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Military

Notes

Chapter 1

1. James G. Leybum, The Haitian People (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 16-17, and Robert Heinl and Nancy Heinl, Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492-1995, Michael Heinl, ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1996) (hereafter referred to as The Haitian People), 33

2. Leybum, The Haitian People, 22-23, See also Ralph Komgold, ed., Citizen Toussaint (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965). For an impassioned review of the revolution, see C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1989). See also, Antoine Dalmas, Histoire de la Revolution de Saint Domingue (Paris, 1814).

3. Leybum, The Haitian People, 22-23.

4. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995), 37. For an account from the perspective of the invaders, see Roger Norma Baily, ed., The Haitian Journal of Lieutenant Howard, York Hussars, 1796-98 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1985).

5. George F. Tyson, ed., Toussaint L'Ouverture (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1073), 53.

6. Leyburn, The Haitian People, 33; Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 95-125. See also Thomas Madiou, Histoire D'Haiti, T. 2, 3 (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 1923). Also invaluable for understanding this subject was an interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman, director of the Haitian Studies Center at the University of Kansas, May 5,1997.

7. Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, the Origins and Legitimacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990),45.

8. Leyburn, The Haitian People, 66-69.

9. See Robert May, The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); James McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), 103-16; Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1994), 73-78.

10. Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean 1898-1934 (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Press, 1985), 123-24.

11. Interview with Otis Van Cecil by Dr. Robert Baumann, January 16, 1997, Platte City, Missouri, Haiti Oral History Project (HOHP).

12. Hans Schmidt, The US. Occupation of Haiti (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971), 83. For a review of U.S. policy on the eve of the intervention in Haiti, see Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). For another valuable account of the U.S. occupation in Haiti, see David Healy, "The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934," in Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy, ed., Georges A. Fauriol (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 36-45; Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, 1915-1930 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1931). For the story of one of the more bizarre episodes of the occupation, see W.B. Seabrook, The Magic Island (New York: The Literary Guild of America, 1929). Seabrook recounts the tale of Faustin Wirkus, a Marine, who when visiting La Gonave was taken for a figure in local prophecy and made royalty.

13. Schmidt, The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 136.

14. Ibid., 141; Peter Bunce, "Foundation on Sand," unpublished manuscript, 46.

15. Bunce, "Foundation on Sand," 24; Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 477; telephone conversation between Dr. Robert Baumann and Dr. Bryant Freeman, August 5, 1997.

16. Emily Greene Balch, Occupied Haiti (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972),179.

17. Schmidt, The US. Occupation of Haiti, 70.

18. Ibid., 83-84,

19. Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: The Adventures of Smedley D. Butler (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933), 189.

20. Ibid., 191.

21. Graham A. Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos: Marines and Counterinsurgency in Hispaniola, 1915-1924," in eds., William Roberts and Jack Sweetman, New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy, October 1989 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 283-308.

22. Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye, 193.

23. Ibid., 201-8.

24. Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos," 6; and Heinl and Heint, Written in Blood, 479.

25. Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye, 216.

26. Michel S. Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1993), 73.

27. Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye, 222.

28. Ibid., 210. Van Cecil Interview, January 16, 1997. Van Cecil relates how he contemplated joining the Haitian Army for the pay but was held back, in part, by the requirement to learn Creole.

29. Schmidt, The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 100-101, and Balch, 125. See also Millspaugh.

30. Schmidt, The U.S. Occupation of Haiti, 102-3.

31. Ibid., 104-5; Heinl and Heint, Written in Blood, 440-41.

32. Schmidt, 131-33.

33. United States Marine Corps, Republic of Haiti (Washington, D.C.: USMC, 1932), 801-100.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.,804-700

37. Ibid., 804-600.

38. Laguerre, The Military and Society, 72.

39. Ibid., 76.

40. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 464-65.

41. Herbert Gold, Best Nightmare on Earth (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 2.

42. Ibid., 27.

43. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 562.

44. Laguerre, The Military and Society, 110, and Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 156-57. Dr. Bryant Freeman met Papa Doc Duvalier and notes that the terror he imposed in Haiti began after a severe medical episode in which Duvalier had lapsed into a coma. Papa Doc was never the same afterwards.

45. Laguerre, The Military and Society, 114.

46. Georges A. Fauriol, "U.S. Policy and the Ouster of Duvalier," in Haitian Frustrations, 48.

47. Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: An Insider's History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 159.

48. Fauriol, "U.S. Policy," 48-49.

49. Elliot Abrams, "Haiti: Playing Out the Options," in Haitian Frustrations, 67-70.

50. Georges A. Fauriol and Andrew S. Faiola, "Prelude to Intervention," in Haitian Frustrations, 103.

Chapter 2

1. Unknown Uphold Democracy staff officer, as related to Major Robert Shaw, quoted in "Organization and Planning for Operations in Haiti (1991-1995)," unpublished A657 (course) research paper, HOHP, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996), 10.

2. Shaw, "Organization and Planning," 10.

3. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, March 23, 1994), 204. JOPES is a continuously evolving system that is used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities associated with joint operations.

4. Armed Forces Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993 (Washington, D.C.: The U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 64.

5. Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1. The letter "J" means joint or multiservice, "C" stands for combined or multinational, and "G" means general staff or a staff that works for a general officer.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Gordon C. Bonham, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, October 12, 1994, ed., Cynthia Hayden, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy: Oral History Interviews (Ft. Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1996), 9.

7. CONPLAN stands for "concept plan," a plan put in a concept format, less detailed than a fully developed operations plan or OPLAN.

