The Role of Close Air Support In Peace Operations

CSC 1997

Subject Area - Aviation

Author: Major Steve Rudder

 

                                      Executive Summary

 

 

 

            The US strategy of engagement and enlargement seeks to enhance national security, promote prosperity at home, and promote democracy. Without the bi-polar relationship historically shared with the Former Soviet Union, the US has assumed the role as the world's only super power. However, this hierarchical status has demanded increased military intervention to promote regional stability throughout the world. US forces, designed for "fighting and winning" on a conventional battlefield, have supported peace operations in regions characterized by fragmenting states and urban chaos. Although support for these operations stretch operational readiness and military budgets, contemporary peace operations are increasing in both emphasis and priority.

            The US relies heavily on airpower to project global dominance. However, contemporary peace operations suggest that the traditional means of dominance by threats of strategic attack and interdiction, as accomplished in Desert Storm, are not always applicable. Instead, there is a increasing primacy for the role of close air support. However, doctrine, equipment, and training for close air support is ill-suited for the task of operating in the operational environment associated with contemporary peace operations. The concept of proportionality for the use of force by airpower is essential to integrating the role of close air support into peace operations; however, proportional use of force is often unattainable by current aircraft and weapons.   Hence, although a necessary mission to support forces on the ground, close air support has proven less effective than its traditional intent. To integrate close air support with contemporary peace operations, doctrine, equipment, and training require evolutionary changes to achieve proportionality in the operational environment of peace operations.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

Executive Summary                                                                                                      i

INTRODUCTION                                                                                                      1

CHAPTER I:    The Operational Environment                                                  6

            The Physical Environment: Cities and Enemies, 6

            The Political Environment: Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, 9

CHAPTER II:   Rule of Engagement                                                                            13

CHAPTER III: Case Studies                                                                                       18

            Beirut, 18

            Somalia, 20

            Bosnia, 24

CHAPTER IV: A Triad of Change                                                                               29

            Doctrine, 30

            Equipment, 35

            Training, 41

CONCLUSION                                                                                                          48

NOTES                                                                                                                       54

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                                        59

 

 

The Role of Close Air Support in Peace Operations

 

Introduction

            The 1996 National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement commits the United States to three primary objectives: Enhancing US Security, Promoting Prosperity at Home, and Promoting Democracy.[1] Supporting the NSS, the National Military Strategy (NMS) identifies peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning the nation's wars as components of military strategy.[2] Today's military, while focused on fighting and winning the nation's wars, has recently spent the preponderance of its assets and resources on Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW encompasses military operations designed to achieve the U.S. goals to "deter war and resolve conflicts" or "promote peace".[3] These goals are further categorized into several military tasks that range from large-scale combat operations to non-combat evacuation operations (NEOs). The Joint Chiefs of Staff have captured the broad spectrum of military responsibilities in the Range of Military Operations Chart (Table 1).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1[4]

            Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Military finds itself as the world's only military super power. Designed for a war of decisive battle against the former Soviet Union, today's conventional forces focus on operations to promote global stability. In particular, the post-cold war engagement and enlargement strategy has specifically focused on peace operations. While promoting the desire for multilateral participation, the NSS advocates the necessity to accomplish both peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions with the following statement:

 

                        When our interests call for it, the U.S. must also be prepared to participate                   

            in multilateral efforts to resolve regional conflicts and bolster new democratic                 

            governments. Thus, our forces must be ready to participate in peacekeeping,               

            peace enforcement and other operations in support of these objectives.[5]

            Designed to stabilize regional strife, peace operations are becoming more frequent.   During the Cold War years (1953-1987), the U.S. participated in only 13 U.N. peacekeeping operations; however, between 1987 and 1992, thirteen peacekeeping operations involved U.S. presence.[6] Since 1992, the number of operations has doubled with the U.S. participating in 27 peace operations including the 1996 deployments to Haiti, Kuwait, Macedonia, Turkey, and the Western Sahara.[7] The number of peace operations involving U.S. forces clearly demonstrates that these operations are increasing in both emphasis and priority. Although support for these operations stretch operational readiness and military budgets, the fact remains that they are currently a necessary pillar of the strategy of engagement and enlargement.[8] General Colin Powell summarized the nation's predicament by stating, "We are not the world's policeman, but guess where the people look when they need a cop."[9]

            The current level of global violence suggests an increasing trend for U.S. intervention. Wide spread ethnic nationalism and the conflict systematic in Bosnia, as well as tribal and clan related violence on the African continent threaten regional stability. Consequently, the U.S. is facing an international dilemma characterized by fragmenting states and regional strife characteristic of the conflicts in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Chechnya. These chaotic environments typify the challenges encountered by today's conventional military forces. Therefore, contemporary peace operations are often the most complex missions faced by military planners.

            A critical arm of conventional forces, offensive airpower is a precise and lethal element of the U.S. arsenal. Contemporary air power theorists, such as Col John Warden, advocate that airpower can achieve "strategic paralysis" by focusing strikes on a country's infrastructure and interdicting his lines of communication (LOCs). However, the employment in peace operations suggest a limited role for destructive weapons designed for hard-target penetration and area-denial. Recent contingencies, such as Somalia and Haiti, have not required traditional strike and interdiction missions due to the lack of definable infrastructures or lines of communications (LOCs). Consequently, the role of offensive airpower has focused on upholding the peace process by directly supporting peacekeepers with close air support.                      

            Close air support has proven a necessity in all operations where military ground forces have faced threats such as General Mohammed Farrah Aideed's forces in Somalia or General Ratko Mladic's Bosnian Serb Army. However, many commanders have failed to exploit the capabilities of close air support because of the political and physical nature of the operational environment. Thus, the paradox between the need to employ close air support and the limits imposed by the operational environment creates tactical uncertainty for conventional forces trained and structured for "fighting and winning" the nations wars.

             This paper will examine the operational environment and the concept of proportionality of contemporary peace operations to recommend how best to integrate close air support. Close air support in recent peace operations has been ineffective; however, given changes to doctrine, equipment, and training, it can provide commanders with an effective means of fire support during peace operations. The first chapter examines the operational environment challenging the mission of close air support. The second chapter focuses exclusively on the crucial aspect of rules of engagement (ROE) and its affect on the employment of close air support. Chapter Three analyzes recently conducted peace operations while the final chapter addresses the thesis by recommending doctrinal, equipment, and training changes for the successful execution of close air support in future peace operations.                       

Chapter I: The Operational Environment

            The operational environment of peace operations encompasses both physical and political conditions that inherently limit the destructive capabilities of close air support and suggest a need to examine the concept of proportionality. Defined by the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, proportionality implies that commanders should limit force in intensity, duration, and magnitude to that reasonably required to ensure the continued safety of U.S. forces and mission accomplishment.[10] However, Hays Parker, Chief of the International Law Team, suggests that the concept of proportionality remains dangerously undefined.[11] Recent peace operations suggest that ground forces require a greater firepower to enforce peace and protect themselves. Between 1987 and 1992, attacks on forces involved in peace operations claimed the lives of more than 800 peacekeepers.[12] With greater frequency, the character of these operations has called upon offensive airpower; however, protection of ground forces by close air support has proven largely ineffective due to lack of adequate doctrine, appropriate equipment, and proper training commensurate with today's environment.

The Physical Condition: Enemies and Cities

            The world peace sought by the U.S. after the fall of the Soviet Union has yet to materialize. Ethnic nationalism, religious extremism, and cultural differences claim responsibility for a preponderance of the current global instability.   Current instability in Bosnia and Chechnya exemplify a global security dilemma as turmoil threatens to spread beyond the borders of these states. Similarly, Sub-Saharan Africa remains in a state of constant cultural violence. The African continent, plagued with disease and starvation problems, currently has a 3.2% annual population growth rate (the world's highest) along with the world's lowest economic growth rate.[13] In light of these problems, further U.S. humanitarian missions appear to be inevitable. There are two physical conditions that define today's operational environment. First, is the growing emphasis on ideological and ethnically initiated unconventional warfare; second is the preponderance of violence aimed at the world's cities.   

