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Chechnya: A Beleaguered President

Charles W Blandy

No: OB 61 August 1998

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the UK Ministry of Defence.
 
 
 

INTRODUCTION
 
 

The recent assination attempt, the fourth on the life of Aslan Maskhadov and the first in his capacity as President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria on 23 July 1998, together with the vast scale of organised crime, abductions and seemingly unrestricted terrorism over the last 18 months, and the growing presence of radical Islam with its divisive and intrusive consequences for the adherents of the form of Islam traditionally practised by the Muslim mountain peoples of the North Caucasus, can only serve to illustrate and emphasise the fact that Chechnya is in danger of slowly but inexorably drifting into a state of complete chaos and anarchy. One political observer commented recently that the seizure of the authorised representative of the President of the Russian Federation, Valentin Vlasov provides "final confirmation of the approaching crash of the unsteady state system of Ichkeria".

Prior to the assassination attempt on Maskhadov, the introduction of a state of emergency and Operation 'Just Sword' on 24 June 1998 with the primary intention of preventing a coup d'etat in Groznyy itself, resulted in limited government successes, but also confrontation and a shoot out between government security forces and those of Salman Raduyev at the Groznyy television centre followed by an open battle at Gudermes, involving Chechen government forces and supporters of radical Islam, the Wahhabity.

It might be possible to dismiss the Chechen internal situation as being of little consequence, if it were not for the facts that not only is the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria through common historical experience, religion and custom intrinsically bound to the other Muslim republics in the North Caucasus, in particular Dagestan and Ingushetia, but on a wider geo-political plane, there is a grave danger that these problems could have a further negative impact on the other areas of conflict and instability present in the Caucasus region, Caspian Basin and further afield, for :

"The North Caucasus and Transcaucasus must be considered as a part of a whole 'security complex' which includes the southern oblasts and national republics of Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan , and furthermore Turkey and Iran. The unity of the region is reflected in the fact that the North Caucasus continues to play a decisive role in the fate of the Transcaucasus and Caucasian 'security complex' as a whole.

In Dagestan to the east, the recent, disturbing catalogue of events indicates an increasing rate of descent on the path towards destabilisation; in the west, Ingushetia and North Osetia are still deadlocked over the position of Prigorodniy rayon which continues to attract terrorist violence.

The situation in Chechnya has reached the stage of an organised challenge to the authority of the legitimately elected President and government of Chechnya by certain field commanders, some influential leaders of teip (clan) power bases and by the activities of radical Islam in the shape of the Wahhabi movement. Whilst the Chechen President remains unbowed in his determination to restore law and order, his death or removal from power could presage the onset of civil war, the ultimate consequences of which could become a catastrophe, not only for Chechnya, the North Caucasus and the 'independent' republics of the Transcaucasus, but ultimately for Russia as a whole.

BACKGROUND
 

Situation in 1994
 

The present state of turmoil in Chechnya, bordering on civil war, to some extent resembles the situation in the summer and autumn of 1994, when splintered, disparate and uncoordinated opposition forces made unsuccessful challenges to the 'Presidential' rule of Dzhokhar Dudayev. However, the Russian armed intervention on 11 December 1994 was the catalyst which united most of the country behind Dudayev against Russia. After some 16 months of bitter fighting, the death of Dudayev in April 1996 provided an opportunity for the more rational, moderate counsels of Aslan Maskhadov, then Chief of Staff of the Chechen separatist armed forces, to prevail after many previous opportunities for peace had been lost or deliberately sabotaged.

Khasavyurt Accords of 30/31 August 1996
 

The Khasavyurt Accords, brokered through the direct participation of General Aleksandr Lebed, brought a cessation of hostilities between Chechen and Russian, the removal of Russian armed forces from Chechnya and the postponement of a decision on Chechen status until 31 December 2001, even though Chechen independence remained and still remains their ultimate objective. The election of Maskhadov to the Presidency in January 1997, gaining almost 60% of votes cast throughout Chechnya, provided grounds for optimism and and even euphoria amongst some portions of the Chechen population: "This is all through the will of Allah. Today, you know, is a special historical day. A man has become the President of Ichkeria whom the very nation has chosen. An end to war! An end to anarchy".

