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Should the U

Should the U.S. Attack Sudan?

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - National Military Strategy

 

Author Art J. Schoenwetter

Should The U.S. Attack Sudan?

Yes. In fact, they already have and are continuing to do so. Over the past several years the U.S. has systematically attacked the ruling powers in Sudan using a combination of accusations and political and economic actions. Last year, the U.S. led a campaign against the Sudan that resulted in three United Nations' resolutions condemning their involvement in international terrorism. Additionally, the U.S. took several unilateral steps to isolate the government of Sudan from the West. These actions are intended to encourage the government of Sudan to refrain from supporting terrorism.

The facts are clear -- according to western intelligence agencies. Not only has the Sudanese government been supporting and encouraging terrorist groups to train and organize within its boarders, they have been caught supporting actual terrorist acts. Current U.S. foreign policy allows direct action, possibly military strikes, against states that sponsor terrorism.[1] However, the U. S. is finding it difficult to determine the right mix of diplomatic, economic and military actions needed to discourage Sudan's ruling powers from continuing their front-line presence in the international terrorism arena.

This paper analyzes the problem of the Sudan by describing its role in supporting international terrorism, its real ruling powers, and its close ties to other terror supporting states. The paper continues with an overview of current U.S. policy toward the Sudan, reviews recent actions taken against Sudan, and includes Sudan's response to these efforts. The paper then analyzes current U.S. policy toward Sudan and concludes with a list of actions the U.S. should take to degrade Sudan's role in supporting terrorism.


I. The Problem with Sudan:

Under the control of an Islamic fundamentalist regime, the Sudan is well known for supporting many of the world's most violent international terrorist groups. Guided by the policies of the National Islamic Front (NIF), the Sudanese government has lured several international terrorist organizations by providing training camps, harboring fugitives, providing international transport, and supplying the passports and visas needed to export their terror. The Sudanese government receives much of its support from other terror exporting states such as Iran, Algeria and Iraq. With this support, the Sudan has also been accused by many of its border states of exporting Islamic fundamentalism across their borders. The Sudanese government is accused of abetting the June 1995 assassination attempt of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Ethiopia and the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.[2] These efforts to export terrorism have even reached the United Nations. Two Sudanese diplomats were indicted in New York as active accomplices in another attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Mubarak. They are accused of being involved in an attempt to blow-up the United Nations building during Mubarak's visit to New York.[3]

 

Terrorist groups and training camps:

The Sudanese government continues to harbor members of some of the world's most violent organizations: [4]

 

        Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): Abu Nidal believes there are no limits to using terrorism to achieve the destruction of Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state.[5] Headquartered and financed from Libya, the ANO targets any group willing to accept any form of compromise from their goal. They have conducted over 90 terrorist attacks, killing or injuring about 900 people.[6] In January 1995, the ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon.

 

        Lebanese Hizballah: Although the primary goal of Hizballah is to establish an Islamic republic government in Lebanon, they are currently focused on disrupting the Arab-Israeli peace process.[7] The organization relies heavily on funding and supplies from Iran. They are also a principle sponsor of terrorism aimed against the West and the United States. Hizballah terrorists are thought to have been involved in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 marines.[8] They were also involved in the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 that killed one U.S. Navy Seal, and the series of hostage taking and confinements in Lebanon.[9] Hizballah terrorists claimed responsibility for the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, and were accused of another Buenos Aires bombing in 1994 that killed almost 100 people.[10]

 

        Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ): The goal of the PIJ is to create an Islamic state where Israel now exists. It receives funding and training from Iran and Libya. The PIJ claimed responsibility for the January 1995 bombing of a bus stop at Beit Lid that killed or injured 70 people. They were also involved in a suicide bombing in Gaza in April 1995 that killed eight people including one American student.[11]

 

        Egypt's al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG): As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, the IG is an "Egyptian extremist group that seeks to overthrow Egypt's government and replace it with an Islamic state. It regards Sheikh Omar abdel Rahman, recently convicted in the World Trade Center bombing, as its spiritual leader."[12] The IG receives support from Iran and Sudan. Although the IG focuses on assassinating high ranking Egyptian officials, they have been known to attack local security officials and Western tourists - as symbols of Western culture. The IG claimed responsibility for the failed assassination attempt of Egypt's President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in June 1995.[13] They were successful, however, in wounding the Egyptian Minister of Information in 1993 and in assassinating the People's Assembly Speaker in 1990.[14]

 

        Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS): Hamas is another radical organization that seeks to replace Israel with an Islamic state.[15] The Hamas is a breakout group of the Muslim Brotherhood and has claimed responsibility for four suicide bombings in Israel since February 1996.[16] This organization also receives funds and training from Iran.

 

        Armed Islamic Group (GIA): The GIA is a radical Islamic faction that is fighting to establish an Islamic state in Algeria.[17] They are supported with funding, weapons, and training by Iran and Sudan. The GIA believes that violence against government, civilians, and foreigners alike in Algeria will help them achieve their objectives. The GIA has killed almost 90 people since 1992. In 1994, the GIA hijacked an Air France flight and killed three passengers before being killed by a French anti-terrorist force.

 

Egypt accused the government of Sudan of providing these terrorist organizations with more than twenty camps that train and house more than 15,000 Muslim militants.[18] U.S. officials claim these terrorist camps train more than 4000 Islamic radicals each year.[19] With the help of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the NIF spent millions of dollars establishing the camps near Khartoum. The training involves paramilitary operations, assassinations, bombing and other forms of violence[20] to be sent to "neighboring countries to explore the situation, carry out limited and swift operations."[21] Targeted recipients include Tunisia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, and Chad.[22]

 

Other support:

To round out their support to these organizations, Khartoum also provides the groups with money, travel documentation, safe passage, and refuge in Sudan.[23] The Deputy Permanent Representative of the U.S. Mission to the UN, Ambassador Edward Gnehm, remarked to the Security Council that "Sudan regularly abuses the prerogatives of sovereign states by giving Sudanese passports, both diplomatic and regular, to help non-Sudanese terrorists travel freely."[24] He further stated that Sudan "provides the very weapons terrorists use to inflict their horror, as in the Mubarak assassination attempt."[25]

 

Ties to other terror supplying states:

Sudan has been receiving support from three main sources: Iran, Libya and Iraq. Sudan's relationship with Iran developed over the years out of mutual benefit. For years Sudan has struggled with imposing Islam on its Christian, southern states -- the primary cause of the civil war. To assist with this problem, Sudan welcomed Iranian influence to help train the Sudanese Army and its internal security forces. A 1993 U.S. News report indicated that the charismatic NIF leader, Hassan al-Turabi, "first forged the terror ties between Khartoum and Tehran, [and] saw oil-rich Iran as a cash box [that] destitute Sudan could tap by spreading its own brand of Islamic fundamentalism."[26] Iran is believed to be providing thousands of Revolutionary Guards for military and paramilitary planning, organizing and training.[27]

Iran's attraction to Sudan is based on strategic location and its contacts with other radical fundamentalists within the region. With Iran's strong desire to spread its vision of Islam throughout the Middle East, Iran sees Sudan as a secure transit point and training location for its terrorist groups. With eight borders and access to the Red Sea, Sudan is an excellent strategic location for passage to many Arab countries in the Middle East. It is also believed that Sudan has assisted Iran in establishing ties with "Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan, the Renaissance fundamentalist movement in Tunisia, and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria."[28]

