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Military

The Next Superpower: Strategic Implication of China's Economic Development

CSC 1997

Subject Area - Topical Issues

Executive Summary

Title: The Next Superpower: Strategic Implication of China's Economic Development

Author: Carl S. Murphy, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Thesis: The central argument of this paper is that U.S. policy can play a pivotal role in China's stability and in the leadership's inclination remain cooperatively engaged in world affairs, or withdraw behind a bulwark of absolute sovereignty and frustrated nationalism. This is so, because China's dependence on the global economy provides the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, with considerable economic leverage to supplement its diplomatic and military influence in shaping policy to accommodate or frustrate China's emergence as a 21st century global power. A pragmatic U.S. engagement policy which recognizes that the passage of time promises a favorable evolution if China remains interdependent within the global economy.

 

Discussion: The revival of China's economy and its continued growth makes the emergence of the PRC as a superpower in the 21st century a credible prediction. However, the need to sustain economic growth has become central to the stability of China and forced pragmatic choices on the Chinese leadership. There is an intrinsic contradiction between China's dependence on foreign market access, investment and technology to grow its economy, and the Chinese inclination toward state centered power-politics linked to insistence that China has been denied the respect due a rising power. Sustained growth of the Chinese economy at the present rate is conditioned by a stable international environment for trade, continued inflows of foreign investment, access to foreign markets and the availability of foreign technology--all of which are heavily influenced by policy decisions made in Washington.

                While China's economic development portends tremendous growth and future power, there is also a fragility in the economy and the fabric of China. The erosion in credibility of world communism has deprived China's leadership of an ideological basis for its continued rule. In response, the leadership has embarked on a dual strategy to legitimize continued communist control: 1) Performance-based legitimacy through sustainment of economic growth and 2) Appeals to nationalism and the Chinese perception of their historical importance, to provide a unifying vision for the populous and inoculate against opposing ideologies. While military improvement has been modest, China's economic strength is growing rapidly. Beijing's nationalistic appeals to the restoration of a perceived historical greatness, combined with popular resentment over imperialist humiliation in the last century, point toward China's development as an increasingly powerful nation--even a future superpower. U.S. force reductions independent of, or in conjunction with, withdrawal from the Asian-Pacific region has the potential to make China a military peer early in the next century.

                Economic modernization supports increased world influence and military power, but forces China' to sublimate military assertiveness to maintain a stable environment for commerce. While efforts to sustain growth have forced subordination of China's zero-sum approach to sovereignty in favor of pragmatic diplomacy, there is an intrinsic dissonance in China's behavior. Nationalistic maneuvering, as evidenced by irredentist territorial claims and anti-imperialist rhetoric, can be seen to arise from a renewed sense of Chinese pride and importance as a result of increasing economic clout. Exercise of China's growing power, however, is in conflict with the international behavior required to assure foreign investors of China's domestic stability and aversion to foreign adventures.

 

Recommendations:

- U.S. policy is central to China's emergence into global cooperation or retreat into truculence. An interdependent China suits U.S. interests and should remain a policy objective.

- U.S. strategy which detracts from the Chinese Communist Party's legitimacy, or threatens China's continued economic growth will weaken an insecure regime. This in turn could bring about an Asian-Pacific cold war.

- U.S. policy must seek incremental changes in China rather than pressing for a republican metamorphosis.  

- U.S. policy should continue comprehensive engagement with China, while avoiding broadly defined initiatives that undermine the legitimacy of China's communist rulers . A U.S. strategy for dealing with China is required which is consistent, coherent and acknowledged by the Chinese. China must understand U.S. motivations. Washington's actions, while not soft on China, must be consistent with clearly articulated U.S. objectives.

- The Asian-Pacific represents a critical strategic region for the U.S. in the next century.

American military presence remains essential to prevent regional conflict. The promise of reunion on the Korean peninsula means the U.S. must find a conceptual basis with both Korea and Japan for continued forward basing; or seek other regional facilities.

-U.S. policy must deal with a regime struggling with the centripetal forces of its own economic revival. While weaknesses in China do not presage economic or domestic upheaval, widespread turmoil could bring enormous refugee flows and mass starvation.   Preliminary discussion of a multinational contingency framework for such an eventuality is advised.

 

 

The Next Superpower: Strategic Implication of

China's Economic Development

Table of Contents

 

I.                      Executive Summary                                                                                 1

 

II.                     Introduction                                                                                             4

 

III.                   China's Economic Promise and Underlying Weaknesses                        7

 

IV.                   Beijing's Legitimacy Strategy: An Appeal to Nationalism                        18

 

V.                    China's Military Modernization                                                               33

 

                       Table 1: Chinese Defense Spending 1990-1995                                     37

 

                       Table 2: Asian Defense Budgets 1996

                                    Asian Defense Spending as a Percent of GDP                         38

 

                       Map 1: Southeast Asia - South China Sea                                              40

 

VI.                   U.S. Policy Choices in Dealing with China                                              45

 

VII.                  Summary and Conclusion                                                                        51

 

VIII.                 Bibliography                                                                                            59

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Next Superpower: Strategic Implications of China's Economic Development

            The remarkable economic growth brought about by Deng Xiaoping's initiation of reforms in 1978, has fueled speculation that China will become the world's largest economic power early in the next century.[1] When viewed in conjunction with sixteen years of 9.5 percent average annual growth rate since 1980,[2] many China watchers predict the PRC will surpass the United States as the world's largest economy and attain economic, military and influential superpower status within a generation.[3] Others speculate that China's growing economic and military influence will fulfill predictions of a renewed cold war.[4]  Recent U.S. Naval Attaché to Beijing, Rear Admiral Eric McVaddon, has described China's emergence as a peer-competitor as a self-fulfilling prophesy, if current Sino-U.S. antagonism over trade and human rights continues.[5] Clearly, a growing negativism towards the United States among the Chinese populous could contribute to an increasingly inflexible response by China in future disputes with Washington. The growth of Chinese nationalism, combined with continued U.S. criticism over issues which China views as facets of internal sovereignty--such as human rights--may give rise to harsher anti-U.S. sentiment and make a mini-Cold War in Asia inevitable.[6] The possibility of this occurring in conjunction with faltering economic performance could drive a permanent wedge between the U.S. and China.

            As a nuclear power with the world's largest population, a burgeoning economy predicted to rival that of the United States within twenty years,[7] an ongoing military modernization program and a seat on the U.N. Security Council,[8] China emerges as a pivotal player in the "Pacific Century."[9] China's new prosperity, however, is dependent on continued access to foreign markets, the infusion of foreign investment and the availability of western technology to sustain further growth.[10] In coping with the challenge of modernizing a nation of 1.3 billion people, China's rulers face many exigencies including a loss of legitimation for continued Communist Party rule, the devolution of centralized authority, growing regionalism and the potential for an economic or even national collapse. This tableau is further complicated by an increasing nationalism which both supports and hinders exercise of China's growing strength. While China's economic growth is the enabling force behind the PRC's likely emergence as a 21st century superpower, the need to sustain economic growth has become central to the stability of China. This has forced pragmatic choices on China's leadership which result from a dependence on access to foreign markets and financial investment. Reliance on foreign trade in turn has highlighted an intrinsic contradiction between state centered power-politics linked with insistence that China has been denied the respect due an emerging superpower and the leadership's need for a stable political and economic environment to support continued growth.

