Military

Is It Time To Subsidize American Sealift? An Alternative View For Strategic Sealift Requirements In The 21st Century.

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Warfighting

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Is It Time To Subsidize American Sealift? An Alternative View For Strategic Sealift Requirements In The 21st Century.

 

Author: LCDR John C. Pirmann, SC, USN

 

Research Question: Are there any options to the strategic sealift programs currently in place within the Department of Defense? Is it time to consider various forms of significant subsidies to the American sealift industry to satisfy the strategic sealift requirements of the 21st century?

 

Discussion: In-depth analysis of the U.S. build-up of forces and logistics for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicates that of three million short tons of equipment and supplies moved to the Gulf, 2.85 million short tons or 95 per cent moved by sea. A total of 288 vessels were used in this effort and it is of particular concern that 163 of these ships were foreign flag charters

 

            This paper will examine, in detail the lift contributed by Department of Defense sealift assets to the mobility requirement of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Furthermore, it will offer some alternatives to the current strategic sealift acquisition and employment strategies including the use of emerging "Fast Ship" technology.

 

Conclusion: Post-Cold War uncertainty dictates that the U.S. be able to respond to a wide variety of contingencies across the threat spectrum. The shift from forwad-based to power-projection forces has increased the need for strategic sealift in spite of a rapid and substantial drawdown in military personnel endstrength and reductions in funding.

 

            It is clear that the U.S. requires a responsive sealift capability that can transport all types of unit equipment and sustainment in a timely manner if it is to exercise its military role worldwide. It is also clear that this will be done with fewer forward deployed troops, smaller forces and a reduced budget.  Strategic sealift concerns may very well be overcome by strategic seaborne mobility concerns and it is this strategic seaborne mobility that will become even more important in the future since timeliness will be the imperative. The acquisition and employment of strategic sealift platforms, as they currently exist, will make it too expensive for the U.S. to continue its strategy of unilateral response should it be required.

 

            Prepositioning has been and continues to be a great success especially in the face of our decreased overseas presence. They must maintain their emphasis on a Roll-on/Roll-off capability. However, they do not have to be dependent upon existing hull types. The emerging "Fast Ship" technology is a promising alternative to the technology currently in use.

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            Ships in the Ready Reserve Force and the National Defense Reserve Fleet with a commercial potential must be identified and offered as commercial charters to the American sealift industry at rates which will make these companies viable in the international market. Such charters will allow for the continuous manning of these vessels and eliminate the manpower shortage experienced by the Military Sealift Command in the Gulf. Any remaining ships in these forces which are not commercially viable and do not possess an absolutely essential military capability should be scrapped to eliminate their maintenance and potential activation costs.

 

            In this age of budgetary reductions, it remains incumbent upon the decision makers of the country to ensure that each dollar is wisely spent and produces the maximum benefit for the country as a whole. Moneys spent to construct the most technologically advanced vessels that will subsequently be operated in the private sector to the benefit of the American economy must be see as a wise investment. Not only is the requirement for strategic sealift realized, the revitalization of the American maritime industry is achieved at the same time.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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CONTENTS

 

 

CHAPTER

 

I            INTRODUCTION                                                                                          1

 

II          AN ANALYSIS OF SEALIFT FOR DESERT SHIELD/

            DESERT STORM                                                                                           3

                        PREPOSITIONED FORCES

                                    OPERATIONS IN ODS

                                    LIMITATIONS

                        FAST SEALIFT SHIPS

                                    OPERATIONS IN ODS

                                    LIMITATIONS

                        READY RESERVE FORCES

                                    OPERATIONS IN ODS

                                    LIMITATIONS

                        NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET

 

III            CURRENT STATUS AND INITIATIVES                                                 11

 

IV            FUTURE OPTIONS                                                                                     17

 

V            RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS                                           25

 

 

ENDNOTES                                                                                                               31

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                                      33

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

            Since its inception, the United States has, of necessity, been a seafaring nation. Its very existence has been, and still is, dependent upon the freedom of navigation of the sea lanes of communication and commerce. To that end, the United States has been equally dependent upon a naval force sufficient to defend these sea lanes and to project power in support of national aims. As described by Alfred Thayer Mahan, the necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs from the existence of and a requirement for peaceful shipping.[1] A portion of any navy is its strategic sealift capability, the resident ability to move large amounts of men, materiel and their sustainment in a timely fashion to those locations deemed necessary by the National Command Authorities in a timely manner to support political decisions with regards to national security.

            From Mahan's standpoint, World War II can be viewed as the zenith of United States seapower. In 1945, at the end of the war, the U.S. Navy had 610 amphibious warships in commission. These ships, loaded with troops and their associated equipment and supplies, provided a forcible entry capability never before seen. In addition, to support the overseas war effort, the U.S. flagged merchant marine consisted of more than 2,114 active and 1,582 inactive ships representing a total shipping capacity in excess of 40 million deadweight tons.[2] By 1 January 1991, the U.S. merchant marine fleet had been reduced to only 408 oceangoing vessels of 1,000 gross tons or more of which only 134 had militarily useful dry cargo capability.[3] At this same time, the entire U.S. Navy, amphibious, auxillary and combatant ships combined, consisted of less than 450 ships of all classes.[4] Furthermore, this downward trend is projected to continue for both the U.S. Navy and merchant marine fleets through the turn of the century.

