Military

MV-22: Enhancing The Capabilities Of Air Assault Forces

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Aviation

 

                                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title:             MV-22: Enhancing The Capabilities Of Air Assault Forces

 

Author:         Major Edward Yarnell, United States Marine Corps

 

Thesis:          The MV-22 will offer an advantage in mobility over conventional

helicopters because it improves the ability of infantry forces to execute Operational

Maneuver From The Sea.

 

Discussion:    The advantages of the MV-22 must be put in the context of how it will

support future infantry tactics and maneuver warfare. Improvements in speed, range and survivability will significantly improve assault support; however, these improvements will not significantly enhance the Marine Corps warfighting capabilities alone. The advantages of new technology must be exploited by exploring better methods of employing them. Operational Maneuver From The Sea is a new concept of warfighting that requires a high degree of mobility. Future infantry tactics will attempt to capitalize on greater mobility. Greater mobility, in the form of the MV-22, offers an opportunity for infantrymen to explore and develop new tactics in executing maneuver warfare. Therefore, the greatest advantage of the MV-22 is that it will provide a platform that links new tactics to a new concept of warfare.

 

Conclusion:   The MV-22 is the only platform available in the foreseeable future that

supports the concept of Operational Maneuver From The Sea to the degree that it gives amphibious forces a decided advantage. The Marine Corps must continue to pursue new infantry tactics in order to explore the best ways to execute maneuver warfare. The MV-22 will fulfill a critical mobility requirement, but more importantly the MV-22 will allow the Marine Corps to realize the full potential of Operational Maneuver From The Sea.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                        PREFACE

 

           During the course of this research, I had the opportunity to interview personnel that are involved in the MV-22 program. This included people from Marine Helicopter Squadron One (MV-22 Multi-service Operational Test Team at Quantico, VA.), Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (V-22 Integrated Test Team at Patuxent River, MD.), Bell Boeing (V-22 Customer Requirements), Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation Plans and Policies code 33), and the Commandant's Warfighting Lab (Wargaming Division at Quantico, VA.). Every person in each of these organizations that I interviewed shared a common view that the MV-22 is a unique aircraft that will improve the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. In particular, the representative from the Naval Warfare Center Aircraft Division emphasized the impact that the MV-22 would have on sphere of influence.[1] As a CH-53D/E helicopter pilot with 2,500 flight hours experience and designated Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron instructor, I am in agreement that the aircraft possesses capabilities that will easily translate into a powerful edge in combat. I had the opportunity to fly the MV-22 flight simulator for two hours during my research. After being assured that the simulator's performance was comparable to the actual aircraft, my impression is that the capabilities of the MV-22 will elevate the utility of air assault forces executing Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) to a new level because the MV-22's agility increases mobility by an order of magnitude that can not be measured in speed or range alone.[2]

 

     MV-22: ENHANCING THE CAPABILITIES OF AIR ASSAULT FORCES

           

                                                       INTRODUCTION

          In 1924, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole's 1,750-man amphibious landing force

conducted experimental wargames against Colonel Dion Williams' 1,550-man

Culebra Island defensive force in order to develop doctrine, tactics, and equipment necessary to lay the framework for what is known today as amphibious warfare. The Culebra wargames in the 1920s took an unproven concept that some people

considered futile and exposed all its weaknesses. The initial wargames were

considered failures; however, they identified shortfalls in force structure, tactics, and equipment. In order to make amphibious operations work, the Marine Corps altered its force structure, developed new tactics and procured new equipment to support the concept.

          Eventually, the Marine Corps developed amphibious doctrine and succeeded in

validating the concept of amphibious warfare as it exists today. In the 1990s, as was the case in the 1920s, the Marine Corps embarked on a similar quest to improve its

warfighting capabilities. Even though the concept of amphibious warfare still remains valid as we transition into the 21st century, the challenge for the next century is to

improve the way amphibious forces are employed.

         Advancements in technology created an environment where the threat within the

littorals has become more sophisticated and dangerous to conventional amphibious

tactics. The Marine Corps recognized this and developed a new concept for

amphibious warfare called Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS). A critical part of OMFTS is that it seeks to improve the survivability of amphibious forces by providing amphibious forces greater mobility. In order to improve mobility, the

Marine Corps developed the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and is in the process of developing the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and the MV-22 Osprey. The LCAC, AAAV, and the MV-22 are referred to as the "triad" of equipment that will eventually support tactics developed for the execution of OMFTS. This situation can be compared to the efforts of the Germans during the 1930s when they embarked on the "Blitzkrieg" concept first and then developed equipment and tactics to support it later. Similar to the efforts of the Marine Corps in the 1920s and the Germans in the 1930s, the Marine Corps has developed a concept of amphibious warfare that requires new equipment and tactics to support it because of the distances involved in "over the horizon" tactics. In the area of equipment, the Marine Corps identified mobility as a shortfall and has invested a great deal of energy and resources toward the development of the MV-22.

          Procurement of the MV-22 continues to be a contentious issue because of the cost, but more importantly because advocates against the procurement of the MV-22

still do not believe that the aircraft offers an advantage in mobility over current

conventional helicopters. Therefore, the focus this research is to investigate if the MV-22 provided a decided advantage in mobility worth the cost of its production. The answer to this question is important because the fate of OMFTS hinges on the Marine Corps' ability to complete the "triad" and for the MV-22 to provide mobility through the air that enhances the Marine Corps' ability to operate from "over the horizon". This paper initially discusses the capabilities of the MV-22, but the main focus is on infantry tactics and maneuver warfare because the greatest advantage of the MV-22 is that it will enhance the Marine Corps' ability to execute OMFTS. Therefore, the remainder of this paper concentrates on exploring the advantages of the MV-22 by examining: the utility of air assault forces, new infantry concepts of employment, how MV-22 enhances maneuver warfare, and a historical comparison using the flexibility attributes of the MV-22.

