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Possibility Of North Korean Collapse

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - General

 

Author: LtCol. PARK, JAE WON

INTRODUCTION

             There is no longer a question about whether North Korea will collapse; the question is when and how, according to Gen. Gary Luck, the former commander of U.S. Forces, Korea. His fear is that the collapse will come soon and be violent enough to spark war between the North and the South. "North Korea is already in a state of economic collapse," Luck told the Senate Armed Services Committee on 28 March 1996. He added that years of poor harvest, a long declining economy, massive spending on the North Korean military and severe flooding last year have created severe food shortages throughout North Korea. (Matthews, 1996).

             The succession of power, since the death of long time leader Kim Il Sung, who died in July 1994, continues to be in doubt. It is believed that Kim Jung Il, his son, has not completely brought the military under his control or have a firm power base. The problem of North Korea's leadership is heightened by the country's isolation from most other nations. We also know that the current economic situation in North Korea is very serious. There was serious flood damage in North during the Summer, the full extent of which remains unknown. North Korea's military has dramatically improved its capabilities since 1953, it continues to try and infiltrate the South with armed spies and submarines.

             Given the current conditions in the North, 67.5 % of the South Koreans estimate that collapse of North Korea will occur within 10 years. (Korea Basic, 1996). General Luck and many political analysts predict that North Korea will soon collapse. Still it is very difficult to estimate the exact time of North Korea's collapse. This paper will analyze the economic, political and military situation within North Korea and discuss the possibility of North Korea's collapse.

POLITICAL SITUATION OF NORTH KOREA

 

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF NORTH KOREA

             Before mentioning the political situation, let's examine the political system of North Korea. Since independence, in 1948, North Korea has been under the one-party rule of the Korean Workers Party (KWP), which was led by Kim Il Sung who served simultaneously as the general secretary of the party, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the president of the state. After he died, his son Kim Jung Il assumed power. According to rumors, Kim Jung Il has not yet taken over as president of the state. The party is an entrenched, elite organization to which all institutions of the society are accountable. The military, the only group with the potential to challenge party supremacy, remains under the effective control of the KWP. This is possible in part because all key military leaders are placed in prestigious positions within top party organizations.

             The political system was originally patterned after the Soviet model. In the decades since the departure of Soviet occupation forces in 1948, the party leadership has gradually grown confident in its management of various problems. The KWP system has been somewhat modified in response to specific internal circumstances. The process of what may be called the "koreanization" of Marxist-Leninist theories and practice evolved during the mid-1950s under the ideology of "national self-reliance". Efforts to "arm" all people with "national self-reliance" were greatly accelerated until Kim Il Sung died. The party's intense ideological efforts have stressed the theme that socialist construction is aimed at the improvement of living condition of the people and that the central frame of reference in all revolutionary activities should be "national self-reliance" as elaborated by Kim IL Sung. The North Korean political system has all the structural characteristics of a communist-ruled state. According to the party there can be no greater honor and duty than being loyal to their leader, "absolutely" and "unconditionally". His words are, in short "the law and supreme command". Foreign observers have generally dubbed the phenomenon an exercise in the "cult of personality".

             For these reasons, North Korea is one of the most unique countries in the world. This unique and isolated country is now changing. The death of the "only great leader", Kim IL Sung, has resulted in his son, Kim Jung Il, assuming power. The country has run into serious economic problems, and it has limited prospects for economic survival. The North is sending signals to foreign countries in numerous ways. We can predict more changes to North Korea than originally expected.

 

WHO IS KIM JUNG IL, AND HOW WAS POWER TRANSFERRED TO HIM ?

                        Actually, facts about Kim Jung Il are appallingly sparse. He is the son and designated heir to his father, longtime leader Kim Il Sung, who died in July 1994.  He holds North Korea's top military title, and has never traveled outside the communist world. He has been prepared to succeed his father since the early 1970s. The rest is extrapolation or pure rumor. He may have married up to three times, there are no reports of children. There are rumors that Kim has been ill, that he drinks heavily, and brings in blonde foreign women for trysts. He is so sensitive about his height, 5 foot 3 inches, that he wears lifts and a bouffant hairstyle. He is fanatical about security and was at one time the country's top purveyor of terrorism.