            The central argument of this paper is that U.S. policy can play a pivotal role in China's stability and in the leadership's inclination remain cooperatively engaged in world affairs, or withdraw behind a bulwark of absolute sovereignty and frustrated nationalism. This is so, because China's dependence on the global economy provides the United States, as the sole remaining superpower, with considerable economic leverage to supplement its diplomatic and military influence in shaping policy to accommodate or frustrate China's emergence as a 21st century global power.

            This paper will first examine the continuing potential and underlying weaknesses in China's economy. Secondly, it will review the strategy of the Chinese leadership to stress the reliance placed on sustaining economic growth and the dichotomy this has forced between pragmatic international cooperation and more assertive nationalistic desires. Thirdly, this paper will examine the potential rise of China as a dominant military power resulting from its burgeoning economic growth. Finally, this paper will analyze U.S. policy options, and conclude with recommendations which focus on China's status as a unique state deserving pragmatic engagement--an exception to imposing U.S. standards of behavior because the passage of time promises a favorable Chinese evolution. This exception is justified because a firm and consistent, but "kid-glove" handling of China is required to lessen the probability of the equally unpleasant extremes of a Chinese collapse, or emergence as a powerful pariah state in the decades to come.

 

China's Economic Promise and Underlying Weaknesses

            In a 1994 report on global economic prospects and developing countries, the World Bank confirmed the growing importance of the Asian-Pacific region to the world's economy, predicting that by 2020, Asia will contain seven of the world's ten largest economies in terms of purchasing power: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Only two such economies will exist in Europe: France and Germany. The same report also predicted that by 2020, China's economy would surpass that of the United States by forty percent.[11] The World Bank's recent downward revision in the rate of increase in China's buying power has not lessened the dynamism and potential of the Asia-Pacific region.[12] China's prospects to incrementally surpass the U.S. as the world's largest economy now appear twenty years off--potentially placing the U.S. and China in economic parity by 2020.[13] The current level of economic activity in the Pacific, combined with the World Bank's prediction of a continuing shift in world trade to the region, lends considerable support to the prediction by Admiral Joseph Prueher, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, that we are approaching the "Pacific Century."[14]

            In the last decade, China's aggregate foreign trade has grown from 15 percent of GNP in 1983 to almost 40 percent today. In June 1996, China surpassed Japan as the holder of the largest U.S. trade deficit, while the World Bank extrapolates the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will exceed $10 trillion early in the next century. [15] China's sustained rate of economic growth is not without precedent. Japan experienced annual growth exceeding 10 percent for more than twenty years between 1950 and 1970.[16] High growth rates are not uncommon in developing nations where modernization of production methods and elimination of waste provides quick improvement. The vast scale of China's production sector and the huge number of state owned enterprises implies significant potential to eliminate inefficient practices.[17] In addition, the rush of foreign investors establishing production facilities in China due to low labor costs, is also predictive of continued high growth rates. Between 1988 and 1992, China was the largest single recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Asia. In 1994 China received over $34 billion in actual foreign direct investment; more than any country other than the United States.[18] FDI in China was estimated at $40 billion in 1996.[19]

            It is impossible to discount China's impressive economic future--if current trends hold true. There are signs, however, which point to a less rapid growth for the Asian giant: a lurching progress marked by reactive governmental intervention in the economy, repressive measures against fledgling regional independence movements and efforts to distract domestic dissatisfaction through nationalistic appeals to a rebirth of "Great China" as a world power.[20] These issues, which have received less publicity than China's growth potential, suggest that the PRC's ascent to military and economic power may follow at a slower and more erratic pace than has been predicted. Taken as a whole these issues highlight a potential for China to stumble in its growth or even split asunder. As the regime struggles to preserve its power, China's outward ambitions may be subordinated to domestic concerns well beyond the year 2020. The likelihood is that China's rulers will remain pragmatic in their international relations to preserve economic growth and bolster domestic order; this in turn aids their retention of power.[21] Several issues are predictive of turbulent times ahead:

            China's leaders have keenly observed the collapse of the Soviet Union, noting that Gorbachev's reforms brought about not merely chaos, but the fall of the ruling communist regime that implemented increased freedom. This has given rise to powerful nationalist and conservative factions in the communist hierarchy that fear the pace of economic reform and may work to inhibit continued liberalization; placing the ability of China to support further economic modernization in doubt. The lack of a formalized leadership succession procedure has caused maneuvering between the leading factions within the Central Committee and given greater power to conservative forces resistant to economic change. This has engendered uncertainty and succession maneuvering between the leading factions within the Central Committee.   At a time when the communist party leaders are not agreed on the future of economic reform, the extent of economic modernization under Deng has made a return to true communism impossible. The irrevocable nature of China's economic reforms compounds the regime's struggle to reach consensus on economic reform and accommodate the challenge which a burgeoning market economy poses to the ideological basis for communist rule. This clash between China's historical Marxist-Leninist ideology and an expanding market economy is generating destabilizing forces within the PRC and challenging China's aspirations to greatness. Uneven regional growth has further diluted the basis for central government control and reduced the legitimacy of monolithic communist management of the economy. Most significant among the challenges which The PRC faces is the deteriorating condition of China's non-competitive and debt-ridden state owned enterprises (SOE).

            It appears that President Jiang Zemin and Beijing's conservatives have drawn similar conclusions from the Soviet collapse: Economic reform must be accomplished from a strong central position before relaxation of government control, as in Glasnost, can be contemplated--if at all. Without central control, China's leaders fear economic reform will allow abuse by a people suppressed for generations and ill-equipped to handle near instantaneous capitalism; as occurred in the former Soviet Union.[22] Another lesson imprinted upon China's ruling elite is that the Soviet Union's headlong rush toward political freedom brought about not merely chaos, but the fall of the ruling communist regime that implemented increases in freedom.[23] The abundant evidence of pandemic corruption in liberalized China and the accelerating growth of criminal activity support the existence of a similar potential for chaos.[24] The resentment which crime and corruption engender in the populous, has prompted numerous crackdowns on both street crime and official graft. The most recent attempt to restrain corruption was announced by President Jiang Zemin in January 1997, perhaps in the hope of preventing the spread of China's endemic corruption, nepotism and cronyism to the detriment of Hong Kong.[25] The consequence of


China's observation of the economic collapse in the former Soviet Union and long delayed revitalization of privatized enterprises is that the Politburo is possessed of a near paranoid apprehension over potential chaos resulting from unrestrained economic reforms. [26] Whether fear of collapse may be over-emphasized in Beijing is debatable, but many in Russia admire China's step-by-step approach to economic reform and lament their own pell-mell rush to "restructuring."[27] China observers point to a decaying society in describing the political paranoia of China's communist leaders, "...one has the sense of the proverbial emperor without clothes: a naked state stripped of its traditional sources of legitimacy and sources of rule; a state increasingly dependent on coercive methods of rule, corruption, and striking deals with local power barons to stay in power."[28] China's fear of chaos and the questionable state of communist legitimacy makes any move toward greater political freedom unlikely while the current generation of rulers remain in power. This also portends continued cycling between relaxation and tightening of economic reform as China follows Deng's axiom of "crossing the river by feeling the stones," in economic modernization.[29]

