The Joint Strike Fighter: A Strike Fighter Without an Internal Gun?
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Joint Strike Fighter: A Strike Fighter Without an Internal Gun?
Author: Lieutenant Colonel Douglas P. Yurovich USMC
Thesis: Is the internal gun necessary armament for the Strike Fighter of the next generation or has it been rendered obsolete by the proposed threats of the future battlefield, joint design criteria and the developing tactics for future air power employment?
Discussion: Initially, the decision to include an internal gun in the Joint Strike Fighter seemed like a simple decision of programmatics over tactics, dollars over capabilities. In fact, the Air Force has decided to force the issue, and include the internal gun on their version of the JSF. In this case, tactical decision making overcame strict programmatics. When asked, the Navy has been mute on the issue.
Upon further inspection, the situation facing the Marine Corps is as unique as the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter platform itself The Marine Corps' position implements the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter as the only fixed wing fighter attack platform in the Corps' inventory from 2007 to 2025. Any threat to the existence of the STOVL concept within that platform represents a threat to the existence of fixed wing Marine TACAIR. The tactical versus the programmatic debate notwithstanding, the strategic reality is that if Marine TACAIR is a carbon copy of either the Air Force and/or the Navy it will cease to exist as a separate entity.
Conclusions: The Joint Strike Fighter will be the Marine STOVL fixed wing fighter attack platform, accepted with tactical compromises, to maintain the unique structure of the expeditionary force. The STOVL JSF will be a Strike Fighter without an internal gun, because of this it will be less lethal than its predecessors in some tactical arenas, and less lethal than initial advertisements would lead you to believe!
Table of Contents
In the Ready Rooms 1
Section I
Truth in Labelling 2
The Future of Multirole Tactical Aviation 2
The Key to
Affordability is Commonality...Joint Design
and Acquisition 3
What's in a
name?...The 'Strike' in Joint Strike Fighter 4
The Fighter - An airplane designed to kill and not be killed 5
Armament - The Killing Power of the Strike Fighter 6
Conclusion 7
Section II
JSF Design Considerations 8
Criteria 8
Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) equates to Basing
Flexibility 10
Section III
The Joint Acquisition Process 14
The Past Has Not Been
Pretty 14
The Future is Now 15
Section IV
Strike Mission Requirements 19
The Task at Hand 19
There is a
Tactical Need for the Gun 20
Section V
Fighter Mission Requirements 23
Another Formidable Task 23
Situational
Awareness - The Key to Success
for the Fighter Pilot 23
The Same Old
Argument 24
There is a
Tactical Need for the Gun 24
STOVL - Where does the USMC stand with respect to an air-to-air
gun? 26
Summary of STOVL Compromises 26
Section VI
Gun Technology for the Future 27
It is Not That Simple 27
Programmatic
Decisions Equal $$ 28
STOVL - The "Blister" Gun 29
Conclusions 31
Notes 33
Bibliography 38
VITA 44
Appendix A A-1
In the Ready Rooms
Between the mundane drill of the daily administrative load in one's in-basket and the necessary preparation for the next scheduled tactical flight, squadron life for a pilot centers around the ready room. Many subjects are discussed with squadronmates over a cup of black coffee or a soda during the well needed break, tactics and aviation being among the most common. With the emphasis in the trade journals being the selection and design for the fighter of the future, the discussion invariably gravitates toward the tools of the trade, airplanes. The experience level in any ready room is varied, but the opinions are firm, even without the requisite knowledge to form them.
"Read this," an officer points to a trade journal, "the Marine Corps doesn't want to put a gun in the Joint Strike Fighter", he incredulously exclaims.
"Are we making that mistake again?" retorts another, not old enough to have experienced any airplane but the Hornet.
Had we over the years missed the obvious, a gun was not needed in a fighter attack aircraft? Was this just an emotional outcry from the users, the fighter pilots of the world, who still mistakenly thought that a gun was necessary! What were the mistakes that were made, and are we making them again? Is the internal gun decision as simple as programmatics versus tactics?
Is the internal gun necessary armament for the Strike Fighter of the next generation or has it been rendered obsolete by the proposed threats of the future battlefield, joint design criteria and the developing tactics for future air power employment?
This paper will attempt to answer this question: Is a gun necessary for the fighter of the future or are we holding on to some romantic notion that takes us back to the days of open canopies and flowing white scarves?
I
Truth in Labelling
The Future of Multirole Tactical Aviation
The first massive fighter project of the post-Cold War era is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the next generation multirole fighter. The Joint Strike Fighter is the only replacement in sight for thousands of aircraft designed in the 1970's (figure 1).
figure 1
The Bottom Up Review (BUR) of 1993 cancelled the U.S. Navy's AFX program, the U.S.
Air Force's continued production of the F-16s after 1994 and the Multirole Fighter
(MRF). These programs were designed to meet warfighting needs in the 2007 time frame.
The Joint Strike Fighter "is actually a family of next generation tactical attack aircraft built around a common core design."1 JSF is being designed to meet the advanced threat of 2010 to 2025, with a focus on improving lethality, survivability and supportability. With. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) targeted for the year 2008, the program is in the Concept Demonstration Phase (CDP), with prototypes to be flown in 1999. Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) will follow, with the award of
a contract to the selected manufacturer in 2001. The Joint Strike Fighter will serve as the Air Force's complement to the F-22, the Navy's complement to the F/A- 1 8E/F, and the Marine Corps' only fixed wing fighter attack platform. The weapons system must meet the full range of military options, while maintaining a fiscally responsible design process in the era of reduced United States defense spending.
Three variants of the Joint Strike Fighter will be produced, all with a single seat, single Pratt and Whitney F-l19 turbofan engine and maximum thrust class of 35,000 pounds. The Air Force's version will be Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL), the Navy's version will be conventional takeoff and landing and carrier capable (CTOL/CV); while the U.S. Marine Corps' version will be Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL).2 This family of aircraft, estimated price tag of $750-billion for all three prototypes, is designed to meet tri-service needs and achieve significant savings throughout the service life of the weapons system.
The Key to Affordability is Commonality... Joint Design and Acquisition
The days of independent service aircraft design are in the past. The cost of
developing an aircraft weapon system makes it prohibitive for an individual service to tackle alone; while the country can ill-afford duplicate developmental efforts at such a
price. Depicted in figure 2, this financial forecast looms in the not too distant future, if we
figure 2
continue the ways of the acquisition past.
Extrapolating from the figure's analysis,
"In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one tactical aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and the Navy, 3 and 1/2 days each per week except leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra day."
Augustine Law IX3
Realistically, with the joint design concept being implemented for the Joint Strike Fighter, the unit fly away cost varies between services due to service needs/variants and is projected as follows:
2036 USAF Aircraft@$28M
300 USN Aircraft@$31-$38M
642 USMC Aircraft @ $30-$35M.
This projection is in Fiscal Year 94 dollars with a production rate of 170 aircraft per year. The projected savings of this joint effort is due to high commonality and multiple service buys, keeping the unit cost down due to savings in the areas of manufacturing, support and training. Although extrapolated savings numbers are not available, a 90% commonality amongst the three variants offers unparalleled economy in the designing and fielding of a future aircraft.