          As in Rwanda and Somalia, the predominant threat consists of irregular or unconventional forces. Although these groups may be a threat to regional stability, many of them are not recognized by the international community and lack established diplomatic channels for peaceful negotiations. Like the Somali warlords or the Bosnian-Serb leaders, many struggling factions focus exclusively on their own plight while disregarding international norms. Thus, they typically depart from international standards of conduct and digress into violent acts of brutality to obtain military or political objectives. In his 1991 book, Transformation of War, Martin Van Creveld provides a description of future warfare by stating:

 

                        In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we            

           today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers. ...Their organization is more                      

            likely to be constructed on charismatic lines rather than institutional ones and to             

            be motivated less by 'professionalism' than by fanatical ideologically based                    

            loyalties.[14]

 

Moreover, these types of forces have chosen the world's cities as their battlefield.

            In 1970, 12 percent of the world's population lived in cities of 500,000 or more. Estimates are that nearly 45 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas by the year 2000.[15] Cities are becoming increasingly important to the control of a nation's populace. Therefore, the current type of combatant seems to prefer the cities rather than the countryside for destabilizing activities. Due to the difficulties of controlling and enforcing civil law in large cities, areas of extreme urban poverty provide combatants with a sense of security from law enforcement and military control. In fact, many insurgents, such as Peru's Shining Path, are moving away from their traditional bases in the countryside and finding greater unrest in the city.[16] While the historical and modern doctrinal guidance is to avoid urban warfare if possible, the challenge of contemporary peace operations suggest the opposite.[17] Ergo, the employment of today's close air support demands operations in urban environments against conventional and unconventional threats.     

            Combatant identification hinders the application of close air support in urban environments against forces described by Van Crevald. Aside from the difficulties of urban navigation and orientation, traditional problems, such as night operations, bad weather, and target marking, significantly degrade combatant identification.[18] In the jungles of Vietnam, U.S. forces often found target identification an insurmountable problem. In the 1966 operation, Operation Harvest Moon, USAF Forward Air Controllers (Airborne) (FAC(A)) and Marine ground FACs from Task Force Delta identified the lack of effective close air support to difficulties in target marking, identification of friendlies, and adverse weather.[19] By using urban centers like jungles, combatants operate in areas sometimes inaccessible to ground forces and at times undetectable by aviation assets.[20] Combined with "stealth" obtained by guerrilla style tactics, many warring factions employ high technology weapons, such as surface to air missiles (SAMs), light artillery, and heavy machines guns, making them an elusive and lethal adversary.

             The physical conditions of unconventional ethnic and clan wars in cities require military forces to deliver lethal or non-lethal weapons amidst populated areas. Close air support provides the capability to destroy or deter in peace operations; however, the challenge is adherence to the use of proportional force.[21] Pilots interviewed in the Balkans said that Bosnia was a true "trial by television" and they couldn't afford to make mistakes when dropping ordnance in populated areas.[22] Similarly, on 9 September 1993 while providing close air support for the Pakistani peacekeepers, U.S. attack helicopters fired on Somali militia who were using women and children as human shields. Even though the mission resulted in killing the attacking Somali warlords, several women and children also perished prompting an international out cry against the U.S. use of force.[23]

 

The Political Conditions: Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

             The political conditions associated with recent peace operations have led to an unclear delineation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is the product of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 contained in Title 22, U.S. Code.[24] Joint Publication 3-07 defines peacekeeping as "military operations undertaken with the consent of all parties to dispute; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement".[25] It defines peace enforcement as "the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order."[26]    Contemporary peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations inherently involve military forces, but each operation implies differing applications of force. Peace enforcement operations fall under the range of military operations that require the use of force to compel compliance; however, peacekeeping advocates use of force only when all alternatives, such as mediation and negotiation fail.[27] Although US doctrine implies that there is a clear delineation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, the governing document, the United Nations (UN) Charter, does not.

             Originally developed at the end of World War II to promote global stability, the UN Charter uses Chapter VI and Chapter VII to satisfy functional imperatives for peace-time security. Titiled, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", Chapter VI specifically addresses peacekeeping. Although it does not actually use the word "peacekeeping" and there is no mention of military operations, Chapter VI serves as a guide for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful methods, such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, and conciliation, and other peaceful means, represented in Article 33.[28] Conversely, Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," specifically addresses peace enforcement. The articles provide a systematic sequence to the application of military force. As per Article 39, the Security Council may identify a threat to international peace and authorize forceful intervention. Such intervention might include: blockades, enforcement of sanctions, forceful disarmament, and direct military action as per Article 41.[29]

            The UN has attempted to clarify its charter by defining peacekeeping as "traditionally involving military personnel as monitors/observers under restricted rules of engagement once a cease-fire has been negotiated". It defines peace enforcement as " the use of military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression by a member state."[30] Whether using the U.S. joint definition, the UN Charter, or the UN definition, peacekeeping and peace enforcement represent two different operational missions with crucial differences in the application of military force. However, recent operations have blurred the delineation between the two missions resulting in the unclear application of proportional force.

            Current physical conditions have caused uncertain political reactions to recent peace operations resulting in an unclear delineation between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations, sometimes referred to as Chapter VI 1/2 operations.[31] Peacekeepers on the ground have found themselves in operations titled "peacekeeping" while surrounded by conditions characterized by unconventional warring clans or factions that lack any desire for a peaceful settlement. However, the political end state demands peaceful resolutions vice decisive military victory. Therefore, in an attempt to satisfy political conditions,

offensive air power has been employed proportionally. For instance, NATO tactical fighters in Bosnia struck Udbina airfield on 21 November 1994. The precision strike sought to deter Serb aircraft from further attacks rather than defeat their entire air force[32] Aside from the physical conditions of peace operations, offensive airpower must operate in an unclear political system vacillating between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. The political title is peacekeeping, but its physical characteristics resemble a "state of war."

            Hence, the operational environment of peace operations is physically dangerous and politically unclear. Cities plagued with warring factions combined with an unclear distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement make the proportional application of close air support extremely difficult. In LtCol Bash's article, Airpower and Peacekeeping, he says there is fear among peacekeepers that the destructive nature of U.S. airpower forms negative perceptions amongst belligerents.[33] Therefore, the dilemma of employing offensive air power in peace operations is deciding on the proportional application of current aircraft and weapons systems designed for the conventional battlefield. In an attempt to control the destructive nature of offensive airpower, political and military leaders rely on the rules of engagement.

Chapter II: Rules of Engagement

            The purpose of ROE is to influence the use of force to insure civilian control over the military amid politically sensitive environments.[34] Joint Pub 1-02 defines ROE as "directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered."[35] Media coverage, UN and U.S. allies, and the local populace are all factors that affect ROE.[36] Inherent to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, strict rules of engagement invariably limit the application of military force. The purpose of this chapter is to examine ROE and their implications on the integration of close air support.

             Violence against a civilian populace is rarely acceptable in Western culture, therefore, ROE often focuses on protecting non-combatants. However, in MOOTW there are sometimes difficulties in differentiating the enemy and non-combatants. The operational environment of counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam combined with the "body count" mentality led to an unclear delineation between civilians and combatants.[37] For instance, attack helicopters interpreted running civilians as the enemy providing the justification to engage them. On 13 February 1991 US bombs hit a bunker in Baghdad thought to be a command and control facility killing 400 civilians and causing an international uproar. Consequently, the US reduced the number of strikes against Baghdad after 16 February.[38]    The killing of civilians raises national and international concern, consequently, strict ROE defines the proportional use of force to protect non-combatants.

            Article 51 of the UN Charter captures the foundation of ROE by stating, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations."[39] From this concept of self-defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) in October 1994. The major influencing factors to the SROE are the right of self-defense, hostile intent, and hostile action. Self-defense is the act of defending a particular unit of US forces, or an element of it, against a hostile act or a manifestation of hostile intent. The need to exercise unit self-defense may arise in situations ranging from apparently unrelated, localized violence, to terrorist acts, low-level conflicts and prolonged engagements. Hostile action is direct attacks or other use of force by a foreign force or terrorist unit. Hostile intent is more difficult to identify. It is most often defined as an imminent use of force. For instance, a cockpit indication of a target track radar (TTR) from a SAM site may define hostile intent. Therefore, hostile intent normally requires specific guidance on threat action. Confirming hostile action or intent is the first step of ROE, the second step, and the most crucial, is deciding on a proportional response by weapon or action and differs depending on the operational environment.