Daunting Task after Elections of January 1997
 

However, expressions of euphoria were matched by: first, the undisguised bad grace of Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the interim President following the death of Dudayev, at not being elected President; second, the daunting scale of tasks and dangers confronting Maskhadov in having not only to fulfil the aspirations of the majority of the Chechen people, but also to limit the actions of those possessing more extreme views, who were prepared to act outside the norms of international law and peace agreements and ignore the will of the Chechen people, cogently and overwhelmingly expressed through the ballot box. At the time, President Mintimer Shaymiyev of Tatarstan made a succinct summary of the situation, "There have been elections, and the next thing we will see is a strong opposition. The opposition will be pressing for independence while he needs to rebuild the country. After a war or revolution or after anything like that, people always expect an improvement in their living standards".

It was not surprising that the position of President Maskhadov, in trying to restore a physically scarred, economically ruined and psychologically damaged country to a semblance of normal life, was described even then as being "Along a bridge that is finer than a hair and sharper than a knife".

FACTORS UNDERLYING PRESENT SITUATION
 

Before analysing the complicated mosaic of power in Chechnya, there is a need to take into account the dire social-economic and political situation in the republic together with a body of external factors which have a negative influence on the republic.

Economic Drivers of Instability
 

A number of negative economic factors stem from the results of the war with Russia, the destruction of Groznyy and infrastructure of Chechnya, resulting in an economic void where only 10% of the population have legitimate employment with the implication that 90% are occupied in illegal activities. There are questions still outstanding on compensation and reparation from the Russian Federation covering the displacement of people as refugees or forced migrants, including the majority of the Russian population forced to leave Chechnya. Issues requiring more immediate action are: the payment of pensions to the elderly and infirm; medical matters and the re-institution of programmes of preventative health care and medicine; the resumption of education and schooling for children; the creation of jobs, enabling full employment in order to remove young men and women from lawlessness, the uninhibited freedoms of banditry and hostage taking; the problems of locating sources of funds for financial investment. Financial aid on the scale that is required will perhaps never materialise, when a system of government such as that in the Kremlin at the present time is unable to make timeous wage payments to its own soldiers, let alone to a government which wishes to cease being a subject of the Russian Federation.

Russia as a Source of Continuing Instability
 

Perhaps the worst aspect of the situation is the fact that Russia has not implemented many of the agreements signed by Moscow and Groznyy, in particular the 'Fig Leaf Treaty' on 12 May 1997, including the fact that there has been no progress on the matter of Chechen status. The ambivalence of the status of Chechnya has served to exacerbate the problem of Chechen relations with adjacent republics, in particular relations with Dagestan. The situation is further aggravated by a virtual blockade of Chechnya through a ring of Russian troops, ditches and 'blokposts' situated on the borders between Chechnya, Dagestan and Stavropol' Kray and the implied threat from Russian Army exercises.

Even though Maskhadov has the respect, trust and support of most of the Chechen population, one of the legacies of Dzhokhar Dudayev which has remained a divisive issue in Chechen society is that the Chechen extremist element regard him as the architect of peace, a peace they did not want, because it ran counter to the philosophy and aspirations of Dudayev. Moreover, as far as the extremists are concerned, Maskhadov has not 'delivered' on the question of Chechen independence. Finally, the absence of a well-founded social-economic policy for the North Caucasus by the Kremlin has had a negative effect on the whole of the North Caucasus including Chechnya.

