Military

U.S. Strategy in Bosnia: Are We Really Committed?

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Topical Issues

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: U.S. Strategy in Bosnia: Are We Really Committed?

 

Author: Major Louis N. Rachal, USMC.

 

Thesis: The main theme of this essay contends that U.S. policymakers pursued a policy commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina that was short-sighted in vision and transparent in endstate. The U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, with its particular emphasis on the strategic objective of stability in Europe, provided policymakers the opportunity to implement Bosnian policy that linked short-term military objectives to long-term political objectives. However, the U.S. pursued a vacillating policy that was "evolutionary" in nature, influenced by world and public opinion, and key tragic events on the ground. Furthermore, U.S. policymakers established and pursued IFOR military objectives that were incompatible with the strategic objectives of the Dayton Peace Accord, and subsequently resulted in the obscure endstate of U.S. Bosnian policy.

 

Discussion: This analysis will review the "minimized evolution" of U.S. policy in Bosnia and the resulting failures that have occurred because of this approach. First, it reviews the reasoning behind U.S. involvement in Bosnia and the events that eventually led to the commitment of U.S. military forces. Second, the analysis addresses U.S. policymakers search for an endstate, and the consequences of non-involvement and involvement. Third, the analysis assesses the Dayton Peace Accords' primary objectives with a particular focus on the lack of linkage between military and strategic objectives. Additionally, an assessment of successes and failures are made on the military and civilian aspects of Dayton. Fourth, it evaluates the current SFOR mission and highlights the inherent problems for the NATO contingent, faced with a U.S. pull-out date that favors "nationalist" rhetoric and intransigence.

 

Conclusion: The "minimized evolution" policy approach to the Balkans has already revealed the weaknesses of its strategy. The failures of free and fair elections, war crimes prevention, civilian reconstruction, and refugees returning home was a direct result of an international community that was short-term in their approach to Bosnia, and subsequently resulted in the wrong perceptions held by Balkan nationalist leaders, political moderates, refugees, and displaced persons. The multi-ethnic, democratic nation-state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the strategic objective (political) of the Dayton Peace Accord, and the IFOR/SFOR military objectives has made this strategic objective elusive as the country moves towards partition. Conditions on the ground are "simmering" below the surface, as nationalist leaders, buoyed by the limited objectives of IFOR/SFOR, are solidifying their ethnic enclaves, and posturing for positional advantage in anticipation of the the U.S. pull out. Despite the unstable conditions in the Balkans, the U.S. still has the opportunity to make Dayton work. First, the U.S. must define and establish a definitive endstate in the Balkans and establish military objectives that secure the endstate (political objectives). Second, provisions within Dayton Peace Accords should be modified to address conditions that are moving Bosnia-Herzegovina towards partition. Finally, the Clinton Administration must inform, educate, and receive the support of the American people before committing U.S. resources to a Bosnian endstate that supports our National Security Strategy.

CONTENTS

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION.....................................1

 

Part One:   POLITICAL BACKGROUND........................6

 

      1.1    Road to U.S. Involvement....................6

 

      1.2    Engagement..................................7

 

Part Two:   SEARCH FOR AN ENDSTATE.....................12

 

      2.1    Diplomacy without Force....................12

 

      2.2    Consequences of non-involvement............14

 

      2.3    Consequences of involvement................16

 

Part Three: THE DAYTON PEACE PLAN......................17

 

      3.1    The Peace Accord...........................17

 

      3.2    Lack of Linkage: Military and Strategic                    Objectives.................................19

 

      3.3    Peace Accord Successes: Military &

             Civilian...................................23

 

      3.4    Peace Accord Failures: Military &

             Civilian...................................24

 

                  Partition.............................24

                  Elections.............................29

                  War Crimes Prosecution................30

                  Civilian Implementation...............33

                  Refugees Returning Home...............37

 

Part Four: AFTER IFOR.................................39

 

      4.1    SFOR's Mission.............................39

 

 

CONCLUSION..............................................42

 

ENDNOTES................................................46

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................49

 

ANNEXES

     Annex A: Summary of the Dayton Peace Accord.......54

 

INTRODUCTION

 

 

 

     Our strategy of engagement and enlargement is

central to U.S. policy toward Europe. European              stability is vital to our own security, a lesson

we have learned twice at great cost this century.           Vibrant European economies mean more jobs for

Americans at home and investment opportunities

abroad. With the collapse of the Soviet empire

and the emergence of many new democratizing states

in its wake, the United States has an unparalleled          opportunity to contribute toward a free and

undivided Europe. Our goal is an integrated

democratic Europe cooperating with the United

States to keep the peace and promote prosperity.[1]

 

     The engagement and enlargement strategy for Europe laid out by our National Security Strategy focuses on the promotion of democracy, peace, and prosperity in the region. The United States involvement in the Balkan conflict since 1991 has been an evolution of short-term policy objectives that have made conditions conducive for the promotion of democracy, peace, and prosperity in Europe. Yet, despite a National Security Strategy that defines our strategic objectives and intent for involvement in Europe, policymakers continue to pursue a U.S. commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina that is short-sighted in vision and transparent in endstate. The situation surrounding Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly meets the criteria for U.S. engagement and enlargement in Europe. However, U.S. actions represent a tentative, cautious approach to the region. Newly appointed Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, has vowed that American troops will be out of Bosnia in "another 18 months, even if there are renewed threats of war and genocide in the former Yugoslavia."[2] The signal that this statement sends to our NATO allies participating in the Bosnian mission -- as well as to players on the ground -- is one of luke-warm support for and short-term commitment to the current peace operation. Undoubtedly, the Dayton Peace Accord has been a substantial success if for no other reason than it stopped the war and began the peace process. Nonetheless, the true challenge to U.S. involvement in the former Yugoslavia is just beginning, assuming we are sincerely committed to the promotion of democracy, peace, and prosperity in the region.