What's in a name?... The 'Strike' in Joint Strike Fighter
The term strike, with respect to air attack, has been with us nearly as long as aviation and airplanes. In his 1921 book, Command of the Air, Giulio Douhet writes of the striking power of the airplane as a superlative offensive weapon.4 In the summer of 1943, the War Department of the United States issued Field Manual FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power. This field manual "established three "priorities" of air missions, a ranking still followed by the U.S. Air Force today: air superiority, strike and battlefield air support".5 The Air Force dictionary further defines strike "as an attack upon a surface target." In the 1980's, the term "strike" crept into the Navy's lexicon with increased frequency. In 1983, the Navy launched a disastrous bombing mission from the carriers U.S.S. Independence and the U.S.S. Kennedy against Lebanon. The subsequent evaluation of Navy tactics and training, by then Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, prompted the establishment of "Strike University," The Strike Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station in Nevada in 1984.6 This University was, and is, tasked to train Carrier Air Wings in power projection air-to-ground warfare from the sea. This center, along with the fleet introduction of the first advertised "strike fighter," the F/A- 18 Hornet, in 1983, cemented the concept of "Strike" as an institutional pillar. Calling an aircraft a "strike fighter" puts the emphasis on its air-to-ground capability."7 With the air-to-ground success of forces in the Gulf War of 1991, it would not be possible in today's Defense and Acquisition climate to establish support for a multirole aircraft weapons system of the future without the moniker of Strike being attached.8 Although, as we will see in the next section, by regulation, Strike is undefined, improper and redundant in the naming of a military aerospace vehicle.
The Fighter - An airplane designed to kill and not be killed
"Fighter" - a word which conjures in the mind a picture of speed and skill, of youth and daring. of freedom and loneliness.9
To answer the threat of the MIG-25 Foxbat, U.S. developers designed and fielded the F-4 Phantom. American fighter development did not achieve priority status until a replacement for the Phantom became necessary. The F-15 Eagle, that replacement in 1972, was the first American jet designed with dogfighting as a part of the design criteria.10 Fighter performance design criteria include, but are not limited to, such platform specific characteristics as: thrust to weight (t/w), wing loading, instantaneous turn performance, sustained turn performance, maneuverability, acceleration, and agility.11
As we have stated, the fighter aircraft is designed to kill. The Department of Defense Instruction (DOD1NST) 4120.15L12, "Model Designation of Military Aerospace Vehicles", dated February 1993, defines a fighter as:
An aircraft designed to interdict and destroy other aircraft and missiles. Includes multi-purpose aircraft also designed for ground support missions such as interdiction and close air support
It is within this definition that the F-117 and the F-111 can be labeled fighters, although they maintain a limited self-defense air-to-air ability and do not have the prerequisite dogfight ability that one associates with a true fighter design.13
DODINST 4120.15L further defines an attack aircraft as:
An aircraft designed to find, attack and destroy enemy land or sea targets using conventional or special weapons. This symbol also applies to aircraft used for interdiction and CAS missions.
There is no definition of strike in relation to defining aircraft in this instruction. By established convention, the fighter attack aircraft (F/A-18) is redundantly labeled, as is the strike fighter. Redundant labelling, in both cases, offers continual reinforcement of the multirole capability of the airplane.
Armament - The Killing Power of the Strike Fighter
The Joint Strike Fighter is being designed to possess the maximum flexibility for weapons carriage with present and futuristic weapons employment in mind. JSF will accommodate both internal and external weapons carriage, internal weapons carriage being fundamental to controlling the size of the Radar Cross Section (RCS).14 With designed maximum flexibility, the permutations and combinations of all weapons on all three variants of the JSF would be a treatise in its own right. The weapons categories designed for utilization are summarized as: air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, guided and unguided bombs, cluster bombs, rockets and naval mines. The gun. is the only optional weapon system that is not being designed integral to all three variants. While there are weapons compromises necessary to accommodate the unique structure of the variants, we will examine mission specific weapons compromises in the mission related sections.
Conclusion
In this section we reviewed the nom de guerre of the next multi-role aircraft, the Joint Strike Fighter, to allow us to establish the baseline for defined capabilities that need to be included in the design of a weapons platform. This review was necessary m establishing the concept of truth in advertising, so that we understand the implications of being labeled the multirole fighter of the future.
II
JSF Design Considerations
Criteria
As the next generation multirole fighter, the Joint Strike Fighter is being designed to meet the needs of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. Each service has a unique mission need statement for the airplane, which resulted from that service s traditional role and how the airplane is projected to arrive at the conflict within current service doctrine.
The USAF mission needs include a multi-mission fighter for employment in strategic attack, air interdiction, close air support (CAS), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), counter air, combat search and rescue and reconnaissance missions. The U.S. Navy mission needs include a first-day (read stealthy) survivable multi-mission, strike fighter for carrier power projection to accomplish strike warfare, air interdiction, anti-air warfare (AAW), CAS, SEAD, anti-surface warfare (ASUW), mine warfare, reconnaissance and airborne refueling. The USMC mission needs encompass CAS, interdiction, SEAD, AAW, reconnaissance and control of aircraft and missiles [TAC(A)/FAC(A)].15 By inspection, the tri-service mission needs overlap, but the unique mission areas for each service offer the challenge for the manufacturers in meeting all the design specifications.
The Joint Strike Fighter will improve on the shortcomings of existing systems in the areas of lethality, survivability and supportability. Becoming more lethal, the JSF will incorporate a system with the capability to locate and combat identify targets at night and in adverse weather, committing weapons from standoff ranges. This standoff range weapons application will reduce aircraft exposure to high threat areas. The Joint Strike Fighter will be able to work independently or as an integral asset in the joint structure with a datalink capability.
To improve survivability, the JSF is being designed with the latest in low observable stealth technology. Stealth technology incorporated into an airframe not only deals with traditional airframe design, but also includes "visual, infrared and acoustic signature reductions".16 Radar Absorbent Materials, (RAM), are used to treat external surfaces to reduce RCS, while new Radar Absorbent Structures, (RAS), are used in airframe construction, but "the four most important factors in the design of a stealth aircraft, one expert remarks, are "shape, shape, shape and materials".17
Incorporating stealth does not come without cost or compromise. A true stealthy design, represented by the F-117A, "met specification for stealth-but at the price of restricted speed and maneuver".18 The typical stealth design is not optimum for the aerodynamics of fighter performance and agility. The application of RAM material to the structure adds weight to the structure. Weight addition with finite thrust available reduces performance. The bubble canopy of a fighter aircraft, while offering unlimited field of view, is a troublesome spot for stealth designers due to the many angles and radar reflectors present in the cockpit. Internal weapons carriage offers the greatest reduction of RCS over external weapons carriage, but it is obvious that this must be an initial design feature of an airframe over a possible modification. The Marine Corps is willing to accept a stealth penalty in aircraft shaping to incorporate the STOVL design into the airframe structure.19 Finally, incorporated stealth technology, even from initial design specifications costs money; and as has been stated, affordability is a driving factor in the JSF program.