This unbending allegiance between Sudan and Iran led to a military alliance between the two countries.[29] This agreement provides the Iranian fleet free passage to access the facilities at Port Sudan and Suakin, a pact to share intelligence information, and provides funding and responsibility for Sudan to infiltrate its neighboring states.[30]

The former Sudanese Labor Minister, George Logokwa stated:

"Libya provides oil, Iraq provides weapons and ammunition and Iran provides revolutionary guards and terrorists who are working in training camps. Even with Iraq under international embargo, Suddam Husayn is currently paying money to some countries to ensure the flow of oil into Sudan until the embargo is over."[31]

The Sudan has held good relations with Iraq since it took Sudam Hussein's side during the Gulf War. Military advisors and chemical weapons experts have been in Sudan for over five years. The Iraqi Air Force has flown over Southern Sudan and bombed civilian targets. Iraq is currently establishing a chemical weapons factory outside Khartoum.[32]

 

Sudan's Islamic insurgency:

Under an agreement with Iran, Sudan was provided the funding and support to export its brand of fundamentalism to its neighboring states.[33] Utilizing this system of terror production, Khartoum has been seeking to export its Islamic fundamentalism into the following states: Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Uganda.[34]

"The Egyptian government contends that several thousand Egyptian fundamentalists have received training from Iranians in Sudanese camps. Egyptian intelligence officials claim to have evidence that Iran was responsible for training [and] organizing [the] terrorist[s] who have attacked foreign tourists in Egypt."[35]

The Eritrean Foreign Minister accuses Sudan of "trying to destabilize the region. [by] helping not only the jihad in Eritrea, but also the Ittihad in Somalia, and . the Oromos tribesman in Ethiopia."[36]

A 1993 U.S. News report indicated "U.S. intelligence reports also suggest that Sudan, possibly with Iranian help, is supplying weapons to Somali warlord Gen. Mohammed Farah Adid."[37]

Sudan is accused of providing money, men, training, and weapons to Algeria's fundamentalist group, GIA.[38] On the border between Algeria and Tunisia, Algerian guards discovered weapons shipments aboard trucks allegedly sent from the Sudan.[39]

A Sudanese opposition leader, Fatimah Ahmad Ibrahim accuses Sudan of providing terrorist training for the opposition groups in Morocco and Tunisia.[40]

Uganda's Security Minister accused Sudan of "providing uniforms, mines, mortars, light machine guns and bases. They have also been preparing Ugandan groups for Islamisation."[41]

The governments of Egypt, Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda have all requested for Sudan to cease its exportation of its Islamic revolution without success. Because of this threat, Uganda and Eritrea have severed their relations with Khartoum.[42]

A United Nations team investigating the proliferation of light weapons in Africa reported that Sudan, Iran and Libya were all providing weapons to terrorist groups in "sub-Saharan Africa, in the name of 'promoting Islam.'"[43]

The government of Sudan was directly involved in two assassination attempts of Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak. U.S. and Egyptian officials emphatically accuse Sudan of training, and equipping the squad of assassins that failed their mission to kill Mubarak in Addis Ababa in July 1995.[44] Sudan was also accused of harboring three of the assassins who fled Ethiopia before they could be apprehended.[45]

At least one Sudanese official categorically denounces the assassination attempt.[46] The Sudan's President, Umar al-Bashir, says that attempts have been made to arrest the suspects, but they are no longer there.[47] Reportedly, at least one of the suspects departed Sudan and traveled to Afghanistan. Bashir denies all responsibility. "The entire issue is fabricated to condemn Sudan. There is bad faith and a plot to strike at Sudan."[48]

However, U.S. Ambassador Gnehm, indicates otherwise. "Sudanese authorities were aware of the location of the three [suspects] before, during and after the assassination attempt."[49] The international community was neither confused nor distracted by Sudan's ploys. Sudan's involvement in terrorism and Mubarak's assassination attempt has yielded three UN resolutions: numbers 1044, 1054 and 1070.

The U.S. has also connected the government of Sudan to an attempt to bomb the UN building in New York. "A Sudanese national. alleged that a member of the Sudanese UN Mission had offered to facilitate access to the UN building in pursuance of the bombing plot." [50] Further investigation revealed that two Sudanese diplomats were involved in an attempt to assassinate Mubarak by blowing up the UN building during a visit to New York.[51] A 1993 U.S. News report indicated that the U.S. has evidence that the NIF leader, Hassan al-Turabi, "informed Sudan's UN ambassador that, although the two had diplomatic cover, they were in fact intelligence operatives."[52]

Sudan is even accused of harboring terrorists by its western neighbor Libya.[53] Libya has officially requested that Sudan hand over twelve Islamic extremists hiding in Sudan to escape prosecution for killing Libyan security officers last year.[54] Although Libya has threatened to cut diplomatic ties with Sudan over the issue and Sudan has agreed to cooperate, the twelve have yet to be provided.[55]

 

II. Geopolitical climate and civil war.

At almost one third the size of the United States,[56] The Republic of Sudan is the largest African nation. This vast expanse of dissimilar land with eight international borders, coupled with the ethnic convergence of Arab and black African cultures has led this nation to many geopolitical complications throughout its history. In fact, it is said that the Republic of Sudan is a nation by name only.[57] Although the country is made up of a numerous combination of cultural and ethnic groups, 570 in all,[58] its population can be culturally divided between the North and South. With approximately 70 percent of Sudan's total population, the North is predominantly Arab and Sunni Muslim. The South makes up the remaining 30 percent by those who follow a combination of Christianity and indigenous African religions.[59]

These fundamental differences have been a root cause of Sudan's national instability. "Sudan has been at war with itself for so long that the sole period without fighting is known as 'the last peace."[60] The current civil war broke out in 1983 when the government imposed the Muslim Shari law throughout the country.[61] The civil war continues to rage today with the NIF regime trying to impose strict Islamic practices and law on the African tribes that practice Christianity and traditional indigenous religions. The Southern Sudanese are primarily represented by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA). They believe their backs are against the wall and are defending their culture against forced Islamization.[62]

Prior to the 30 June 1989 coup, the Sudan was one of the few African countries that enjoyed a multiparty democratic system of government. The Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic fundamentalist group seeking to spread Islam worldwide, used the freedom of democracy under its own party, the NIF, to penetrate and occupy key posts in the government, military and business communities.[63]

The bloodless coup was conducted by the Sudanese Army, headed by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir.[64] Bashir immediately began operating as commander in chief and chairman of the legislative body and banned all political parties and curtailed the freedom of the press. With all political parties banned, the Muslim Brotherhood began operating under the auspices of the NIF, an unofficial political party lead by Hassan Abd Allah at Turabi. While the full nature of the relationship between Bashir and the NIF is unknown, clearly Bashir has been a tool for Turabi and the NIF in adopting Islamic programs. Additionally, some informed western observers believe that Bashir uses the NIF for his own purposes.[65] Since most of Bashir's policies and actions directly support Turabi and the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood and the NIF, Turabi is often viewed as the controlling power in the country.[66] He has always held more power than the president by ruling through secret security cells created by the NIF.[67]

"Turabi has clear ties to the Iranian government, wields enormous influence in Sudan and is accountable to no one. Although he has no official position in the current military regime, he has installed his own people at every level of government. He has thus assured that his own vision of a repressive Islamic society will be the one that predominates [in] the country. Opposition within the universities and labor unions has been rooted out, and many opponents are now in exile. Islamic "Shari" law has become the basis for all civil and criminal legal procedures. Once a friendly country, Sudan has become dreary and militantly oppressive. There is clear evidence that Sudan, under the sponsorship and direction of Iran, is now attempting to export this extremist and repressive version of Islamic principles to other countries in Africa as well."[68]

As a result of the successful coup, Bashir eased Sudan's laws that restricted entry into the country and began allowing any Arab and Muslim to enter the country without restrictions or visa. This was a pretext that made Sudan a safe-haven to terror organizations. The Bashir regime needed terror expertise to use in its war against the SPLA and SPLM. They are fighting a civil war to stop Khartoum's efforts to control Southern Sudan and destroy their African identity by a policy of imposing Islam and Muslim Shari law.