Limitations of Presidential Power
 

When he became President at the beginning of 1997, Maskhadov was reckoned "to control directly 60% of Chechen territory, indirectly 30% and some 10% was not under his control". At the present time a view persists that " ...in essence no one in Chechnya today has the internal forces to control the situation even on 50% of the republic's territory". Two more extreme views in the Russian press portrayed the power of individual field commanders in relation to Maskhadov as follows:"the whole of the republic is like a big chicken house, where in each corner its own rooster sits, who openly does not give a rap for the crowing from Khankala"; and "therefore the relationship between Maskhadov and the field commanders follows that same logic which reflects a relationship between a weak king and the independently minded barons of the Middle Ages".

In spite of the fact that Maskhadov has the support of the majority of the civil population, he has had to tread warily, paying continual attention to the correlation of forces through the arrangement of alliances with other influential members of the Chechen elite and field commanders, for example, including Shamil' Basayev in the government as interim Prime Minister and now as Deputy Commander in Chief, thereby ensuring not only the loyalty of Basayev but the loyalty of Basayev's followers as well. It must not be forgotten that one of Maskhadov's prime objectives has been to prevent an escalation of internal tension in Chechnya, to avoid a similar degree of polarisation between various factions of the population which took place in "Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Algeria from happening here", namely the development of wide-scale open warfare within Chechnya.

Shortages of equipment are yet one more factor downgrading the effectiveness of government forces in apprehending terrorists and kidnappers, as indicated by General Israpilov: "I do not have a conclusive basis of negotiation with the kidnappers, photographs,evidence from witnesses. And I have no specialist equipment, I am not able to intercept their telephone conversations, to react operationally to all the movements of bandits and hostages. I do not even have transport to pursue the terrorists. My people are not paid and they simply work out of enthusiasm. Tell me, how is it possible to wage war against crime under such conditions?"

To some extent this explains the inability of the Chechen authorities to free the two British hostages or President Yel'tsin's personal representative to Chechnya, and to curb the activities of illegal bandit formations and other criminal acts. There is also the possibility that many of these criminal acts are initiated from outside Chechnya, as confirmed by Russian Interior Minister Sergey Stepashin in his statement on 4 July 1998: "Working on the Vlasov case, I have had the chance to become convinced that there are probably also leads back to Moscow", but the question remains as to whether it was Russian security services playing their own deep game or Chechen anti-Maskhadov factions in Moscow in a campaign to discredit the present Chechen government. The siting of the vehicle bomb, the force of the explosion and damage in the assassination attempt against Maskhadov on 23 July 1998 were reminiscent of the precision in timing and force of a similar device on 5 October 1995 which seriously wounded General Anatoliy Romanov in the 'tunnel' by Groznyy main station, destroying hopes for a permanent cease-fire built on the bond of a developing trust between Maskhadov and Romanov.

It should also be remembered that many kidnap victims are Chechens whose only qualification for abduction is the fact that they were either part of the Zavgayev government, loyal to Moscow, or disapproved of the Chechen separatists. In Chechnya, as elsewhere in the world, there is an element of the need to settle old scores. It is not only the lack of government power which aids this illegal process. Within government itself, there are those who do not share the same generosity of spirit required to heal and rebuild the nation which Maskhadov possesses.. In some echelons of government and the law enforcement agencies, a sympathetic attitude engendered by shared combat experience exists towards those illegally meting out "justice and punishment" to people who did not support the separatist cause. Moreover these bureaucrats and state officials, themselves former fighters who defended their country against Russian armed intervention, also help to fund today's illegal fighters. It would appear that having once been a fighter or 'bandit' themselves, these officials have difficulty in saying "No".

Another hindrance to the implementation of effective measures by the President lies in the Chechen psyche, namely an over-hasty reaction in the correction of perceived insult and indiscipline in the military sphere. During the Russo-Chechen conflict, it became apparent that: "The problem of the Chechens, especially in the battles for Groznyy, was related to their weak discipline in all ranks, when every fighter considered himself to be a general. The Chechens were able, for example, at a price of large forces to recapture a number of federalist objectives, but the Chechens sometimes without any reason abandoned them without informing the command. Guerilla warfare frequently switched to inter-partisan warfare. The Chechen command were often forced to apply considerable force in order to restrict this occurrence, but were not successful in ridding themselves of it completely".

