Tactical and Training Deficiencies of Today's Sea Control Aviation Community
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Tactical and Training Deficiencies of Today's Sea Control Aviation Community
Author: Lieutenant Commander E.G. Schiefer, United States Navy
Thesis: The Sea Control Aviation Community's current tactical development organizations and training standards are not keeping pace with the Navy's shift to littoral operations. The fleet needs to take an active role to correct these deficiencies; the problem is that the fleet has not yet responded.
Background: The Sea Control Aviation Community is comprised of the following aircraft: P-3C, S-3B, SH-60F and SH-60B. The mission of this community is to defend the Navy's surface combatant ships from enemy surface and subsurface sea-borne threats. The Navy's shift from blue water, open ocean operations to operations in the littorals has created the requirement to develop new tactics and new training standards for the Sea Control Aviation Community to effectively operate in this new arena. This shift has unfortunately occurred during an era of budget and force reductions. These reductions have had a significant negative impact on the organizations charged with developing tactics. Additionally, administrative flaws within the tactical developmental process, itself, have also had a negative impact. These factors together have impeded the tactical development organizations' ability to meet the tactical needs of the Sea Control Aviation Community's. The organizations impacted are the Tactical Development and Evaluation (TAC D&E) organization and the Commander of the Operational Test and Evaluation Force. Tactics can be developed at the fleet level but the fleet, has in the past and today, overly relied on the tactical development organizations to produce tactics. This, together with the fleet's extreme focus on current operations, has hindered operational squadrons from reaching their potential as tactical developers. In the area of training, the fleet has failed to respond to the differences of the littoral environment. Threats in the confined littoral environment are able to threaten Navy combatant ships much faster and more elusively than ever before. To dominate the littoral environment the Sea Control Aviation Community will have to employ the unique capabilities of each aircraft against the threat (i.e. conduct coordinated multi-platform operations.) Conducting multi-platform operations is very complex and foreign to most aviators in the Sea Control Aviation Community. In the past these aircrews were spread over the open ocean, operating mostly on their own, to provide coverage over an expansive area. Current fleet training is still biased toward this type of operational environment and, hence, aircrews are not training like they will operate in the littoral environment.
The fleet is the common denominator of these Sea Control Aviation Community problems.
Recommendation: The fleet must give up its reliance on tactical developmental organizations and must shift its focus from current operations to the area of tactical development. The fleet must also revise its current training and readiness structure in order to meet the requirements of the littoral environment.
Tactical and Training Deficiencies of Today's Sea Control Aviation Community
The Navy's Sea Control Aviation Community is composed of the following aircraft: P-3C, S-3B, SH-60F and SH-60B. The mission of this community is to defend the Navy's surface fleet from enemy surface and subsurface sea-borne threats. The mission of the Sea Control Aviation Community remains the same, but the environment where the community conducts operations has dramatically changed. The Navy's white papers "...From the Sea" and "Forward...From the Sea" have shifted the Navy's focus from sea space dominance over the open ocean to sea space dominance in the littorals and power projection ashore. This dramatic shift has created many new challenges for Sea Control Aviation Community.
The littoral region is frequently characterized by confined and congested water and air space occupied by friends, adversaries, and neutrals-making identification profoundly difficult. This environment poses varying technical and tactical challenges to Naval Forces. It is an area where our adversaries can concentrate and layer their defenses. In an era when arms proliferation means some third world countries possess sophisticated weaponry, there is a wide range of potential challenges. For example, an adversary's submarines operating in shallow waters pose a particular challenge to Naval Forces...Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from command of the seas. It is an objective which requires our focused skills and resources.1
Are operations in the littorals much different than blue water, open ocean operations? The answer is yes. In the blue water, open ocean environment, operations were conducted over much vaster distances. The P-3C's mission was to locate and track all soviet submarines underway. This important mission required many aircraft to accomplish the tasking and occurred, for the most part, far from carrier battlegroup operations. Hence, P-3C's rarely operated with the other aircraft of the Sea Control Aviation Community. Within the carrier battlegroup, the SH-60F remained within 60 miles of the carrier to provide, what is called, "inner zone subsurface defense." The SH-60B conducted surface and subsurface operations from the inner zone out to 150 nautical miles from the carrier. The S-3B conducted surface and subsurface operations which overlapped the SH-60B zone and reached out as far as 250 nautical miles from the carrier. These broad areas of coverage and differing missions not only highlight the differences of defended space and operations, but also point out that these aircraft rarely, if ever, operated together in the course of their missions.