 

                                        CAPABILITIES OF THE MV-22

          The MV-22 tiltrotor is a revolutionary, advanced technology, vertical and short

takeoff and land (V/STOL), multi-purpose aircraft with excellent high speed cruise

performance. It performs a wide range of missions as effectively as a conventional

helicopter while achieving the long range cruise efficiencies of a twin turboprop

aircraft. The MV-22 can transition within a couple of minutes from a hover to speeds

in excess of 250 knots and can fly at altitudes greater than 20,000 feet with a full

combat payload. Tiltrotors reduce rotational speed and use very low thrust for cruise propulsion and so they are inherently quieter than both helicopters and airplanes

during cruise flight. Possible missions include: combat troop lift, internal and external cargo lift, combat search and rescue, special operations, and self deployment. The MV-22 will be capable of self deploying to any region in the world through the use of its aerial refueling system. The combat radius of the MV-22 is approximately 250 NM in the basic configuration.[3] Secondary missions include tactical air control support and aeromedical evacuation. It is capable of seating 24 combat loaded troops, palletized cargo, light wheeled vehicles, or 12 medical litters. The standard MV-22 has an operating weight of 34,000 pounds. This gives the MV-22 a vertical take off payload of approximately 10,000 pounds and a runway take off payload of almost 15,000 pounds. It can also externally carry 10,000 pounds with a dual hook arrangement that provides sufficient stability for cruise speeds. It is shipboard compatible, designed to permit easy shipboard movement and has environmentally sealed electrical components designed to prevent corrosion from operating in a salt water environment. The aircraft folds up compactly for stowage aboard ship.

          The MV-22 Osprey allows the Marine Corps to interdict any world crisis from

amphibious ships, aircraft carrier battle groups, or through self deployment. The MV-22 increases range and reaction time, and allows the operational commander more capabilities to strike further, move faster, and to build up combat power ashore more quickly. An amphibious task force with MV-22s can respond to a crisis in the littorals that are up to 2,000 miles away within just 24 hours. In addition, the MV-22 can self deploy to any Major Regional Conflict (MRC) with less impact on strategic lift. A self deploying Osprey squadron saves four to six C-5 sorties supporting each squadron.[4] The number of C-5 sorties will depend on support equipment and personnel requirements, but more importantly the MV-22 arrives in theater ready to execute missions immediately. This can be compared to a two week delay that a CH-53E squadron would take to reassemble aircraft that were transported in C-5 aircraft.[5]

          Reducing the time it takes to provide operationally ready transport aircraft in

theater, allows commanders to plan for missions to be executed at a quicker pace. Thus, a self deploying MV-22 squadron would increase the ability to generate tempo on an enemy immediately upon arrival in country. The MV-22 is also designed to

survive on the battlefield. It is seven to eleven times less vulnerable to small arms fire than current helicopters and will have fifty percent less exposure time en route to and from landing zones because of its demonstrated airspeed.[6] The MV-22 will also

increase survivability by having a reduced acoustic signature that is 75 percent quieter than current helicopters.[7] Tiltrotor technology will allow the MV-22 to accelerate and

decelerate 40 percent faster than helicopters, which translates into increased agility and survivability. The MV-22 is also the only tactical transport aircraft that incorporates nuclear, biological, and chemical protection.[8]

          Procuring the MV-22 is an effort by the Marine Corps to modernize and

enhance its amphibious warfighting capability. Therefore, the MV-22 is designed to fit Wasp-class LHD amphibious assault ships and is designed to fit the existing CH-46E squadron organizational structure. The MV-22 also has improved survivability features incorporated into the aircraft that drastically improves its capability to operate from "over the horizon". With a third generation thermal imager and a cockpit lit for night vision goggles, the MV-22 will be fully capable of operating around the ship and littorals at night. It will also have a digital map that can display the enemy threat situation. The MV-22 engine nacelles will also have infrared engine exhaust suppressors to reduce the lock on area available to shoulder fired heat seeking missiles. The MV-22 will have the Litton APR-39A(V)2 threat warning system that is compatible with a range of missile and laser warning detectors, radar jammers, and chaff and flare dispensers to counter many enemy threats. The twin-engine MV-22 retains credible single engine flight capability. The production T406 engine has a 6,830 shaft horse power, 10 minute emergency rating. An MV-22 in the helicopter mode with one engine out should be able to return to ship with as much as a 20 knot wind over the deck. With both engines out, the MV-22 will angle its nacelles up and descend in a 110 knot glide to a 30 knot rolling touchdown. The MV-22 was designed to reduce the area vulnerable to 12.7mm (50 cal) rounds. Composite structures inhibit cracking after ballistic damage, and even with aluminum bulkheads and frames, the MV-22 will be far more ballistically tolerant than conventional metal airframes. Speed, range, and survivability make the MV-22 a formidable transport asset, but more importantly it is designed to survive the rigors of amphibious operations and combat.[9]

          Operationally, the MV-22 is performing well. Unit recurring cost is down 16

percent over the past year and expected to be further reduced as production

efficiencies are achieved. Additionally, the aircraft has completed over 1081 flight hours and 942 flights of development risk reduction flight testing and envelope expansion. Currently, the MV-22 is 300 pounds under its design weight, has lower projected drag, higher projected reliability and maintainability, and meets or exceeds all of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee standards. The USSOCOM/USAF CV-22 aircraft Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) is also scheduled to begin in 1997, with deliveries scheduled to begin in 1999. Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the Marine Corps is scheduled to occur in FY 2001.

