Military

Planning for Peace Operations: The Relevancy of Center of Gravity

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Operations

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Planning for Peace Operations: The Relevancy of Center of Gravity

 

Author: Major Margaret E. Schalch, United States Air Force

 

Thesis: Despite the lack of a clear cut enemy in peace operations, center of gravity determination does factor into a commander's planning considerations, either intuitively or overtly, and is important, even critical, for operational success. However, the traditional Clausewitzian notions of enemy and friendly centers of gravity are too narrow in scope to provide sufficient conceptual support to commanders and military planners of these non-traditional operations.

 

Background: Current military doctrine postulates that the accurate determination of centers of gravity is essential to campaign planning and the successful execution of conventional military operations. Yet, U.S. military forces are more likely to be involved in Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The paper describes peacekeeping and peace enforcement and reviews the associated doctrine to provide the baseline for analyzing the center of gravity concept against selected case studies (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, UNITAF and UNISOM II).

 

The analysis did not derive a clear description of the use of COGs in the planning and execution of peace operations. Nor did the case studies contribute to crafting common standards or methodologies for the COG selection process. The studies did affirm though that where hostilities are possible, the selection of friendly centers of gravity and their application to the planning process are critical to mission success. Less conclusive is the utility of selecting centers of gravity of other parties central to the operational environment. In peacekeeping, the utility of the concept does not appear to extend beyond the use of friendly COGs for force protection. In contrast, the risk of escalation of hostilities in peace enforcement and certain humanitarian assistance operations require the critical contributions that COG selection offers. The paper concludes that contemporary interpretations of the COG concept are not aligned well with the unique requirements of peace operations.         

 

Recommendation:   More attention should be given within the academic and military communities to the COG concept and its practical application in a range of traditional and non-traditional scenarios. Joint and Service doctrines need to better define centers of gravity and describe their use in various types of military operations to develop a common framework before COG determination becomes a key consideration in a practical sense.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

Current military doctrine postulates that the accurate determination of centers of gravity (COG) is essential to campaign planning and the successful execution of conventional military operations. A robust body of literature exists regarding the history and intellectual foundation of the concept introduced by Clausewitz in the early nineteenth century. Yet even today, debate rages regarding its description and proper application in traditional military campaigns. No common framework exists for selecting and employing centers of gravity in the campaign planning process. Joint doctrine acknowledges the importance of identifying center of gravity as a planning consideration but does little in the way of addressing the thorny issues of common definitions and methodologies. The Services are then left to employ their own notions of centers of gravity.

For the most part, the conceptual debate has been confined to the use of centers of gravity as a planning tool for conventional military operations. There is a dearth of literature which examines the relevancy of center of gravity for planning and executing non-traditional operations, such as humanitarian assistance, or stability and support operations. Yet, U.S. military forces are more likely to be involved today on the "non-traditional battlefield" in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) rather than in all-out hostilities against a clearly defined enemy.

This paper focuses on the emerging debate of whether identifying centers of gravity is a critical or even suitable campaign planning consideration for peace operations, a category within the OOTW umbrella. It sets the stage by first examining the role of center of gravity in traditional campaign planning. The paper then describes the types of peace operations typically supported by the military and reviews the associated doctrine to provide the baseline for analyzing the center of gravity concept and for drawing conclusions as to its relevancy in planning and execution.

 

Center of Gravity

            Clausewitz introduced the concept of center of gravity in On War. Central to his conceptualization is the notion of opposing forces-friendly and enemy. The enemy possesses hostile intent and has the strategic aim of preventing the opposing force from achieving its objectives. Clausewitz argued that total annihilation of the enemy is not necessarily needed to achieve the strategic aim of war. Rather, the commander should identify and exploit the "decisive factors" and "dominant characteristics" of his enemy while understanding his own.[1] Clausewitz postulated that "Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."[2] All "energies should be directed"[3] against this point to most efficiently attain one's military objectives. According to Clausewitz, the overwhelming significance of the enemy's center of gravity makes it a crucial consideration in campaign planning and execution. He deems "the first task, then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one. The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive."[4]

