Naval Carrier Battle Group CSAR Operational Capabilities in Hostile Urban Environments
CSC 1997
Subject Area - Strategic Issues
Author: Lieutenant Commander Kenneth J. Norton, USN
"The Marines from the 24th MEU(SOC) were amazing. They were loaded with weapons and ready for anything. I knew the cavalry had arrived, everything was cool."[1]
Captain Scott O'Grady, USAF
Reflecting on his rescue from Serb held
territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Today's military operations are more diverse than they have ever been. Since the end of the Gulf War, The U.S. Armed Forces' participation in support of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian missions, collectively labeled military operations other than war (MOOTW), have been the crux of deployed operations. It should not be a great revelation that all U.S. Navy carrier battle groups deployments since Desert Storm have readily participated in these peacetime engagement operations.[2] These MOOTW missions are supporting the National Military Strategy's concepts of overseas presence and power projection.[3] When examining recent MOOTW missions, a common tendency runs through most. That common tendency is operations are normally conducted in urban
centers. Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are all recent examples where the majority of U.S. Armed Forces were dispersed to the major cities to lend support. The accounts of urban MOOTW missions also indicate another disheartening commonality. This commonality is lethal assaults against U.S. military personnel (Marine barracks, Beirut, Lebanon; Quick Reaction Force raid, Mogadishu, Somalia; and Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia). These previous attacks indicate that escalation of a permissive urban MOOTW mission into armed hostilities is always a distinct possibility. Force protection considerations have a prominent role in today's MOOTW missions. Regrettably, complete deterrence of armed assaults against U.S. Armed Forces is impossible to achieve. The onus is therefore on combatant commanders to provide an immediate response against belligerent acts directed at U.S. Forces. A probable course of action that a combatant commander will immediately attempt is a Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) mission. CSAR missions are military operations which extract endangered personnel from hostile territory. A possible shortcoming in current Navy operational deployment philosophy is the lack of applicable Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) response capability in support of MOOTW missions conducted in hostile urban environments. This Military Issues Paper will profile current Naval battle group deployment strategies; review Joint CSAR doctrine; compare the Joint CSAR doctrine to Navy CSAR doctrine; analyze carrier battle group CSAR capabilities; and conclude whether an appropriate urban CSAR response is feasible by a carrier battle group.
"Naval and marine forces must be capable of conducting naval and amphibious warfighting operations. Forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces can respond immediately to a crisis, execute forcible entry or reinforce other forward-deployed elements, and through prompt action help halt an enemy offensive and enable the flow of follow-on ground and land-based air contigents."[4]
National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1995
As the quote suggests, a naval expeditionary force or NEF is capable of conducting an immediate military response to any crisis and perform in any capacity from rendering humanitarian aid to waging war. A notional NEF, as described in the Navy and Marine Corps' White Paper, Forward...From the Sea, is comprised of a carrier battle group (CVBG) and an amphibious ready group (ARG).[5] The CVBG is comprised of an aircraft carrier (CV) and its embarked air wing (CVW). Additionally, surface combatants, supply ships, and possibly a submarine, accompany the carrier as an integral part of a CVBG. The ARG is comprised of amphibious ships with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit, certified and designated as Special Operations Capable, known as a MEU(SOC). Additionally, surface combatants and supply ships are integrated into the ARG.
The fallacy of the statement from National Military Strategy is that within both the Navy and Marine Corps, current operational constraints and resource restraints limit NEF deployments as the NEF is described above. Independent work-up schedules and individual cruise schedules of CVBGs and ARGs, do not optimize the integration of these
diverse yet complimentary battle groups. The National Command Authority (NCA) primarily deploys Naval battle groups (either a CVBG or an ARG or both) to three geographic regions concurrently. The Naval forces' forward presence is considered a vital part of the National Security Strategy policy of engagement and enlargement, and a Naval battle group has the appropriate military force level for a credible overseas presence.[6] This is a full-time presence mission and the turnover of Naval forces is performed on-station so continuity is maintained in the geographic CINC's area of responsibility (AOR). This operational constraint, ("must do" forward presence mission), determines the current Naval battle group deployment strategy. Specific peacetime Naval battle group deployment schedules are also effected by operational restraints ("cannot do"), the restrictions of hardware availability and sailor quality of life issues.