            Influencing the definition of self-defense, hostile intent, and hostile action, the operational environment requires continuous monitoring to execute a proportional response. Beirut presented military commanders with the dilemma of a growing hostile environment with essentially the same ROE throughout the "presence" mission. The initial ROE developed for the Marines in Beirut was the following: Marines will use only the degree of military force necessary to accomplish the mission or reduce the threat, avoid injury to noncombatants or damage to civilian property, or act in self-defense only.[40]

            As the situation in Beirut deteriorated from the peacekeeping "presence" mission to an armed conflict with various local factions, the established ROE continued to prevent Marines from engaging factions unless in self-defense. Only after several Marines were killed did the Marines use high explosive artillery and naval gunfire to thwart aggressive acts; however, offensive air power continued to represent an impartial and disproportional application of force. Colonel Tim Geraghty, 24th MAU Commanding Officer, said that even though attacks by Druze militia intensified, airpower represented "too much force."[41]   

            The SROE in Somalia authorized soldiers to use force against a hostile act or hostile intent: "You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.... Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act."[42] United Task Force (UNITAF) defined hostile intent by four basic "no's:" no "technicals," such as trucks carrying mounted machine guns, no banditry, no roadblocks, no visible weapons.[43] This supplemental ROE requested from Combined Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) intended to declare "technicals" and individuals with crew served weapons hostile. Commanders attempted to clarify the ROE down to the weapon to include attack helicopter and fixed wing munitions. The Army and Marine AH-1s could not employ 20mm rounds or 2.75 inch rockets while fixed wing aircraft, such as the AV-8B, flew sorties over the city with 500 pound laser guided bombs (LGBs) and 5 inch rockets but the ROE did not allow employment of these weapons.[44] AV-8B ordnance and unguided weapons on attack helicopters represented disproportional force. But the question remains, in what situation would they have been proportional?

                   Originally mandated to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the Serb-Croat front-line, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operated under very strict NATO ROE.   U.S. airpower fell under restrictive ROE governed by NATO and the UN. This strict ROE dictated by Boutros Boutros Ghali resulted in the "dual-key" arrangement where only he could authorize close air support missions, hence, controlling proportionality.[45]    Frustrated with inability to effectively employ close air support, Admiral "Snuffy" Smith desired more force. He stated, "one or two bombs against one target was not enough to deter Bosnian-Serb armor".[46] However, to UN leaders one or two bombs equated to a proportional response. 

            In summary, the physical and political conditions of peace operations dictate that strict rules of engagement apply in an attempt to ensure proportionality. Political climate, public support, and changing situations on the ground add to the importance of simple, well understood ROE that are applicable to ground forces as well as to aviation fire support. However, changing political conditions and the adaptability of the enemy to use ROE limitations to their advantage dictate constant review of ROE.[47] Col Tim Geraghty insists that "the enemy understands U.S. ROE restrictions and will use it to their advantage."[48] Thus, the ROE should maintain a focus on defining proportional response to insure that close air support assets deliver the correct application of firepower commensurate with the operational environment.

Chapter III: Case Studies

Beirut

            The Lebanese government requested US intervention in 1982. Consequently the 32nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MAU) deployed to the region and arrived on 25 August. The 800 Marines joined a multinational force of approximately 800 French and Syrian armed forces and encircling them was the Israeli Defense Force (IDF). The peacekeeping force met its clearly stated objectives within the desired 30 day window. The Marines began a redeployment on 9 September 1982; however, the assassination of Lebanon's President Bashir Gemayel lead to a Christian militias retaliation by killing over 700 men, women, and children in Palestinian refugee camps.[49] These events prompted the return of the Israeli Army and the 32nd MAU. This time the mission presented to the MAU was ambiguous. Casper Weinberger, the secretary of the state at the time, implied that the mission of the Marines was to "establish a presence"[50] While the surrounding environment changed to a "state of war", the Marines' mission of presence never changed.

            By August 1983, the conflict escalated into an outright civil war between five factions: the Lebanese Army and Christian Phalangist militia opposed by Syrian backed Druze, Shiite and Palestinian militias. The intervention in the form of training the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) began to erode the perception of US impartiality. On 22 July the first signs of aggression towards the Marines occurred when rockets struck their positions on the Beirut airfield.[51]    On the night of 8 August, 122mm rockets impacted against Marine positions wounding one Marine. After locating the position of the incoming rounds, the Marines fired illumination rounds over the positions of enemy artillery.    This was the first time Marines used non-lethal indirect fire in their own defense. Simultaneously, two Marine AH-1 helicopters were launched from naval shipping and were held over "Green Beach" ready for on-call missions. Three weeks later on 29 August, the Marines directed the first lethal engagement by authorizing the attack of an enemy armored personnel carrier (APC) by a Cobra and the employment of high explosive artillery rounds which silenced a rocket battery killing 15 Druze.[52] Col Tim Geraghty summarizes this crucial turning point in the Marine mission by recalling, "the instant we engaged the Druze with artillery, I knew our posture was forever changed"[53]   

            Attacks on Marine positions continued throughout the remainder of August and into September. Escalation continued and Marines suffered artillery and rocket barrages resulting in several deaths. The Marines unsuccessfully used Cobra helicopters in an attempt to locate artillery positions firing on them from the surrounding hills. Fire support for the Marine "peacekeepers" intensified with substantial NGF in support of Marine forces. Navy carrier-based reconnaissance aircraft flew several missions over suspected artillery positions in order to provide naval guns accurate targeting data. Marines struggled under the restriction of proportional force as a result of ROE intended for a "presence" mission. Rarely used, offensive airpower consisted of Marine Cobras standing 30 minute at sea and Navy A-6s on alert aboard the carrier. A rare occasion on 6 February, a BLT 2/8 forward controller directed a Navy A-6 to drop two laser-guided bombs on targets in Druze controlled areas silencing an artillery position.[54]

             The dilemma faced by the Marines mired in a presence mission was how to proportionally respond to threats while preserving a politically desired impartial posture. Proportional response consisted of artillery and NGF, although, aviation could have proved itself an invaluable force protection asset by providing close air support for ground forces. However, commanders were uncomfortable with its application in a presence mission. Because the enemy was employing artillery, the Marine Commander determined that artillery and naval gunfire were a more proportional response than offensive airpower. For instance, the Navy delivered over 360 5-inch shells within a few hours in support of Lebanese forces; however, as Col. Geraghty suggested, the perception of offensive airpower represented a disproportional response in relation to enemy's indirect fires. The scenes from the 23 October 1983 bombing of the Marine Headquarters serves as a constant reminder that the operational environment surrounding peace operations demands that peacekeeping forces use the full spectrum of proportional response to protect themselves. Offensive airpower would have allowed Marines to effectively respond in a precise and proportional manner to enemy attacks.       

Somalia

            The Somalia intervention escalated from a humanitarian mission to the first ever sanctioned peace enforcement under UN Chapter VII. The operational environment, like Beirut, consisted primarily of urban terrain and an accompanying unconventional threat that demanded an assessment of proportional force. U.S. involvement in Somalia proceeded through three stages: Operation Provide Relief (UNOSOM I), a humanitarian assistance mission; Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF), an operation that combined humanitarian assistance with limited military action; and UNOSOM II, a peace enforcement mission involving active combat and nation-building.[55] The mission of American forces supporting UNOSOM II was, "to conduct military operations to consolidate, expand, and maintain a secure environment for the advancement of humanitarian aid, economic assistance, and political reconciliation in Somalia."[56] However, the deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993 and several other incidents led to an all out attempt by U.S. Rangers to capture General Aideed that culminated with 18 American dead in an urban battle between Aideed supporters and Task Force Ranger.[57] Although there are several accounts of close air support missions by attack helicopters and AC-130s, the urban battle fought by Task Force (TF) Ranger on 3 October 1993 presents a unique perspective on proportional application of close air support in a peace operation.