A review of the contemporary application of the center of gravity concept in military doctrine suggests that its use in military planning has diverged from the traditional Clausewitzian notion. Further, military scholars continue to ponder the distinctions between the strategic and operational centers of gravity, and how Clausewitz's elaboration should be applied to both levels. One aspect of this debate centers on distinguishing the center of gravity from other key strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities that signify the characteristics of a state's power.[5] At the strategic level, there seems to be wide acceptance of the Clausewitzian notion that the center of gravity is the source of power for the state. The selection of the strategic center of gravity is critical to the process of strategic level planning. It is at this level that political, economic, and military aims are developed, and strategic objectives defined.[6] Divergent opinions begin to emerge, however, in determining whether the strategic center of gravity is fixed; whether there are one or more strategic centers of gravity for an entity; whether the strategic center of gravity is always characteristic of a source of strength rather than a vulnerability or weakness; and whether a strategic center of gravity applies to other strategic organizations such as coalitions, alliances, or other transnational, multinational, or international groups.[7] Likely candidates for a strategic center of gravity include a capital city, a charismatic leader, or the will of the people.

At the operational level, the center of gravity is focused on a theater of operations. Scholars still debate issues such as whether one or more operational centers of gravity exist for a theater, and whether center of gravity determination extends to the tactical level of warfare. Unlike the strategic level, the factors weighing on the determination of an operational center of gravity include objectives, capabilities, and the intent for employing capabilities.[8] Consequently, the potential increases for commanders and military planners to confuse operational centers of gravity with targets, decisive points, and critical assets.[9] As Clausewitz suggests, the operational center of gravity represents a concentration of enemy strength. For the military planner, this concentrated mass of combat power is most vital for the military force in executing the operational aims of its campaign.[10] As Clausewitz put it, "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity."[11]

Despite the potential divergence in the contemporary application of the center of gravity concept, Clausewitz' precepts are the foundation in current doctrine on the concept's use in campaign planning. Joint Publication 1 states that "finding and attacking enemy centers of gravity is a singularly important concept [and] means concentrating against capabilities whose destruction or overthrow will yield military success."[12] Therefore, center of gravity analysis provides an essential focus for all efforts. The Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations, states that the concept is "useful as an analytical tool to cause the joint commander and his staff to think about their own and the enemy's sources of strength as they design their campaign and determine objectives."[13] However, Army guidance does not address a method for selecting centers of gravity, and this lack of a common planning standard increases the risk of inappropriate selection. Planners could confuse the operational center of gravity with other strategic and operational aspects of military power, such as decisive points, strategic and operational strengths, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses.[14]

The traditional role of the military, as described by Clausewitz, is to fight and win wars. In today's international environment though, military objectives are less likely to focus on defeating an enemy. Rather, the military may more likely be employed to promote peace, deter war, and resolve conflict. Our National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement and corresponding National Military Strategy provide the foundation for these military roles. Does the concept of center of gravity, as espoused by Clausewitz and captured in joint and service doctrines, carry the same critical weight in non-traditional military operations? In particular, is center of gravity determination a central planning consideration in peace operations? Current doctrine is ambiguous on this score, but suggests that it might. As a first step in the doctrinal review, it is necessary to describe terms and concepts that encompass peace operations.

Definition of Terms

            National security objectives and military strategy have placed the added responsibility upon the military to engage in operations that are not driven by the traditional notions of offensive operations and defeat of the enemy. National interests may dictate that U.S. forces engage in Operations Other Than War. Peace operations fall under the OOTW umbrella along with such activities as strikes and raids, support to insurgency, antiterrorism, noncombatant evacuation, counterdrug operations, disaster relief, civil support, and nation assistance.[15]

Peace operations encompass three types of OOTW activities-support to diplomacy (which includes peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Such operations are undertaken to "create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish."[16] This paper focuses on peacekeeping and peace enforcement activities rather than support to diplomacy activities where the military plays a less central role.   

