Military

Warfighters And Humanitarians: Integrating Technology To Save Lives

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Warfighting

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: WARFIGHTERS AND HUMANITARIANS: INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY TO                    SAVE LIVES

 

Author: Major Ronald M. Zich, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis: The Department of Defense (DoD) and civilian relief agencies (non-governmental organizations--NGO) have not effectively integrated communication and data system technologies into their combined humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Background: Future humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions will require DoD forces to integrate with NGOs. Voice and data communications, critical at all levels, are most challenging at the tactical level. The tactical Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) has developed into the binding organization between the military and NGOs. Operations Provide Comfort, Sea Angel, Restore Hope, and Support Hope provided four common themes concerning tactical level military-NGO communications: daily face-to-face meetings have been the most effective communications means; NGOs do not have the capability to provide themselves robust communications capabilities; military commanders often desire to support NGOs communication efforts, allowing for improved military-NGO relief efforts; and the NGOs must have a need to communicate with the CMOC.

     Today's communications interfaces can take three forms: meetings, single channel radio (SCR) communications, and host nation infrastructure use. Military-NGO meetings must be tailored to emphasize relief, vice warfighting, and provide the NGOs utility. These meetings will continue to be crucial for CMOC functionality. SCR has inherent advantages and disadvantages--for each operation the use of SCR must be considered as a coordination tool between the military and NGOs. The fundamental advantage of SCR is timeliness, while its disadvantages include security (equipment and personnel), legal issues, and NGOs logistic and fiscal supportability. Analysis of host nation infrastructure capabilities for radio, telephone, and data systems integration must be accomplished before each operation.

 

Recommendations: Given the common themes and existent systems, the military and NGOs must explore current and developing technologies that will enhance integration--as we move into the 21st century, this exploration must be a joint effort. Commercial-off-the-shelf radio systems must be procured by the military to ensure a common operating environment. Cellular phone systems, with their flexibility and easy use, must be examined for their potential applications in humanitarian operations. Ongoing software initiatives must be merged, ensuring compatibility and integration amongst all relief participants. The problem of moving packets of data around the "battlefield" must be resolved through innovative ideas such as equipment assignment to forward deployed units that support the military, NGOs, host nations, and coalition forces, with follow-on equipment based with the Joint Communications Support Element. The technologies of the future must be evaluated and incorporated into the tactical environment. Finally, there must be a culture shift within the military to ensure that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations are recognized as legitimate military operations, receiving the training and education emphasis they deserve.   

 

 

 

 

 

WARFIGHTERS AND HUMANITARIANS:

INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGY TO SAVE LIVES

 

 

 

 

 

 

Past policy might have changed irrevocably, on 9 December 1992, when U.S. Marines landed "from the sea" at Mogadishu, Somalia--not to close with and destroy the enemy and seize advance naval bases, but to enable relief missions to carry out food and medicine to tens of thousands of people on the edge of starvation.[1]

     

     Hardly a day passes without headlines announcing a major humanitarian plight or

 

natural disaster somewhere in the world. Millions lack basic health services, safe

 

drinking water, adequate medical care, and suffer from malnutrition. More are exposed

 

daily to the horrors of AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases. Localities continue

 

to be subjected to the brutal atrocities perpetrated by governments, tribes, insurgents, or

 

local police forces. Natural disasters continue to strike and cause destruction in both

 

developed and developing countries, eroding public services and causing widespread

 

famine, disease, and food shortages.

 

     To combat effects of humanitarian horrors and natural disasters, President Clinton in

 

the National Security Strategy[2] and General Shalikashvili in the National Military

 

 

Strategy[3] have declared "peacetime engagement" as integral to America's overall global

 

strategy. The National Military Strategy describes peacetime engagement as "a broad

 

range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate

 

commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve

 

suffering, and enhance regional stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include

 

military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian

 

operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping."[4]

 

     The Clinton administration has employed the Department of Defense (DoD) as one of

 

its primary agencies for such operations, as Patricia Irvin writes, "DoD is uniquely

 

qualified to participate in these efforts by virtue of its ability to make available--often on

 

short notice--its highly trained and skilled personnel and high-quality resources."[5] As we

 

move into the 21st century, it has become increasingly clear that the U.S. military is no

 

longer just a fighting force. Rather, because of its "breadth of assets, global reach, and

 

rapid responsiveness,"[6] DoD forces will find themselves deployed with other U.S.

 

agencies (most commonly with State Department offices), United Nations (U.N.)

 

agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO), private organizations (PVO),

 

international organizations (IO), and other countries' military forces supporting

 

humanitarian assistance operations.[7] These assets, specifically communications and lift

 

capabilities, make the military crucial to peacetime engagement.

 

     DoD has defined four types of foreign[8] humanitarian missions: relief missions that

 

provide prompt aid and the distribution of relief supplies; dislocated civilian support

 

missions that provide camp organization, provisions, and placement services; security

 

missions that establish and maintain conditions to allow for relief operations; and

 

technical assistance and support functions that provide short-term relief assistance.[9] The

 

extent of U.S. military involvement in any of these missions will be dictated by the

 

domestic and international political situation, the operational context (unilateral,

 

multinational, or U.N. response),[10] and the magnitude of the crisis. While conditions

 

predicating military involvement normally coincide with unstable or non-existent

 

government and little or no infrastructure, if substantial damage or plight exists, the

 

President may call upon DoD, especially for its command and control and lift

 

capabilities.

 

     Unlike military operations, U.S. forces are usually not the "first to fight" on the

 

humanitarian battlefield. More often, the military will deploy to areas where civilian

 

relief agencies are already operating, and will continue to operate after military forces

 

depart. These agencies are "independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary

 

 

 

relief providers."[11] Referred to generically as NGOs,[12] each type of agency has a unique

 

function. The most common civilian relief agencies, NGOs, are transnational

 

organizations composed of private citizens that provide a broad array of services.

 

Normally U.S. based, PVOs are similar to NGOs in their organization and functions.

 

Organizations that have global influence (such as the Red Cross) are defined as IOs.

 

They are the largest and most influential relief agencies. The relief agencies vary in size,

 

experience, capabilities, and resources.[13] Although the U.S. government has developed

 

lines of communication within itself, there are no specific hierarchies or structural lines

 

between the government and civilian relief agencies (NGOs).[14]        

 

 

LEVELS OF "WAR"

 

     Both military and civilian organizations support humanitarian assistance efforts

 

through their own structural hierarchy (Figure 1). Each "warfighting" level is represented

 

and each agency contributes vital functions to the operations. While a purely military

 

operation is much "cleaner" because of the established hierarchy, the interworkings

 

between and across the levels provide significant challenges during humanitarian

 

assistance operations. The significant role played by relief organizations in humanitarian

 

operations demands their interests be represented at every level.[15]

 

 

 

 

	DoD	US Agencies	United            Nations	Relief           Agencies
Strategic	-NCA -SecDef -Joint Chiefs of     Staff -CINC	-Department          Secretaries	-UN Hq -Functional Hq	-International &     National Hq's
Operational	-CINC -CJTF	-Ambassadors -Regional              Offices	-Special Reps	-Regional              Offices
Tactical	-CJTF -Components	-Ambassadors -Field Offices -USAID Teams	-UN Military          Forces -UN Teams	-Field Offices -Relief Workers

 

Figure 1

AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES[16]

 

     At the strategic level institutionalized coordination between agencies has recently

 

developed, and efforts continue at the U.S. agencies, U.N., and relief agencies to resolve

 

philosophical and operational differences. The military has provided its commanders

 

with basic guidance and policy through Joint Pub 3-08 (Interagency Coordination During

 

Joint Operations) and Joint Pub 3-07.6 (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for

 

Humanitarian Assistance [draft]). Both address the military-civilian relief organization

 

interface at the strategic level and the importance of developing relationships that will

 

build the bridge towards a unity of effort.