            As has been recently demonstrated by operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS), contingencies can happen anywhere in the world. The United States must have the unilateral ability to project power anywhere, at any time to protect its national interests. ODS demonstrated a successful example of strategic sealift in support of national goals. However, it must be viewed as a qualified success from a strictly national viewpoint. Simply put, the United States did not achieve this success by itself. Instead, the movement of military personnel and materiel required for ODS relied heavily upon foreign flagged vessels from allied and other nations. Future conflicts will, in all likelihood, involve the concerted efforts of a coalition of nations. In this regard, ODS can be viewed as a blueprint for future operations. However, it is just as likely that there will arise those occasions in which the United States chooses to, or is forced to, act unilaterally. Presently, the United States does not possess the ability, within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the American sealift industry, to duplicate another operation the size of the Gulf War.

            Following the Gulf War, the DOD conducted the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS), the Bottom-up Review (BUR), and subsequently the Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-up Review Update (MRS/BURU) to determine the force structure and strategic mobility assets required to fight and win two, nearly simultaneous, major regional contingencies as set forth in the National Defense Strategy. The MRS/BURU identified strategic mobility shortfalls and made procurement recommendations to correct them.[5] This paper will review the sealift operation that was required for ODS, current initiatives within the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and its subordinate command, the Military Sealift Command (MSC), to address strategic sealift shortfalls as well as innovations in the private sector, and examine various methods to satisfy sealift shortfalls as well as subsidizing the American sealift industry.

 

CHAPTER II

AN ANALYSIS OF SEALIFT FOR DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

            United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Operational Plan 1002-90 was the basic plan used for ODS.[6] This plan called for the largest build-up of forces and logistics for any operation since World War II and it came as no suprise that USTRANSCOM was unable to meet the enormous transportation requirements of this OPLAN utilizing MSC assets and American flagged carriers alone. VADM Paul D. Butcher, in testimony to the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine in September of 1990, stated that national security policy relies heavily on the maritime industry to meet strategic sealift requirements in any foreign crisis and it was estimated that 95 percent of all dry cargo and 99 percent of all petroleum products would be delivered to the Gulf War by sea.[7] In point of fact, of the more than three million short tons of equipment and supplies moved to the Gulf, 95 percent moved by sea.[8] Vice Admiral Butcher was proven to be remarkably prescient.

            Sealift in ODS consisted of three parts and utilized a total of 288 ships of all classes. The first consisted of 97 ships under U. S. government control. The second was comprised of 28 charter vessels under U.S. flag or those under U.S. economic control. The third portion consisted of 163 foreign flagged vessels.[9] A straight forward "number crunch" reveals that over 56 percent of the total shipping utilized, by hull, was foreign flagged. However, this does not take into account the gross tonnage, cargo tonnage or class of ships such as Roll On/Roll Off (RORO), Container Carrier, Petroleum Tanker or Break Bulk Dry Cargo. A closer analysis reveals that 48 percent of all materiel moved aboard U.S. government controlled vessels, 10.5 percent aboard U.S. flagged charters and 41.5 percent on foreign flagged charters.[10] Compared to the ship utilization figures, the dependence upon foreign flagged vessels in this analysis is reduced by over 15 percent. It seems obvious that without the assistance of foreign flagged shipping, ODS would have required a significantly longer period of time for the shipment and build-up of all types of materiel in the theater of operations. What is required is a detailed examination of U.S. government controlled assets.

            Consisting of Prepositioned Forces, Fast Sealift Ships (FSS), the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), government controlled shipping at the onset of the Gulf crisis represented a significant investment of DOD dollars. What did they deliver? What was their performance and what, if any, are their limitations?

 

 

PREPOSITIONED FORCES

 

OPERATIONS IN ODS

            Prepositioned Forces were the most outstanding aspect of the entire strategic sealift campaign, a resounding success by any measure. Having their genesis in the late 1970's, their purpose was to support the Carter Administration Doctrine that declared the Middle East an area of vital interest to the United States. Moderate and even friendly Middle Eastern countries of the time had no interest in hosting permanently stationed U.S. military forces, in the fashion that the countries of western Europe did, on their own soil.[11] The idea of storing significant quantities of precious military equipment aboard ships around the world coupled with the associated cost of ships and crews was not only controversial, it was viewed as undesirable by all services with the single exception of the Marine Corps. The concept subsequently became more palatable under the massive military build-up during the Reagan administration with its corresponding increase in funding.