          Current Marine Corps plans call for 22 MV-22 squadrons (18 active and 4

reserve). Each squadron will be comprised of 12 aircraft with a similar staffing

requirement to that of current CH-46E squadrons. The first tactical deployment of a

MV-22 squadron (VMM) is scheduled to occur in 2004.[10] The introduction of the MV-22 into the Fleet will obviously improve the assault support capability of the Marine Corps; however, it will also provide the Marine Corps an opportunity to explore new methods of troop employment that can possibly lead to a fundamental change in infantry tactics.

 

                                  UTILITY OF AIR ASSAULT FORCES

          There is a growing debate regarding a possible radical transformation in the

nature of warfare as a result of revolutionary technologies and ideas.[11] The most

threatening challenges on the horizon are weapons of mass destruction and precision guided weapons. These threats create a dilemma for amphibious forces because

technology has extended the range and increased the lethality and accuracy of weapon systems around the littorals. Any third world country with enough money or support can develop a sophisticated coastal defense system that can make a traditional amphibious operation untenable. The current system of amphibious warfare, which generally involves a massive buildup of forces on a beach or through major ports and airfields, is particularly vulnerable to such threats.[12] The Marine Corps recognizes the fact that amphibious forces can no longer anchor offshore with valuable capital ships and assets within enemy weapon ranges. Therefore, the Marine Corps is attempting to address this problem by relying more on sea basing and a style of maneuver warfare the maximizes mobility at sea and the ability to provide responsive and accurate indirect firepower.[13]

          Providing ground forces greater mobility and more responsive and accurate

 indirect firepower will increase survivability and will make our ground forces more

effective.[14] The new threat to amphibious forces around the littorals requires a shift into a new era where the purpose of our infantry is no longer just to engage an opponent with direct fire weapons. The infantry must also be able to locate threats and bring indirect firepower to bear in order to create conditions favorable for amphibious operations.[15] Precision-guided munitions, new communications, and target designation technologies, and other computer-simulation training systems will enable infantrymen to take over the responsibility for controlling indirect fire support.[16] Infantry can assume a decisive role by directing indirect fire support to shape or destroy enemy forces, a style of warfare that will allow better use of maneuver warfare doctrine and strength in technology.[17]

          Unfortunately, infantrymen are currently unable to capitalize on this concept for two major reasons: First, technology in indirect firepower has not been fully

developed. Second, mobility through the air is still limited to conventional

helicopters. Our ability to provide responsive and accurate firepower and our ability to provide an advantage in mobility through the air to the degree necessary to support "search and attack" tactics, does not exist as of yet. Both of these factors combined, potentially creates a situation where infantrymen fear becoming the "hunted" instead of the "hunter." The concept will not work without access to overwhelming indirect firepower that can defeat massed armor or without the ability to rapidly transport forces to and from the battlefield. Technology is quickly improving both direct and indirect firepower capabilities for infantrymen, however, mobility through the air is the other half of the equation where drastic improvement is needed. Within the foreseeable future, the MV-22 is the only transport aircraft capable of providing an advantage in mobility to infantrymen because its speed, range, and versatility far exceeds the capabilities of any conventional helicopter. The MV-22 will allow the infantry to explore better tactics that use smaller, more highly trained units in executing maneuver warfare. These units could be designed to exploit the advantages of sophisticated indirect fire support that uses "search and attack" tactics vice "close with and destroy" tactics. The MV-22 will improve the capabilities of a mobile air assault force and will provide the impetus needed to transform infantry tactics to a form of warfare that exponentially increases the lethality of indirect and direct firepower.

          In order to fully appreciate the potential of air assault forces for the Marine Corps, we must consider how amphibious warfare can affect potential adversaries and how assault forces can enhance the Marine Corps amphibious mission. Amphibious

operations are still limited to tactical relevance, specifically the seizure of advanced bases and initial introduction of ground forces ashore.[18] If the desired outcome of

amphibious warfare is to seize and control potential "through put" areas, then the

focus of effort should be to gain tactical leverage through maneuver in order to put the enemy into an untenable position that forces him to displace. According to FM 100-5,

Operations, maneuver is "the means of positioning forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum, massed effects, and moral dominance."[19]

          The concept of using airborne forces to achieve this type of maneuver was first

introduced by Soviet General Mikhail N. Tukhavchevskiy. General Tukhavchevskiy

developed the theory of "deep battle" after studying the battles of WW I. He noted that warfare degenerated to static contact along vastly extended lines that denied

assailable flanks for maneuver. He foresaw the utility of airborne assault forces that could conduct landings throughout the area separating Corps, Army, and Army groups from reserves. Potential missions assigned these forces included capturing enemy weapons systems, seizing bridgeheads, securing mountain passes, and annihilating strategic objectives otherwise resistant to attack.[20] Tukhavchevskiy also recognized the exposed flank of the enemy can also be the sea, if he lacks the maritime superiority to adequately secure it. Freedom of maneuver can be achieved through maritime

superiority.[21] By blocking his lines of communication and destroying his facilities, the enemy is presented with a dilemma which he must resolve. The resulting chaos,

disorganization and immobility are direct products of the enemy's loss of tactical and operational agility. These conditions introduce inertia into the enemy's decision

making process and reduce his ability to recover. They also expose additional

vulnerabilities for friendly exploitation. As the enemy strives to gain cohesion, the commander is able to increase the tempo of his own activities, concentrate his own strength, and take advantage of transient opportunities. Operational maneuver

provides a method to increase the friction confronting an enemy and thus improve the retention of agility at the enemy's expense.[22] Deep operational maneuver forces seek to interdict enemy reserves and to paralyze the enemy's command and control system thereby degrading his freedom of action.[23] The Russians never exploited the concept of airborne tactics in WW II because they lacked infantry tactics that could support this type of maneuver. They were also limited by technology that left their forces

dispersed and lightly armed. However, General Tukhavchevskiy recognized how

airborne forces "from the sea" can produce a dilemma for an enemy that has the potential of disrupting cohesion and increasing operational tempo.