8. Bonham Interview, 9.

9. Howard W. French, "Offer of Amnesty Removes Obstacle to Accord in Haiti," The New York Times, April 14, 1993.

10. Donald E. Schulz and Gabriel Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Troubled Out look for U.S. Policy Toward Haiti (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, March 10, 1994), 22.

11. Several plans officers believed that Cedras signed the agreement to placate the United Nations and to buy time to continue solidifying his fellow junta members' power base.

12. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman, Institute of Haitian Studies, University of Kansas, by Walter E. Kretchik, October 1997, Montrois, Haiti, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Haiti Oral History Project (HOHP).

13. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (U.S. Anny, ret.) Phil Baker by Walter E. Kretchik, July 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

14. Baker Interview.

15. Baker Interview. Also see Lieutenant Commander Peter J. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," in Military Review (July-August 1997). Riehm conducted extensive oral history interviews with Colonel Pulley, Commander Butcher, and other witnesses to the incident.

16. Freeman Interview. Freeman was in Haiti working for Pax Christi at the time.

17. Schulz and Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, 27.

18. Baker Interview.

19. CINCLANTFLT is the U.S. Navy headquarters subordinate to USACOM and responsible for controlling naval assets for missions such as this one.

20. Baker Interview.

21. According to a U.S. Army officer, present estimates are that over 700 Somali gunmen were also killed.

22. Schulz and Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, 27.
23. Schultz and Marcella, Reconciling the Irreconcilable, 27.

24. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," 33.

25. Conversation with Riehm by Walter E. Kretchik, May 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Riehm noted that the boat reconnaissance is standard procedure and generally practiced.

26. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," 33.

27. Freeman Interview. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," 33.

28. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," 33.

29. Freeman Interview.

30. Baker Interview.

31. Riehm, "The USS Harlan County Affair," 35.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Freeman Interview.

35. Although care was taken to inform the Haitian people as to the purpose of the embargo, their quality of life, and especially that of the poor, suffered tremendously.

36. Schulz and Marcella, 29-30. Tom Post, with Douglas Waller, Peter Katel, Eleanor Clift, and Spencer Reiss, "Sailing into Big Trouble," Newsweek, November 1, 1993, 34-35.

37. Andrew S. Faiola, "Refugee Policy: The 1994 Crisis," Haitian Frustrations, 83-84.

38. The "Harlan County incident" shocked many Americans as well as the international community, who perceived that the ship departed under threats from FAd'H-controlled Haitian thugs. Numerous plans officers believe that the incident backed the United States into a corner and forced the eventual U.S. invasion of Haiti to "save face."

39. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Ed Donnelly by Walter E. Kretchik, October 1995, U.S. Atlantic Command, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. FORSCOM is USACOM's Army subordinate headquarters that provides Army units for various contingency operations. As an example, if USACOM required a certain type of Army unit for a mission, FORSCOM would help to determine which Army unit would best meet the requirement and then task that unit or its headquarters to support USACOM's mission.

40. Donnelly Interview.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Faiola, Haitian Frustrations, 84.

44. The crisis-action process under JOPES produces an OPORD, not an OPLAN. For historical clarity, however, titles will be used as the various commands referred to them.

45. Major William B. Garrett, interview with Dr. Robert K. Wright, Dr. Donald Carter, and Ms. Cynthia L. Hayden, March 29, 1995, Oral History Interviews, 43-45.

46. As commonly applied, there is a difference in meaning between "force entry" and "forcible entry." Force entry is a planning term for an operation where a military force enters another nation-state opposed or unopposed. Forcible entry implies that the force will be opposed.

47. XVIII Airborne Corps Staff, "OPLAN 2370-97 CJTF 180 Campaign Plan for U.S. Military Operations in the Republic of Haiti," unpublished briefing slides, 1994.

48. Both Garrett and Benson are graduates of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), a second-year follow-on course for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. SAMS officers receive detailed instruction in the theory of war and peace operations. SAMS graduates first received acclaim as the "Jedi Knights" for their role in planning Operation Desert Storm.

49. Major Damian Carr, "U.S. Army Public Affairs During Operation Uphold Democracy," M.M.A.S. thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996, 55.

50. Garrett Interview, 45.

51. Bonham Interview, 9.

52. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595.

53. JTF 180 OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

54. Haitian police at the time were FAd'H military police, not civil police as in other countries.

55. The heavy weapons company was a major concern for the invasion force, as it represented most of the Haitian Army's firepower.

56. JTF 180 OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

57. Bonham points out that Marines were not part of the initial OPLAN 2370 and were added much later. The addition of Marines frustrated the planners, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

58. The 82d Airborne Division chooses to use nonjoint service or U.S. Army official brigade-size unit designations. The unofficial regimental names date back to World War II and are used to inspire tradition and esprit within the 82d.

59. The actual aviation deployment consisted of 583 aviation personnel from two battalions, thirty-three UH-60 Blackhawks, seventeen CH-47s, and eight OH-58D Kiowas.

60. Headquarters, 82d Airborne Division, "82d Airborne Division After Action Report: Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Ft. Bragg, NC, December 15, 1994.

61. Sean Naylor, "The Invasion That Never Was," Army Times, February 26, 1996, 13.

62. Written comment from Dr. John Partin, command historian, U.S. Special Operations Command, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, to Dr. Lawrence Yates, Combat Studies Institute, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. H-hour is the time the operation commenced, with the exact time to be decided based upon the situation and the commander's intent.

63. Major Robert C. Shaw, "Organization and Planning for Operation in Haiti (1991-1995)," unpublished A657 (course) research paper, HOHP, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 42-43.

64. OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

65. Ibid.

66. OPLAN 23 70 briefing slides. Also see Lieutenant Colonel Larry J. Godfrey, "Health Services Support Planning Joint Task Force 190 and Multinational Force Operation Uphold Democracy," unpublished. A657 (course) research paper, HOHP, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996. Godfrey was the JTF 190 command surgeon.

67. OPLAN 2370 briefing slides.

68. Bonham Interview, 10. The JCS directed the use of the term "OPORD," as that is the appropriate document that results from crisis-action planning. The Army corps planners kept referring to an "OPLAN" as a product of deliberate planning, so the JCS attempted to clarify the language. In the Army, however, OPORD means "execute," as Bonham explains. Therefore, the XVIII Airborne Corps personnel thought for a brief period of time that they were about to invade Haiti.

69. Faiola, Haitian Frustrations, 86.

70. Bonham Interview, 10.

71. Bonham Interview, 11.

72. U.S. Army doctrine does not direct a division to act as a JTF and, therefore, the headquarters has neither the equipment, personnel, nor training to do so. Despite the enthusiasm of many members of the 10th Mountain Division's staff regarding their ability to do joint planning, Major General Meade acknowledged that his staff did not have the maturity or experience required for that mission. See Interview with Major General David Meade by Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, October 27, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

73. 10th Mountain Division Handbook, Operations in Haiti, Planning/PreparationlExecution (Ft. Drum, NY: Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, 1995), 1-7.

74. Combined Joint Task Force Haiti, Operation Plan 2380 Operation Maintain Democracy, Headquarters, 10th Mountain Division, 081600R, September 1994, Change 1, 5.

75. Operation Plan 2380, 6-7.

76. According to Major General David Meade (U.S. Army, ret.), ICITAP participated in this planning process at Ft. Drum. The statement was made in a conference on public security in Panama sponsored by the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University at Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., January 24, 1997.

77. 10th Mountain Division Handbook, 7.

78. As Lieutenant General Shelton joked, OPLAN 2375 was devised and written only several days prior to the invasion because of the changing political conditions in Haiti.

79. Bonham Interview, 26.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Revising a plan this complex is not easy and required the staff to work around the clock for several days.

83. Garrett Interview, 45.

84. CARICOM is an acronym for the Caribbean Community, an economic and political organization of English-speaking Caribbean nations. CARICOM was used by the USACOM planners to mean Caribbean Command, instead of Caribbean Community. CARICOM provided a battalion-sized force, with the participating countries each providing about a platoon or around forty personnel.

85. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Chris Olson by Walter E. Kretchik, December 1995, U.S. Atlantic Command, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

86. Headquarters, Jamaica Defense Force, "Minutes of a Meeting of the Caribbean Region Executive Session held at the Morgan's Harbour Hotel on Friday, July 22, 1994."

87. Olson Interview.

88. Caribbean Region Executive Session Conference Deliberations, August 19, 1994, Agenda, 3.

89. The term "fuel" is used loosely. According to one observer, a gallon of fuel was made up of about one-half gallon of fuel, with the remainder being urine and kerosene. The concoction cost about $4 U.S. a gallon.

90. The 1st Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light), was the official name for the 9th Infantry Regiment. Like the 82d Airborne Division, the 9th Regiment commander chose to mimic the use of an unofficial unit designation. The 9th Regiment moniker was adopted primarily because the subordinate battalions are all from the 9th Infantry. Moreover, when the 7th Infantry Division was reformed at Fort Ord, California, former airborne officers with an airborne tradition of using regiments instead of brigade designations made up a great deal of the leadership. I was the I Corps chief of plans at Fort Lewis, Washington, in 1993-94 and watched the process of nominating the 9th Regiment for the Dominican Republic mission. The 9th Infantry Regiment was a unit in limbo in 1993-94, as the 7th Infantry Division (Light) no longer existed except in name only. A large majority of the division, less the 9th Regiment and its own support units, was inactivated as part of the early 1990s force drawdown mentioned earlier in this chapter. The 9th Regiment, now an independent or separate brigade, was seeking missions to avoid being caught in the drawdown itself. The leaders of I Corps, the senior headquarters at Fort Lewis, saw the MOG mission as an ideal way to give the 9th Regiment a real mission within its capabilities. Trenda noted that McMillian's lack of Spanish proved to be detrimental and led to his removal as the MOG commander later on. Trenda, in a separate comment to this author, identified McMillian as a hyper individual who had trouble relaxing and getting some sleep. According to Trenda, McMillian drove himself and his staff to the point of exhaustion, thus his removal from the team was more due to McMillian's personality than his lacking Spanish.

91. Trenda Interview.

92. Robert A. Pastor, "A Short History of Haiti," Foreign Service Journal (November 1995): 3.

93. Bonham Interview, 32.

94. In this publication, for the sake of consistency, the plan will also be called OPLAN 2375.

95. Interview with Major David Stahl by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, Center of Military History, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

96. Lieutenant Colonel James L. Dunn and Major Jon M. Custer, "Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: The Role of the SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force," Special Warfare, (July 1995): 29.

97. Author unknown, "Unpublished Notes, Planning Intervention in Haiti," Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 2.

98. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Phil Idiart by Walter E. Kretchik, December 1995, U.S. Atlantic Command, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

99. Michael R. Gordon, "Top U.S. Officials Outline Strategy for Haiti Invasion," New York Times, September 14, 1994, 1. John Barry and Douglas Waller, "How U.S. Forces Would Go In," Newsweek, September 19,1994, 41-42.

100. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Execute Order 051658Z, September 1994."