 

     As the link between the strategic and tactical levels, the operational level provides the

 

bridge for successful operations. In pure military operations, the operational level is

 

closely tied to the tactical situation. The same is true for humanitarian operations.

 

Humanitarian tactical-level operations focus on the relief workers' efforts while the

 

logistical work of moving supplies in-country (the key to success) transpires at the

operational level.   

 

     The tactical level is the "tip of the spear" for both combat and humanitarian

 

operations. It is the most challenging level for interaction between agencies, for it is here

 

that the mission of coordinating multiple military forces and civilian agencies towards

 

one common objective resides. Compounding this challenge is the fact that purely

 

military command and control methods will not succeed when dealing with relief

 

agencies who do not have the knowledge, resources, or desire to operate like with

 

military forces.

 

          From a technical standpoint, tactical level coordination requires equipment

 

(hardware and software) compatibility (or interoperability). Joint Pub 1-02, DoD

 

Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms, provides two definitions for

 

interoperability:     

 

     1. The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services from other systems, units     

or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively           together.

 

     2. The condition achieved among communication-electronics systems or items of

     communication-electronics equipment when information or services can be                       exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.

 

The challenge for U.S. forces is to closely coordinate (communicate) with civilian

 

relief agencies (IO, NGO, PVO) that are poorly equipped to handle the

 

communications interfaces required for voice (radio and telephone) and data

 

(computer) circuits.

 

RELATIONSHIPS: THE KEY TO IT ALL

    

For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses--manpower, equipment, expertise, transport, and communication capability--that only the military can deploy.[17]

    

    The relationship between organizations is critical to mission accomplishment during

 

any operation. Nowhere is this more true than during humanitarian assistance operations.

 

The integration and coordination of military, U.S. agencies, civilian relief agencies, U.N.

 

agencies, and host nations bring a unity of effort to the operation and act as a force

 

multiplier. With the varied capabilities, personalties, and cultures that each organization

 

brings to the relief effort, it is critical that U.S. military forces fully participate and help

 

establish working relationships with the civilian agencies supporting relief efforts. Joint

 

Pub 3-07.6 states, "Relationships with these organizations [NGOs] need to be based on

 

mutual understanding of lines of communications, support requirements, procedures,

 

information sharing, capabilities, and most important, mission."[18] This relationship

 

may be difficult to foster given the different personality traits and cultural attitude that is

 

normally divergent between the military and relief organizations. Joint Pub 3-0 states,

 

"Efforts must be coordinated despite philosophical and operational differences separating

 

agencies."[19] To facilitate this relationship, the military (and U.N. if involved) may

 

establish three operations centers that directly interface with the civilian agencies. At the

 

strategic level, the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) provides

 

interagency planning and coordination. A Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)

 

provides the operational link, coordinating the overall relief strategy. The HACC and

 

HOC will normally have personnel from the military, U.S. State Department, host nation,

 

U.N., and NGOs represented.

 

     At the tactical level, the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)[20] provides on-site

 

relief workers the coordination means with military forces for security, logistics

 

requirements, and technical support issues. Communication among tactical level

 

agencies is most critical--direct links between commanders and civilian workers should

 

be established for effective coordination and decision making. The CMOC is manned by

 

military forces, but can also have NGO personnel. Additionally, host nation and U.N.

 

agencies will usually include a member of their staffs in the CMOC. It must be noted

 

that the CMOC is not always a facility, but rather a coordination concept.[21] This point is

 

crucial when discussing the "CMOC's capabilities" from a technical standpoint. Figure 2

 

provides a notional organization relationship chart for a humanitarian assistance or

 

disaster relief operation.

 

 

Figure 2

NOTIONAL ORGANIZATION RELATIONSHIP

 

     Expectations by NGOs are a significant part of the military-NGO relationship,

 

especially with regard to communications support. With NGOs having an "all pervasive

 

and permeating attitude"[22] about the military, they expect a robust and flexible system

 

present if military forces arrived before them. Interestingly, NGO expectations are very

 

low when they have been on scene for a considerable time before U.S. forces arrive.

 

This paradox may occur because of the NGO workers' myopic view of the operation and

 

exaggerated expectations of military capabilities. One perception is if NGOs have

 

survived without the military for a time, they may consider the operational advantage

 

they can gain from DoD command and control systems as minimal. In this case, they

 

under estimate the military's capability.

 

 

 

 

FOUR HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES: SOME COMMON THEMES

 

     Operations Provide Comfort (southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, April 1991), Sea Angel

 

(Bangladesh, May 1991), Restore Hope (Somalia, December 1992), and Support Hope

 

(Rwanda, July 1994) offer four unique views of communicating at the tactical level of

 

a humanitarian operation. While different in mission objectives, scope of plight, and

 

level of military-NGO interface, the operations have two common themes. First, they

 

represent the U.S. military's most extensive efforts in humanitarian relief. Second, the

 

four operations cover the entire spectrum of potential missions as defined in Joint Pub

 

3-07.6 (draft).               

 

Provide Comfort

 

Right from the beginning we had private organizations that were in here that were working side by side with us. These organizations were located all over the area of operations, in the border camps, eventually in northern Iraq, at our aerial and seaports of debarkation.[23]

 

     As the Kurdish people streamed into Iran and Turkey, the U.S. military had no idea

 

the scope of mission they were about to undertake. Beginning with airlifts, and gradually

 

moving towards a longer term stabilization force, the U.S. military, fresh off the Desert

 

Storm victory, was thrust into the NGO world of humanitarian assistance operations.

 

Tasked to stop the suffering and returning the Kurds to their native localities, the military

 

had to deal with organizations that were as strange to them as the military was to the

 

NGOs. Before the military could coordinate with the NGOs, they had a valuable lesson

 

to learn. "The military was introduced to the greatest strength and greatest weakness of

 

the NGO community: the ability to go anywhere anytime with no one's approval."[24]

 

Dealing with this lack of control and coordination was the biggest hurdle the military had

 

to overcome. The NGOs had some lessons to learn too, mostly about the culture and

 

capabilities of the military. The relief workers quickly learned that the military was as

 

compassionate and caring as them, while bringing along capabilities beyond the scope

 

and means of NGOs. Once both sides broke their stereotypes, the business of relief

 

began.

