, sought to exert influence by impeding, when it thought necessary, the attempts of regional organizations to decide and act. Partly because of concerns for Russian sensitivities and a desire to remain aloof of internal Georgian political problems, many players were generally unresponsive to Georgian concerns regarding sovereign control of humanitarian activities and outsider military activities in the country.

The game revealed a number of U.S. foreign policy opportunities and constraints, which are identified in the game report. Such implications were also examined at the Geneva Center for Security Policy from 16-19 March, where fifty mid-level officers, diplomats, and civil servants from 25 countries participated in a game using the same scenario. Comparisons between the two games are highlighted in this report.

Additional information on these games, or on the International Game series in general, is available through the Strategic Research Department of the U.S. Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies at (401) 841-4274 or DSN 948-4274.

 


 

Introduction

Garmisch Game '99 was a three-day politico-military simulation, conducted simultaneously in the English, Russian and German languages at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in concert with their faculty. The game was a capstone event for the Marshall Center’s "Leaders for the 21st Century" course. The participants from 30 countries were assigned to one of six international cells: United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP), European Union/Western European Union (EU/WEU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and humanitarian assistance and non-governmental organizations (HA/NGO). With the exception of this latter cell, many of the players had experience with the organizations they were assigned to for the game (e. g., as Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Ministry of Defense desk officers). National representation within each cell is shown in Appendix A.

The countries represented by students in the "Leaders for the 21st Century" course were: Albania (2), Armenia (2), Azerbaijan (2), Belarus (3), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2), Bulgaria (4), Croatia (4), Czech Republic (4), Estonia (2), France (1), Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (3), Georgia (4), Germany (4), Hungary (2), Kazakhstan (2), Kyrgystan (3), Latvia (3), Lithuania (3), Moldova (2), Romania (6), Russia (5), Slovak Republic (2), Slovenia (2), Sweden (1), Tajikistan (2), Turkey (2), Ukraine (6), United Kingdom (2), United States (6) and Uzbekistan (4). Marshall Center faculty played France, the United Kingdom and three of the four German positions, while a Swedish Geneva Center for Security Policy faculty member represented his country, in order to increase Western European representation in the game. The Marshall Center also provided an international law advisor.

Players developed cross-cell national positions on game issues and simulated their own countries in the various European security and humanitarian assistance organizations involved in game play. Prior to the game, players were provided the basic scenario, game assumptions, and fact sheets on relevant international organizations and selected countries. The Control cell provided additional information and explanation for scenario events throughout the game. Control facilitated communication among cells. This included establishing a Georgian cell, with a Georgian President, in response to player requests for more information from the Georgian perspective.

The Marshall Center faculty chose student chairpersons for each cell. These chairpersons represented their cells in the plenary sessions, which Control conducted at the end of each game move. Moderators for each cell were Marshall Center faculty. Participants were encouraged throughout the game to talk both within and between the various cells to determine their national positions, form coalitions and coordinate actions taken or contemplated.

The scenario events, based primarily in the Republic of Georgia, were placed ten years in the future in order to free the players from current policies and personalities and to minimize sensitivities for those from the Caucasus region and neighboring countries. A natural disaster was used as the catalyst for these events for this latter reason as well.

The scenario included two game moves; with the first having mainly a humanitarian focus and the second more of a political nature. The scenario, provided in Appendix B, addressed the following main issues:

    • Humanitarian assistance
    • Peace support (plus political support in move 2)
    • Pipeline politics
    • Ethnic unrest
    • Access to region and resources, including pipeline politics
    • Roles of international organizations and regional countries
    • Newly Independent State cooperation within the international community

The game was also designed to examine whether Europe would take a strategic interest in the region, given the following assumptions:

    • Caspian energy sources, primarily oil, are important to Europe, and Georgia is an important transit route because of the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Ceyhan main export pipelines, in which oil is transported from the Caspian to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. These routes are shown in Appendix C.
    • Persian Gulf energy sources are unreliable as tensions are rising between Iran and Iraq.
    • PfP interactions among the nations in the region are healthy, with a robust exercise program in place and on-call forces available for use in a crisis.
    • The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which began to emerge in the 1990s has matured, with a mechanism for forces "separable but not separate" from NATO available to the players.
    • There are no major contentious issues impeding cooperation between Russia and the Western nations. Thus, there is an opportunity to leverage Russian participation and cooperation, in such operations as the peace implementation and stabilization forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the Caucasus region.
    • U.S. force levels in the Mediterranean are generally the same as those of the late 1990s, and these forces are not tied up in any regional crisis elsewhere.

 


 

 

Game Play

Background/Move 1 Scenario: As winter approaches in September 2009, a series of massive earthquakes hit the Caucasus region (primarily Georgia), causing huge death tolls, destruction of infrastructure and disruption of logistics. The Georgian President, a western-oriented leader who has continued Shevardnadze’s economic and democratic reforms in the face of a narrowing political base, comes to the international community for help. His request for humanitarian aid is coupled with a requirement to protect that aid from interdiction by separatists, criminals and nationalists (see political map in Appendix C) who oppose the current government and have access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Neighbors, concerned about refugee flows and environmental and economic impacts, are joined by other investment partners (mainly oil/gas pipeline interests) in the desire to see the situation stabilized. The media and world religious leaders echo the Georgian President’s plea for help.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council/Partnership for Peace (EAPC/PfP), the European Union/Western European Union (EU/WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were proactive in reaching consensus about their role in response to the crisis. In the United Nations (UN), the Security Council drafted a broad resolution, which called upon the international community, member states, regional organizations and others concerned to provide adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region under Chapter VI authority. The UN took no dominant leadership role in controlling the crisis, leaving regional organizations to develop courses of action without the benefit of a strong global mandate. Both the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Humanitarian Assistance/Non-government Organizations (HA/NGO) had difficulty deciding upon their respective crisis management roles. They were minor actors in early game play, other than in their efforts to keep the game focused on the need to respond to the humanitarian situation.

The EU/WEU assumed responsibility for Georgian rescue and relief, devising a three-phase plan under the UNSC Resolution. They also stood up a cell to include NATO, regional PfP members, EAPC, OSCE and the NGOs in the planning and coordination processes. The EU, NATO and EAPC/PfP planned to deploy units to Georgia and its vicinity, constructing an unambiguous command and control arrangement and designating NATO's Southern Region Commander (CINCSOUTH) as Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force (CTJF) Headquarters, located in Trabzon, Turkey. NATO was clearly subordinate to EU political control under this arrangement.

