Military

The Army of the Future

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Strategic Issues

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title:                    The Army of the Future.

 

Author:                    Major Roudenok V. M. Officer, Ukrainian Marine.

 

 

Thesis:                    The characteristics of the future army cannot be known with certainty, but from the military perspective the goal is to be able to envision future battlefields better than our opponents can.

 

 

Background:     A new military-technical revolution (MTR) in military affairs was occurring in the early 1980s, and now we can see nontraditional weapons and third-generation nuclear weapons as key elements of future warfare. New-generation warfare will change the laws of armed combat and the principles of military art. It will change the very coordinates of war. Future armed combat will be concentrated in the vertical or aerospace coordinate, and efforts on the ground will become supporting. Future wars generally will not require occupation. It will be enough to use non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons to inflict serious losses upon the enemy's most important military, economic, and counterattack assets -- its political system will disintegrate on its own. Future warfare will also present fundamentally new problems in a cyberspace environment. A basic problem is distinguishing between attacks and other events such as accidents, system failures, or hacking by thrill--seekers. The main consequence of this feature is that we may not know when an attack is under way, or how the attack is being conducted.

Whatever the technology of the future may bring, warfare will continue to be the domain of man. Machines will remain our tools. The human factor will continue to decide the most terrible wars. In addition to training and leadership, the soldier of the 21st century should be equipped with a wide range of systems designed to facilitate military operations in the modern information age.

 

Recommendation:                        As for the Marines, we shall be prepared to discharge "such other duties as the President may direct, whatever those duties may be. But, most of all, be prepared to fight and win.¹

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¹           The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance. A Marine Corps for the 21st Century. (Marine Corps Gazette: August 1995), A-2 1.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

 

 

 

"Essentially war is fighting, . . . The need to fight quickly led man to invent appropriate devices to gain advantages in combat, and these brought about great changes in the forms of fighting."¹

 

The characteristics of the future army cannot be known with certainty, but from the military perspective the goal is to be able to envision future battlefields better than our opponents can.

This study analyzes the features of emerging 21st century warfare, tries to look forward, and attempts to imagine the main means of future armed combat. We cannot neglect this duty, because we will enter the new century poorly prepared for its challenges. Let us therefore look forward and consider a few of the many environmental and technological challenges that the 21st century will bring.

"Conflict can take a wide range of forms, constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence

 

involved."² We can easily predict that on one end of the spectrum, military conflicts in the 21st century will be low intensity humanitarian and peace keeping operations where military power will be restrained and selective; the other end will be represented by conflicts of incredibly high intensity (a clash of Great Powers) in which the application of military force will be practically unlimited. A specific conflict's place on the spectrum will depend on many factors.

We should always keep in mind, that:

"Absolute war and peace rarely exist in practice. Rather, they are extremes between which exist the relations among most nations. The need to resort to military force of some kind may arise at any point within these extremes, even during periods of relative peace."³

This passage from Warfighting brings up several thoughts about potential future military conflict, such as unlimited war.

A new military-technical revolution (MTR) in military affairs was occurring in the early 1980s, and now we can see nontraditional weapons and third-generation nuclear weapons as key elements of future warfare. This MTR was generated by the emergence of non-nuclear deep-strike systems and

 

 

 

 

electronic and information warfare assets that will revolutionize all aspects of military art and force structure.

In this future war, emphasis will be on destroying the enemy's most important military, economic, and counterattack assets -- thus sapping their political will. Desert Storm is the prototype of the new air-space war regarding the advent of this MTR, and serves as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics.

The military conflict in the Persian Gulf highlighted new features of regional wars:

-- a new class of targets emerged -- ecologically dangerous production and raw material extraction enterprises;

-- a growing role for conventional precision long-range weapons, including those deployed on naval ships and aircraft. Their employment will decrease the need of requesting consent from allies in military-political blocs for land basing rights. Because of this, the concentration of both nuclear and conventional arms will be in the world's oceans, and the danger of war from maritime sectors will increase;

 

 

 

 

-- the role of all command, control, and support systems (intelligence, communications, combat, technical, logistic, and so forth) is intensifying.