A more recent example of intemperate behaviour and indiscipline was the fight at Gudermes on 15 July 1998 between government forces and elements of the Wahhabi movement, resulting in the dismissal of Abdul Malik Mezhidov of the Shariah Security Ministry and Arbi Barayev, Commander of the Special Forces Islamic Regiment. Furthermore, the young Chechen of today does not have so much respect for the traditions of the past, "Youths hit each other more easily, use their weapons more easily, partly because of the spread of alcohol, a great disgrace and crime - thanks to Soviet rule. We are trying to bring them back to a love of tradition, of solidarity and cooperation with their neighbours, not being so ready to use guns, but this will be a long process".

Growth of Field Commanders' Power
 

The unbridled power of Chechen field commanders originated in the period between 1991-1996, enhanced initially by "the weapons (and not only infantry ones) that Russia 'presented' to Chechnya [in 1992, which] were so numerous that difficulties arose over their accounting and security" and later through the gains of victory over the Federal Armed Forces. Recently, according to Vladimir Zorin, Chairman of the Russian Duma Council on Nationalities Affairs, "It was in this period that a system came to be formed in Chechnya where little depended on decisions made by the authorities in the republic, and it is the field commanders who make the weather". This system worked effectively during the period of combat operations 1994-1996, when fronts were formed by the separatist forces and allotted territories which were put under the control of certain field commanders. These were to become territorial-military autonomies and in the opinion of Zorin "they continue to exist today" and have reportedly spawned a "network of recce-sabotage schools: Serzhen-Yurt and Aleroy (controlled by Khattab); Kadi-Yurt (controlled by Salman Raduyev); Vedeno and Dargo (controlled by Shamil' Basayev)".

In the past, the factor which restrained the field commanders was financial control by the then Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev. All the sources of funding were in the hands of Dudayev and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shamseddin Yusuf. During the time of active operations, the leaders of the Chechen resistance worked like a well-oiled machine: Yusuf obtained and brought the money over from abroad; Dudayev distributed it, whilst Maskhadov fought. It was not only Maskhadov who was dependent on funding from Dudayev, but also all the other field commanders, such as Shamil' Basayev, Ruslan Gelayev, Vacha Arsanov and Salman Raduyev, to name but a few. Such practices "allowed 'the taming' of some excessively wayward and zealous commanders, in effect stopping them as though they had to make a choice: either they subordinated themselves entirely to the Commander in Chief [Dudayev] or they became'outside the law'. The difference between then and now is the fact that now the main sources of financing illegal bandit formations come through terrorism, cattle-rustling, organised crime and hostage-taking.

Teip System
 

The actions of Chechen field commanders are guided and controlled by the attitudes of the teips to which they belong, for "in reality it is teip (clan) relationships in Chechnya which define the political system, the foreign policy of that country and the underlying relationships within Chechen society and the Chechen state. . . Teips never live in a specific area [although they were once tied to land]. Members of a teip are distributed throughout the republic. So, the teip system tends not to divide the nation. On the contrary, it tends to consolidate the Chechen nation". The teip system, which through the requirement to marry outside the teip strengthened the bonds of Chechen national unity in the face of external aggression, is now seen by some as being one of the factors promoting internal dissension in the struggle for survival within the republic, as a result of extreme financial penury and lack of legitimate employment. In the high mountains of southern Chechnya the teip are grouped into tribes (tukhumy).

Influence of Geography
 

Another factor concerned in Chechen power groupings is a geographical variation in the intensity of positive and negative feelings of the Chechen population toward Russia and Russians. The strongest anti-Russian feelings predominate in Chechnya's southern, mountainous rayony. Those living on the Sundzha and Terek lowland plains have been and remain lukewarm towards the continuation of war with Russia. The people living in the north of Chechnya, near the border with Stavropol' Kray and Russia proper, have had greater opportunities of daily contact with Russians than the people in the remote, southern mountainous region of Chechnya. Consequently the northern Chechens are more orientated toward Russia than their southern counterparts. Moreover, they take little part in internal political matters and conflicts in Chechnya.
 