101. Olson Interview

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid

104. Ibid.

105. Bonham Interview, 36.

106. Bill Clinton, "The Possible Invasion of Haiti to Restore a Democratic Government," Vital Speeches of the Day, no. 24, October 1, 1994, 739-40.

107. Major General Meade said that when he and Lieutenant General Shelton arrived in Guantanamo Bay on September 18, 1994, they did not know, had not been informed of, President Carter's mission. Meade statement, INSS Conference, National Defense University, January 24, 1997.

108. CINC, USACOM, message, dated 182231Z September 1994, Headquarters, U.S. Atlantic Command, Norfolk, Virginia. Zulu is Greenwich Mean Time.

109. Crisis Action Team A, Colonel (first name not provided) Fawcett, journal UPDATE A.919, entry number 463, undated, 1.

110. Crisis Action Team A journal, 1.

111. Ibid., 2.

112. Ibid.

113. Bonham Interview, 38.

114. Bonham, 38-40, Also see OPLAN 2380 target list.

115. Joint Task Force 180, OPLAN 2380 Plus, September 19, 1994.

116. Ibid.

Chapter 3

1. Major Michael F. Davino, "The 4th Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment During Operation Uphold Democracy," unpublished A657 (course) research paper, Haiti Oral History Project (HOHP), U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996.

2. Lieutenant General Henry H. Shelton, CINC, JTF 180, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, October 22, 1994, Cynthia Hayden, ed., JTF-80 Uphold Democracy: Oral History Interviews (Ft. Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1990), 62.

3. "Words of Clinton and His Envoys: A Chance to Restore Democracy," The New York Times, September 20, 1994,

4. Larry Rophter, "Cables Show US Deception on Haitian Violence," The New York Times, February 6, 1996.

5. Shelton Interview, JTF-180 Uphold Democracy, 64.

6. Interview with Colonel Mark Boyatt by Dr. Robert Baumann and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, February 28, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

7. "A Conversation with Former Prime Minister Robert Malval," Haiti Insight (February-March 1996):36.

8. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adams by Dr. John Fishel, Dr. Robert Baumann, and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, November 16, 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

9. Interview with Major Tony Schwalm by Dr. Robert Baumann and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, March 20, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOEP; Interview with Major Tony Schwalm by Major John Cook, February 11, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

10. John Kifner, "Haitian Police Crush Rally as American Troops Watch," The New York Times, September 21, 1994.

11. Colonel Michael Sullivan, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, November 8, 1994, Cynthia Hayden., ed., Oral History Interviews: Operation Uphold Democracy, , ed., 363.

12. Boyatt Interview.

13. Interview with Colonel James Dubik by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, Dr. John Fishel, Dr. Lawrence Yates, and Dr. Robert Baumann, July 27, 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

14. Major General David Meade, Commander, JTF 190, interview with Colonel Dennis P. Mroczkowski, October 27, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 10.

15. Martin I. Urquhart, "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy," M.M.A.S. thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 72.

16. Ibid., 76-78.

17. Dubik Interview, July 27, 1995.

18. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Anderson, JTF 180, J3, civil affairs officer, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, October 10, 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 305-6; interview with Major Chris Hughes by Dr. Robert Baumann and Major Christian Klinefelter, March 29, 1996, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

19. Lieutenant Colonel Edward Short, Special Operations LNO, JTF 190, interview with Captain Thomas Ziek, October 6, 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 413-20.

20. Lieutenant Commander Donald J. Hurley, "The Effectiveness of Naval Intelligence Support to 10th Mountain Division Units Embarked on the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69), September 14-21, 1994," M.M.A.S. thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1997; and 10th Mountain Division briefing slides, n.d., circa December 1994.

21. Interview with Major Jeff Miser by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 4, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

22. Colonel Jonathan Thompson, Commander, Task Force Castle, interview with Major Christian Klinefelter, October 17, 1994, as cited in Klinefelter's draft thesis, chapter 5, "Command and Control of Engineers in Joint Operations: Lessons Learned from Haiti," Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 81-100.

23. Major General David Meade, memorandum, personal, for Admiral Miller, Lieutenant General Hartzog, Vice Admiral Gehman, and Lieutenant General Shelton, "The Post Aristide Return Strategy," undated (judging from the content, written shortly after October 15, 1994), Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. Though no signature appears, this document is from the collection of Meade's personal papers for JTF 190.

24. Hughes Interview.

25. Urquhart, "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence," 89.

26. Hughes Interview.

27. Captain Edward R. Armstrong, "Detainee Operations in Haiti During Operation Uphold Democracy," Military Police (Winter 1995): 16-19.

28. Ibid. Taped briefing by Major Chris Hughes, Center for Army Lessons Learned, November 1995; Colonel Lawrence Caspar, Commander, 10th Aviation Brigade, interview with Colonel Dennis Mroczkoswki, October 19, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 397; Combined JTF Haiti Operations Plan 2380, 4; interview with Major Dan Godfrey by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 23, 1998, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

29. Hughes Interview.

30. 10th Mountain Division briefing slides, n.d., circa December 1994.

31. Interview with Major Len Gaddis by Major John Cook, February 12, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP; interview with Major Len Gaddis by Dr. Robert Baumann, March 27, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP; Major John Kidd, S3, 4th PSYOP Group, JTF 180, JPOTF LNO, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, October 4, 1994, JTF 180 Operation Uphold Democracy, 3 63-65.