 

     When the initial wave of DoD forces and NGOs arrived at various camps in Turkey,

 

all recognized the requirement for some form of coordination. The austere operating

 

environment and limited forces in-country meant the only coordination option was

 

face-to-face meetings. These meetings became a regular event, and although they had no

 

structure, provided the only forum for military-NGO interaction. Functioning as

 

round-table discussions, they became the initial lifeline for coordination in the earliest

 

stages of Provide Comfort.

 

     With the situation developing, the military and NGOs established headquarters at

 

Diyarbakir, Turkey. Again, the face-to-face daily meetings became prominent. Besides

 

the military and NGOs, the U.N. was now an active member of the relief effort. In

 

today's vernacular, this daily meeting would have transpired in the CMOC. Although the

 

meeting was held at a regularly scheduled time and place, that was all the structure the

 

meeting had--every attendee was given the opportunity to speak and voice their concerns.

 

Consensus was as important as a rigid decision making process.  

 

 

     Despite the fact that DoD deployed almost 1,400 short tons of equipment and 400

 

communicators to support relief efforts, communications between the U.S. military and

 

NGOs were lacking. "Few of these organizations [NGOs] had their own communications

 

systems, and they had to rely on host nation facilities. Some agencies did have

 

single-channel HF radio, others made use of the International Maritime Satellite

 

(INMARSAT) system, but in any case they did not have any spare capacity."[25] While the

 

U.S. did at times provide communications support to NGOs working inside Iraq, there

 

was no established communications system for military-NGO interface.   

 

     Two critical lessons emerge from Provide Comfort. First, the face-to-face

 

military-NGO meeting an effective tool for coordinating relief efforts at all levels and

 

locales during the operation. Second, the lack of a common communications

 

infrastructure between the military and NGOs hinders relief efforts. While not

 

manifested in this operation, the requirement to pass and receive timely, accurate

 

information and have an information repository is crucial to the well-timed delivery of

 

supplies, security, and a trusting relationship.          

 

Sea Angel

 

The most difficult problems to overcome in determining both the need and the ability to meet the need were the almost total lack of communications with the affected areas.[26]

 

     Sea Angel was conducted as a humanitarian operation after Hurricane Marian

 

pounded the Bangladeshi coastline for two consecutive days, destroying the road and rail

 

networks and key communications facilities. With the NGOs already in Bangladesh, this

 

lack of infrastructure hindered their ability to distribute the much needed supplies to the

 

hardest hit areas. Underlying tensions between the NGOs and Bangladeshi government

 

impeded the initial coordination of the relief effort. Then, further complicating the

 

situation, U.S. military forces arrived.

 

     To coordinate the political entities, military forces, and relief agencies, the Relief

 

Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC) was created. "The RACMC

 

represented strategic[27] awareness of the overall situation and a tactical discussion of how

 

to move the assorted supplies to Chittagong[28]."[29] The cell's priority was to provide

 

operational level guidance to the effort--the RACMC forwarded its relief effort priorities

 

to the Military Coordination Center (MCC), today a CMOC, located at Chittagong. The

 

Joint Task Force (JTF) Forward coordinated the efforts at the MCC, working closely with

 

Bangladeshi officials, NGOs, and various countries' military components.

 

Communications between the military and NGOs at Chittagong took two forms: a daily

 

meeting and radio communications.

 

     General Stackpole described one of the military's roles in Sea Angel, writing, "The

 

second major role played by the JTF staff, a role that developed over a period of days,

 

was that of coordinator among all the agencies trying to help."[30] To carry out this

 

guidance, the MCC held a daily meeting to coordinate relief efforts throughout the area.

 

The reliance upon DoD's lift and communications capability compelled the NGOs to

 

participate. This meeting brought together the tactical level workers and provided the

 

forum for tactical level decision making. To the credit of the JTF staff, their

 

even-handed, common sense approach led to an effective distribution of supplies by all

 

the relief agencies.        

 

     Lacking a communications infrastructure, DoD forces established radio

 

communications between the MCC, distribution points, and NGO/government

 

warehouses around Chittagong.[31] "Valuable communications support was another

 

valuable asset supplied by the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). At one point, up to

 

ten[32] comm sites[33] were established in Bangladesh. These sites supported both the

 

Bengali[34] government and a number of NGOs."[35] Capt Seiple points out that NGO

 

expectations for this system were very high, writing, "In terms of relative expectations,

 

that the military would be able to provide a working communications system, this

 

comparatively poor performance was a major disappointment."[36] Despite the systems

 

problems, whether real or perceived, CARE's after action report did not mention DoD

 

provided communications as a shortcoming.

 

     Participants of Sea Angel had two recommendations regarding communications.

 

First, General Stackpole[37] recommended a strategic level "study designed to develop a

 

communications backbone that is as disaster proof as possible (regional and long range

 

radio nets)." LtCol Anderson, the JTF J-3, wrote, "To function effectively, they [NGOs]

 

will need some augmentation from U. S. communications assets. Consideration

 

should be given to allowing NGO liaison personnel access to uncovered comm links."[38]

 

These recommendations will be analyzed shortly.

 

Restore Hope

 

When directed by the National Command Authorities, CINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure major air and sea ports, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, to provide security for relief convoys and relief organizations operations, and to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.[39]

 

     This mission was unprecedented--military forces had never seen an order at this level

 

explicitly directing security and assistance support to the U.N. and NGOs during a

 

humanitarian operation. What was meant by "assist in providing humanitarian

 

relief?" Was there a clear "division of labor" or were U.N., NGOs, and military forces to

 

integrate as one team? What were the NGOs' expectations? As the CINCCENT planners

 

prepared for this mission, was there the realization that the military-NGO relationship

 

about to be forged would be the standard for the future?  

 

     Operation Restore Hope was a major media event as well, with a torrent of images

 

of starving and malnourished Somalis flashing across America's TV screens at six

 

 

 

o'clock. Going in, the military had to be aware that the sooner relief began, the sooner

 

their mission would be accomplished. This unequivocally meant close coordination with

 

a NGO community that was still foreign to the military, even after Provide Comfort and

 

Sea Angel. Likewise, the NGO community knew its survival was based solely on the

 

military--the NGOs previous Somalia experiences taught them the harsh lessons of

 

lawless rule.[40]

     Somalia validated conclusions from the previous operations that the daily meeting

 

between the military and NGOs provides the most effective coordination and information

 

sharing. Once the first Marines landed, coordination between them, U.S. government

 

officials (Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART), part of U.S. Agency for International

 

Development), and NGOs took place at a daily DART meeting. The Marines, wanting to

 

establish an immediate presence in Mogadishu, assigned Col Hellmer a unique mission.