            The tragedy of TF Ranger exemplifies the importance of close air support when peace operations digress into a state of war and presents another failure to integrate the operational environment to a proportional response. As U.S. Rangers struggled to secure an MH-60 brought down by Aideed's militia, Army attack helicopters performed close air support for the Rangers on the ground. Close air support assets assigned to TF Ranger consisted of AH-60 aircraft loaded with snipers and AH-6 attack helicopters armed with 7.62 mini guns and 2.75 inch rockets. Normally accompanying these type of missions is the AC-130 gunship; however, these aircraft were sent home a few weeks previously. Army and Marine Cobras and Navy and Marine fixed wing aircraft were in theater but did not participate due to the perception that there was no requirement for additional fire support.[58] Therefore, 3 teams of 2 AH-6s bore the preponderance of close air support after the shoot down of the MH-60.

            Although effective in covering the trapped ground forces, the AH-6 small caliber munitions were unable to decisively thwart the Somali attack.[59] The ROE precluded the use of 2.75 inch rockets because of their inaccuracy; however, during the battle AH-6 crews requested their employment due to the requirement for greater concussion effect and penetration into the surrounding buildings. AH-6 pilots said they desperately required greater lethality than the 2.75 inch rockets.[60] However, commanders contended that the mission only required a small force and the that AH-6 had adequate fire power. Making the best of their limited fire power, the AH-6s fired ordnance as low as 200 feet and within 50 feet of friendlies. Stressing the difficulties of urban close air support, the AH-6 pilots attributed the success of their mission to extensive urban training. By focusing training on close fires amidst built-up structures and close coordination with the ground elements, AH-6 aircrews were able to deliver effective close fires resulting in substantial enemy causalities.[61] However, due to the continuous onslaught of Somalis, the sole application of the AH-6 suggested the requirement for an increased response by additional fire support assets.

            Operations in Somalia promoted using the attack helicopter as a proportional weapon of choice, but on 3 October the AH-6 was a disproportional or "too little" response to an overwhelming enemy attack. Like Beirut, the Joint Task Force commander had a substantial "menu" of close support assets to accomplish his mission. On 3 Oct, commanders relied solely on attack helicopters. Other assets in theater included Army AH-1s and OH-58s armed scout helicopters, Marine AH-1s, UH-1s, and AV-8Bs, and Navy A-6Es, F/A-18s, and F-14s.[62] Routinely, AV-8B Harriers conducted patrols loaded with 500 LB Laser Guided Bombs(LGB) and were capable of delivering substantial firepower if needed; however, commanders feared they represented too much force.[63] The Army, with the exception of the AC-130, completely excluded planning for fixed wing close air support. Close air support in Somalia was integral to operations on the ground; however, very few aircraft weapons fit the profile of proportionality under normal peacekeeping efforts.           

            Somalia is typical of operational environments involving peace operations. Even though the ROE permitted timely engagement of hostile elements, contingency planning on 3 October 1993 lacked the foresight to effectively use the full "menu" of close air support assets. The use of proportional force is critical to achieving political goals; however, the events of the TF Ranger suggest that commanders did not plan to proportionally increase firepower as required by the changing operational environment. On 8 October, President Clinton, still lacking a clear mission for forces in Somalia, dispatched the USS Abraham Lincoln to the region in order to provide increased offensive airpower.[64] However, there was never a clear understanding on how to integrate it under the requirement for proportional response.

Bosnia

            Unlike Somalia, operations in Bosnia relied exclusively on the use of tactical fixed wing aviation as the primary means of fire support. In 1992, UN peacekeepers were put on the ground in Bosnia without dedicated fire support assets. To protect the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), NATO offensive airpower was made available to provide close air support.[65] However, the difficulties in deciding on the level of appropriate force lead to an ineffective employment of close air support. Despite continuous violence on the ground, only 9 close air support missions actually dropped ordnance until the commencement of Operation Deliberate Force in 1995.

            The Bosnia-Herzegovina war proved to be a more complex operation than the preceding case studies. Bosnia combined a conventional war, an unconventional war, and a humanitarian operation.[66] Soviet trained Bosnian Serb forces employed lethal air defense systems consisting of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), shoulder fired SAMs, and medium altitude SA-6s and high altitude SA-2s. In addition, the ground forces resembled a conventional structure with heavy artillery and mechanized forces. However, they also had the capability to operate unconventionally among the civilian populace. Combined with mountainous terrain and marginal weather, Bosnia proved a difficult challenge for the use of offensive airpower.     

            On the UN/NATO side, Operations Deny Flight had an assortment of UNPROFOR peacekeepers supported by over 5,000 NATO personnel and approximately 250 land-based aircraft dispersed over 18 air bases.[67] Aviano hosted the majority of tactical fixed wing aircraft. Air assets included US F-15Es, F/A-18Ds, A-10As, F-16s, F-111Es, EA-6Bs, and Spanish EF-18.[68] These assets were designed to provide a lightly armed UNPROFOR with close air support and combat air patrol (CAP) missions. Although resembling other traditional close air support missions, the political conditions surrounding the Bosnian peacekeeping/peace enforcement operation limited the employment of conventional weapons. An expensive operation in terms of flight hours and committed support personnel, Operation Deny Flight represented an international answer to ethnic aggression.

            Fixed wing air support aimed at thwarting ethnic aggression and achieving an eventual political settlement. By denying the Bosnian Serbs the movement of their heavy weapons, tanks and artillery, offensive airpower sought to create a secure environment to stop "ethnic cleansing" and enhance the humanitarian efforts. The concept of operations for the use of air consisted of the following:

 

            - When requested by the UN authority through an air operations coordination               

            center (AOCC), close air support assets may be employed in Bosnia-

            Herzegovina to support UNPROFOR.

            - All close air support operations are limited to the degree, intensity, and duration                      

            necessary to achieve the specific objective with the minimum collateral damage             

            that is militarily feasible, avoiding any damage to friendly forces UNPROFOR).

            - All close air support missions must be conducted under the control of a forward

            air controller (FAC) on the ground or airborne; weapons can be released only              

            when the target has been positively identified by the aircraft crew and after the              

            FAC clearance.[69]

This concept of operation seemingly supports the intent of employing tactical fixed wing aircraft in the role of close air support. However, an unwieldy command structure between the UN and NATO for clearance to deliver ordnance limited the utility of close air support to attain proportional affects. Regardless, in June of 1993, NATO began planning to use close air support for the protection of UN peacekeepers if threatened by Serb forces. On 12 March 1994 NATO responded to an UNPROFOR close air support request. French aircraft provided support for French troops being shelled near Bihac. The aircraft requested never dropped bombs; however, the incident represented the first request for close air support of the operation.[70]

             The first test of NATO close air support transpired in the battle for Gorazade. On 10 April, after UNPROFOR again requested close air support, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary approved a mission that concluded with the delivery of ordnance by two F-16s under the control of British SAS forces. The Serbs briefly discontinued their assault but attacked again the following day. Again under the control of a British SAS forces, two Marine F-18As dropped ordnance and strafed targets near Gorazde.[71] However, fearing the perception of disproportional force, the UN only cleared the lead F-18 to drop ordnance. Under the threat of further airstrikes, the Serbs eventually backed down, temporarily saving Gorazade. Later that summer, two Dutch F-16s dropped Mk-82 bombs on Bosnian Serb armor moving into the town of Srebrenica, but without further clearance to use NATO air, the town eventually fell. Because NATO air lacked substantial credibility, the UN could not halt Bosnian Serb attacks. Consequently, several more towns fell including the UN safe haven of Gorazde.[72]    

           UN ROE dictated proportionality through several requirements. The first requirement limited weapons employment exclusively to precision guided munitions (PGMs). For instance, NATO ROE precluded the delivery of cluster munitions, such as MK-20 or CBU-87 series munitions. In addition, the ROE dictated stringent procedural control. Control of the close air support missions in Bosnia required the FAC to positively identify a target and obtain clearance. The aircrew were also responsible to maintain "full positive control" which meant maintaining the target in sight throughout the attack.[73] Although restricted use of weapons and strict procedural control hindered close air support, the most detrimental factor was the UN command's perception of proportional close air support in response to Serb aggression.