THE FUTURE
 

Presidential Objectives
 

Presidential objectives must be to continue determined efforts to re-establish the rule of law throughout the republic, "reining in the criminal gangs profiting from Chechnya's misery", the full completion of measures outlawing the possession of arms and to expel disruptive foreign elements from Chechen soil, even though some of them may have been of inestimable value in helping to defeat the Federal Armed Forces, such as the Jordanian-born Chechen Khattab. This can only be achieved through united action which transcends Chechen internal loyalties and depends on the firm construction of alliances.

Interrelation of Alliances
 

There are perhaps four main repositories of political power in the republic, namely, those belonging to President Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil' Basayev, Movladi Udugov and Salman Raduyev. Fuller details concerning the composition of these political groupings, power foundations and from where they derive their support are contained in Annex A. Mention must also be made of the fifth group living towards the north of Chechnya, orientated towards Russia and taking no part in Chechen political disputes and conflict. Even a cursory analysis of these power groupings and interrelationship with other political groups reveals a mosaic of complicated, ill-defined boundaries of influence, with a tendency for individuals to have interests in more than one grouping and characterised by a degree of impermanence.

In theory, as President, Maskhadov has the resources of the newly formed army and security services of the Chechen Republic with a numerical strength of 8,530, which would appear to be orientated towards defence, maintenance of law and order, customs and border duties and the prevention of illegal misappropriation of petroleum and derivative products. Against this are ranged: "Nearly 300 armed groups in Chechnya, with manpower totally 2,500 not controlled by the Chechen authorities. The groups possess four tanks, 12 combat vehicles and four air defence systems. The so-called General Dudayev's Army of about 1,000 men - the largest of the militias - has its main base 60 km southeast of the Chechen capital Groznyy. There are about 500 fighters stationed at the base. Groups of Chechen fighters are concentrated in areas bordering on Dagestan, North Osetia and Stavropol' Territory".

However, full-scale war between President's Maskhadov's armed forces and the unofficial groupings is unlikely at the moment. The president's current concerns relate rather to the establishment of law and order in the republic, and balancing the demands of the various political groupings in order to achieve this. The most unsettling has been that of Raduyev.
 

For some time now, since he returned to Chechnya after medical treatment following an attempt on his life in April 1996, Raduyev's actions as the 'Commander' of the "Army of General Dudayev" have been irrational, uncontrollable and a continued source of aggravation to the Chechen authorities. His behaviour led to nothing less than a power struggle between his forces and the representatives of the legal government because Raduyev, as the son-in-law of Dudayev, considered himself justified in not acknowledging the present leadership. This led to a serious clash on 22 June 1998 between Raduyev and Lecha Khultygov, Chief of the National Security Service, in the square in front of the Groznyy television Centre, where Khultygov, his chief bodyguard Akhmed Basayev, a relation of of the 'hero of Budennovsk' and Musa Dzhafarov, an associate of Raduyev, were killed. This was in fact not a consequence of a religious conflict but a power struggle between representatives of legitimate government authority and the 'wayward'.

The supporters of Shamil Basyev are now pursuing the murderers of Lecha Khultygov and Akhmed Basayev around the the rayon of Nozhay-yurt, having referred the matter to the Sharia court and adat guidance on a blood-feud. Raduyev himself may attack first, claiming revenge for his dead friend Musa Dzhafarov, shot by Akhmed Basayev. As the commander of the so-called Army of General Dudayev, Raduyev has a large body of armed support; estimates range from around 1,000 to some 4,000 men.