Flightdeck availability and Navy imposed personnel tempo restrictions are the primary factors that frame both CVBG deployment schedules and ARG deployment schedules. Examining available aircraft carriers and recent Naval carrier battle group global positioning, the Navy as a minimum, simultaneously forward deploys three CVBGs. Typically one CVBG is on-station in the Arabian Gulf (CINCCENT), another CVBG is on-station in the Mediterranean Sea (CINCEUR), and a third CVBG is always available to the Western Pacific Ocean region (CINCPAC). Concurrently, when viewing ARG/MEU(SOC) deployments, the Navy usually deploys two simultaneously, one ARG/MEU(SOC) assigned to CINCEUR and the other ARG/MEU(SOC) assigned to either CINCCENT or CINCPAC. All other Naval battle groups are involved in some phase of a work-up/deployment cycle.[7]
In peacetime, CVBGs and ARG/MEU(SOC)s deploy independently to a geographic CINC's AOR to minimize the operational disruptions and corporate knowledge drain when an experienced battle group turns over its mission to a relieving battle group. As a CVBG is relieved by another CVBG in an AOR, the ARG/MEU(SOC) in that AOR is generally going to remain and continue operations. Likewise when ARG/MEU(SOC)s turnover, the AOR co-stationed CVBG will remain and continue to operate. A NEF battle group, on the other hand, would completely rotate the operationally AOR adept Naval force with an AOR inexperienced Naval force, creating a potential operational pause or disruption in a geographic CINC's daily operations. The overlapping of battle group deployment schedules in an AOR maximizes the battle group experience and provides a more seamless transition of Naval forces. On average, thirty percent of all
Navy ships are forward deployed, and over fifty percent of all Navy ships are underway.[8]
Operational rotations of Naval battle groups are also currently restrained by the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO) instruction on deployment lengths and turnaround training intervals. U.S. Navy Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) guidelines have a specific six month maximum deployment length and twelve month work-up interval between cruises. All Navy personnel assigned to ships, squadrons, submarines, or afloat staffs fall under this rubric.[9] The CNO must personally approve any deviations from these guidelines that would increase deployment lengths or decrease turnaround training intervals. This PERSTEMPO post cold war peace dividend is deemed sacrosanct by the current CNO due to the negative impact that excessive sea duty has on personnel retention, safety, and quality of life. The future prospects of the CNO approving an increase of peacetime deployment lengths and/or shortening the interval between
deployments is very unlikely.[10]
The three recurrent geographic Naval battle group forward presence missions, plus the overlapping of battle groups' on station time to limit operation pauses during turnover, coupled with finite flightdecks in the Navy inventory, and peacetime PERSTEMPO considerations, dictate that individual battle groups conduct independent turnaround training and deployment operations. The impact of these independently tailored battle group work-up and cruise cycles is that NEFs are rarely formed during turnaround training exercises and CVBGs and ARGs seldom deploy together. NEFs when established, are only formed for brief periods in a CINC's AOR. This NEF formation is entirely dependent upon overlap in on-station time between a CVBG and ARG in theater.
Today's reality is that the majority of Naval battle group operations are independent and the execution of any mission, including CSAR, is going to rely on the weapons systems organic to a specific battle group. The probability of a CVBG and ARG forming a NEF and conducting a MOOTW CSAR mission in response to an emerging situation, is extremely remote due to the independent stationing of Naval battle groups and infrequent opportunities for NEF formation. In all likelihood, either a CVBG or an ARG will be available to conduct the CSAR mission, not both. The ramifications of this Naval force stationing policy is that a CVBG relies exclusively on the embarked CVW to provide a CSAR response and the ARG relies exclusively on the embarked MEU(SOC). The make-up of a CVW and the weapons systems it employs provides the essential elements to conduct a CSAR mission. The supposition of whether a CVW can conduct urban CSAR will be addressed later, but a review of applicable joint CSAR doctrine and procedures is important to point out the current guidelines to properly conduct a CSAR operation.