            Early in 1992, UN and NATO command elements failed to agree on what constituted a proportional response by air assets. The debate over the employment of close air support culminated in several disagreements between the U.S., the NATO allies, and the UN. The US wanted total command by USN Admiral Jeremy Boorda, NATO CINCSOUTH, to launch aircraft at will against Serb positions. NATO commanders disagreed, fearing that the wide spread use of airstrikes, if not properly monitored, would complicate the situation.[74] Consequently, three originators of air strikes were authorized: a NATO member state, the United Nations or the NATO military authority. The air request then needed to go to the NATO Council. They would analyze the status of the negotiation process and the situation on the ground. The NATO Council then would send the requirement to the UN Secretary-General in New York for approval. For instance, a request for close air support would pass from the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACPs), via Kiseljak, to the NATO Combined Air Operations Center at Vicenza and then on to the UN in New York.[75]        

             NATO close air support never integrated with the UN mission of peacekeeping. Admiral "Snuffy" Smith summed up the UN and NATO relationship by saying, "airpower was ineffective basically because UNPROFOR and NATO air were not an air/ground team."[76] Therefore, UN and NATO command relationships, political uncertainty, and the physical conditions of Bosnia, all posed dilemmas for the proportional application of close air support.

Chapter IV: A Triad of Change

            Throughout history, operational concepts have responded to changing operational environments. Recent operations conducted in environments of ethnic and clan driven violence suggest that close air support requires new concepts in order to integrate into peace operations. Before suggesting solutions for the role of close air support in peace operations, the following assumptions are made.

            1. The governing definitions of Chapter VI (peacekeeping) and VII (peace                  

            enforcement) represented in the UN Charter will not change in future peace                  

            operations.                   

            2. Rules of Engagement will conform to SROE. Although right to self defense              

            will never be denied, hostile intent/action, proportional response, and minimum             

            collateral damage will frame the operational employment of close air support.

            3. The majority of peace operations will be executed in urban areas.

            4. Policy will always dictate military action, thus, peace operations will remain              

            an important aspect of the US policy of enlargement and engagement.

            The remaining text examines shortfalls and recommends changes that will aid in the proportional application of close air support in peace operations.   For military forces to effectively operate in peace operations, the evolution of traditional fire support requires a focus towards operations in the physical and political conditions of peace operations. By capturing lessons from recently conducted peace operations, joint and service planners can better integrate close air support to this confusing operational environment.   The text recommends the following three evolutionary imperatives:                         

            - Doctrinal inception of planning considerations for the proportional employment                       

            of offensive air support to include employment considerations for the use of attack         helicopters and fixed wing platforms.        

            - Development of weapons that allow offensive airpower to range the full                                 

            spectrum (lethal -- non-lethal) of proportional response.

            - Training for unconventional and urban warfare by ground FACs and aircrew.

Doctrine

            Doctrine is the process that guides military forces to conduct the way they fight. Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as the "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[77] Joint Pub 1 provides further guidance stating that:

 

                        Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issue of how best to employ the                      

            national military power to achieve strategic ends. It represents the central beliefs                        

            for waging war in order to achieve victory....It is the building material for                                   

            strategy.[78]

Current doctrine requires the addition of "fundamental principles" and "fundamental issues" on the employment offensive airpower in peace operations. Currently, there is no doctrinal bridge between Joint Peace Operation doctrine and Joint Close Air Support doctrine that defines "how best to employ the national military power..."

            To suggest rigid procedures on the use of close air support is not the intent of this paper; however, the guidelines for the use of this capability are as essential as for logistics and for legal issues. Therefore, assuming peace will be multilateral, there needs to be planning guidance on the limitations and capabilities on the proportional employment of aircraft and weapons. Currently, no guidance exists pertaining to the employment of rotary and fixed wing close air support in peace operations.

            The process of achieving a common thought process or central belief has resulted in numerous joint and service publications on peace operations. However, the problems associated with the differentiation between peacekeeping and peace enforcement are rarely present in these publications. More alarming is the fact that none of these publications address the use of rotary and fixed wing close air support in urban environments. The three publications requiring modifications are Joint Pub 3-07 MOOTW, Joint Pub 3-07 Peacekeeping, and Joint Pub 3-09.3 JTTP for Close Air Support. There is currently no joint publication pertaining to peace enforcement. The first publication, Joint Pub 3-07, lacks any guidance on the use of offensive air support in peace operations. The Joint 3-07.3, designed to specifically address peacekeeping operations, contains a section on air operations which reads as follows:

 

            Air operations are helpful in monitoring no-fly exclusion zones, e.g., Bosnia or Iraq. The air component's ability and flexibility in covering large areas in a short amount of time is an asset for both ground and maritime operations. Additionally, the air component's contributions to peacekeeping can be in the nature of airlift; logistics; surveillance; reconnaissance; command, control, and communications (C3); intelligence; aerial refueling; search and rescue; and medical evacuation.[79]

Aside from an offensive role in monitoring no-fly zones, there is no mention of the capabilities and limitations of air delivered munitions.

            Finally, Joint Pub 3-09.3 makes no mention close air support operations in MOOTW. The 1995 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (JCAS), standardizes conventional close air support procedures. The close air support definition states that, "close air support is air action by fixed and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.''[80] However, performing close air support in peace operations against unconventional targets suggests "close proximity of fires" may be within 100 meters of friendlies and non-combatants and "detailed integration" may demand aircrew to fully understand the ground unit's "fire and movement" in urban areas. Currently, the doctrinal focus is still on conventional combat against large "Soviet style" mechanized forces fighting in open terrain. Given the reliance on close air support in recent peace operations, there is a doctrinal requirement for significant emphasis on the use of close air support in peace operations to include the complementary employment of rotary and fixed wing attack assets. In addition, the JCAS publication requires further emphasis on urban close air support focusing on the concept of proportionality as it applies to individual weapon systems.   

            With the absence of joint doctrine for the application of offensive airpower, services must rely on their own specific doctrine. However, service doctrine is lacking as well. A widely used document by the Army and Air Force is the Army's FM 100-23, Peace Operations. FM 100-23, in two short sections, attempts to address offensive air support in the fire support role. Although close air support is not mentioned, the Combat Functions section of 100-23 uses the sub-sections of Maneuver and Fire Support to mention the use of airpower. Under Fire Support, considerations for offensive air support are written as follows:

            AC-130 aircraft, attack helicopters, and observation/scout helicopters are target acquisition, deterrent, and attack assets in peace operations. Tactical air (TACAIR) can provide selective firepower, particularly in the employment of precision-guided munitions. Collateral damage and unexploded ordnance are significant planning factors when considering the employment of TACAIR.[81]

This paragraph is the only reference to offensive airpower in the publication. There is no further guidance or references to expand on the complexities of offensive air power. Are collateral damage and unexploded bombs the only significant planning factors of TACAIR? In addition, the U.S. Army FM 100-5 Operations, addresses the solution for multinational fire support by stating the requirement for ad hoc procedures.[82] Priding itself on its close air support history, the Marine Corps is attempting to bridge offensive air support doctrine and peace operations in a draft publication MCWP 3-2, Air Operations. Still broad in scope, the Marine Corps document briefly refers to aviation as having the capability to "rapidly apply fire-power" and gives a historical example of aviation's close air support role in Somalia.[83]

            It is evident by the lack of doctrinal guidance on offensive air support in peace operations that doctrinal publications require the addition of detailed guidance on proportionality and close air support. Since most peace operations are multilateral, the proper location for offensive air support guidance seems best integrated into joint doctrine. A solution may be to integrate NATO concepts into U.S. doctrine. At the 1995 Strategic Studies Conference, William Johnsen presented a document that stated, "At the operational level of war, NATO military authorities need to ensure common, or at least compatible doctrines..."[84] Integrating concepts from NATO publications, such as the their document titled The Role of Air Power in Peace and Humanitarian Operations, US forces may bridge the US/NATO doctrinal gap while enhancing US doctrine.  For instance, the NATO document defines its aim and scope as, "providing a reference document for developing detailed concepts of the contribution of airpower to multinationally mandated peace and humanitarian operations."[85] Fusing NATO concepts into U.S. Joint publications, not only produces better joint publications, it provides greater standardization for multinational operations.