 

"I was given that assignment (to start a Civil-Military Operations Center) with the broad

 

mission statement of making it happen, and primarily acting as a liaison between the

 

non-government organizations and other relief organizations to interface with the

 

operational commander."[41] Eventually, HOCs were established by the JTF in each of the

 

eight designated sectors, along with CMOC cells. HOCs would gather and validate the

 

NGOs' requirements and forward these requests to its respective CMOC for action.

 

While the HOC and CMOC worked closely with the NGOs, U.N. officials also worked

 

 

 

closely with both organizations.[42]            

 

     The austere environment forced a heavy reliance on single channel radio (SCR)

 

communications. Because of the vast area and numerous NGOs, the JTF did provide

 

some NGOs military SCR assets to enhance coordination (and to provide a measure of

 

security for NGOs who did not have assigned military forces). Rather than enhancing

 

control, NGO risk was actually increased[43]--the radios were stolen by Somali thugs. This

 

had the effect of compromising radio nets for a short time. NGOs that had military

 

security teams assigned had access to military radios, however, these radios had a strictly

 

military purpose, being linked to the COC rather than the CMOC. While some NGOs

 

had their own SCR nets, these nets did not provide the necessary infrastructure for the

 

military to be able to "tap into" them, allowing close coordination.

 

     The most important lessons learned in Somalia are consistent with the two previous

 

operations reviewed: the daily face-to-face meetings provide the best forum for

 

coordination, and most NGOs do not have the organic communications assets to support

 

military-NGO interfaces. Before military augmentation of NGO communications

 

capabilities is decided upon, an assessment should be made to determine the utility of

 

augmenting the NGOs.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Support Hope

 

It's amazing how quickly information can get around the local population and

     NGO community.[44]

 

Operation Support Hope differed from other humanitarian relief efforts in that the

 

U.N. was in-charge and the U.S. military, like the NGOs, was a supporting agency. This

 

did not preclude the need for a military-NGO interface, but did limit its scope. Entebbe,

 

the main point of entry, was the initial CMOC location. Because of the military's lift

 

capability, the NGOs were "driven" to coordinate at the daily CMOC meeting. This

 

meeting took the form of other CMOC meetings--a loosely structured meeting where

 

everyone spoke. As the operation expanded, additional CMOCs were established

 

throughout the theater and used the same forum.

 

     Support Hope had something none of the military's previous humanitarian operations

 

had--a telephone communications infrastructure (albeit archaic by U.S. standards). This

 

provided the CMOCs with the ability to coordinate without face-to-face encounters and

 

proved to be somewhat effective from both the military and NGO viewpoint. Now, the

 

NGOs could stay "in the field," call the CMOC, and request through voice or facsimile

 

their requirements. Because the telephone system was located sporadically throughout

 

the country, often communications relied upon the passing of messages by locals, but this

 

was better than no communications at all.[45] The key lesson learned in Support Hope is

 

that military-NGO coordination can be greatly enhanced by using the existing

 

communications infrastructure.

        

 

COMMON THEMES

 

     From the four operations studied, NUMEROUS SIMILARITIES APPEAR. First, the most

 

effective means of communications between the military and NGOs at the tactical level

 

has been daily face-to-face meetings. Ironically, these CMOC meetings have become the

 

military's focal point during relief operations, and the military has excelled in

 

harmonizing itself with the NGO community. The Combat Operations Center (COC) or

 

other tactical operation centers have taken a back-seat to the CMOC during humanitarian

 

assistance operations. When operating in a non-permissive environment, the CMOC and

 

COC should be separate but accessible to each other to provide ready coordination of

 

military operations and relief efforts. The military shift in tactical awareness has resulted

 

in ever-increasing trust by the NGOs. The second significant similarity is the NGOs'

 

inability to provide themselves a robust communications capability which would allow

 

communications integration with the military, other NGOs, host nations, and their

 

respective headquarters. Fiscal and logistics constraints, coupled with a myriad of legal

 

issues, make it unrealistic for most NGOs to support a large communications package.

 

Viewing this situation, the third similarity emerges--the military commander's desire to

 

support the communications structure of a relief effort to include NGOs. Finally, the

 

NGOs must have a need to communicate with the CMOC. The CMOC must have a

 

"value added" sense for the NGOs--if the CMOC can't offer them something tangible

 

(lift, security, information, communications), they have no incentive to coordinate.

 

 

 

 

TODAY'S TOOL BAG

 

     Today's communication interfaces at the tactical level between U.S. forces and NGOs

 

can take three forms: meetings, SCR communications, and host nation infrastructure.

 

While each form has inherent advantages and disadvantages, clearly the "lowest tech" but

 

still the best form, the face-to-face meeting, has been the most utilized. This clearly does

 

not preclude the necessary use of other communications means. Today's available tools

 

as well a search for new ideas and initiatives are critical for future mission

 

accomplishment.

 

The Meeting

 

     Noted during each humanitarian operation was the heavy reliance upon the daily

 

meeting for coordination and information sharing. These meetings are of considerable

 

value so long as specific parameters are applied to the meeting. First, the meetings must

 

be conducted in an area that is "NGO friendly." If the NGOs are required to pass

 

through multiple security checkpoints, wear identification badges, or follow strict

 

procedures or rules, they are less apt to attend. Second, the meeting must be an open

 

forum, with no individual or agency in charge (unless the NGOs decide to elect a

 

meeting leader). Most NGOs desire to remain neutral, or at least give the allusion of

 

neutrality--attending a meeting chaired by the military does not provide neutrality.

 

Military CMOC personnel must remember their mission--coordinating and supporting the

 

NGOs. "Warfighting" stays in the COC. Third, attending the meeting must provide

 

utility to the NGO. With their personal security at stake in Somalia, the NGOs had a

 

great desire to visit the CMOC daily, as Col Hellmer points out, "We met with the NGOs

 

every day and they did not hesitate to come into the airport."[46] Here, the utility was

 

personal security, but it could be as simple as providing access to a telephone or as

 

intricate as arranging to airlift supplies to a remote destination. It is essential that the

 

NGOs leave the CMOC meeting each day with the feeling that the CMOC "did

 

something for them." No matter what communications equipment the military and NGOs

 

procure in the future, this daily CMOC meeting must continue. There will never be a

 

substitute for face-to-face coordination.

 

Radio Communications

 

     Surprisingly, the CMOC has never used a "CMOC Coordination" radio net, which

 

could include the military (both U.S. and coalition), U.N. agencies, NGOs, and the host

 

nation. Such a net would greatly aid in the decision making process, especially in the

 

timeliness of low-level decision making. In Bosnia, U.S. forces have established an

 

"unofficial" radio watch with NGO radios--some NGOs have provided a radio or base

 

station to U.S. forces for "monitoring" their activities.[47] While the emphasis on this is

 

"unofficial" (for neutrality purposes), the lesson is clear: any real-time communications

 

between agencies enhances performance.

 

     There are numerous reasons why such a radio net has not been established, but this

 

should not preclude its consideration, given the appropriate situation. Foremost is the

 

issue of security. As one of the basic tenets of military communications, security of radio

 

nets is crucial to successful operations. If radios fall into "enemy" hands, the radio net

 

 

 

could be compromised. The intrusion or monitoring of a CMOC net has the potential for

 

disaster--security forces dispatched to meet false alarms or ambushes, relief supplies

 

moved to locations where they are not needed, or even media intrusion to get the "best

 

scoop."   