            At the onset of the Gulf crisis, the prepositioned forces consisted of twenty five ships, thirteen Maritime Preposition Ships (MPS) loaded with Marine Corps equipment and supplies and twelve Afloat Preposition Ships (APS) loaded with Army and Air Force support equipment and supplies along with a deployable Navy Field Hospital. The MPS ships were divided into three squadrons and stationed in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. Of the APS ships, eleven operated out of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and one was in the Mediterranean.[12]

            Within hours of receipt of orders to get underway on August 8, 1990, the ships of MPS Squadrons Two and Three were enroute to the Persian Gulf. Three ships of MPS Squadron Two arrived in Saudi Arabia just seven days later on 15 August, 1990 and began their offload. The fourth and fifth ships of Squadron Two arrived on 24 August and 5 September, 1990 respectively. The ships of MPS Squadron Three arrived on 25 and 29 August, 1990. These ships had departed anchor from ports in Diego Garcia and as far away as Singapore in south east Asia and Florida in the United States.[13]

            Nine ships of the APS departed Diego Garcia at 15 minute intervals beginning on 9 August, 1990 and arrived only eight days later in Saudi Arabia. MPS Squadron One was ordered to the Gulf on 14 November, 1990 and arrived seven days later.[14]

 

LIMITATIONS

            There are few limitations to the capabilities and usefulness of the prepositioned forces. However, their forward deployment and the high value of their cargo make them a potential target for terrorist activities or preemptive strikes by any potential enemy. This potential is partially offset by the increasing requirement for prepositioned materiel in the face of the decreasing presence of U.S. military forces permanently based overseas.

            The tour of duty for members of the Naval Support Element aboard prepositioned ships is one year. Without follow on tours, there is very little opportunity to build a level of expertise within the military personnel of the prepositioned fleet. In addition, civilian crews assigned to these ships rotate every four months. Fortunately, most of the crew members return to the same ship or another ship within the same squadron in subsequent rotations. Although they have frequent underway periods, an MPS squadron for example, only participates in an amphibious exercise about once a year further raising the question of resident expertise.[15]

            The investment in the Prepositioned forces during the 1980's was validated and the actual results it produced were undeniable during ODS. The ships of MPS Squadron Two were docked in Saudi Arabia and unloading unit equipment for the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade a full day before the first of the Fast Sealift Ships departed Savannah, Georgia with equipment for the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division.[16]

 

FAST SEALIFT SHIPS

 

OPERATIONS IN ODS

            The Fast Sealift Ships (FSS) comprise a single squadron of eight ships of identical design. Originally designated the SL-7 class, they were initially constructed for the Sea-Land Services company in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Conventional oil fired steam plants provided these ships with speed in excess of 30 knots. The oil embargo of 1972 subsequently made them uneconomical to operate by the private sector and they were purchased by the U.S. Navy in the early 1980's. Converted in U.S. shipyards to include a RORO, container and limited break bulk capability, MSC placed them in a reduced operating status in 1985. Manned with a core crew of nine merchant mariners, they were designed to respond to an activation order in 96 hours. As a frame of reference, these eight ships combined represent the lift equivalent of 2,100 C-5 and C-141 sorties.[17]

            It took an average of six days to activate all eight ships of the squadron, two days longer than advertised, and they were used load out the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division at the port of Savannah Georgia. The first FSS vessel arrived in Saudi Arabia 27 August, 1990 only sixteen days after activation.[18] Although not as responsive as the Prepositioned Forces due to their reduced operating maintenance status and their lack of a permanent complete crew, all eight of the FSS vessels sailed within sixteen days of activation and delivered in excess of 350,000 short tons of material, more than ten percent of the total sealift to the Gulf.[19]

 

LIMITATIONS

            Despite their enormous cargo capacity, coupled with their impressive speed, the FSS fleet is not without limitations. The required crew of 42 people, necessary to operate these steam powered ships, is well beyond the crew size of today's low speed diesel powered merchant vessel. Given that only nine personnel are in the core crew, the activation of a single ship generates the immediate requirement for 33 additional personnel just to get underway. Additionally, their reduced operating status means that they are not immediately available for load out on C-day. Significant efforts must be expended to assemble crews, make any required repairs, provision the ship and transit to the designated port of embarkation.[20]

 

READY RESERVE FORCES

 

OPERATIONS IN ODS

            The concept behind the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) was to establish a reserve force capable of a quick response to support rapid world wide deployment of U.S. military forces and unit equipment.[21] Consisting of 96 ships, the RRF was maintained in a 5-10-20 day readiness status. Originally conceived to support the strategic lift of the MPS, APS and FSS ships, the RRF possessed a combination of ships including RORO, crane ships, tanker and break bulk vessels having a military use. A 1988 Memorandum of Understanding between MSC and the Maritime Administration (MARAD) tasked MARAD with the maintenance funding responsibility for the RRF through the Department of Transportation. MSC would exercise operational control of RRF assets when they were activated.[22] The primary reason for the existence of the RRF was the shifting of the United States merchant marine from militarily useful ships such as break bulk cargo ships towards large container ships which were of limited military value. The DOD, already concerned with the ability to meet strategic sealift requirements during such crises as the Iran/Iraq war and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the 1980's, decided to purchase these older ships that had no commercial value but still had some military usefulness.[23]

LIMITATIONS

            The response of the RRF during ODS was poor. Of the 42 ships activated under the 5 day plan, 31 missed their cast off dates. The age of these vessels, their material conditions and the lack of adequate numbers of merchant mariners to man them severely impacted their responsiveness to sail orders.

            Activating ships from a reduced operating status that have not been operated since being acquired proved to be both slow and expensive. Less than 50 percent of the RRF contingency force was activated to support the initial surge of ODS and of the total number requested to be activated, 63 percent had never been broken out of reserve status.