            Because of recent operations, military leaders are recognizing the lethality of the operational environment of peace operations. While lecturing the Marines in Quantico, Virginia, Major General Mike Jackson, the British Force Commander in Bosnia during the IFOR mission, described a recommended change in British doctrine that links the inherent roles of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. He suggests that combining the peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission into one integrated operation would promote peaceful settlements yet still be responsive to the inevitability of "combat".[86] He concluded his lecture by stating, "never again should we order soldiers to accomplish a Bosnian mission without adequate combat power."[87] Admiral "Snuffy" Smith, referencing the same scenario said, "Peace operation forces have to be bigger and meaner than the combatants."[88] While both military leaders agree that peace operations advocate peaceful settlements, they support the ability to apply force to accomplish the mission.

            Joint doctrine captures concise but comprehensive statements of fundamental principles and issues for the conduct of warfare. Some believe that doctrine is too authoritative and restrictive, consequently, constructing new ideas and principles into a lengthy process. Rear Admiral Cebrowski, a former battle group commander, stated that "the Navy does not favor rigid procedures, tactics, and techniques. Rigidity is not very expeditionary."[89] However, military doctrine provides us a common cultural perspective -- "telling us how to think about war".[90] The historical lessons from Beirut, Somalia, and Bosnia are all essential in developing new doctrine. The use of offensive airpower, or lack there of, provides a basic framework to develop new publications; however, the failures, frustration, and successes have only appeared in books and articles. In summary, for the success of close air support in the peace operation environment, the framework for success begins educating military commanders with evolutionary doctrine.

Equipment

            The dilemma facing the employment of close air support in peace operations is deciding how to harness the destructive capability of aviation ordnance to satisfy the proportional use of force requirement. For peace operations, the development of less destructive and non-lethal weapons deserves the greatest attention. Assuming that most peace operations will take place in urban environments, proportionality will normally dictate precision engagement of a specific target with the restriction of minimum collateral damage. Today's aviation ordnance fulfills the precision requirement by using laser, wire, TV, and IR guidance; however, weapons can not satisfy the requirement of minimum collateral damage or guarantee the safety of close friendlies and non-combatants. In addition, the transition from a ground force delivering 7.62 or .50 caliber munitions to a 500lbs. bomb may overstep the intent of proportional response. The goal of this section is to examine current close air support weapons and their inherent limitations in peace operations. This section recommends that future weapons require an increased precision capability combined with less destructive munitions and/or non-lethal capabilities.

            The following precision ordnance systems are currently in the U.S. inventory for close air support missions:

 

            Fixed Wing PGMs                                         Rotary Wing PGMs

- The Paveway Laser Guided Bomb systems                 - The BGM-71C/D/E TOW    

(GBU-12 500 pound, GBU-16 1000 pound,                - The AGM-114A/B/C/F/K Hellfire[91]

and GBU-10 2,000 pound.)

- The AGM-65 Maverick series

[AGM-65A(TV-Anti armor),   AGM-65B/D

(IR-Anti armor), AGM-65E (Laser-Blast Penetrator),                                                  

AGM-65F/G (IR-Blast-penetrator)].

            These precision guided weapons provide military planners with high probabilities of kill (Pk) and hit (Ph) as per the joint munitions effectiveness manuals (JMEMs). However, they represent weapons designed for the conventional battlefield. The GBU series of munitions are standard blast fragmentation iron bombs configured with a fin assembly and laser seeker. The AGM-65 series comes in various configurations containing a 300 pound warhead designed with either a shaped charged or blast-penetrator warhead. Both AGM-65 warhead designs make it an overly destructive weapon unsuitable for urban close air support in peace operations. The primary intent of attack helicopter precision guided munitions (PGMs) is to defeat conventional armor. These anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) are primarily designed to penetrate armor using a shaped charged warhead. The TOW missile contains the smallest warhead among the PGMs weighing 6.8 pounds. The Hellfire uses the same laser seeker as the AGM-65E; however, it contains a smaller warhead consisting of 13.7 lbs. Although both systems are smaller than fixed wing munitions, the shaped charge warhead employs a directed penetrating blast making it too lethal for light urban structures and not lethal enough for reinforced concrete buildings.          

            The risk associated with fixed wing PGMs depends on the conditions associated with friendly or non-combatant disposition on the battlefield. There are no charts or studies that directly relate the effects of conventional fixed wing munitions in an urban environment. However, to examine the risk associated with fixed wing PGMs, the following section will use a method of risk assessment called the casualty criterion. The casualty criterion is the 5-minute assault criterion for a prone friendly in winter clothing and helmet and his ability to function after a given ordnance detonates nearby. The physically incapacitated (PI) value is the typical percentage of combatants that are physically unable to function in an assault within a 5-minute period after an attack. The physical effects are due to concussion effects and do not take into account flying debris. The 0.1% PI value means that one friendly out of a thousand will not be capable of functioning in an assault within five minutes and 10% PI value represents 100 friendlies.[92] Table 2 represents casualty criterion for the employment of precision guided fixed wing weapons:

 

Item	Description	Risk Estimate            10% PI	Distance (m)          0.1% PI	Notes
MK-82 LGB	500 lb bomb	250m	425m
MK-83 LGB	1000 lb bomb	275m	475m
MK-84 LGB	2000 lb bomb	225m	500m
AGM-65	Maverick	25m	100m	AGM-65ABCD

 

Table 2[93]

 

The data presented in Table 2 is one tool available to military planners to determine the risk to friendly troops. However, it can also provide an illustration of the PI affects suffered by noncombatants during close air support missions. In the Army's manual, Training For Military Operations On Urbanized Terrain, it states that targets are often engaged at ranges under 100 meters which is well under the distances in Table 2.[94] It is clearly evident that these munitions present employment concerns in urban areas where military personnel may be intermixed with non‑combatants.

            Helicopter weapons present problems as well. Helicopters operating at low altitudes are susceptible to a wide array of threat systems from the AK‑47 to shoulder launched SAM systems. Therefore, in urban environments, helicopters are forced to mask their maneuvers using buildings and streets for survivability. However, the employment of helicopter PGMs dictate the engagement in close proximity to urban structures with a limited geometrical advantage. The TOW missile requires line of sight delivery and at least 500 meters to arm the warhead. The Hellfire requires line of sight if self‑designating, a minimum of 500 meters to arm, and can require increased stand‑off distances depending of the mode of deliver. For instance, to lock‑on to reflective laser energy in the Lock‑on After Launch (LOAL) mode the missile requires up to 3.5 kilometers for seeker to effectively scan and track reflected laser energy after launch. Thus, the use of helicopter PGMs requires a detailed urban terrain analysis and may not suit close fighting in urban streets. Moreover, the TOW and Hellfire shape‑charged warhead may be lethal against wooden or thin concrete, but not penetrate thick reinforced

cement walls. Used in urban close air support inside 100 meters, the Hellfire can cause significant collateral damage to vehicles and urban buildings which could injure friendlies and non‑combatants in the immediate area.

            The success of procuring weapons designed for the conventional battlefield is evident in the availability of accurate and lethal weapon systems for anti‑armor and structural penetration. However, peace operations require weapons with flexible designs which allow for proportional use on the unconventional battlefield. Thus, weapons procurement should include munitions which are precise, yet less destructive. Quite possibly, precision delivered inert warheads, such as the laser guided training round (LGTR) may provide the required capability. Designed for an‑nor penetration, the Hellfire and TOW missile require a warhead that employs a greater lateral burst of energy and an inert warhead capability. Interchangeable ATGM warhead configurations would enable attack helicopters to deliver lethal, less‑than‑lethal, and non‑lethal munitions depending upon the threat disposition.

            Aside from the development of less destructive weapons, there is a growing interest in aerial delivered non‑lethal munitions. The fundamental purpose of a non‑lethal weapon is to neutralize the enemy without killing. Non‑lethal development attempts to solve the dilemma of weapons employment against combatants operating amidst non‑combatants. In their article, "Weapons of Mass Protection," Chris and Janet Morris list the categories of nonlethal weapons as the following: antipersonnel or antimaterial, electromagnetic, kinetic, or chemical, and nonlethal and antilethal. They further list the

technologies identified as non‑lethal munitions as acoustic, laser, high‑power (HP) microwave; non‑nuclear electromagnetic pulse; HP jamming; obscurants; foams; glues and slicks; supercaustics, and magnethydrodynamics.[95] The most controversial non‑lethal weapon is chemical munitions. Although chemical weapons represent excellent munitions for crowd control, international opinion is strongly opposed to their use. Therefore, the use of newly developed non‑lethal chemical agents may be restricted by the Geneva Convention even though their intent satisfies the reduction of causalities.