Bashir's policies and support for Muslim militants have effectively isolated his government from the West and alienated many of its neighbors for fear of destabilization and infiltration across their boarders.[69] His measures taken in the South as a result of the civil war, namely human rights violations, and his support for Iraq in the Gulf War further isolated Sudan from the West. This isolation and desperate need for assistance in continuing the civil war played a large part in determining Sudan's foreign policy in the 1990's.[70] Sudan therefore turned to Iran and Libya for military aid and economic assistance. It is estimated that Iran began supplying 1 million tons of oil annually for military and civil consumption as well as financing at least US$300 million in military equipment from China.[71] Iran began providing Revolutionary Guards in support of the civil war. In return, Sudan granted Iran use of facilities at Port Sudan and Suakin and permission to establish an intelligence monitoring station.[72]

 

Human rights violations.

Sudan's human rights record is profoundly disturbing. Sudan is listed as one of the four most repressive countries in the world by Freedom House, a pro-democracy group.[73] U.S. Representative Frank Wolf said, "[y]ou've got almost a holocaust taking place. This ought to be a top issue."[74]

"International human rights organizations.have reported that the Bashir government has.systematically engaged in a range of human rights abuses against persons suspected of dissident political activity.and scores of politicians, lawyers, judges, and teachers were arrested.arbitrary arrest continued to be frequent, at least 40 political prisoners with serious health conditions were not receiving medical treatment, more than 200 political prisoners had been detained for more than a year without charges, torture was routine, and some political prisoners were summarily executed after trials in which the accused were not afforded opportunities to present any defense."[75]

A wide range of authorities have documented systematic human rights abuses by the current regime. The U.S. Department of State as well as two leading human rights groups, Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) report systematic abuses against civilians, including slavery, by all parties in the civil war. A Swiss based organization, Christian Solidarity International (CSI), estimates that there are tens of thousands of black African slaves held in northern Sudan.[76]

A U.S. State Department report on Sudan's human rights "documents the serious abuses committed by security forces, including massacres, extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, and torture of political opponents."[77]

The AI report, "Sudan: Progress or Public Relations?" condemned Sudan for continuing human rights violations and called on the UN to deploy a team of monitors to further investigate the atrocities.[78] The report details additional brutality committed by government forces "including the deliberate and arbitrary killings of villagers, the abduction of scores of children, torture and ill-treatment and incommunicado detention of suspected government opponents."[79] AI also reported that, as a tactic of war, government security forces routinely round-up suspected opponents, attack civilian targets in the South, deliberately kill adult villagers and forcibly abduct children.[80]

Another human rights group, HRW, also documented human atrocities occurring in Sudan.[81] The report, "Behind the Red Line - Political Repression in Sudan" details the threat of arbitrary arrest, detention and torture as well as a denial of basic freedoms of speech, assembly and association.[82] The report charges the government of Sudan with indiscriminately bombing civilian areas in the ongoing civil war, interrupting the delivery of humanitarian aid, conducting a scorched earth campaign against southern villages, looting and kidnapping women and children for use as slaves or forced domestic labor.[83]

Last November, CSI reportedly obtained the release of 58 slaves held near Bahr El Ghazal on 29 October 1996.[84] The slaves claim a consistent pattern of beatings, sexual abuse, forced Islamisation and denial of sufficient food and shelter.[85] CSI paid 50,000 Sudanese pounds, approximately $34.00 for the release of each of the 58 slaves.

While conducting these brutal campaigns, Sudan's ambassadors to the UN report that human rights violations do not occur.[86]

Although the UN sent a specialist to investigate human rights abuses in Sudan, his scheduled seven day visit was unexpectedly shortened to less than two days. The UN special reporter on human rights in Sudan, Gaspar Biro, was forced to depart at short notice after Sudan's Prosecutor-General informed him that Khartoum could not guarantee his personal security.[87]

Prior to 1994, Sudan sheltered one of the world's most wanted terrorist, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, AKA "Carlos the Jackal." To improve Sudan's international standing, Bashir negotiated an agreement with France to expel the criminal.[88] However, the agreement involved the trading of French spy satellite imagery of southern SPLA positions. After the trade, using Iraqi imagery analysts, Sudan launched a massive air and ground offensive against the SPLA.

"British MP Tony Worthington was one of a few Western politicians who expressed his outrage, saying 'Obviously we can understand that the French were keen to capture Carlos, but does it have to be at the expense of the Sudanese people who have been brutally murdered by the appalling regime in Khartoum whom the French have assisted by providing military intelligence to help the slaughter?'"[89]

 

Humanitarian Crisis:

Over the last decade, more than one million people in the Sudan have lost their lives due to the combination of raging war, ethnic conflict, record food deficits, floods and famine.[90] Since 1983 many of the 4.2 million refugees migrated enormous distances over an area one-forth the size of the U.S. seeking relief from the fighting. They have settled, at various times, in relief centers in Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Zaire, Central African Republic, Kenya and in southern Sudan.

The government of Sudan continues to impose restrictions on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) relief efforts, a UN-led relief effort for the South. These restrictions include barring the only efficient means of transporting emergency food and supplies to southern Sudan, the C-130 delivery flights, and placing travel restrictions on OLS relief workers.[91] Last July, approximately 700,000 people faced starvation in southern Sudan because the government blocked the World Food Program (WFP) from using C-130 transport planes to deliver food and aid to the war-ravaged region.[92] The government of Sudan claimed that humanitarian groups were using the planes to smuggle weapons to the southern rebels.[93]

On 15 July 1996, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed his deep concern over the serious deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the Sudan. He said that the situation is a "result of the unilateral and unjustified obstruction by the Government of Sudan."[94]

More than 100 people were killed and 4,000 homes destroyed in a series of severe floods that swept across the Sudan last August and September.[95] This devastation left an additional 15,000 people homeless for OLS to feed and support.[96]

Another humanitarian disaster is in the making in the Sudanese Nuba mountains where approximately 500,000 people are in desperate need of emergency food and medical assistance.[97] As SPLA sympathizers, the people of the Nuba mountains were isolated in 1991 by the Government of Sudan.[98] Bashir's regime expelled all aid agencies from the Nuba region in October 1991 and has been resisting all attempts by the UN to allow emergency food and aid to reach the people there.[99] The military regime also took control of the water supplies and most of the farms in the area.[100]

 

Islamic radical ideology.