            The activation of these ships was not only expensive at $1.5 million each, it was extremely labor intensive requiring between 800 and 1200 man days for each vessel. The RRF was an aged force averaging 24 years and consisted of mostly oil fired steam plants. Spare parts were scare and skilled operators were even harder to find. Their 5-10-20 day readiness status proved to be a paper designation based on policy requirements. Despite these drawbacks, the RRF provided lift of over 741,000 short tons of materiel to the Gulf. However, delivery dates to the theater commenced more than 90 days after the FSS ships.

In fact, some ships of the Prepositioned Force and FSS made two deliveries to the theater before the arrival of the first RRF ship.[24]

            The reduction in size of the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet between World War II and ODS became acutely apparent when the activation of the RRF generated the need for more than 3,000 seamen. A pool of readily available and qualified seamen did not exist among active members of the U.S. flag fleet. Retired merchant marines were recruited and many volunteered; some were 82 years old. The resulting average age of the RRF crew was 55 years of age. Often, these crews were assigned to ships on which they had little or no experience. Despite this critical manning problem, all RRF vessels activated were eventually manned.[25]

 

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET

 

            At the time of ODS, the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) consisted of 217 ships, 96 RRF and 121 other ships, all approximately 50 years old. World War II Victory ships accounted for 71 of these older vessels. The primary purpose of these vessels was to be attrition fillers in a full war mobilization scenario. Those ships not designated RRF were not aggressively maintained but rather they were held in a state of preservation. Estimates for the cost of activation of these preserved ships were in the vicinity of $2.5 million per vessel. As a cost comparison, the average cost of activating the RRF ships was $1.5 million each compared with a pre-war estimate of only $1 million. Given the 50 percent higher activation cost for the RRF and the less than advertised actual activation dates of the RRF, none of these ships were activated for ODS.[26]

 

 

CHAPTER III

CURRENT STATUS AND INITIATIVES

            With regard to the commercial sector of American sealift, the current view, from a strategic transportation standpoint, is grim. At the time of ODS, U.S. flagged carriers had over 300 vessels underway employing more than 14,000 merchant mariners afloat and ashore. Today, U.S. flagged carriers operate only 234 ships and employ just over 13,000 merchant mariners. These numbers are projected to decrease to approximately 130 ships and 11,000 merchant mariners shortly after the turn of the century.[27]

            In an effort to maintain their commercial viability, American sealift carriers have been and are continuing to move towards an almost totally containerized fleet. The benefits derived from containerization and intermodal transportation are realized by every business entity in the production/consumption cycle from the manufacturing sector, to the transportation sector, to the wholesaling and retailing sectors and finally to the consumer. The ability to place a newly manufactured product into a container in one part of the world and not have it removed from that same container until it arrives at its retail destination in another part of the world has reduced not only transportation and handling costs, but inventory and loss in shipment costs as well. More importantly, the time to transport products has been dramatically reduced. Port facilities in the U.S. and around the world also reflect this change in containerization. Huge container cranes and material handling equipment capable of moving and stacking 45 foot, 80,000 pound containers have replaced booms, cargo nets and longshoremen by the hundreds.

            In an effort to capitalize on this trend, USTRANSCOM developed the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) in partnership with American carriers. Operating similar to the Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), this program guarantees a certain amount of cargo to American carriers in exchange for the promise of vessel availability in times of crisis. In Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, USTRANSCOM moved more than 1 millions short tons of material via this program.[28] In past years, much of this cargo would have moved via C-5 or C-141 channel flights to overseas destinations. While shipping times via VISA are significantly longer than by Air Mobility Command (AMC) channel flights, the cost of shipping is cheaper and the lifespan of our strategic airlift assets has been extended. This extension is particularly important pending the full fielding of the new C-17 air transport.

            While military cargo such as food, repair parts, and some unit material readily lends itself to containerization, the majority of military combat cargo does not. Rolling stock, both tracked and wheeled, simply does not fit into even the largest existing containers. One possible solution is the use of flatracks (skeletonized frames of containers without walls or ceilings which, when placed side by side, allow the loading of cargo which is too wide to fit inside a single container; vertical extensions can also be used on flatracks to accommodate cargo which exceeds the vertical capacity of existing containers). However, while this allows for the transportation of outsized rolling stock aboard container ships it still requires the availability of heavy lift cranes or booms at both the port of embarkation and the port of debarkation. The transportation weight of an M1A1 main battle tank exceeds the lift capacity of many port facilities and self contained ships. Cargo such as this requires RORO vessels to minimize on-load and off-load times. Unfortunately, these are not the types of ships American carriers have chosen to operate in great numbers.

            In late 1994 and early 1995, the Joint Staff conducted the Mobility Requirements Study/Bottom-up Review Update (MRS/BURU) to update the original Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) that had been conducted by DOD at the direction of Congress following ODS. Perhaps recognizing the trend within the American sealift industry, the update reached the following conclusions:

            - Validated the original MRS recommendation for additional organic RORO capacity in the form of 19 additional Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships.

            - Reconfirmed the need for pre-positioning of an Army heavy armor brigade and associated combat support equipment.[29]

            In keeping with the recommendations of the MRS/BURU and to meet the requirements for transporting rolling stock in any future contingency, the U.S. Army made the significant financial commitment to add the 19 LMSR ships to the APS and FSS fleets. Eight of these ships will be fully operational and operate as APS assets while the remaining ships will be maintained in the RRF fleet in minimum operational readiness time status. These new ships will add more than 5 million square feet of RORO capacity to the organic sealift capability within the DOD. This initiative has received high praise not only from the regional military planners but more importantly, from our warfighters as well.