          General Tukhavcheskiy may have been the father of airborne tactics, but the

Germans in World War II were the first to successfully employ airborne and air

assault forces. The Germans validated the utility of vertical envelopment and the "deep battle" concept by deploying air delivered troops behind enemy lines. German General Kurt Student was an advocate of airborne tactics and convinced Hitler to

establish the XI Airborne Corps under Student's command prior to WW II. The

Germans used paratroopers during the invasion of Belgium and Holland in 1940 and were able to capture key bridges that were vital in supporting the movement of follow-on heavy armored forces. The Germans achieved success by capturing the Belgium fortress at Eben Emael before the main offensive began. The capture of this key position was possible because the Germans achieved tactical surprise with air assault forces deployed in gliders. The use of gliders enabled German forces to arrive covertly without becoming dispersed and was instrumental in validating the utility of air assault forces. Even though the Germans were greatly outnumbered, they were able to overcome their opponents through sheer shock and surprise. The assault on Eben Emael was the first successful use of the vertical envelopment concept in battle and provided legitimacy to a concept that was considered risky and dangerous. Success at Eben Emael also paved the way for the first exclusive use of airborne and air assault forces in an invasion and produced a new concept in warfare called "oil spot tactics."

          During the invasion of Crete in 1941, General Student executed the use of "oil spot tactics" by assaulting three key objectives simultaneously with airborne and air assault forces.[24] The idea behind "oil spot tactics" was to force an enemy to disperse his defensive positions by increasing the defenders' area of responsibility beyond what he was capable of covering. This would create a gap in enemy defenses that could be exploited by at least one of the assaults. Even though this tactic contradicted the

German principle of "schwerpunkt", the invasion of Crete was a success and provided the first example of air delivered troops defeating an opponent exclusively with air power as indirect fire support.

          In the future, modern technology and the MV-22 will create an environment that will allow the employment of assault forces to maneuver beyond the constraints of

tactics developed in WW II. In order to appreciate the full potential of air delivered forces assaulting from "over the horizon", we must remember what made the invasion of Belgium and Crete a great success. The use of air assault forces by themselves do

not produce the combined arms effect necessary to completely shatter enemy

cohesion. Air assault forces must be used in conjunction with ground forces and

indirect firepower in order to produce a synergistic effect. Air assault forces in

amphibious warfare can become a force multiplier, if they complement the capabilities

of ground forces and indirect firepower. Therefore, the mission of a modern air

assault force will be to exploit maneuver warfare principles and maximize friendly combined arms capabilities. Air assault forces will create tempo beyond the enemy's ability to react and produce an advantage so great that an adversary surrenders in the Sun Tzu approach, even before the decisive battle is fought. "For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."[25] The Marine Corps recognizes that air assault forces will become a force multiplier in future amphibious warfare and has explored its use in a series of wargames called project CULEBRA.  

 

                         NEW INFANTRY CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT                            In May 1994, Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC), hosted the Project

CULEBRA Phase I seminar wargame to examine the tactics and capabilities needed to apply maneuver principles to practice. The idea of an Assault Battalion emerged. It would be organized, trained, and equipped either to fight as a maneuver battalion or to break up into small teams called Universal Spot Teams (USTs). USTs would

reconnoiter enemy positions and direct fire support to destroy important targets. The teams would be equipped to provide precise targeting data and designation for laser guided weapons. The Assault Battalion proposal was not fully developed in detail; only notional structure and operating concepts had been developed. The following

conclusions were derived. First, because it is smaller, the Assault Battalion

significantly reduces the amphibious footprint. Second, the Assault Battalion has less combat power and would need considerable fire support: Third, the proposed force structure assumed future support firepower would make up for the lack of organic

firepower. Fourth, the USTs would significantly increase the effectiveness of

precision fire support. Fifth, USTs could be incorporated into current structure that would be useful in testing the concept. The Assault Battalion reduces the troop space requirement on amphibious lift by four to twelve percent depending on how many

infantry battalions are converted. Because they are designed to have organic mobility (tactical vehicles), the downside was that the ships would have to provide three

percent more vehicle square footage. Even at these figures, the additional requirement can barely be accommodated within projected amphibious lift. Personnel structure is 45 percent less, but more importantly it would have considerably less firepower.

Reduced size would also mean that an air assault battalion would be less capable in manpower intensive operations such as handling POWs. This proposal is based on the belief that future precision weapons can make up for the difference in organic

firepower, while increasing tactical mobility.[26] The highlight of project CULEBRA was that it validated the concept of small infantry units shaping the battlefield in order to gain leverage and maximize combat power. The concept of USTs provided a

conceptual framework that also validated the utility of air assault forces.

          In March 1995, the concept of the UST was examined under a wargame scenario called Project BELISARIUS. The wargame had three objectives, which were: to gain

insight into the use of maneuver oriented tactics, to examine emerging technologies that are likely to be most useful in future operations, and to gain insight into the

operational, tactical, and organizational implications of the Revolution in Military

Affairs (RMA) on future Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Although the participants discussed uses of technological innovations such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and postulated other capabilities, much of the discussion centered around two related organizational innovations: USTs and Small Infestation Action Platoons (SIAPs). Closely related to the SIAP concept was the extremely responsive command and control capability of responding to calls for fire within two minutes. Most players agreed that these small, highly trained units could be useful in several arenas. First, in a high-threat environment, they would provide information primarily for targeting enemy capabilities. Second, in a lower-threat environment, they could provide information to help build the overall intelligence picture of the area. Finally, a counter to the SIAP concept was that its small size limits its utility in manpower intensive military operations in urban terrain. In addition, the SIAP's inability to absorb casualties was highlighted.