            Other promising non‑lethal technologies include flash‑bang and acoustic technologies to stun personnel, kinetic weapons to cause blunt trauma, and electromagnetic devises used to disable vehicles and aircraft.[96] Moreover, the employment of non‑lethal weapons may solve the dilemma of proportional response. In their 1994 report on Military Operations in Built‑up Areas (MOBA), the Defense Science Board came to the following conclusions on non‑lethals: "They would permit less restrictive rules of engagement, assist in reducing the difficulties of dealing with a few hostiles hiding in a crowd of non‑combatants, and minimize casualties to our own troops, noncombatants, and combatants."[97] Weapons that minimize noncombatant and friendly casualties would solve the proportionality issue.

            The fact remains that the current procurement of hard‑target penetrator and area‑denial weapons, such as the Joint Stand Off Weapon JSOW) and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), remain a service priority. Desert Storm demonstrated the utility of stealth and precision guided munitions. At the time, President Bush called this

combination a "revolution in warfare".[98] In fact, two raids of 300 B‑17 bombers dropping 3,000 bombs could not achieve what two F‑1 17s can do with only four bombs.[99] Although these weapons enhance the capability to deliver lethal striking power from medium and high altitude through bad weather, their lethality makes them ill‑suited for urban areas and sensitive political environments requiring proportional response. This paper does not suggest that conventional warfare is a thing of past or that the JSOW or JDAM are not crucial; however, it does suggest that alternate weapons are required to satisfy the concept of proportional response in support of peacekeepers operating in urban environments.

Training

            Between July and September 1993, NATO aircraft in Bosnia flew 1,500 training sorties in preparation for the peace enforcement mission.[100] The sorties focused on precision engagement emphasizing minimum collateral damage and different procedures used by NATO FACs. Many US aircrews experienced these procedures and this type of environment for the first time. VMFA‑533, a Marine F‑18 Squadron, recorded several lessons learned from their first deployment to Bosnia. Prior to their second deployment, VMFA 533's training focused on urban navigation and target identification. In addition, aircrew trained extensively on talk‑on close air support procedures.[101] VMFA‑251 trained in Canada with NATO FACs in order to familiarize themselves with talk‑on urban close air support procedures prior to their deployment in support of Operation Deny Flight. However, aside from special operations units and Marine Expeditionary Units

(MEUs), U.S. forces rarely train for the operational environments of contemporary peace operations.

            The application of close air support is a mission inherent for any operational contingency whether it is war or MOOTW However, many attack helicopter and fixed wing squadrons rarely train to fight in environments requiring proportional force where close precision fires require aircrews to identify and engage targets operating on crowded urban streets. Instead, the majority of close air support exercises occur in desert environments of the western U.S. and focus on combating conventional mechanized forces using wartime ROE. Open desert terrain presents an optimum environment for acquiring and destroying targets. Therefore, there are two general observations pertaining to close air support training deficiencies. First, major training exercises conducted in the U.S. still focus on fighting conventional style warfare against Soviet style enemies in the open desert. Second, peace operations demand proportionate close fires in urban areas and currently there is no training that prepares aircrews for this task. The following section will address these two aviation and ground training deficiencies by suggesting that close air support training modify scenarios to fit the current operational environment and that the services develop urban ranges specific for close air support training.

            Since the end of the cold war, training refocused from defeating the Soviet Union to defeating the next potential conventional threat. Therefore, most large exercises and tactics schools now plan and fight against a threat like the "rogue" nations of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Training for contingencies, such as UNOSOM II and Deny Flight,

rarely take place, and an aircrew's first exposure to urban close air support is during actual contingencies. Pragmatically, the military must prepare for high intensity warfare and, as a conventional military force, the U.S. feels most comfortable fighting large conventional forces. Yet, crucial battles in modem conflicts are being won and lost in urban sprawl (Gronzy, Sarajevo, and Mogadishu). Thus, recent peace operations suggest that training against unconventional, low threat forces warrants increased training emphasis. A difficulty in major exercises is reproducing the type of environment aircrew will face in peace operations.

            The Army's National Training Center (NTC) is one of the countries largest battlefield training centers. During the NTC training exercises, close air support is provided by the Air Warrior, an Air Force exercise control agency specializing in close air support. Comprised of brigade size force on force maneuvers that match conventional mechanized forces against one another, the Army and Air Force exercise tests the integration and performance of close air support in providing support of the friendly scheme of maneuver.[102] Although the exercise trains to low threat close air support and stresses the importance of FAC control, the threat consists of exclusively conventional mechanized forces using Soviet style tactics.[103] The Marine Corps holds its own coordinated fire exercises at Twentynine Palms. The Combined Arms Exercise CAX tests the FAC's ability to coordinate indirect fires in concert with close air support. Again, the threat is designed around a conventional mechanized force in linear array across the desert. Strike University in Fallon, Nevada, trains Navy Carrier Air Groups

 

(CAGs) prior to deploying. Although the Navy trains for close air support with actual ground FACs, its primary focus is still on air superiority and strategic deep air strikes.

            The Army and Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the most prepared for MOUT. By dedicating a majority of their training to direct action and hostage rescue in urban terrain, these forces will most likely operate separate from the rigors of everyday peacekeeping or peace enforcement. They will typically focus on quick, decisive action, vice a prolonged presence mission more characteristic of peace operations. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) program requires pre‑deploying units to complete a work‑up cycle focusing on MOUT while being evaluated by a Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) on their ability to execute missions such as non‑combat evacuations (NEOs) and amphibious raids in MOOTW environments. Although these units concentrate on training units for MOOTW with a focus on urban warfare, they represent only a fraction of the forces normally required for peace operations. Rarely trained for the challenge of operating in urban areas, most aviation units are not proficient in urban close air support. This paper suggests that aviation units require a greater emphasis on MOUT training.

            The Army and Marine Corps have attempted to solve the problem of MOUT training, but much of it has focused on infantry training. Army MOUT training facilities located at Forts Hood, Campell, Bragg, Lewis, Drum, Stewart and Polk and Marine Corps facilities at Camp Lejuene and Camp Pendleton simulate small villages with multiple story buildings and road networks. Although they are adequate facilities for

small unit training, they are too small to simulate large urban environments for likely contingencies. Currently under construction at the Joint Readiness Training Center is a 13.2 million dollar MOUT complex comprised of a 29‑building mock city, a seven‑building airfield take‑down facility, and a five‑building military compound.[104] Promoted as a mock city, it still lacks the size to realistically prepare forces for realistic MOUT. MOUT complexes built by the Army and the Marine Corps have, to a certain extent, aided in the training effort for MOUT; however, close air support training in MOUT complexes is very limited, especially for fixed wing aircraft.

            Currently there is no MOUT complex designed for close air support training. Special Operations Forces and MEU(SOC) units employ simulated close air support (SIMCAS) in MOUT complexes, but airspace restrictions and the small size of these complexes is inadequate for training. Due to the inability to operate in confined airspace, close air support elements most often face exclusion from MOUT training areas. Consequently, without the required training areas for close air support aircraft, the aircrew and ground FACs lack the required experience to effectively employ ordnance in an urban environment. To gain adequate proficiency to conduct urban close air support, aviation requires the development of two programs: aviation specific MOUT complexes and a process to train in US cities.

            The types of aviation specific MOUT ranges that require development are an urban live fire range and an instrumented range for simulated weapons delivery. Whether you are an aviator or infantrymen, live fire is a fundamental requirement for proficiency.

Live fire in a simulated city environment not only enhances aircrew proficiency, it also allows the training of ground FACs in the delivery of precision munitions in a confined urban area. Restricted to inert laser guided ordnance, such as Laser Guided Training Rounds (LGTR) or the MK‑76, FACs could operate in these training areas while aircrew performed live drops. Inert ordnance also reduces damage to the training area. Ultimately; however, the ideal situation would an urban live fire training area which would familiarize aircrews with the inherent problems of urban close air support such as laser geometry, target identification, and marking friendly positions.