 

     The Bosnian War that began in 1992, between the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, was a culmination of nationalist leadership exploitation of the Balkan peoples' religious differences that were prevalent throughout the region for approximately 500 years. Neither religious faction ever allowed domination of one over another, though there were periods throughout history during which they were ruled by outside forces (Ottoman Turks, Austrian Hapsburgs, Russia-Yugoslavia).[3] The break-up of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 gave the Serbian and Croatian political factions, through the opportunism and manipulation of nationalist leaders, the opportunity to pursue conditions they felt were favorable to their situation and resulted in the Bosnian conflict. U.S. policy during the 1991 time period focused on achieving a diplomatic solution to the crisis, without having to commit military forces. The American people had recently received their sons and daughters back from the successful Persian Gulf War and were not supportive of another military commitment. It was during this early stage that the U.S. had the opportunity to analyze the situation and establish a policy that provided short-term solutions to shape and enhance favorable long-term consequences. Instead, rather than display a steadfast commitment through diplomacy and physical presence, the U.S. proceeded with a policy that vacillated between world opinion, events on the ground, and political intransigence. In a region torn by ethnic and cultural differences, this vacillation nurtured and allowed the seeds of hatred to thrive, resulting in physical confrontation among the three ethnic groups. The declaration of Bosnia as an independent state by the United Nations in 1992 signaled the start of the Balkan Civil War and eventually drew the U.S. into a short-term, peace-keeping involvement -- but not before the atrocities of ethnic cleansing, wartime casualties, and displacement of citizens shocked the international community into effective intervention.

 

     This thesis will review current U.S. policy in Bosnia, with particular emphasis on its evolutionary progression, as influenced by world opinion, key tragic events occurring on the ground, and political intransigence, rather than an embracement of the "enlargement and engagement in Europe" strategy as stated in our National Security Strategy. Additionally, the thesis will address the lack of vision that current U.S. policy in Bosnia has demonstrated through the pursuit of incompatible military and strategic objectives and the potential long-term consequences that are destined to occur if not adjusted. This thesis is structured in the following manner:

     First, the thesis reviews the reasoning behind U.S. involvement in Bosnia and the events that eventually led to the commitment of U.S. military forces.

 

     Second, it will address U.S. policymaker's search for an endstate, or the more commonly referred term of "exit strategy", and the consequences of non-involvement and involvement.

 

     Third, the thesis analyzes the Dayton Peace Accords' primary objectives and the lack of linkage between military and strategic objectives. Additionally, the analysis will cover Dayton's measured degree of success and failure from both a military and civilian perspective -- focusing on short and longterm consequences.

 

     Finally, the thesis evaluates the current Stabilization Forces (SFOR) mission and highlights the inherent problems facing the NATO contingent as it attempts to resolve a complex problem with a short-term remedy.

PART ONE: POLITICAL BACKGROUND

 

1.1     Road to U.S. Involvement

 

     In 1991, the Bush Administration's limited involvement in Bosnia was very much influenced by the events occurring in the world during that period. The Persian Gulf War and the break-up of the former Soviet Union were the priorities facing the Administration. After these events had come to closure, the European Community (EC) tried to establish their leadership over the Balkan crisis through diplomacy. The Bush Administration continued to support both the European Community and United Nations (UN) effort through the Vance-Owen Plan. The Vance-Owen Plan was a joint effort between the EC (Lord David Owen) and the UN (Cyrus Vance) that called for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten autonomous provinces to be loosely governed by a weak, Muslim dominated, central government[4]. Serbian refusal to fully support the plan eventually led to the breakdown of the agreement and once again, the U.S. found itself standing on the diplomatic sidelines offering limited support to both the EC and the UN. The Bush Administration's support of the New World Order[5] in the Balkan crisis lacked a willingness to commit U.S. troops to an area that did not have the support of the American public and was ambiguously linked to our national interest. During this period, the Bush Administration's actions were limited to humanitarian and airlift support for UN operations and supporting the diplomatic efforts of the international community.

 

1.2     Engagement

 

     The Clinton Administration marked the U.S. first attempt to establish a Bosnia strategy and policy. The administration pursued diplomatic efforts with the international community to achieve the following goals:

 

- Stop the killing in Bosnia.

- Prevent the conflict from spreading.

- Bring concerted pressure on all parties,

       especially the Bosnian Serbs, to reach a peaceful

       settlement of the conflict.[6]

 