 

     As shown in Restore Hope, both personal and equipment security must be considered

 

when deciding to implement a CMOC net. In a non-permissive environment, it is crucial

 

for the NGOs to maintain neutrality. Any association with the military could have a

 

devastating impact on the relief workers' personal safety. In such a situation, however,

 

the mere possession of valuable equipment will put both the relief worker and the

 

equipment in jeopardy, regardless of the owner (military or NGO). Thus, from an

 

accountability standpoint, the issuance of military radios to NGOs in such a situation may

 

not be prudent. However, if NGOs are willing to use their own equipment to link into a

 

net, accountability will not be an issue. At this point, it suffices to note that in a friendly

 

environment, the establishment of a CMOC net would not have any security issues

 

associated. However, in a hostile situation, great debate will occur before deciding on

 

net establishment. If it determined to establish this net, many political, fiscal, and

 

security problems will require resolution based on the exact distribution of equipment

 

assets.

 

     Although the military and some NGOs are capable of establishing sophisticated

 

radio links, international and host national legal issues must be considered. First, the

 

frequency spectrum, as defined by international law, is the property of the host nation. In

 

an operation such as Restore Hope, where no recognized government existed, use of the

 

spectrum was unrestricted. However, in Bangladesh, its government had control, thus

 

frequency allocation was at their discretion. The recent trend of selling portions of the

 

frequency spectrum and charging for use of the spectrum continues to grow.[48] "This

 

problem is not limited to the United States. Other nations have their own frequency

 

allocations, and U.S. forces passing through or operating in another country potentially

 

face frequency conflicts."[49] Although there was unlimited use of the spectrum in

 

Somalia, frequency deconfliction problems still existed. "Even an austere signaling

 

environment rapidly became crowded and required increasing attention to the

 

'deconfliction' of radio frequencies being used by the military units."[50] Once frequency

 

issues are resolved, other issues such as power outage, "type approved" equipment, and

 

usage locations must also be coordinated with both the host nation and between using

 

organizations.

 

     Another consideration is the ability of NGOs and the military to bring equipment into

 

the relief area. In addition to the lift constraints both the military and NGOs encounter,

 

individual country license fees, customs regulations, and the appropriate paperwork are

 

required just to get the communications equipment in-country. "Politics of the arena may

 

not let in the best technology,"[51] stated Larry Roeder, an experienced relief worker with

 

the State Department. While some of this may seem petty in light of the support which

 

 

will be provided, host nation laws must be adhered to or the possibility exists that

 

equipment will not be authorized by host nation officials for use in their country.

 

     Improving coordination through radio communications is constrained by the fiscal

 

reality that supporting even one radio net is expensive. With numerous ways to power a

 

radio system, it is obvious that the use of generators is not feasible for most NGOs in the

 

field. Given NGOs' mobile requirements, one-time use batteries are the most reliable and

 

flexible power source in most situations.[52] Presented with this, NGOs are apt to shy away

 

from a CMOC radio net--costs, logistics requirements (purchasing batteries, passing

 

customs, flying radios into the country, and distribution), and utility of one radio net is

 

not a "value added" incentive. It must be noted that many of the larger NGOs do bring

 

radio systems for their exclusive use, and one more radio net would not cause concerns.

 

However, for smaller NGOs, this is a major effort that may require resources beyond

 

their capacity.           

   

     Operational success requires communications; successful communications requires

 

interoperability. "Only with communications that will interoperate is it possible for

 

military forces acting jointly to achieve their full potential,"[53] wrote Norman Augustine in

 

his article on noninteroperability. These axioms hold true when applied to combat,

 

humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief operations. Diverse military forces (not only

 

U.S., but coalition as well), the U.N., and numerous NGOs add up to varied

 

communications capabilites--in a word, noncompatability. Without an agreed upon

 

 

common operating environment (COE) for radio operations, one cannot expect that all

 

relief participants will be capable of talking with the CMOC. An agreed upon COE

 

between the U.S. government, U.N., and larger NGOs[54] will go a long way towards radio

 

interoperability, and thus, more efficient and effective relief operations.

 

Host Nation Infrastructure

 

     Support Hope offered the first view of host nation infrastructure, providing

 

humanitarian relief communications support, when the CMOC and NGOs received

 

limited commercial telephone support. For the most part, regions of the world where

 

these operations occur will either have little to no infrastructure or facilities damaged

 

beyond immediate repair. Bangladesh's communication infrastructure, for example, was

 

destroyed by Hurricane Marian. Somalia's infrastructure suffered a different fate. "The

 

Somalia infrastructure that had survived the civil war was destroyed as everything of

 

value was stolen, and sold, or bartered for cash or services."[55] The military and NGOs

 

will normally bring their organic systems, but this should not preclude the examination of

 

host nation support. However, for the military or NGOs to even consider sole reliance on

 

host nation communications would be fatal. In order to utilize host nation assets, it must

 

be recognized that a permissive, secure environment is generally required. Telephone,

 

radio, and data systems require constant upgrade and maintenance. Without repeaters,

 

antennas, telephone lines, and most importantly, a management system, host nation assets

 

are of little or no value.

 

Perhaps the most reliable communications to be found in developing countries will be

 

their commercial telephone system. This may include everything from archaic analog

 

systems which resemble spaghetti factories--wires everywhere with no apparent

 

organization--to modern cellular systems with an extensive repeater network throughout

 

the country. Whichever system is present, both have useful applications for interfacing

 

the tactical level military and NGO communities. Either system, if capable, can provide

 

voice and data circuits.

 

     From the military perspective, any analog system can be interfaced given the right

 

tools. Integration of commercial lines into the military switching[56] network provides

 

great system flexibility and redundancy. NGOs do not possess switching capabilities,

 

thus they are totally reliant on either commercial or military provided switches and

 

telephones. Although analog telephone systems provide a great communications tool,

 

many factors enter into the equation. First, these telephone lines are not free--thus, the

 

NGO must be willing to pay for dedicated lines or access to them. Second, the relief

 

worker may not have ready access to a telephone, as happened in Rwanda. Finally,

 

the reliability of these telephone systems is suspect. They are affected much more by

 

weather, distance, and manual operator requirements than U.S. systems.   

 

     Modern cellular systems provide more flexibility than analog systems and are the

 

preferred choice of relief workers because of their size and capability.[57] However, their

 

potential to support a large traffic volume is much more tenuous.[58] Depending on system

 

design, there can be bottlenecks (too little capacity compared to demand for service),

 

limited range or loss of service due to repeater location and maintenance, or exorbitant

 

costs related to this service. Secure military systems are not capable of interfacing

 

directly with these systems, thus there is total reliance on the commercial company

 

providing the service. Despite all these potential problems, if the cellular system can be

 

used, one can anticipate superb interaction between the CMOC and NGOs, as well as

 

with the U.N. and host nation.