These radical Islamic fundamentalist organizations view the fight against 'Western Imperialism' and its eradication from Lebanon and the entire region as their primary goal. Part of this ideology uses a militant approach of terror as a means of attaining this goal. The West is foreign to the region and constitutes a threat to Islam and the Muslims. To these Islamic radicals, "the U.S. is the successor of the European colonial empires that sought to dominate the Middle East since the time of the crusades."[101] The destruction of Israel and the eradication of the West from the region is deemed a religious obligation. The use of terror against the enemy is viewed as a weapon in the hands of the oppressed against the stronger aggressor. American culture is a threat to their Islamic piety. In the war against "Western Imperialism," terrorism is an acceptable tool for pursuing God's will.[102]

This ideology began to spread widely in Sudan in the 1960's with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, founded by Hasan al Banna in Egypt in the 1920's. [103] The movement sought to return the fundamentals of Islam. The Brotherhood used the NIF party as a tool to infiltrate the government and private sectors.[104] In Sudan, one of the Muslim Brotherhood's primary objectives is to institutionalize Islamic law throughout the country. [105] This effort began in 1983 when the government imposed the Muslim Shari law throughout the country.[106] Sudan's president al-Bashir stated that "fundamentalism is the return to our roots, return to the fundamentals. We take from religion all the principles of justice. These values can return under the aegis of a modern state."[107]

 

III. Current Situation:

Sudan's continual and widening entanglement in international terrorism has yielded several actions from the international community. The U.S. has cordoned international consensus by sponsoring several United Nations actions designed to influence Sudanese radical policies. Additionally, the U.S. has taken various unilateral steps to isolate Sudan from the West. However, the U.S. is finding it difficult to determine the right combination of political, economic, diplomatic and indirect military pressure to persuade the government of Sudan to change its extremist policies. A precise mix is required to effect the desired result and maintain international cohesion without creating additional turmoil and suffering for the Sudanese people. Rather than seeking to overthrow the Khartoum regime, the Clinton administration is pressing Sudan to stop backing terror groups. "We are not seeking a change in Sudanese government itself, but a change in its policies and practices," says the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan.[108] Unfortunately, these efforts have not yet produced the desired results. A report issued as recent as 7 January 1997 concluded that "Sudan continues to harbor members of the world's most violent organizations."[109]

 

UN Sanctions:

Without complete success, the U.S. has been attempting to gain international consensus to impose strict economic and military sanctions on Sudan for harboring suspects and supporting international terrorism.[110] After a series of attempts, these efforts have all but dwindled because other countries are reluctant to act against Khartoum.[111]

Considering the recent assassination attempts of Mubarak, one might expect Egypt's enthusiastic backing for strict action against Sudan. However, under pressure from other Arab countries to maintain Arab solidarity, Egypt toned down their stance.[112] The government of Egypt fears that tough actions would play in the hands of Sudan's southern opposition. Last September, Mubarak said,

"We do not want to punish the Sudanese people and so we are extremely eager not to let this people be harmed. There are between 4 and 5 million Sudanese citizens living in Egypt alongside their Egyptian brothers. Most of them, or maybe all of them, disagree with the policy of the regime in Khartoum, but throughout history Egypt and Sudan have been linked by one lifeline."[113]

Three other members of the Security Council also oppose sanctions: Russia, France and China. With sizable commercial interests in Sudan, France was against the idea of any sanctions that might prevent Sudanese creditors from paying their bills.[114] The outcome was that the Security Council adopted a series of more limited sanctions. These sanctions are listed below.

 

        UN Security Council Resolution 1044. Established on 31 January 1996. Calls for Sudan to extradite, by March 30, the three suspects wanted for the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Ethiopia in June 1995. It also calls on Sudan to desist from engaging in activities of assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter and sanctuaries to terrorist elements.[115]

 

        UN Security Council Resolution 1054. Established on 29 April 1996. Demands that Sudan act immediately to extradite the three assassination suspects and desist from supporting terrorist activities prior to 10 May 1996. The resolution calls on all States to significantly reduce the number of Sudanese diplomatic posts, and restrict or control their movement within their territory if the 10 May deadline is not met.[116]

 

        UN Security Council Resolution 1070. Established on 16 August 1996. Imposes an air embargo against Sudan unless it complies with UN resolutions 1044 and 1054 within 90 days.[117]

 

Despite a report that Sudan had failed to comply with the resolutions, further sanctions were considered and postponed in November 1996.[118] Although the delay was officially noted to allow time for collecting additional information, it is believed that other permanent members, including the U.S., will "refuse to take the lead in a sanction campaign without Egypt's enthusiastic backing."[119]

 

Unilateral actions taken:

Over the past several years the U.S. has assailed the ruling powers in Sudan by using a combination of political and economic actions. In 1993, the U.S. included Sudan on the State Department's list of states that support international terrorism. Last year the U.S. closed their Embassy in Khartoum, expelled a Sudanese diplomat and enacted legislation to restrict diplomatic movement within the U.S. Also, in its frustration of the United Nation's weak stance against Sudan, the U.S. sought out another alternative way to dampen Sudan's plunder. In this effort, the Clinton administration recently announced a US $20 million military aid package to three of Sudan's neighbors most threatened by their subversion.[120] These unilateral actions taken towards Sudan consist of the following:

 

        In August of 1993, the U.S. Department of State added Sudan to its list of states that support international terrorism. This action prohibits the transfer of U.S. military equipment, military useful civilian technology, and foreign aid. It strips it of favorable trade privileges and requires the U.S. to block loans by international financial institutions. This action effectively blocked all U.S. trade - a modest US $74 million in 1992.[121]

 

        Suspension of permanent presence at the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum. In February 1996, due to security concerns, and in response to Sudan's growing involvement in international terrorism, the United States government moved its diplomats out of Khartoum and began operating in a limited capacity out of Nairobi, Kenya. A team of U.S. officials returns each month to maintain official diplomatic ties with the government of Sudan.

 

        On 22 November 1996, President Clinton enacted a proclamation that places visa restrictions on all Sudanese Government officials. The proclamation suspends entry into the United States all immigrant and nonimmigrant members or officials of the Sudanese Government or Armed Forces.[122]

 

        In April 1996, in response to the plot to blow up the United Nations building and New York City bridges and tunnels, the U.S. expelled a Sudanese diplomat, an Egyptian and nine others. To help garner UN support for stricter sanctions, this action was widely regarded as an attempt to keep international attention focused on Sudan. [123]

 

        US $20 million military aid package to three of Sudan's neighbors most threatened by their subversion, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda.[124] If not intended to topple the regime, the military aid package could result in containing Sudan's subversion by helping its opposition defend themselves.[125] By keeping one small step behind the front-line, this action allows Washington to consciously defend itself against accusations of being anti-Islam and pro-intervention.

 

The promise of military equipment had an effect of shaking the Sudanese government. Sudan's National Congress announced that, in retaliation to the American decision, it will raise 20 million U.S. dollars for arms' purchases.[126] Also, there is talk among the NIF of opening up an eastern front against Eritrea or Ethiopia, and Turabi is talking about "striking back at the U.S., indirectly."[127]

No developmental assistance has been provided to Sudan since 1989. However, a generous amount of emergency assistance was provided for the international relief effort of war-torn Sudan.[128] For example, in FY-95 more than U.S. $28 million in aid was provided to support OLS, the UN-led relief effort for the South.[129] Additionally, the U.S. contributes to "other non-governmental organizations' relief efforts for Sudanese refugees in neighboring countries and non-Sudanese refugees in Sudan itself."[130]

 

Sudan's international isolation.