Pursuing these goals involved a mixed set of actions and options that began with diplomatic and economic efforts and ended with limited military measures. From the outset, there was no definitive endstate defined by U.S. policymakers. The overall strategy seemed to be one of "minimized evolution" tied to diplomatic, political, and public opinion support. An example of this "minimized evolution" approach was evidenced in the U.S. efforts concerning the arms embargo. Through 1993-94, the U.S. pursued diplomatic efforts to get the arms embargo (UNSCR 713) lifted. This arms embargo was imposed against the whole of Yugoslavia in September 1991 at the request of Belgrade, and ultimately resulted in providing the Bosnian Serbs a significant military advantage throughout the course of the war, due to the large military stockpiles maintained in the Former Yugoslavia. At the start of the war in 1992, the Bosnian Government had no army at all, much less arms from which to use in self-defense. Nonetheless, the Bosnian Muslims displayed a determined resilience against Serbian forces, given the imbalance in military arms, and U.S. policymakers believed that if the Bosnian Muslims could achieve some form of parity in the arms situation, they could withstand the Serbian attacks and force a favorable resolution to the war -- and ultimately minimize U.S. military involvement. However, the Clinton Administration faced strong political pressure from Great Britain, France, and Russia, who were in opposition to lifting the arms embargo, and proved to be significant obstacles to these diplomatic efforts. The arms embargo represented one of the unfortunate circumstances of the Bosnian War. Had the Bosnian Muslim's been given the opportunity to defend themselves from a position of military parity, they in all likelihood, would have been able to defend their territory and defeat the Bosnian Serb forces sooner rather than later. The Bosnian/Croat military successes in 1995 seem to support this argument. As Noel Malcolm, a political columnist and author of "Bosnia: A Short History," points out, "In the long term, the Bosnian arms embargo had not so much reduced the quantity of fighting as extended its duration."[7] Having reached a diplomatic impasse on lifting the arms embargo, the Clinton Administration continued to pursue the "minimized evolution" strategy, with its primary focus on regional stability and humanitarian support. Although slow, evolution towards military commitment ultimately occurred as situations moved from one set of events to another. It was not until the 5 February 1994 Sarajevo mortar massacre, during which 68 civilians were killed, that U.S. public opinion was swayed to support the commitment of American military forces to limited participation with NATO. U.S. led NATO forces began to conduct limited airstrikes against Serbian positions in hopes of pressuring the Serbs to accept a peace plan proposed by a "contact group" consisting of Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.S.[8] Despite the NATO airstrikes, the Serbs continued to show their resolve against the international community by continuing military actions against the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The Serbs recognized the "limited" airstrikes as minimal efforts by stronger powers who were unable to agree upon common, decisive, and forceful measures.[9] This unwillingness on the part of the international community, and particularly the U.S., to agree upon a common strategy, emboldened the Serbs to escalate their actions in hopes of further "splintering" the NATO coalition. The Serbs continued to flaunt their activity towards the NATO coalition by continued shelling of safe havens and the seizure of UN peacekeepers. In July 1995, Serbian atrocities in the safe havens of Srebrenica and Zepa finally galvanized world opinion and more importantly, U.S. opinion to pursue measures that would resolve the conflict. It was at this juncture that the Clinton Administration's policy stance evolved to increased military involvement, partially based on Serbian intransigence to U.S. limited military actions and partially based on a "shifting" of world opinion and U.S. public opinion against the Serbs. As world opinion and U.S. public opinion began to change, so did U.S. policy in the Balkans. The "clincher" that moved U.S. policy towards a determined resoluteness occurred with the Serbian mortar attack on the Sarajevo market place in August 1995, that killed 37 people. The U.S., through NATO, unleashed the full power of the coalition in the form of lethal airstrikes that destroyed command and control facilities, and significantly disrupted Serbian military operations. NATO had finally captured the Serbs attention. Additionally, the military successes of the Bosnian-Croation coalition forces in the Krajina and Bihac region began to change the land possession ratio in favor of the Bosnian Muslims and Croats.[10] The NATO coalition had finally created conditions that pushed the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table in Dayton, Ohio. The problem with an evolving strategy that was dependent on both U.S. and world public opinion, was that significant, tragic events such as Sarajevo, Srebrinica, and Zepa had to occur before meaningful actions were taken to halt the atrocities. Events were driving U.S. Bosnian policy -- the "minimized evolution" strategy -- rather than policy driving events. After approximately two years of U.S. military commitment under NATO, the U.S. had finally created conditions for all political factions to seek peace. Through implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord, the U.S. would agree to commit ground troops to implement the peace as part of a NATO coalition.

 

PART TWO: SEARCH FOR AN ENDSTATE

 

2.1     Diplomacy Without Force

 

In trying to "pin down" the endstate of U.S. policy towards the Bosnian crisis, one traces an involvement that is still evolving today. Secretary of Defense Cohen acknowledged that the administration's "exit strategy" for Bosnia was "elusive."[11] Just recently, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), during an Armed Services Committee meeting on 12 February 1997 to discuss the FY98 Defense Budget, stated the following:

 

   "I don't sense that we have any criteria for

exiting in the final analysis concerning Bosnia.

It seems our justification in Bosnia is becoming

more and more expensive at the cost of our

modernization program. There seems to be no

existing benchmark and we underestimated our time          

     commitment and expense cost."[12]

 

Even after a period of U.S. involvement that covered participation in the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and the current Stabilization Force (SFOR), congressional members, to include one member on the Armed Services Committee, continued to question the transparent endstate of U.S. Bosnian policy. The doctrine for employment of U.S. forces developed by former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in 1984 was the benchmark for U.S. military commitments during the 1980's, and included participation in the Persian Gulf War through Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell's influence. This doctrine became known as the Weinberger Doctrine and highlighted six points that had to be met in order for the U.S. to commit forces abroad:

 

    - No commitment of forces unless vital to U.S.

        national interest.

- If the U.S. commits forces, we go with a clear

        intention of winning.

- Poltical and and military objectives are clearly

        defined.

- Commitment must be continually reassessed and

        adjusted if necessary.

- Must have the support of American people and

        Congress.

- Use of U.S. forces should be last resort.[13]

 

     If during our Bosnian policy formulation, the strategist and policymakers had used the Weinberger Doctrine as their benchmark to establish an effective approach to the situation, they may have come up with a definitive, clearly defined endstate. Unfortunately, that was not the case. The question about national interest in the Balkan crisis is still a topic of debate. Political and military objectives are still not clearly defined and support of the American people and Congress has been appallingly inconsistent.

 

2.2     Consequences of Non-involvement

 

     The consequences of U.S. non-involvement in the Bosnian crisis were predictable. The war would have continued. The ethnic-cleansing atrocities would have continued, and the credibility of a Post-Cold War NATO would have been severely shaken. So why the question of our endstate? If our current policy has resolved the above-mentioned conditions, then did we not have a definitive, clearly defined endstate? The problems mentioned above, though stopped for the time being, are simmering below the surface, and ready to explode at the first opportunity. Major General Montgomery Meigs, 1st Infantry Division Commander in charge of U.S. forces in Bosnia recently commented, "These people are psychologically still at war."[14] Sergeant Greg Thurby, a Platoon Commander in the 1st Infantry Division stated, "It'll be a long time before they have peace here."[15] Policymakers should always trust the opinion of the personnel who are "on the ground" to get a true sense of the environment and the results of their plan. The problem with the endstate in U.S. Bosnian policy is the fact that we have given clear indications that our commitment is not for a long-term solution. Secretary of Defense Cohen's pledge to Congress that U.S. peacekeeping troops will leave Bosnia by June 1998, stating that "We are not going to be there" and "This is going to end at this point"[16] signaled our short-term commitment to the Bosnian crisis. There can be no endstate to foreign policy that has a self-imposed time limit to work within -- particularly concerning a geographic region that has been racked by war and atrocities on a large scale for the past few years.