With respect to supportability, JSF is being designed so that reliability and maintainability will reduce existing manpower requirements, thus reducing logistics footprints. JSF is postulated to decrease strategic lift by 40-50% over the F/A- 18.20 With less stress on strategic lift, due to reduced logistics footprints, JSF will be able to more rapidly deploy and respond to a global crisis.
Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) equates to Basing Flexibility
"The airplane won't amount to a damn until they get a machine that will act like a hummingbird-go straight up, go forward, go backward, come straight down and alight like a hummingbird".
Thomas A. Edison (1847- l931)2l
The Marine version of the Joint Strike Fighter will be Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing, a STOVL22 capable airframe. In establishing the requirements for the Joint Strike Fighter, the USMC is attempting to incorporate the best characteristics of the F/A18C/D and the AV-8B into a low observable STOVL airframe. This JSF may be the only fixed wing aircraft present to support warfare in the littorals and the landing forces of the future, due to the expeditionary nature of the Corps.
The United States Marine Corps JSF is unique in that it will be the only STOVL JSF variant in the US inventory, although "USAF officials are considering buying at least three to four squadrons for contingency operations".23 STOVL represents basing flexibility to the U.S. Marines, although it is not a new design concept in aviation.
Since the mid 1940's, when helicopters first demonstrated basing flexibility, not requiring large landing fields or prepared landing sites, the Marine Corps has been interested in STOVL capable platforms. In the early 1950's, the U.S. Navy issued a requirement for a small fighter aircraft capable of operating from platforms on merchant ships for convoy protection. Tailsitters, the first design answers to this requirement, were cumbersome and impracticable.24 Although technology, engine, and airframe had not matured to establish STOVL as a feasible concept in 1956, the Navy abandoned the STOVL effort due to an "underlying fear of threatening the big deck carriers."25
With the Cold War and NATO airfields targeted by Warsaw Pact weapons, a continued need was present to free the force from reliance on fixed, vulnerable runways. A STOVL platform could provide that freedom, base forward, become more flexible and more responsive. "The closer you could get aircraft to the battle, the quicker the response
was the thought."26 In 1958, a requirement for a high performance fixed wing VSTOL aircraft was scrapped due to projected limited payload. Technology, or the lack of it, was again to blame. In 1968, the USMC evaluated an existing platform in England, the Kestrel. This technology, with almost thirty years of modifications and utilization, is represented by the AV-8B Harrier in service with the U.S. Marines today. As late as 1990, and the development of the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), STOVL performance was judged too risky and too costly in terms of performance, due to existing engine technology and limited engine performance.27
Why does the future of the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter look so much brighter than the past STOVL endeavors? With the maturation of engine technology, engines have become lighter and able to produce greater amounts of thrust. The Pratt and Whitney F-l19, projected for use in all the JSF variants, develops roughly 35,000 pounds of thrust at maximum power. Thrust at maximum power utilizes afterburner as an augmentor. Afterburner will not be available in the vertical landing mode of STOVL. The maximum projected thrust of the F-l19 engine in military rated thrust, that thrust used for vertical landings, is roughly 32,000 pounds.28 There is no plan to incorporate water injection to provide thrust boosting in either design concept.29
Let us analyze the demands on the F-l19 Pratt and Whitney engine in the STOVL Marine JSF. Design weight for the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter is 24,000 pounds.30 The initial design requirement delineates vertical landing (implied vertical takeoff), with 50% internal fuel, 2XlOOOlb bombs and 2 Advanced Medium Range Air-To-Air Missiles, AMRAAMS.
STOVL JSF 24,000 lbs
50%
Internal Fuel 7,500 lbs
2X1000
lb bombs 2,000 lbs
2XAMRAAMS 650 lbs
34,150
lbs
By inspection, and quick addition, we find we are in a thrust deficit by roughly 2,000 lbs from thrust available in the vertical landing mode. What can we adjust to acquire the STOVL design requirement? We can delete a bomb and/or missile or use smaller, lighter bombs, but that would make us less effective in the target area. We can delete a percent of the fuel requirement, but that decreases our tactical radius, limiting our range and targets in the battlespace. We can adjust the total empty gross weight of the STOVL aircraft or give up on the STOVL concept altogether.
Let us examine the implication of abandoning STOVL for the Marine Corps. If the United States Marine Corps does not have the STOVL version of JSF, it will be forced to purchase another version of JSF or F/A- 18E/F. Its tactical fixed wing air will become identical to the Air Force and/or the Navy. Marine Corps tactical air (TACAIR) will be less expeditionary without STOVL. Marine JSFs will either arrive at the conflict via Navy carriers or airborne refuel and cross the oceans with Air Force tankers. Either way, Marine TACAIR will become separated from the ground combat element during transit to the battle, which could signal the end of the Marine Air Ground Task Force and Marine Fixed Wing Aviation. For without the unique element to Marine TACAIR, STOVL, differentiating it from the other services, the justification to maintain another air arm, with USMC markings, becomes difficult and fiscally near impossible. Abandoning STOVL does not look like a positive step for Marine fixed wing tactical aviation, if we wish to maintain our own organizational air cover.
We are back to adjusting the empty gross weight of the airplane. Designers rapidly address the removal of the gun as a means of a quick weight adjustment. In the early days of the development of the F/A- 18A, the gun was removed three times due to weight to increase performance.31 In 1991, when F/A-18E/F was projected not to meet its initial range specifications, a discussion of a proposal surfaced to save weight by removing the gun.32 Removal of the M-61A2 Vulcan cannon, a candidate for the JSF, and associated hardware and ammunition saves roughly 1000 lbs.33 Tactically, one might debate the swap of a 1,000 pound multiple kill capable gun system with that of a one thousand pound bomb, but many programmatic decisions are not made within a tactical framework or by tacticians. Couple the reduction of JSF gross weight by the removal of the gun, with the decrease of one AMRAAM and 1000 pounds of fuel, and STOVL is again a reality. This compromise is not a far cry from reality in the environment of negotiated design.
Are we saying that the exclusion of an internal gun on the Marine version of the JSF is the key to saving Marine fixed wing aviation for the next century? Possibly, but what we are really saying is that any threat to the unique STOVL-capable JSF is a step toward making Marine TACAIR interchangeable with USAF or NAVY TACAIR. The STOVL capability has to be retained to maintain the uniqueness of the USMC's tactical aviation. If the internal gun has to be scrapped for weight to save STOVL, it will be scrapped. From a Marine Aviator's position, this would certainly be the definitive programmatic decision over the tactical decision to save a strategic asset: Marine TACAIR.
Although the advancement in engine technology has improved the promise of capabilities for future airframes, with greater expectations come greater requirements. The manufacturers, designers, acquisition professionals and the tacticians still find the need to compromise to achieve a product with tactical utilization and STOVL flexibility. The more things change, the more they stay the same!
III
The Joint Acquisition Process
The Past Has Not Been Pretty
Historically, joint fighter development in this country has not been a successful story. Although many airplanes have proven useful across service lines, only the F-111 in the 1960's was conceived and designed as a joint service endeavor prior to the Joint Strike Fighter.
Motivated to reduce the number of duplicate weapon systems for budgetary efficiency, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara implemented changes in doctrine and management of the Department of Defense (DOD). The Air Force's Tactical Fighter Experimental Program, TFX (F-111), became the basis for the joint Air Force-Navy acquisition effort. This set a precedent in DOD acquisition, since there had never before been a joint development of a tactical fighter.