             Some analysts speculate that Kim's image as arrogant, testy, ambitious, crude and temperamental could stem from a childhood in which he lost his mother around age 7. He was raised in the shadow of the personality cult that revered his father as a near-god. His only public address has been a one line speech when he was named supreme military commander four years ago. The biggest question now, which carries the most impact for the rest of the world, is why he has yet to take his father's top two titles. Analysts say he appears to be firmly in charge of a country suspected of nuclear weapons development. As mentioned above, Kim Jung Il is a mysterious person and there are some doubtful factors about him. Even if he has succeeded to power from his father, the process is not clear and there are still many questions about his succession. (The Associated Press News Service, 1995)

 

DOES KIM JUNG IL HAVE REAL POWER ?

             There are no real answers to this question, just many rumors. Choe Ju Hwal, 46, was a high ranking military officer, equivalent to a colonel, before recently defecting to South Korea through a southeast Asian country. Choe made several remarks at news conferences. Responding to a question as to why the formal succession of power in the North is being delayed, Choe cited three main factors. He thinks anyone of these three could prevent heir-designate Kim Jung Il from taking power, including the grave economic situation.  "Kim Jung Il has not yet completely brought the military under his control as he has no firm power base in the military with which to maintain his grip over the ruling hierarchy", Choe said. He also revealed that a number of high - ranking military officers attempted an unsuccessful military coup in 1992 and all of them were punished. "I think a large number of senior military officers just pretend to be obedient to Kim Jung Il, while harboring animosity toward the younger Kim," he said. As a way of heading off any resistance from the military, Kim has sought to provide nice houses and cars for military officers and has also appointed his loyalists to key posts in the armed forces. It was widely assumed that Kim, who has been groomed to assume power since the early 1970s, would formally take over the top leadership shortly after his father Kim Il Sung's death. His failure to do so has touched off speculation among North Korea watchers that he is seriously ill or is facing internal resistance. Choe also said that Kim does not possess characteristic qualities befitting the top leader of the workers party of Korea. (The New York Times, 1995). So, it is impossible to estimate Kim's power in North Korea. Kim is unable to fully control his military and party members, so far based on Choe's testimony. He may be able to stabilize power soon.

 

ECONOMIC SITUATION

 

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF NORTH KOREA

             At the outset of the 1980s North Korea exhibited one of the most highly planned and centrally directed economies of the world. Economic activity largely responded to the commands of the state rather than to market forces. Government agencies controlled all major industrial enterprises, while agricultural cooperatives sold their produce almost exclusively to state representatives at fixed prices. The pricing system tended to favor heavy industries over those specializing in consumer items, and the standard of living was therefore far from luxurious. Although modern consumer goods were prohibitively expensive, domestic food production and social services satisfied the only basic needs of the population. The country was by no means isolated from the international environment and suffered as much from the oil crisis and world recession of the mid-1970s as other nations. Nevertheless, imports of industrial plants and equipment and selected raw materials continued. But economic development was second only to political solidarity among the immediate concerns of the North Korean leadership at that time. (Bunge, 1981)

             At the Sixth Party Congress held in 1980, the slogan "national self reliance-orientation, modernization, and scientization" reaffirmed the importance of technological modernization to the construction of an independent national economy. North Korea is in considerable trouble economically, and could fall apart. The failure to recover from economic problems could only result in desperation.

 

CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF NORTH KOREA

             North Korea's economy has been sinking since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rest of the Eastern Block, on which it relied for trade. With rations cut, more than 1,200 North Korean peasants and workers are said to have risked execution by sneaking into China in search of food. There are many reasons for these economic problems. Of course, serious flood damage in North Korea last year is one of the reasons. Grave food shortages, worsened by floods, have put millions of North Koreans at risk of severe malnutrition. The floods wiped out entire villages, a large percentage of the country's food stocks, and the new harvest. This aggravated an economic crisis created after the Soviet Union collapsed. Additionally, China decided a year ago to stop selling the North grain on credit. However, the real reason is North Korea's total economic failure.