To concisely sum up, the impending new generation of warfare, with its centerpiece of superior data processing to support smart weaponry, will radically change military capabilities and, once again, alter the character of warfare. Future wars will see smart conventional weapons destroying precisely located targets -- limiting casualties while defeating the enemy militarily and politically with, in most cases, no need to occupy enemy territory. Military operations will be space-based with greatly expanded command and control capabilities.

Space will become a new theater of military operations, even as the superpowers significantly reduce offensive nuclear weapons and replace them with conventional offensive strategic armament. Large ground force operations and nuclear missiles will decrease, to be gradually replaced by high-precision conventional weapons.

New-generation warfare will thus change the laws of armed combat and. the principles of military art. It will change the very coordinates of war. In wars of past generations, the main efforts of the warring sides and the width and. depth of the offense or defense were confined to

the earth's surface. The vertical coordinate (primarily air) was auxiliary or only supporting. But in future wars, this emphasis will be reversed. Future armed combat will be concentrated in the vertical or aerospace coordinate, and efforts on the ground will become supporting.

Past wars relied on ground forces to achieve victory by routing the enemy's armed forces and destroying its economic potential and political system. This kind of warfare caused extensive casualties and required occupation. Future wars generally will not require occupation. It will be enough to use non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons to inflict serious losses upon the enemy's most important military, economic, and counterattack assets -- its political system will disintegrate on its own. As the role of ground forces recedes into the background, the spotlight will focus on the air force, the navy, air defense, and electronic warfare.

Now, let us take a closer look at some types of so-called nontraditional (nonlethal) and third-generation nuclear weapons of future warfare.

In analyzing the destructive properties of various types of weapons, we note that despite their diversity, the effect of weapons on targets is determined primarily by three basic forms of energy: physical, chemical, and biological. Depending on the forms of destructive energy,

it is possible to define the types of weapons that may appear in the near future, means of protection from them, and the variety of warfare they bring to the table.

Based on the forms of energy used, it is possible to single out mechanical (kinetic), acoustical, electromagnetic, radiation, and thermal means of destruction. The common properties of acoustic, electromagnetic, and radiation energy are conditionally called radiated destruction. The energy, not of substances but of physical fields, is at issue here -- in contrast to mechanical means of destruction. The effects of this radiated energy on electronics, weapons, military equipment, targets, and people, as well as protection against radiated destruction, can be called radiated warfare.

Contemporary armed forces chiefly employ weapons that act by kinetic, nuclear, and thermal energy. But even now, means of radiated destruction, such as laser, radio-frequency accelerator, and infrasonic, possess significant destructive capabilities. They have essentially instantaneous effects, and are beginning to enter inventories. For example, during the Persian Gulf War, the United States demonstrated how lasers can be used in precision weapons. Laser guidance to a target ensures an almost 100% probability of a hit.

 

 

 

Another promising direction is in the electronization of military operations that comes with the increasing introduction of various electronic (radio-electronic) devices and instruments to modern weapon systems and to tactical and operational means of support.⁴ Electronic countermeasures, reconnaissance, and electro-optical weapon guidance will be increasing elements of the battle and in operations. In the future it is expected that electronic weapons with a direct damaging effect will be introduced to the troops. The most success in this area has been achieved in the U. S., where at present, several models of a tactical laser weapon have been created and are being tested. Electronic weapons, in turn, give birth to another form of battle -- the electronic-beam battle. This battle will be characterized by transient and highly accurate strikes on targets and instantaneous damage effects. Maneuver will not permit escape from a strike by a beam weapon.

