Military

Marine Corps Logistics: From Nothing To The Future

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Logistics

 

Author: Major C.M. Stump

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

            Logistics, though proven important to success on the battlefield, have not been a focus of effort throughout the history of the Marine Corps. The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical perspective on the development of logistics support in the Marine Corps, evaluate the overall success of the support effort, and, determine its effectiveness in satisfying the critical requirements of Marine combat support forces. The paper will then identify factors that will likely impact on combat service support organization for the future.

 

            The Marine Corps, since its inception has been a force in transition. Starting as ships' guards, the Corps was small and could be supported by the ships it was assigned to. Slowly, the Marine Corps role changed. Congress started to use the Marines ashore, first as a quick-strike force and later as an amphibious assault force. This change in mission resulted in a requirement for greater logistics support, but, not until after the Korean War did the Marine Corps develop its own capability for sustainment, relying instead on the assets provided by the Army and Navy.

 

            Now, as a force in readiness, the Corps has a robust sustainment capability, able to readily task organize for support of any assigned mission. But the future role of the Marine Corps is evolving again. Studies indicate that the Marine Corps will be more mobile and faster in the future. Operations will likely be quick-strike, vice extended with significant build-up ashore. These changes in tactics will provide a challenge for the sustainment forces as increased numbers of vehicles, spread over a large battlefield, require significantly more logistical support. Rapid, responsive logistical support has not been a hallmark of Marine Corps operations in the past.

 

            Additionally, the Marine Corps will likely be more involved in operations such as humanitarian and refugee assistance. This type of non-traditional role requires an elaborate sustainment effort, which is not necessarily in concert with development of a limited presence ashore. As the Marine Corps looks to the future, maintenance of the ability to sustain the force, capably responding to myriad missions of all sizes, is an important organizational consideration. Historical lesson learned have proven that organization for combat service support must be integral to organization for the mission, not an afterthought. In the future, sustainment ability may well become more critical to mission success than such traditional matters as fire superiority.

INTRODUCTION

     Throughout the history of warfare, battles have been studied, analyzed, examined and often, recreated in detail, to determine the reasons for success or failure in war. Operational strategy and battlefield decisions are dissected to determine why and how combat forces gain, or lose, advantage. Firepower, strength in numbers, genius of the commander and technological advantage are most often cited as the factors most affecting battlefield success. H. G. Summers, identified another consideration for battlefield analysis with his provocative argument that, "Combat forces are meaningless without the combat support and combat service support forces that generate and sustain their combat power."[1]

     Historical analyses of battles are laced with examples of logistics plans gone awry. In American military history, from the Revolutionary War onward, there have been numerous incidences recorded where lack of supplies, or other logistical support, for the combat Marine forces, impacted negatively on the outcome of a battle. The criticality of logistical support, though often targeted as a primary factor in combat failure, is rarely recognized as a primary reason for battlefield success. If, in fact, ability to sustain the force is imperative to combat success, as proposed by numerous scholars of military history,

then organization for provision of such support may well be as critical as the number and organization of weapons on the battlefield.

     Historically, the Marine Corps evolved from an organization comprised of small teams of marksmen, primarily deployed aboard naval ships to protect and police the crews, to today's amphibious force of 174,000 men and women. This force, able to rapidly task organize, can provide a mission-tailored, self sustaining force ashore for extended operations. This evolution has had a significant impact on logistic requirements.

     The purpose of this paper is to study the history of logistics support in the Marine Corps, evaluate the overall success of combat service support, and determine its effectiveness in satisfying the critical requirements of Marine combat and combat support forces. Finally, the paper will identify sustainment factors, that must be considered, so that Marine Corps combat service support units can best anticipate and prepare for future warfighting trends.

 

 

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

     The Marine Corps has, by several historical accounts, transitioned through four basic, developmental phases. Marines were first organized to serve the Navy aboard ships, and they were referred to as continental Marines. During this first developmental phase, the Marines acted primarily as ships' guards, primarily organized in small detachments whose main function was to act as sharpshooters against enemy ships.

     During the second phase of development, that of the colonial infantry, the Marines frequently moved off the ships and were employed as quick strike infantry, acting as an expeditionary force ashore, as required. The third phase, occurring primarily during the second world war, was the development and employment of the Marines as an amphibious force. During this phase of Marine Corps history, the Corps developed tactics to move the force from ship to shore, with the express purpose of gaining and defending advanced naval bases. This new tactic was a bold foray for the Marines into longer-term or extended combat ashore.