 

 

2.3     Consequences of Involvement

 

     The consequences of U.S. involvement have been significant, particularly in the area of the military's modernization program. Again, Secretary of Defense Cohen pointed out that the administration's additional cost of $2.4 billion to cover the current Bosnian commitment has placed a drain on the services modernization programs.[17] Over the past three years, the cost of supporting Bosnian operations has been approximately $2 billion, with the money being funneled away from DoD modernization programs.[18] With a foreign policy that saw the commitment of military forces and the financial cost of approximately $7 billion to our DoD modernization program, why should the U.S. continue to support the Bosnian effort if we are not willing to stay the course for the duration? The question seems to address a U.S. policy that would establish a tangible endstate and a commitment that provides a long-term resolution. A U.S. commitment to "see this thing through" would support the National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement, and send a clear and definitive signal to allies and the Bosnian ethnic factions that regional stability would be the only acceptable endstate. Unfortunately, despite the superb successes of the IFOR mission, to include a cease-fire that has held for fifteen months, the conditions in Bosnia appear to be precarious at best. The country is increasingly ethnically divided and further away than ever from common governance. Military success at separating the parties has not led to multi-ethnic integration, the return of refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes, or freedom of movement. Painstaking work at local negotiations and cooperation can be upset overnight by political decisions in Sarajevo, Pale, Mostar, Zagreb, or Belgrade. The parties are continuing the war with non-lethal means, leading most to conclude that it is only a matter of time - when international forces depart - before hostilities resume.[19]

 

PART THREE: THE DAYTON PEACE PLAN

 

3.1     The Peace Accord

 

     What were the conditions that brought the Bosnian warring factions to the negotiation table after approximately three and a half years of fighting? The increased bombing campaign by the NATO forces, to include the launching of thirteen cruise missiles against Bosnian Serb military command and control installations in September 1995 convinced the Serbs that NATO resolve had suddenly changed. Additionally, the Serbian military force had grown weary of war. A Bosnian Serb Army colonel indicated that on the Serbian side, "People no longer want to fight. They are afraid. They have had enough of war."[20] The initial territorial gains made by the Bosnian Serbs at the start of the war were being lost to the effective military cooperation of the Croatian-Bosnian armies. By 1995, the Croatian-Bosnian military alliance began to assert themselves as a capable military force against the Bosnian Serbs. This situation, combined with the increased bombing campaign by the NATO forces and Milosevic's reluctance to commit additional forces, ultimately forced the Bosnian Serbs to seek a diplomatic solution. On 14 December 1995, after several weeks of intense diplomatic negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, President Slobadan Milosevic of Serbia, and Alija Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Accord in Paris.

    The Dayton Peace Accord basically recognized Bosnia as a single country divided into two parts: a Muslim-Croat federation and a Bosnian Serb Republic. A representative government would be established through free and democratic elections and all refugees would be guaranteed return to their homes and free movement throughout the country. Finally, the Peace Accord would be implemented by a NATO force and all parties were required to cooperate with the War Crimes Tribunal (See Annex A for Dayton Peace Accord Summary).

 

3.2     Lack of Linkage Between Military and Strategic              Objectives

 

     Clausewitz tells us that strategy is "the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war" and that the strategist must "draft the plan of war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements."[21] Understanding that Clausewitz was discussing strategy and its application during the prosecution of war, the strategy concept is still applicable in the analysis of the Dayton Peace Accord, and the link (or lack thereof) between strategic objectives (purpose) and military objectives (engagements). The strategic objective of the Dayton Peace Accord was peace in Bosnia and the preservation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic, democratic nation-state. The military objectives of the Dayton Peace Accord were to stop the fighting, separate the warring factions through a zone of separation, and return troops and weapons to cantonment areas. Both civilian and military leaders have been explicit in maintaining the separation between the military mission, with the mandate for withdrawal in one year, and the political objectives laid out in Dayton. This conscious separation of strategic and military objectives, a mind-set established from the outset by policymakers and military leaders, represents the major failure of the Dayton Peace Accord. Former Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, proposed the following "iron logic" for committing ground forces to the NATO IFOR:

 

- The U.S. has vital, political, economic and

       security interest in Europe.

- The war in Bosnia threatens these interests.

- We now have an opportunity to end this war.

- To seize this opportunity, a NATO force is

       required to implement the peace.

- The U.S. is the only nation that can lead that

       force to success.[22]

 

 