NATO forces were responsible for strategic lift of supplies to the staging areas, while EAPC/PfP units took responsibility for delivery and security of the aid within Georgia. NATO did not plan to deploy its units inside Georgian territory at this stage of the crisis. NATO sought Chapter VII authority and robust rules of engagement, both of which were not supported in the EU and the UN.

The EAPC activated the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) at NATO Headquarters, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) in theater, with national elements from the EAPC members. EAPC/PfP members designated specific units for deployment inside Georgia as part of the Georgian Rescue and Relief Plan, including Ukrainian heavy helicopters, the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), Central Asian battalion (CENTRASBAT) and other forces. The EAPC also developed a command and control diagram for EAPC/PfP units operating in Georgia. PfP countries were very proactive, at times operating independently of a more deliberative NATO, although it was clear that they desired to operate in concert with NATO under the EAPC arrangement rather than under some other coalition. In fact, they expressed concern that NATO might abandon them, or take too much of a back seat, if the partner countries got too far out in front.

Move 2 Scenario: Later that month, the Georgian President is killed while surveying recovery efforts and pipeline vulnerability. Initially, there was confusion regarding the President’s safety, and later the manner in which he met his death, but it was eventually learned that he died in a subsequent earthquake. The Chairman of the Parliament succeeds as President, with an election to follow in 90 days, in accordance with constitutional provisions. The new President vows to continue the pro-western, anti-crime and anti-separatist initiatives of his predecessor, while the fledgling government comes under siege from a coalition of anti-government forces in a series of embarrassing incidents (hostage taking, pipeline attacks/seizure, etc.) and he asks for help.

The EU/WEU and NATO continued aggressive play, while other cells responded by supporting their initiatives. The EU/WEU provided resources, such as military units, engineers, nuclear/biological/chemical defense units and financial assistance. They continued to refine their three-phase plan of assistance, taking care to interlock institutions in a mutually supporting way. Different organizations would assume a leadership role during each phase. Phase 1 would include immediate stabilization of the Georgian security situation. The EU/WEU would act as the lead agency, with cooperation of NATO, PfP and OSCE. Phase 2 would see the withdrawal of military forces and other support provided to the Georgian security forces. OSCE would act as the lead agency, with the support of the EU and the Caspian Sea Group (a regional organization of states bordering the Caspian Sea postulated in the game materials). Phase 3 would focus on regional stabilization, with the UN as the lead agency with the cooperation of OSCE, EU and the Caspian Sea Group.

NATO assumed responsibility for security of the humanitarian effort, strengthened its military role and moved its forces from the staging areas into Georgia. NATO described its efforts as "peace enforcement" and continued to seek Chapter VII determination from the UN. NATO also established expansive objectives, robust rules of engagement for the use of force in Georgia, and was even willing to use food as a weapon or lever in support of the Georgian government. Other countries and organizations did not share NATO's view on the importance of the security dimension to this problem. Some felt they should not be perceived as "partial" to the Georgian government, as opposed to separatist and other elements, despite the unquestioned legitimacy of the Georgian government and its interim President.

The EU and the UN continued to hold that Chapter VI authority was sufficient for the operation. NATO eventually left such differences of opinion "unsaid" and got on with the tasks at hand. To accomplish its expanded mission, NATO developed a detailed command and control arrangement, in concert with the EU, assigning NATO and PfP (including Russian and Georgian) units to multinational divisions in country. Russian liaison was incorporated at every level of this organization, with a "dotted line" back to their national command authorities in Moscow.

The UN, OSCE, EAPC/PfP and the HA/NGO again played supporting roles to the initiatives developed in the EU/WEU and NATO. The UN passed a second resolution, emphasizing Chapter VI provisions of its charter without any further definition of leadership roles, but welcomed cooperation and participation of NATO, EU/WEU, OSCE and other regional organizations. The OSCE passed a decision in its Permanent Council, which called for EU political leadership in the crisis in Georgia, and for the WEU to employ its capabilities to provide for military security in Georgia.

The PfP countries accepted EU/WEU leadership through NATO. Georgia would accept additional Russian troops in country only under such an arrangement. PfP responsibility for security in Georgia during Move 1 was superceded by NATO’s assumption of the security role following Move 2. The PfP countries thus became fully subordinate to planning conducted by NATO. The HA/NGOs sent increased personnel and material to Georgia following as the situation worsened in Move 2. During their final briefing, the HA/NGOs refocused attention on the humanitarian tragedies and the need for swift response from the international community.

General Observations

 


 

Eager Response to Humanitarian Crisis

Players were eager to respond to the humanitarian crisis through both bilateral and multilateral arrangements, but game design focused players on multilateral activities. Players in regional organizations wanted and initially watched for UN initiatives, such as specific UN leadership or a mandate. This inclination to consider an international mandate important was similar to the player response in the previous game in Geneva. Despite the lack of a clear or strong mandate, regional organizations planned and acted. The players at Garmisch were somewhat more proactive in this regard than their counterparts in Geneva. A key difference between the two games was that the Geneva game occurred on the eve of the real world NATO operation in Kosovo, which was conducted without a UN mandate, while the Garmisch game took place after the conclusion of the campaign. In post-game polling, 83% of the Garmisch participants expressed the view that regional organizations should act in the absence of a UN mandate and 80% felt they should develop their own mandate in such a case.

Without a clear or strong UN mandate or detailed guidance, the other cells looked to the EU/WEU for direction. The EU/WEU cell shouldered this responsibility willingly and, in turn, used NATO and the EAPC/PfP to respond to the operational needs of the Georgian relief effort. When the HA/NGO cell thought there was a lack of urgency in organizational responses, they focused attention on the need to respond to human needs. Although the HA/NGO cell was not as active as the one in Geneva, which had extensive experience in this field, humanitarian issues similarly galvanized players. In responding, organizations wanted aid to be dispersed impartially, and not be used as a weapon for various factions or to leverage actions. Except for NATO, interest in security issues was limited to its impact on the humanitarian situation and there was little desire to get involved beyond this.

That the international community should intervene in the humanitarian situation was never in question. In post-game polling, 91% of the participants indicated that they felt it was a "right" of the international community to do so. However, they were split on the issue of intervention by an individual state.