     A "force in readiness" is the most recent, and current, stage in the evolution of the Marine Corps. This force is touted as "able to respond quickly to developing crisis, maintaining amphibious capability, and capable of other than a short-lived
attack."[2]  The need for a force, of this type, evolved because of a recognition by American military tacticians, that war, and the prosecution of the tactics of battle, changes with new enemies and technologies.

     Provision of logistics to the fighting forces evolved through these general stages as well, adjusting to the changing requirements of the combat force. During the revolutionary war, the main role of the Marines was to quell mutinies aboard ship. The Marines were primarily organized as small detachments, operating as ship's guards. This role meant that the forces could easily be resupplied from the ship's hold. The Marine's needs were limited primarily to musket ammo, food, water, uniforms and pay. The small units involved in enforcing shipboard regulations and providing landing parties, could easily be supported by Naval supplies and no additional supply organizations were required.

     Still during the first phase of development, as Continental Marines, the Act of 1798[3] added more missions for the Marines ashore to include guards to dockyards, coast fortifications, and other public property, and, during the War of 1812, in support of the Army forces in land battle. Barracks were established at Naval Yards and support became more of the type required by the Army, (with land forces), than the Navy, (primarily located on ship). Unfortunately, budget and supply distribution problems made the Army supply system unreliable, and the Navy unable to cope with a ground centric force support requirement.[4] Due to personnel and budget restraints, the Marine Corps continued to depend on other services for supplies and support.

Civil War logistical support throughout the services was more a matter of luck than actual management at the service level. Establishment of a centralized, depot style of supply, where massive quantities of goods were staged and distributed to all area forces, from a single source, was the preferred method of sustaining the forces. Dependence on an ability to harvest crops found enroute, and live off the land, was the normal mode of sustainment, not the exception. Centralized oversight from the Commandant's staff took place, but no real control over actual force provision operations occurred. There was no overt development of an internal capability to sustain the Marine Corps during this period in history.

     The United States, after the turn of the century, began to focus outside its continental boundaries. Since the United States has an extended and vulnerable coastline, intervention and other action before aggressors arrived was considered the prudent response. This approach meant that the Navy needed a capability to operate at extended distances where bases were not yet established. The need to protect these types of installations, led to the notion of moving naval guns ashore. This was no easy task.

     The Marine Corps started exercising options for this move ashore. In the Caribbean, at Culebera in 1901, "twenty seven Marines needed nearly four days to move a single five inch gun thirteen feet over broken terrain. The job required moving thirteen tons of equipment, which did not include the ammo."[5] The Marines were not suited or equipped for this type of operation, but, to remain a viable asset for the United States, the Marine Corps would have to adjust.

     Focus on the effectiveness of the individual marksman, and emphasis on quality of the Marine leader, were the hallmarks of the early 1900s. The evolving reliance on Marines, who served as the ships' landing parties to support land attacks, meant increased reliance on ship based, naval stores for resupply. Marines, by the early 1900s, were well versed in expeditionary operations, but the increased size and complexity of employment of Marine forces required more oversight than could be provided by a staff located in Washington D.C.

    Congress, during the period of 1899 - 1941, began to utilize the Marine Corps in an expeditionary role, and Marine staffs were added at major naval sites to include such billets as: adjutant, inspector, quartermaster and paymaster. Logistical functions entailed in amphibious operations were too diverse to be directed from a central staff in Washington, D.C. Centralized oversight of the geographically separated staffs was accomplished in 1914 with the creation of an assistant to the Commandant, responsible for training, equipping, and planning for expeditionary duty.[6] Reliance on existing military support systems for required resupply had become ineffective.     

     Until this time, the Marine Corps had no real need to develop a logistic or support branch. The focus of the Marine Corps was on the rifleman and his individual sustenance needs, which could be provided by other service organizations. Little of the Marine Corps' comparatively small budget was allocated to provide for required combat resupply. More and more, as Marines were employed ashore for extended periods, the need for more sophisticated support became evident. Reliance on larger crew served weapons, and emphasis on extended operations ashore meant that the requirement for support went far beyond the requirement of the Continental Marine for food, ammo, water, and clothes.