The littoral environment is a much more confined space, and the threat is much more elusive. Operations close to shorelines provide the enemy with the following two major advantages in sea-borne operations: (1) enemy diesel submarines can now range the carrier battlegroup and (2) dense neutral shipping environments provide masking for fast combatant patrol boats. By having to operate in a more confined space and by having to respond quickly to elusive threats, the aircraft of the Sea Control Aviation Community will have to use all its aircraft together, to overcome the advantages of the threat. (i.e. conduct extensive multi-platform operations.) Conducting multi-platform operations is a new way of operating for the aircrews of the Sea Control Aviation Community. As was pointed out above, the aircraft operated over much broader areas and worked alone most of the time. Because of this new way operating, the development of new tactics and new training standards is required. With proven tactics and proper training the Sea Control Aviation Community will dominate the littorals as it had in the in the days of blue water, open ocean operations.
The following scenario will familiarize the reader with the complexity and challenges of prosecuting littoral sea-borne threats:
Imagine carrier battlegroup operations in the Arabian Gulf today. While steaming north to take station in support of Operation Deny Flight, a crisis has evolved in Iran. Intelligence reports indicate that two of the three Iranian Kilo class submarines are underway and not located, and that a substantial number of their Naval surface craft have left their ports. The Sea Combat Commander, who is the warfare commander responsible for defending against surface and subsurface threats, responds by getting as many sea control assets in the air as possible to locate, and if necessary, engage the threat as far from the carrier as possible. Meanwhile, ninety miles from the carrier, a P-3 has reported radar contact on one of the submarines, which has since submerged. Immediately an S-3, SH-60B and SH-60F are directed to the area to assist in the prosecution of the target. The P-3 becomes the on scene commander to coordinate prosecution of the target due to the advantage it has in command and control capabilities. The P-3 mission commander's first concern is to gain acoustic contact with the submarine. On top of expertly coordinating his crew to achieve this, he must now shift his focus of effort to determine how to most effectively incorporate the other three aircraft into the prosecution. He has worked with an SH-60B once a few years ago but has never worked with an S-3B or an SH-60F, neither does he know of the most recent weapons enhancements incorporated into each of the aircraft. He thinks to himself; "what are the sensor and weapons capabilities of each aircraft?" "What are the weapons envelopes for each aircraft?" "Can I pass GPS locations or do I need to pass relative locations?" "What buoy frequencies can each aircraft monitor and who should drop them?" "What should the situation report criteria be to control the vast amount of radio communications required to coordinate this event?" "In order to avoid midair collisions I must make altitude assignments, but what should they be in order achieve the most effective sensor use of each aircraft?" If poor weather conditions were factored into the above scenario, the on scene commander would be even more overwhelmed.
As was stated previously, the Sea Control Aviation Community needs to develop new tactics and new training standards. These two requirements define the primary challenges that the Sea Control Aviation Community faces today. Making these challenges more difficult to overcome, is the inopportune timing of the shift to the littoral environment. Simultaneously, along with the shift to the littorals, the budget and force structure have been reduced. What this means is that the Sea Control Aviation Community will have to do more with less, in order to overcome these challenges. What it really means is that more needs to be accomplished at the fleet level to overcome these challenges and herein lies problem.
The fleet has both in the past and today, relied upon tactical development organizations to develop the majority of fleet tactics. Hence, very little tactical development is accomplished at the fleet level.2 The tactical development organizations have been slow to respond to the tactical deficiencies that exist today due to budget cuts, administrative delays and force reductions. To overcome the tactical deficiencies that exist today, the fleet will need to make up the difference by taking a more active role in the development of tactics. The fleet has also been slow in responding to developing new tactical training standards. The scenario above highlighted the complexity of multi-platform, littoral operations. To this day though, very little multi-platform training is accomplished. The Training and Readiness Manuals, which dictate training requirements, are antiquated. They are still very biased toward operations that the Sea Aviation Community used to perform (i.e. lone operations vice multi-platform coordinated operations.) These manuals need to be updated to provide aircrews the training they need to conduct complex, multi-platform littoral operations.