Regional organizations sought to build coalitions

Regional organizations sought ways to act in a complementary fashion. They demonstrated a strong willingness to search for consensus and coordination throughout the game. As in the Geneva game, organizational action was complementary. In composing the structure of forces, players sought to balance political acceptability with operational effectiveness. They accepted EU/WEU political leadership, showing a distinct preference for European, that is, non-U.S. primacy. They also accepted, though somewhat reluctantly, the need for NATO operational leadership. In general, players developed interlocking institutions with various partners sharing responsibilities.

The EU assumed the lead once the UN mandate was issued, moving ahead under a broad interpretation of UNSC resolutions. Participants viewed the EU as a more central player than the OSCE, which was willing to offer a mandate but no money or troops to back it up. Thus, the OSCE assumed "niche" jobs, coordinating humanitarian aid, securing hostages and observing elections. It appeared that the players did not consider the OCSE an effective security organization, despite the term "security" in its name, since it lacked a military means to engage in security. In participant polling, 50% felt Europeans should act through the OSCE in situations such as that posed in this scenario, whereas 66% indicated they should act through the EU/WEU.

From the start, the EU/WEU did not consider this effort to be a military operation. In their view, the military was only a small part of the crisis response plan. By contrast, NATO focused on the security issues and military solutions. NATO also drew upon particular U.S. military capabilities, such as lift and command and control. European players appeared to accept the necessity of NATO operational control, but emphasized EU political leadership at the top and WEU/PfP forces on the ground.

The players designed a command and control structure that mirrored their organizational roles and preferences. According to the EU plan, " This humanitarian operation is led by the EU. The chain of command for the military operation … runs through the EU to the WEU Council to the CHODs of the WEU through the European Military Staff to DSACEUR as the Operational Commander", thus submerging NATO forces within a European command structure.

The diagram above reflects the command and control arrangements devised by the EU/WEU with NATO assistance in move 2. It should be noted that there were Russian Federation liaison positions (not shown here) at every level, with a dotted line back to their national command authorities in Moscow.

CINCSOUTH (an American Admiral assigned to NATO) was designated Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander and headquartered south of Tbilisi. His Deputy was a Georgian General. A Turkish Vice Admiral was designated Sealift Component Commander and an American Lieutenant General was assigned as Airlift Component Commander. NATO partners were included in the ground and sealift components. These included the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT), the Ukrainian-Polish Battalion (UKRPOLBAT), the Baltic battalion (BALTBAT), the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) and the on-call maritime Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR).

Two Russian Federation brigades came under a German commander in Multi-national Division North, or MND (N), while the Southern MND was under Turkish command and the Central MND was under joint UK/US command. A Georgian brigade had responsibility for Tbilisi and the eastern part of Georgia.

The various organizations generally sought consensus, both intra-organizationally and inter-organizationally, throughout the game. Nonetheless, there was tension. Organizational objectives differed. Most groups felt support should be limited to humanitarian relief efforts, remaining clear of Georgia's internal problems, while NATO sought to provide broader support to the Georgian government. NATO felt it was necessary to take measures to protect the pipeline and shore public confidence in Georgian leadership. This led to obvious differences in rules of engagement (ROE) discussions. The differences were never resolved; rather, they ultimately became unspoken.

NATO involvement downplayed, but needed for military operations

Players recognized the NATO military structure as necessary for effective action, but downplayed its importance relative to regional European organizations. In short, they were reluctant to have NATO play a highly visible role. Players knew NATO was a sore point with Russia and others, most notably Iran. However, NATO was selected by default for execution of the military operation because it was the only organization that could provide the necessary command and control for complex multi-national military operations. While the Georgian government and the HA/NGO community more readily turned to NATO for security, most players considered NATO to be too proactive and provocative and would have preferred another option. This possibly reflects a bias against U.S. and NATO forces heightened by, or in response to, the recent Kosovo experience. A pro-NATO bias, generally observed among Eastern Europeans in previous games, was not evident in this one. Similarly, some NATO partners expressed concern that NATO might abandon them after they had committed forces to the operation.

The players sought to raise the European profile and downplay U.S. involvement. They designated a European-led force and included Russia, with the U.S. participating as an "other interested state" in a supporting role. A player commented: "If we have a NATO led effort, then that will involve the U.S. at some level … but there are advantages to a European-only led operation, but (we Europeans) do not have much experience and assets to bring to the table." This somewhat rambling statement captures the sense of ambivalence and frustration many players experienced as they wrestled with the notion of a European Security and Defense Identity. Post-game polling reflected that most players felt NATO would continue to hold its current importance in crisis management and response for at least the next ten years, with the EU's military arm developing significant capabilities.

The EU did not concentrate on the security implications of the Georgian crisis, whereas NATO focused on security issues and framed its response as a military operation from the outset. In general, the EU sought to maintain NATO in a subordinate relationship through WEU control. Players, other than NATO, took a minimalist position concerning the use of force, continuing to focus primarily on strictly humanitarian aspects.

Proactive NATO/PfP support for Georgia

NATO was most proactive on security and stability measures in support of the Georgian government. NATO sought Chapter VII of the UN Charter and robust ROEs as necessary, drawing an analogy to the real world experience some members had in Somalia. The UN maintained Chapter VI was sufficient, similarly to their counterparts at the Geneva Game, with the EU in full support of this position.

Although initially very proactive and somewhat independent, the PfP countries accepted a subordinate role to NATO and generally waited as a junior partner for NATO to designate responsibilities. The NATO partners were concentrated in a subzone within Georgia, with missions directed toward security, medical, humanitarian aid and environmental support.

Proactive European leadership

In general, the EU was a much more proactive organization in the Garmisch game than in Geneva. Perhaps, this reflects a post-Kosovo preference for an increased European role in regional affairs.

Another interesting contrast between the two games was that in Garmisch, a bloc arose within Europe to facilitate action while, in Geneva, a bloc developed for the purpose of limiting European action. This is illustrated by a Baltic decision to sent BALTBAT to Georgia early in the Garmisch game, as opposed to a Nordic-neutral reluctance to contribute certain types of forces or to conduct certain types of missions (e. g., those related to pipeline security) in the Geneva game.

Geneva and Garmisch resolutions similar

The game solutions developed in both Geneva and Garmisch had striking similarities regarding NATO involvement:

EU Plan in Garmisch: "The Theater Commander is Commander CJTF comprised mainly of dual-hatted European land, naval, and air forces, as well as additional NATO and other national assets in the field of C3I, transportation, and logistics."