It is of interest to note in this, that even though Maskhadov as a member of the highly respected Alleroy Teip is accorded support in mountainous southern Chechnya, he would not have been able even to take an independent decision concerning the punishment of the perpetrators of the murder of Lecha Khultygov, without the agreed assistance of the 'Basayev supporters'. In this it might have been necessary to conduct negotiations with his closest supporter Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Shamil' Basayev. In the negotiations a 'third force' was probably also present, Vice President Vacha Arsanov, whom the majority of observers reckon is inclined toward the supporters of the 'pro-Arab' faction.

There are a number of additional points of significance. First, it was Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the former interim President, disappointed and disgruntled loser in the elections of January 1997 who not only founded the movement, the "Path of Dzhokhar", the parent organisation of the "Army of General Dudayev" headed by Raduyev, but Yandarbiyev's prominent "pompous and ponderous" presence at rallies of the latter organisation providing support, despite the ban on such open-air public meetings by the Chechen government, could only have had the intention of trying to undermine President Maskhadov. Second, whilst Maskhadov was wary of a precipitate Islamisation of Chechnya during the period of interim government in the last months of 1996, Yandarbiyev had always been a doctrinaire proponent of an Islamic state in Chechnya. It is not altogether surprising that now reportedly "in the spread of influence of the Wahhabis in the Chechen government have been noticed Udugov, Yandarbiyev and others".

As a result of this type of action Raduyev is continually losing the support of Dudayev's relations and his teips "so that his detachment is even more isolated in the mountainous zone and makes him completely uncontrollable". With the effective isolation of Raduyev there has become evident a gradual shift of emphasis in the re-establishment of the rule of law to direct action against the Wahhabis and other foreign bodies, which have now outstayed their welcome.

Neutralisation of the Wahhabis and Other Foreign Bodies
 

It would appear that the interests of both Maskhadov and Basayev have not only coincided on the need to neutralise Raduyev but also on the need for similar action to curb the Wahhabi movement and presence of 'Arabs'; for the supporters of Basayev consider their main enemies, apart from those belonging to the former circle of Dudayev, to be the Wahhabis. In this, the position of the Mufti of Chechnya Akhmad-Khadzhi Kadyrov would appear to coincide fully with that of Maskhadov.

The Wahhabi sect is close to the official ideology of Saudi Arabia. In the USSR, the first Wahhabis began to appear at the beginning of perestroyka in the mid 1980s. In Chechnya and Dagestan the numbers of Wahhabi followers from the Near East rose sharply after the commitment of Russian troops into Chechnya. Particularly notable was the formation of a special detachment under the leadership of the Jordanian-born Chechen Khattab, in which many Wahhabity from Dagestan fought. Disregarding their spiritual aspirations, their aims would appear to be "... the beginning of the unification of the peoples of the Caucasus. Soon in this agreement will be included other nations of the Caucasus. We have one aim - the creation in the Caucasus of an Islamic Republic which will include Ichkeria, Dagestan, Kabarda, Balkariya, Ingushetiya, Karachayevo-Cherkessia and Azerbaijan", together with "The creation of a 'corridor' on the territory of Dagestan connecting Chechnya with the Caspian and Azerbaijan, the separation of Dagestan from Russia, Dagestan's reunification with Chechnya and the proclamation of an 'imamate'", but Russians fear they may have more extensive aims.

From a Russian viewpoint, "Consolidating their position amongst the multi-nation peoples of the North Caucasus, the Wahhabis have the objective of penetrating the power structures. This work is not wasted. Wahhabi sympathisers have appeared amongst deputies of legislative assemblies of republics, government apparati and state organs.

Movladi Udugov, the Chechen Foreign Minister, has never concealed the fact that he uses the support of several Arab countries. Udugov and his brother Musa Temishev put ideological and financial support of the 'Islamic Path' party into practice. The fighting part of this organisation consists of seven camps under the overall command of Khattab. Besides, Udugov uses the support of many influential Chechen theologians, especially those who had since 1992 through the Muftiat criticised the secular position of Dudayev. Movladi Udugov is one of Radical Islam's most fervent proponents in Chechnya, together with Vacha Arsanov and ZelimkhanYandarbiyev. There is no doubt that in the final analysis, Udugov will probably be required to retire from the Chechen government, as his aims do not coincide with those of Maskhadov and Basayev.