Tactical Development Deficiencies
There are a number of approaches which the Sea Control Aviation Community can take to develop tactics: (1) the community can submit tactical project requests through the Naval Forces Tactical Development and Evaluation (TAC D&E) Program, which if accepted would provide structure (i.e. the funding for analytical support,) to the project request (2) the community can wait for the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (COMOPTEVFOR) to develop tactics, or (3) the community can develop tactics at the fleet level using only fleet aviators, fleet aircraft and fleet experience.
The first approach is constrained by large budget decreases and by an organizational structure which inhibits timely tactical development. The second approach is constrained by the same budgetary decreases and additionally by force reductions. The third approach is constrained by the dedicated man hours required to develop and prove tactics, but it is where the Sea Control Aviation Community can make a substantial contribution to tactical development.
Tactical Development and Evaluation Program
The TAC D&E program is a "band aid" program which is in place to support high priority fleet issues. High priority issues are selected from a large bank of fleet tactical project requests by a steering committee, which is restricted to fleet commander in chief representation.3 This highly selective process is required due to the significant budget decline that this program has sustained over the past twelve years.4
The fiscal year 1985 budget for the TAC D&E program was approximately $19 million. For comparison, the 1991 budget was approximately $9.1 million and the 1997 budget is not expected to exceed $2.5 million.5 Adjusting 1997's budget for inflation and other cost increases since 1985 further amplifies the impact budget cuts have had on the current TAC D&E program. The impact is that fewer and fewer tactical project requests will receive funding for development at a time when the demand for tactical development is high.
Funding alone is not the only shortfall of the TAC D&E program. The span of time it takes the program, from generation of an idea to an actual published tactic, is far too long. The following administrative time-line is an example of the time it takes for a tactical idea to become a published fleet tactic:
17 Mar 97 A notional fleet squadron develops a tactic to identify enemy targets in dense shipping environments and submits a project request to COMTHIRDFLT. This starts the process for tactical development. If the request is selected it will receive the funding necessary for civilian analytical support. COMTHIRDFLT has received the document because they are CINCPACFLT'S TAC D&E agent.
Jan 98 COMTHIRDFLT chairs a meeting which votes on all project requests submitted from CINCPACFLT units. This meeting occurs only one time a year in mid January. The project request submitted by the notional fleet squadron obtains a majority vote and is forwarded for voting by the TAC D&E steering committee. The TAC D&E committee meets only once a year in May.
May 98 The Navy TAC D&E Steering Committee meets and votes on projects which have made the numbered fleet level cut. The project request again obtains a majority vote. The project request will now receive support from the TAC D&E program.
May-Oct 98 The Naval Tactical Support Agency coordinates contractor support for the project request. Civilian contracted personnel develop the plans to test and prove the tactical ideas submitted by the fleet, and are called tactical memorandums. These tactical memorandums are then assigned to fleet units to gather data outlined in the plan for analysis. The contractor does not begin development of the tactical memorandum until funded, which occurs at the start of a new fiscal year.
01 Oct 98 FY 99 money becomes available, and the contractor awarded the project begins work.
30 Sep 99 The draft tactical memorandum for the project is delivered to COMTHIRDFLT.
15 Oct 99 COMTHIRDFLT assigns the draft tactical memorandum to fleet units working up for deployment. The fleet has until the end of its deployment to return the evaluated tactical memorandum.
01 Jun 00 The fleet unit returns having evaluated the tactical memorandum with positive results.
30 Jun 00 COMTHIRDFLT distributes the tactical memorandum and results to other fleet units. The additional fleet units run the Tactical Memorandum through staffing and either concur with the findings or recommend further development.
Near Future The tactic is published in fleet tactical manuals and units begin training with it.6
In summation, the current TAC D&E organization is neither funded for nor responsive enough to meet the tactical development demands that exist today.