Although the UN resolutions have so far afforded little effect, the Khartoum regime is increasingly becoming isolated from the West. Due to Sudan's consistent support for regional extremist insurgents, and for fear of the civil war spilling over, Khartoum's diplomatic relations with its regional neighbors are poor. "Thousands of rebels from the southern Sudan are based in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda."[131] Diplomatic relations ceased between Khartoum and Eritrea and Uganda for these very reasons.[132] Military training is provided to Eritrean Islamic extremists at a base near refugee camps in northeastern Sudan that house 500,000 Eritreans.[133] In response to this threat, Eritrea openly collaborates with the SPLA against Khartoum.[134] Skirmishes abound between Sudan and Egypt over the long-running dispute with Sudan over the Hala'ib border area.[135] Egypt also charges Khartoum with supporting Egyptian extremists.

Little change in Sudan's policies and actions.

Despite all of the rhetoric and regardless of all U.S. and UN efforts to date, Sudan's Islamic militant subversion and terrorism support continues. Its prosecution of a long-standing internal war and suppression of human rights also remain unheeded.[136] Few are surprised. Last April, Ambassador Edward Gnehm told the Security Council that "[t]he United States does not believe that the diplomatic sanctions imposed on Sudan are strong enough to force that government to stop supporting terrorism."[137]

Although little hope remains that the Sudan is likely to change its policies, the latest UN resolution, an air embargo, could create additional domestic problems for Khartoum. Last August, Bashir made the following comments regarding the UN air embargo.

"[f]or us, air transportation is everything, because Sudan is a large country, with an area of more than 2.5 million square kilometers. We lack a basic, modern infrastructure. You can only reach certain areas by air in order to deliver the citizens' medical and basic material needs. We do not have the resources to maintain our aircraft; this must be done abroad. Domestic air transportation is a vital element for us.Naturally, if applied, the embargo will have negative effects on our community and our economy."[138]

 

Sudan's response:

Naturally, the government of Sudan has consistently denied any involvement in all of the accusations brought forth by the international community. In fact, regarding Mubarak's assassination attempt, Sudan's Ambassador to the U.S. indicated that,

"Sudan categorically has denounced the foiled assassination, has invited the Egyptian security services to search for the suspected Egyptian culprits on Sudanese soil and has placed its territory off limits to any person or group plotting against foreign governments. Sudan has been the victim, not the perpetrator, of aggression by three of its diplomatically cunning neighbors."[139]

Regarding the extradition of the three suspects, Turabi commented that "Sudan is 1 million square miles, and a government cannot look for someone and find them in a month or two. If the Sudan is pressed, it will go to more extremes, actually."[140]

On the issue of supporting terrorism and abusing human rights, Bashir claims that "[w]e are innocent of this. It is an attempt to make us appear that we live in a jungle."[141]

Bashir also commented on the issue of deteriorating diplomatic relations with nearly all of his neighboring border states, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda. "Our relations are deteriorating with the countries you mentioned, but our relations with Kenya, Zaire, Central Africa, Chad, and Libya are excellent. The countries that have firm ties with the United States are now in a state of hostility to Sudan."[142]

In response to Sudan's road to international isolation, Bashir claimed "[w]e are not in opposition to the international community. Through our diplomatic campaign, which began before the resolution, international sympathy has clearly been with us."[143]

Referring to UN resolution 1070, air embargo, Bashir said, "The issue of the embargo is part of an international plan to strike at Sudan and classify our country as one of the terrorist countries or supportive of terrorism."[144]

 

IV. Policy analysis:

Prior to analyzing U.S. foreign policy and its results in dealing with Sudan, a basic understanding of U.S. culture and how it relates to foreign policy should be established. U.S. culture typically encourages a short-sighted attitude or a desire for a quick-fix solution to their problems. This is illustrated and partially caused by the one year government budget cycle and the four year election system of U.S. local and federal government. This cultural mentality has resulted in a desire for the U.S. to put an end to conflicts very quickly. While this attitude is not entirely negative, it does tend to ignore many of the long term, often underlying, root causes of a problem or conflict. The way U.S. foreign policy approaches the problem of terrorism is not exempted from this generality. U.S. policymakers long for the single decisive action that will solve the problem of international terrorism. Those foreign to the U.S. can see this, but most Americans generally do not.

According to current U.S. foreign policy,[145] several avenues are available to counter international terrorism. These include making no concessions to terrorists, continuing to pressure state sponsors of terrorism, fully exploiting all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists and helping other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism.[146] Current U.S. foreign policy also provides the option to use direct military force "to strike terrorists at their bases abroad or to attack assets valued by the governments that support them."[147]

The U.S. has been fairly consistent with the policy of providing no concessions to terrorists. Nonetheless, the policy was recently abrogated by U.S. Representative Bill Richardson in his negotiated release of three Red Cross workers that were held hostage in Southern Sudan.[148] He traded five tons of rice, four jeeps, nine radios and medical assistance for their freedom.[149] Although the U.S. State Department stressed that "Richardson had not violated the U.S. policy against negotiating with hostage-takers because he was working on behalf of the Red Cross,"[150] the action has a clear association to the U.S. government. Since Richardson is a U.S. Representative and was accompanied by Tim Carney, the U.S. Ambassador to Sudan, the link with the U.S. government is indisputable. If terrorist organizations believe that there is even a small chance that the U.S. will negotiate, the effect of this policy deviation can only result in an increase of terrorist attempts. Since terrorism is a political act of violence against the innocent, a means to achieve a particular end state, any form of negotiation can only encourage additional violent acts. It is hoped that this deviation of policy is a one-time occurrence because the most effective policy is with no concessions in any way at any time.

While the policy to pressure state sponsors of terrorism has been fairly successful in the past, it has proven to be very difficult for the U.S. to garner sufficient international support to apply meaningful, strict sanctions against Sudan. The American perspective is much different from that of Europe and the Middle East, which have endured acts of terrorism in a greater number for a longer time than the U.S. Their political ties and economic interests within their region are substantial. The general consensus among the international community is that restrictions on states usually do not yield the desired result. They are reluctant to pay the cost of restrictions that may not produce the desired results.

This is the case with Sudan. Frustrated by the UN's weak stance against Sudan, the U.S. was forced to seek alternative ways to encourage Sudan to change its policy of exporting terrorism. Although the combinations of actions taken by the U.S. have had an effect on Sudan, they have yet to produce the preferred result.

The unilateral diplomatic and economic actions initiated by the U.S. created far less of a positive result than actions implemented with international consensus. Unilateral actions taken by the U.S. appear to the international community as the U.S. "ganging up" on an Arab state. Therefore, unilateral actions against Sudan can make it even more difficult to obtain international support, a result that is counterproductive to the original intent. If Egypt, as the recipient of much of Sudan's threat, is not willing to take hard steps against Sudan, why should the U.S.? This does not imply that unilateral actions should not be pursued, however. These actions should be utilized as long as they are not politically motivated and the U.S. policymakers consider potential repercussions within the international community.