          The consensus was that the SIAP concept had its uses, however, like all

capabilities, they are no panacea. The SIAP concept introduces a new way of looking at infantry operations. Rather than incorporating both maneuver capability and

organic fires into infantry units, SIAPs will provide targeting and the gathering of

intelligence. The SIAP concept seeks to change the practice of massing conventional ground units because Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) of the future will be able to defeat large concentrations of

mechanized forces. The movement toward adopting tactics that are similar to Force Reconnaissance tactics is viewed as a more efficient way to increase the survivability and lethality of conventional ground forces in the future. Although SIAPs could

assemble for direct action, their primary means of attack would be as a vehicle to call in fire support. The SIAP concept trades size and organic firepower for greater

mobility and stealth. Mobility includes insertion by air and organic ground vehicles. Stealth could be gained by smaller size and training. The SIAPs primary mission would be to destroy enemy forces through indirect fires. Therefore, new doctrine and tactics must be developed in conjunction with emerging new technology in order to maximize the SIAP's potential.[27]

         SIAP teams were envisioned to be built within an infantry battalion called the

Assault Battalion. SIAPs could either fight as a battalion or break up into small teams. This new Assault Battalion would have three companies, a weapons company, a headquarters and support company, and an associated MV-22 squadron.[28] Each

assault company would have three SIAPs, each sized to be lifted by one MV-22. The

SIAP could have up to 24 men. The size was predicated on the lift capability of the MV-22. The structure analyzed by the Belisarius Wargame had 21 man platoons that consisted of three six man squads plus a three man platoon headquarters. This platoon structure is designed to allow the size of a team assigned to a particular mission to be adjusted.[29] Factors that mitigated toward larger teams were the ability to deal with

"incidental contact," carry equipment, recover and evacuate wounded, and to operate 24 hours a day in a high stress environment for extended periods. Factors that

mitigated toward smaller teams were the ability to remain clandestine and to cover more territory with a given number of men when searching for targets. The minimum sized team (six man) was based on experience in Vietnam with two-to-four man

reconnaissance teams in "Stingray" operations. The weapons company would have 24 Javelin medium anti armor weapons, four vehicle mounted 120mm mortars, and five Combined Arms Teams (CATs). Each CAT would have a weapon carrying Highly Mobile Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). All told, the assault battalion would have about 450 personnel.[30] Figure one on the next page illustrates a notional assault battalion force structure.

 

[31]

 

          The assault battalion's organic combat power is substantially less than that of the current infantry battalion. So in order to make the infantry more mobile, agile, and

maneuverable, the assault battalion gives up almost half of its organic firepower. To

maximize the benefits of nonorganic fire support, SIAPs and their subordinate teams will be equipped to provide precise targeting information. Equipping the teams with Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, laser designators and rangefinders, and

digital communications will allow them to provide targeting data with a target location

error of about 10-16 meters. With this capability, a small team can substantially

improve the effectiveness of precision fire support.

          The declining defense budget will force the military to reduce its force structure

and place an emphasis on developing technology that will increase the lethality of

organic firepower within infantry units. Up to this point, the Marine Corps lacks the

ability to provide the type of indirect fire support that the SIAP concept requires.

However, the weapon systems that are available in the current inventory and the

manner in which they are employed can be modified to support the concept. The

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with the infantry battalion as the center piece, will reap the benefits of the SIAP concept the most because the SIAP concept seeks to

increase the combat power of smaller sized units like the MEU. Increasing the combat effectiveness and survivability of the Marine Corps' battalions operating at sea

supports the need to develop new infantry tactics like the SIAP concept. Using smaller units to attack and destroy enemy forces without engaging them in close combat is a better form of warfare and is in concert with the OMFTS concept. Therefore, the

purpose of SIAP operations must not be viewed as an attempt to avoid contact. SIAP operations must be viewed as an attempt to conduct combat operations under the best possible conditions without getting decisively engaged. In addition, Special Forces and Command and Control Warfare (C2W) can complement conventional forces

utilizing the SIAP concept to create a formidable fighting force that will be flexible and lethal enough to defeat any enemy threat. However, in order for the SIAP concept to be successful, new infantry tactics must be developed in three areas: command and control, fire support, and emergency response.

          Current command relationships produce several layers of command between

squads/platoons and the Marine Air Ground Task Force commanders that inhibit

responsiveness for fire support. In order for SIAP operations to be effective, the teams

and the MAGTF's fire control agency must be able to communicate directly to

provide rapid response. This creates a dilemma because of the need to provide a direct communication link from the units operating in the field to the MAGTF commander vice through the current infantry command and control structure. This will also create a need to revamp the command relationship within the infantry unit, however, the

ability to provide the MAGTF commander with a "real time" picture of where the teams are located exists in current technology. Systems such as the Position Locating and Reporting System (PLRS) and Situational Awareness Beacon Report (SABER), in conjunction with digital communications, allows the commander to exercise direct

influence on the battlefield and expedite calls for fire. Once employed, the SIAPs will rely heavily on communications and the ability to maneuver.

         The MV-22 will allow the MAGTF commander to insert, resupply, extract, and

maintain communications with the SIAPs. Most operations will be conducted under the cover of darkness, however, the MV-22 will also have the capability to fly

circuitous routes that avoid hostile positions without sacrificing speed or surprise. As

a command and control platform, the MV-22 can also provide the communication link necessary for the commander to maintain tactical control.

          SIAP missions will also affect how fire support assets are employed. If SIAP teams are to seek out and target enemy forces for indirect firepower, one method of

coordinating fire support will be to schedule fire support for specific times or during

predetermined windows. A more flexible method will be to have SIAPs operating in a

general area, calling for fires on targets of opportunity. This will require assets to be standing by for on-call missions that could respond quickly. Another fire support method will be to have assets assigned in direct support of a specific SIAP or groups of SIAPs. All of these methods can be combined to allow maximum flexibility and redundancy.