             Just three years ago, the South Korean government's biggest fear about North Korea was its determination to develop nuclear weapons -- a determination that could have led to war with the South. That worry was allayed after North Korea promised not to pursue atomic weaponry, in exchange for help with more benign nuclear power plants. South Korea now has a different worry--that North Korea is in so much trouble economically that it could collapse. Rather than eliminate a threat, a sudden collapse could touch off internal chaos, a flood of refugees and, if things got truly desperate, war with the South. When the North Korean regime, whose guiding principle is self-reliance, turned to the outside world for help, the United States concluded that the economic problems were severe enough to warrant $2 million in food aid. Since North Korea remains subject to a 46-year-old economic embargo, the pledge of emergency aid was diplomatic overture as much as it was a humanitarian response, designed to show that the United States had no interest in seeing North Korea fall apart.

             In the summer 1995, the North even allowed the United Nations' World Food Program to secretly open an office in the capital, Pyongyang. Its presence has provided rare snapshots of everyday life. Early this month, Trevor Page, the program's director, visited Hwanghae, a prosperous town by North Korean standards and the fifth-largest in the country. According to his report, conditions were appalling. Children, one to 16 years of age, met in unheated classrooms where temperatures were about 5 degrees below zero. Most of the children were coughing and sneezing. School feeding rations had been cut in half. There were no cars on the streets, only a steady stream of oxcarts and bicycles, a sign of fuel shortage. Groups of peasants were furtively selling firewood, clothing, cigarettes, matches and ball-point pens on an illegal black market, which, according to an internal World Food Program report, 'the Government is now tolerating because the public rationing system has broken down for lack of food'. (Los Angeles Times, 1995)

             In another report after a World Food Program visit to North Pyongyang province last month, people interviewed said they were eating only two meals a day and stretching rice by turning it into porridge. The agency also has reported that the police are not arresting peasants who come into Pyongyang from the countryside with nothing to do but wander around in search of food. The last North Korean winter was hard and long, and people were cold and hungry. (The New York Times, 1996)

                        Another sign of discontent is that more North Koreans are fleeing overland into China and defecting to the South. Although American intelligence analysts look with skepticism on the stories told by defectors in staged press conferences in South Korea, the sheer number of the reports, particularly from soldiers who have defected, means they are now taken more seriously. Some defectors, for example, claim that hungry soldiers are deserting, robbing peasants, and being treated in hospitals for malnutrition. (The New York Times, 1996)

             There is some interesting information that North Korea's serious flood damage last year was exaggerated and North Korea's government has been wildly inflating the extent of recent flood damage, so that it can attract food and other aid from abroad. The flood damage, the U.S officials say, was largely confined to a single province, while the region of North Korea that produces most of the nation's food was unaffected. One US official observed "I think what North Korean officials are trying to do is create a climate in which they can get as much international economic assistance as possible". (Los Angeles Times, 1995). In fact, U.S, Japan and South Korea assisted with huge amounts of provisions to North Korea after their request. Some reliable intelligence identified that the offered provisions moved to the eastern part of North Korea, while flood damaged areas are located in the west area. The reason is obvious, most of the provisions were stored in military storage which is located close to the front line. They seem to want money, foods, and the necessities of life from foreign countries to overcome the current difficult situation.

 

MILITARY SITUATION

 

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

             The North Korean military is directly controlled by the Defense Committee which was elevated to an independent organization according to the constitution revised in April 1992. Its military structure is a mixture of those of the former Soviet Union and China. The ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF) has the General Staff under its command. The North Korean armed forces maintain a single command system: the chief of the General Staff directly commands and controls ground force corps, artillery, tank and light infantries, navy command, and air force command. Kim Jong Il, as the supreme commander of the People's Armed Forces and the chairman of the Defense Committee, has overall command of the North Korean military apparatus and directly exercises the right of military administration and command.

             Under the control of MPAF, the North Korean ground force is composed of 19 corps commands including four mechanized and two artillery corps as well as Tank and Artillery Instruction Guidance Bureaus, and one light Infantry Instruction Guidance Bureau which controls the special operations forces. Major combat units consist of 152 divisions and brigades, including 60 infantry divisions and brigades, 25 mechanized infantry brigades, 13 tank brigades, 24 SOF brigades and 30 artillery brigades.

             The North Korean Navy consists of two fleets, the East and Yellow Sea Fleet. The Yellow Sea Fleet is made up of 325 vessels in six combatant groups and the East Sea Fleet of 465 vessels in ten combatant groups. Approximately 60 percent of North Korea's naval force is deployed close to the front line areas. They include 460 combat vessels, such as patrol boats, missile boats, torpedo boats and fire support vessels, and 330 supporting vessels such as hovercraft.