COMOPTEVFOR
COMOPTEVFOR is the Sea Control Aviation Community's model manager for the tactical manual program and is responsible for further tactical development of existing aircraft. COMOPTEVFOR can use the TAC D&E program to fulfill this requirement.7 AIRTEVRON One (VX-1) is COMOPTEVFOR's agent responsible to fulfill this requirement for the aircraft in the Sea Control Aviation Community but comes up short in fulfilling this obligation.8
The primary reason VX-1 has difficulty is fulfilling its charter is its manning shortage. VX-1 has sustained a fifty percent cut to its officer ranks since 1993. The effects of these cuts results in a tactical development department that is manned to the bare minimum. For example, the SH-60B Tactics division consists of one officer, who is the Tactical Manual Model Manager, and one enlisted Sailor. A majority of their time is spent on administrative requirements of the program. (i.e. setting up and chairing Tactical Manual conferences and incorporating administrative changes to the Tactical Manual.) These administrative requirements consume valuable time that could be spent overseeing and directing the tactical development program of the SH-60B. This one officer must also complete a myriad of other tasks relating to his assignment as operational test and evaluation pilot. As an operational test and evaluation pilot, he expends a large amount of time in the course of evaluating naval weapon systems due to training and travel. The results of all this is that VX-1 is not able to fulfill their responsibilities as an aircraft tactical development agency.9 Note: The example above focused on the SH-60B community only for example purposes only. Each aircraft of the Sea Control Aviation Community has its own tactics division within VX-1 and they each suffer the same problems as those suffered by the SH-60B division.
VX-1 will not be able to develop the tactics that the Sea Control Aviation Community needs today, unless they are given sufficient manning. Considering future force reductions, this will be difficult to accomplish.
Fleet Tactical Development
Fleet units may develop tactics for incorporation into the Tactical Manual without going through the TAC D&E organization.10 As mentioned above, the TAC D&E organization provides the funding for civilian analytical support. At the fleet level, the operators can develop and prove tactics by producing an evaluation plan to prove that the tactics are effective. In essence, the operators develop the same product that a civilian analyst would produce had this particular tactical development gone through the TAC D&E system; the product being a Tactical Memorandum. This form of tactical development is by far the most affordable; the only additional cost incurred is the fleet man-hours required to produce a Tactical Memorandum.
If this type of tactical development is so affordable, then why are more tactics not developed by fleet units? Why, in 1996, did the SH-60B community only submit one tactic to the Tactical Manual Model Manager for consideration of inclusion into the Tactical Manual?11 The answer is that tactical development takes a "back seat" to more quantitative command concerns such as aircraft and aircrew readiness. The maintenance and operations departments receive the majority of attention on a day to day basis. Aircraft mission capability rates and sortie completion rates are quantitative numbers by which fleet units are mainly judged by. Accordingly, the maintenance and the operations officer billets are assigned to senior officers with much experience. The TAC D&E officer billet, on the other hand, is often times filled by junior officer with little fleet experience. The TAC D&E officer billet is also subject to rapid turnover unlike the maintenance and operations officer billets.12 Even though fleet tactical development is the most cost effective and the most timely form of development, it will never reach its potential without first receiving command attention.
Possible Courses of Action
Course of action one: Develop tactics at the fleet level using only fleet aviators, fleet aircraft and fleet experience.
This course of action requires no additional funding or manning. It only requires the leadership in the Sea Control Aviation Community to identify the tactical deficiencies that exist today and to refocus their day to day effort to overcome these deficiencies.
Course of action two: Increase the funding of the current TAC D&E organization and reorganize its developmental administrative structure. Additionally increase COMOPTEVFOR's manning to a level that will enable them to fulfill their charter as fleet aircraft tactical developers.
This course of action will be nearly impossible to accomplish. Current unplanned operations have heavily taxed the Navy's already reduced budget, and an emphasis toward modernization and upkeep will take prioritization over tactical development. The Navy has also recently announced that another reduction in force will take place soon. This will certainly effect manning across the board making it difficult for VX-1 to overcome its critical shortfall.
Course of action one is recommended. To accomplish this course of action, the leadership will have to stress the importance of tactical development to the people they lead. In order for that to evolve, tactical development will need to reach a level of importance similar to that of maintenance and operations. To this end tactical development will require giving attention to tactical considerations at wardroom, staff and other meetings of that nature. Only through command attention will this course of action reach the potential it has.