UNSC Resolution in Geneva: " …NATO form a coalition of European (including the Russian Federation) forces together with the forces of interested states, to be known as the United Nations Force Georgia (UNFOG), to provide security of the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance in coordination with the aforementioned Special Representative, reporting to the Security Council."

NATO was seen as the necessary mechanism, however reluctantly, for such an operation. It is noteworthy that the Garmisch players appeared more reluctant regarding U. S. and NATO dominance than their counterparts in the Geneva game. Several Garmisch player comments reflected frustration or displeasure over the Kosovo experience.

Russia as spoiler

In this game, Russian players were extremely sensitive about the fact that the crisis was taking place in a former Soviet republic. Thus, it is no surprise that Russia acted as the spoiler and generally impeded progress. Russia did not seek to lead, but rather to limit others and to leverage its own position. For example, early in the game, it vetoed a UN resolution calling for a strong mandate for action and leadership to regional organizations.

In Geneva, the Russian players were more pragmatic in their approach, working to advance their position through alternative organizations as they ran into strong opposition, taking care to avoid being seen as the spoiler. The veto was used as a matter of last resort and only after attempting to reach common ground with the other players.

Player sensitivity toward Russia

Most non-Russian players were sensitive that the crisis area was in Russia’s "near abroad." Like their counterparts in Geneva, the Garmisch players saw Russian involvement as key; however, they were more sympathetic to Russian concerns, while those in Geneva generally expressed skepticism regarding Russian moves. The differing approaches taken by the Russians in the two games may have colored non-Russian player perceptions and reactions.

While Georgia sought to limit the Russian role and to ensure Russian subordination to NATO, other players sought to include Russia and its troops in a more prominent role. Georgia considered Russian troops already present in country to be problematic, while others sought to include them in the solution.

Player sensitivity toward Georgia

Players were not particularly sensitive to Georgian views on Russian involvement and Georgian sovereignty. Many players did not want to appear partial to the Georgian government, despite the fact that the UNSC resolutions were produced in response to pleas from this legitimate government, and they often did not see a need to coordinate with Georgian leaders on actions contemplated within Georgia. NATO was more willing than the other players to fully support the Georgian President’s request for assistance, especially in non-humanitarian ways such as protecting oil pipelines.

 UN caught in the middle between U.S. and Russia vetoes

As in Geneva, regional organizations assumed the UN was critical to responding to the Georgian crisis initially. The UN was later marginalized, once it became bogged down in an attempt to issue a stronger mandate.

While the UN debated changing from Chapter VI to Chapter VII, to permit more robust ROE, the UN ultimately maintained Chapter VI was most appropriate. Essentially, the organization was deadlocked due to vetoes and unable to move beyond Chapter VI, despite the changing situation in Georgia. This was the same situation observed in Geneva, where the cell produced broad, convoluted resolutions and attempts toward further action ended in deadlock.

The Caucasus as an area of strategic interest and regional involvement

Players viewed the Caucasus region in terms of vital interests. In polling, 62% of the players indicated a belief that access to Caspian oil and gas would be a strategic concern by 2009. This was a key game assumption. It is noteworthy that the participants at the Marshall Center generally accepted the game assumptions, mentioned earlier in this report, while those at the Geneva Center for Security Policy did not. Group composition may account for much of this. In Garmisch, Eastern/Central Europeans and Central Asians were more heavily represented than Western Europeans. This may have made them more inclined to view the region and its resources as strategic. They were also a younger, more junior group. This, perhaps, may have been reflected in more openness to change, or possibly it reflected more willing acceptance of guidance provided by authority figures. Another factor was information, provided by a speaker at Geneva and in an Economist article just prior to that game, which contradicted this key assumption about energy futures in the Caspian region. Post-game polling indicated a player preference for forming a Black Sea, Caucasus or Central Asian security organization (74%) however, 63% of those polled believed regional on-call forces such as the maritime BlackSeaFor and Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) should not play a major role in resolving regional crises. This suggests a desire for an additional regional forum, though which members may pursue or express their concerns, while maintaining a link to Western European or NATO's military capabilities.


U.S. Policy Implications

The basic reason the Naval War College conducts the international game series is to illuminate possible opportunities and constraints for U.S. Policy. This section of the report contains those implications identified in post-game analysis.

Russia as part of the solution

Russia will clearly exhibit an interest and some degree of leverage in areas it considers to be of strategic importance, such as the former Soviet republics. We must recognize their concerns, and their ability to make things difficult for the U.S. through mechanisms such as the UNSC veto. The following are some suggestions on how to involve Russia as part of the solution to problems in the region.

  • Explore now, with our allies, all avenues for Russian participation in resolving crises, particularly in Russia’s "near abroad." We should channel their participation into those key activities, which support regional stability and other U. S. interests. This requires a dialogue with allies and regional countries most affected on how to accommodate the Russian perspective. This dialogue should occur before a crisis occurs for its benefits to be fully realized.
  • Bring Russia into the planning and exercise program of international crisis management in a realistic and meaningful way to provide the necessary mechanisms for rapid and effective crisis resolution in this part of the world.
  • Explore working with alternative organizations other than the UN or NATO, such as the EU, WEU or OSCE. If NATO is a "show stopper" because of international sensitivities and perceptions, and we want or need to work with Russia, we should work through some other arrangement, such as another mutually acceptable organization or command and control relationship.

NATO/PfP partners as a stabilizing influence and framework for action

PfP, partnership activities in the spirit of PfP, and regional initiatives offer a mechanism for a stabilizing presence and a means for action. NATO should continue to expand such efforts, as well as enhance combined capabilities such as the CJTF. These efforts may facilitate activities in-country, such as ensuring safe delivery of humanitarian aid and enhance immediate and rapid response capabilities (i. e., CJTF, standing and on-call forces). We should continue to emphasize increased interoperability with our allies and partners.

Enhanced regional initiatives, linked to NATO

Regional initiatives, such as the Turkish-inspired on-call forces known as BlackSeaFor and Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) and other such bilateral and multi-lateral efforts should be encouraged. NATO should establish a direct relationship with these efforts in order to maintain control and avoid development of competing entities. At the very least, enhancement of regional initiatives provides a stabilizing influence and an early reaction force, easing demands on U.S. assets. Through these initiatives, reluctant partners may be encouraged to respond to humanitarian and security concerns. However, we must remain sensitive to fears that NATO may abandon the effort after a partner has committed forces.