32. Meade Interview, Oral History Interviews, 7-11; Gaddis Interview, February 12, 1997, March 1997; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

33. Interview with Major Jack Pritchard by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 24, 1998, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. Douglas Ide, "A Presence for Peace," Soldier 49, no. 11 (November 1994): 14. Major Pritchard commanded the headquarters battery of the 10th and trained it to assume the role of ARFOR HQ of TF Mountain. According to Pritchard, members of the ARFOR staff were "very much" influenced by the Somalia experience: "Immediately people drew the same thought that it was a similar mission...." In fact, they perceived the situation to be less permissive than in Somalia.

34. Major General David Meade, memorandum for Lieutenant General Hartzog, "Somalia Vs. Haiti a Comparison," undated (judging from the content, written shortly after October 15, 1994), Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

35. Ibid.

36. Interview with Major Kris Vlahos-Schafer by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, March 30, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP; Gaddis Interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, March 27, 1997; Gaddis Interview, February 12, 1997.

37. Major Berthony Ladouceur Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, March 1997. Part of the problem also evidently stemmed from Meade's command style. Virtually every interviewee, both inside and outside JTF 190, with whom the subject of command climate at JTF 190 was broached noted the strained atmosphere at headquarters. Some interview subjects preferred not to be identified with regard to these observations. Numerous references refer to tense encounters between Major General Meade and Lieutenant General Shelton, and between Meade and Brigadier General Potter. To the credit of all participants, such friction as may have existed was kept from public view, but accounts of its existence coincide rather well with differences in perspective over mission priorities and force protection questions. If, as most observers felt, Meade's force protection policy went too far, for too long, it is only fair to note that he was the man on the spot in Port-au-Prince, and the Somalian experience had served as a reminder of how quickly casualties could undermine U.S. foreign policy. Congressional opponents of President Clinton's Haiti policy emphasized more than once that the mission did not justify American casualties. As for the effects of the force protection policy and tedium on morale in Haiti, see Favis Kirkland, Ronald Halverson, and Paul Bliase, "Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations," Parameters (Summer 1996): 85.

38. Anderson Interview, October 10, 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 306.

39. Taped briefing by Major Chris Hughes, Center for Army Lessons Learned.

40. Vlahos-Schafer Interview.

41. OPLAN 2380, 4.

42. Hughes Interview.

43. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman by Dr. Robert Baumann, May 5, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

44. Bob Shacochis, "Our Two Armies in Haiti," The New York Times, January 8, 1995.

45. Anderson Interview, October 10, 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 30-37.

46. Gaddis Interview, February 12, 1997.

47. Department of the Army, Operation Uphold Democracy: Initial Impressions, Haiti D20 to D+150, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, April 1995, A2.

48. Taped briefing by Major Chris Hughes.

49. Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

50. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel George Steuber, TF Mountain, by Dr. Robert Baumann, January 31, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

51. Captain Robert Elmore, "BSA Defense in Cap Haitien," Army Logistician (September-October 1996): 12-23.

52. John T. Fishel and Edmund S. Cowan, "Civil Military Operations and the War for Moral Legitimacy in Latin America," Military Review (January 1988); John T. Fishel, Civil Military Operations in the New World (New York: Praeger, 1997), 209-34.

53. 2 BCT briefing slides.

54. Dubik Interview, July 27, 1995; Fishel, Civil Military Operations, 223-25.

55. Shelton Interview, October 22, 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 62.

56. Ibid., 63.

57. Interview with U.S. Army lieutenant colonel involved in training by Dr. John Fishel, Dr. Robert Baumann, and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, November 16, 1995; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997; Colonel Richard Quirk III, Commander, 525th MI Brigade, interview with Captain Thomas Ziek, October 20, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 101.

58. Freeman Interview.

59. Captain Berthony Ladouceur Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, October 22, 1994, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 174.

60. Ibid., 168-70.

61. Freeman Interview.

62. Major Jiyul Kim, "Perspectives of Uphold Democracy from the Army Operations Center," unpublished A657(course) research paper, HOHP, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Spring 1996.

63. Michael Hodges, "Watching Over Small Town Haiti," The Washington Times, October 18, 1994.

64. Colonel John D. Altenburg, JTF 180, staff judge advocate, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 327-31.

65. Schwalm Interview, 11 February 1997; Todd Robberson, "'Macaroni' Means Hero in Haiti Town," The Washington Post, October 26, 1994.

66. Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

67. "U.S. Force Battling Language, Voodoo," The St. Petersburg Times, October 29, 1994.

68. Freeman Interview.

69. Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

70. "U.S. Facing Weapons, Werewolves," The Washington Post, November 24, 1994.

71. Urquhart, "The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence," 71.

72. Altenburg Interview, JTF 180 Uphold Democracy, 327-31; Gaddis Interview, February 12, 1997.

73. Brigadier General Richard Potter Interview with Major Christopher Clark, October 23, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 17; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997; U.S. Army lieutenant colonel interview, January 1997.

74. Potter Interview, October 23, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 17; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

75. Ibid.

76. Gaddis Interview, February 12, 1997.

77. Interview with Special Forces Soldiers by Dr. Robert Baumann and Major Robert Shaw, January 16, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP; interview with Major John Brockington by Major Don McConnaughhay and Dr. Robert Baumann, February 6,1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. Major Brockington was not a witness to events at Camp D'Application but was made aware of them in the course of his legal work for Special Forces in Haiti while he was at Ft. Bragg. Interviews with a number of Special Forces soldiers who were present confirmed the general facts of this event.

78. Shacochis, The New York Times; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

79. Special Forces Soldiers Interview, January 16, 1996.

80. General George A. Fisher Interview with Major Burton Thompson, Jr., unpublished joint history interview transcript, May 8,1995.