Mr. McNamara was the single official residing within the Department of Defense who had a stake in the success of the bi-service program.34 The cultural biases of the services, previous unilateral service developments, coupled with existing service acquisition developments competed in reducing the efficient establishment of the TFX as a model joint acquisition program. There was no one below the Secretary of Defense responsible for resolving conflicts in design, as the TFX proceeded through EM]) and the milestone process. Through the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, DDR&E, and the Defense Planning, Programming and Budget System, PPBS, Secretary McNamara attempted to establish and incorporate the joint requirements. The DDR&E though, did not share the Secretary's doctrinal concerns and did not reconcile problems with the design and mission priorities.35 Therefore, no one adequately addressed resolving doctrinal issues and service desires as the TFX developmental process matured. The Air Force and the Navy individually attempted to resolve these issues. For instance, the Air Force attacked early developmental engine stall problems while the Navy was focusing on weight problems.36 The design process is said to be "a negotiated environment"37 with most problems and solutions affecting other areas of the weapons system development. They cannot be resolved independently without gross inefficiencies and costly redesigns. In this regard, the oversight and acquisition process of the development of the TFX was a failure.
The F-111 has given this country many years of service, but it never fully fulfilled its design requirements for either the Navy or the Air Force. The legacy that the program left in the Department of Defense and the acquisition community forms the basis for the projected successful development of the Joint Strike Fighter. A trained cadre of acquisition professionals, a fly before you buy strategy, coupled with an established joint acquisition culture represent the present tools for success.
The Future is Now
At the highest levels of the Department of Defense, a joint organization exists to resolve any cross-service tradeoffs for the benefit of the military capabilities of the nation. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council, or IROC, assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in assessing military requirements for defense acquisition programs mandated by the Goldwaters-Nichols Act of 1986.38 The JROC is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) and is comprised of the service Vice Chiefs. This act linked JROC actions to the PPBS system and the defense acquisition process, and presented the JROC as a much more active agent for setting the future orientation of the U.S. Military. "The JROC presents the CJCS and the Joint Chiefs with reasoned, cross-service insights from senior warfighters regarding military requirements."39 This system is founded on an assumption Secretary McNamara rejected and assumes "senior military leadership can act as members of a corporate board devising national, cross-service solutions to the difficult question of what the military needs, in addition to their individual roles as defenders of service needs."40
Within the JROC is a process called Joint Warfare Capabilities Assessments, or JWCAs. The JWCA construct emphasizes capabilities, not systems or platforms. Seen in matrix form, figure 3, JWCAs cut through normal functional responsibilities to generate cross-service insights.
This process reviews only Major Defense Acquisition Programs, or MDAPs. The JSF program is considered an MDAP. A procurement ceiling of $2.1 billion establishes an MDAP and as we have stated, JSF at $750 billion, greatly exceeds this threshold.
Within the DOD structure of the joint acquisition hierarchy exists the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office (JSFPO). Presently headed by a Navy Rear Admiral as the Director, the JSFPO maintains a multi-service structure. The director states, "one-third of my staff is from the Air Force, one-third is from the Marine Corps and one-third is from
the Navy. This is the way to manage a joint program."41 The JSF Program Deputy Director is an Air Force BGeneral who will become the Director when the Admiral's tenure is complete. This biennial transfer of authority maintains program continuity in the management of the development of the weapons system. The senior Marine Officer in the Program Office is a Colonel, representing the Marine position on STOVL and all other related issues.
Although the acquisition process might have matured, are all our problems solved? The requirements for the services have not altered much since the 1960's. The Navy still needs an aircraft for shipboard operations. This design typically adds a 10-15% weight penalty due to beefed up structure for the catapults and arrested landings.42 Weight additions always reduce performance without additional thrust. The Air Force needs an airplane for dominant airpower and the Marine Corps STOVL offers unique design criteria not considered necessary in the other two variants. Consider the following scenario. Contractor A meets 97% of the performance and design requirements of the Navy and Air Force and falls within the 70% range of meeting the performance requirements of the Marine Corps STOVL version. At the sametime, Contractor B meets 75% of the Navy and Air Force performance and design criteria, while attaining 105% of the Marine Corps requirements due to the unique nature of STOVL design. When this situation occurs, who is the director of the Program Office? What inputs might drive his decisions? The Air Force is buying the most JSF airplanes. They can continually claim they are bringing the most money to the process, therefore deserve continual consideration for their requirements. The Navy is buying the least amount of the JSFs, but they have a Director every two years. The Marine Corps is buying twice as many aircraft as the Navy and the major purchaser of STOVL, but are only represented by a Colonel at the Program Office. In this scenario, this decision might be elevated to the Service Chiefs or Secretary of Defense because of the magnitude of ifs outcome, but every decision of this acquisition program cannot be elevated to that level. Many of the day to day decisions in the Program Office are made in the field of the negotiated environment and the above concerns are valid amongst the participants.
As we have tried to portray, the development and the acquisition processes between the TFX and established for the JSF are vastly different. From a single individual's desire to streamline a department, to the law of the land and an established joint structure, the true measure of success of the JROC/JWCA process, and the efforts of the Joint Strike Fighter Program Office will not be measured until the Joint Strike Fighter is operational and evaluated against its design criteria.
IV
Strike Mission Requirements
The Task at Hand
The Joint Initial Requirements Document II, the precursor to the Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) defines air to ground capabilities thusly, "JSF must be able to search, detect, track, classify (e.g., wheeled vs tracked vehicles), ID, prioritize and engage multiple targets at tactically significant ranges in adverse weather, day or night."43 To accomplish this requirement JSF will employ a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), with definitive resolution and a reliance on Global Positioning System (GPS) enhanced and Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs).44 JSF's target acquisition using onboard systems and/or off board assets should allow employment of the aircraft's entire weapons suite at maximum kinetic ranges.
Overall, the JSF is being designed to be more lethal and more survivable than exiting systems. Designed lethality is an increase in expected kills per pass, while survivability is focused on keeping the aircraft out of high risk environments with the application of standoff weapons.
As one reads through the requirements document, the dependance on advanced technology to produce the expected results is very evident, but no one weapon or weapons system is advertising a probability of kill, Pk, of 100%. Without an assured
success in a dynamic battlefield environment, we would expect a flexible complementary weapons system with the ability to maximize the probability of kill. Does the development of standoff weapons technology enhanced with GPS resemble the reliance on standoff missile technology of thirty years ago? This technological development in air to ground munitions has, as with missile technology, formed the basis for the internal gun disappearing from design criteria. The exclusion of the gun has reduced our inherent battlefield flexibility. Our mentality in designing a standoff weapons system has voided the capability on the in-close missions delineated in the design criteria. These advancements, coupled with the reliance on present day Rules of Engagement (ROE)45 and the gross weight argument, form the thesis for the exclusion of the gun in the strike portion of the Joint Strike Fighter.