European desire for a mature ESDI

The tensions resulting from a European desire for a mature ESDI without commensurate European resources are likely to continue. Europe will still require and rely upon U.S. military assistance for the foreseeable future. We should encourage development of European assets, which complement superior U.S. operational capabilities, and position ourselves as a facilitator or enabler for European operations. In this way, we maintain influence on matters of importance to us.

The U.S. and NATO need to accept the idea that Europe wants to be in charge in Europe and understand that Europe resents U.S./NATO leadership. Europe reluctantly accepts NATO as a default option, but wants to submerge NATO within an overall European structure and leadership. The U.S. should consider the strategic significance of European desires and sensitivities in building relations and responding to crises in the future.

 


 

Appendix A - Participants

Game Participants

Player Cell Composition

UNSC: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United States

NATO: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

EAPC/PfP: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United States

EU/WEU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, United Kingdom

OSCE: Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United States

HA/NGO: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United States

 

Control Team

Naval War College:

Game supervision:

                Dr. Donald C. F. Daniel

Game Director and Control Team Leader:

                CAPT James T. Harrington USN

Game controllers and advisors:

    CAPT Mel Chaloupka USNR, CAPT Linda L. Borges-DuBois USNR, Dr. Peter J. Dombrowski, Prof. Theophilos C. Gemelas, and LCDR Fiona Bain USNR

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Game supervision:

                Col Nick Pratt USMC (Ret)

Game moderators and advisors:

    Dr. John J. Clarke, Prof. Richard Cohen, MajGen (Ret) Alain M. Faupin FRA, Dr. Paul Holman, Prof. Jan Hyllander, Dr. Roger D. Kangas, LtCol Gwen Linde USAF, LTC Dr. Hans H. Mack, LTC Thomas Maley UKA, LTC Walter Schweizer GEA, LTC Matthais Stoermer GEAF, LTC Thomas P. Wilhlem USA


Appendix B - Scenario

International Game Series ‘99

European Scenario

"Tremors in the Transcaucasus"

It is early September, 2009. The Caspian Region remains one of significant social, political and environmental challenges. Its economic potential is great, but has only just begun to be fully realized. Gas and oil development in the region has proceeded in fits and spurts, following the ups and downs of the world oil market. While estimates of the region’s oil reserves still vary, recent explorations in the southern end of the Caspian Sea have been very promising. Many oil experts now believe Caspian reserves will significantly exceed those of the North Sea. Most analysts agree that the region’s oil and gas reserves are substantial and that the worldwide demand for oil is going up.

Economic development of the Caspian states has long been overshadowed by regional politics. Internal and international politics, often acrimonious, have left the countries in the region unsettled. While oil and gas, the region's primary strategic assets, have largely dominated the political scene since the 19th century, there are other, often destabilizing factors that have contributed to fierce competition and heightened tensions in the region. These include rising nationalism, ethnic and religious animosities, organized crime, and disputes over non-petroleum resources like water.

While the countries in the Caspian region face significant challenges, there have been a number of positive developments since the turn of the century. An increasing number of Caspian wells are producing. Several new oil and gas pipelines have been built or are being built, and the capacity of other pipelines has been increased. Demand for Caspian oil and gas is increasing, spurred by robust economies in Europe, China and the U.S. The Paris-based International Energy Agency forecasts that oil demand will exceed 90 million barrels a day this year, and will continue to grow at an annual rate of 2% for the next decade. Oil prices, which had been flat for more than a decade, have slowly risen since 2004 and currently stand at $17 per barrel. Revenues resulting from increased demand and rising prices are providing much needed hard currency to many countries in the region. Several regional organizations (e.g., the EU, NATO and EAPC) and their member countries have successfully established a number of programs aimed at fostering international harmony and cooperation. NATO/PfP interactions include a robust military-to-military exchange program, an innovative "distributive learning and wargaming" network, and frequent training exercises that focus on disaster response, search and rescue, peacekeeping and environmental cleanup. Additionally, multinational regional land and maritime on-call forces have been established. These forces have successfully pursued an ambitious regime of exercises in the spirit of PfP.

The U.S. has remained actively engaged in the region. U.S., European and Asian (including Chinese) firms have made huge capital investments in the region and provided much of the needed technology to extract and transport oil. These companies and their international partners are just now beginning to see a return on their investment. Although overall U.S. military force structure and overseas presence has fluctuated somewhat over the past 15 years, military forces continue to play a key role in the U.S. strategy of engagement. U.S. Sixth Fleet forces, along with national forces belonging to NATO Southern Region countries and NATO’s standing destroyer/frigate and mine countermeasures forces (STANAVFORMED and MCMFORMED), continue to provide the bulk of NATO naval presence in the Mediterranean. These forces have played an increasingly active role in the Black Sea since the late 1990s, exercising and training with regional countries in PfP activities under NATO sponsorship, or in activities in the spirit of the partnership on a bilateral or multi-lateral basis. The European Security and Defense Identity within NATO has matured, with "separable but not separate" European forces available for EU operations under the command of NATO’s Deputy SACEUR. Currently, U.S. and NATO forces are not engaged in any major crises.

Russia continues to struggle politically and economically, although the recent upswing in the oil market and two years of ample harvests have helped bolster the Russian economy. The country continues to have unresolved debt problems. Relations with EU nations and the U.S., though strained at times, have been mostly positive for the past 15 years, building upon the peace support partnership established in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the mid-1990s. While most Russians remain wary of NATO's continued expansion into the former Warsaw Pact countries, they have become increasingly more concerned over the continued rise of China's power and its spreading influence in the Caucasus region. Russian Federation borders remain the same as in the 1990s, with the North Caucasus opting for increased autonomy rather than full independence. Russia and its southern autonomous regions have profited greatly in the transport of Caspian oil through their territory.

China is, in fact, exerting increasingly greater influence throughout Eurasia. The Chinese economy has been very impressive, and its growth has outpaced that of its Asian neighbors, the EU and the U.S. China represents a huge market for western goods, has become a major exporter to Central Asia, and is increasingly looking for oil and gas to fuel its booming economy. While few talk publicly about China's military might, the growth and sophistication of Chinese military capabilities has been keeping intelligence analysts busy.