81. Anderson Interview, October 10, 1994, 292.

82. Ibid., 299.

83. Ibid., 300.

84. Ibid., 300-305.

85. Ibid., 308-9.

86. Gaddis Interviews, February 12, March 27,1997; Schwalm Interview, March 20, 1997.

87. Interview with Colonel David Patton by Dr. John Fishel and Dr. Robert Baumann, January 13, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP.

88. Lieutenant Colonel Bill Maddox and Gerard Healy, "Instant Advisers: Civil Affairs Team Assists Haitian Ministries," Special Warfare (October 1995): 29-31.

89. Colonel Jonathan Thompson, Commander, 20th Engineer Brigade, Commander, Task Force Castle, interview with Captain Thomas Ziek, October 17, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 203.

90. Major James C. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision: Psychological Operations in Operation Uphold Democracy," unpublished A657 (course) research paper, HOHP, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, March 3, 1996, 12.

91. Stephen Brown, Making a Difference: The Short-Term Impact of Operation Uphold Democracy, Headquarters, JPOTF, September 27, 1994, 5-8, as cited in Boisselle; PSYOP Support to Operation Uphold Democracy: A Psychological Victory (Ft. Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps, 1996), 7-8.

92. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 10, and interview with Major William Schaff by Dr. Robert Baumann, May 6, 1996, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HORP.

93. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 14-19; Stephen D. Brown, "PSYOP in Operation Uphold Democracy," Military Review (September-October 1996): 69.

94. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 16.

95. Interview with Major Berthony Ladouceur by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

96. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 17-19.

97. Brown, Making a Difference, as cited in Boisselle, 19.

98. Interview with Major Clayton Cobb by Dr. Robert Baumann, April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

99. Colonel Jeff Jones, memorandum, HQ, JPOTF, "Reestablishment of U.S. Credibility in Haiti an Alternative Approach," October 2, 1994, as cited in Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 20; and interview with Major Robert Shaw by Dr. Robert Baumann, Major Cheryl Smart, and Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik, May 15, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

100. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 21.

101. Captain John Valledor, Commander, Company B/315 Infantry, interview with Captain Thomas Ziek, October 26, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 386-87.

102. Boisselle, "Communicating the Vision," 21.

103. Ibid., 22-23.

104. Lieutenant Colonel Larry Godfrey, "Health Services Support Planning: Joint Task Forces 190 and Multinational Force, Operation Uphold Democracy," unpublished A657 (course) research paper, HOHP, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, Q12.

105. Ibid., 46.

106. Ibid., Q4, Q11.

107. Major Patricia Dallas Horoho, "Health Facility Assistance 'Hit Team,'" unpublished A657 (course) research paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 23.

108. Ibid., 13-14.

109. Ibid., 15.

110. Interview with Captain (U.S. Army, ret.) Larry Rockwood by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Kretchik and Dr. Robert Baumann, October 31, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP. It is less than clear just how specific, detailed, and accurate were the reports available to Rockwood. Experience of U.S. forces in Haiti suggested that reports of many sorts were often highly exaggerated. However, Major Vtahos-Schafer, who by virtue of her position also saw intelligence reports, confirmed that some did pertain to conditions in the prisons. In any case, there is little dispute that prison conditions were bad. As for whether or not acts of brutality were occurring at that time in the national prison, the evidence is uncertain. Major Schwalm, however, noted in his interview with Major Cook that there were confirmed reports pertaining to other prisons. On the other hand, a lieutenant colonel with TF Mountain observed to the author in an interview on January 31, 1997, that sudden, unauthorized intrusion at the prison might conceivably have triggered acts of violence against prisoners. See also, Nick Adde, "Appeals Court Holds Rockwood Conviction: Captain to Seek Reversal from Highest Court over Haiti Incident," Army Times, March 16, 1998.

111. Ibid.

112. Anna Husarska, "Conduct Unbecoming," Village Voice, April 11, 1995, 21-26; U.S. Army lieutenant colonel with TF Mountain, interview with Dr. Robert Baumann, January 31, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

113. Husarska, "Conduct Unbecoming," 21-26; Gaddis Interview, February 12, March 1997.

114. Law and Military Operations in Haitk Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates, 1994-1995 (Charlottesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General's School, 1995), 54-56; see also footnote, 174. One of the authors of this volume, Major Mark Martins, generously offered clarification of some legal points to Dr. Baumann.

115. Husarska, 25-26.

116. Fisher Interview.

117. Ibid.

118. Operation Uphold Democracy: Joint After-Action Report (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Atlantic Command, 1995), 36.

119. Interview with Major Walter Pjetraj by Dr. John Fishel, Major Robert Shaw, and Dr. Robert Baumann, January 13, 1996, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, HOHP.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. Greg Chamberlain, "What René Preval Brings to the Haitian Presidency," Haitian Insight (February-March 1996): 1.

123. Freeman Interview.

124. Lieutenant General Joseph Kinzer, telephone conversation with Colonel Jerry Morelock, Director, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, August 22, 1997.

125. Brigadier General John Ryneska, Deputy Commanding General for Support, JTF 190, interview with Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski, October 27, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 42-44.

126. "Le Commissioner," New York, January 16, 1995, 34-36.

127. Colonel Michael Sullivan, Commander, 16th MP Brigade, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Charles Cureton, November 8, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 30-45.

128. Gaddis Interview, February 12, March 27,1997; Major David leMauk, LNO to Haitian Police, JTF 190, interview with Colonel Dennis Mroczkowski, October 26, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 323.

129. Sullivan Interview, November 8,1994, Oral History Interviews, 311-12.

130. Ibid., 313.

131. leMauk Interview, October 26, 1994, Oral History Interviews, 324.