Peacekeeping involves primarily non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense) as its hallmark. Designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of existing truce agreements, peacekeeping operations are undertaken by external forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties. They are commonly referred to as Chapter VI operations-the chapter ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes") in the United Nations charter that authorizes or directs most traditional peacekeeping operations.[17]

Peace Enforcement involves the application (or threatens the use) of armed force to ensure the achievement of objectives. Peace enforcement operations are usually employed to maintain or restore peace under conditions broadly defined by international organizations, such as the United Nations. Within this setting, military forces typically perform one or more of the following activities: restore order and stability; protect parallel humanitarian assistance operations; guarantee or deny movement of indigenous groups or forces; enforce sanctions; establish protection zones; and forcibly separate belligerents. At different times the force may be engaged in combat with one or all parties to the conflict.[18] Peace enforcement operations, authorized or directed by the United Nations, fall under the broad rubric of the charter's Chapter VII operations ("Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression").[19] An important consideration of peace enforcement is that while force may be used to compel, the use of the force is restrained and settlement, not victory, is the strategic aim.[20]

Peace Operations Doctrine and Center of Gravity

The issue of identifying centers of gravity as a planning consideration in peace operations has been addressed only in a broad sense in both Joint and Army publications. Center of gravity analysis is listed in Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, as a fundamental of campaign plans and one facet of operational art to consider when planning joint operations. Appendix B of the publication outlines a generic "Estimate Process" which it contends is "central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation."[21] Enemy and friendly center(s) of gravity analysis is listed, along with other factors, as part of the situation analysis step. Implicit within this guidance is a linkage between strategic aims and the center of gravity first articulated by Clausewitz. This linkage prompts a cognitive selection process particularly useful to planners which, according to Mendel and Tooke, rests on two principles. The first principle establishes the premise that centers of gravity are "derivative" of strategic aims and apply equally to strategic, operational, and tactical planning. The second principle holds that operational and tactical objectives "should contribute to our ability to impose our will....over the center of gravity at the next higher level of war."[22]

The joint doctrine's guidance to apply the "Estimate Process" to any situation, therefore, implies that COG analysis is relevant to peace operations. Yet, Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, confounds the issue when it neglects to distinguish COG analysis as a planning consideration. The publication does, however, point out that appreciating and understanding potential threats is of particular importance in the OOTW planning process. Further, it recognizes that intelligence efforts may be focused more on political, cultural, and economic factors than a protagonist's military capability.[23]

Although joint doctrine neglects to relate COG analysis to OOTW planning considerations, Army doctrine on peace operations does address the issue, albeit superficially. In December 1994, the Army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations, a capstone document to help military planners and soldiers understand the nature of, prepare for, and execute peace operations. It draws heavily upon the Army's experiences in operations such as Restore Hope in Somalia and Provide Comfort in northern Iraq following Desert Storm.

The publication suggests that development of a campaign plan is essential for linking the mission to the desired outcome. Peace operations tend to unfold incrementally, and planners should lay out a definable path to the end state. The manual prescribes planning guidance that includes the identification of centers of gravity for friendly, belligerent, and "neutral" parties' that may affect the Army's mission or operations.[24] Army doctrine does not elaborate on the overarching purpose for incorporating COG determination into the OOTW planning process. The apparent rationale for identifying belligerent and peripheral parties' centers of gravity seems to be so planners can respond to the "what if" questions that will arise if the situation escalates unpredictably. By addressing COG considerations during the planning phase, on scene commanders can effect a quick transition to a combat footing if required.

The tendency in FM 100-23 is to take traditional Army planning considerations and apply them to peace operations. However, the manual neglects, in some cases, to adequately address the suitability of traditional campaign planning to the unique environments associated with OOTW. For instance, this doctrinal review supports the assumption that there is a role for center of gravity analysis in peace operations. Yet doctrine offers little in the way of a common process for interpreting and applying center of gravity considerations to planning. The issue is especially problematic because peace operations are not conducted to defeat an enemy. Ideally, no party is tagged as the enemy. Further, if one party violates terms of the resolution, force is not used to defeat them, but rather gain their compliance. Settlement equates to victory.