          Emergency response for SIAP teams that encounter an enemy force too potent to

handle with organic firepower leads to three possible options. First, the team may stay where it is at and call for fire support to repel the enemy. Second, is for the team to break contact first and then call for an extract. Finally, the team that can not break

contact would have to request for an emergency extract that includes heavy fire

support. In any case, the mission of the SIAP will not be to decisively engage the

enemy with close combat. The primary mission for the SIAP will be to get the enemy to expose itself to friendly aviation, artillery, and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). Even within the current military structure, the SIAP concept is proving to be a viable form of combat for the future and has created interest across the entire Defense community.

          The SIAP concept is the model for tactics that has been explored by the Defense

Science Board 1996 Summer Study Task Force on Tactics and Technology for the 21st Century Military Superiority. Based on their analysis, they believe that an

expeditionary force with ground forces redesigned from the bottom up, starting with a

ten to twenty man "combat cell", can offer critical early roles for U.S. forces deployed in theater. These roles include integrating with coalition forces, complementing remote sensors by filling in gaps and resolving ambiguities, identifying noncombatants, securing points of debarkation for follow on forces, temporarily controlling territory, locating and neutralizing weapons of mass destruction capabilities, and preparing to make more permanent the gains achieved by long range precision strike. The conceptual approach outlined in their report provide for rapid insertion of ground forces as well as for air and sea based firepower. This expeditionary force will serve as a precursor to help deter aggression, halt attacks, secure critical areas, and prepare for the arrival of more extensive forces. The "combat cells" will operate in highly dispersed postures, presenting few concentrated targets for the enemy. Stealth, situational awareness, and information warfare will be vital ingredients in their survival kit.         

          The SIAP and "combat cell" concepts coincide with the desire to change the way we employ our ground forces because future warfare will be about massing fires not forces.[32] The SIAP concept is feasible because advancements in technology can support it. Precision guided weapons increases the lethality of our forces to the extent of making it a combat force multiplier. The emergence of laser guided munitions, cruise missiles, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) increases the fire power and lethality of friendly forces. Unfortunately, the possibility of the enemy possessing the same type of fire power also creates a need to develop new tactics and equipment that counters modern weapon systems. The OMFTS concept, supported by equipment such as the LCAC, AAAV, and the MV-22, combine to create a lethal combined arms capability that enable friendly forces to attack from "over the horizon". The MV-22 and "over the horizon" concept enable forces to bypass strong points while still attacking enemy critical capabilities. This potentially maximizes the success of OMFTS by generating operational and tactical tempo beyond an enemy's capability to react. An important point to remember is that a concept of warfare must exist first in order to ensure new technology and tactics are effectively employed. With that in mind, the ultimate goal of developing new equipment and tactics is to support the OMFTS concept and maneuver warfare principles.

 

                                  MV-22 AND MANEUVER WARFARE

          The goal of future warfare is to accelerate the friendly Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA) loop process. This creates a tempo advantage that attacks or adversely affects an enemy's decision making process. A growing number of tacticians are

beginning to realize that small units directing precision firepower are highly capable of influencing operational tempo. Since the end of World War II advanced technology has had a profound impact on the armed forces; however, infantry missions have been affected the least and still comprise of the following: detect, identify, and locate

hostile elements; direct the fire of organic and supporting weapons on such elements; and close combat. Think of what can be developed for the infantryman, if the amount of money that is spent on the B-2 bomber aircraft is put toward technology and

training that enhanced the survivability and lethality of the individual Marine or

soldier. This type of investment will capitalize on the greatest asset that the Marine Corps possesses, the infantryman. Infantrymen who have access to indirect fire power, comparable to the destructive power of a B-52, will produce a dilemma for the enemy that far exceeds the destruction of key facilities. The psychological effect of infantrymen, operating in an area with credible fire power, will allow friendly forces to dictate the tempo of operations. Even though futurists are enamored by technology and equipment, the true test of combat power lies in the infantry's ability to wage war. The role of infantry in future battles will be more important because technology will make infantry forces more mobile and lethal. The priority mission will be to target and destroy enemy forces at the greatest possible distance without having to get decisively engaged in close combat.[33]

         The MV-22 will have the capability to expand the battlespace and increase

operational tempo because the speed at which it travels is almost two times greater than any conventional transport helicopter. In order to understand how the MV-22 will improve the Marine Corps' warfighting capability, the advantages of the MV-22 must be put in the context of maneuver warfare principles. This can be accomplished by comparing the capabilities of the MV-22 against the maneuver warfare principles of: "seamless" operations, "in-stride" operations, and the "pull" concept. "Seamless" is a term used in maneuver warfare to describe a command and control architecture that allows operations to flow without disruption or unnecessary pauses.   A "surface" is a term used to describe a hard spot, a strength in the enemy's defense, deployment, or disposition.   A "gap" is a term used to describe an area between the surfaces,

relative weakness that can be exploited. One of the main tenets of maneuver warfare is to find gaps and bring combat power to bear on them. By doing this, we can exploit weaknesses that eventually lead to eroding enemy strengths. This facilitates defeating the enemy more easily at a lower cost, than if we attacked surfaces head on. The practical goal of "seamless" operations is to maintain cohesion during the exploitation of gaps, while accelerating the tempo of operations fast enough to get inside the enemy's OODA loop.[34] The MV-22 will allow friendly forces to exploit enemy "seams" by expanding the friendly sphere of influence. The MV-22 will be able to transport highly trained infantry units with access to lethal indirect fire support anywhere in theater. This can create a defensive culminating point for the enemy by placing him on the horns of a dilemma similar to an elk's stack. The objective is to restrict the enemy's ability to maneuver by forcing him to maintain a defensive posture to protect assets. If the enemy adopts an offensive posture, indirect firepower can be brought to bear to attrite his forces to the maximum extent possible. In either case, the psychological effect may be enough to undermine the enemy's will to fight. At a minimum, the enemy will be put into a disadvantageous position before the conflict ever begins because we seize the initiative and influence enemy actions.