"Each Service and the US Special Operations Command are responsible for performing combat search and rescue (CSAR) in support of their own operations."[11]
Executive Summary, Commander's Overview
Joint Pub 3-50.2
Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
26 January 1996
As directed in the CSAR joint doctrine publication, it is clear that CSAR is of significant importance and cannot be overlooked when conducting MOOTW missions. The most recent example of a CSAR mission executed in support of a MOOTW is the successful extraction of Captain Scott O'Grady, USAF, by the 24th MEU(SOC), on June 8, 1995, from Serb held territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina.[12] Captain O'Grady, was shot down over hostile territory while piloting a F-16 aircraft while participating in United Nations' sanctioned MOOTW mission, Operation Deny Flight. Operation Deny Flight was a component of a UN peacemaking mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in which coalition nation aircraft patrolled the skies over the former Yugoslavian republic to prohibit aircraft of the belligerents from flying into each others airspace. The 24th MEU(SOC)'s after action report revealed that the O'Grady CSAR mission firmly adhered to current Joint CSAR doctrine. This strict adherence re-validated the CSAR procedures contained in CSAR joint doctrine publication.[13]
"This publication provides a single-source that contains relevant joint and Service CSAR doctrine and details the guidance and procedures necessary to plan, coordinate, and conduct a timely and tailored joint CSAR response across the range of military operations."[14]
Executive Summary, Conclusion
Joint Pub 3-50.2
Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
26 January 1996
This statement is worth noting due to the implication that CSAR response is possible "across the range of military operations" which would infer a hostile urban environment such as encountered in Mogadishu, Somalia during Operation Restore Hope.[15] In fact, current joint CSAR doctrine and procedures do adequately address hostile urban operations when reviewing current recovery methods. Joint CSAR forces can employ a variety of recovery methods when prosecuting a CSAR mission. The specific method of recovery will be dictated by the situation. The two CSAR procedures addressed in CSAR doctrine are the "Single Unit" and the "Combat Search and Rescue Task Force (CSARTF)".
Of the two recovery procedures, the Single Unit is the preferred recovery method due to its simple, yet effective characteristics. The Single Unit employs a single type of vehicle, normally a helicopter or a flight of several helicopters, which penetrate hostile or denied territory without the support of any other aircraft. The helicopters' defense is dependent upon remaining undetected throughout the flight by using masking terrain, darkness, or adverse weather as opposed to relying on firepower support. This mission is executed in communications silence as well as limiting other emission control (EMCOM) aspects, such as radars and transponders. Thorough preparation, including extensive navigational study and threat analysis, is paramount to the success of a Single Unit CSAR mission. This recovery method requires pinpointing the exact location of isolated personnel prior to helicopter launch.[16] The Single Unit recovery procedure closely parallels Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) in most of its aspects and is applicable to permissive urban environments. However, in non-permissive urban environments, enemy threat levels, enemy activities, terrain, and lighting conditions may not permit the Single Unit recovery method due to the likelihood of the helicopters becoming detected (and vulnerable).
The other recovery procedure is the CSARTF. The 24th MEU(SOC) used this recovery method to successfully extract Capt. Scott O'Grady. This recovery method is more complex than the Single Unit and has more participants. Typical CSARTF elements include: Airborne Mission Commander (AMC), On-Scene Commander (OSC), Rescue Escort (RESCORT) aircraft, Rescue Combat Air Patrol (RESCAP) aircraft, Recovery Helicopters, and Support Aircraft such as tankers, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC).[17] The CSARTF collectively plans, briefs, and executes the mission with all participating elements. Each element has specific airborne responsibilities that are strictly coordinated in order to successfully perform a recovery mission. A brief overview of each of the major CSARTF element functions and procedures will provide an operational perspective on how a CSARTF prosecutes a CSAR mission.
The function of the AMC is to serve as an airborne extension of the executing component's rescue coordination center (RCC) and appoints, as necessary, the OSC. Typical duties include coordinating the radio nets, managing the flow of aircraft to and from the objective areas, coordinating no-fire zones in the objective area, and advising the RCC of mission support requirements and mission progress. Additionally the AMC arranges for aerial or ground refueling of the helicopters as required.