            LTG Keane, commanding general of the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, recently commented that these new ships will allow for the rapid movement of his entire command of more than 85,000 personnel and their required materiel and equipment as a single corps entity. This did not happen in ODS. Some units of the XVIII Airborne Corps had equipment spread over three or more vessels adversely affecting their coordinated off-load in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. This uncoordinated off-load in theater, in turn, adversely affected their consolidation at the port of debarkation and onward transportation to their point of employment.[30]

            As mentioned above, a drawback to these ships must be considered - their size. The SL-7 class of the FSS fleet displaces approximately 55,000 tons fully loaded. Each ship has about 150,00 square feet of enclosed RORO equipment and helicopter hangar space. This space, in conjunction with its container capability, allows each of these ships to carry up to one eighth of the unit and combat support service equipment of an Army heavy armored division. The loss of even one of these ships would significantly reduce a CINC's combat capability.[31] The new LMSR's will have almost of 250,000 square feet of RORO space and carry at least 75 percent more total cargo than the SL-7s.[32] Are these the new high value targets for our future enemies?

            More than $60 million was spent on activation of 42 RRF vessels for ODS. As a result, these ships are in a relatively high state of material readiness.[33] To maintain this readiness, these ships must be regularly activated for exercises. An added benefit of these exercises are the identification of available merchant mariners and the resulting crew familiarization with activated ships.[34]

            The strategic sealift for ODS took place in a largely benign environment using port facilities in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere inside the Persian Gulf. They are considered to be among the most modern and most capable ocean terminal facilities in the world. Future military operations, however, must be prepared to operate through ports that are damaged or destroyed, lack modern facilities, have limited draft capability or, in some cases, in areas where there is no port at all. Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) has been developed to address these potential problems.

            JLOTS provides the capability to offload vessels without the benefit of a fixed port facility. Cargo such as unit equipment, vehicles as heavy as the M1A1, and sustainment and ammunition can be offloaded from ocean going sealift ships onto smaller vessels known as lighterage. These smaller vessels then deliver the materiel to the port or to a bare beach. Petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) can be directly delivered from the ocean going ships to the high water mark by pipeline or hose. The warfighting CINCs have incorporated JLOTS into their contingency war plans.

            In order to maintain, and hopefully expand, the capability of JLOTS, training is essential. Expertise in the activities described above is highly perishable. At a minimum, one dry cargo vessel and one liquid vessel training exercise per year must be conducted just to maintain existing proficiency. Coupling JLOTS training with the periodic activation of the RRF has proven mutually beneficial. However, such training and activation is expensive and will be constrained by overall funding.[35]

            One of the most significant ideas to emerge from the commercial sealift sector is the concept of the "Fastship." Using jet ski technology, these ships would be capable of speeds in excess of 35 knots or more than 43 mph. Transatlantic crossings would require less than four days, compared to the current requirement of more than twelve for existing low speed diesel ships.

            Using the equivalent of a 747 jet engine to supply power to water jets for propulsion, coupled with an innovative hull design, trials of a scaled down model indicate that the "Fastship" would be capable of navigating through 75 foot high seas without slowing down. Air-cushioned loading and unloading systems would reduce the time required to load or unload a comparable number of containers by 80 percent. Additionally, the interior cargo capacity of the new design allows for the construction of container, RORO and lighter aboard ship (LASH) variants. While the cargo capacity of the new ship, estimated in the vicinity of 8,000 to 9,000 short tons, is significantly less than the more than 25,000 short ton capacity of existing cargo ships, its overall advantage in speed would allow it to deliver the same total tonnage, in almost the same amount of time, as the existing ships.[36]

 

CHAPTER IV

FUTURE OPTIONS

            Any discussion of future options must begin with an examination of how strategic sealift got where it is today. The original MRS recommended that DOD purchase 20 LMSRs which could sustain a speed of 24 knots. The MRS envisioned that nine of them would be dedicated to prepositioning and 11 would be maintained in the FSS fleet.[37] As mentioned above, this number has been reduced to 19. This enhancement to the existing organic RORO capability, proven during ODS, would ensure that the United States had a substantial, unilateral surge capability to respond to future crises. The MRS also recommended that DOD acquire 18 used LMSRs for sustainment shipping and place them in the RRF to be called into service as needed.[38]   

            As previously discussed, the sealift shipping resources available to the United States during ODS were formidable. Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, Commander, MSC, stated that 1994 plans were even more ambitious and would require him to lift as many supplies and equipment in 52 days as were required for movement in the first 90 days of ODS.[39] At the time, the existing sealift acquisition program was designed to meet this earlier arrival time line. The Navy awarded contracts for the first five LMSRs in July 1993. The initial procurements were for the conversion of existing commercial vessels. Two additional contracts were let in September 1993 for two new construction LMSRs with the option to buy more. The remaining ship requirements were to be reviewed and purchased in 1998, if required.[40]