In peace operations, commanders may view the situation confronting their forces as "the enemy." For instance, in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, multinational forces worked to alleviate human suffering and in Operation RESTORE HOPE, coalition forces quelled a chaotic environment. Yet, neither the Kurds' suffering nor the chaos in Somalia were inherently adversarial; these conditions may more appropriately be referred to as obstacles. A staff officer from the Army's Peacekeeping Institute goes so far as to suggest that such obstacles have a center of gravity and that the "belligerent" center of gravity should be viewed as "that particular thing that you can change to determine success or failure for your mission."[25] This perspective clearly deviates from the Clausewitzian notion.

 In any case, obstacles could levy unanticipated demands upon friendly forces, or, in the worst case, pose a direct threat. Therefore, the commander has the responsibility to identify and protect the friendly center of gravity at the operational level whenever friendly forces are involved. Failure to do so could result in loss of life, mission failure, and adversely impact the friendly strategic center of gravity.

Case studies will analyze how commanders are using the center of gravity concept in planning for peace operations to determine what, if any, changes are required to modify doctrine.

Analysis

Traditional Peacekeeping Operations

A primary mission of traditional peacekeeping operations, exemplified by the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai since 1981, is to serve as a buffer force and monitor truces or cease-fires. In such cases, the disputing parties have agreed to the terms of settlement. They consent to the imposition of peacekeeping forces on their soil. The commander of these forces should not have to be concerned with identifying operational enemy COGs as he faces no opposing forces to defeat. The commander is not faced with the planning considerations of conventional military operations. However, the commander must always be cognizant of friendly force protection.

Crucial to force protection are the perceptions of the parties to the dispute. If one party perceives that the peacekeeping forces are not impartial and neutral in their activities, the settlement could collapse, fighting renew, and the safety and security of the peacekeeping forces jeopardized. In peacekeeping, a commander must ensure that the activities of his forces are free from bias and partiality. The classical interpretation of center of gravity applies least clearly in traditional peacekeeping operations.

Peace Enforcement Operations

 From a military perspective, peace enforcement operations approach traditional military operations. The commander of this type of operation normally has the option to quell resistance to its efforts. However, due to the volatility of the environment, and the likely fragile nature of political and international arrangements, force is tightly constrained and proportional to the limited strategic aims of the operation.

Operation PROVIDE COMFORT

Shortly after the fighting ended in the Gulf War in late February 1991, a Kurdish rebellion erupted in northern Iraq. As Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds, hundreds of thousands fled the cities and moved up into the hills of southern Turkey seeking safety. Their plight drew worldwide outrage and galvanized support as the media exposed the magnitude of death and human suffering imposed upon them. In early April, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe established Joint Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT. Initially established to provide humanitarian relief for the Kurds in the mountains, the operation expanded to include security assistance so they could safely return to their homes once the humanitarian crisis subsided.[26]

This operation illustrates the difficulty in applying the traditional notion of center of gravity in peace operations. No tangible enemy opposed the task force's relief efforts in the mountains. Further, while the Iraqis reluctantly complied and removed their forces from an imposed security zone, they did not physically resist U.S. forces. Consequently, the strategic and operational aims of the humanitarian operation did not address the engagement and defeat of Iraqi fielded forces. The commander was concerned, though, about ensuring force protection and emphasizing to both the Kurds and the Iraqis the capability of U.S. forces to provide security.

Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, USMC, (then brigadier general) chief of staff of PROVIDE COMFORT offered his perspective on the center of gravity question in this operation. General Zinni recalls that as he and the JTF commander, then Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, USA, analyzed their immediate mission to "stop the suffering and dying," they determined that the center of gravity confronting the task force was the lack of an effective relief distribution system.[27] Initial airdrops had proved inefficient and costly. So all efforts were geared to improving the distribution system.

This selection demonstrates the confusion that arises when applying the center of gravity concept to non-combat operations. The distribution system (or lack thereof) may more appropriately be considered a critical requirement or mission essential task. The traditional notion of an enemy center of gravity at the strategic and operational levels also does not "fit" in this case. Forces on the ground were not attacking a resisting force. Instead, they were faced with a condition-human suffering from exposure and hunger, that demanded relief.