Rightfully so, caution has been the norm in U.S. policy towards Sudan. This applies to policies intended to influence Sudan, both internally and externally. As indicated by El-Tayib Zain al-Abdeen, a political scientist at Khartoum University,

"[t]he danger is that the pressure being applied to the Sudan could cause an explosion.The United States government should not encourage chaos. The civil war can spill over our borders if the economic crisis continues, if peace in the southern Sudan does not come quickly, if the eastern front opens. And we have nine borders. We have 570 tribes. If this spills over, it could be worse than Liberia. It could be worse than Somalia."[151]

Given the fact that international cooperative efforts against terrorism and its sponsors yield a greater effect, these have been the primary path for the U.S. Unfortunately, this effort is currently stalled due to lack of interest within the UN. Therefore, the U.S. effort should be shifted to regaining international support, and more efforts should be focused on the terrorist organizations themselves. The U.S. should continue to work closely with Egypt and France to determine adequate and acceptable actions that would protect their interests, yet yield the desired result in Sudan.

The U.S. focus of effort should include placing more emphasis on the terrorist organizations by increasing intelligence and law enforcement efforts. The U.S. should increase its efforts in intelligence collection and analysis of the terrorist organizations in Sudan. Collecting useful information on the terrorist groups in Sudan is an essential element in the ability to track and defeat them. Once key members of these groups are identified and located, we should exploit this knowledge by preempting their plans, removing them by force for prosecution or using them for other operational purposes.

Along with intelligence, the U.S. must continue to use law enforcement to deter international terrorism. Arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating terrorists has been effective in recent years. Continuing to use law enforcement as a tool to implement counter terrorism policy sends a clear signal to all terrorists that attacks against the United States will not go unpunished, and if they are identified and caught they will pay the price. It simply holds them accountable for their actions.

The U.S. has been working closely with its allies to exploit all legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists from Sudan. A suspect implicated in the plot to blow up the UN building in New York was arrested and exported. The U.S. also coordinated closely with Ethiopian officials during the investigation of the assassination attempt of Mubarak. However, policymakers should not discount the option of removing terrorists by force to induce the cooperation of the host government. If Sudan continues to harbor the three suspects accused in the assassination attempt against Mubarak, and their location becomes known, the U.S. should assist Ethiopia and/or Egypt in using appropriate force to "snatch" the suspects from Sudan and export them to Ethiopia for prosecution.

Policymakers should not discount the option of using direct military force to strike against terrorist organizations. Current U.S. policy allows the use of force against terrorism. This option was exercised in 1993 against Iraq in response to an assassination attempt against former President Bush and in 1986 against Libya. However, U.S. military force should only be used in retaliation or in protection of U.S. interests. Additionally, care should be taken to ensure there is no collateral damage and that force is used against specific targets within a terrorist organization, or the host nation. Although a terrorist organization should be a primary target, the host national government could also be targeted only if a direct connection to terrorist support is made and all potential political consequences are duly considered. While the use of military force will not necessarily stop terrorism, it will unquestionably raise the cost of exporting terror, possibly deterring future terrorist actions.

In the case of Sudan, however, the use of military force to strike against a terrorist organization may be inappropriate, given the current political situation. Training camps can be quickly rebuilt and attacking them could involve a high risk to the civilian population. Many of the training camps are collocated with either refugee camps or the capital of Khartoum. This proximity to civilians and relief organizations could severely complicate the use of military force to attack these camps without threatening their safety. Moreover, many of the terrorist groups in Sudan are assisting with the internal civil war, making it difficult to distinguish between facilities' conducting military or terrorist activities. Attacking one of these groups or camps could be viewed by the international community as an effort to influence the outcome of the civil war. Also, the U.S. could be viewed as being anti-Islamic or against the Arab world.

The problem with Sudan can not be solved in isolation. Any action taken must be given due consideration at many levels. This is why the U.S. has been cautious in its process of isolating Sudan. Taking the wrong move could jeopardize an important effort such as the Middle East peace process. One wrong signal sent to the wrong party could jeopardize the entire process.

On the other hand, good statecraft is, in part, based on power and the U.S. cannot afford to dilute its powerbase by focusing too much attention on international 'signals' at the expense of real issues. The U.S., instead, should bolster its power by maintaining consistent policies and actions when confronting terrorism and terror supporting states. Good statesmanship requires our leaders to know when real action is called for and must be willing to use it in lieu of resolutions.

The U.S. should enlist Sudan's allies to place additional international pressure against Sudan. In conjunction with U.S. allies, the U.S. should take steps to influence countries like Kenya, Zaire, Central Africa and Chad to bring additional pressure to bear against Sudan. Faced with almost total international isolation, Sudan would become more willing to change its foreign policy. In return for ceasing its terrorist activities, Sudan could be offered economic and political incentives from the international community. This would provide the resources needed to allow Sudan to cut its ties with Iran and Iraq.

The U.S. should continue to fully support allied states most threatened by Sudan's terrorism. By providing economic and military assistance, the U.S. has been engaged with several states that are threatened by Sudan's exportation of terrorism. This assistance should be expanded to include counter-terrorist training and the sharing of intelligence and analysis. An expansion of effort such as this would be beneficial to all participants. It would provide the border states with additional capabilities to counter terrorism and the U.S. could benefit by receiving additional intelligence assets.

 

V Conclusion:

As terrorism has been gaining national attention, a lot has been written on what actions the U.S. should do to defend its interests. While the purpose of this paper is focused specifically on what the U.S. should do to combat Sudan's role in exporting terror, the complexity of the problem warrants international considerations.

Terrorism is just one means to reach a desired end state. It is usually directed at the will of the government and the people. Generally, terrorists are a political group that offers a radical version of the future and the argument that the status quo, i.e., their opposition, is unjust. If the general public feels otherwise, the terrorists may well be alienated from the population.

Many terrorist organizations rely on Western states for support. The democratic processes that benefit these terrorists are also their own worst political enemy. Their prime objective, then, is to eliminate the democratic process by creating an illusion of injustice in order to provoke members of society to sympathize with the terrorists. Terrorists are protected by the very democratic process they are waging war against. If the processes are obviated, the terrorists will gain additional political support. As long as the democratic process remains, it is extremely difficult for the terrorists to lose. They attempt to hold a society hostage against itself and its most founding principles. Yet, they move around at will and take advantage of the freedom that defines this democracy. They receive all the support they need from the very same nation-state with which they are unwilling to deal with effectively.

This paper has already presented strong allegations that the Sudanese military regime continues to support and encourage terrorist groups to train and organize within its boarders. There are reports that Sudan has been involved in actual terrorist acts, and they have been exporting terror throughout the region. The U. S. has found it difficult to identify the right mix of actions needed to resolve the problem of Sudan. The actions taken to date appear to have further isolated Sudan by driving a wedge between Sudan and the West. This result has encouraged a heavier reliance on other terror supporting states such as Iran, Iraq and Libya.