Tactical Training Deficiencies
Each aircraft and crew of the Sea Control Aviation Community brings similar and unique capabilities to the fight. Referring back to the scenario above, coordinating these assets during a prosecution, to ensure that each aircraft achieves maximum effectiveness, is complex and requires much training. The first exposure to coordinated, multi-platform operations aircrews may get will be during fleet exercises. In some cases aircrews will not have had the opportunity to conduct operations, such as those described in the scenario above, until they are for real.
Current Training Requirements
The current Training and Readiness Manual for the P-3 identifies only two training flights for qualification where multi-platform coordination is required. One flight is a coordinated undersea warfare flight and the other flight is a coordinated surface warfare flight. Both of these flights can be accomplished in a weapons system trainer (simulator).13 The SH-60B Training and Readiness manual identifies only one air coordination training flight for qualification. The requirement does not specify the type of mission; it just requires the crew to operate with a platform other than another SH-60B. The Training and Readiness Manual also requires one officer per aircraft detachment to attend a one-week of classroom training course on coordinated surface warfare.14 The SH-60F Training and Readiness Manual identifies only one air coordination training flight and, similar to the SH-60B community, it does not specify how many aircraft or what type of aircraft are required to accomplish the qualification.15 The S-3B Training and Readiness manual identifies one coordinated undersea warfare training flight to be conducted with helicopters and two training flights for surface warfare operations with platforms other than S-3B aircraft.16
The above outlined flights are a "one flight, one qualification" type of flight. In other words the aircrew satisfies the requirements by checking on station and coordinating with another platform or ideally a number of platforms. At the end of this one flight, the qualification requirements have been met. If the aircrew is from the Sh-60B or SH-60F community, they are now qualified, according to the Training and Readiness Manual, to conduct multi-platform operations. Keep in mind that the aircrews of P-3 aircraft can sign off their qualifications in a weapons system trainer, without ever being exposed to the actual operating environment.
One, two or even three multi-platform training flights will not ensure proficiency, this minimal requirement just ensures exposure to a very complex operation. To ensure proficiency aircrews from different platforms must train together on a continual basis, beyond the requirements outlined in Training and Readiness Manuals alone. This is the only way to build familiarity with complex multi-platform operations.
The following is a summary of an actual multi-platform exercise conducted at the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center range located in the Bahamas. The event was a scripted undersea warfare exercise, coordinated from the range control center. The aircraft participating in the event consisted of one P-3, two S-3B's, one SH-60B, one SH-2F and one SH-3. The exercise was conducted at night in clear weather conditions. Strict altitude and positional assignments were given to each aircraft for safety of flight reasons. The aircraft only communicated with the controllers in the center. Upwards of five to seven controllers were in the control center to coordinate the phenomenal amount of communications required to run this scripted event. The exercise was running smoothly until the crew from the SH-3 reported that a sonobuoy was almost dropped through their rotor blades. This could have caused serious damage and possibly the loss of an aircraft and its aircrew. Even though numerous safety restrictions and controls were in place, an aircraft still came very close to dropping sonobuoys through a helicopter's rotor blades as it flew over the top.17 This real world example should amplify why the need for continuous multi-platform training is required.
Now imagine the P-3 mission commander who is not in a sterile control room full of people running a scripted event. Imagine the mental gymnastics he must go through to coordinate this kind of operation, and then apply poor weather conditions. The only way to achieve mission effectiveness is through extensive training in a multi-platform environment comparable to the training conducted by carrier airwing aircraft today. Leading up to an intense three-week training period in Fallon, Nevada, carrier airwing aircraft conduct numerous multi-platform training missions with other airwing aircraft.18 After building a foundation of familiarity in multi-platform operations, the entire airwing flies to Fallon, Nevada, for three weeks of dedicated classroom and flight training. At the end of three weeks of training, the airwing is well trained in conducting complex, multi-platform strike operations.