SecDef Perry's "iron logic" certainly supports Dayton's strategic objective of a free, multi-ethnic, Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and particular elements of the logic (vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe and the war in Bosnia threatens these interests) seems to imply a U.S. long-term commitment. However, SecDef Perry, in the same testimony to Congress stated "We believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we have built our plan based on that timeline" and "We expect that these civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year. But, even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison."[23] The mission SecDef Perry refers to is the military mission, and herein lies the disconnect between Dayton's strategic objective and IFOR's military objectives. The military objectives are focused on short-term fixes, ie., zones of separation, inter-entity boundary lines, and separate ethnic enclaves, all to be achieved within a year's time, while the purpose (Dayton's strategic goal) for U.S. involvement would require an open-ended commitment of both military and civilian resources -- until the strategic goal is achieved. The IFOR military objectives do not support the strategic objectives of Dayton, and this may be the key reason as to why U.S. involvement in Bosnia has no clear, definitive endstate. The wisdom of Clausewitz on strategy -- that all engagements (objectives - tactical, operational, strategic) are used to determine the purpose -- seems to have been validated by the current conditions in Bosnia. The military objectives (zones of separation, inter-entity boundary lines, ethnic enclaves), with its disconnect to the strategic objective of Dayton, has pushed the three ethnic factions towards partition, a condition that completely contradicts the multi-ethnic, nation-state intent of the Dayton Peace Accord. History is replete with failed campaigns that did not apply the basic principles of an effective strategy; the linkage of military objectives to secure the strategic goal or endstate. The French military campaign in Algeria, U.S. involvement in both Vietnam and Beirut, Lebanon (Beirut Bombing), are recent examples of military objectives that failed to support the strategic objectives, and ultimately resulted in defeat and tragedy. Weinberger's previously mentioned third point, "clearly defined political and military objectives," was developed for the specific reason to remind policymakers and military leaders that the two objectives are inextricably linked, in order to have an effective, successful strategy. Failure to link the IFOR military objectives to the strategic objectives of Dayton will not result in a NATO military defeat in Bosnia. NATO will be successful in accomplishing the military objectives of IFOR.  But if history proves correct for those who failed to link military objectives to strategic objectives, Bosnia-Herzegovina will not become the multi-ethnic nation-state as hoped for in the Dayton Peace Accord.

 

3.3     Peace Accord Successes: Military & Civilian

 

     The situation in Bosnia would certainly have been worse off without the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord. The NATO IFOR, comprised of men and women from 33 countries, successfully accomplished the military tasks within their mission. A cessation of hostilities has been achieved. Warring factions have been withdrawn to Zones of Separation. National elections were conducted within a secure environment. The withdrawal of heavy weapons and equipment into cantonment areas has been completed. The seeds of hope have been planted.[24] However, despite Dayton's best intentions, the arrangements concerning Bosnia's substate division, right of refugees to return home, free and democratic municipal elections as soon as possible, and war crimes resolution, seem to have gravitated away from a single, unified Bosnian state.

 

3.4     Peace Accord Failures: Military & Civilian

 

    Partition - No one naively thought that the Peace Accord would automatically resolve the ethnic conflicts inflamed by a three and a half year war.   However, the peace planners did not count on the phenomenon of "majoritization" to take place. Majoritization has become the defining principle of social organization in post-Dayton Bosnia, as the ruling parties of each camp endeavor to geographically concentrate their own communities. This phenomenon not only impedes practical steps toward reintegration, it has also tended to expose fissures within each ethnic community, fissures that are now a central feature within Bosnia.[25] IFOR, in the separation of warring factions and establishment of zones of separation, facilitated this majoritization effort, moving Bosnia further away from reintegration and closer to partition. Before the former-Yugoslavia broke up, Bosnia-Herzegovina represented an extraordinary multi-ethnic society during which three different peoples lived in a relatively cooperative, supporting, and coexisting manner. Despite the juxtaposition of ethnic groups, the Bosnian peoples' ethnic problems were no more different from those experienced throughout the world, to include the U.S. In Europe alone, Bosnia represented the one region where inter-ethnic cooperation was amenable.[26] So why then was the Balkan Civil War fought along the lines of ethnic division? After the fall of communist Yugoslavia in 1990, the political leaders of Serbia and Croatia, Milosevic and Tudjman, played the "nationalist" card in order to solidify their political power base and promote their personal agendas. The break-up of Yugoslavia left in its wake fragmented republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia) with large political vacuums, and this represented opportunity to the individual who could form a consensus of support. Through manipulative control of the media, political leaders Milosevic and Tudjman, solidified their power base by playing on the nationalistic fervor of their people and subsequently moved their countries towards the Balkan Civil War. Former Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Mr. Warren Zimmermann, best summed up the nationalistic manipulation conducted by Milosevic and Tudjman in the following:

 

The breakup of Yugoslavia is a classic example of

nationalism from the top down -- a manipulated             

     nationalism in a region where peace has historically       

     prevailed more than war and in which a quarter of

the population were in mixed marriages. The                

     manipulators condoned and even provoked local ethnic       

     violence in order to engender animosities that could       

     then be magnified by the press, leading to further

violence.[27]

 

Multi-ethnicity and different cultures living together in civility and harmony were nothing new to the Balkan peoples. However, they allowed themselves to be manipulated into thinking that one race was superior to another and that they could no longer live in a coexisting state.

 

     So it seems, that in the aftermath of the Bosnian war, if there was any region in Europe that might stand the chance of creating a multi-ethnic nation-state, Bosnia is the place. Unfortunately, the Dayton Peace Accord are accomplishing the opposite. As pointed out earlier, the irony of the accord is that one of the missions of IFOR - to separate the warring factions and facilitate the re-establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single, multi-ethnic state - has failed to accomplish its mandate. The use of IFOR to establish zones of separation between ethnic and religious groups, reinforced the nationalistic goals that the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croat leadership initially set out to achieve in 1992. To the satisfaction of the nationalist ethnic leaders within Bosnia, the "separation of warring factions" has successfully moved Bosnia away from a united, decentralized, state to one of partition -- the existence, for all intents and purposes, of three separate, autonomous, republics. The term Inter-Entity Boundary Line (Annex 2, Dayton Accord), implies partition between the three Bosnian factions, and reinforces opportunities for the continuation of nationalistic fervor that was so responsible for the war in the beginning. Similar to the U.S.' inability to visualize an endstate strategy for participation in Bosnia, the Dayton Accord provided no phased implementation approach to the separation of the warring factions, with a follow-up plan to reintegrate the ethnic parties into a multi-ethnic nation-state.      