There is a Tactical Need for the Gun
If we analyze Post-Vietnam conflicts involving the use of American military force46 we can see that Operations Other Than War (OOTW) have continued and are projected to continue into the future. With an enemy Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) fully intact, the ability for U.S. pilots to use the gun in the air to ground support role is probably prohibitive due to surface-to-air missile threats and antiaircraft artillery. Low Intensity Conflicts (LICS) and OOTWs, though, usually do not offer an IADS of that subsequent nature, making gun employment tactically less risky, therefore, more feasible.
What are the advantages of using the gun in the air to ground support role? Desert Storm experience shows high tech/high cost weapons are not always used with low priority targets later in the war. Expensive precision weapons were used quickly and in a contingency operation may be in short supply. The gun provides a multiple kill capability, thus increasing lethality. In the Urban CAS scenario, close air support in a city, the gun can limit collateral damage with troops in contact around civilian populations, while increasing useful time on target. (If your two bombs are expended, what next?) In the Combat Search and Reseue47 mission, the Joint Strike Fighter will be expected to function as the RESCORT and/or RESCAP.48 Duties in both of these missions are to suppress surface threats en route to and from the objective area, provide protection for recovery helicopters, and provide protection for isolated personnel. Presently, the F/A-18 forms the most potent asset available for this mission due to its internal gun.49
Why should the gun be internal to the aircraft? Why can we not justify, as with the Douhetian concept of elasticity50, that we add the external gun when we foresee the need? This implies the ability to forecast the dynamic aspects of the battlefield. Consider this scenario. In April 1994, over the city of Gorazde, Bosnia-Herzegovina, aircraft were called to stop a Serbian troop movement and convoy along a highway. There were troops in contact and the Forward Air Controller's (FAC) request for assistance had a sense of urgency in his voice. The weather in the target area was a low overcast, inhibiting allied aircraft to get into the target. Four Marine F/A-18 Hornets managed to negotiate the weather and arrive in the target area with convoy in sight. Initially, there was no clearance to drop any weapons due to existing ROE, so all four F/A-18s proceeded to airborne refuel over the Adriatic Sea. Post-tanking, all four F/A-18s were recalled to the target, visually identifying their targets; the first two were cleared to attack. Each F/A-18 was carrying one LASER guided bomb and one conventional iron bomb, along with 578 rounds of 20mm ammunition. With the low overcast in the target, LASER guided bomb usage became difficult due to time of fall and arming considerations. Two of the bombs that were dropped did not detonate and the only recourse was to use the gun to halt the advance. The gun proved effective and portions of the convoy were destroyed. An analysis of the flights of these four Hornets illustrates:
~3 mission changes: Air to Air, Visual/Armed Recce, Air to Ground
~2 aircraft flew 7.1 hours each, 6.5 hours each prior to the attack
~2 aircraft flew 5.4 hours each, 4.9 hours each prior to armed recce.51
The point is that, no one could have foreseen the events of that day unfolding as they did. That day represented a fluid, dynamic battlefield, and with an internal gun, there are British citizens alive today. (There are also Serbians who perished.)
With respect to the external gun, the fallacy that you will have one when needed is suspect. With the internal gun, you buy one gun per aircraft. That is not the buy ratio with an external gun. Tacticians have continually fielded weapons systems that are not fully capable due to limited purchasing of external assets.52 So the tactician wants a fully combat capable weapons system from initiation, while the acquisition officers look to save programmatic dollars at the expense of tactical capability. Herein lies the roots of the
emotional debate of a gun or no gun; programmatics over tactics, and the tacticians hate to be shortchanged!
There exist strike mission requirements that justify the inclusion of the gun on the Joint Strike Fighter. The feasibility to predict the dynamically changing battlefield, present or future, and select the correct weapons system when needed can prove to be disastrous when predictions are in error. The maximum flexibility necessary for the multi-role fighter of the future is only enhanced with the inclusion of the gun. Tacticians should demand as much, since it is their lives they are risking to accomplish the mission.
V
Fighter Mission Requirements
Another Formidable Task
As the Strike mission requirements were delineated in the JIRD, so to are the Fighter mission requirements. The JSF must, "using on board systems search, detect, track, classify (e.g., commercial air, fighter, cruise missile, helicopter), ID, prioritize, and engage reduced signature targets at tactically significant ranges. Additionally, JSF must be able to search, track multiple targets, and support Air Intercept Missiles (AIMs), AIM-120 AMRAAMS, to multiple targets up to the limits of aircraft weapon carriage capability."53 Along with the previously mentioned RADAR system, JSF will incorporate Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSICs) and the Joint Tactical Information Display System (JTIDS) to provide the pilot with the highest quality of unambiguous information about the surrounding environment. This type of technological balance is expected to maintain situational awareness (SA) for the Joint Strike Fighter pilot and allow him to lethally employ the weapons system at range.
Situational Awareness - The Key to Success for the Fighter Pilot
The pilot must have a three dimensional sense of awareness and feel time, distance and relative motion as if they were a part of his soul, only if you have a feeling for what is going on around you can you take action and make correct
decisions. Randy "Duke" Cunningham54
The ability to grasp and maintain situational awareness in a fluid, rapidly changing air-to-air scenario is difficult to quantify from fighter pilot to fighter pilot, but its attainment is a prerequisite for success. With that premise established, "the present trend is still to use technology as the ace factor by increasing the situational awareness of the pilots using electronic means, and providing them with even more lethal weapons."55
Reexamining the requirements document and the Air-to-Air mission statement for the JSF, we can see that the dependency on technology to increase the pilot's capability is a trend that is projected into the future with the design of this weapons system.
The Same Old Argument
Since 1918, and the introduction of an armored German fighter prompting General J. J. Pershing to state a requirement for a heavy caliber aircraft machine gun56, the gun has been the preeminent air-to-air weapon. With the development of beyond visual range (BVR) missiles in the 1950's and 1960's, close in aerial combat and conventional dogfighting was thought to be a thing of the past. "Technological promise of the future, which said there would never be another dogfight, had tactical planners recommending removing the gun from the F-l05." The F-l05 received credit for 20 air-to-air kills in Vietnam with the 20mm cannon.57 The F-4 Phantom, designed as an interceptor relying on missiles, did not have a gun, internal or external. The Phantom was credited with 22.5 gun kills over its service life after a gun was added to the airframe.58 Appendix A, figure 5 features a historical review of air-to-air engagements and gun kills.
We are again debating the applicability of inclusion of the gun in the air-to-air role for the JSF. With even more lethal missiles, AIM-120 and AIM-9X59, helmet mounted sights offering greater angular missile employment of see and shoot technology, the gun seems to be expendable again!
There is a Tactical Need for the Gun
With the technological advances, missile systems have become more capable, more lethal; but no weapons system is claiming 100% probability of kill. No Combat Identification system is claiming 100% accuracy. The money spent to develop systems to increase the Situational Awareness of the pilot is spent to help him make better decisions, weapons employment decisions, those decisions necessary in the dynamic air-to-air arena.
Without an accurate positive hostile identification system, which will allow weapons employment at range, close in air-to-air engagements will occur, forcing a visual identification. Proliferation of stealth and/or electronic counter measures (ECM) technology increases the probability of close in air-to-air combat due to the reduction of detection ranges. The Joint Strike Fighter will encounter shorter range engagements ingressing to a target, by taking the fight to the enemy. With only limited missile capability (4), JSF needs the multiple kill capability a gun offers in the projected close in scenarios.