The OSC's primary responsibility is to coordinate rescue efforts at the rescue site. The RESCORT flight leader is most often designated as the OSC by the AMC. Use of an OSC ensures a coordinated and timely recovery response in the often chaotic and hostile objective area. The OSC will give the pick-up command to the recovery helicopters to permit entry into the rescue site after verifying location and authentication of the isolated personnel. The OSC continues to provide on-scene oversight until the recovery helicopters are clear of the objective area.
The RESCORT aircraft are tactical aircraft capable of operating close to the same altitude, speed, and endurance of the recovery helicopters' flight characteristics. The primary responsibility of the RESCORT aircraft is to provide protection to the recovery helicopters from surface threats along the entire ingress and egress routes. Other tasks of RESCORT include assistance in authenticating and locating isolated personnel, determining the level of enemy activity in the objective area and suppressing any threats in the pick-up zone.
The primary function of the RESCAP aircraft is to maintain a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) over the isolated personnel until the other elements of the CSARTF arrive in the objective area. The purpose of RESCAP is threefold. First, due to its stationing above the objective area, the RESCAP is able to provide navigational assistance to the low flying, terrain hugging recovery helicopters in the final ingress phase of recovery operation. From a high vantage point, the RESCAP is able to steer the recovery helicopters to the landing zone (LZ). The second purpose that a RESCAP provides is protection to located and authenticated isolated personnel from enemy ground activity. One of the most vulnerable periods for isolated personnel is when they break cover and proceed to the LZ in preparation for pick-up. Third, the RESCAP protects the CSARTF from hostile airborne threats. RESCAP aircraft are capable of conducting counterair and electronic warfare missions. launch of the recovery helicopters until the
The CSARTF's recovery helicopters' functions are similar to the Single Unit helicopters' functions. The subtle difference between the two helicopter missions is recovery helicopters in a CSARTF, instead of flying unaccompanied (Single Unit recovery method), the recovery helicopters have the full firepower support of the rest of the CSARTF.[18] Consequently, the CSARTF recovery helicopters operations have more inherent complexity in execution due to the close proximity of other airborne participants. This review of the major components and associate procedures illustrates the complexity of a CSARTF operation. A CSAR mission often involves coordinated operations using both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. Because of the differences in operating environments and flight regimes, aircraft unique threats should be carefully evaluated to determine the appropriate composition of a CSARTF in each rescue mission.[19] When an urban CSAR mission involves using fixed wing aircraft and helicopters the ability of TACAIR to perform the RESCAP or RESCORT mission is severely diminished. TACAIR's inability to match the flight characteristics of highly maneuverable helicopters in a tightly constrained urban environment, prevents them from adequately engaging and suppressing enemy surface threats. Fixed wing TACAIR are well suited to RESCORT and RESCAP roles in an open or rural environment where population and terrain features do not affect these tasks. Conversely, in a densely populated, built up, urban center, fixed wing RESCORT and RESCAP are virtually ineffectual, due to the inability to fly low and
slow enough to provide assistance to the recovery helicopters or the survivors. Another undesirable characteristic of fixed wing aircraft flight that minimizes their effectiveness, in a densely populated urban environment, is the difficulty to discern enemy forces and from neutral bystanders. The high speeds at which fixed wing TACAIR fly make identification of friend or foe extremely difficult. If positive identification cannot be assured, bringing weapons to bear is prohibited in accordance with most MOOTW Rules of Engagement (ROE).
To surmount this urban unique situation, a CSARTF can use armed assault helicopters such as the Marine Corps' Cobra in the RESCORT and in the RESCAP roles. The ability to match the flight characteristics of the recovery helicopters makes the Cobra an ideal substitute of fixed wing aircraft. The fixed wing TACAIR flight characteristic limitations in the hostile urban environment does not apply to armed assault rotary wing aircraft.
In comparison, the major difference of the two CSAR recovery methods is that the Single Unit recovery operation relies on stealth while the CSARTF recovery operation relies on firepower and air superiority. Additionally, the Single Unit procedure can immediately respond to a no-notice CSAR mission from an alert posture if threat conditions permit. On the other hand, the CSARTF method provides the best protection for isolated personnel as well as the recovery helicopters. However, the extensive prior planning and prior coordination of a CSARTF to execute a CSAR, does not allow a no-notice response to an emerging requirement. Consequently a combat rescue opportunity may be lost if time is an essential factor for a successful recovery.