            Second, aviation requires urban areas constructed and integrated into instrumented aviation ranges such as the Tactical Air Combat Training System TACTS ranges that currently allow for air to ground weapons instrumentation. Currently, the TACTS range in Yuma, Arizona, originally designed for air‑to‑air combat, has an instrumented airfield for simulated delivery of laser guided munitions. The computer generates profiles o these weapons and scores simulated weapon impact from a central monitor station. Additional structures on these ranges containing threat systems, airfields, and petroleum sites could greatly enhance urban type training.

            Finally, effective urban training needs to include actual cities. Training in Los Angeles, New York, and New Orleans, currently used by SOF and MEU(SOC) units, allows attack helicopters to train for urban close air support. However, due to airspace limitations, fixed wing aircraft very rarely train around actual cities. Army special forces have trained extensively in U.S. cities, conducting three to four large exercises a year.

For instance, in June of 1996, the Army trained over 200 troops with attack helicopters at several locations inside Pittsburgh, specifically to conduct urban training.[105] Training aids such as portable PGM scoring systems, noncombatant role players, and covert friendlies would enhance air/ground coordination for the delivery of precision and proportionate fires.

            Close air support MOUT complexes need to provide realistic training for both aircrew and ground personnel. Without a concerted effort in this area, MOUT close air support, a common element of peace operations, will continue to plague U.S. aircrews. Without the proper training the U.S. will repeat the chaotic scenarios already experienced by U.S. attack pilots. Describing the confusing urban battle in Somalia, an Army Cobra pilot from TF Raven recalled, "There was a constant stream of 12.7 from the APC's (friendly) shooting at the rooftops. Because of that, we couldn't get in low. The ground guys asked the Cobras to stop firing because it was causing the APC drivers to button‑up as the 20mm impacted nearby."[106] The Cobra pilots participating in this battle had never trained for urban close air support.

CONCLUSION

            The future threat to U.S. national interests combined with a dwindling military budget will guide the procurement of new weapons and determine force structure in order to "fight and win" the nations wars. It seems that traditional forms of warfare will remain, but these conventional wars will have an equally lethal unconventional partner in the form of civil wars and insurgencies that will require future peace operations. Brig. Gen. William Hodges, director of logistics for the U.S. Air Force in Europe, told the National Journal, "We just have to accept the fact that these types of operations are the nature of the beast and we'll be dealing with them on a day‑to‑day basis."[107]

            Therefore, there are two conclusions that may be drawn from this study. First and most significant is that tactical employment of close air support will assume a primary role in future peace operations. The concept of strategic paralysis by deep strikes and interdiction will assume a lesser importance. A contemporary air power theorist, Col John Warden advocates strategic paralysis in order to "cause such changes to one or more parts of the enemy's physical system that the enemy decides to adopt our objectives, or we make it physically impossible for him to oppose us."[108] Desert Storm provides a recent example of this concept by the accomplishment the following phases: Instant Thunder (attack on Iraq's infrastructure), suppression of air defenses over Kuwait, attrition of enemy forces by fifty percent, and finally the ground war (close air support).[109] However, Desert Storm demonstrated the concept of strategic paralysis on the vulnerable and definable Iraqi infrastructure. Contemporary peace operations most often involve

countries that lack a definable infrastructure or LOCs. Therefore, the Desert Storm "strategic paralysis" template is inadequate for operations in Somalia and Bosnia. While the U.S. revels in the strength of its strategic air power, the cur‑rent operational environment suggests the primacy of close air support and the requirement for evolutionary methods of employment.

            Second, the answer to the successful integration of close air support depends on the following evolutionary changes:

            ‑ Doctrinal publications are not checklists followed by military commanders on the battlefield; they are guides designed to aid joint forces for successful operations. The operational environment associated with contemporary peace operations poses new problems for forces equipped and trained to fight on the conventional battlefield. To effectively integrate close air support with peace operations guidance must first begin with doctrinal integration. The case studies clearly indicate the lack of ineffective use of air delivered fires in past peace operations. Thus, fundamental guidance on capabilities and limitations of current close air support assets will help understand the proportional application of differing weapons and platforms.

            At a minimum, doctrinal publications on peace operations require definitions on proportionality, the insertion of rotary and fixed wing capabilities, and the effects of weapons on differing urban structures. Publications also require tactics, techniques, and procedures that provide guidance on the employment of close air support in MOUT. Currently, three programs, the Marine Corps 'Urban Warrior, Marine Aviation Weapons

and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS), and the Air Force's Urban Close Air Support Tests, are working aviation MOUT issues; however, the results from these projects are, quite possibly, two years away. It is crucial that doctrinal publications reflect changes immediately to meet near term global challenges.

 

            ‑ Current close air support equipment provides U.S. forces with only one method of force application comprised of a lethal conventional response. Today's forces require weapons that are less destructive and non‑lethal so as to allow proportional application of force in environments associated with peace operations. Therefore, the successful integration of close air support requires specific weapons to conform to the operational environment.

            In order to conform to future environments that demand proportionality the menu of weapon systems must allow aircrew options to select non‑lethal and lethal munitions on the same mission. Munitions must have good target affect but limit collateral damage. The Air Force is currently testing a 250 lbs precision guided munitions at Eglin, AFB. Enhancements to current munitions could provide lower cost solutions. The AGM‑65 Maverick has a Laser, IR, and TV variant that may be modified with smaller warheads to allow for less destruction. The Hellfire and TOW require interchangeable warheads that would allow aircrew to load a desired ordnance configuration commensurate with the operational environment. Currently, attack helicopters have only an anti‑tank ordnance mix.

            ‑ Finally, aviation training requires a shift to place emphasis on unconventional and urban warfare. The end‑state requires designated aviation specific training ranges that have urban areas that allow for instrumentation of simulated weapon delivery, precision munitions drop zone for integrated training with ground FACs, and a training program using actual cities for urban navigation, target identification, and simulated close air support. In the mean time, current training requires a fundamental shift to train for likely scenarios. Exercise scenarios should include an unconventional and asymmetrical threat. In addition, FAC/aircrew training should stress the requirements for close air support to deliver munitions under 500 meters.

            The implications of relegating attack helicopters and tactical fixed wing aircraft to strictly preparing for conventional warfare suggests a detrimental lack of focus on the operational environment associated with peace operations. The concept of "close proximity of fires" to friendlies and noncombatants combined with weapon delivery restrictions, such as mandated minimum collateral damage in an urban setting, and the ever present "CNN factor" pose new challenges for proportionate force by close air support. Ralph Peters suggests that, "We will fight in cities, and this brutal, casualty‑prone, and dirty kind of combat will negate many of our technological advantages while straining our physical and moral resources."[110] In analyzing recent peace operations amidst an urban back drop, the difficulties incurred by military forces seem to support Peters' statement.

            Today's strategic environment is becoming increasingly more complex as national security becomes a function of enlarging the community of secure, free market and democratic nations.[111] China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea present the U.S. with a conventional threat that requires forces to be able to "fight and win" the nations wars; however, the future demands that military forces support the national policy of "engagement and enlargement" by maintaining a forward presence and a robust and flexible force in order to respond the full range of military operations. The range of military operations depend on offensive airpower for many mission specific tasks and one that is fundamental is that of close air support. Contemporary peace operations represent a new era of warfare. In Andrew Krepinevich's book, The Army in Vietnam, he describes the Army's challenge in Vietnam by stating, "Thus, both insurgency and counterinsurgency represent major departures from "conventional" war. For the United States Army, an army that "won its spurs" through winning conventional wars, the reorientation of thought and process, of doctrine and organization, to acclimate itself what was, for it, a "new" conflict environment in Vietnam presented a major challenge."[112] Krepinevich's statement parallels the dilemma facing U.S. forces today with the "new conflict environment" of peace operations.

            To master the challenges of the new world, the traditional application of close air support requires an evolutionary approach to conform to the requirements of proportional response. Therefore, to better integrate close air support with peace operations, doctrine, equipment, and training need to evolve with the operational environment.

 

"This is the hardest form of combat for the United States, because our own rules

cripple us and, at worst, kill us."[113]

 

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