Some advocates include the gun for sake of its flexibility alone, but this is not persuasive enough for today's JSF Program Officers. Some might think the gun has a leveraging effect for an aircraft gunning down a cruise missile, but the feasibility study is still pending.60 Within the concept of the compressed intercept, close in maneuvering, the gun is the best option for the close in overshoot. The gun has no minimum range, while all missiles have an inner range limit to their firing envelope. The gun is impervious to countermeasures and has no high angle of attack and maneuvering limitations associated with missile employment in the close in arena. The gun is instantly available and provides a means of defense when all missiles are expended. We will examine gun specific improvements in the next section; avionics technology and improved heads up displays, incorporating more lethal aiming means have made air-to-air gun usage more effective. The gun will not be the premier air-to-air weapon in the next century, as it once was, but it allows for a "graceful degradation" in the fighter weapons system when combined with long range and short range missiles.61 Excluding the gun from the JSF results in reduced lethality, and this counters our initial premise under truth in labeling...JSF was to be more lethal!
STOVL - Where does the USMC stand with respect to an air-to-air gun?
With all that said, the Air Force is planning on including a gun in the CTOL version of the JSF.62 Without the weight penalty incurred by the STOVL plumbing, the tactical justification just levied overcame the programmatic rationale. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, has decided to emphasize the air-to-ground capability of the aircraft and accept a "good" air-to-air capability.63 Although the air-to-air argument for inclusion of a gun is applicable, the necessity to maintain STOVL is of a more driving concern to the Corps. Any arguments of an air-to-air nature do not have real credibility from the Corps' perspective, due to the focus on air-to-ground for the STOVL version of the JSF. The inclusion of a requirement for an external, "blister gun", is the method the Marine Corps has attempted to address the tactical necessity for having the gun and answering the critics from inside their own aviation community.
Summary of STOVL Compromises
We have seen the Marine Corps is willing to pay programmatic and tactical penalties to attain the STOVL version of the JSF. The basic weight of the STOVL version will be heavier to accommodate STOVL hardware. The range will be reduced due to a decrease in internal fuel, resulting from the accommodation of the STOVL hardware. With the STOVL hardware, a reduction in the stealth capability will be accepted. No 2000 pound class weapons will be carried on the Marine JSF, and no internal gun will be present. The nebulous 'good' air-to-air capability is acceptable!
As an organization, the U. S. Marine corps is willing to accept these tactical and programmatic concessions to maintain their strategic asset: Marine Air.
VI
Gun Technology for the Future
It is Not That Simple
With respect to the warfighting doctrine and tactics of the future, there exists missions and scenarios in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground arena that justify the inclusion of the gun on the Joint Strike Fighter. With the decision to include a gun, or desire to include a gun, what type of gun do we include? Analysis of this question poses another programmatic decision for developers and acquisition professionals.
"At the dawn of military aviation, gun and ammunition technology was already well matured; the aircraft arming process was largely a matter of adapting ground weapons to aerial combat."64 A major criticism of the development process that ensued was that gun design and ammunition design had been relatively independent. This less than cohesive mating of developmental processes has hindered advances in the weapons system throughout the years.
A look at the chronology of gatling guns, (Appendix A, figure 6), shows the stalwart and prime candidate for inclusion into the 1SF is the M-61 Vulcan cannon, operational since 1959! With the projected retirement of the F/A-18C/Ds in 2007, this gun will have performed admirably for nearly 50 years in a variety of airframes. Surely, technology has progressed to where we can improve on the capability and lethality of the Vulcan cannon. Research in the area of advanced tactical guns shows limited technological advances over the history of aviation. Unless one entertains the futuristic prospects of laser weapons and pulsed energy weapons, the guns of the next generation aircraft will look very similar to the guns in service today.
"The general demands for a gun remains much the same as they were when the cannon was introduced; to throw a great deal of explosive in a short burst; to achieve a high probability of hit; and to achieve a high probability of a kill in the event of a hit."65 Designers have developed the Advance Tactical Gun (ATG) to improve on the limitations
of the M61 Vulcan cannon. A 25mm gun, the ATG, boasts fewer moving parts than the Vulcan and employs cased telescoped (CT) ammunition.66 The use of the unique cased ammunition design advertises lighter weights over conventional ammunition, reducing tactical fighter aircraft weights and airlift requirements for sustainment. Case telescoped ammunition is reported to be easier to transport and store over conventional ammunition. With a 25mm size projectile, the ATG with CT ammunition offers higher velocity of a greater mass projectile, increasing kill probability to that similar to the A-10's 30mm GAU-l0. With the greater velocity of the 25mm bullet, standoff range can be increased to more survivable altitudes, while the probability of kill is almost increased 60% over the M61.67 With all that improvement over the M-61, why is the incorporation of the ATG into the JSF not an easy decision?
Programmatic Decisions Equal $S
With the long standing usage of the M-6 1, the United States and its allies have a considerable investment in Vulcan cannons and the 20mm ammunition associated with it. "The maintenance of another non-interchangeable line of guns and ammunition in the supply accounts would seriously complicate logistical arrangements and interoperability."68 This is also not the first time the aviation industry has been presented with cased telescoped ammunition. In the 1970's, CT ammunition and the GAU-7, 25mm Gatling Gun, were to be the advance gun for the F-15. The GAU-7 was deemed a program failure and the F-15 went with the reliable Vulcan.69 Program failures resulted from ammunition storage and uneven propellant burning. Industry and technology profess to have solved these problems of twenty-five years ago. Mr. Mets sums up the programmatic decision of which gun to purchase with the following paragraph from Checking Six, "The decision as to which gun is shrouded in imponderables. An intuitive judgment must be made. The attractiveness of a quantum jump in muzzle velocity and a simpler, more reliable gun than the one in current fighters is substantial. Yet the
experience with the M-6 is suggest that such choices tend to be forever. It is therefore this author's intuitive judgment that the new missiles be complemented with the improved M61 and improved but conventional 20mm ammunition. This would avoid a premature and practically irreversible commitment to advance gun technology and ammunition when even greater gains may be just around the corner." The tacticians and acquisition officers might not accept this logic, in that, the 'new development just around the corner' might not be able to be implemented due to the permanent acceptance of the M-61, again. One has to wonder how the development of the gun system has been hampered by the continual rejection, and subsequent inclusion into the fighter design over the last forty years.
STOVL-The "Blister" Gun
The Blister gun, as presented in JIRD II, is shrouded in uncertainties. The blister concept implies minimal impact on RCS signature and performance. The blister would be conformal to the fuselage of the aircraft, thus minimizing any impact on parasite drag. This optional STOVL gun system is desired to be very easily removed/installed without a requirement for re-boresighting. That requirement is much easier written, than it is designed, fielded or funded.