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE DEVELOPMENT

     Although the Marine Corps, as discussed earlier, started experimentation with movement of naval guns and personnel ashore early in the 1900s, World War I was instrumental in illustrating the real need for artillery support ashore. Among the lessons of WWI was that, "infantry tactics should provide fire superiority as well as maneuver, that artillery support was essential against a determined enemy... (and) that success in battle required continuous logistical support."[7]

   Once in theater, artillery support could be transported by rail and truck but transportation assets were limited, and timely responses were rare. Even when the artillery could be placed where required, there were few assets available to support the ammunition resupply needs. Since the Marine Corps was being tasked for more extended operations ashore, an efficient way to get equipment and personnel, with appropriate sustainment, from the ship to the shore had to be developed.

     Mobilization for WWI proved that failure to thoroughly plan for sustainment, particularly in extended operations ashore, was a harbinger for chaos. Little planning had been done for large scale operations, and the early stages of WWI were exercises in the way not to conduct sustainment operations.    "Uncoordinated transportation plans thwarted the deployment of resources. War traffic overloaded the railroad system, and the shortage of shipping caused by submarines compounded the problem."[8]

     After WWI the Marines were faced with shrinking budgets and a significant drawdown in personnel. In order to demonstrate their relevance to national security, the focus of effort for the Marine Corps in the early 1930s, was learning how to get people and equipment from naval ships to shore, and sustain them for extended operations.    

     The Marines entered WWII still dependent on the Army and Navy for supplies and transportation of gear. " The structure of American military logistics, in the Pacific, placed a high premium on interservice harmony, particularly for the dependent Marine Corps."[9] The function of the Marine quartermaster, now more often referred to as a supply officer, was mostly administrative in nature, during WWII. Most equipment and supplies were staged at major depots on, or near, the coasts for further movement aboard Navy and Army transportation assets. The quartermaster coordinated with the other services to get appropriate supplies and equipment embarked, with varying rates of success due to limited transportation space and the enlarged footprint of the amphibious force.

     Supply in theater was, for the most part, the responsibility of the unit. Each unit had to designate a portion of its transportation assets to move required ammo, food, water and maintenance parts from centralized supply dumps. These dumps were normally located on a beachhead, to allow for ease of replenishment from the sea. This location often was not easily accessible to Marine units as they moved inland.

     Historical accounts of the battles of WWII, particularly of the Marines in the Pacific, are littered with accounts of logistic support gone awry. Beginning with the first amphibious landing on the Solomons, in August 1942, reports of logistics efforts, in the Pacific, were bleak.

     Naval shipping could not move the large amount of gear required by the 1st Marine Division, so the Marines were forced to cram in as much as they could. Since the Division needed to be tactically loaded, in order to conduct the amphibious assault, the ships were reloaded in Wellington, New Zealand, leaving much gear behind. Unfortunately, the reload was conducted in the midst of both pouring rain and a New Zealand dockworkers strike, plus the Marine supplies were poorly packaged for movement. The result was "chaos, with lines of wet, hungry, tired Marines, manhandling supplies, trudging ankle deep in ruined food and cardboard boxes."[10] The end result of this reload, was that the 1st Marine Division was unable to take its organic motor transport assets and, as loaded, had sixty days supply, ten days
ammo and minimal individual baggage.[11] All resupply was dependent on the Navy and its ability to get additional ships to the theater.

     When the Marines, assaulted the Central Solomons, in February, 1943, the key to sustainment of the forces ashore remained the interdependence and cooperation between the services. The Marines had no organized service troops and, with the exception of the efforts of the attached Motor Transport Battalion, resupply continued to be performed by dedicated unit personnel and equipment.[12]

     During the battle of the Central Solomons, a new challenge for combat service support was added, the introduction of the 155mm howitzer. The additional transportation and ammunition requirements of this weapon heavily burdened the already faltering resupply efforts. Torrential rains also hampered any opportunity for resupply and caused congestion and backlog at the beachhead, making the troops vulnerable to enemy air attack. Eventually, wheeled vehicles were unable to support the effort and amphibious tractors were tasked.[13]

     At Tarawa, in July 1943, the 2d Marine Division continued to encounter resupply problems as there was no centralized control of the distribution process. The supplies were stacked on a pier at Red Beach but could not be distributed due to lack of transportation and danger of artillery fire. Individual units had to provide organic personnel and equipment to get the needed supplies.[14]