The primary similarity between the two recovery methods is the requirement to pinpoint the location and authenticate the isolated personnel prior to launching recovery helicopters. Without exception, the essential condition for any successful recovery is an accurate location of isolated personnel.[20] An evading individual's best chance to avoid capture and aid the rescue attempt is by avoiding known population centers and concentrations of enemy military forces. It is important to point out that a typical evasion plan of action or EPA requires the evader to reach low density populated areas which allows either single unit or CSARTF recovery methods to effect a rescue. Unfortunately, EPAs of this type are not normally applicable to MOOTW operations in large urban areas. Isolated personnel will likely have minimal evasion opportunity from the inner-city areas out to a desolate countryside. In all likelihood evasion will be from building to building, rather than from boulder to boulder. The ability to provide a urban CSAR capability is paramount to support MOOTW operations.
This review of the joint CSAR doctrine and procedures indicates that a CSAR response is possible in a hostile urban environment if the appropriate mix of aircraft are available to form a CSARTF. Currently this appropriate mix of aircraft is resident in a NEF. MEU(SOC) armed helicopters can execute RESCAP and RESCORT missions; CVW fixed wing assets can execute AMC, RMC, and support roles; and CVW CSAR helicopters are capable of executing the helicopter recovery mission. The ability of a NEF to form this CSARTF for urban operations is dependent upon the co-location of a CVBG and an ARG/MEU(SOC). The earlier operational constraints and restraints discussion provided the rationale which currently curbs NEF formation to occur.
Consequently, the probability of a CVBG being tasked to respond to a MOOTW CSAR mission is likely. If this MOOTW is in a hostile urban environment, does a CVBG CSARTF have the capability to effectively respond? A review of the current US NAVY CSAR doctrine to Joint CSAR doctrine and CVBG CSAR capabilities should determine the effectiveness and applicability for hostile urban operations.
" Combat Search and Rescue. A specific task performed by rescue forces to effect the recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war."[21]
Glossary
Joint Pub 3-50.2
Doctrine for Joint Combat Search and Rescue
26 January 1996
Navy CSAR doctrine encompasses all of the salient points of Joint CSAR doctrine with an additional requirement of providing a CSARTF as a component part of all strike operations. Navy strike packages include dedicated airframes to the CSARTF which preemptively launch to provide near real time response to a CSAR recovery mission. Strike planning includes developing potential CSAR ingress and egress routes, EPAs for downed aviators, and CSAR GO/NO GO criteria. In a CVW CSARTF, the designated AMC monitors an ongoing strike and alerts the CSARTF when warranted. The OSC initiates the CSAR recovery mission and selects the appropriate ingress and egress routes for the entire CSARTF. The rest of the functions and tasks of the Navy CSARTF are consistent with the Joint CSAR doctrine.
The CVBG CSAR capabilities are dependent on the specific aircraft in the carrier based CVW. Today, a typical CVW CSARTF will use fixed wing aircraft in all CSARTF components except the recovery helicopters. The E-2C Hawkeye is used as in the role of AMC. The early warning and control capabilities of the Hawkeye make it suitably equipped to handle the command and control tasks as well as maintaining awareness of mission's progress. The Hawkeye is the connectivity link between the CSARTF and the RCC on the CV. An alternative to the Hawkeye is the S-3B Viking. The multi-mission Viking, though limited by radios, can adequately accomplish the AMC role and provide tanker support as well. The F/A-18A Hornet can fly both the RESCORT and RESCAP missions. The Hornet's dual strike/fighter capability has the ability to perform either as an air-to-air or as an air-to-ground provider, depending on the situation. The Hornet is night vision devices (NVD) capable. The F-14D Tomcat can also fly both the RESCORT or RESCAP missions, It too has the versatility to provide air-to-air or air-to-ground fires. However, a major limitation of the Tomcat is that it is not equipped with a NVD cockpit. The Tomcat can only fly RESCORT during daylight hours. The EA-6B Prowler can augment a RESCAP package by providing the electronic countermeasure warfare capability to the CSARTF. The recovery helicopter function is performed by the HH-60H Seahawk. The HH-60H Seahawk is NVD capable and carries survivability enhancements to include radar warning receivers, defensive countermeasures, airframe armor and ballistic tolerance, and internal geonavigational systems. The HH-60H has either 7.62 mm or .50 caliber machine guns mounted at both the starboard cabin door and at the port cabin window.[22]
In a low threat environment, the HH-60H is capable of executing a Single Unit recovery mission. Low threat is defined as hostile territory with small arms and infrared missiles. HH-60H crews are trained to conduct day and night CSAR and Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operations. The crews fly nap-of-the-earth and terrain following flight profiles which enhances terrain masking for covert operations.