            Congress realized DOD's need for additional sealift in the aftermath of ODS and in FY 1990 allocated $2.1 billion for ship acquisitions. It is interesting to note that this occurred two years prior to the publication of the original MRS.[41] It did not take long for what seemed to be a marriage made in heaven to begin to dissolve. Prior to the first contract being awarded, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report to Congress in July 1992 criticizing the Navy's proposed acquisition program. First, the GAO took the position that the Navy's requirement for a 24-knot sustainment speed was a capriciously determined design requirement, in that 22 and 23-knot vessels were commercially available and could easily be converted to military use. The GAO contended that the slightly slower speeds of existing ship designs delayed arrival by only one day to the farthest proposed operating distance and therefore, new ship construction was unwarranted. Second, the GAO stated that the MRS made invalid assumptions on sail dates of current fleet assets, such as the ships of the FSS, which inflated the speed requirements for the new acquisitions. The result was that the GAO believed the Navy could buy off-the-shelf vessels and save $50 million.[42]

            Growing dissension within DOD itself only added to the controversy. Navy critics of the Army's ambitious maritime prepositioning plan began raising concerns that excess sealift was being purchased at the expense of more vital requirements, such as amphibious ships to replace the aging amphibious fleet supporting the Marines. Apparently, the argument had merit. The DOD Inspector General agreed with the Navy and, in early 1994, sent a report to the Secretary of Defense, charging that the DOD may be wasting as much as $793 million on strategic sealift it did not need. The Inspector General recommended that steps be take to validate both the exisiting and projected maritime prepositioning requirements and even suggested that foreign governments contribute to sealift costs.[43] Strategic sealift acquisition began to slow.

            More than anything else, the current state of strategic sealift has been determined by available funding. The competition for financial resources at the Federal level is intense. This is not only true for the individual Armed Services within DOD but between the various federal departments as well. Underlying this competition is the desire of both Congress and the White House to eliminate the annual deficit spending habit and tackle the national debt now in excess of $4 trillion. There has not been a comprehensive appraisal of the best way to spend limited dollars for strategic sealift while maximizing the return on the investment.

 

OPTION I

Maintain Procurement Plans But Eliminate Waste

            As with any situation requiring a decision, the option not to change is often the most convenient alternative. With regards to strategic sealift, the option to maintain the current status quo with regards to ship acquisition and ship assignment to the MPS, APS, FSS or RRF is undoubtedly the easiest for the DOD and the MARAD. However, such an approach would offer the largest possible target to Congressional budget cutters. While moneys already appropriated by Congress and obligated by the DOD would not be reduced in the out years, in all likelihood, future funding would be. This would severely impact the current plans to acquire the 19 LMSRs for the APS and FSS fleets described above.

            To increase the viability of the current acquisition plans for strategic sealift, older vessels within the RRF and the NDRF should be scrapped. It does not make economic sense to maintain World War II Victory ships regardless of their readiness status, especially in light of their projected activation costs. Not only does preservation have a cost, but there are costs associated with anchorages and berthings as well. Additionally, elimination of these aged ships would eliminate the need for the expertise to man them, an expertise that is rapidly vanishing within the current merchant marine labor pool.

            By scrapping those vessels which are too old, too costly to bring to operating status, or too difficult to man if activated results in the elimination of the NDRF, the resulting cost savings could be applied towards the current procurement plan for additional LMSRs. Future procurement funding could be justified by this reduction in maintenance costs.

 

OPTION II

Rent Existing Assets

            MARAD is currently tasked with maintaining the RRF. As described above, ships in this force are maintained in various states of readiness. The class of readiness designed to provide the most rapid response, when tasked, is called Reduced Operating Status (ROS). Selected ships are maintained on a 5 day readiness string, receive a high level of continuing maintenance and are manned with full-time skeleton crews. The annual cost to maintain one ROS ship is in excess of $3 million. The other classes of readiness are 5-10 days and 10-20 days and have respective annual maintenance costs of $2.8 million and $2.4 million per ship.[44] In 1995, Congressional budget cuts saw the ROS program reduced from 57 to 32 vessels. Nevertheless, MARAD is still spending over $100 million to maintain 32 of the best ships in the RRF every year.[45]

            Commercially useful vessels in the RRF program could be bareboat chartered to U.S. flag shipowners/operators. A bareboat charter, is simply the charter, rental or lease of the ship itself. All costs of operating the ship, such as crew wages, fuel, repair parts, and port costs are the responsibility of the company chartering the ship, not the owner of the ship. The charter hire rate should be at the market rate in which the vessels are to compete with other U.S. flag vessels and should be appropriately reduced if they are to compete for trade routes where there are no American flag competitors. The terms of the charter must include guarantees that the vessel will be made available to the DOD, with the experienced crew, when needed.

            During the Workshop on Crewing the Ready Reserve Force held in 1994, Jerome E. Joseph of the American Maritime Officers estimated that such charters would generate "somewhere around $4 million dollars per vessel per year".[46] If all 32 ships currently in the ROS portion of the RRF were chartered, a $100 million annual expense could possibly become a $130 million annual revenue source. The total revenue could be increased by extending the charter program to the remaining commercially viable ships in the RRF and those in the FSS fleet as well. MARAD with its expertise in interfacing with labor unions, ship yards, ship's managers, steamship companies and merchant marine labor pools is ideally situated to administer such a program.