 

     Is partition the best alternative for Bosnia, considering the hatred that is still prevalent between the three different ethnic cultures today? There are some who propose that the three factions be allowed to "self determine" their own existence through the establishment of a plebiscite in each ethnic region, wherein the people would choose between a multi-ethnic Bosnia or partition.[28] Others contend that neither a multi-ethnic Bosnia nor partition can survive the long run separately, but when combined, prove to be the formula for survival, particularly from the perspectives of political, economic, and strategic reality.[29] The problem with the Peace Plan is that it states one thing - the recreation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzogovina as one sovereign, independent, multiethnic, nation-state - yet promotes the "sovereign" equality of each party -- through partition. Partition was not the original intent of the peace accords. Accordingly, this majoritization and partition effort has resulted in a number of Muslim and Serb clashes as refugees attempted to resettle into their former homes. The recent clash that occurred between the villages of Celic (Muslim territory) and Koraj (Serb-held territories) in November 1996, highlight the difficulties. Serbs claimed that the Muslim attempts at resettlement were disguised military operations to retake the former Muslim villages. Caught in the middle were IFOR forces supporting Serbian claims as NATO spokesman Major Simon Haselock stated, "We believe this to be a deliberate, orchestrated, and provocative move to circumvent established procedures for the return of refugees."[30] In addition, Serbian forces undertook a strategy to consolidate the separation of ethnic enclaves by "dynamiting" Muslim designated resettlement homes. Recent activities throughout Bosnia reinforced a commonly-held notion that IFOR and SFOR were providing nothing more than temporary stability. Despite this picture, the U.S. continues to advertise a June 1998 exit strategy that encourages nationalist intransigence and a "wait them out" mentality.

 

     Elections - The elections guaranteed by the Peace Accords called for "free and democratic elections." After the September 1995 elections, the U.S. basically acknowledged that the elections had been far from the "free, fair, and democratic" elections that Dayton had originally hoped to achieve. As former U.S. diplomat overseeing the vote, Robert Frowick, commented, "The best we can hope for is a reasonably democratic electoral process" and "To call the elections 'free and fair' would be stretching it."[31] The questionable elections process seemed to be a hurried check-block approach as the U.S. IFOR contingent quickly approached their December withdrawal deadline. Again, the time limited U.S. exit strategy, without a commitment to a definitive Balkan endstate, resulted in electoral conditions that did nothing more than substantiate the consolidation of nationalistic support for all three Bosnian political parties.

 

     War Crimes Prosecution - The failure of the Peace Accords as it pertains to war crimes prosecution is probably the most disappointing aspect of the IFOR mission. Prosecution of those individuals indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague would be the one distinct act that would automatically begin the cathartic healing of the effected Bosnian peoples, and signal to all factions that "true peace" is the ultimate goal of the international community. In particular, the indictment of Radovan Karadzic, a Bosnian Serb political leader, and General Ratko Mladic, the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, by the War Crimes Tribunal, as well as the refusal of the IFOR contingent, or lack of any other international body, to bring these two individuals to justice, completely discredits the overall intent of the peace process. The political minefield that the Clinton Administration would have to navigate for U.S. forces to participate in the capture of war criminals presents a difficult dilemma. In particular, the capture of Karadzic and Mladic would in all probability lead to the eventual indictment of the Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic. In the earlier stages of the Dayton Peace Accord, U.S. policymakers believed that without Milosevic's support, there could be no successful achievement of peace in the region.[32] Therefore, IFOR, nor any other international contingent, pursued the capture of Karadzic and Mladic. Times have changed now. Milosevic is facing an internal struggle within Serbia that has completely focused his efforts away from Bosnia. In a sense, the umbilical cord from Serbia to the Bosnian Serb state is practically severed as Milosevic struggles for his own political survival. The opportunity would have been "ripe" for the capture of these two prominent war criminals had U.S. policy been structured in a manner that fully supported an endstate that aggressively pursued the prosecution of all war criminals. Meanwhile, the worst consequences of the failure to apprehend war criminals is coming to fruition in the Bosnian Serb state. Karadzic is still in power through financial control of companies that monopolize the sales of cigarettes, gasoline, building materials, and cattle.[33] He is using the profits from these sales to line his pockets, financially support his loyal Bosnian Serb police, and control the economic infrastructure of the Bosnian Serb state. These conditions are destabilizing the political influence of his successor, Biljana Plavsic (Bosnian Serb President), and consequently destabilizing the efforts hoped for in the election process established by Dayton. Karadzic's impudence is a stark validation of the fallacy in the current policy that the international community has taken towards war criminals. His influence throughout the Bosnian Serb state is cancerous, as his actions negatively impact both the political and economic structures implemented by the Dayton Peace Accord. Karadzic's cancerous influence extends beyond the Bosnian Serb state, through the impact he has on refugees hoping to return to their home of origin, who recognize "no change" in the status quo that originally forced them from their homes. Allowing indicted war criminals Karadzic and Mladic to pursue financial prosperity and political influence within their own Bosnian Serb state completely destroys the credibility of any efforts conducted at the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, and sends the wrong message to nationalist leaders, moderates, refugees, and displaced persons -- that conditions remain the same!