          "In stride" refers to the ability to seize and exploit opportunities more quickly than an opponent can react. Accomplishing this may mean that forces engaged in one

activity, pause, reorient, and then execute another activity. The goal is to be able to take these changes "in stride" without having to stop, regroup, re-plan, and then change. The standard for executing an operational task "in stride" successfully is to be able to make changes faster than the enemy can react.[35] The MV-22 will allow commanders to seize and exploit opportunities more quickly because of its payload, range, speed, and agility. All of these attributes provide maximum flexibility for a commander and enables the commander to adapt to change based on an increased capability to react to change. Response time will be critical in future conflicts.   Possessing the ability to insert and extract lethal forces to and from battle in the most expeditious manner, regardless of distance or weather, will be the next RMA. The MV-22 is the first aircraft in the next generation of transport aircraft that increases the agility of air assault forces. Greater agility will allow infantry units to make changes faster than an enemy can react, thereby, creating circumstances that maximize the concept of "Pull".

          The concept of "Pull" refers to a method of operating that adapts to

circumstances rather than adhering to a rigidly fixed plan. It requires more extensive pre-operation planning, flexibility, innovation, rapid decision making, and speed of action. The potential payoff is more rapid achievement of objectives at lower cost. "Pull" is similar to the principle of following the path of least resistance, its aim is to get the job done with the least expenditure of effort. Synchronizing the effort of dispersed units operating under the "Pull" concept requires careful coordination. In maneuver warfare, this can be accomplished by coordinating events in the following manner. First, "schedule driven" events coordinate unit actions by timing. Second, "on order" events allow the commander to make decisions as the operation unfolds. Third, "event driven" events allow the commander to execute plans based on enemy actions.[36] Achieving the ability to dictate tempo of operations based on enemy action is where the greatest advantage lies. The MV-22 will improve the Marine Corps'

ability to exploit "event driven" missions. This is possible because the capabilities of the MV-22 will allow commanders to deploy forces faster and respond to enemy

actions quicker.

          The MV-22 will provide tactical mobility and operational reach beyond what is

comprehensible today. Highly mobile infantry units exercising search and attack

tactics will be the centerpiece of OMFTS. OMFTS seeks to initiate contact under

favorable conditions. Dictating when and where to fight is the essence of maneuver,

be it on land or sea. Highly mobile infantry forces that can react to change will be in the best position to attack an enemy's weakness or influence his decision making process. Exploiting weaknesses or the psyche of the enemy can be done in two ways by air assault forces. First, expand the battlespace so that it increases the possibility for "gaps" to exist. Second, generate higher tempo of operations that reduces enemy reaction time and undermines his ability to mass forces. Both can be accomplished more effectively in an amphibious environment through the use of air assault forces transported by the MV-22.

 

                           EXAMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE MV-22

          The potential for a change in infantry tactics already exists because technology will allow the concept of massing firepower to become a reality. Conventional

helicopters can provide the mobility necessary to support SIAP operations, but

conventional helicopters pale in comparison when placed in the context of exploiting the enemy OODA loop process. In order to evaluate how the MV-22 can enhance air

assault operations, we must remove the MV-22 from the shackles of the helicopter world and develop scenarios that exploit its capabilities. The Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) performed by the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) did not adequately examine the key performance parameters such as aircraft speed, range, payload, survivability, and self deployability in the context of maneuver warfare and OMFTS. Over the past couple of years of conducting one MV-22 COEA after another, it has become obvious that the art (not to be confused with science) of accomplishing such analysis leaves much to be desired. The primary purpose of an COEA is to compare the effectiveness of various means of fulfilling some mission requirement: therefore, a set of mission scenarios are developed. Within the framework of the selected scenarios, alternatives are then compared. The selection of a scenario can, of itself, markedly influence the outcome of the comparison. The MV-22 always shows up with a marginal advantage, but not with an advantage so significant as to engender an overwhelming case for the MV-22. The full value of the MV-22 is never fully measured since the scenarios selected for evaluation do not exploit or capitalize on those exceptional capability advantages.

          In the early 1980s, recognizing the forthcoming need to replace the H-46, the

services were asked to describe what sort of performance characteristics one would like to have in a new development vertical lift aircraft. The responses was: more speed, range, survivability, payload, and self deployability. Few thought that technology could provide all these attributes in one platform. Attainment of such capabilities was not going to be cheap. Therefore, such an aircraft would have to fulfill a variety of joint service missions. At one point in the mid-1980s the armed services listed 46 missions that the MV-22 had the potential to fulfill. Despite attempts to prove the MV-22 cost ineffective, the MV-22 continues to provide attributes that epitomize flexibility. Attempts to kill the MV-22 were based on the services developing tactical doctrine within the capabilities of the weapon systems they have in their inventories. The end result was that COEA mission scenarios and tactical doctrine reflected the capabilities of the H-46. This scenario was flawed because it was based on the limitations of the H-46 and other helicopters in the

inventory. The problem of illuminating the flexibility attribute of the MV-22 was solved by creating more innovative scenarios. One method of creating more innovative scenarios was to compare the capabilities of the MV-22 to past military operations that relied on assault support.

         An illustration of this was the comparison of the MV-22 against helicopter

operations conducted in Operation URGENT FURY, the invasion of Grenada.