132. Ibid., 322-24.

133. "Le Commissioner," 34-36.

134. Pjetraj Interview.

135. William G. O'Neill, "Building a New Haitian Police Force and Justice System," Haiti Insight (October-November 1995): 1, 3, 8.

136. Pjetraj Interview.

137. Patton Interview, January 13, 1996; J. P. Slavin, "The Haitian Police: Struggling with Inexperience and Leadership Woes," Haiti Insight (April-May 1996): 4-5; "Haiti: Human Rights After President Aristide's Return," Human Rights Watch/Americas (October 1995): 20-21.

138. Patton Interview, January 13, 1995; Slavin, 4-5; Robert Maguire, "Defanging the Predatory State," Hemisphere, no. 1 (1995): 14-16; Susan Tamar Joanis, "Human Rights: A Key Component of Police Training," Haiti Insight (April-May 1996): 4-5.

139. Tammerlin Drummond, "A Constabulary of Thugs," Time, February 17, 1997, 62-63.

140. Freeman Interview.

141. The experience of the previous decade in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility proved to be not only relevant but also explanatory of what was effective and what was not. SOUTHCOM lessons focused on the ways in which civic action could either mitigate the ill effects of military operations (mitigating civic action) or contribute to national development (development civic action).

142. Kevin C. M. Bensen and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations," Parameters (Autumn 1996): 69-80.

143. Michael Mandelbaurn, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs (January-February 1996): 25.


Chapter 4

1. These principles are found in Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, Washington, D.C., 1993, and Joint Pub 3-0, Operations, Washington, D.C., 1993, and Joint Pub 3-07, Military Operations Other Than War, Washington, D.C., 1995. The principles of MOOTW are found in both FM 100-5---where they are called principles of operations other than war (a subtle difference)---and the joint pubs. We refer to them and the environment in which they operate as MOOTW out of deference to the recent Army decision to cease using the term OOTW; however, the joint term, by direction of the chairman, JCS, still takes precedence.

2. Although several definitions of "legitimacy" are used in current field manuals, joint pubs, and political science writing, the way in which we are using the term derives from and expands somewhat on these definitions. We use legitimacy to mean the perception that a government has the moral right, as well as the legal right, to govern and that governments or international actors are perceived to be acting in morally and legally right ways.

3. Transition refers to the transition from the UN-sanctioned U.S.-MNF operation to the UN's own UNMIH operation, as well as to the second phase of UNMIH, when U.S. forces turned over the operation entirely to a Canadian-led UN force.

4. See chapter 2 in this publication.

5. UN S/RES 940, July 31, 1994.

6. See chapter 2 in this publication.

7. Ibid.

8. UN S/RES 940, July 31, 1994, paragraph 8.

9. Robert Pastor, a member of the Carter team, recounted the story that Biamby fled with Cedras and that the U.S. team had to make contact with Mrs. Cedras to get the general to reinitiate negotiations so that the U.S. team could conclude terms successftilly. Interview with Robert Pastor by John T. Fishel, September 1995.

10. The Tonton Macoutes, a Creole phrase meaning bogeyman, were the secret police of the Duvalier regimes.

11. See chapter 3 in this publication. It should be remembered that the 10th Mountain Division was also the ARFOR of UNITAF under its previous commander, then-Major General Steven Arnold, and had a wholly different experience than it had had in UNOSOM II.

12. Ibid.

13. USACOM briefing slides, n.d., circa October 1994.

14. Ibid.

15. TACON (tactical control) means that the force commander can assign missions to a unit within the terms of reference agreed upon at the governmental level but cannot task organize the unit.

16. For a more complete description of this case, see chapter 3.

17. UNSCR 940, July 31, 1994, paragraph 8.

18. Interview with Colonel William Greenawald, UNMIH advance party operations officer, by John T. Fishel, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1995. Interview with Colonel Bill Fulton (Canada), UNMIH chief of staff, by John T. Fishel, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 1996.

19. John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack," paper prepared for conference on Haitian recovery, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, September 1995.

20. Joseph W. Kinzer, "Military Commander's Vision/Intent," draft, n.d., circa December 1994.

21. Ibid.

22. Greenawald Interview.

23. Ibid. Colonel Greenawald speculated that the reason had to do with the traditional UN reluctance to get too close to any national force, thereby identifying itself as a mere extension ofthe foreign policy of that nation.

24. Interviews with U.S. officer involved with the training of the UNMIH staff by John T. Fishel, spring 1995. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman, director, Haitian Studies Institute, University of Kansas, and a member of MICIVIH and of General Kinzer's staff at various times, by John T. Fishel, 1995.

25. Kinzer. See also briefing slides, "Haiti Unconventional Operations," 3d Special Forces Group (Abn), November 12, 1994-April 22, 1995. See also interviews with officers and staff in Haiti by John T. Fishel, January 1996.

26. Interview with Canadian CivPol officer by John T. Fishel, January 1996. CivPol is the part of UNMIH that is responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the HNP.

27. Interviews with Major John Charlton, aide-de-camp to General Kinzer, by John T. Fishel, March 1997. Interview with Colonel Bill Fulton, UNMIH chief of staff, by John T. Fishel, January 1996.

28. See Dr. Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, "Haiti Yields Clinton Small 'Rally Effect,'" The Gallup Poll Monthly (September 1994): 18-19. See also, Donald E. Schulz, "Whither Haiti?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 19-25, and P. A. Dostert, J.D., Latin America 1996 (Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post Publications, 1996), 122.

29. Fulton Interview.

30. Interview with Colonel David Patton, Commander, U.S. Support Group, Haiti, by John T. Fishel, January 1996

31. In 1997, the executive protection service was found to have been engaged in extralegal political violence that prompted the U.S.-imposed retraining.