 

     Civilian Implementation - Though the military mission in Bosnia has been a qualified success, the outcome of the civilian reconstruction efforts framed by Annex 10 (Civilian Implementation) of the Peace Accords remains to be seen. The Pentagon has insisted that there be a distinct separation between the military and civilian aspects of the operation and blames the Europeans for delays in the civilian operation while the Europeans insist that the cause of the delays has been this unsustainable separation and U.S. delays on economic funds.[34] The task in successfully orchestrating the reconstruction of a country that has been at war for 4 years seems daunting, particularly when considering the continued instability within the region. The World Bank has estimated that the country would need approximately $5.1 billion over the next 3 years just to begin the process of recovery.[35]

 

     In 1996, fifteen countries pledged $1.8 billion towards the reconstruction effort in Bosnia. To date, approximately 30 percent has been received. International investors, companies, etc., are unwilling to take the risk of heavily investing in a country that is politically unstable. The Office of the High Representative, the office established by the Peace Accords to coordinate the reconstruction effort and led by Carl Bildt, has been struggling with the job of coordinating the funds coming into Bosnia from the World Bank, the European Union, and other international donors. The flow of international aid into Bosnia has attracted and created an "aid infrastructure" of hundreds of organizations, private groups, international contractors, management consultants, and engineers.[36] And with this "aid infrastructure" has come the unfortunate realities of corruption, mismanagement, and criminal activity. Mark Brown, Vice-President for External Affairs of the World Bank, stated that "Real success will remain elusive in Bosnia as long as peace remains fragile" and that "international effort remains as plagued by difficulties as any national reconstruction effort in a divided country might be expected to be."[37]

    

     The potential investment capital being withheld from Bosnia is directly related to the unpredictability of its future. Policymakers should consider the economic opportunities that a unified, stable Bosnia-Herzegovenia would offer to businesses and neighboring countries. Before the war, Bosnia was considered an economically stable country, relatively rich by Eastern European standards, with a large, educated urban middle class. With the country's natural resources and an educated working class to process those resources, Bosnia would be an attractive investment opportunity for any business attempting to fill the numerous economic infrastructure "voids" caused by the war. Unfortunately, half of that middle class lives in neighboring countries as war refugees, the economic infrastructure is completely stripped, and the country is drifting away from reunification. Despite the setbacks, there have been some successes. Bosnia's main railway from Sarajevo to the coast is operating again; the Sarejevo airport is opened to commercial air traffic; several key road links between Bosnia's cities are now in use; three of the country's principal power plants are being rehabilitated; repairs have been made to tens of thousands of homes; and basic infrastructure services such as water, sewage, heating, and electricity are being restored throughout the country.[38] Unfortunately, the U.S.' short-term commitment to the reintegration of Bosnia has perpetuated a sense of uncertainty and stalemate, particularly as it pertains to Bosnia's ability to offer long-term economic opportunity and growth, and will remain in that condition until a more definitive endstate can be established.

 

     Refugees Returning Home - Annex 7 (Refugees and Displaced Persons) of the Dayton Peace Accord states the following:

 

All refugees and displaced persons have the right

freely to return to their homes of origin. The

Parties (Bosnia Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and            

     Croatia) shall ensure that refugees and displaced          

     persons are permitted to return in safety, without

     risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or          

     discrimination, particularly on account of their

ethnic origin, religious belief, or political o            

     opinion.[39]

 

As of September 1996, approximately 2.3 million Bosnians were in either a refugee or internally displaced person status, and by November 1996, only 225,000-250,000 had returned to their country of origin.[40] Repatriation of refugees to their original homes has been extremely slow, and in best-case scenarios, would take several years. After Dayton, there was pressure from the international community to repatriate the refugees to their countries sooner rather than later. However, refugees are hesitant to come back to a country that still has nationalist leaders entrenched in power and pursuing policies that separate their states along ethnic lines. They are very much aware that these were the same prevaling conditions that led to war in the first place.  Ethnic confrontations such as house bombings and physical confrontation in the cities of Brcko, Jusici, and Gajevi are conditions that do not measure up to the promises of Dayton, and reveal the weaknesses of IFOR's military mission to secure Dayton's strategic goal. The Zones of Separation and Inter-Entity Boundary Lines severely limit freedom of movement throughout the country as refugees and displaced persons attempt to reclaim their homes. With a political climate in which nationalist leaders are openly pursuing policies that support partition, the region will continue to be perceived as "unstable" in the eyes of the refugees and displaced persons, and significantly impede the repatriation process hoped for in Dayton.

 

     There are those who vociferously enumerate the many shortcomings of the Dayton Peace Accord. Others claim that Post-War Bosnia is no better off than they were during the war years. To be sure, the Dayton Peace Accord and IFOR's implementation of the accord has been a measured success. However, had the U.S. taken their policy a step further, to include the commitment to accomplish a definable endstate, we could have eliminated diplomatic and political second-guessing while reassuring our allies that the U.S. National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement was a creditable strategy. An inconsistent Bosnian endstate strategy resulted in the following conditions as IFOR began its pull-out in December of 1996:

 

  By implementing only military provisions of the

Dayton accords, with a zone of separation as its

major achievement, IFOR has strengthened partition

instead of helping the reintegration of Bosnia.            

     Without freedom of movement in the country, without        

     security for more than 2 million Bosnians even to

visit their homes and towns from which they were           

     expelled, with indicted war criminals enjoying             

     protection and even influence in Serb and                  

     Croat-controlled territories, with the same                

     nationalistic parties that started the war now             

     strengthened by elections marked by fraud and              

     intimidation - with all these problems still

festering, it is clear that the troops departing

Bosnia are leaving behind a peace that cannot last.[41]

 

PART FOUR: AFTER IFOR

 

4.1     SFOR's Mission

 

 

   I am absolutely convinced that all U.S. troops

would be out of Bosnia by the end of the year.