URGENT FURY could have been performed simpler, faster, and more efficiently than

conventional helicopters, given the availability of an aircraft with the range, speed, and payload of the MV-22. Pre-assault force deployment and staging could have

occurred entirely at Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico, less than 500 NM from Grenada. This would have increased operational security, eliminated the need to transport H-60s for the 82nd Airborne Division to Barbados for staging, and would have provided a ready reserve vertical lift force that was lacking in Operation URGENT FURY on D-day. Special operation missions could have been launched from Roosevelt Roads,

thereby exploiting the MV-22 night and all weather capabilities. The MV-22s large payload would have permitted use of a larger, more capable SEAL force to secure the

Governor's residence where considerable resistance was encountered. The MV-22s range would have permitted the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to stand farther off

from the beach for the initial Marine vertical assault, increasing both OPSEC and

tactical surprise. The initial assault of Army units would have benefited most from the MV-22. A Special Operation Force (SOF) was to secure the Point Salinas airfield three minutes prior to the 750 man Ranger paradrop mission. However, the SOF was discovered early and encountered heavier than expected resistance. This extended the amount of time required to mass forces and caused the Rangers to parachute into a hostile environment. This also had a negative effect on the delivery of subsequent

reinforcements. An initial Ranger assault carried by MV-22s directly from Roosevelt Roads might have eliminated need for the high risk SOF operation entirely, and might have decreased mission complexity. Hover capabilities of the MV-22 would have

permitted troop and equipment delivery to the airfield even with blocked runways. The MV-22 would have also permitted more rapid reinforcement of the initial assault forces by elements of the 82nd and 101st Divisions once the airfield was secured. This would have allowed U.S. forces to maintain the initiative and operational tempo and which would have allowed other objectives to be seized more quickly. Use of the MV-22 in follow-on operations would have increased mission success. Marines could have flown directly into Pearls from Roosevelt Roads to augment the Marine forces launched from USS Guam. This would have increased their mobility and ability to secure the northern end of the island, while still providing forces for the planned operations in the Saint George's area. The endurance and mobility provided by the MV-22 could have been used to carry elements of the 82nd and 101st Divisions for the air assault on the Grand Anse Campus. This would have expedited the evacuation of the students by mid-afternoon, one day earlier than was possible. All major objectives could have been accomplished in only one day with less risk, less complexity, and increased operational security.[37]

          OPERATION URGENT FURY illustrates how conventional forces, using

current infantry tactics, would have benefited from a transport asset such as the MV-22. URGENT FURY also illustrates how important advanced force operations are to the success of any military mission. The successful invasion of a small island such as Grenada could have been accomplished by the Marine Expeditionary Unit alone, if the MV-22 was available to insert reconnaissance teams prior to D-Day and sufficient indirect fire support for the follow on assault forces were made available through an aircraft carrier. The invasion force could have been supported logistically by the amphibious task force because the MV-22 would have the range and speed to resupply from Roosevelt Roads. This would have allowed Marine forces to sustain themselves through logistics provided from off-shore and would have enhanced force protection by being able to operate from beyond enemy weapon ranges. Marine forces on the amphibious ships also could have been augmented from units based in CONUS or from forward deployed sites. This would have increased the combat power of the

amphibious task force. All of these factors are important because they increase any

theater CINC's sphere of influence and create an atmosphere where the forward

deployment of Marine Expeditionary Units are more threatening to potential adversaries.

 

                                                 CONCLUSION                                       

          The Department of Defense is currently undergoing the Quadrennial Defense

Review. Early indications from the review are that senior Pentagon officials favor

integrating computer technology into weapon systems and military command and

control networks in order to capitalize on what military experts believe will be the next RMA. Pursuing this course of action carries the promise of greater military agility, precision and potency; however, it requires large force reductions to finance and also requires radical adjustments in the way U.S. troops fight.[38] This creates an environment where the Marine Corps feels compelled to explore new technology and tactics in order to remain a viable force under the constraints of possible force reductions.

           Reducing the force structure translates into less equipment and manpower. The

prospect of less assets forces the Marine Corps to rely more on maneuver warfare

principles in an indirect "Sun Tzu" approach that pits strength against weakness in

order to reduce the effects of attrition warfare. The Marine Corps can not afford to

engage future adversaries in attrition warfare because it will not possess the resources.

With this in mind, the Marine Corps is attempting to counter the effects of reduced

force structure by maximizing the destructive power of smaller sized units. The

survivability of smaller sized units operating against a credible threat is a major

concern for the Marine Corps. One method of drastically improving the survivability of smaller sized units is for the Marine Corps to provide greater mobility through the air.

          "Mobility is our most important modernization concern. That concern will be

allayed when the V-22 Osprey Tilt-rotor aircraft comes into the inventory."[39] The MV-22 will provide an advantage in mobility over conventional helicopters because it provides mobility that has the potential to change how forces can be employed. Having the ability to rapidly transport assault forces over long distances has many advantages. How the Marine Corps plans to exploit the enhanced capability of the MV-22 remains to be seen. Even though the Marine Corps will not operationally field the MV-22 until FY 2004, the possibility of having an aircraft with the characteristics of MV-22 has sparked a great deal of interest toward improving infantry capabilities and tactics because drastic improvements in mobility can increase the sphere of influence, lethality, and survivability lightly equipped forces. Highly trained infantry units will have the capability to provide more precise firepower, better intelligence, and better situational awareness in future battlefields. An advantage in mobility will allow smaller infantry units to execute tactics that are designed to mass firepower vice forces. Therefore, the Marine Corps can justify the procurement of the MV-22 because it is the only aerial platform available in the foreseeable future that supports the concept of OMFTS to the degree that it gives amphibious forces a decided advantage. The Marine Corps must continue to pursue new infantry tactics like the SIAP and Assault Battalion concepts in order to explore the best ways to execute OMFTS. The MV-22 will fulfill a critical mobility requirement, but more importantly the MV-22 will allow the Marine Corps to realize the full potential of OMFTS.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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