 

     As unbelievable as it may seem to modern society, many Third World countries still

 

rely heavily on single channel radio communications. As such, during a humanitarian

 

assistance operation, these systems may be available for use. Their most likely

 

employment is an integrated military, NGO, and host nation radio net which would

 

support operational level communications. The utility at the tactical level would be

 

extremely restricted and is primarily based on the location of the host nation radio

 

facilities.    

 

     By far, the least likely communications asset to be available is data (computer)

 

network access. With the worldwide proliferation of the Internet, this powerful

 

technology could be leveraged to significantly enhance tactical operations at a low cost.

 

Access to the Internet would provide the means for rapid information sharing, data

 

distribution, and even the forum for meetings (chat mode). However, the barriers to gain

 

and maintain Internet access are great. The military and NGOs must have computers,

 

telephone lines must be working, and data servers require constant attention. The reality

 

is most nations that require the military-NGO team do not have the capability to provide

 

access to this resource.

 

     Today's tools are genuinely "low-tech" when compared to the available technology.

 

However, given the operational locations, fiscal constraints, mobility and lift restrictions,

 

and the lack of infrastructure, the military-NGO relationship and communications

 

interfaces have done remarkably well. Now the challenge is seeing how we can become

 

"high-tech" for future relief operations.       

 

 

MOVING INTO THE 21st CENTURY

 

     Perhaps the most ironic revelation to come from past operations is that despite the

 

technology boom of the 1980s and 1990s, technology has not truly entered the tactical

 

level military-NGO relationship. Today's battlefield is high-tech, complex, fast paced,

 

vastly expanded, and information driven--and rapidly becoming the same are the

 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief "battlefields." At a conference on

 

communications management on recent Africa operations, participants "recognized that

 

using faster, broader, and more consistent information gathering and dissemination

 

methods and tools supported the goals of information sharing--saving lives, reducing

 

risks, and cutting costs."[59] It is the responsibility of both the military and NGOs to

 

explore new technologies for practical solutions to the interface problem. The question

 

is, are there systems which are affordable, reliable, flexible, manageable, and durable

 

enough for the tactical environment that is associated with relief work?

         

 

Radios          

 

     As previously discussed, one of the problems faced today is interoperability amongst

 

communications systems; this holds especially true for radio systems. Obtaining an

 

agreed upon COE, while solving part of the problem, still could leave some NGOs, host

 

nations, and coalition forces without radio communications because of their

 

non-compliance. The only actual means of providing a fully compatible radio system is

 

to procure and distribute the system to all participants. Obviously, this involves a

 

significant cost that government funds (either U.S. or another nation contributing to the

 

effort) provided towards relief would have to cover--NGOs do not have the budget for

 

such an expenditure. These packages could fall under the "foreign aid" category when

 

the equipment is turned over to the host nation at the end of the operation.[60]

 

     The solution to the fully compatible radio system problem is a cheap, disposable radio

 

system ("throw-away") that could be provided to participants willing to follow

 

communications procedures.[61] Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment that can be

 

easily purchased in large quantities would provide participants a ready means of

 

communications, while providing the military an intelligence and coordination means.

 

The NGOs benefits are immediate communications with the CMOC, a degree of

 

protection (via immediate requests to the CMOC), and cost-savings (not having to

 

purchase equipment and batteries).

 

     The military's equipment must be compatible (interoperable) with the majority of

NGOs (as well as the U.N., host nations, and coalition forces). DoD research,

 

development, and acquisition must ensure that terminal and transmission systems are

 

fully compatible or can be reconfigured to meet humanitarian operation requirements.

 

Additionally, COTS radios should be purchased in sufficient quantities to support two

 

simultaneous humanitarian relief efforts. Based on the four operations reviewed, it can

 

be anticipated that between 70 and 100 NGOs will participate. Given this baseline,

 

procurement of a combination of 300 radios and base stations (150 per operation) could

 

support NGOs, military forces, coalition forces, U.N. agencies, and host nations.

 

Forward based units (i.e., Marine Expeditionary Units) and rapid reaction forces (air alert

 

units) should maintain a portion of these, while the remainder should be controlled by the

 

Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) for contingency missions.

 

Cellular Telephones

 

     During Operation Restore Hope, DoD utilized portable cellular telephone technology

 

to enhance communications between the JTF, its components, the embassy, and U.N.

 

staff. For its size, this COTS package delivers a powerful punch. Consisting of

 

INMARSAT terminals, portable cellular sites (PCS), and cellular phones, this system is

 

capable of interfacing with tactical military switching systems and the Defense Switched

 

Network (DSN). Employed in Mogadishu (two PCSs) and aboard amphibious shipping

 

(one PCS), the JTF had the capability of employing up to 90 cellular phones (30 per

 

PCS). The major drawback is PCS location, which directly impacts the range and

 

effectiveness of the system. Each cellular phone has to have the ability to "see" the

 

PCS--distant travel, mountainous terrain, or urban environments will severely limit

 

 

use. As seen in Somalia, "dense structures around the airport obscured the JTF antenna

 

and caused interference."[62] Though this problem was resolved with the erection of a

 

taller antenna, Mogadishu is not a typical urban area. Despite this drawback, one can

 

quickly see the utility of such a system in humanitarian operations. Providing NGOs and

 

other agencies cellular phones would rapidly provide mobile, reliable communications.

 

As with the radio system, this system could either be provided to the host nation upon

 

departure or re-employed in future operations.

 

     Even though the current cellular telephone services discussed may seem

 

technologically advanced, in fact, the emerging satellite based cellular networks will

 

quickly antiquate these systems. Repeaters and PCSs will be replaced by Motorola's

 

Iridium, Qualcomm's Globalstar, Ellipsat's Ellipso, Constellation's Aries, and TRW's

 

Odyssey satellite systems. These systems are designed to allow users to move

 

worldwide and still maintain telephone coverage. The system is best described as "the

 

cellular system where you remain stationary and the cell moves."[63]

 

     Capable of fully integrating with ground based commercial telephone systems, the

 

satellite systems provide maximum flexibility and reliability, especially in remote

 

locations. DoD has begun investigating Globalstar, concerned with combat durability

 

(NGOs will also be interested in the durability question) and secure voice options.

 

NGOs are always concerned with the fiscal aspect of relief operations.  As can be seen

 

by this comparison (Figure 3), today's initial cost is rather high for NGOs to absorb,

 

however, the per minute charge is quite reasonable given the capability provided.