             The North Korean air force, under the direct control of the Air Command, consists of three air combat corps, and it controls the Civil Aviation Bureau. The corps, comprising various regiments of fighters, bombers, AN-2s, helicopters, missiles, and radars, are capable of independent operations. North Korea has deployed its aircraft at approximately 70 air bases, including jet bases, non-jet bases, and emergency air strips. Major tactical aircraft are concentrated at air bases around Pyongyang and near the DMZ, thus enabling efficient air operations.

             North Korea still maintains huge military forces and a strong military structure despite its serious economic situation.

 

RECENT MILITARY TRENDS IN NORTH KOREA

             As the North Korean nuclear issue became a salient topic in the international community, North Korea designated October 1992 through July 1993 as a one time preparatory period for war and separately established a war preparation command, which focused upon the expansion of the production and stockpiling of war materials and upon strengthening underground facilities. To reinforce its wartime mobilization, North Korea extended the age of citizens mobilized in wartime from 40 to 45. Thus, North Korea seemed to have completed basic war preparations at that time. On the other hand, based on Gulf War evaluations and because of its lack of raw materials and economic difficulties, North Korea has been continuously reinforcing underground facilities and enlarging stockpiles of reserve materials.

             For a few years since 1989 North Korea substantially reduced the number and scale of military exercises due to its economic difficulties, but resumed them in late 1993. In consideration of our military deployment, North Korea actively conducted offensive drills in the areas of topographical similarity with our own. It also increased such military exercises as joint military-government-civilian exercises, reserve force mobilization exercises, and blackout and evacuation exercises for the residents in large cities. Despite its serious economic difficulties, North Korea has qualitatively improved its weapon systems in parallel with its quantitative buildup.

             Given the strategic instabilities of the 1990s, due to the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea has maintained a huge military force to keep superiority over the South. It has also tried to gain supremacy over the South in strategic arms by developing such weapons as Daepodong-1 and Daepodong-2 missiles with range far longer than the Rodong-1 missile. To secure survivability of these weapons, North Korea has constructed underground bases for their storage. At the 7th Session of the 9th Supreme People's Assembly held on April 6-8, 1994, North Korea announced that it had allotted $2.19 billion for its defense budget, 11.6% of its total 1994 budget of $18.88 billion. It is believed, however, that the real defense budget for 1994 amounts to $5.7 billion, 30% of the total budget. Maintaining its policy priorities on the military, North Korea is spending a huge military budget to maintain superiority over the South. This means that North Korea still has capabilities to buildup military power and its economic base is stronger than we expect.

             In September 1996, North Korea tried to infiltrate the east coast of the South with a submarine that included 26 military spies. When the submarine was confiscated, North Korea threatened horrible revenge on South Korea, including the use of the Rodong-1 missile, and a dissolution of the nuclear agreement between itself and the U.S.

 

IS NORTH KOREA GOING TO COLLAPSE AS EXPECTED ?

 

WHERE IS NORTH KOREA IN THE PROCESS OF COLLAPSE ?

             The United State Forces in Korea (USFK) recently published a special report, that identified 7 phases in the collapse of North Korea. The report was titled, "Sub-structure collapse model of North Korea", and was presented to President Clinton. The sequence of North Korea's collapse, without war, is predicted as follows : (Matthews, 1996)

A.            Shortage of food, fuel and resources phase.

B.            Distinction of resources phase between urban and rural areas.

C.        Rural area independent phase for survival.

D.        Cruel pressure phase from the government.

E.         Internal disorder phase.

F.         Internal cracking phase with violence.

G.        Power reorganization phase (collapse).

             Now, North Korea is in phase 3, "Area independent phase," and the speed of collapse is faster than analysts expected, said General Luck, former commander of USFK. North Korea's collapse depends on how long phase 3 will last. (Matthews, 1996). Some South Korean analysts estimate that at least 10,000 North Korean refugees are hiding illegally in neighboring China. Some have also escaped to Russia. Given these symptoms, it is easy to estimate that a North Korea collapse is at hand. (The New York Times, 1995). Many western analysts are predicting North Korea's collapse within 10 years because of serious economic problems and the unstable political situation. (The New York Times, 1995). Also, most of the defectors have mentioned that the collapse of North Korea is approaching fast and it has already started. (The New York Times, 1995). According to opinion poll results, 31.8 % of the South Korean people estimate that the collapse of North Korea will occur within 5 years and 35.7 % believe it will happen within 6-10 years. (Korea Basic, 1996). In an integration of all the analysis about the collapse, it is obvious that North Korea will collapse eventually. The only question is "when."