            The death of Deng Xiaoping has placed the future of "Dengism," China's focus on economic growth and prosperity, over strict adherence to communism, in doubt.[30] Soviet educated Jiang Zemin, is the first leader of the PRC to rise to power without purges or warfare.[31] To shore up his prospects for ascendancy in advance of Deng's death, Jiang courted allies within the Central Committee and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to offset a powerful neo-conservative faction.[32] Lacking the unquestioned authority of Deng, Jiang must appease many diverse factions within the Central Committee to avoid challenge to his ascendance. Examples of Jiang's consensus building within the CCP and courting of PLA support, include The PRC's mantra-like emphasis on the restoration of Chinese greatness, reunion--at any cost--with Taiwan and assertive territorial claims accompanied by military posturing over the resource rich Spratly and Paracel Island groups.[33]

            The ideological vulnerability of the Chinese Communist Party was forcefully illustrated during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, when millions of Chinese demonstrated across China for political reform.[34] China's population of 1.3 billion has become less dependent on the Communist Party and less controllable as a result of economic liberalization and reduced isolation from international influence. Respect for political authority has waned, alienation is common place among the youth and material hedonism has spread throughout Chinese society.[35] Neo-conservative factions within the CCP tend to view the pace at which change has already occurred with concern.

            Conservatives perceive chaos and a loss of Party control as the result of continued economic liberalization. Their assessment of the risk of social unrest and potential turmoil is supported by China watchers who point to inflation, widespread corruption, increasing labor mobility and rural unemployment-- brought about by economic growth--as having the potential to trigger mass demonstrations comparable to those which erupted in 1989.[36] The inherent contradiction in this situation is that the regime needs to obviate the specter of a hostile and uncontrollable populous. To do so demands continued economic improvement to maintain the CCP's performance-based justification for control, while increasing police efforts and prosecution of members of the ruling elite illegally profiting from the expanding economy. Sustaining continued improvement in prosperity is essential, or the communist party may find it necessary to once again resort to Mao's Draconian axiom: "power grows from the barrel of a gun."[37] Ironically, the opening of the economy and the chaotic swirl of activity which this has entailed have created ever increasing opportunities for official graft.

            Under Deng Xaioping, China decentralized economic decision making to the level perceived as the most logical and efficient: the provinces. But, decentralization and the establishment of exclusive economic zones under Deng has diminished the central government's control of these rapidly developing zones.[38] Through increased economic "openness" coastal provinces have grown considerably faster than interior provinces, contributing to the rise of "regionalism." The power of the economically successful coastal regions is increasing at the expense of central control from Beijing. These powerful provinces have become economically integrated with their principle outside trading partners; further diluting the once absolute authority of Beijing in both economic and international relations.[39] This devolving of power has lead to "Rice Wars" in which stronger provinces have used military power to attain resources from interior provinces without consultation with Beijing. In 1992, Guangdong province was able to charter ships and purchase its own oil on the international spot market when the central government attempted to enforce its control over resource allocation.[40] The implication is that Beijing's control over economic policy in the provinces is only a pretense; as is the adherence of the provinces to the central government's economic directives. This also implies that these provinces may act in their own best interests, at the expense of a unified Chinese policy, when economic growth, foreign trade or direct investment is at stake.    

            The largest challenge to the PRC in sustaining economic growth and maintaining domestic stability is the deteriorating condition of China's non-competitive and debt-ridden state owned enterprises (SOE). These backward production facilities have bloated payrolls and inefficient production methods which imperil China's banking system, deprive the remainder of China's economy of financing for modernization and force The leadership to seek out foreign investment. The fragility of these institutions demands government intervention. Government reform, however, threatens great economic upheaval through unemployment of excess workers as well as the exhaustion of capital needed to finance revitalization of other sectors of the infrastructure. Chinese Premier Li Peng recently stated that "reform of state enterprises cannot follow the capitalist model, with bankruptcies and layoffs, for fear of mass unemployment."[41] The burden of financing fragile state owned businesses has increased the importance of continued foreign investment, while the fear of massive lay-offs has slowed the pace of government programs to reform the SOEs and raised concern among foreign investors. It is ironic that while China has become the second largest economy in the world, after the United States, the PRC remains the world's largest beneficiary of multilateral World Bank and unilateral Japanese aid.[42] In this context, foreign investment capital has already become essential to support sustained growth and the revitalization's of China's infrastructure.

             China's State Owned Enterprises employ 90 million workers of which 20 million are considered redundant.[43] Seventy percent of China's estimated 100,000 SOE are losing money due to inefficiency and growing competition from private enterprises and imported goods.[44] These monoliths are also burdened by the requirement to provide their workers with cradle-to-grave care--the historic hallmark of collective communist systems. For those losing money, financing their deficit accounts for as much as seventy percent of all domestic investment capital.[45] This burden on China's banking system makes the continued availability of foreign investment critical. A major Chinese state bank recently reported losses of $7.2 million in the bankruptcy of a state-owned textile firm.[46] The rate at which these obsolescent facilities are devouring state finances further limits the governments options for modernization. One of the largest drains on state finances is intercompany, or "triangular debt." In a self perpetuating cycle, one entity fails to pay for goods received. The supplying enterprise is forced to default on payroll or payment to its suppliers unless it can borrow from the state. Debt service consumes earnings and causes further defaults. Triangular debt was estimated at $70 billion in 1994; equivalent to 30 percent of China's industrial output.[47]

            Another alarming trend is the number of ailing state firms feigning bankruptcy to avoid repaying loans or to cover for mismanagement. China's central banks are trapped between government insistence on continued lending to sick state firms and massive non-performing loans. Motivated by the regime's aversion to painful job cuts, and in the face of a growing number of bankruptcies by state enterprises, continued loans to ailing industries threatens insolvency for China's state banks.[48] Closing or privatizing inefficient facilities would free government funding for those industries that can become viable, but the Politburo fears an associated increase to its 100 million strong unemployed or "floating" workforce. [49] To provide perspective on this problem, it is worth noting the entire U.S. work force is approximately 100 million persons.

            With the passing of power from Deng to Jiang Zemin, a more deliberate approach to economic change can be seen taking shape, as well as increasing concern over dismantling this last vestige of centralized control over the economy. While Jiang is reported to recognize the need for continued economic growth, he does so with a slower pace in mind. Jiang has demonstrated concern that radical reform of the SOE into modern corporations could cause the collapse of many weaker enterprises and lead to increased hostility toward the government; further reducing the legitimacy of Communist Party control. During the fourth plenum of the National People's Congress in 1995, Jiang announced the government would back away from the radical reformation of state enterprises implemented in 1993.[50] This may reflect a move to mollify neo-conservatives by slowing the pace of reform in an effort to maintain a coalition within the Central Committee.