In recent years, electronic warfare (EW) has become a relatively independent and specific form of warfare. Data verified during exercises and by local conflicts show that by using wide-scale, well-coordinated EW measures it is possible to substantially alter the force ratio, disorganize command and control of the enemy's troops and weapons, deprive the enemy of reliable situation information, and

force the enemy to act favorably to one's own side. Not long ago, these EW capabilities were proposed to be used mainly to create optimum conditions for delivering attacks against enemy personnel and equipment for purposes of destruction.

In the future, nonlethal weapons will be delivered to targets by using EW systems and equipment. In addition, conditions are created that will ensure their most effective employment -- sharply reducing or totally eliminating friendly losses. In combination with information warfare and new generations of precision weapons, EW can paralyze the armed forces and command-and-control points of a less technologically developed enemy.

Theoretical work and experiments conducted abroad show that non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generators can be used to effectively disable electronic and electrotechnical equipment, erase data banks, and impair computers. Using nonlethal weapons based on non-nuclear EMP generators, it is possible to disable computers, key radiotechnical and electrotechnical equipment, electronic ignition systems, and other automobile machine units. It can also detonate or inactivate minefields.

Third-generation nuclear weapons also are critical components of the MTR. V. N. Mikhaylov, Russian minister

 

for atomic energy, has argued that third-generation nuclear weapons will be "capable of destroying enemy strategic targets both in space and on earth," and may be usable "in any conflict".⁵

Third-generation weapons will have a small fraction of the global contamination effects of today's warheads, but with the same destructive capability. They will be weapons with directional and selective emission of energy on a target. Such a weapon works like a scalpel. The forces behind these weapons are laser-beams; electromagnetic, X-ray, or microwave radiation; or a shock wave concentrated in the direction of the target. Development is now under way, so these weapons may well appear in the foreseeable future. The only barrier to their production would be the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

Some states have also started work to create a nuclear-pumped X-ray laser designed for use as the primary weapon for destroying missiles in the boost phase and during warhead separation. Its combat performance characteristics must ensure disruption of an enemy's massive retaliatory strike.

As a variant, it is proposed to accommodate nuclear-laser warheads on missiles of nuclear submarines. In a crisis situation, or in defense of a first strike,

 

 

these submarines must move to patrol areas and take up battle positions as close as possible to enemy missile basing areas. When a warning of enemy launch comes from the system, the submarine missiles are launched. As soon as the nuclear-laser warheads arrive within line-of-sight distance, the control system will begin directing laser energy at the enemy missiles. When the targeting laser occupies a position in which the radiation will hit the target, the computer will give a command and the nuclear device will detonate.

The wide use of computers in weapons and military equipment in all methods of warfare has also predetermined the appearance of new methods of affecting the enemy -- with results rivaling weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, the ongoing information revolution is so rapid and profound that the net result could be an extremely new and grave threat to traditional military operations and civilian populations. In other words, it can also fundamentally change the future character of warfare. To use a phrase from William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense, "We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs . . . are changing the face of war . . ."⁶

 

 

 

Emerging new information warfare (1W) is directly tied to the prospect that the ongoing rapid evolution of the global information infrastructure (cyberspace) can bring both new opportunities and new vulnerabilities. It deserves special recognition and attention as a legitimate new facet of warfare with profound implications for both military strategy and national security strategy. In fact, traditional distinctions will be complicated by the growing interaction within this information infrastructure. It will be increasingly difficult to distinguish between foreign and domestic sources of 1W threats and actions. You may not know who is under attack by whom, or who is even leading the attack. Clear distinctions between different levels of anti-state activity, ranging from crime to warfare, will be disappearing.

On a parallel track, new information-based techniques may substantially increase the power of deception and of image-manipulation activities -- dramatically complicating governmental efforts to build political support for security-related initiatives. Opportunities for 1W agents to manipulate information that is key to public perceptions may increase. As a result, some state administrations might face daunting tasks in shaping and sustaining domestic support for any action marked by a high degree of ambiguity

 

and uncertainty in the area of information warfare. In addition, unlike traditional weapon technologies, development of information-based techniques does not require sizable financial resources or state sponsorship. Interconnected networks may be subject to attack and disruption not just by states but also by nonstate actors, including dispersed groups and even individuals. Thus, the threat to state interests can be multiplied as the requisite expertise is more widely diffused. It will also increase the difficulty in developing intelligence related to 1W attack at all three levels of concern: strategic, operational, and tactical.