     June 1944, brought no relief for the Marines at Saipan. The Navy had been growing throughout the Pacific campaign and had added carriers, battleships and many support troops. While the Navy was able to transport and deliver large amounts of supplies, distribution ashore remained a constant problem. At Saipan, "management of supplies on the beachhead suffered from lack of labor troops and vehicles and general disorganization."[15]

Prior to the attack on Iwo Jima in February, 1945, 5th Marine Division, learning from lessons in earlier battles, divided an element, then 16th Marines, into a form of support organization. The Service Group, as it was called, included an engineer battalion, a medical battalion, a motor transport battalion and a service battalion. These battalions then provided detachments in direct support of combat teams.[16] The units still depended on huge, rear area supply dumps; for the first time, however, specific units were designated to handle the distribution of supplies. This type of organization was unique to 5th Marine Division and though there were shortages of such items as fuel and mortar ammo, morale was improved with delivery of personal items such as baked goods, fruit, newspapers, etc.[17]

     For the joint operation of the battle of Okinawa, in May 1945, the Marines were again dependent on the Army and Navy for supplies. Consistent with the other battles of the Pacific, movement of supplies and control of distribution remained a problem.

     Millet summed up the combat service support problem of the Marines in the South Pacific saying, "The Marine Corps had to learn much of its logistical wisdom on the job. Supply duty had never attracted the Corps' best officers, and logistical administration proved less imaginative than tactical operations."[18] The historical accounts indicate that the Marine Corps has experienced significant problems with combat service support, particularly when engaged ashore in extended operations.

     

TRANSITION TO A FORCE IN READINESS

     In the aftermath of World War II, a massive drawdown of all U.S. military forces occurred. Although lessons of WW II highlighted some serious deficiencies in the way the Marine Corps sustained its forces, a desire to keep the operational, frontline forces as strong as possible, meant very little change in the way the Marine Corps was organized for combat service support. The Marine Corps could not afford to dedicate a significant number of personnel strictly to the support role.

     Thus, the Korean conflict, in 1950, was plagued with many of the same logistical problems encountered in WW II. Although the Division and Air Wing drew support from units stationed in Japan, shortages continued to exist. Throughout the Korean campaign, the Marine Corps was again dependent on the Navy and Army for supplies. The Air Force also was integral, in the resupply of gasoline, rations and ammo, because of shortages in vehicles to transport the supplies over the very hazardous terrain. South Korean workers figured largely in the movement of supplies on land and, new and better technologies, made helicopters a reliable way to get supplies to the forward deployed units. Still, the Marine Corps needed a way to better sustain the force in extended combat operations ashore.

     After the Korean conflict, again the services had to find ways to scale down. The Marine Corps proved its worth as an amphibious force in readiness but, maintaining that capability could be difficult without development of a better mode of sustainment. Since its inception, the Marine Corps had been dependent on the other services for support. The Marine Corps could not truly be a force in readiness without the capability to sustain itself ashore.

     1956 was the year of the first Corps-wide shift to a centralized organization for general combat service support to the force. The Service Command was responsible for planning and provision of all theater logistics. The Service Command contained several subordinate elements, designed to support specific elements. Reorganization for support to the ground combat element was accomplished as described below:

     Principles of austerity and mobility determined the               reorganization of the division service and support units.        The main criterion was that each unit be able to support        both helo and amphib assaults. The division service             requirement shrank to a service battalion and excess units          moved into an expanded Force Service Regiment which would          provide difficult and expensive services like major               maintenance, ordnance care and disposal, and complicated        supply operations. Other force troops would include             topographical companies, specialized dental and medical        companies, engineer bridging companies and additional motor      transport battalions.[19]

 

     The Force Service Regiment organization allowed units to retain organic capability to requisition and move supplies and equipment but provided for a cost effective means of providing the more expensive, but less often required, higher levels of support. The purpose of the reorganization, while leaving the

responsibility for logistics to the commander, focused on relieving the logistic burdens to the combat troops, as much as possible.[20] The primary mission of the Force Service Regiment (FSR) was to provide sustained logistic support for a division /wing landing force, what is referred to today as an air-ground task force. The key point in this reorganization effort was that, for the first time, the capability to task organize to provide combat service support was mandated by Marine Corps doctrine.