            Fear that non-competitive State business will be unable to compete against foreign imports has also perpetuate a "fortress of trade barriers longer than the Great Wall."[51]

Trade barriers have been at the root of much of the recent bickering between China and the U.S. Following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in November 1996, U.S. Commerce Secretary Mikey Kantor made clear that China was informed it must offer freer market access if it wishes U.S. support of its admission to the World Trade Organization:

 

            We have fought very hard to get rid of... discrimination through industrial agreements, agreements in agriculture and agreements on intellectual property rights protection in trying to get China to adhere to the commercially reasonable agreement to get into the World Trade Organization.[52]

 

            While a recent accord on opening China's textile markets to U.S. goods has averted another trade war,[53] the weakness of China's state controlled industries makes a complete lowering of trade barriers unlikely. Friction with the U.S. is likely to continue given China's replacement of Japan as the holder of the largest trade surplus with the U.S. in June 1996.[54] From testimony by U.S. trade representative Charlene Barshefsky during her confirmation hearing in January 1997, it appears that the Clinton administration intends to block China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) over Chinese barriers to U.S. agricultural products. If this occurs, the recent pattern of U.S. threatened sanctions leading to a truculent Chinese capitulation is likely to continue. Admission to the WTO is seen in Beijing as an important accomplishment if China is to someday wield the major economic influence of a great nation.[55] Continued denial of membership in the WTO fuels China's theory of a U.S. led containment strategy and could lead to increasing hostility between Washington and Beijing.

            The inefficiency of state-owned businesses and fragility of China's urban and rural infrastructure have become a major bottle-neck in the PRC's economic growth. The frail condition of China's infrastructure has made the leadership desperate to attract foreign investment and joint venture partners to inject capital and technical efficiency into state enterprises. The leadership is urgently seeking investment to improve fossil fueled energy production, telecommunications, water purification, hydroelectric power development and transportation sectors. Modernization of these critical market sectors is estimated to require $500 billion beyond the massive funding needed to transform state run enterprises into viable commercial ventures.[56]

            To attract foreign investment, The PRC has had to provide long term tax concessions and accept build-operate-transfer agreements in which foreign firms create infrastructure and operate the enterprise for a specified time, receiving all profits, and later return the entire operation to the state. In providing these advantages to foreign operated firms, China has further undercut its inefficient state operations which bear double the tax burden imposed on privileged foreign joint ventures.[57]

            A 1994 report by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade concluded that "so inefficient and inflexible is the infrastructure that it is slowly dawning on foreign investors that investing in China is not as profitable as it might have seemed."[58] Despite misgivings, investors continue to pour an estimated $40 billion in direct investment into China each year. China has even opened its once sensitive power generation sector to attract the necessary capital and expertise to support improvement of its precarious infrastructure.[59]    However, the February 1997 announcement of plans to curtail civil law and human rights protections in Hong Kong after reunion has jeopardized approximately $20 billion in annual foreign investment channeled from Taiwan through Hong Kong.[60]

            Taken collectively, the many weaknesses in China's economy and infrastructure could lead to a decline in the rate of economic growth or a downturn in the economy accompanied by increased domestic dissatisfaction. The success of China's continued economic modernization is by no means certain. Economic reforms instituted under Deng Xiaoping have transformed China into a market economy which is straining the boundaries of centralized communist control and raising foreign investor's concern over the future of economic reforms. Disputes with the United States over trade, human rights and the future of Hong Kong and Taiwan, threaten to raise investor's fears and further reduce the availability of investment capital for continued economic modernization.[61] On the other hand, some economists suggest China may remain stable with as little as a 6 percent annual growth rate, but quickly point out that any significant downturn in economic development could create serious domestic stability problems.[62] These issues are predictive of possible economic and domestic turmoil, but do not lessen the dynamism of China's economy, nor discredit predictions for continued increase.

            The inherent conflict between the centralized authoritarian control implemented under Mao's Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the growth of a free-wheeling market economy in China, is compounded by the demise of world communism. These changes have in turn eroded the ideological basis for continued communist rule. Lacking a conceptual basis to justify its monopoly on power in a disturbed anthill of laissez faire activity, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become dependent on economic growth to bolster its mandate for exclusive reign, and nationalistic appeals to invoke a unifying vision for the Chinese people.[63] The conflict between the need for growth and the expansive posturing of nationalism presents the world with an increasingly powerful, but contradictory China.

Beijing's Legitimacy Strategy: An Appeal to Nationalism

             In the wake of the worldwide collapse of Communism; in which Marxism and Leninism have been largely discredited and predominantly abandoned, the theme of "reunification to rebuild Chinese greatness" runs throughout the political discourse of China today. As the regime searches for renewed legitimacy for its right to rule, and a means to derive recognition by the people of this right, both a new nationalism and an overriding imperative to continue economic growth have emerged as central themes.[64] These themes provide the political basis for the transition of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) foundation from the charismatic and ideological legitimacy of Maoism--the cult of personality--to a rationalized performance-based mandate to govern, aspired to under "Dengism."[65] To legitimate its rule and inoculate against ideological challenge, the Communist regime has resorted to irredentist territorial claims and a theme of absolute Chinese sovereignty to reinforce its basis for control. The exception is where economic growth requires the maintenance of international good will and avoidance of conflict.[66] In these instances dependence on trade has forced pragmatism on China and a subjugation of sovereignty to pursue favorable conditions for economic growth. The CCP has also used its knowledge of Marxist insurrection techniques and revolutionary teachings to shape its nationalistic and economic performance messages as a counter to ideologies introduced as a by-product of economic liberalization and increased world access.

             Lenin taught that three things are required in building a popular revolution to overthrow an existing authoritarian government: 1) Mass discontent of the populous, 2) An organizing entity to harness and direct this discontent, and 3) A faltering of will and loss of unity by the rulers.[67] The legitimacy strategy of China's communist party regime, can be viewed as specifically combating these potential vulnerabilities. Recent pragmatic and cooperative behavior by the PRC appears rooted in China's critical need for political stability and regional peace to continue its economic growth, maintain markets for its goods and ensure access to international financial aid and technology.[68] Selective cooperation with the developed nations, and the institutions which they control, is evidence of a pragmatic or "Realpolitik" understanding that China's system of "market based socialism with Chinese characteristics" is dependent on trade and investment."[69]

            Sustained economic growth, which is seen by the populous as improvement in family income and living standards, aids the regime's attempts to avoid discontent. Increased prosperity also allows the communist party to legitimize its rule by claiming responsibility for economic improvement. In calling for the rejuvenation of Chinese greatness and the ascendance of China as a great power, the regime is also attempting to harness the emotions of the Chinese populous and direct them away form sources of discontentment. Nationalism aids in the eradication of opposition parties and unifies the resolve of the communist party to remain in power. Through ethno-national appeals to the ancient glory of China's Confucian past, and the greatness of Chinese civilization before the Opium Wars of the mid-1800's, the communist regime is compensating for its weak mandate by appealing to every variation of what the Chinese populous "believe to be their natural and inalienable right to great power status."[70] Irredentist territorial claims, continuing military modernization and themes of anti-imperialism, aided by the crushing of dissidence, as in the Tiananmen Square response of 1989, directly support the Communist party's continuing stranglehold on political rule.