In summary, we may have difficulty identifying potential adversaries, their intentions, and their capabilities. One implication is that new organizational relationships are needed within the intelligence community and between this community and other entities. A restructuring of roles and missions will also be required.

Future warfare will also present fundamentally new problems in a cyberspace environment. A basic problem is distinguishing between attacks and other events such as accidents, system failures, or hacking by thrill-seekers. The main consequence of this feature is that we may not even

 

 

know when an attack is under way, or how the attack is being conducted.

IW can also cause difficulties in building and sustaining coalitions. Many allied and coalition partners will be vulnerable to 1W attacks on their core information infrastructures. For example, the dependence on cellular phones in developing countries could well render telephone communications in those nations highly susceptible to disruption. Other sectors in the early stages of exploiting the information revolution, such as energy and financial, may also present vulnerabilities that an adversary might attack to undermine coalition participation. Such attacks might also serve to sever 'weak links' in the execution of coalition plans. Conversely, tentative coalition partners who urgently need military assistance may want assurances that deployment plans to their region are not vulnerable to IW disruption.

Additionally, information warfare has no front line. Potential battlefields are anywhere networked systems allow access. Given the increased reliance of our economy and society on a high-performance networked information infrastructure, a new set of lucrative strategic targets presents itself to potential IW-armed opponents.

 

 

So, if drawn to a short conclusion, every country may find itself facing the possibility of, or indications of, a strategic 1W attack. This must be acknowledged today. Strategic information warfare is a very new concept that is presenting a whole new set of problems.

Now, let us come back to the other end of our military conflict spectrum of the 21st century -- low intensity humanitarian and peace keeping military operations. This area is crucially important. "Technology progress is not a new phenomenon... "⁷ Even though, "Historically, longbows, stirrups, gunpowder, steam engines, airplanes, and a host of

 

other technological advances dramatically changed the nature

 

of warfare"⁸; one fact, is still certain. The infantryman will

 

continue to play a key role in future low intensity

military conflicts. Thus, if we want to retain an acceptable level of control over our military destiny, we must begin preparing ourselves today to face the many future environmental and technological challenges that the 21st century will bring.

When we place these issues in context of operational integration and strategic coherence in the next century, we can draw the following conclusions:

 

 

 

 

-- even if technology offers a vast array of possibilities, we cannot choose all of them due financial, physical, or other restrictions;

-- importance of technological appropriateness is evident, but we must be on our guard against falling in love with marvelous solutions that do not fit the essential problems; e. g., restrictions of urban combat.

Whatever the future constellations of power and sources of disequilibrium, one thing appears relatively certain. Warfare in the 21st century is going to involve an unprecedented proportion of urban combat. Now carry this thought a few decades into the next century, while considering current demographic trends. As Third World populations grow at startling rates, they also gravitate increasingly toward sprawling capitals and major cities. Imagine a capital city girdled with varied satellite communities extending over an area of several hundred square miles, with a population in the tens of millions. In matters of dimensions, scope and scale, it is an entirely new problem. And it is one we must take absolutely seriously.

Consider the relative value of each of our most expensive and prestigious weapon systems in such an environment. Tanks and infantry-fighting vehicles are of

 

small value, and future systems directly descended from them will continue to be of little worth in urban environments. The best weapon for urban combat remains the infantryman.

Yet casualty rates are terrific in urban combat. We need to seriously address this problem by designing weapons and support systems to enhance the infantryman's capability and survivability in urban surroundings. Then we need to consider what might lie beyond the infantryman as a select weapon for urban combat. Robotics, for instance, offers tantalizing possibilities.