 Once the task force established an effective distribution system, the Kurdish plight in the mountains stabilized and efforts shifted to getting these people to return home. However, the Kurds were reluctant to return until they felt it was safe to do so. General Zinni said that initially, at the operational level, the task force viewed the enemy center of gravity as the Iraqi forces in the border region.[28] They would have to move out before the Kurds would relocate to refugee transit camps. Discussions between the task force's Military Coordination Committee and Iraqi military leaders greatly facilitated the withdraw of Iraqi troops from the area and effectively "neutralized" this threat. The general did not specify that the task force identified an "enemy" strategic center of gravity for this operation.

While the Kurds eventually moved into the transit camps, the linchpin to permanent resettlement lay in securing Dahuk. The majority of refugees in Turkey came from Dahuk, the provincial capital located 40 kilometers south of the allies security zone. The 24th MEU(SOC) commander, Colonel James Jones, USMC, whose marines were part of the task force, wrote, "Moving towards this city became the key to resolving the refugee problem."[29] Also, General Zinni relates that after reevaluating the situation, the task force identified Dahuk as the enemy operational center of gravity.[30] The Iraqis were opposed to vacating forces from the city, but the JTF didn't have to force them out. A deal was struck that would allow humanitarian and logistics personnel to enter the city along with non-combat U.N. forces. Combat forces were to advance no further beyond their positions on the outskirts to the east and west of Dahuk. Col Jones writes that in turn:

 

Iraq agreed to withdraw all armed forces and secret police from Dahuk and take up new positions 15 kilometers south of the city. On 20 May, a small convoy of coalition vehicles entered Dahuk and established a forward command post.The security zone now extended 160 kilometers east to west and 60 kilometers north to south below the Turkish-Iraqi border.[31]

          

            The "capture" of Dahuk and extension of the security zone unleashed the Kurd's reluctance to leave the border transit camps. Remaining forces continued to stabilize the region and served to reassure the Kurds that the coalition's impending departure would not signify a change in resolve to support them. A demarche was drawn up and presented to the Iraqi government which outlined the type of activities expected of their armed forces as well as coalition intentions to monitor the security situation.[32]

            A review of this operation illustrates the difficulty of applying the traditional notion of center of gravity to a strictly humanitarian operation. In the first phase of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the task force did not face an opposing force, but rather a grave situation. Thorough mission analysis was crucial to coming up with a fix to the crisis.[33] However, the "fix" whether it be a distribution system, food, or potable water, should not be considered the same as the center of gravity. To view center of gravity in peace operations simply as that "particular thing that you can change or influence that will determine whether your mission succeeds or fails"[34] clearly diverges from the original conceptualization.

            In the second phase of the operation, the task force faced a tangible potential enemy-Iraqi forces in northern Iraq. General Zinni appropriately identified fielded Iraqi forces as the enemy operational center of gravity for this phase.[35] However, a combination of diplomatic measures and show of force (combat air patrols and coalition security presence on the ground) effectively "neutralized" them in accordance with the strategic aims of the operation which did not call for engagement and defeat of the Iraqis, but only their withdrawal from the northernmost border region. The Kurds, though, did not feel completely safe to return to their homes until the city of Dahuk, much further south, was secured. While General Zinni contends that the enemy operational center of gravity shifted to Dahuk upon discerning it's vital importance to the Kurds,[36] one can argue that the city alone wasn't the Iraqi operational center of gravity, but rather the forces occupying it.

The significance of Dahuk to the Kurds, though, brings to light another consideration. In the second phase of the operation, the task force had a tough time convincing the Kurds to return home. Understandably, they feared for their safety from the Iraqi threat, and the task force accordingly established transit camps in secure areas. One may conceivably argue that the task force initially failed to comprehend the Kurds' centers of gravity. While they didn't oppose the task force in the traditional sense, the Kurdish people did initially resist coalition efforts to encourage them to relocate home. General Zinni admits that the force went into northern Iraq without understanding the Kurdish people-their history, values, and structures.[37] It wasn't until the task force identified the Kurdish elders (arguably the Kurd's strategic center of gravity) and convinced them of the coalition's legitimacy and the safety of secure areas, that they, in turn, influenced the refugees to return home. Securing Dahuk, though, proved to be the linchpin for the mass move of the refugees. This suggests that the provincial capital was a Kurd center of gravity prior to the uprising.