 

Economics will decrease the price rapidly, and soon this technology will be affordable

 

for NGOs. Extremely attractive for fiscal, logistical, and command and control reasons

 

(for both the military-NGO and relief worker-NGO headquarters relationship), CMOCs

 

will have a ready means of voice communications. NGOs should explore the feasibility

 

 

	Motorola's Iridium	Qualcomm's     Globalstar	Ellipsat's       Ellipso	Constellation's        Aries	TRW's      Odyssey
Number of Satellites	66.00	48.00	24.00	48.00	12.00
Cost ($B)	$3.37	$1.6	$.4	$.29	$1.3
Activation Date	1998.00	1998.00	1996.00	1996.00	1998.00
Telephone Price	$3000	$700	$1000	$1500	$550
Price per Minute	$3	$.30*	$.50*	$.50*	$.65*

Figure 3

SATELLITE SYSTEM COMPARISON[64]

 

of these systems for their operations. The military should continue their research,

 

ensuring that the chosen system is interoperable with commercial systems that NGOs will

 

procure.

 

     The capabilities of portable cellular telephone technology make it a viable option for

 

future humanitarian operations. While siting, range, and security are concerns, the ability

 

to obtain such an asset from within DoD (JCSE) will greatly enhance relief efforts. By

 

maintaining two of these systems (with a minimum of three PCSs each), the military can

 

quickly establish reliable communications amongst 90 users in remote locations.

    

Data Communications

 

Participants in breakouts on communications structures, who tended to have operational experience, described an effective (i.e., commonly relied on) communication system as one that provided transparent, accurate and consistent information about the theater (country, culture) and actors (who's there, with what), and up-to-date information about the locale, security, and assessment of needs. [65]

 

     The emergence of data systems in the last five years has revolutionized military and

 

civilian communications. The resultant impact will quickly spill over into the

 

military-NGO relationship. What better tool is there is to meet the needs articulated in

 

the above quote? The ability to access the Internet from a remote location, to pass

 

electronic mail (e-mail) seamlessly up and down the chain, and to transfer large

 

standardized files will result in an information flow between the military and NGOs like

 

never seen before. The challenge is harnessing these powerful tools and making these

 

data systems practicable for users at the tactical level.       

 

Is Software the Answer?

 

     The trend today is to apply software solutions to the information flow problem in an

 

attempt to enable relief workers to easily input and retrieve information on a near

 

real-time basis. The U.N. and State Department have initiated software-based projects to

 

advance the information flow to and from the relief worker (as well as the strategic and

 

operational levels). Additionally, National Defense University (NDU) has contracted for

 

a prototype software package "to create an unobtrusive means of coordinating

 

information between the military and NGOs."[66] Examination of these "software

solutions" will provide evidence that there is one crucial link missing: transmission

 

systems. The real issue is how to resolve this shortfall.       

 

ReliefWeb

 

     The U.N. has developed ReliefWeb[67] for information sharing at the strategic and

 

operational levels, as well as for the general public's use, through the Internet.

 

ReliefWeb is a meta-database that is designed to combine time-critical information with

 

already existent databases, providing the most accurate information available. Touted as

 

"indispensable for emergency response,"[68] ReliefWeb tracks emergency situations from

 

their onset to conclusion and is currently following 26 ongoing or potential crises. While

 

ReliefWeb provides a tool for management, it does not offer easy access to the relief

 

worker on-site, as it is completely reliant on the Internet or modem dial-ins through

 

telephone line. Since ReliefWeb has no standardized reporting system for the tactical

 

level, the State Department set out to alleviate this problem.

 

REMAP

 

     In conjunction with about 20 NGOs, the State Department developed the Relief

 

Emergency Mapping System (REMAP). REMAP is an experimental initiative designed

 

for the tactical level worker to provide and access template based data systems.[69]

 

Agencies (military, NGOs, U.N., host nation) with access to REMAP can update

 

template information and forward this update to a U.N. database repository. The

 

 

 

information can be forwarded via the Internet or diskette (CDROM)--again, availability

 

to the Internet enhances the software's potential. The information is fused by the U.N.

 

and posted as part of ReliefWeb. To access updated REMAP information, either the

 

Internet is required, or the military, NGOs, or CMOC will have to wait for a diskette to

 

arrive with the revised data. Larry Roeder, REMAP designer, found three system

 

shortfalls. First, without timely transmission and receipt capability, the information will

 

be dated. Second, the relief workers needed an incentive to provide information. Third,

 

if false or inaccurate information is provided, the system becomes unreliable and

 

essentially useless.[70] Combating the first shortfall will be addressed shortly. Like

 

attending CMOC meetings, if the relief workers find utility in providing the information,

 

they will. To ensure only "trusted" sources have the ability to provide and receive

 

information, some type of screening (validation of credentials) will be required before

 

access to REMAP is granted. The U.N. must address this problem.

 

CiMi Link

 

     While the U.N. and State Department focused on providing open access information,

 

NDU[71] aimed their software efforts on a direct civilian relief agency-military system,

 

appropriately named the Civil-Military (CiMi) Link. NDU's initial proposal involved a

 

highly intricate computer based system that the NGOs promptly rejected as "too

 

high-tech." The NGOs desired a "low-tech" system that required minimal training,

 

minimal input effort, no additional equipment,[72] and most important, maximum value for

 

 

their time.[73] The newly designed system is essentially commercial-off-the-shelf bulletin

 

board software--the twist is that the package supports both the military and NGOs and is

 

part of the task equipment (T/E) and task organization (T/O) of the deploying military

 

unit.

 

     Outstanding CiMi Link issues are system management, data management, and

 

transmission to remote sites (to be addressed separately under shortfalls). Although the

 

initial proposal is to allow the military to manage the hardware and software, the

 

potential exists for problems with the NGOs in this relationship. Software problems,

 

inaccessible accounts, and system outages will fall directly on the military. Rather, the

 

NGOs must provide a "system technician" to be located at the CMOC to overlook their

 

interests. The military will send data representatives to install, operate, and maintain

 

numerous data systems[74]--adding one system will provide an additional burden, clouding

 

their effort of priority.     

 

     Management of the data is envisioned as an adhoc committee (military and NGO

 

representatives). That is, both have an equal say on which information is submitted for

 

inclusion in the database. The military must hold back and remain an equal partner--this

 

is a "joint" system and the NGOs' input is as valuable as the military's. While this may

 

seem trivial, this can be a source of major conflict, especially with regards to the

 

military's view of security. As information about locations of non-friendlies, landmines,

 

and dangerous routes of travel are gathered and entered into CiMi Link, the military may

 

have a pension to pull out information and regard it as intelligence (and possibly

 

classifying the information) rather than raw data. The military and NGOs must establish

 

inclusion and exclusion data criteria for the system as soon as possible (most likely when

 

all have arrived on-site).      

 

NDU's software proposal is by far the most viable of the three reviewed for

 

military-NGO coordination. Its self-contained package eliminates interoperability

 

problems with the all-inclusive T/E. This wide area in-country network is heading in the

 

right direction. However, given the initiatives already launched by the State Department,

 

NDU should coordinate their efforts and integrate REMAP into CiMi Link. NDU

 

should also ensure that their software can be seamlessly merged into ReliefWeb (via the

 

Internet or possibly GCCS). The only remaining issue is data transmission.   