            China's new prosperity has contributed to an unprecedented expansion of the economy and improvement in the lifestyle of the average Chinese.[71] Increased economic strength has brought about increased pride in China's historical importance and future power. Resurgent pride is fueling nationalism and calls for the restoration of China to a greatness previously denied by Western imperialism and Japanese invasion. Economic growth has also provided The PRC with increasing resources with which to exploit opportunities for greater power and influence, including military modernization. Growth and its effect on nationalism have also built popular expectations for China's continued domestic improvement. If not satisfied, these expectations could generate increased dissatisfaction. One means to deflect anger in such a case would be to draw on nationalism and vilify an external target like the United States or Taiwan; distracting domestic discontent.

            China's leaders have chosen an emotionally charged nationalistic goal to provide a unifying vision for the party and people alike: The restoration of China to its pre-Opium War boundaries[72] and resumption of its rightful place as "a great nation." Observers in the West often discount the lingering bitterness with which the Chinese people regard over one hundred years of subjugation by outside, and predominately Western powers following the Opium Wars in the mid-1800's. China's resentment of Western imperialism is exceeded only by the well publicized rancor which remains as a result of Japan's invasion of China during the Second World War.[73] As a result, the leadership in Beijing has embarked on a strategy to restore idealized territorial boundaries believed to exist prior to China's humiliating loss of sovereignty at western hands, concurrent with a military rejuvenation program. The regime's plan can be seen as a program to build a "rich country and strong army to guarantee that China will never again face similar treatment."[74] The "century of humiliation" has embedded in Chinese political thinking a concept of absolute state sovereignty dating from the 19th century; a zero-sum competition between nations in which one nation's gain must mean the other's loss. Humiliation by empire building outsiders has taught China two lessons: power politics are all important in international relations and China will not receive the respect due a great nation without military power.[75] In an address to the National People's Congress in January of 1995, Jiang Zemin, Chinese President and heir-apparent to Deng Xiaoping, articulated China's overarching drive toward repossession of historical territories and resumption of greatness as follows:

           

It remains the sacred mission and lofty goal of the entire Chinese people to achieve the reunification of the motherland and promote the all-round revitalization of the Chinese nation.[76]

           

            Jiang's remarks went far beyond China's efforts to reunite with Taiwan. Themes of "the development of the Chinese nation in the modern world," and the reunification of China to "bring about its rejuvenation" were repeated throughout the address--even as he rejoiced at the impending return of Hong Kong and Macao:

 

            In 1997 and 1999 China will resume its exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao respectively, which will be happy events for the Chinese people of all ethnic groups, including our compatriots in Taiwan. The Chinese nation has experienced many vicissitudes and hardships, and now it is high time to accomplish the reunification of the motherland and bring about its all-round rejuvenation.[77]

 

            The use of nationalism in China, and its growing influence, is closely tied with a resurgence of conservative opposition to the rate and nature of ongoing economic reforms. The nationalist movement has the advantage of distracting the Han majority from their dissatisfaction with the spread of crime and corruption --ironically made pandemic by economic growth --as well as the imperfect justification for remaining a communist state.[78] While the CCP has been hated and ridiculed by the Chinese people for years, it retains one area in which it can still influence the population: national pride. Intensified nationalism is being used to win over conservatives and intellectuals alike to support the regime and gain acquiescence to the continuing economic reforms essential for performance-based legitimation of the regime. In short, "nationalism is the glue binding the state to society."[79] In the words of Chinese writer and expelled dissident, Liu Binyan, "Nationalism and Han Chauvinism are now the only effective instruments in the ideological arsenal of the CCP."[80] Nationalism has been used within the context of "Rejuvenating China's Greatness": a restoration of the power and prestige of ancient dynasties, fueled by the impending return of Hong Kong. Nationalism also represents an additional avenue of retaining power, should economic growth falter.

            Chinese nationalism builds on Mao's "One China Policy" in the interest of returning Taiwan to mainland control--by any means--peaceful or forceful.[81] The "Rejuvenating Chinese Greatness" theme has also been used to support China's claims to sovereignty over the potentially oil rich Spratly, Paracel and Senkaku island groups.[82] These claims have placed China in dispute in recent years with Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan. While this may reflect China's realization that it has become a net importer of crude oil, it is more plausible that these irredentist claims reflect both a growing sense of China's importance in the Asian-Pacific and a more pragmatic understanding that China's ascent to economic superpower status will depend on reliable energy supplies, domestic stability, and positive economic growth. It is estimated that China will need to import 100 million tons of crude oil annually by 2010 unless it finds new sources.[83]

            While obtaining sovereignty over territories believed to contain significant petroleum reserves ties into an economic strategy of securing the means of economic production, nationalism provides the means of building domestic legitimacy for conflict over these territories and a rhetorical basis for discussion in the international forum. As an up-and-coming naval power, China's provocative territorial claims in the South China Sea have also drawn attention to the geo-political and geo-economic importance of the predominately maritime Asian-Pacific theater.[84]

            Nationalism has also provided the regime a rhetorical tool for responding to a host of demands by many actors, foremost among which has been the United States. These issues include: human rights; peaceful reunification with Taiwan; Tibetan sovereignty; preservation of democratic freedoms and the rule of law in Hong Kong; intellectual property rights, and foreign arm sales. China views these issues from a historical perspective, as the victim of the efforts of colonialist nation's to undermine its sovereignty. Statements critical of China in these areas are seen to arise from fear of China's growing power. China views these issues as internal affairs of a sovereign nation and interprets foreign involvement as a screen behind which to hide an unwillingness to share power; a desire to hold China down and weak for as long as possible.[85]

            A phenomenon which is poorly understood by Chinese critics in the West, is that criticisms of China will continue to receive violent response from a Chinese regime bent on preserving its legitimacy and reinforcing its sovereignty. The Chinese counter to U.S. led criticism in these areas has been to accuse the United states of meddling in the "internal affairs of China."[86] Some Chinese point to a long-term U.S. strategy of containment toward China, evidenced by the re-establishment of U.S.-Vietnam relations; continued U.S. alliances with Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, and close cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Chinese authors have even called for a Chinese counter-containment strategy.[87] Not surprisingly, there is a growing resentment of the U.S. as an impediment to China's assumption of great nation status.[88] American challenge of China's bid to host the 2000 Olympic Games and interference in the Taiwan Straits in March 1996, has fueled negativism within the Chinese population. In contrast, U.S. actions have also enhanced the ability of The CCP to marshal public opinion and draw performance-based legitimacy to the regime by challenging U.S. statements which condemn China.[89]

           While the Chinese government has not launched a concerted anti-American program (other than during the Taiwan crisis in March 1996), 57.2 percent of Chinese youth now view the U.S. as the most disliked foreign country; a twenty six percent increase since 1994.[90] This highlights the risk associated with playing on nationalistic themes. With 40 percent of its GNP derived from trade, China's leaders recognize their dependence on continued access to Western assistance, technology, investment, and more significantly, U.S. markets for exported goods (the "Walmart Syndrome").[91] This access is essential to support continued economic modernization and garner performance-based legitimacy for the communist monopoly on political power.[92] Yet, to maintain a peaceful international environment which assures the continued flow of trade, foreign assistance and aid, requires pragmatic rhetorical posturing in negotiating the settlement of disputes. Increasing negativism in the populace could exacerbate future diplomatic wrangling and reduce China's already limited willingness or ability to compromise.[93]