Although the threat or actual use of force is the best deterrent for terrorism,[152] Sudan has been successful in sufficiently concealing responsibility for terrorist acts, therefore avoiding a military response. As Americans are strongly tempted by a military reply to terrorism, the next logical step would seem to be the use of military force to strike against Sudan. However, serious thought should be given prior to using military action against Sudan. The problem with Sudan, after fully considering the humanitarian crisis and the current regional political situation, as a whole, does not lend itself to typical military action. Not only are there serious difficulties inherent in a military attack, such as locating a target and defining an end-state, the potential ramifications from the rest of the world could be immense. However, since good statecraft requires power, and power can only be maintained with a delicate mix of diplomacy and action, the plight of Sudan calls for forceful action.

Traditional military attacks are not the only option. Policymakers should consider using "grab and snatch" operations to apprehend and prosecute known terrorists from terror-harboring states. The U.S. should also consider using covert actions such as information and psychological operations to create dissension within the organizations and provoke a sense of vulnerability.[153] These efforts could also be focused to create distrust between the terror group and the state sponsor. Covert agents could be inserted or befriended to disrupt terrorist operations and turn terrorists and their organizations against each other. Subversion operations could also be launched against the training camps, logistical networks and other assets.[154]

It will not be possible to solve the problem with Sudan in isolation. Sudan's role in supporting terrorism can be viewed as an expression of the symptom of the problem rather than the cause. Sudan is a medium for which terrorism has spread. The cause of the problem itself goes much deeper, and requires a good deal of international attention and effort for even a minimal gain.

The U.S. should strictly enforce the policy of allowing no concessions to terrorists and focus on international cooperative efforts toward terrorist organizations as well as the Sudanese government. The U.S. should place additional emphasis on Sudan's terrorist organizations by increasing U.S. intelligence and law enforcement efforts. By providing additional counter-terrorism training and sharing intelligence and analysis, the U.S. should increase its efforts of assisting U.S. allies that are most threatened by Sudan's role of exporting terrorism. The U.S. policymakers should not discount the options of using military force to strike against terrorist organizations, or to remove fugitive terrorists by force if necessary. Finally, the U.S. should consider using covert actions such as information and psychological operations and subversion operations to displace, disorient and dissolve the terrorist organizations and their assets.

International terrorism is not likely to be eradicated.[155] However, it can be weakened considerably if its costs are raised sufficiently. A relentless, coordinated and firm international campaign against the organizations themselves, as well as the states that support them, could sufficiently raise the cost of killing innocent people for political gain. This level of effort was successful in neutralizing the threat of Iraqi terrorism during the Gulf War and could work again.[156] International terrorism must be attacked, beginning at the international level, and followed through right down to the organizations themselves.


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[1] The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington DC: Feb 1996) 15.

[2] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[3] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[4] United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington DC: April 1996) 27.

[5] Congressional Research Service (hereafter referred to as CRS), Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 17.

[6] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 17.

[7] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 4.

[8] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 4.

[9] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 4.

[10] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 4.

[11] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 6.

[12] John Battersby, "Profiles of Major Mideast Terrorist Groups," The World, International (Jerusalem: 13 March 1996), 18.

[13] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 8.

[14] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 8.

[15] John Battersby, "Profiles of Major Mideast Terrorist Groups," The World, International (Jerusalem: 13 March 1996), 18.

[16] Judith Matloff, "Isolated Sudan Backs Muslim Militancy," The Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1996, 11.

[17] CRS, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors (Washington DC: 9 August 1995), 8.

[18] Mark Huband, "Sudan: Neighbors Accuse Country of Harboring Terrorists" (text) London The Times, 30 Aug. 1996, 16. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter referred to as FBIS), FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-170).

[19] Judith Matloff, "Isolated Sudan Backs Muslim Militancy," The Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1996, 11.

[20] Ron Ben-Yishal, "Wanted: a New Hideout," Time, (6 April 1992), 29.

[21] George Logokwa, Sudanese Labor Minister, "Official on Terrorist-Training Camps" (excerpts), Cairo Al-Ahram Al-Masa'I (23 August 1992), 5. "Interview with Sudanese Labor Minister George Logokwa," Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter referred to as JPRS) JPRS-TOT-92-030-L, (Washington DC: 3 September 1992) 5.

[22] George Logokwa, Sudanese Labor Minister, "Official on Terrorist-Training Camps" (excerpts), Cairo Al-Ahram Al-Masa'I (23 August 1992), 5. "Interview with Sudanese Labor Minister George Logokwa," JPRS-TOT-92-030-L, (Washington DC: 3 September 1992) 5.

[23] United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington DC: April 1996) 27.

[24] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[25] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[26] Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Bad company in Khartoum," U.S. News & World Report, 30 Aug. 1993, 45.

[27] George Logokwa, Sudanese Labor Minister, "Official on Terrorist-Training Camps" (excerpts), Cairo Al-Ahram Al-Masa'I (23 August 1992), 5. "Interview with Sudanese Labor Minister George Logokwa," JPRS-TOT-92-030-L, (Washington DC: 3 September 1992) 5.

[28]James Phillips, "The Challenge Of Revolutionary Iran," The Heritage Foundation, (Washington DC: 29 Mar 1996).

[29] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[30] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[31] George Logokwa, Sudanese Labor Minister, "Official on Terrorist-Training Camps" (excerpts), Cairo Al-Ahram Al-Masa'I (23 August 1992), 5. "Interview with Sudanese Labor Minister George Logokwa," JPRS-TOT-92-030-L, (Washington DC: 3 September 1992), 5.

[32] "How Iraqi Hijackers Came To Be In Sudan," Sudan Democratic Gazette (London: 25 Nov 96).

[33] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[34] Guy Roux, "Hassan Turabi - Tehran's Sudanese Puppet," International Review, 18 June 1996.

[35] James Phillips, "The Challenge Of Revolutionary Iran," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 29 Mar 1996).

[36] Guy Roux, "Hassan Turabi - Tehran's Sudanese Puppet," International Review, 18 June 1996.

[37] Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Bad company in Khartoum," U.S. News & World Report, 30 Aug. 1993, 45.

[38] Guy Roux, "Hassan Turabi - Tehran's Sudanese Puppet," International Review, 18 June 1996.

[39] Guy Roux, "Hassan Turabi - Tehran's Sudanese Puppet," International Review, 18 June 1996.

[40] Guy Roux, "Hassan Turabi - Tehran's Sudanese Puppet," International Review, 18 June 1996.

[41] Mark Huband, "Sudan: Neighbors Accuse Country of Harboring Terrorists" (text) London The Times, 30 Aug. 1996, 16. FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-170).

[42] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[43] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[44] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[45] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," 26 April 1996

[46] Eltayeb Ali Ahmed, "Faulty Evidence Against Sudan," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 18 Dec. 1996).

[47] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[48] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[49] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[50] United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington DC: April 1996) 27.

[51] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[52] Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Bad company in Khartoum," U.S. News & World Report, 30 Aug. 1993, 45.

[53] "Tensions With Neighbors," Sudan News & Views, Issue No 23, January 1997.

[54] "Tensions With Neighbors," Sudan News & Views, Issue No 23, January 1997.

[55] "Tensions With Neighbors," Sudan News & Views, Issue No 23, January 1997.

[56] Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, (Washington DC: 1995).

[57] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[58] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[59] Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, (Washington DC: 1995).

[60] Todd Shields, "Maestros of Mayhem," U.S. News & World Report, 30 Aug. 1993, 43.

[61] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), xxv.