Today our best-tailored force for urban combat is the light infantry division. But such a division fights with tools little improved since World War II. We could neither sustain nor tolerate the losses such a poorly equipped division would suffer in a hostile city of any significance.

Further, urban combat poses radically different problem sets for reconnaissance and intelligence personnel. Consider the complexity of conducting zone or even route reconnaissance in an inner city, or the skills required to execute intelligence preparation of the battlefield in the context of battle for areas such as Los Angeles, the German Ruhr area, or Mexico City.

Base-line technology already exists for tactical intelligence in urban environments, but no pertinent systems

 

are scheduled for procurement. Sensors whose characteristics maximize their effectiveness in rural environments have little to offer in combat for massive blocks of high-rise apartment buildings. In urban combat, there is also a dramatic increase in the vertical dimension confronting ground forces, reaching both skyward and down into the earth. Within this virtual maze, the enemy and the civilian population form a triangular relationship with our own forces. For the individual soldier, urban combat in the next century promises to be the most stressful form of conventional warfare.

Whatever the technology the future may bring, warfare will continue to be the domain of man. Machines will remain our tools. The human factor will continue to decide the most terrible wars. In fact, "quality soldiers, trained and led by competent and caring leaders, will remain key to success on future battlefields."⁹ In addition to training and leadership, the soldier of the 21st century should be equipped with a wide range of systems designed to facilitate military operations in the modern information age.

In conclusion, to be a relevant military force in the next century, the Armed Forces must learn to adapt themselves (like an entrepreneurial organization would) to the social, political, economic, and military changes which

 

are now upon us. While traditions based upon individual integrity, honor, and service to country must be retained, those based on discredited perceptions of the battlefield and of warfighting itself will be left where they belong --in the twilight of the 20th century.

As for the Marines, it is best said in the 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance. We shall be prepared to discharge "such other duties as the President may direct, whatever those duties may be. But, most of all, be prepared to fight and win."¹⁰

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

¹

 

 

 

ENDNOTES

            Carl von Clausewitz, On War (New Jersey: Princeton, 1984), 127.

²           FMFM 1, Warfighting (U.S.Government Printing Office:

1994-367-255-814/10245), 21.

 

³               FMFM 1, Warfighting (U.S. Government Printing Office:

1994-367-255-814/10245), 4.

 

⁴               V. V. Krysanov, "On the Features of Development of the Forms of Military Action," Voennaya mysl' 2: 1992, 42-45.

           

⁵              V. N. Mikhaylov, "The Keys from the Nuclear Arsenal," Pravitel' 12: 1991, 12.

⁶           William Perry, The Future of War (New York: Crown Publishers, 1997), 24.

 

⁷                 Stephen J. Cimbala, The Politics of Warfare (Univ. Park, Pa.: Penn State Univ. Press, 1996), 245.

 

⁸                 Stephen J. Cimbala, The Politics of Warfare (Univ. Park, Pa.: Penn State Univ. Press, 1996), 246.

 

⁹               U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5. Force

21 Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1 August 1994),1.

 

¹⁰          The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, A Marine Corps for the 21st Century (Marine Corps Gazette: August 1995), A-21.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. New Jersey: Princeton, 1984.

 

FMFM 1. Warfighting. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1994-367-255-814/10245.

 

Krysanov, V.V. "On the Features of Development of the Forms of Military Action." Voennaya mysl' 2,1992.

 

Mikhaylov, V.N. "The Keys from the Nuclear Arsenal." Pravitel' 12, 1991.

 

Perry, William, The Future of War. New York: Crown Publishers, 1997.

 

Cimbala, Stephen J., The Politics of Warfare. Univ. Park, Pa.: Penn State Univ. Press, 1996.

 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5. Force

21       Operations. Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army TRADOC, 1 August 1994.

 

The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance. A Marine Corps for the 21st Century. Marine Corps Gazette: August 1995.