Now consider that in the Jacksonville, Florida area, all of the Sea Control Aviation Community squadrons are located within 20 miles of each other, but do not train together on a continual basis.19 The only expense required to conduct multi-platform training would be in man hours required to coordinate and schedule the flights. Additionally, the Sea Control aircrews assigned to a particular battlegroup, do not receive dedicated training similar to airwing training conducted at Fallon, Nevada. Multi-platform prosecution of sea borne targets, in a littoral environment, is a complex mission which requires proper training to ensure success. The bottom line is the Sea Control Aviation Community does not "train as it fights."
Possible Courses of Action
Course of action one: Rewrite the current Sea Control Aviation Community Training and Readiness Manuals to reflect continuous multi-platform training operations. Additionally require the sea control aircrews, that are assigned to battlegroups, to conduct dedicated training similar to carrier airwing training at Fallon, Nevada. This course of action will take the most reorganization and effort, but it will ensure that aircrews "train like they fight."
Continuous multi-platform training will hone the skills of each aircrew and expose them sufficiently to operations which they will conduct in the course of their actual operational missions. This course of action does not subtract from already established training standards, it just improves the way training is being conducted today.
This course of action is also affordable. The requirement to rewrite the Training and Readiness manuals will incur no monetary expense, because these manuals are locally produced fleet instructions. The requirement to conduct training similar to carrier airwing aircraft training at Fallon, Nevada will, though, incur an expense. Funding will be required to cover travel costs and additional instrumented range time. Most of the training will be conducted in locations where a preponderance of the Sea Control Aviation Community assets are stationed, thus, minimizing travel related expenses. Additional instrumented range time will cost money, but the benefits of the training will far outweigh the additional costs incurred.
Course of action two: At the squadron level, identify additional training requirements beyond what is required by current training and readiness manuals, and train to these new self-imposed standards.
This course action may initially improve aircrew proficiency and performance but may only provide a short-term solution. Without written requirements, squadrons will most likely fall back on old practices of doing business, because this course of action demands more man-hours to coordinate such training. During periods of organizational stress, such demands will be easy to discard without mandated requirements.
Course of action one is recommended. To execute this course of action, the leaders in the community must first accept that problems exist within the current training structure. From there they must determine the training requirements that will resolve the issues identified and incorporate them into the Training and Readiness Manuals. The biggest challenge of this course of action will be in organizing dedicated training similar to that conducted by carrier airwings. A solution is to have the Sea Combat Commander coordinate this training. Assigning the aircrews to the Sea Combat Commander for two to three weeks will make this possible. During this period of time aircrews will be exposed to intense classroom and flight training focused on multi-platform, sea control operations. This type of dedicated training will reinforce the foundation provided by the Training and Readiness requirements, and also personally familiarize the aircrews with one another, thus, building unit cohesion.
Conclusion
The Navy's shift from blue water, open ocean operations to operations in the littorals poses a number of tactical and training challenges to the Sea Control Aviation Community. The littoral region of operations is dramatically different compared to blue water, open ocean operations. Confined water and air space occupied by friends, neutrals and adversaries-create many tactical and training challenges for the Sea Control Aviation Community. Elusive diesel submarines can now range ships of our fleet and dense shipping environments make it difficult to distinguish adversaries from friends and neutrals. To overcome these challenges, the development of new tactics and new training requirements is needed today. In the area of tactical development, organizations responsible for tactical development have been slow to respond, due to budget and force reductions. In the area of training the fleet has failed to respond to the new environment and threat by training to antiquated standards.
Fleet level action is required to overcome the deficiencies in both tactical development and training. Today the fleet develops very few tactics and trains to antiquated standards. Courses of action have been recommended to overcome these fleet deficiencies. In the area of tactical development the recommended course of action directs the fleet to shift some of its focus from quantitative areas, such as maintenance and operations, to the area of tactical development. In the area of training, the recommended course of action directs a complete re-write of the fleet Training and Readiness Manuals. It also directs that dedicated multi-platform training be conducted similar to training conducted by carrier airwings at Fallon, Nevada. With positive leadership these affordable courses of action will ensure that the Sea Control Aviation Community is prepared to conduct operations in the littorals today and well into the future.
ENDNOTES
1. ...From the Sea, Department of the Navy Washington, 1992, 6.
2. Commander Henry Watras, USN, Tactics Officer, Sea-based Weapons and Tactics School, phone interview by author, 15 January 1997.