            Despite its deleterious effect on China's flexibility in international affairs, nationalism has proven essential to an insecure Politburo. Just as the Tiananmen Square massacre was seen by a weakened CCP as necessary to eradicate a fledgling opposition political party,[94] the 1996 U.S. human rights report on China documents that by the end of 1996 "all active dissidents in China had been Jailed or Exiled." This retreat on human rights has led to the complete elimination of active dissident voices in today's China[95]--a level of repression unrivaled since Stalin's reign of terror in the former Soviet Union. The crushing of political opposition and intolerance of criticism of communist rule, further supports the premise that China's leaders fear challenge to their legitimacy to rule.   This premise also explains Chinese moves to limit free speech and political freedom in advance of the re-absorption of Hong Kong in July 1997.[96] The re-absorption of Hong Kong holds an important place in China's hyper-nationalistic drive to attain great nation status and in efforts to convince Taiwan that peaceful reunion is in its best interest.[97] Hong Kong holds a prominent position in China's access to foreign exchange, trade and technology; elements critical to the regime's legitimacy strategy.

            The regime's overall strategy to redefine the domestic legitimacy of communist party rule, and the dependence of that strategy on continued economic growth, has produced a dichotomy in China's international behavior. Through an almost ecumenical drive to sustain China's extraordinary economic growth rate,[98] China has been forced to make pragmatic decisions in its dealings with the outside world. While the regime has harnessed Chinese nationalism to augment its coercive powers,[99] examination of several recent decisions shows the subordination of nationalism and in some cases China's sovereignty to economic stability:

            In 1991 China reversed long-standing opposition to the international peace settlement in Cambodia and withdrew support for the Khmer Rouge. In a pragmatic sense this decision reflected China's understanding that continued support for a revolutionary regime was contrary to its need for regional stability and continued foreign investment.[100]

Chinese leaders have also been credited with significantly aiding U.S.-North Korean agreement on dismantling the DPRK's nuclear weapons program in October 1994. From a Realpolitik view, China appears to have found the prospect of a nuclear capable North Korea contrary to its best interests. This is a particularly pragmatic decision when juxtaposed between the PRC's long alliance with Pyongyang and the burgeoning trade relationship which has developed between Seoul and Beijing.[101] While China did not take a leading role, it did break ranks with India and Iran in agreeing to the conversion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to permanent status.[102] As a nuclear power, China may have decided its prestige and might were best served by keeping nuclear weapons ownership an exclusive club. A more pragmatic explanation may lie in the recognition that China's economic growth will be increasingly fueled by Middle Eastern Oil--an area where nuclear weapons are keenly sought and conflict is frequent. An economic motivation may be the stipulation within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1994 which prohibits the U.S. Export-Import Bank from underwriting loans to countries proven to be in violation of the act. Financing for important construction projects in China may have been threatened.[103]

            In 1995, China accepted the Nuclear Test Ban treaty, after conducting just 45 total


nuclear tests (compared to 1,030 for the U.S. and 715 by Russia). Effective at the end of 1996, this move essentially ended development of new Chinese warhead designs and left the PRC--by major power standards--with a limited arsenal of simple warheads.[104] It may be that China is satisfied that its estimated 350 strategic warheads are adequate to provide strategic deterrence and sufficient military influence. It is more likely that faced with growing world outcry, China weighed the benefit of continued testing against the potential goodwill and rhetorical advantage to be gained by ending the tests and signing the treaty.

            In 1996 China committed to negotiations to establish binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions. As the second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, with continued economic development leading to rapid increase in China's consumption of Coal--the most egregious fossil fuel offender--China is the world economy most affected by limits on greenhouse gas emissions. [105] China's motivation appears to have been the avoidance of pollution taxes and tariffs for its goods in view of recent U.S. agreement to this accord. In November 1996, China also agreed to a landmark surrender of sovereignty, a treaty protecting global fisheries. This treaty allows ships suspected of illegal fishing violations to be boarded for inspection in international waters.[106] From a pragmatic sense it appears that China's desire to preserve its own fisheries from encroachment, may have won out over protecting its sovereignty.

            Pragmatism aside, China has not ceased to flex its growing strength and stake its irredentist claims to territory in the Asian-Pacific:

            In 1992, the Chinese National People's Congress passed a law asserting ownership of all the island territories under contention in the South China Sea: the Spratly, Paracel and Senkakus Island groups, in addition to its ubiquitous insistence on sovereignty over Taiwan. This law further claimed authority to "adopt all necessary measures to prevent and stop the harmful passage of vessels through its territorial waters" and for "PRC warships or military aircraft to expel the intruders".[107] In the spring of 1995, China stepped up its assertiveness in the Spratly Islands by constructing concrete structures, radar installations, and boundary markers meant to identify China's territorial waters in a contested area known as Mischief Reef; just 50 miles from the Philippines' Palawan Island.[108] It was reported in 1995 that China was "testing Japan," by conducting oil exploration for several months in a Japanese claimed area of the Senkaku Islands.[109] In January 1996 China's aggressive posturing in the Spratlys resulted in a confrontation between PLAN and Philippine naval vessels near Zambales.[110]

            Recent press reports cite a U.S. intelligence study indicating that China's March 1996 missile launches in the Taiwan Straits were part of a multi-service wargame to exercise a unified contingency for the invasion of Taiwan. These exercises served several purposes: bellicose intimidation during Taiwan's first democratic elections; a warning against declaring Taiwanese independence and PRC training for a future all-out invasion of Taiwan in the event of a Taiwanese declaration of independence.[111]

            With the exception of Taiwan, China has occasionally shown a willingness to place economic interests before nationalism. This was particularly apparent in China's agreement at a November 1996 APEC Summit in Manila to put aside conflicting claims to the Spratly islands, allow bilateral development and defer the resolution of competing claims to sovereignty.[112] China has also demonstrated an increased willingness to exercise its growing economic strength in support of its assertion of sovereignty over Taiwan.

            In May, 1996, China showed a growing sophistication in the use of economic linkage to retaliate against the U.S. dispatch of aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits during the Taiwanese elections in March. China's decision to cancel a multi-million dollar aircraft purchase from Boeing, in favor of Europe's Airbus consortium, has been interpreted as a punitive decision aimed at vicariously punishing the U.S. government through Boeing's misfortune; turning trade leverage to China's advantage.[113] The status of Taiwan also motivated China's 1997 Security Council Veto of Guatemala's request for a U.N. observer team; the first Chinese Security Council veto in 25 years.[114] This move appears aimed at punishing Guatemala for its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. Shortly after the veto, China asked Guatemala to end its recognition of Taiwan in exchange for Chinese "flexibility" on the U.N. Observer request.[115]

            Taiwan plays a central role in China's growing nationalism because it serves as a symbol of China's national tragedy during the "century of humiliation." China's loss of Taiwan to Japan, a former tributary state, in 1895 is considered by the Chinese as the ultimate insult during the imperialistic period. Taiwan is the central goal in The regime's campaign to rectify the century of humiliation. As such, it has assumed a symbolic status in modern Chinese nationalism. The retention and ultimate reunion with Taiwan has fueled the growth of nationalism. Nationalism in turn, has filled a vacuum created by the ideological discredit of communism.[116]