If we look at these bolt-on type of gun systems, re-boresighting is only one concern. The installation and removal process of the external gun wears out the attachment mechanisms causing excessive gun vibration during firing, increasing bullet dispersion and reducing lethality. The placement of the "blister" on the airframe is a design concern. Blister placement with respect to the center of gravity of the airplane can impart pitching moments to the nose of the aircraft, up or down, that need to be countered by the pilot during gun firing or handled by automatic aerodynamic flight control coordination. The extra pilot manipulation can reduce the effectiveness of the weapon and is considered a design deficiency, while the automatic flight control biasing, needs to be quantified, tested and funded. Presently, the blister concept is an appeasement to those portions of Marine aviation that believe a need for a gun exists, but an internal design can not be accepted due to the threat to STOVL. With the optional external blister gun system, not the internal gun system, will the Marine Corps purchase 642 guns to match the purchase of JSFs or limit the procurement of an external gun to be fiscally responsible? The tacticians wonder and worry!
VII
Conclusions
Initially, the decision to include an internal gun in the Joint Strike Fighter seemed like a simple decision of programmatics over tactics, dollars over capabilities. In fact, the Air Force has decided to force the issue, and include the internal gun on their version of the JSF. In this case, tactical decision making overcame strict programmatics. When asked, the Navy has been mute on the issue.
Upon further inspection, the situation facing the Marine Corps is as unique as the STOVL platform itself. The position that the Marine Corps has established, implements the STOVL version of the Joint Strike Fighter as the only fixed wing fighter attack platform in the Corps' inventory and any increase in gross weight that threatens STOVL, threatens the program.
Tactically there exists a need for the multiple kill capability offered by the gun in the air-to-ground and air-to-air arenas. With the focus on the urbanized littorals for future conflict, the projected need for a fixed wing close air support platform, with weapons to be employed in an urban area, will be present. The STOVL JSF with gun will answer that call. With a continued need, no matter where, to perform the Combat Search and Rescue RESCORT/RESCAP mission in suppressing enemy surface threats, while rescuing downed allies, the STOYL JSF with gun will fill that need. Without a gun on the JSF, these mission areas will go unattended by the future aviation procurements within the Department of Defense.
In the air-to-air arena, even with the increased reliance on stealth and missile technology, no weapon system can promise 100% reliability on the dynamic battlefield of the future. JSF will encounter shorter range engagements due to stealth technology ingressing to a target, and with limited missile capability, requires the flexibility and multiple kill capability a gun offers.
Although gun and ammunition development over the years has not been significant enough to radically change gun design, two candidates have emerged for the inclusion into the JSF. The reliable M61 Vulcan cannon or its derivative, offers years of service with the limitations of a 20mm projectile. Low impact velocities and greater stand off ranges during employment are the detractors for staying with the M61 system. The Advance Tactical Gun, while unproven, offers a 25mm projectile with increased impact velocities, increased probability of kill, and greater standoff ranges. The inclusion of a 25mm projectile into the supply system can fiscally hamper supportability. The decision to include the ATG might be tactically correct, but programmatically foolish depending on the maturity of the system. The decision to include the gun should be made now, with the monitoring of gun system maturation, for a future weapon selection when dictated by the program timeline. Either one of these existing choices has a much greater advantage over the concept of the blister gun, which is intended as an internal USMC appeasement.
We have established the thesis that any threat to the existence of the STOVL concept, tactically or programmatically within the platform, represents a threat to the existence of fixed wing Marine TACAIR. The tactical versus the programmatic debate notwithstanding, the strategic reality is that if Marine TACAJR is a carbon copy of either the Air Force and/or the Navy it will cease to exist as a separate entity in the future.
The Joint Strike Fighter will be the Marine STOVL fixed wing platform, taken with the tactical compromises acquiesced to, to maintain the unique structure of the expeditionary force. The STOVI JSF, as it exists in design today, will be a Strike Fighter without an internal gun. The Marine JSF will be less lethal than its predecessor, the F/A-18 Hornet, in some tactical arenas, and less lethal overall than initial advertisements would lead you to believe!
Notes
1 Margaret Bone, "Birth of the Strike Fighter," The Retired Officer Magazine, October
1996, 48.
2 Appendix A, figures 1 and 2.
3 Norman R. Augustine, Augustine's Laws (New York: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc., 1983), 55.
4 Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,
1983), 16.
5 Richard P. Hallion, Storm over Iraq-Air Power and the Gulf War (Washington:
Smithsonian Institute Press, 1992), 13.
6 Hallion, 32.
7 James P. Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox-The Development of the F-18 Hornet (Annapolis, MI): Naval Institute Press, 1993), 160.
8 Single mission airplanes along with total number of assets are discussed in a cost /benefit analysis with respect to the Quadrennial Defense Review. Patrick Pexton, "How Many Fighters Needed?" Navy Times, 6 January 1997, 18; David A. Fulghum, "Final JSF Competition Offers No Sure Bets." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 November 1996, 21.
9 Mike Spick, An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighter Combat (London: Salamander Books Ltd., 1987), Fwd.
10 The F-86 requirement was generated as a high altitude interceptor, as was the Phantom. Stephenson, 2.
11 Fighter performance definitions taken from Klaus Huenecke, Modern Combat Aircraft Design (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987); Robert L. Shaw, Fighter Combat - Tactics and Maneuvering (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press), 1985.
thrust to weight: ratio of engine output in pounds of thrust to the weight of the aircraft in pounds. The highest known thrust to weight ratios are about 1.4, while a thrust to weight ratio of 1.0 gives the aircraft the ability to be airborne by its own jet thrust. A high thrust to weight ratio is vital for a highly maneuverable air superiority fighter.
wing loading: aircraft weight divided by wing area, one of the most important design criterias. For an air superiority aircraft, modest aircraft weight, with a relatively large swept leading edge wing lead to low wing loading and good maneuverability.
instantaneous turn performance: aircraft's maximum turn capabilities at any given moment under existing flight conditions (e.g., speed and altitude). For the fighter pilot this equates to quickly positioning the nose for weapons employment or intimidation of the enemy.
sustained turn performance: aircraft's ability to maintain a turn for an extended length of time under a given set of flight conditions.
maneuverability: a combination of characteristics that encompasses climbing performance, acceleration capability and turning speed.
acceleration performance: ability of an aircaft, measured in feet per second, to maximize thrust while minimizing drag to increase speed.
agility: roll performance is the ability of an aircaft to change the lateral direction of its plane of maneuver. Roll performance may be defined as a measure of the aircraft's agility. The F-16 is considered the most agile aircraft ever designed and its performance capabilities are being used to construct a government specification for agility testing for future aircraft. (Personal notes).
12 A triservice document that lists the use of the enclosed designations as mandatory.
(AFR-82-I {18 May 1990}, AR 70-50, and NAVAIRINST 8800.3)
13 Data taken from Mike Spick, Designed for the Kill, The Jet Fighter-Development and
Experience (Shrewsbury, England: Airline Publishing Ltd., 1995), 168-173;
Laurence K. Loftin, Jr., Quest for Performance - The Evolution of Modern
Aircraft (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1985), 326. The thrust to weight ratio of the F-ISA at normal takeoff weight is
1.15, while the F/A-18A is 0.89. Comparatively, the F-111 is 0.5 and the F-117A
is 0.41.
14 RCS is the apparent size of an aircraft as it appears to search and fire control radars,
and has no relationship to the actual physical cross section of the airplane. Hallion,
293.
15 Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. Draft of Joint Initial Requirements Document II for Joint Strike Fighter. Washington, DC, January 1997, 2.