 

OPTION III

Build to Rent

            This option is essentially an extension of the previous one with one exception, the goal would be to not only provide the DOD with readily available, fully manned vessels capable of meeting the Nation's strategic sealift requirements, but to provide the American sealift industry with vessels designed around cutting edge technologies. The Fastship presents the greatest single opportunity for American shippers to regain lost market share in the international trans-oceanic transportation industry.

            Given that these ships could be built in any configuration, American shippers could compete world wide on any route currently dominated by foreign flagged carriers provided the charter price allows for it. Even if these vessels were chartered for half the going rate they would still represent a source of revenue that would help offset the cost of their construction. Additionally, this type of support for the American sealift industry would be in keeping with one of the three goals of the National Security Strategy, namely to bolster America's economic revitalization and "to place greater emphasis on dual-use technologies that allow the military to capitalize on commercial-sector innovation for lower cost, higher quality and increased performance."[47]

 

OPTION IV

Change the Procurement Plan

            The current procurement plan for additional strategic sealift is centered on the LMSR class of vessels. These new ships will have almost 250,000 square feet of RORO space each. While their capacity and capability is not in question, their vulnerability is. From the perspective of modern Naval combat, one commercial ship is as vulnerable as another. Existing weapons systems make little distinction in ship class, tonnage or type. The question posed to the attacker is, what is the maximum result to be achieved from each weapon expenditure? In other words, where does he get the most bang for his buck? Potential future belligerents must know the importance of U.S. prepositioned forces. These forces are forward and they deliver a huge punch to air delivered combat personnel. As such, they must be viewed as high value targets by our enemies in any future military action. The "Fastship" offers some possible alternatives to the large ships currently being acquired.

            First, it is much faster. The speed offered by this technology would allow a smaller ship to deliver the same amount of materiel in almost the same amount of time as the larger LMSRs depending on the scenario. This speed would also virtually eliminate the diesel submarine threat currently expanding around the world by enabling the ship to literally outrun a submerged diesel boat as well as many surface combatants. High speed would also allow these ships to be prepositioned in friendlier waters while still maintaining the required delivery times.

            Second, they are smaller. Smaller ships are simply able to operate in a larger number of ports than larger ships due to their shallower draft and shorter water lines. We can not know exactly where the next contingency will be. It makes strategic and operational sense to be able to have access to as many seaports as possible. While the loss of any strategic shipping to enemy action is not a pleasant thought, it must be planned for. The loss of a single Fastship would not result in the same loss of materiel as would the loss of a single LMSR simply because of its smaller size.

            Future conflicts will, in all likelihood, unfold rapidly without much time to respond. A smaller force capable of responding with exceptional speed while delivering the same combat power, man for man, as that carried aboard today's MPS, APS and FSS ships may be the tool of choice.

            Finally, as discussed in previous options, these Fastships could be chartered to the American sealift industry to offset costs of procurement and maintenance as well as to eliminate the requirement to locate and hire crews when activated. The gas turbine technology of these ships is virtually identical to that now employed aboard the Navy's gas turbine ships. Engineering and other personnel leaving the U.S. Naval service would be immediately employable by the private sector thus reducing the private sector's training costs to man these ships and placing the burden of finding qualified merchant mariners on the commercial sector.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

            Post-Cold War uncertainty dictates that the United States be able to respond to a wide variety of contingencies across the threat spectrum. The shift from forward-based to power-projection forces has increased the need for strategic sealift in spite of a rapid and substantial drawdown in military personnel endstrength and reductions in funding. Add to this shift an increased involvement in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), support for United Nations operations and humanitarian aid operations both in the United States and abroad and the requirement becomes even greater. Funding for acquisition programs to relieve the strategic sealift shortfall, given a Congress which is driving large military budget reductions in light of a decreasing military threat and an increasing deficit, is unlikely.

            An examination of the U.S. Budget (in millions) from 1994 to 1997 reveals the following information concerning some of the costs of strategic sealift.[48]'[49]

 

 

Program by Activities:	1994 (actual)	1995 (actual)	1996 (est)	1997 (est)
Strategic Sealift Acquisition	288	677	596	604
Strategic Sealift O&M	761	637	754	731
Ready Reserve Force	---	43	359	351

Beginning in Fiscal Year 1996, the Ready Reserve Force funding passed from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and MARAD to DOD. MARAD continues to administer the RRF on a refundable basis. As it now stands, these three programs alone account for over $1.5 billion of the total DOD budget. A way must be found to maximize the effects of every dollar spent on strategic sealift.

            It is clear that the United States requires a responsive sealift capability that can transport all types of unit equipment and sustainment in a timely manner if it is to exercise its military role worldwide. It is also clear that this will be done with fewer forward deployed troops, smaller forces and a reduced budget. Strategic sealift concerns may very well be overcome by strategic seaborne mobility concerns and it is this strategic seaborne mobility that will become even more important in the future since timeliness will be the imperative. The acquisition and employment of strategic sealift platforms, as they currently exist, will make it too expensive for the United States to continue its strategy of unilateral response should it be required.

            There is no doubt that prepositioning has been and continues to be a great success. Furthermore, prepositioning must be continued in the face of our decreased overseas presence. These prepositioned forces must maintain their emphasis on a RORO capability designed to deliver heavy forces to the desired location. As such, they should be a priority item in future funding considerations. However, prepositioned forces do not necessarily have to be dependent upon existing hull types such as the LMSR. The emerging "Fastship" technology is a promising alternative to the technology currently in use.