             Taiwan's growing independence movement is foremost among China's fears. The "One China, two systems" policy designed to conceptualize the return of a capitalist Hong Kong, has been extended to Taiwanese reunion. This policy recognizes Taiwan as a renegade province with a different style of government. With the election of a truly democratic government, Taiwan is now in a position to appease China while it observes the re-absorption of Hong Kong. If the transition of rule in Hong Kong goes badly, as some would suggest is already occurring,[117] it is reasonable to assume that prospects for a peaceful reunion between Taiwan and the mainland will dim. Should China despair at an evaporating hope for a peaceful reunion, the regime may be forced by nationalist influences to attempt a preemptive invasion of Taiwan along the lines of the contingency exercises conducted in early 1996.[118]

            More significantly, a failure to capture Taiwan, as is generally predicted by Western analysts, might provide just the impetus needed to start open rebellion in either Xinjiang or Tibet. China faces a growing potential for separationist movements in Xinjiang Province. Once referred to as Chinese Turkistan, this area borders the new Islamic republics of the former Soviet Union. The region is populated by 20 million Muslims who make up eighty percent of the population, and speak a common dialect with the surrounding independent countries comprising the former Russian Turkistan.[119] Chinese leaders fear the emergence of a militant independence movement in this region and the potential for such a movement to spread to Tibet.

            While China's border with Russia, its former Marxist rival--and a

fallen superpower--is relatively secure,[120] its northwestern reaches are bordered by a handful of fledgling states open to influence by China's rivals and a competing ideology: Islam. China fears a spillover of unrest from Central Asia into The Xinjiang-Uigher Autonomous Region. The existing Central Asian turmoil foreshadows a potentially desperate scenario in which unrest engulfs northwestern China. Nevertheless, China hopes to use the Central Asian markets as a motivator to fuel a new prosperity zone in Xinjiang, revive the Silk Route[121] for international trade, and tap Central Asian energy resources.[122]

            Should the Chinese leadership fail to sustain economic performance, to the extent that there is a significant economic disruption in China, there is little reason to believe PRC can avoid the centrifugal forces that have sundered the majority of former Communist empires along ethnic and sectarian lines.[123] Economic disorder breeds ethnic, religious, and political extremism. A strong, vibrant economy is a prerequisite for political stability.[124] The Soviet failure and subsequent revolution in Afghanistan, the breakaway of the Soviet Central Asian states and recent conflict in Bosnia demonstrate that Muslim minorities rarely remain contented when locked within another state and culture, especially an atheistic one. The prototype of ethnic independence resides in the fledgling states just over China's northwestern border.[125] The significance of this is not lost on Uighur Islamists in Xinjiang[126] or Tibetan independence advocates.[127] The Chinese leadership is also anxious over possible destabilization of the northwest provinces of Gansu and Qinghai and the autonomous region of Ningxia by ethnic or resurgent Islamic separatist movements.   

            Another, less plausible scenario for the fracturing of China envisions Guangdong and Fujian, the two wealthiest and most economically decentralized provinces, breaking from China as the result of an economic countermarch by the Central Government.[128] To retain the advantages of continued economic liberalization, this scenario envisions the governments of these provinces being drawn into alliance with Hong Kong and Taiwan by their profound economic interdependence.[129]

            The foremost source of instability in China is not ethnic strife, but dissatisfaction with governmental corruption.[130] While frequently cited as the number one frustration of the Chinese population, corruption has flourished in economically liberalized China. Graft has also been cited as one of the principle inducements to labor unionists and the general populace in joining the student democracy protest during the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989.[131] Dissatisfaction with corruption was still critically high in a 1994 survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.[132] If any aspect of the current system in China has the potential to bring about violent protest and a failure of plans for peaceful re-absorption of Hong Kong, it is the potential for the spread of communist party nepotism and corruption to Hong Kong. While media reports indicate that most Chinese would say another workers' rebellion is unlikely, unrest over official corruption is seen as the spark which could ignite a powder keg of dissatisfaction arising from the negative aspects of economic reforms including job insecurity, growing income inequity, unemployment and inflation.[133]

 

China's Military Modernization

            China's overriding priorities for continued economic expansion and recognition as a great power have led to significant changes in terms of regional security. In order to assure foreign investors of China's domestic stability and aversion to foreign adventure, The PRC has abandoned support of insurgencies in neighboring countries in favor of pursuing peaceful relations.[134] China's overarching need to maintain economic growth has translated into an imperative to "avoid difficulties and maintain stability."[135] As a result, China has negotiated border agreements with Russia and Khazakstan as well as confidence building measures and troop withdrawals with India. Despite opposition from Pyongyang, Beijing has recognized South Korea and established a burgeoning trade relationship. China has worked to improve relations with Vietnam, and as previously discussed, given its support to the peace settlement in Cambodia.[136] Owing to competing nationalistic impulses, China has also shown a determination to stretch its economic might into military power. The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent chaos in Russia has freed China from immediate external threat for the first time in 150 years. China is now more secure than at anytime since the founding of the Peoples Republic in 1949.[137] The immediate absence of a clear and present danger from abroad has encouraged a change in military and diplomatic focus from continental territorial disputes to expanding China's sphere of influence in the South China Sea, increasing military power projection capabilities and greater participation in international economic and security organizations.[138] The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a "repository of nationalism."[139] With Deng's death, the PLA is also the most coherent of the PRC's political institutions. The PLA is increasingly influential in Chinese policy decisions and one of the staunchest champions of theories of a U.S. policy to contain China. The PLA is also a major actor in determining China's stance on Taiwan, the South China Sea, foreign arms sales and human rights.[140] Some China observers speculate that the military's growing influence in China's political affairs may apply increasing pressure on civilian leaders to flex China's military muscle in foreign policy disputes. Dr. David Shambaugh of George Washington University's Asian Studies Department points out that "these are not secure leaders and they have to prove their mettle on questions of sovereignty. They think of forces as an instrument of diplomacy and so they may be more prone to act rashly because of the political succession that is going on."[141]

            For the most part, the PLA has subordinated its hard-line tendencies in recognition that conflict does not support China's need for a stable economic environment.[142] They recognize that China's current economic policies represent the best means of acquiring the capability for high-technology warfare as showcased in the Gulf War.[143] The one great exception would be a declaration of independence by Taiwan. Nationalism and the political peril this would create for the regime would necessitate military action.[144] Despite recent exercises, the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is not considered capable of executing a successful invasion of Taiwan. However, China could inflict tremendous damage on Taiwan's infrastructure and economy. Taipei's qualitative advantage in Western military hardware is generally believed capable of blunting an invasion from the mainland. A naval blockade, however, is conceivably within the PLAN's capabilities.[145] While a blockade could damage Taipei's economy, it is not certain to bring about settlement of the conflict on Beijing's terms.[146]

            The uncertainty of a U.S. response to an attack on Taiwan and the poor prospects for success in comparison to the certainty of adverse economic and political consequences is the principle reason why China has not attempted forceful reunification with Taiwan.[147] In the wake of America's response to the Taiwan crisis of 1996, Chinese planners have every reason to believe that in any future confrontation with Taiwan, they will have to deal with U.S. forces--possibly spearheaded by aircraft carriers.[148] The U.S. must make it clear to Taipei that a drive toward independence is perilous and that U.S. military assistance in the wake of a declaration of independence is not assured.[149] The implication for U.S. policy is that the a Taiwanese declaration of independence should be discouraged, while efforts should continue to enhance peaceful co-existence and the growing economic interdependence of the PRC and Taiwan; future prospects for a peaceful reunion must be preserved.