This case illustrates that in peace operations, the military must consider center of gravity aspects of all affected parties despite the traditional Clausewitzian notion of having only friendly and enemy COGs. Current joint and service doctrine on peace operations insufficiently addresses the notion of centers of gravity for protagonists that are not considered enemies in the traditional sense. Doctrine writers should reexamine the role of center of gravity in the planning and execution of peace operations if for no other reason than its important contribution for helping to ensure that strategic aims are in sync with military objectives.

Throughout Provide Comfort, General Zinni said that the task force viewed its own operational center of gravity as extended lines of communications (LOCs).[38] The closest ports and airfields were from five hundred to one thousand miles away, and the road network into northern Iraq from Turkey was limited and vulnerable to disruption and attack. Consequently, strict measures were taken to protect and keep the LOCs open. Many argue that LOCs are not a COG, but rather a vulnerability to be exploited. Rather, they contend the forces being sustained are more appropriately considered the operational center of gravity, for they are the might that counters the enemy.[39] Regardless of one's leanings, the general's perspective illustrates that confusion prevails regarding use of the concept.

Somalia Operations

In 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between tribal warlords and factions following the demise of its dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre. The country fell into total anarchy and fighting ravaged the countryside, resulting in a man-made famine that threatened approximately four million of the 5.1 million Somali population.[40] U.N. efforts brought the belligerent parties together in February 1992, resulting in a cease-fire agreement. The representative of one faction (led by Ali Mahdi) asserted that the cease-fire would not hold without international monitoring.[41] The U.N., therefore, established United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)-a small force comprised initially of 50 military observers to monitor the cease-fire and a 500-strong infantry (Pakistani) to escort relief convoys. Authorized troop strength was soon increased to 3,500 as the security situation worsened. However, UNISOM actual troop strength topped at only 893 before the United States stepped in and offered to lead a new effort. The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 794 (1992) which welcomed the U.S. bid "to help create a secure environment for the delivery of aid.and authoriz[ed], under Chapter VII., the use of 'all necessary means' to do so."[42]

On 4 December 1992, President Bush ordered U.S. troops to Somalia in what is now considered a "landmark in nontraditional military operations"[43]-Operation Restore Hope. Over the next five months, more than 38,000 (to include 28,000 US) soldiers from 23 nations under the US-led United Task Force, referred to as UNITAF, executed a massive humanitarian and peacemaking effort. The operation was proclaimed a success. UNITAF stabilized the security situation, allowing the civilian-led relief effort to proceed, and turned over its functions in May to the permanent peacekeeping force, the U.N. Organization in Somalia (UNISOM II).

            During RESTORE HOPE, UNITAF was confronted by an unstable and chaotic environment in Somalia. However, as the faction leaders had agreed to the multinational forces' presence, no particular enemy existed at the operational level. According to Lieutenant General Zinni, director of UNITAF operations, ninety percent of their firefights were with bandits not affiliated with any clan.[44] Despite lacking a unified opposing force, UNITAF adopted the center of gravity concept to analyze the challenges confronting it. General Zinni states that the task force considered the people of Somalia as the strategic center of gravity. For the mission to succeed, he said, "UNITAF had to win their confidence" and "foster a climate of assistance rather than confrontation."[45] PSYOPS played a vital role in this effort.

General Zinni identified the faction leaders as the operational COG confronting the task force. Every effort was made to inform them of UNITAF's intentions and activities in order to limit interference by their militias. Political preparation of the battlefield was crucial. General Zinni relates that he routinely met with Aideed to keep him "in the fold."[46] General Joseph Hoar, Commander, United States Central Command, wrote about how Ambassador Oakley preceded the military into relief areas to describe the forthcoming humanitarian activities, reassure clan leaders of the military's neutrality, and to warn them of the consequences of interfering with the mission. He said, "This courageous personal political campaign was key to turning the tide in the psychological contest for the respect and confidence of the Somalis and it began the process of breaking the strangle hold of the warlords and bandits."[47]

