The CINCs' Strategies: The Combatant Command Process
Authored by COL (RET) William W. Mendel, Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr..
December 01, 1997
110 Pages
Brief Synopsis
The authors report their observations of the different ways combatant commanders-in-chief (CINCs) produce a strategy document, and suggest that new joint doctrine is needed to bring a degree of regularity and orderliness to the CINCs' strategic planning process.
The CINCs' Strategies: The Combatant Command Process provides a brief look at the CINCs' strategy objectives and concepts in order to place the planning process in context. The focus of the study, however, is on the process itself as it exists and could be further developed. With our National Security and National Military Strategies so clearly directed toward shaping the international environment, effectively responding to crises, and preparing for major theater warfare and smaller-scale operations, the unified actions of our joint forces can be greatly enhanced by joint doctrine which guides military planning for the strategic level of war.
SUMMARY
As the United States approaches the 21st century, fundamental transformations of regional and global security environments are placing new importance on the strategic concepts and responses developed by the Combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs). In assessing the strategy development process of the Combatant Commanders in detail, this study addresses both traditional planning considerations and highlights new factors and circumstances that shape CINC perspectives and approaches. Drawing upon interviews with CINCs' planning staffs, briefings, and national and command-level documents, the study reviews the formative guidance influencing strategy development; conducts command-bycommand assessments of the process whereby each CINC develops and articulates his strategic vision; and concludes with a series of key judgements suggested by the CINCs' strategy development process.
Dominating CINCs' assessments are two variables–strategic guidance from senior echelons and evaluations of the threat environment. National-level strategy and planning documents aid directly in the development process by providing basic conceptual guidance for producing assessments and strategies. Understanding the dangers to U.S. interests within a CINC's domain is a central factor influencing the CINC's appreciation of his strategic situation. In every region, security challenges are complex, diverse, often nontraditional, and frequently interconnected. These challenges range from the conduct of major regional contingencies, dealing with internal threats to friendly regimes, addressing a host of transnational dangers, supporting large-scale disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, and countering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They have strong interagency and international dimensions that evolve in an environment characterized by change, uncertainty, and surprise.
National-level guidance and assessments of complex security challenges are points of departure for the central part of the study which considers how geographic CINCs–U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)–together with selected functional CINCs–U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)–develop their respective strategies.
Principal among the questions considered in the course of this command-by-command review are the following:
· Do all combatant commands have a current strategy?
· Where do the CINCs look for strategic guidance?
· What is the doctrinal guidance?
· Why are the CINCs' strategy documents important?
· What is the planning process?
· Is there a common theme to the CINCs' strategies?
· Have the CINCs' strategies accommodated to new threats and security concerns?
· Do strategies effectively link ends, ways, and means?
· Who participates in writing a strategy and who approves it?
At each combatant command headquarters, these and other questions were addressed by enthusiastic and knowledgeable joint planners, skilled in the art of military strategy. Yet, the review suggested that joint doctrine on this subject is incomplete, and that authoritative guidance encouraging a coherent system of combatant command strategies is needed. This view of the CINCs’ processes identifies an approach that is incompletely defined and structured, reflecting the pretermission of the U.S. joint doctrine community. It argues for the promulgation of joint procedures and doctrine to guide strategy development, and measures for at least some form of review and coordination of final products.
The study argues also for the inclusion of common tenets that are considered in the development of a CINC's strategy. Until direction concerning the process for writing these strategies is institutionalized, the issue will remain the source of debate and confusion. CINCs should be held to some standard for current and coherent strategies affecting their combatant commands.
This is critically important for five principal reasons. First, a strategy provides the CINC's vision and guidance for a myriad of activities that protect U.S. interests within geographic or functional areas of responsibility. Commanders of subordinate theaters of operations or subregions can benefit from the unifying action of a theater strategy. Second, because of the way our nation has organized its joint forces to fight under the command authority of the geographic CINCs, a strategy is needed to integrate the many U.S. and multilateral regional activities involved. CINCs, for example, must account for U.S. policy and interests, alliances, economic and political issues, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), new technologies, and information warfare, among other considerations.
Third, a strategy is useful in pulling together the U.S. interagency cooperation and support that a CINC often will need for mission success. Knowing where the command is headed for the long haul, how peacetime activities are meant to support warfighting plans, and what government and nongovernment agencies can buttress the CINC's strategic concepts can assist combatant staffs and subordinate commands as they develop campaign plans. Fourth, CINCs' strategies are critically necessary as a basis for cooperation among the combatant commands. The doctrinal imperatives of “supporting to supported” relationships, which planning for the major regional contingencies demands, suggest this in particular, as does the requirement to address emerging transnational dangers and nontraditional threats that defy classical notions of territorial boundaries–or Areas of Responsibility (AOR).
Finally, a complete set of the CINCs' strategies–developed on the basis of common criteria–is important to the Joint Staff and service staffs. This would provide staffs with the means of accessing the current strategic concepts of combatant commanders and ensure that the staffs fully understood the range of CINC support requirements. If a complete strategy includes the ends, ways and means of
strategic vision and intent, then the CINCs occupy the primary echelon of what can properly be called military strategy. This analysis, based on primary research through 1996, provides a view of how the CINCs go about writing a strategy and offers suggestions about the process.
Contents
Foreword
About the Authors
Summary
Chapter I.
Planning for a New Threat Environment
Chapter II.
Strategy Process
Chapter III.
The CINCs’ Strategies
Appendix A.
Suggested CINCs’ Strategy Formats
Appendix B.
Bibliography
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