Chapter 5

1. Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars, United States Intervention in the Caribbean 1898-1934 (Belmont, CA: Wadworth Publishing Company and the University of Kentucky Press, 1988), 2-6.

2. Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), x-xv.

3. Donald E. Schultz, Whither Haiti? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), x.

4. Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Russ Glenn, School of Advanced Military Studies, by Walter E. Kretchik, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994, defines each of the situations in the following manner. A hostile environment is an operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. An uncertain environment is defined as an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended areas of operations. A permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. Key to all three environments is that the local government and its forces either control or fail to control their country.

6. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adams by Walter E. Kretchik, 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Haiti Oral History Project (HOHP). Dr. Freeman is the director of the Institute of Haitian Studies, University of Kansas. He has authored over sixteen books on Haiti, written the only Haitian Creole-English dictionary in existence, and has lived and traveled in Haiti over the last thirty years.

7. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Randall P. Munch by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, 1995, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

8. According to joint doctrine, a permissive situation means that the host country military and law enforcement agencies are in control and have the intent and capability to assist operations that an outside unit intends to conduct. See Joint Pub 1-02, 275.

9. Ibid.

10. Conversation with Major Tom Ziek, JTF 190 historian by Walter E. Kretchik, September 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

11. Interview with Colonel Andrew Berdy by Major Tom Ziek, October 9, 1994, Bowen Field, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

12. Interview with Colonel Thomas Miller by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, date unknown, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

13. Berdy Interview.

14. Interview with Colonel Jim Dubik by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

15. Interview with U.S. Army Special Forces officer by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

16. Interview with U.S. Army Military Intelligence officer by Walter E. Kretchik, April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

17. Interviews and conversations with numerous officers by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996-May 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. According to numerous field grade officers from the 10th Mountain Division, both Major General David Meade, the division commander, and Brigadier General George Close, the assistant division commander, exhibited leadership styles that were "trying." One officer witnessed a "screaming fit" by the division commander that was directed at two MPs who had temporarily removed their body armor while laboring in the sweltering 100 degree heat. A logistics officer saw a similar instance and remarked that "the entire chain of command just stood there and took it. Later, we wondered about it, was this leadership by screaming?" Lieutenant Colonel George Steuber, a key leader within Task Force Mountain, related that Brigadier General Close was a hard, but usually fair, individual. Steuber related that Close was also prone to rages where he would lose control of himself in front of subordinates to include throwing his helmet. According to Steuber, who personally was involved in one such instance, Close had earned his nickname "Danger Close," a term usually identified with firing artillery or using air strikes near or upon ones own position. Steuber also noted that Meade would treat his subordinates in a like fashion, but that Close would sometimes apologize afterwards.

18. Interviews with U.S. Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs officer by Walter E. Kretchik, February-April, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. An example of directed nonengagement was Brigadier General Close's orders to Special Forces soldiers on the first day of the operation to not talk with Haitians through the fence at Port-au-Prince airport. According to one eye-witness, Close ordered him and several others away from the fence, thereby denying them access to the people. Although political considerations were possibly at stake as the junta and the FAd'H were cooperating with U.S. forces, SF soldiers were unaware that they could not meet and engage in conversation with the populace, normally a typical SF mission. Many SF soldiers later ignored the directive as it was in direct conflict with the orders they received through Special Operations Forces command channels.

19. Interview with Major Len Gaddis by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

20. Conversation with 10th Mountain Division officer by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

21. Conversation with Haitian scholar by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996, Montrois, Haiti.

22. Miller Interview.

23. Ibid.

24. Conversations with numerous Haitian scholars by Walter E. Kretchik and Bob Baumann, November 1996, Montrois, Haiti. The conversations were with native Haitian scholars who bad eye-witness experiences with U.S. troops. One Haitian described American soldiers as "sterile" in their approach toward Haitians. Another Haitian believed that the Americans did not interact with the population out of contempt, the same contempt that her father told her the U.S. Marines of the 1920s felt toward him. These comments, and others, indicate that the 10th Mountain Division did not present a totally positive image with the populace.

Some observers noted that certain members of the XVIII Airborne Corps were frustrated with the 10th Mountain Division's initial operating methods in Haiti. To some XVIII Airborne staff officers, conservative decisions were overriding the accomplishment of political objectives. Major Tony Ladouceur, Shelton's personal translator, noted that Shelton stayed in Haiti a lot longer than he had planned because of concerns over 10th Mountain Division's operations. Ladouceur noted that Shelton voiced several concerns with Meade over operational command decisions, particularly over population engagement, and had personally tried to rectify the situation on several occasions without effect. Ladouceur's comments to the author were that Shelton remained in Haiti simply because he was not comfortable with how the 10th Mountain Division was conducting itself. He therefore stayed beyond his expected departure time to ensure that the division did what it was supposed to do.

25. Interview with Colonel Marc Boyatt by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997., Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

26. Conversations with U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996-February 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HORP. The Special Forces soldiers mentioned that Lieutenant General Shelton told his subordinates to really understand "street rhythms" to know what was happening on the streets of Haiti.

27. Miller Interview.

28. Interview with Brigadier General Richard Potter by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, October 23, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

29. Conversations with members of the FORSCOM staff by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996 and April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

30. Conversations with several members of the 25th Infantry Division and 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment staffs by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996, December 1996, and February 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

31. Lieutenant General Shelton, upon his return to Ft. Bragg, was promoted to general and given command of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Major General Meade retired.

32. Freeman Interview.



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