     FMFM-20, published in April 1963, says that, "Logistics plans and organizations must be simple, flexible and practicable,"[21] and further that,

     For graduated task groupments, a task organization of         elements of the FSR may be formed to provide necessary           combat service support. Dependent upon the requirements of      each operation, attachment of other force level combat         service support units, or elements thereof, may be required      to increase the logistic capability of the FSR.[22]

 

     The focus of the FSR was to ensure that the Division was supplied specifically with class I supplies (including rations and water), class III supplies, (fuels and lubricants), and class V supplies, (ammo), during the initial stages of the operation. The remainder of the required supplies would be echeloned ashore

under the direction of the Service Command. Also during the early 1960s, methods of control and distribution of supplies, (a critical problem during earlier Marine operations), and modes for requesting additional support were included in published doctrine. The preferred method of combat service support remained building a large supply base ashore and distributing supplies from a central point.

     Organization, for logistic support of the Marine combat forces, remained, basically the same, throughout the Vietnam conflict. Small changes, some as minor as a name change, occurred in some areas, as efficiencies were realized and lessons learned incorporated. The basic organization, based on seven principles of responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, sustainability and survivability, organized along six functional areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health service and service, remained. The focus of combat service support from the late 1970s until today, has been on the readiness and sustainabilty aspects of military capability.[23]

     Cuts in personnel, in the aftermath of Vietnam, again resulted in a reduction of the strength of the combat service support elements. During the early 1980s, efforts were made to strengthen the combat service support units so that they were able to support peacetime tasks, respond to contingency missions, and quickly expand to support wartime requirements.[24]

      Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, the Marine Corps has been tasked with several unique missions including, but not limited to, humanitarian, peacekeeping, and relief operations around the globe. Throughout this time, however, the Marine Corps has continued to maintain a primary mission as an amphibious force, able to seize and defend advanced naval bases and gain a foothold to allow for introduction of follow-on forces. In this time of shrinking resources, the "key to the future of the Marine Corps is flexibility."[25] To remain efficiently flexible, the Marine Corps must plan for the future by anticipating what the nation's security requirements will likely be.

THE FUTURE

     Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has attempted to forge a place by looking to the future, determining what the security needs of the nation will be, and building a capability to meet those needs. The challenge of looking to the future is that there is little, if any, concrete information on which to base a decision. John Casti, in a recent book, proposes that, the only way to discuss future war is hypothetically. He writes,

     Hypothetcality is: to refer to situations in which we have      to make life or death decisions, but are unable to perform        the experiments or tests needed to gain much needed              information about the decision before having to make the      decision.[26]

 

     One significant problem in attempting to look at the future hypothetically, is that decisions made today concerning what the future holds, translate into budget dollars for future acquisitions. Decisions based on little to no facts may result in a waste of limited funds on programs that have little to no possibility for usefulness.

     The current Commandant, General C. C. Krulak stated, in his planning guidance that, "The future Marine Corps will give our nation an unbeatable force, composed of highly capable men and women, bound by an unbreakable bond of our unique spirit, possessing a singular focus - to serve the nation as its force of choice."[27]   Determining what threat the Marine Corps must plan to face in the future, remains a challenge. Future force planning has been described as consisting of, "appraising the security needs of the nation, establishing military requirements, and selecting military forces within resource constraints."[28] General Krulak put the task more succinctly stating that we, the Marine Corps, must ask three basic questions: "why will we fight, where will we fight and whom will we fight?"[29]

     The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) examined the future threat and provided, to force planners, the following, more definitive view of the anticipated characteristics, of future war. The MCIA predicts that chaos will be normal, that a majority of conflicts will be low intensity, that there will be an increased demand for humanitarian operations, that regional conflict will be the norm, with terrorism as a prevalent tactic, and that employment of weapons of mass destruction is possible.[30]

     This MCIA projection has significant implications for logisticians engaged in the provision of combat service support in the future. Until now, the focus of combat service support has been on arming, refueling, fixing, feeding, and clothing combat forces in engagements ashore.[31] The focus of sustainment efforts has been strictly placed on supporting the fighting force. Humanitarian and relief missions, however, put the burden of effort on the combat service support elements, not only to support the fighting force, but also to adjust supply rates to include necessities for refugees and other non-combatants.