An indication of the delicacy and sensitivity required to maintain his support for Maskhadov appeared in Basayev's reported disagreement with the Chechen President's July 1998 order expelling Wahhabi missionaries and Arabs from Chechnya. Maskhadov reportedly considered enlisting the aid of Raduyev and his followers in General Dudayev's Army to counter the Wahhabi threat. Raduyev is just as much an enemy of the Arabs and Wahhabis as Maskhadov and Basayev. Raduyev regards the Wahhabis as rivals, threatening his own niche of an extreme extremist. Far from "bequeathing anything to the Wahhabis", Raduyev's mentor Dzhokhar Dudayev supported a secular state.

The priorities of the legally elected Chechen leadership must be the restoration of the economy, reconstruction of the infrastructure and rehabilitation of the Chechen people, together with the fulfilment of their overriding straightforward desire to run their own affairs without interference from Moscow. At the moment, despite Russian alarmist cries, this does not necessarily include the creation of a North Caucasus Islamic Republic stretching from Makhachkala to the Kuban', "for it is possible to conceive the view in which the interests of Maskhadov and Basayev will fully coincide with the interests of Magomedali Magomedov [Chairman of the Dagestan State Council], who still remains a respected man in the republic [Dagestan] and with whom the population still even connect certain hopes" of peace and stability.

The Russian Hydra
 

This reflects the dilemma posed by the Chechen problem in the large number of players that are involved on the Moscow side, ranging from the President of the Russian Federation and his immediate circle, the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry and the Security Services to name only the most important. President Maskhadov presents a very real dilemma to the Kremlin. On the one hand, Maskhadov with his rational, moderate attitude and integrity is acknowledged as being perhaps the only person who can quieten the situation in Chechnya, thereby removing a major threat to stability in the North Caucasus. On the other hand, in the longer term, with his quiet but nevertheless determined purposefulness, he is a real danger to the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, for amongst all those in Chechnya at the moment, he is more likely than anyone else to achieve de jure independence for Chechnya.

President Yel'tsin and President Maskhadov have met twice, on 12 May and 18 August 1997. The sun beamed on both those occasions, leading to the hope that Yel'tsin would visit Chechnya in late 1997 or early 1998. This was later discouraged by those surrounding the Russian President, which have largely failed to produce anything positive. President Yel'tsin and his circle are not necessarily openly hostile to Chechnya; in fact it seemed that there was a favourable rapport between President Yel'tsin and President Maskhadov. The Ministry of Defence conducts military exercises close to Chechen territory, where there must be a hint of menace for the Chechen. The Russian Interior Ministry digs trenches and imposes a ring of barbed wire around Chechnya. These two are openly not so friendly to the Chechen. It would not be beyond the bounds of possibility that the fifth group, the FSB and other security services, have followed and will continue to follow their own agenda of covert hostility, which could well be directed against President Maskhadov. It would not be the first time that Moscow has followed conflicting policies in its relations with others.
 

CONCLUSIONS
 
 

President Aslan Maskhadov has continued to demonstrate with great clarity the determination to "re-establish the rule of law, and has not hesitated to impose new punishments for hostage-taking - or to invoke harsh precepts of summary Islamic justice to deter crime".

There is no doubt that the assassination attempt on Maskhadov greatly affected the Chechen people, effectively reminding them of how close the nation and country stands to possible impending catastrophe: an indication of this has been not only field commanders visiting the President but also a declaration from the Speaker of the Chechen Parliament, Ruslan Alikhadzhiyev, that they must all work more closely with the President from now on. However, further attempts on the life of Maskhadov cannot be ruled out, either from disaffected Chechens or those with trails which lead back to Moscow.