 

CAN NORTH KOREA AVOID THE COLLAPSE AND RECOVER FROM ITS SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ?

             All the estimates about North Korea's collapse are based on the current economic situation, political instability, and some questionable military activities. North Korea will last longer than we expect, there are several reasons for this.

             First, the potential of North Korea's national infrastructure is stronger than we believe. Even though North Korea failed with its recent economic policy, and its economy is declining, it retains considerable natural resources and manpower. Second, its economic situation seems to be less serious than reported. As mentioned before, there has been instability during the succession of power between the late Kim, Il Sung and his son, Kim, Jung Il. Kim, Jung Il doesn't want to deal with two major problems simultaneously - economic difficulties and instability during the power succession. He has tried to overcome the economic difficulty by seeking international aid and using the nuclear threat as a means to this end. North Korea is slowly opening its closed gates to recover its economy. Third, North Korea has one of the biggest militaries in the world which they are continually improving. Fourth, the external factor, Japan, China and Russia don't want the sudden collapse of North Korea. China and Russia are still friends with North Korea, even though political situations have changed considerably. They may not want a unified Korea on their border. Japan doesn't want an unstable situation, but may fear the economic power of a unified Korea.

             How can North Korea avoid collapse and recover from its serious economic problems? First, if North Korea abandons the strategy of communizing the South by force and tries to find a way to talk with the South, they can be helped on a humanitarian level. Second, if they abandon their nuclear weapons plan completely, international assistance is very possible. Third, if North Korea reduces its huge military and uses defense money for economic recovery, they can avoid collapse. Fourth, if North Korea, like the Chinese economic system, change its economic policies to resemble a capitalistic system, its economy will recover.

 

CONCLUSION

            Years of poor harvests, a long-declining economy, massive spending on the North Korea military, and severe flooding last year have created severe food shortages throughout North Korea. The economic and political conditions in North Korea are very serious. North Korea's total structure remains strong, and will not collapse as easily as many analysts estimate and predict.

             North Korea has several options available to avoid collapse and recover from its serious economic problems. If they select one or two of these options, they may recover. If North Korea does not change its political, economic, and military policies and insists upon the strategy of communizing the South by force, they will collapse quickly as most of the western analysts' are estimating.

             If North Korea chooses war to escape an emergency, this will be a shortcut to collapse. They must know that this choice will cause the destruction of both Koreas, and it would be the worst way to solve the problem. South Korea wants peaceful reunification, not the sudden collapse of North Korea. We know that sudden collapse may cause a chaotic situation. We have to find the best way to live together and we must unify peacefully. South Korea is prepared to negotiate and ready to give assistance to North Korea.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

1.    "An Economic Basket Case; In North Korea The Threat is Total Collapse." The New York Times. 18 February 1996, pp. 5.

2.    "Apparent Defection from North Korea That Hurts to the Heart." The New York Times. 14 February 1996, pp. 7.

3.    Bunge, Frederica M. "North Korea : A Country Study." 3rd ed. Foreign Area Studies The American University, 1981.

4.    "Defectors Find that The Welcome Mat is Fraying." The New York Times. 19 April 1995, pp. 4.

5.    "Feed The Hungry in North Korea." The New York Times. 30 December 1995, pp. 26.

6.          "Kim, Jong Il unable to Fully Control Military." Kyodo News International. 13 October 1995.

7. "Korea Basics" The Federation of Korean Industries. 9 May 1996

8.    Matthews, William. "North .Korea Collapse Appears Imminent." Air Force Times. 15 April 1996. pp. 19.

9.    "North Korea Leader stays in Shadow." The Associated Press News Service. 8 November 1995.

10.    "North Korea Overstating Flood Damage to Attract Aid." Los Angeles Times. 7 October 1995, pp. a-11.

11.    "United Nations says North Korea faces Danger of Famine." The New York Times. 14 December 1995, pp. 19.