Since Saddam Hussein, long time nemesis of the U.S. and his Persian Gulf neighbors, died of natural causes in 2006, Iraq's moderate Islamic government has focused on stabilizing its political base, rebuilding the country's economy and reestablishing links with the rest of the world. Unfortunately, friction between Iran and Iraq has increased over disputed borders between the two countries. This situation has been exacerbated by transborder ethnic conflict (primarily involving Kurdish separatists). Skirmishes have become increasingly common between ground forces. Additionally, cross border air raids have raised uncertainty around the world about the prospects for continued uninterrupted flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

Iran-U.S. relations remain strained. Both countries still have different strategic views of the world, but have moderated their positions toward each other. Although the U.S. lobbied hard for years to shut Iran out of the Caspian, new pipelines were built from Turkmenistan (gas) and Kazakhstan (oil) to the Iranian ports of Kangan and Kharg Island respectively. These pipelines now appear to be highly vulnerable in view of recent Iraqi raids. The threat of instability in the Gulf has led nervous customers to identify alternative sources and has further increased demand for Caspian energy reserves.

Turkey remains a key player in the region. The Turks have taken the lead for NATO involvement there, building upon their instrumental role in establishing the Black Sea Maritime Force and the Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG). New NATO members Romania and Bulgaria have continued their strong support for such regional initiatives. Turkish ties to Georgia and Azerbaijan have grown tremendously as a result of the three-way collaboration on Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and U.S.-Turkish relations have never been stronger. (U.S. efforts to ensure construction of the cross-Turkey pipeline clearly irritated the Iranians and the Russians.)

Georgia is representative of the promise and problems of the region. Oil and gas transit fee revenues are up, especially since the capacity of the Baku-Supsa pipelines was increased in 2003 and the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline was completed last year. Relations with the west have been extremely positive, and western investment (especially from the EU countries) has stimulated and diversified the country's economy. While Georgia's economy and democratic processes have continued to mature, there are a number of internal challenges that threaten stability. Last year, contentious local elections reinforced the belief that President Bradze's political base is narrowing. Most observers predict he will be hard-pressed to implement the economic and political reforms he recently announced as key parts of his presidential election campaign platform. Abkhaz, Ajarian and South Ossetian separatists are still seeking independence and nationalist supporters of the late former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Zviadists) continue to vie for power, maintaining strong centers of support in Mingrelia, Immeretia, Svanetia and Ajaria. Additionally, organized crime remains prevalent in Ajaria. Separatist group and other ethnic minority dissatisfaction is fueled in part by a feeling that they have not benefited from the oil transshipment revenues to the same extent as mainstream ethnic Georgians and those who live directly in the path of the pipeline.

Georgian relations with Russia have been problematic at times. A brigade of Russian troops remains in Georgia under a 25-year agreement signed in the early 1990s. They are primarily employed in border patrol activities in the separatist regions, although they are available for other tasking and may be augmented as mutually agreed by the Georgian and Russian governments.

In the post-Shevardnadze period, various radical minority separatist, criminal and other anti-government factions have joined in efforts to discredit the current administration, hoping to achieve their aims for independence, increased autonomy or reduced interference. While such coalitions have characteristically been of a limited, ad hoc nature, this new dynamic poses a serious threat to governance. Oil transport is a particular vulnerability, given the terrain traversed by the pipeline. Major concerns are its proximity to separatist South Ossetia, as well as various nationalist enclaves, and the proximity of the major transshipment port of Supsa to the separatist coastal province of Abkhazia, the organized crime stronghold in separatist Ajaria and the Mingrelian nationalist power center. Pipeline vulnerability is not limited to Georgia. Anti-Georgian government entities could produce the same effect by interdiction of the pipeline in Azerbaijan. The President of Azerbaijan recently expressed this concern in discussions with his Georgian counterpart. The Turkish government has also expressed anxiety regarding pipeline vulnerability in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

One particularly troubling development in recent years has been the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region. Chemical weapons are especially prevalent and are readily obtainable, if not already in the hands of terrorists or any other group considering their employment.

 

Move 1

A series of major earthquakes has hit the region. Georgia, Armenia, northwestern Azerbaijan and eastern Turkey are affected, with Georgia hardest hit in terms of human casualties. Preliminary reports there indicate over 10 thousand dead, 80 thousand injured and many thousands missing or unaccounted for. Homeless estimates range to 850 thousand people and there has been tremendous damage to the infrastructure. Reports from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia have been very sketchy so far, but indicate that the scope of the crisis in those countries, although significant, is not nearly as severe as it is in Georgia. However, the main supply routes and airports into Georgia from the humanitarian aid staging areas in Yerevan, Trabzon, Kars and Ganca have been severely disrupted, requiring months of restoration work. Within Georgia, the main road and rail connections from the port of Poti to the national capital in Tbilisi have also sustained significant damage. Fortunately, the road from the Georgian port city of Batumi to Tbilisi is passable.

Initial assessments by the Georgian government, and echoed by ICRC representatives in the region, are bleak. Medical facilities in the region are woefully inadequate for a crisis of this magnitude, in which disease is expected to follow the initial onslaught of injured victims. Drought, which has affected the region for the past two years, complicates the problem. Food reserves and water supplies are low. As winter approaches, the plight of the Georgians is desperate. Many land routes for humanitarian relief are blocked due to damaged or destroyed roads and bridges. Strong aftershocks continue, further complicating the problems and slowing disaster relief efforts. Gas and oil pipelines have been disrupted in some areas, causing local environmental problems and threatening to contaminate water supplies. Refugees are seeking shelter in neighboring countries and in the more temperate climate along the Georgian coast. With coastal areas less severely damaged than those inland, refugees have begun to mass in the major port cities. Large numbers of refugees have been observed fleeing in all manner of craft, many of which are unseaworthy.

The international news media has drawn world attention to the plight of the people of Georgia, as religious leaders and the UN Secretary General have called for immediate and massive relief in this humanitarian catastrophe. The major oil and gas companies have added their call for urgent action. Requests for humanitarian assistance are being responded to by NGOs and PVOs currently involved in relief efforts in Georgia, but logistics challenges beg for military involvement. Additionally, there is a need to protect the aid from criminal elements seeking to sell the supplies on the black market, as well as separatists wishing to advance their standing at the expense of the central government. Accordingly, the Georgian President has petitioned the UN, NATO, OSCE, EU, and the governments of countries with vested Caspian interests (North American, European, Asian and regional capitals) for humanitarian, economic and military assistance in relieving the suffering of his people.