16 Doug Richardson, Stealth (New York: Orion Books, 1989), 86.
17 Bill Sweetman, "Will Cost Kill Stealth?" Jane's International Defense Review, October 1996, 48.
18 Richardson, 115.
19 Headquarters United States Marine Corps. JIRD Operational Characteristics. January
1997.
20Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. Draft of Joint Initial Requirements Document II for Joint Strike Fighter. Washington, DC, January 1997, 10.
21 Bill Gunston, Warplanes of the Future (New York: Crescent Books, 1985), 82.
22 V/STOL or VSTOL stands for Vertical and Short Take-off and Landing capable aircraft vs STOVL - Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing. The subtle difference being the STOVL aircraft doesn't profess to have the ability to takeoff vertically initially with a tactical weapons load.
23 Paul Proctor, "Boeing JSF Prototype to Prove New Manufacturing Methods," Aviation Week and Space Technology. 25 November 1996, 23.
24Robert Jackson, Combat Aircraft Prototypes since 1945 (New York: ARCO/Prentice Hall Press, 1985), 142.
25 Jackson, 143.
26 Bruce Myles, Jump Jet - The Revolutionary V/STOL Fighter, 2d ed. (London:
Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), 150.
27 Bill Sweetman, Advanced Fighter Technology (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks
International, 1987), 84.
28 Pictured in appendix A, figures 3 and 4 are the contractors design concepts for STOVL
lift. The STOVL hardware for each concept is roughly 1000 lbs. Pictures and data taken from Stanley W. Kandebo, "Fl 19 Versatility Challenged by JSF Requirements." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 November 1996, 25-27.
29 Water injection enables engine rpm to be increased for a given turbine entry
temperature (TET). The AV-8 Harrier carriers roughly 59 U.S. gallons of water to allow for near 90 seconds worth of thrust boosting in the vertical landing mode. Water injection typically adds 1000 pounds of thrust in optimum conditions, while the water supply lasts. NATOPS Flight Manual, Navy Model A V-8A, TA V-8A, AV-8CAircraft, NAVAIR 0l-AV8A-1, 1 December 1981.
30 Boeing Strike Fighter Fact Sheet.
31 Orr Kelly, The Inside Story of the F/A-18 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990), 73.
32 Personal notes.
33 JAST - Quick Look Gun Study.
34 Robert F. Coulam, Illusions of Choice - The F111 and the Problems of Weapons Acquisition Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 244.
35Coulam, 143.
36 Coulam, 173.
37 Coulam,, 151
38 Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JROC Planning in a
Revolutionary Era. Washington, DC: The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996, 3.
39JROC, 15.
40JROC, 22.
41 Bone, 51.
42 Personal academic notes.
43Joint Strike Fighter Program Office. Draft of Joint Initial Requirements Document II for Joint Strike Fighter. Washington, DC, January 1997,6.
44 The STOVL JSF will not carry any 2000 pound class ammunition. JIRD II, 8.
45 Rules of Engagement in Bosnia would not allow an aircraft to fly less than 10,000 above ground level, due to exposure to small arms ground fire. At this altitude it is difficult, to near impossible, to identify and shoot a vehicle or artillery position. Therefore, since ROE did not allow you to fly to a firing solution, the weapon was unnecessary. Personal notes.
46 Cambodia (Mayaguez), Libya (El Dorado Canyon), Panama (Just Cause), Iraq (Desert
Storm), Somalia, Haiti, Iran (Hostage Rescue Attempt), Lebanon, Grenada, Deny
Flight/Provide Comfort, Bosnia, Rwanda?
47A combat search and rescue mission is a specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-50.2 "Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue". 26 January 1996, GL-4.
48 Joint Publication 3-50.2, II-8.
49 Academic notes, Stike Leader Attack Training Syllabus (SLATS), Strike Warfare, Fallon, Nevada, 1995.
50Douhet, 118.
51Personal notes.
52 There is not a one to one ratio of Foward Looking Infrared Pods (FLIRs) to F/A-18s in
the fleet. Digital map sets are cross decked from carrier to carrier, as is electronic
counter measures equipment. Personal notes.
53 JIRD II, 6,7. The underlining is as it exists in the document.
54 Mike Spick, The Ace Factor - Air Combat and the Role of Situational Awareness (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 152.
55 Spick, 172.
56 Display, Quantico Air to Ground Museum, Quantico, VA, September 1996.
57 Stevenson, 15.
58 Mike Spick, An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighter Combat (London: Salamander
Books Ltd., 1987), 62.
59 Michael A. Dornheim, "AIM-9X Missile Selection Nears," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 november 1996, 30.
60Mark Hewish, "The Menace Reawakens: Defense Against Cruise-Countering the
Threat of Cruise Missiles." Jane's International Defense Review, December 1996,
28-33.
61 Bill Sweetman, Advanced Fighter Technology (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks
International, 1987), 162.
62 Bill Sweetman, "Decision Day Looms For Joint Strike Fighter," Jane's International
Defense Review, September 1996, 37.
63 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Joint Strike Fighter Brief, January 1997.
Good remains undefined.
64 David R.Mets, Checking Six is Not Enough: The Evolution and Future of Air Superiority Armament (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1992),
36.
65 Roy Braybook, Aircraft Weaponry of Today (Somerset, England: Haynes Publishing Group, 1988), 26.
66Appendix A, figure 7 features a comparison of convention ammunition and cased telescoped.
67 Air Combat Command, United States Ak Force, CAF Issues, Gun Study, 1996, 86.
68 Mets, 35.
69Mike Spick, F-15 Eagle (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1986), 11.
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VITA
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Paul Yurovich USMC was born in Lorain, Ohio on May 16, 1957. He graduated from Lorain Senior High School in June, 1975. In the Fall of that same year, he entered The Ohio State University and in June, 1979 received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mathematics and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Education with a Secondary Teaching Certificate. Lieutenant Colonel Yurovich was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps on 8 June 1979 and entered U. S. Navy Flight School in June, 1980. He received his Naval Aviator Wings on 25 September 1981. After eight years of operational flying in the F-4 Phantom and the F/A- 18 Hornet, Lieutenant Colonel Yurovich was selected to attend the U. S. Navy Test Pilot School, Patuxent River, Maryland. He graduated from the fixed wing test pilot course in June, 1990. From July 1990 to May 1993, Lieutenant Colonel Yurovich functioned as a Weapons Test Pilot and Department Head for the Ordnance Department, Strike Aircraft Test Directorate, Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division, Patuxent river, Maryland. In December of 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Yurovich completed the requirements for and was awarded a Master of Science degree in Aviation Systems Engineering from the University of Tennessee.
Lieutenant Colonel Yurovich has logged over 3200 flight hours in 30 different types of aircraft. He is a graduate of Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN}, and designated a Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) by Marine Aviation and Weapons Squadron One (MAWTS-1), Yuma, Arizona. He is also a graduate of the Navy's Strike Leader Attack Training Syllabus (SLATS), at Strike University in Fallon, Nevada and has logged 165 carrier arrested landings. He is presently attending United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia, awaiting his next assignment as the Commanding Officer of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, flying the F/A-18C.
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