     Much work has been done over the past twenty years, to develop a capability to resupply from ships, using operations like, Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) and prepositioning. While these were effective forms of support in yesterdays battles, the increased speed and technology of the future will likely quickly outpace the current ability to respond to a dynamic battlefield. The Marine Corps has consistently depended on a depot style of resupply, where a significant cache of supplies is staged, either on a beach, pier, or other facility, and distribution is made from there to front line troops. The Commandant, in a recent White Letter states that better logistics is possible, but we need to be "lighter, more agile, with less footprint to win battles against increasingly well-armed adversaries." [32]

     An article, generated through the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces (ICAF) concerning the battlefield of tomorrow, states that "theater warfare is characterized by three things: great distances, military means affected by the industrial and technological sectors of national strength, and the duration of conflict."[33] Many other sources agree with this premise, but add a fourth requirement of speed as a critical aspect of the future battle, particularly as it applies to the sustainment effort.

     In order to develop a force capable of moving great distances, with speed and a small footprint, much attention has focused on movement toward a light, very mobile force. Unfortunately, for combat service support units, mobile means more vehicles, of some type. This added mobility means an increase in sustainment needs, particularly for fuel. The ability to move fuel, particularly large quanties for long distances, has been a problem for the Marine Corps throughout history.[34] Added to the distance challenge, is dispersal of units, and a resultant requirement to resupply at several different points. This increased requirement, while moving limited sustainment equipment ashore, may severely affect responsiveness, which is a primary goal of combat service support.

     Missions such as humanitarian aid, NEO, and peacekeeping operations may become more common in the future and these operations are sustainment intensive. Building a sustainment force responsive to the quick-strike, over the horizon tactics envisioned for the future, may limit combat service support capability to respond to more extended operations, as history shows likely to occur.

     As the Marine Corps plans for the future, several experiments are underway to study new concepts and technologies for battle. Combat service support elements such as CSS Enterprise, the sustainment force for the experimental Special Purpose MAGTF(X), are testing new, technology intensive ways to provide sustainment to the Marine Corps of the future. Recently, CSS Enterprise participated in an exercise, Hunter Warrior. Using commercial industry as a model, the CSS element tried to define how to replace mass, or footprint ashore, with speed and information, or precision logistics.[35]

     During the exercise, CSS Enterprise experimented with such innovations as: alternative power sources, new on-line command and control systems, long range rations, fuel monitoring systems and several other innovations that rely heavily on technology and

result in provision of sustainment[36] support when and where needed, and in the quantity and type required.

     Sea Dragon, another experimentation plan for the Marine Corps of the future, is testing the concept of "Operational Maneuver from the Sea", (OMFTS). This concept focuses on three main areas for improvement of the sustainment effort: reducing the quantity/frequency of support needed, access to needed support when required, and delivering needed support without adversely affecting operations.

     The testing and experimentation currently underway shows some technological improvements that may streamline the sustainment effort, but, I believe results in two very large risks for the commander of the future. As an amphibious force, moving by the sea, if supplies are not taken to shore, that means they likely remain ship-based. This means that the resupply effort could be very vulnerable to changing weather conditions.

   The new, experimental type of precision resupply is heavily reliant an technology and communication for efficiency. Many studies already have determined that our ability to communicate is a critical vulnerability. As the enemy develops greater technological skill, establishing a system of resupply significantly dependent on an ability to communicate, creates another vulnerability for the commander.

     The main problem, with the systems of sustainment currently being studied, is that there is no redundancy, depth or alternative if something goes wrong. Without ready access to, at least minimal resupply, the commander of the future may be no better equipped than those of history, dependent on what can be found on or near the battlefield. The Marine Corps approach to sustainment has been slow to develop but is a product of lessons learned. Sustainment is critical to success on the battlefield and should not be left to chance.

     When building a sustainment force focused on a desire for a small footprint ashore, it is critical that logistics organizations maintain an ability to change and task organize to adjust to a significantly increased need for resupply. The challenge then, for combat service support organizations of the future is to develop a capability to move more equipment and supplies faster and more efficiently, maintaining a flexibility that will allow adjustments to a variety of missions, likely, over a very short periods of time, with increased reliance on technology.

     But most important, some redundancy and safeguards or alternatives must be incorporated into the sustainment plan, and, as history has proven, the sustainment focus must be broader than just the anticipated mission. Combat service support elements must be structured to maintain a capability to support more than quick-strike, over the horizon battles. The combat service support elements of the future must be prepared to support extended, sustainment intensive, operations ashore as well.

 

 

 

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