            There is as much opposition as there is support for continuing with the RRF and the NDRF. Opposition has highlighted the aging of the ships, crew shortages, slow reaction and response times, high activation costs and shipyard availability as reasons not to expand or continue the RRF and reasons to scrap the World War II Victory ships which comprise the lion's share of the force.

            Supporters for the NDRF cite its overall performance in ODS as proof that the RRF is a viable asset for strategic sealift. Supporters of the NDRF and strategic planners are not comfortable with scrapping an asset unless it is going to be replaced by something else. Realistically, both the RRF and the NDRF are well on their way to becoming paper assets giving a false sense of security. In order to make the RRF a true asset to strategic sealift, some initiatives must be undertaken.

            Ships in the RRF and NDRF with commercial potential must be identified and offered as commercial charters to the American sealift industry at rates which will make these companies viable in the international market. Charter terms favorable to American companies will allow for the continuous manning of these vessels and eliminate the manpower shortage experienced by MSC and MARAD during ODS. As mentioned previously, any such charters must guarantee the availability of these ships in time of crisis. Any remaining ships in the RRF or NDRF which are not commercially viable and do not possess an absolutely essential military capability should be scrapped. The maintenance costs for these ships represents an unacceptable expenditure of increasingly scarce funds.

            How do the options discussed above, compare with the current procurement and utilization strategies? The following table provides a qualitative comparison of some key factors:

 

 

 

	Status      Quo	Option             I	Option          II	Option        III	Option        IV
Solve crew manning problems?	No	Not         Completely	Yes	Yes	Yes
Use new technology?	No	No	No	No	Yes
Provide source of revenue?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Minimize maintenance costs?	No	Not         Completely	Yes	Yes	Yes
Minimize activation costs?	No	Not          Completely	Yes	Yes	Yes

 

Status Quo: No change in current policies.

Option I: Maintain current procurement plans but eliminate waste.      

Option II: Rent Existing Assets

Option III: Build to rent.

Option IV: Change the procurement plan.

 

It must be noted that this comparison is oriented towards cost savings. The comparison does not weight any of the factors involved and hence, it cannot be construed as indicating the best possible option. However, it does indicate that there is the definite potential for substantial dollar savings in view of the budgetary figures discussed above.

            The United States is by far the largest trading nation in the world. However, less than four percent of our enormous sea going trade is carried aboard American flagged vessels. The poor state of our maritime industry is due in part to the fact that the U.S. Government has refused to play by the rules of the international game. Whereas some foreign governments subsidize ship construction or operating costs, the U.S. does not. This policy has come home to haunt us in that we can no longer rely on our own maritime industry to be a viable strategic asset.

            Although subsidies and tax incentives are rapidly becoming political taboo, they can be an effective means to revitalize the industry along with other programs such as government build and lease. It is important to realize that the moneys spent by the Federal government to build new, high technology ships for lease by the private sector have far reaching consequences.

            A commonly accepted principle of economics is the Multiplier Principle. Simply put, it states that an increase in investment will result in a magnified increase in income. One dollar in wages to a given individual becomes money he will subsequently pay for goods and services he needs and desires. If he saves at a rate of ten percent, he will have $.90 to spend at say the grocery store. The grocer will, in turn, have $.81 to spend somewhere else. Theoretically, the cycle is limitless, but it is factual that the $1.00 originally spent to pay wages has been magnified far beyond its original value.[50]

            If the DOD decides to build a Fastship with an estimated cost of $200 million, what is the impact on the economy? If the Multiplier Principle is applied to the original amount of $200 million through ten iterations, the result is in excess of $1.350 billion. Clearly there is a significant and positive impact on the economy. The impact of Federal spending is not lost on cities such as Norfolk, VA and San Diego, CA. But what, if anything, is the benefit to the government?

            In addition to the newly constructed vessel, the incomes generated by the Multiplier Principle are taxable. If an overall Federal tax rate of just five percent is applied, the revenue to the federal government is in excess of $50 million, more than 25 percent of its original investment. The actual tax rate may well be higher if one factors in the federal taxes on gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, etc. The fact is that the Federal government can expect to see a return on its investment of $200 million that far exceeds the ship it has contracted to have constructed.

            If the newly constructed ship is subsequently chartered to an American sealift company, the multiplier effect continues with the exception that the sealift company is now providing the original wages for the next set of iterations. The difference is the size of the original amount invested, i.e., crew's wages, and the fact that these wages will continue as long as the ship remains under charter, unlike the one-time investment in the ship's construction.

            It should also be pointed out that a reduction in investment will result in a magnified decrease in income throughout the economy, a fact not lost on our elected officials. In this age of budgetary reductions, it remains incumbent upon the decision makers of the country to ensure that each dollar is wisely spent and produces the maximum benefit for the country as a whole. Moneys spent to construct the most technologically advanced vessels that will subsequently be operated in the private sector to the benefit of the American economy must be seen as a wise investment. Not only is the requirement for strategic sealift realized, the revitalization of the American maritime industry is achieved at the same time.

 

BIBILIOGRAPHY

 

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