 

Move 2 (Some days later)

While touring the country assessing earthquake recovery efforts and pipeline vulnerability, Georgian President Bradze is killed in a subsequent earthquake. Initially, the reports are sketchy and there is confusion regarding the President’s status and, later, the cause of death. Ultimately, it is learned that there is no foul play and the Chairman of the Parliament, Tedo Giorgvili, succeeds him in accordance with constitutional provisions. The new president promises to continue the pro-western, anti-separatist and anti-crime initiatives of his predecessor. His government comes under siege however, as political opponents, separatists and criminal elements coordinate their efforts and take advantage of his fledgling government in a series of embarrassing incidents, which include:

  • Twenty-two German, French and Swedish humanitarian aid workers taken hostage in the Ajarian port city of Batumi by separatist elements. The attention gained on the world stage prompts similar events in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in which citizens from the U.S., Canada and various Western European nations are held hostage.
  • Organized criminal elements continue seizure of humanitarian supplies at food storage sites and along transit routes throughout Georgia for sale on the black market.
  • Organized criminal elements attempt to seize an oil tanker (Ukrainian registry) shortly after its departure from Batumi. In the struggle, a collision occurs with a Russian freighter off the coast of Turkey and a huge oil spill results.
  • South Ossetian separatists conduct a series of attacks on oil and gas pipelines to the west and southeast of Tbilisi, destroying sections of pipe and pumping stations. Huge fires result in one incident, destroying a large section of forested land and setting the stage for land slides during the coming rainy season. In another incident, the Kura River is contaminated with oil, posing health and environmental problems in Georgia and in Azerbaijan. The latter country is particularly affected, as the Kura is the irrigation source for its central field.
  • Transnational criminal elements (drug trade) and separatists from the provinces of Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia seize the pipeline at the junction of the routes to Supsa and Ceyhan.

There is extensive coverage of these, and similar, events in the international media and world religious leaders call for increased international intervention to relieve the suffering of the people of Georgia and to protect members of their humanitarian assistance agencies currently in the region. On the economic front, the spot price of oil spikes as producers in other parts of the world seek to take advantage of political and economic uncertainties. Retailers in the West pass the increased prices, resulting from the uncertainty of supply and increased cost from the producers, along to their consumers at the pump. Panic buying results in local shortages, which are highly publicized in the mass media and on the internet. Transnational oil and gas companies call for military intervention to protect wellheads, pipelines and their associated pumping, processing, storage and transfer facilities. The new Georgian President asks the UN, NATO, OSCE, the EU, and the capitals of countries vested in Caspian oil enterprises (all North American, European, Asian and regional capitals) for increased economic and military assistance in restoring public order.

 

Move 2 Control Injects

Reuters Bulletin.

Scattered reports from the first 72 hours after the series of earthquakes that struck Georgia suggest that victims are beginning to dig out from their destroyed homes and villages. Recent reports suggest that there are over 15,000 dead and 100,000 injured or unaccounted for. Homeless estimates range from 700,000 to 900,000. Some may now be moving away from their homes to regions where they believe that food, shelter, water and medical treatments might be more readily available. With a major epicenter south of Tbilisi some victims appear to be heading west and south of the most heavily affected areas. Early reports from aid workers and local government officials indicate that internally displaced persons are moving westward toward the Georgian lowlands and major port facilities including Poti and Batumi. Smaller numbers may be leaving Georgia entirely to seek assistance in northern Turkey and Armenia, which also suffered from the initial shocks but sustained far less damage. Although it is unclear whether border guards are acting on the direction of Ankara, some border crossings into Turkey appear to have been opened to admit fleeing Georgians. Aid officials already on the ground are now questioning whether they have the resources available to help refugees especially if their number continues to climb in the days ahead. NGO officials in Geneva, New York and elsewhere are already issuing urgent calls for monetary donations as well as calls for equipment and transport. Unnamed sources observe that while the full extent of the disaster remain unknown, the timing could not be worse for Georgia-- winter weather is just weeks away and the probability of housing and feeding the population of the devastated region using local resources is slight.

 

Reuters PM Press Report

Oil Prices Soar Due to Georgia Crisis

Oil and oil product prices have skyrocketed during the past five days as the Georgian crisis has mushroomed into a disruption that could keep the Baku-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines out of commission for weeks and months. Meanwhile, anxious business and consumer groups are beginning to pressure western governments to take actions to offset the negative economic impacts caused by events in the Caucasus.

Spot crude oil prices on international commodity exchanges have risen an average of 29 percent over the past five trading sessions. On the New York Mercantile Exchange heating oil futures for February 2010 delivery have risen 34 percent in anticipation of exceptionally tight supplies combined with forecasts of a cold winter in the northern hemisphere. Gasoline futures and spot prices have not risen as dramatically because most of the world’s drivers are entering the low-consumption winter season. Experts believe companies will pass on the high current prices of crude oil when the spring and summer driving seasons arrive, especially if instability in Georgia keeps the pipelines closed for longer than anticipated or if the crisis spreads.

Oil producing nations may be enjoying a windfall, but the companies that own the Georgian pipelines and oil producing properties in the unstable Caspian region are concerned that lost earnings due to the pipeline closure, combined with huge sunk costs in oil fields, could more than offset any earnings increases from other worldwide oil operations.

Meanwhile, consumer groups are lobbying western capitals to take action to control price speculation. In London, Berlin, and Washington, industry leaders of oil consuming sectors such as electric utilities, airlines, and road transport are calling for emergency price controls or government subsidies until the Caspian oil returns to the world market. Major oil companies from the U.S. to Italy to Japan are already warning of further fuel price hikes if the crisis lasts much longer. Groups ranging from auto dealers to economists are warning of potential business losses and the recessionary impact on Western economies that traditionally accompany sudden increases in fuel costs.

Industry experts note that this crisis is almost the mirror image of the oil price crisis of 1998-99. Then, a decline of about 1.5 percent in world demand, combined with robust supplies, led to a 40 percent decline in world prices. Now, the loss of about 1.3 percent of the world supply, combined with robust growth in demand, has raised prices by nearly a third.

 

Georgian Request for Assistance to the UN, OSCE, NATO, EU, and Humanitarian Assistance Organizations

The Georgian Government, wishing to ensure prompt and secure relief to its citizens, and not wishing to place too great a burden on any one state, requests that a NATO/PfP force deploy as soon as possible to provide security services to Georgia and for international donors to provide emergency assistance to people of Georgia.