I cannot imagine circumstances changing in such

a way that we would remain in Bosnia.[42]

 

General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

(Comment to Washington Post reporters in April 1995)

 

     As the December 1996 deadline for the U. S. pull-out of forces approached, the Administration's lack of a viable endstate to the Bosnian conflict was never more apparent. Throughout the year, Senior Administration officials refused to acknowledge any proposed change in plan, despite rumors "to the effect" that policy planners were trying to establish conditions for a follow-on force to IFOR. Military planners indicated that, as late as October 1996, they were still unsure of the specific role that the U.S. military would play in an "after IFOR" mission.[43] By November, planners were aware that the U.S. intended to support SFOR. On 15 December 1996, President Clinton formally approved U.S. participation in NATO's deployment of SFOR to Bosnia. As had occurred in the past, U.S. policy "evolved" to participation in the SFOR NATO contingent. SFOR's mission was to deter a resumption of hostilities and to stabilize the security environment to facilitate the civilian implementation process.[44]

 

     SFOR's downsizing in the U.S. contingent from 20,000 troops to 8,500 troops seems to support an eventual end to U.S. participation in the Bosnian conflict. Additionally, senior Administration officials, to include Secretary of Defense Cohen, and congressional leaders are embracing the proposed June 1998 pull-out of U.S. forces from Bosnia. NATO officials are tip-toeing around the difficult issues that might cause confrontation between SFOR and the Bosnian factions as evidenced by the recent decision on the city of Brcko. The city of Brcko was left unsettled in the Dayton Peace Accord. Serbs controlled the city when the fighting ended while the Muslims claimed that they were the largest ethnic group occupying the city before the war. For the Serbs, Brcko represents a vital possession on the Posavina Corridor that links the eastern and western Bosnian Serb Republic. For the Muslims, Brcko represents their only access to the Sava River. NATO officials were supposed to arbitrate the destination of Brcko by 14 February 1997. They chose to postpone the decision until March 1998 in order to reduce the underlying tensions in the area.[45] NATO's SFOR troop strength of 31,000, a reduction from IFOR's 61,000, seems to indicate a waning commitment by both the EC and the U.S. Support seems to be increasing for the decision to let our European allies assume responsibility for Bosnia in June 1998.[46] SFOR's major task will be to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a stable environment which will allow the civil organizations to carry out their responsibilities. SFOR will seek to maintain a low profile with minimal confrontation as the U.S. moves towards pulling out of Bosnia in 1998.

 

CONCLUSION:

 

     President Clinton stated that "the conflict in Bosnia is the most dangerous threat to European security since the end of the Second World War", and that "there is the very real risk that it could spread beyond Bosnia, and involve Europe's new democracies as well as our NATO allies."[47] The President used this argument to persuade members of Congress and the American people to support his request to send troops into Bosnia to execute the military mission of the Dayton Peace Accord. The argument falls right in line with the U.S. National Security Strategy of "engagement and enlargement in Europe", yet our current policy is shaping an exit strategy that completely contradicts the President's original intent for U.S. involvement in Bosnia. The June 1998 pull-out deadline, advertised by senior Clinton Administration officials, is indicative of the evolutionary approach that U.S. policymakers have pursued in the Balkans. This strategy focused on an exit, but not a viable, developed policy endstate. We are seeing the potential long-term consequences, as evidenced through the Dayton Peace Accord numerous shortcomings of partition, election fraud, civilian reconstruction, war criminal prosecution, freedom of movement, and refugees returning home. The signals from the troops on the ground indicate the conditions between the three factions are explosive and far from being resolved by the June 1998 deadline. On the contrary, conditions are boiling just beneath the surface, and the Bosnian factions seem to be biding their time as they await the anticipated U.S. pull-out. U.S. expectations that Europe will assume responsibility for resolving the Balkan crisis after U.S. pull-out are ill-founded and completely irresponsive to the "signals" being sent by our NATO allies. Britain's ambassador to the U.S., John Kerr, clearly revealed British resolve towards the Balkan crisis by stating "the war in Bosnia could rumble on for years without directly impinging on the security of Western Europe."[48] Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge, Chief of the British Defense Staff, was more specific in clarifying Britain's intent in the event of U.S. pullout by stating, "the understanding has always been, all in together, all out together."[49] Without U.S. participation, NATO support will almost certainly fragment. If this occurs, the Balkans could explode, and all the events that forced U.S. military commitment in the region will play itself out on the world scene again.

 

     However, the opportunity still exists to adjust our foreign policy in the Balkans and make the Dayton Peace Accord work. First, the U.S. must define and establish a definitive endstate in the Balkans that is committed to the long-term goal of a peaceful, multi-ethnic Bosnian nation-state. Second, provisions within the Dayton Peace Accords should be modified to address the unforeseen shortcomings that are now being nurtured through the execution of its provisions. In particular, the country's movement towards partition and the intransigence exhibited towards prominent war crimes indictments. Finally, the Administration needs to inform, educate, and receive the support of the American public before committing U.S. resources to a definitive, [50]conclusive Bosnian endstate that accomplishes U.S. foreign policy objectives as indicated in the National Security Strategy of engagement and enlargement.

 

     The lack of a Bosnian policy endstate is the primary reason that we are currently moving towards disengagement. Unfortunately, a continuation in the direction of complete U.S. disengagement may place the successes of the Dayton Peace Accord at risk and plunge the region back into military confrontation. Consequently, the gains made over the past sixteen months would have been for nothing, and the U.S. may find itself back in the Balkans with a larger price to pay.

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ANNEX A

 

 

 

SUMMARY OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORD

 

1. Country - Bosnia will be a single country divided into two parts: a Muslim Croat federation, covering roughly 51 percent of the land, and a Bosnian Serb republic, with 49%.

 

2.  Government - Each entity will have its own president and legislature; the central government will have a collective presidency; the parliament's membership will be two-thirds Muslim and Croat and one-third Serb. The central government in Sarajevo will be responsible for foreign, economic, and monetary policy, citizenship, immigration and other issues.

 

3. Elections - Free and democratic elections will be held within six to nine months for all elective offices in central government and the two entities; international monitors will be present. Leaders who have been indicted on charges of genocide by the tribunal will be barred from holding office.

 

4. Refugees - The return of refugees to their homes, with free movement, is guaranteed.

 

5. Foreign Soldiers - All foreign combatants must leave.

 

6. Peacekeeping - The Peace Accord will be implemented by a NATO force of 60,000, including 20,000 thousand Americans.

 

7. War Crimes - All parties are required to cooperate with the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: Washington Post, 15 December 1995, Sec. A46.