Echoing similar sentiments, Major General Arnold, the U.S. Army Force commander for RESTORE HOPE, said that he viewed the center of gravity of the Somalia operation as "the independent power of the warlords."[48] The warlords weren't UNITAF's enemy per se, but an obstacle that hindered the country's stability. Although not specified as part of UNITAF's humanitarian-oriented mission, General Arnold contended that erosion of the warlords power, "whether accomplished voluntarily.or done involuntarily as military situations arise.must take place if Somalia is ever to return to some form of normalcy and attempt to rule itself."[49]

In terms of "friendly" COG, General Zinni identified the coalition forces' will to work together and carry out its tasks as the strategic center of gravity. At the operational level, he pointed to South Mogadishu as the critical hub of all power.[50] UNITAF's success depended upon its ability to keep open the port and airfield as adequate facilities were not readily available elsewhere in Somalia to bring in relief supplies. Further, General Hoar states, "the city had to be relatively secure prior to expanding to the interior where the humanitarian need was most acute."[51] As this was also Aideed's territory, UNITAF exerted a great deal of effort patrolling and securing Mogadishu.

A case could be made that the city of Mogadishu was not in fact the operational friendly center of gravity, but rather acted as a "combat" multiplier for UNITAF, enabling it to more effectively accomplish its mission. UNITAF could have conceivably set up its operations elsewhere, but this would have been logistically more challenging, more time-consuming, and more costly. The strength of the unified forces, more specifically the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) which formed the core of the joint task force, may more accurately be considered the friendly operational center of gravity. Without this robust core the operation risked failure.

Once the situation stabilized in Somalia, UNITAF turned over its peace enforcement responsibilities (on 4 May 1993) to a U.N.-led force-UNISOM II.[52]

This was the first U.N.-directed peacekeeping operation conducted under the provisions of Chapter VII of its charter. Significantly, the mandate expanded from providing security for humanitarian efforts to disarming the Somali clans and rehabilitating the state's political and economic institutions.[53]

This ambitious mandate threatened the Mogadishu power base of one clan warlord-Aideed, whose militia started lashing out at the UNISOM II forces. On 5 June 1993, Aideed supporters killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in an ambush. The next day, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution (837) which called for the apprehension of those responsible. A hunt for Aideed ensued and skirmishes with his militia increased. On 3 October 1993 a major engagement took place and 18 American soldiers were killed. Shortly thereafter, President Clinton announced the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia over the next five months.[54] By November 1994, the lack of progress in the peace process and insufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues compelled the U.N. to withdraw remaining forces and dissolve the operation in March 1995.[55]

With the passage of UNSCR 837, UNISOM II's mission changed sharply, shifting to offensive oriented operations in Mogadishu. The resolution had effectively created an enemy in Aideed whose militia successfully resisted UNISOM II's attempts to control the city and capture their leader. One military analyst of the operation, Lt Col Thomas Daze, U.S. Army, argues that UNISOM II failed to correctly identify its own strategic center of gravity which left both its strategic and operational centers of gravity vulnerable to attack and exploitation by hostile militia forces. He reports that the Force Commander viewed Mogadishu as UNISOM II's center of gravity and stated that "we must control it to be successful."[56] Although the commander did not specify whether he was referring to the city as both the strategic and operational friendly center of gravity, Daze infers this was the case. He writes that at the strategic level, UNOSOM II's success "appeared to be defined, by the international community, as success in Mogadishu."[57] Media coverage focused on the fighting there, rather than the successes that were being achieved elsewhere in the country. Daze's analysis determines that, "strategically, the cohesion of the U.N. coalition of forces was UNISOM II's center of gravity."[58]

At the operational level, Daze relates that Mogadishu's importance for the operation centered on its air and sea ports. Aideed's power base, Mogadishu, was also important to the warlord. Daze makes the case that Aideed and his militia conducted a series of related military operations designed to rid U.N. forces from Mogadishu.[59] He contends that these attacks were launched at the enemy's critical vulnerabilities and decisive points which effectively weakened UNISOM's strategic center of gravity. He argues that, "[the] inability of UNOSOM II forces to provide security in Mogadishu and secure its lines of communications.[had] a cascading, deteriorating effect on the morale, cohesion and will to fight that prevented UNOSOM II from achieving its aims."[60] When the operation turned into a hunt for Aideed, and U.N. forces increasingly came under attack, contingents from several countries (for example, Belgium, Pakistan, Italy, among others) refused to conduct aggressive patrols and failed to control checkpoints into Mogadishu. Aideed gradually gained control of the city's lines of communications, impeding UNISOM II's operations and civilian relief efforts as well.