When a CVW CSARTF mission is required, operations are permitted in medium threat environments. Medium threat is defined as a non-integrated or a local enemy air defense capability. It could include man-portable air defense systems, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), armed helicopters, and armed fixed wing aircraft. In addition, the low threat weapons could be present. The CVW CSARTF's RESCAP and RESCORT elements are capable of suppressing the medium threat systems allowing the Recovery Helicopters a momentary low threat sanctuary to effect a pick-up of isolated personnel.
In a high threat environment, air superiority is not established and a dedicated strike mission or shaping mission is required to reduce the threat level to medium threat or less. High threat is defined as a sophisticated integrated enemy air defense system and includes all the threats in the medium and low threat environments. If a strike package is not feasible to suppress an enemy's integrated air defense system, HH-60H helicopters may be used, within their threat level capability, to insert and extract Naval special warfare (NSW) forces. NSW forces can effect a CSAR recovery mission if they deployed as part of the CVBG and if they are not predisposed in accomplishing other CVBG missions.[23]
The CVW CSAR capabilities are as effective as the CSAR capabilities of a NEF with the exception of one crucial capability. The CVBG Commander who deploys today with an embarked CVW, does not have organic armed assault helicopters at his disposal. Without assault helicopters, urban CSAR operations are limited to permissive environments or possibly low threat environments. Recall that the Single Unit method of recovery is dependent on stealth and uses masking terrain and darkness to avoid potential threats. If CVW based HH-60H helicopters attempt to rescue isolated personnel in a non-permissive urban area, no threats should be encountered on the ingress and egress routes. However, since the possibility exists that small arms or infrared missiles might be encountered, these threats would have to be thwarted by the rescue helicopter's own survivability systems. Chaff and Flares coupled with cabin mounted machine guns, enhance the chances of survival, but are not very effective against rocket launched grenades as were encountered in Mogadishu during Operation Restore Hope by the Quick Reaction Force.[24]
A CVW CSARTF with fixed wing RESCORT and RESCAP elements have severe limitations in city centers as were noted in the joint CSAR capabilities review. The fixed wing aircraft of a CVW cannot provide plausible surface threat suppression in a
timely manner as can be done by a slow flying armed assault helicopter. It is an improbable task for fast and high flying Navy TACAIR to maintain constant contact with the recovery helicopters to provide RESCORT during the recovery helicopters' low and slow ingress and egress. Additionally, laying down accurate RESCAP fires against well hid and/or mobile surface threats, in a densely populated city is a cumbersome task (if not impossible) at the rates of speed that TACAIR flies. Another important consideration of using CVW TACAIR in RESCORT and RESCAP is ROE constraints. Positively identifying belligerents forbid indiscriminate fires by TACAIR to prevent noncombatant casualties.
I firmly believe that the practice of independently stationing CVBGs and ARG/MEU(SOC)s, vice NEFs, in support of a MOOTW mission are likely for the foreseeable future. Since MOOTW missions are often conducted in cities, the preponderance of participating military forces will be located in an urban environment. If urban CSAR missions are required, CVBG Commanders need to augment the CVW CSARTFs with armed assault helicopters or needlessly risk imperiling the lives of the recovery helicopter aircrews due to the fixed wing limitations. If armed assault helicopters are unavailable, the CVBG CSARTFs have very limited CSAR capabilities to conduct recovery missions in a hostile urban environment. This limited urban CSAR capability is a critical CVBG shortcoming and highlights that an independently stationed CVBG is not currently in compliance with joint CSAR doctrine which directs all Services to perform CSAR in support of their own operations across the spectrum of their operating environment.
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