Specifically, the Georgian Government requests international organizations such as the UN, EU, OSCE, World Bank, and NGOs provide:

  • Engineering equipment to repair roads and airfields, and to provide emergency water purification services. Of highest priority is the reopening of airports and repairs along the main road from Tbilisi to its western ports of Batumi and Poti.
  • Emergency medical care and medical evacuation of seriously injured.
  • Security along routes from outside Georgia into the country, along routes used to distribute humanitarian assistance inside the country, and to protect humanitarian assistance depots.
  • 100,000 tons of heating oil over the next six months to meet winter requirements.
  • 200,000 tons of wheat over the next year until the next harvest comes due.
  • International loans or grants for an amount to be determined later to repair the Georgian communications and energy production infrastructure damaged in the earthquakes.
  • Election monitors for the presidential elections scheduled in 90 days to select a successor to President Bradze (OSCE).
  • Security assistance to secure Tbilisi and preserve the constitutional government.
  • Security assistance to secure and safeguard the main export pipeline.

 


Appendix C - Maps and Illustrations

Caspian Oil and Gas Routes in 2010

This map shows the Caspian oil transit routes the scenario posited. Essentially, the scenario held that all routes currently under consideration in 1999 were constructed and in use in 2010.

 

Caucasus Political Map

This map shows some of the secessionist and nationalist strongholds within the Caucasus, many of which coincide with ethnic and religious groups in the region. It should be noted that this map, while useful in illustrating the various sub-regions of the Caucasus, does not correctly reflect the internationally recognized borders for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

 

Caucasus Region

wpe5.jpg (110016 bytes)

This map shows the Caucasus population centers, transportation network and topographic features.


Appendix D – Polling Data

After Move 2, a plenary session was held to allow each team to brief their move and allow Control to provide feedback. After the briefs and feedback, Control asked a series of questions in an effort to determine the validity of apparent trends in the group discussions and elicit player opinion on a number of European security issues.

The questions were presented orally and answers were tabulated via electronic voting pads that anonymously transmitted the vote directly to a computer. The result of the voting was displayed immediately after all questions for a given session had been asked. Each participant, regardless of team assignment or national origin, was provided a voting pad.

The following summarizes the questions and the results of the voting.

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

38

57%

No

29

43%

Total

67

 

Answer Number Percent
Yes 38 59%
No 26 41%
Total 64

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

58

91%

No

6

9%

Total

64

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

31

48%

No

34

52%

Total

65

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

54

83%

No

11

17%

Total

65

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

12

18%

Unsure

7

11%

Strongly Disagree

2

3%

Agree

23

35%

Disagree

22

33%

Total

66

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

18

27%

Agree

29

44%

Unsure

6

9%

Disagree

10

15%

Strongly Disagree

3

5%

Total

66

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

51

80%

No

13

20%

Total

64

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

49

74%

No

17

26%

Total

66

  

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

16

24%

Agree

28

42%

Unsure

5

8%

Disagree

13

20%

Strongly Disagree

4

6%

Total

66

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

13

20%

Agree

20

30%

Unsure

3

5%

Disagree

23

35%

Strongly Disagree

7

10%

Total

66

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

12

19%

Agree

6

9%

Unsure

10

15%

Disagree

18

27%

Strongly Disagree

20

30%

Total

66

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

14

21%

Agree

23

34%

Unsure

6

9%

Disagree

13

27%

Strongly Disagree

11

16%

Total

67

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Yes

24

38%

No

40

62%

Total

64

 

Answer

Number

Percent

Strongly Agree

18

28%

Agree

22

34%

Unsure

9

14%

Disagree

11

16%

Strongly Disagree

5

8%

Total

65

 


Appendix E-- Participating Organizations

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

The Marshall Center is a unique institution dedicated to the mission of creating a more stable security environment by advancing democratic defense institutions and relationships, promoting active, peaceful engagement and enhancing enduring partnerships among the nations of North America, Europe, and Eurasia.

The Marshall Center is a partnership between the American and German governments. The College of International and Security Studies consists of an international faculty, teaching an international student body from the countries of North America, Europe and Eurasia, and conducting research vital to the advancement of democratic principles and cooperative security. The Conference Center hosts more than sixteen bilateral and multilateral conferences each year, for the exchange of ideas on a variety of issues.

The College's Defense and Security Studies Program offers three courses for military and civilian foreign affairs and defense officials from Europe and Eurasia. These courses consist of post graduate-level studies that provide a current focus on how national security is formulated and maintained in democratic societies. There is a two-week Senior Executive Course for parliamentarians/general officers and their civilian equivalents, a 15-week Executive Course for colonels/lieutenant colonels and their civilian equivalents and a nine-week course entitled "Leaders for the 21st Century" for majors and captains and their civilian equivalents. All courses are taught in three languages, English, German and Russian, and may include participants from over 40 countries.

 

The U.S. Naval War College

On October 6, 1884, Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler signed General Order 325, which began simply by stating: "A college is hereby established for an advanced course of professional study for naval officers, to be known as the Naval War College." The order went on to assign "the principal building on Coaster's Harbor Island, Newport, R. I.--the Newport Asylum for the Poor, built in 1820--to its use and Commodore Stephen B. Luce . . . to duty as president of the college." Such were the humble beginnings of what is now the oldest continuing institution of its kind in the world. Luce organized the Naval War College as "a place of original research on all questions relating to war, and to statesmanship connected with war, or the prevention of war."

Today, the Naval War College is organized to pursue and integrate both academic and research endeavors. Academically, the faculty is divided into three teaching departments: Strategy and Policy, National Security Decision Making and Joint Military Operations. Research activities are drawn together in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. The student body is subdivided into four resident colleges and one nonresident college:

• College of Naval Warfare: Senior level school attended by senior grade officers from all five U.S. military services and civilians from U.S. Government agencies.

• College of Naval Command and Staff: Intermediate level school attended by mid-grade officers from all five services and civilians from U.S. Government agencies.

• Naval Command College: Senior level international school attended by senior grade naval officers from some 35 nations annually.

• Naval Staff College: Intermediate level international school attended by mid-grade naval officers from some 25 nations per class.

• College of Continuing Education: Intermediate level nonresident school intended to extend the Naval War College program to U.S. officers and eligible civilian employees of the Department of Defense who are unable to attend resident courses.

The College is accredited by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEAS&C) to award a Master of Arts degree in National Security and Strategic Studies to qualified graduates from its Colleges of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff.

 

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

In 1981, the Center for Naval Warfare Studies was established as a focal point, stimulus and major source of strategic thinking within the U.S. Navy. The Center brings together under one organization the related research programs of the Strategic Research Department, the Decision Support Department, the Advanced Research Program for students, the War Gaming Department and the Naval War College Press.



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One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger - by Matthew Yglesias