Daze's findings highlight the significance of accurately determining the friendly center of gravity in peace operations. Failure to identify and protect friendly COG may endanger the successful deployment and employment of forces. While one may not necessarily pursue a belligerent's COG following an attack in a peace enforcement scenario, the commander must continually protect friendly centers of gravity to enhance force protection. In UNISOM II, this meant gaining the consensus of coalition members to employ their contingents in accordance with the enforcement mandate of Chapter VII. Moreover, many contingents simply refused to act when threatened by Aideed's hostile militia and the coalition lost its cohesion and effectiveness.

Conclusion

            This paper analyzed the military issue of whether the center of gravity concept is a critical consideration in the planning and execution of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The findings of this analysis conclude that the selection of centers of gravity does factor into a commander's planning considerations, either intuitively or overtly, and are important, even critical, for operational success. However, the traditional Clausewitzian notions of enemy and friendly COGs are too narrow in scope to provide sufficient conceptual support to commanders and military planners of these non-traditional operations. Likewise, joint and service doctrines offer little in the way of common standards or methodologies for COG selection in the planning process. This exacerbates the confusion that already exists among commanders and planners regarding the concept. Indeed, a COG to one commander may indicate a critical vulnerability or critical requirement to another. As scholarly debate continues over the description of centers of gravity and associated factors, the forum should be expanded to include the discussion of the COG concept in relation to military operations other than war.

            The case studies were inconclusive for deriving a clear description of the use of COGs in the planning and execution of peace operations. They also were deficient in helping to craft common standards or methodologies for the COG selection process. Nevertheless, the studies did affirm that in peace operations where hostilities are possible, the selection of friendly centers of gravity and their application to the planning process are critical to the success of the mission. Less conclusive, however, is the utility of selecting centers of gravity of other parties central to the operational environment. In peacekeeping operations, the primary role of military forces is to monitor the adherence of a cease-fire agreement between the belligerents. The peacekeeping troops do not have an international mandate for engaging in hostilities to compel compliance among the belligerents. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that the concept of an "enemy" COG does not apply to peacekeeping. Moreover, given the limited role of peacekeeping forces, the utility of the COG concept does not appear to extend beyond the use of friendly COGs for force protection.

In contrast, peace enforcement and humanitarian assistance operations may be authorized under a wide variety of situations. These situations could involve a sworn enemy, a potential enemy, or civilian parties which are central to the success of the operation which refuse to cooperate, to name a few. As a further complication, in peace enforcement operations the use of force is typically authorized, but in a limited sense, effectively constraining the range of options available to the military commander. As the case studies pointed out, the utility and importance of COG selection becomes obvious in the traditional, Clausewitzian sense when confronting an organized adversary. Less clear, however, is the need to select COGs for non-adversarial parties which are the focus of the operation at hand, such as the Kurds in Iraq. It is debatable whether COG selection for such parties is appropriate as a planning tool; and. if so, it is especially problematic to select the COG correctly and not confuse it with a key vulnerability, critical asset, or the like. Nevertheless, the risk of escalation to hostilities in peace enforcement operations and certain humanitarian assistance operations require the critical contributions that COG selection offers to the planning and execution processes. This does not mitigate the fact though that the contemporary interpretations of the COG concept are not aligned well with the unique requirements of peace operations.

What needs to be done? More attention should be given within the academic and military communities to the COG concept and its practical application in a range of traditional and non-traditional scenarios. Joint and Service doctrines need to better define centers of gravity and describe their use in the various types of military operations. Conceptually, COG determination is a core analytical tool for planners. But, a set of common, joint standards that establish a planning process for identifying and applying centers of gravity must be developed before COG determination becomes a key consideration in a practical sense. Without a common framework, the difficulties of aligning aims, objectives, and mission that are encountered during the planning process will be exacerbated during the execution phase of operations due to the dynamic and, at times, volatile environmental conditions facing deployed forces.

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