 

 

MOVING THE DATA--THE WEAK LINK

 

     Unquestionably, the weakest link in these software solutions, or any computer

 

network, is the transmission path. Transferring data requires extremely high path

 

fidelity; the transmission path must be clear and stable. Data transmission can occur over

 

numerous paths: radio, wire (host nation telephone infrastructure that has already been

 

described), multichannel radio,[75] or satellite. In a humanitarian operation, any or all of

 

these mediums could be used. The challenge for NGOs is choosing the medium that

 

allows the movement of large volumes of data from remote locations to the CMOC and

 

to outside of the theater.

 

Radio    

 

     During humanitarian operations, larger NGOs employ high frequency (HF) and

 

INMARSAT radios for their internal voice and data communications. HF radio presents

 

an option for linking relief workers, but it presents numerous problems in its

 

employment. Frequency selection, antenna selection, power output, and the weather all

 

can have negative impacts on HF operations. Add to these potential problems the linkage

 

of a computer and modem for data operations and one can quickly see that expert

 

communicators are needed to keep the system functioning. Realistically, the effort to

 

establish and maintain HF communications by NGOs will not happen. Rather, they need

 

an easy-to-operate system, and INMARSAT fits the bill.

 

     Both the military and selected NGOs have INMARSAT in their inventories--the

 

challenge is getting the NGOs to want to use it for military-NGO coordination at the

 

tactical level. INMARSAT technologies currently support four systems: INMARSAT A,

 

B, C, and M. Each system is capable of high speed data operations; the primary

 

differences are in cost and mobility. The obvious drawback for NGOs is $5.00+ per

 

minute charge. The technical details are easily resolved between the military and NGOs.

 

Transferring data is the easy part--providing utility in the software for the NGOs is more

 

difficult.

 

Data

 

     Although not practical for moving data within the tactical level, current initiatives

 

place a heavy reliance on the Internet (ReliefWeb and REMAP) for moving data to and

 

from the tactical level. With the exception of radio and host nation infrastructure, NGOs

 

do not have the means to conduct data transfer. Internal to the battlefield, CiMi Link can

 

require data transmission. One solution that has not been addressed is providing direct

 

military support to the NGOs--that is, offering Internet access at the CMOC or offering

 

computer access at remote sites. This solution opens a whole new set of problems, the

 

most significant being the use of military equipment bandwidth to support the NGOs.

 

Military multichannel (mux) and satellite systems are operated as classified

 

systems--allowing NGOs access provides potential security problems. Separate,

 

unclassified mux systems to support NGOs or additional satellite bandwidth would

 

resolve the problem. But, with resources (personnel, equipment, and satellite access)

 

already strained, can the military afford to support the NGOs? Resoundingly, yes--not

 

supporting these data systems decreases the potential for timely, effective information

 

sharing and coordination between the NGOs and the military. Ultimately, both share the

 

same "battlefield" for the same purpose, humanitarian assistance. DoD must address the

 

equipment sharing concept now--waiting until ReliefWeb, REMAP, and CiMi Link are

 

firmly entrenched is too late.          

 

Satellites and The Internet

 

For the ultimate in Internet surfing, a different sort of satellite network

is needed.[76]        

 

     Looming on the horizon (2002) is satellite technology, being developed by Bill Gates

 

(Microsoft) and Craig McCaw (McCaw Cellular) that will free users of traditional

 

Internet access requirements. Teledesic is an 840 satellite system that provides global

 

Internet service based on its ability to see constantly the entire earth. The satellites will

 

 

provide broadband access and allow high-speed data rates. With 840 satellites orbiting,

 

entry into the Internet will almost be guaranteed, as a satellite will always be overhead

 

and servicing only a small number of users.[77] Such a system will revolutionize tactical

 

level communications.

 

     Looking ahead, the technology is on the horizon for an integrated cellular telephone

 

computer system that is as small as today's laptops, yet much more powerful. Relief

 

workers will only have to raise a small antenna (like on a cellular phone), type in their

 

information, and hit the "send" button. The information will race across satellite systems

 

and be automatically downloaded into a computer database that will update itself

 

immediately. If logged on, users will have their database automatically updated. Those

 

who are not logged on will have their systems updated as soon as they connect.

 

Communications between the military and NGOs will become as routine as placing a

 

telephone call is today--and thus overall coordination will be enhanced.

 

 

Practice Makes Perfect

 

The final solution to solving communications and interoperability problems is the

 

most obvious, yet the most difficult. The military routinely conducts training exercises

 

for non-combatant evacuations, amphibious operations, raids, and reconnaissance

 

missions. Not surprisingly, exercises for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are

 

not conducted, much less discussed by commanders. Military operations other than war

 

(MOOTW) documents rarely address in detail the intricacies and nuances of these

 

operations. One of the lessons from Provide Comfort on military-NGOs relations was the

 

 

need to "recognize that coordination and integration of civilian organizations poses a

 

special problem for military forces in their operations. Senior leader training needs to

 

address this issue."[78] When deployed for one of these assignments, commanders, their

 

staff, and troops are "starting from scratch." Whether the military likes it or not, America

 

expects to see U.S. troops at the forefront of these operations. The sooner the military

 

comes to the realization that these operations are as complex, difficult, and dangerous as

 

combat, the sooner training towards them can begin.

 

     Now is the time to begin dialogue with the NGOs. One author suggests, "Involve

 

NGOs in humanitarian assistance operation planning, particularly through exercises and

 

wargames that use humanitarian assistance operation scenarios."[79] Communications

 

discussions could include the format of the CMOC daily meeting, assessing the

 

feasibility of military-provided support to NGOs, radio type, frequency, and antennas,

 

determining prepositioned assets that could support NGOs, and software interfaces for

 

data systems. If the military waits to coordinate, the potential for noninteroperability of

 

communications equipment increases exponentially.

 

Conclusion

 

The US. military/NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of our present and the era into which we are entering. Its proclamations twofold: 1) interagency/multinational coordination will only increase; and 2) the role of civilians in military operations, no matter how pure the "battlefield," will also only increase.... It is our--both communities--responsibility to understand this relationship prior to its implementation in the field.[80]

 

     There is no doubt that future military missions will include humanitarian assistance

 

and disaster relief operations. Embodied in these operations is the inherent need for

 

effective military-NGO communications. The military has a disproportionate

 

requirement to communicate with the NGOs--the military's "ticket home" is when NGOs

 

(or the U.N.) have the situation well in-hand. Military command and control techniques

 

do not neatly apply to humanitarian assistance. Consensus building and unity of effort,

 

not command and control, are key to military-NGO coordination. Although it is difficult

 

to predict interoperability problems, the JTF must be capable of operating with a wide

 

range of organizations whose equipment does not interoperate with its own. Perhaps the

 

current way of "communicating" will suffice, perhaps commercial-off-the-shelf

 

technology is the answer, or perhaps the answer is some form of technology not yet

 

introduced. Whatever the answer, both the military and NGOs must be committed to

 

fully utilizing current technologies and investigating new methods for coordinating at the

 

tactical level. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations will continue to

 

require unity of effort and improved efficiency--the people we are helping are counting

 

on our, the military and NGOs, dedication to this effort.

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