[62] Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," Foreign Affairs (Washington D.C.:, May/June 1995), 50.

[63] Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment," Foreign Affairs (Washington D.C.:, May/June 1995), 55

[64] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), xxv.

[65] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), xxviii.

[66] "The Menace of Sudan," The Washington Post, 4 Dec. 1996, A24.

[67] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[68] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[69] Judith Matloff, "Isolated Sudan Backs Muslim Militancy," The Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1996, 11.

[70] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), xxxi.

[71] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), xxxi.

[72] Majid Jaber, "Iran and Sudan Behind Mubarak Assassination Plot?" International Review, August 1995.

[73] George Gedda, "Survey: Iraq 'Repressive'" The Washington Post (Washington DC: 17 December 1996).

[74] Tod Shields, "Maestros of Mayhem," U.S. News and World Report, 30 Aug. 1993, 45.

[75] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), 211.

[76] "Christian Solidarity International Frees Slaves in Sudan," Africanews, November 1996.

[77] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[78] "Sudan: Progress or Public Relations?" Amnesty International, 29 May 1996.

[79] "Sudan: Progress or Public Relations?" Amnesty International, 29 May 1996.

[80] "Sudan: Progress or Public Relations?" Amnesty International, 29 May 1996.

[81] "Behind the Red Line - Political Repression in Sudan," Human Rights Watch, 29 Man 1996.

[82] "Behind the Red Line - Political Repression in Sudan," Human Rights Watch, 29 Man 1996.

[83] "Behind the Red Line - Political Repression in Sudan," Human Rights Watch, 29 Man 1996.

[84] "Christian Solidarity International Frees Slaves in Sudan," Africanews, November 1996.

[85] "Christian Solidarity International Frees Slaves in Sudan," Africanews, November 1996.

[86] "Sudan: Progress or Public Relations?" Amnesty International, 29 May 1996.

[87] "UN Human Rights Investigator Forced to Leave Sudan," United States Information Agency, 17 January 1997.

[88] Judith Matloff, "Isolated Sudan Backs Muslim Militancy," The Christian Science Monitor, 20 March 1996, 11.

[89] Wayne Madsen, "Protecting Indigenous Peoples' Privacy from "Eyes in the Sky," Computer Sciences Corporation (Falls Church, VA).

[90] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[91] "An Estimated 700,000 People Face Starvation in Southern Sudan," The Associated Press, 11 July 1996.

[92] "An Estimated 700,000 People Face Starvation in Southern Sudan," The Associated Press, 11 July 1996.

[93] "An Estimated 700,000 People Face Starvation in Southern Sudan," The Associated Press, 11 July 1996.

[94] "UN Secretary-General Statement on Deterioration in the Humanitarian Situation in The Sudan," UN Office of the Secretary General, 15 July 1996.

[95] "Sudan Plagued By Flash Floods," The Associated Press, 16 September 1996.

[96] "Sudan Plagued By Flash Floods," The Associated Press, 16 September 1996.

[97] Moyiga Nduru, "Disaster 'In The Making' In Sudanese Nuba Mountains," Inter Press Service, 6 March 1997.

[98] Moyiga Nduru, "Disaster 'In The Making' In Sudanese Nuba Mountains," Inter Press Service, 6 March 1997.

[99] Moyiga Nduru, "Disaster 'In The Making' In Sudanese Nuba Mountains," Inter Press Service, 6 March 1997.

[100] Moyiga Nduru, "Disaster 'In The Making' In Sudanese Nuba Mountains," Inter Press Service, 6 March 1997.

[101] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).

[102] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).

[103] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), 106 - 107.

[104] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), 106 - 107.

[105] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), 106 - 107.

[106] Library of Congress, Sudan: A Country Study / Federal Research Division, Library of Congress; edited by Helen Chapin Metz (Washington DC: 1992), xxv.

[107] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[108] Joyce Hackel, "An Islamic Revolution Falters," The Christian Science Monitor, 29 March 1996.

[109] CRS Issue Brief, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington DC: 7 January 1997), 14.

[110] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[111] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[112] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[113] Husni Mubarak, "Egypt: Mubarak on Peace Process, Iraq, Iran, Sudan" (excerpt) Cairo Mena, 17 Sept. 1996. FBIS Daily Report (FBIS-NES-96-182).

[114] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[115] UN Resolution 1044 (1996), United Nations, 31 January 1996.

[116] UN Resolution 1054 (1996), United Nations, 29 April 1996.

[117] UN Resolution 1070 (1996), United Nations, 16 August 1996.

[118] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[119] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[120] David B. Ottaway, "Wielding Aid, U.S. Targets Sudan," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 10 Nov 1996), A34.

[121] Todd Shields, "Maestros of Mayhem," U.S. News and World Report, 30 Aug. 1993, 44.

[122] U.S. President, A Proclamation by the President of the United States of America, The White House, 22 November 1996.

[123] John M. Goshko, "UN Remains Reluctant to Impose Tough Sanctions on Sudan for Terrorist Links," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 24 November 1996), A32.

[124] David B. Ottaway, "Wielding Aid, U.S. Targets Sudan," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 10 Nov 1996), A34.

[125] "The Menace of Sudan," The Washington Post, 4 Dec. 1996, A24.

[126] Yahya El Hassan, "Sudan's National Congress To Arm Country For War," Panafrican News Agency, (Dakar, Senegal: 21 November 1996).

[127] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[128] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[129] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[130] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[131] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[132] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[133] Mark Huband, "Sudan: Neighbors Accuse Country of Harboring Terrorists" (text) London The Times, 30 Aug. 1996, 16. FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-170).

[134] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[135] Edward Brynn, "Testimony of E. Brynn on US Policy Toward Sudan before the House Committee on International Relations," U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: 22 March 1995).

[136] "The Menace of Sudan," The Washington Post, 4 Dec. 1996, A24.

[137] Edward Gnehm, "Ambassador Gnehm's Security Council Remarks," The U.S. Mission to the UN, 26 April 1996.

[138] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[139] Eltayeb Ali-Ahmed, "Faulty Evidence Against Sudan," The Washington Post (Washington DC: 18 December 1996), A22.

[140] Joyce Hackel, "An Islamic Revolution Falters," The Christian Science Monitor, 29 March 1996.

[141] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[142] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[143] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[144] Mulhim Karam, "Sudan: Al-Bashir Discusses Sanctions, Regional, Domestic Issues" (excerpt) Paris Al-Hawadith (30 Aug. 1996), 18 - 21. Translation by FBIS, FBIS Daily Report, 30 Aug. 1996 (FBIS-NES-96-185).

[145] The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington DC: Feb 1996) 15.

[146] The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington DC: Feb 1996) 15.

[147] The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington DC: Feb 1996) 15.

[148] Jim Abrams, The Associated Press (New York: 10 Dec. 96).

[149] Jim Abrams, The Associated Press (New York: 10 Dec. 96).

[150] Jim Abrams, The Associated Press (New York: 10 Dec. 96).

[151] Tim Weiner, "Sudan's Engmatic Chief Warnes U.S. Against Meddling," The New York Times, 24 December 1996.

[152] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).

[153] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).

[154] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).

[155] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).

[156] James Phillips, "The Changing Face of Middle Eastern Terrorism," The Heritage Foundation (Washington DC: 6 Oct. 1994).



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