3. OPNAVINST 5401.6K, NAVAL FORCES TACTICAL DEVEOPMENT AND EVALUATION PROGRAM , 17 December 1993, 6.
4. Commander Walsh, USN, Tactical Development and Evaluation Department Head, U.S. Naval Doctrine Command, phone interview by author, January 1997.
5. Robert Shaefer, Naval Tactical Support Activity, phone interview by author, 16 January 1997.
6. Watras.
7. OPNAVINST 5401.6K, 2.
8. Lieutenant Commander Anderson, Tactics Department Head, AIRTEVRON ONE, phone interview by author, January 1997.
9. Lieutenant Walt Oneschuk, USN, SH-60B Tactics Model Manager, AIRTEVRON ONE, interview by author, 10 December 1996.
10. Walsh.
11. Oneschuk.
12. Lieutenant Commander Mike Tooker, Tactics Officer, Helicopter Wings Atlantic, phone interview by author, 6 February 1997.
13. Combined COMPATWINGSLANT/COMPATWINGSPACINST 3500.26D, Patrol Aviation Qualification Manual, 12 March 1996.
14. COMHSLWINGLANT.INST 3500.1A, Training and Readiness Manual, October 1995.
15. COMHSWINGLANT.INST 3500.2C, Training and Readiness Manual, New.
16. COMSEACONWINGPAC.Inst 3500.3, VS Training and Readiness Manual, 18 Jul 94 revised 29 May 96.
17. Exercise witnessed by author in early 1991.
18. Lieutenant Colonel Doug Yurovich, USMC, Student, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, interview by author, 13 March 1997.
19. Lieutenant Commander Jim Hurst, USN, Training Officer, HSL-44, phone interview by author, 27 February 1997. Lieutenant Sean Liedman, USN, Instructor, VP-30, phone interview by author, 27 February 1997. Lieutenant Commander Mark Huber, USN, Assistant Operations Officer, HSWINGLANT, phone interview by author, 27 February 1997. Lieutenant Commander Brian Bowden, USN, Operations Officer, SEACONWINGPAC, phone interview by author, 11 March 1997.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Anderson, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Tactics Department Head, AIRTEVRON
ONE. Phone interview by author January 1997.
2. Bowden, Brian, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Operations Officer,
SEACONWINGPAC. Phone interview by author 11 March 1997.
3. Huber, Mark, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Assistant Operations Officer,
HSWINGSLANT. Phone interview by author, 27 February 1997.
4. Hurst, Jim, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Training Officer, HSL-44.
Phone interview by author, 27 February 1997.
5. Liedman, Sean, Lieutenant, USN, Instructor, VP-30. Phone Interview
by author, 27 February 1997.
6. Oneschuk, Walt, Lieutenant, USN, SH-60B Tactics Model Manager at AIRTEVRON
ONE. Interview by author, 10 December 1996.
7. Shaefer, Robert, Naval Tactical Support Activity. Phone interview by author, 16
January 1997.
8. Tooker, Mike, Lieutenant Commander, USN, Tactic Officer, Helicopter Wings
Atlantic. Phone interview by author, 6 February 1997.
9. Yurovich, Doug, Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, F/A-18 Pilot/Student, USMC
Command and Staff College. Interview by author, 13 March 1997.
10. Walsh, Commander, USN, Tactical Development and Evaluation Department
Head, U.S. Naval Doctrine Command. Phone Interview, January 1997.
11. Watras, Henry, Commander, USN, Tactical D&E Manager, SWATS. Phone
interview by author, 15 January 1997.
12. Combined COMPATWINGSLANT/COMPATWINGSPAC.INST 3500.26D, Patrol
Aviation Qualification Manual. 12 March 1996.
13. COMHSWINGSLANT.INST 3500.2C, Training and Readiness Manual. New.
14. COMHSLWINGLANT.INST 3500.1A, Training and Readiness Manual. October
1995.
15. COMSEACONWINGPAC.INST 3500.3, VS Training and Readiness Manual, 18
July 1994 revised 29 May 1996.
16. ...From the Sea, Department of the Navy Washington. 1992.
17. OPNAVINST 5401.6K. NAVAL FORCES TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT AND
EVALUATION PROGRAM. 17 December 1993.
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