It would be an unparalleled disaster for stability in the Caucasus if President Maskhadov was killed or removed illegally from office. This could have a disturbing effect on economic and political development in the Transcaucasus too, in particular on those two vulnerable sovereign states lying to the south of Chechnya, Georgia and Azerbaijan, thereby affecting Western commercial interests.

Chechnya needs funding and investment on a massive scale in order to facilitate reconciliation within the republic, not only for the restoration of the socio-economic and political situation but also to improve the effectiveness of the law enforcement agencies and services. In the immediate short term, Russia must honour and implement all the agreements signed by Moscow and Groznyy, making reparation and compensation available to innocent people caught up in the Chechen conflict.

Wahhabism in the North Caucasus is a divisive, power-seeking mechanism with a tendency to interfere with and polarise the attitudes of the Muslim peoples of the North Caucasus, causing additional problems within states such as Chechnya and Dagestan and creating further obstacles between them and the Russian authorities. The funding by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states of the Wahhabi presence in the North Caucasus only serves to exacerbate the apprehensions of the Kremlin, furthering the development of a fortress mentality and increasing the Russian reluctance to loosen constitutional ties.

Russia must also develop a proper socio-economic and political policy for the North Caucasus. Unless there is investment and economic growth in the region, Wahhabism and other forms of radical, political Islam will continue to develop, not only to the detriment of the people living there but also to Russia.

Aslan Maskhadov was born into the much-respected and presitgious Alleroy Teip. He enjoys the full support of the Alleroy and Akhshipatoy Teips, the town of Groznyy, several villages in Vedeno Rayon, part of Groznenskiy Rayon, in particular towns of Avtury and Atagi.

Supporters include:

Turpal-ali-Atgeriyev - 1st Deputy Prime Minister (Economy);

Kazbek Makhachev - Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Internal Affairs;

Aslanbek Arsayev - Minister of Sharia State Security;

Magomed Magomedov - Deputy Procurator/Head of Special Anti-Kidnap Brigade;

Mairbek Vachegayev - Press Secretary;

Khunkapasha Israpilov - Head of Anti-Terrorist Centre;

Islam Khalimov - Ex Minister for Internal Affairs;

Said-Khasan Bisultanov - Religious Affairs Assistant;

Akhmed Bakanayev - Chairman Gostelradio.
 

Shamil' Basayev has the support of the following teips: Tsentoroy, Belgatoy, Kurchaloy, Gendergnoy, Gunoy and Varandoy Teips. Support for him is also derived from a large part of Vedeno rayon, the rayons of Shali, Shatoy, Achoy-Martan, and part of Urus-Martanovskiy rayon.

Supporters include:

Shervan Basayev (Brother) - Head of State Council on Fuel and Energy;

Akhmed Garayev - Head of Grozneft';

Abu Movsayev - Head of Internal Security;

Ruslan Gelayev - General/Defence Minister;

Apti Batalov - Minister of Internal Affairs;

Lom-Ali Baysgurov - Head of Military Counter Intelligence;

Akhmed Zakayev - deputy Prime Minister for Culture.
 
 
 
 

Movladi Udugov and Supporters

Movladi Udugov derives his support not so much from teips as from the 'Party of the Islamic Path' and elements in the towns of Gudermes and Argun, Gudermesskiy rayon and some villages in Vedeno rayon.

Supporters include:

Vacha Arsanov - Chechen Vice President;

Emir Khattab - Jordanian-born Chechen;

Magomed Khanbiyev - Commander of the Sharia Guard;

Arbi Barayev - Commander of Special Forces Islamic Regiment;

Magomed Khatuyev - Commander Border-Customs Service.

Salman Raduyev has 'the support with reservations' of the Myalkhi and Orstkhoy-Tsechoy Teips. Geographical locations that support him include Nozhay-Yurt rayon and the villages of Samashki and Yandyrka, Gekhi-Chu in Urus-Martan rayon. As Commander of the 'Army of Dzhokhar Dudayev' he has the potential support of up to 4,000 men.

Supporter:

Lechi Dudayev - Mayor of Groznyy.

ENDNOTES

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