            The PLA and PLAN leadership recognize that current shortfalls in military capability are unlikely to change in the near-term. However, the long-term military modernization program on which China embarked following its failed invasion of Vietnam in 1979, is beginning to bear fruit. Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms have provided the PLA/N with the wherewithal to make that modernization program a reality. China doubled its gross domestic product between 1978 and 1988 and is projected to do so again by 1998.[150] This unprecedented growth is providing China with the means to buy its way to military superpower.[151] China has purchased large quantities of advanced weapons systems from cash-starved Russia including the Su-27 fighter aircraft. China's purchases in 1992-93 alone were estimated at $5 billion in unadjusted funds.[152] In February 1996 China completed an agreement to build the Su-27 fighter in China to supplement the 65 aircraft obtained and stationed at Wuhu Air Base east of Shanghai.[153] Press reports cite Pentagon estimates indicating China may build to a fleet of as many as 300 Su-27 aircraft.[154] China has also arranged to buy two and possibly as many as eight Russian Sovremenny Class guided missile destroyers. These ships embody the height of Soviet naval technology prior to the U.S.S.R.'s collapse. Designed as the first Soviet surface combatant to integrate stand alone anti-air systems and powerful anti-ship missiles like the weapons suites of U.S. warships, these platforms promise to considerably increase the blue-water capability of the PLAN.[155] In addition to sophisticated hardware, China's modernization program has brought about improved command and control capabilities and allowed the formation of a limited number


of elite "quick reaction" brigades of high caliber. [156] The PLA/N has only begun to conceptualize the operational doctrine necessary to integrate modern weaponry once it gains broader access to it, but China has recently discarded its focus on attrition warfare and "trading territory for time" in defense against an anticipated land invasion.

            From observation of the Gulf War, the PLA/N has refined its articulated vision of future war as being localized and fought to achieve limited objectives: A conflict which will be won by the side best able to concentrate decisive high-technology combat power at some distance from its national borders.[157] In short, a Chinese version of America's power projection capability.

            The most significant achievement in China's military modernization is the development of a self-sustaining cadre of professional military officers.[158] This mind-trust has the greatest potential to bring about a militarily proficient Chinese superpower. When combined with China's growing defense budget and projected economic growth over the next several decades, a remaking of the PLA/N is within reason. China's reported 1995 military budget of $7.5 billion, adjusted for "purchasing-power-parity" by the World Bank, equaled $62.8 billion; over $18 billion more than in 1990(Table 1).[159] Given this rate of increase in spending, even twenty percent annual inflation; significant reductions in military budgets, and the loss of proceeds from foreign arms sales--a result of China's limited cooperation with anti-proliferation protocols--will not stop China form buying its way to superpower. At present, China spends 5.7 percent of GDP on military programs. The U.S. State Department predicts that China's GDP could surpass $10 trillion early in the next century (Table 2).[160]

History provides ample precedents to support the potential for a sudden rise by China to dominant military power:

 

In 1480, Spain was a collection of little kingdoms, as eager to fight each other as to defend their common interests. Twenty years later, Spain held title to half the globe. In 1850, Germany was little more than a geographical expression, a no-man's land between the territory of the great powers. By 1871, Germany was the dominant force in Europe. In 1935, with no armed forces to speak of and an economy in decline, the United States wanted nothing more than for the world to leave it alone. Within ten years, flush with victory, economically prosperous, and in sole possession of the atomic bomb, the United States became the single most powerful nation on earth.[161]

            With Central Asia a military backwater; Mao's "People's War" doctrine for attrition warfare discarded, and the PRC's land borders with Russia and India secure, the PLA and PLAN now have the opportunity to look toward employing the results of China's economic prosperity in influencing events outside China's borders; particularly in the South China

            Japan               China               Taiwan             South Korea

                                                           

Source: Material from The Military Balance 1996/1997, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996). Adapted from graphs by Robert Mansfield in James Shinn, "Northeast Asia: strategic crossroads," Great Decisions 1997, 18.

(Table 2)

           

Sea.[162] If the economic growth predicted for the Asian Pacific region continues at its present rate, the importance of the region to the world's economy cannot help but increase. The prediction that seven of the top ten world economies will reside in the Asian Pacific by the year 2020, highlights the importance of the region.[163] With the exception of trade internal to China, there is no appreciable land transportation infrastructure in the theater. Trade in the region can only be carried by sea and air. Since aircraft are unable to carry bulk cargo, maritime transpiration of goods will be the dominant economic link in the region for the foreseeable future. Whether one is an adherent of Alfred Mahan or Julian Corbett, a strategic view cannot help but reveal that the Asian Pacific, and by extension, the future of the world's economy, lies in a maritime theater (Map 1).

            China's creative interpretation of its historical territories, if recognized, would put the PRC in a dominate position to control maritime traffic through the South China Sea. China's recent encounters with the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan straits have also demonstrated the importance to the PLA/N of sea power in the region.[164] China's confrontational choice of the of the "strait territorial sea baseline method" in calculating its territorial waters in the Paracel Islands in May of 1996, may have been the "last straw" in hardening ASEAN's attitude toward China. The move was particularly alarming to Vietnam and Indonesia. Press reports have even indicated that Vietnam has offered to allow the U.S. Navy to return to the facilities it constructed at Cam Ranh Bay during the Vietnam conflict.[165] The shift in world economic activity to the Asian Pacific region has brought greater wealth and discretionary income for Asian nations. In addition to China, the significance of the region as a maritime theater has not escaped the attention of Tokyo, Taipei, Bangkok, Seoul or Canberra. Military capabilities, especially naval capabilities, are on the rise. Jane's Navy International reports, that naval planners in the region are able "to write perfectly good strategic justification for ships, aircraft and submarines, in full knowledge that financial resources are likely to be available for their acquisition. There is little reason to doubt that the area's maritime power will grow broadly in line with its economic power."[166]

 

                                                                                                    [167]

 

            Concern over the safety of oceanborne trade; the need for self-reliance to offset the uncertain continuation of U.S. regional presence after reunification of the Koreas; Taiwanese plans to repel an amphibious landing or blockade by the mainland, and deep and bitter cultural memories in China and Korea of Japanese invasion, all feed an escalating arms race in the Asian-Pacific.[168]

            Former PLAN commander and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party, Admiral Liu Huaqing has been quoted as urging that the PLAN expand beyond its close-in strategy and defend the coast of China outward to the "first island chain" running from the Kuril islands north of Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and encompassing the South China Sea (Map 1). Liu has also been quoted as urging further extension of China's operations to the "second island chain," which encompasses waters east of Japan, Guam, the Marinas and the Caroline Islands.[169] Liu's ambitious plan is beyond the current capability of the PLAN, but provides insight into indicators of future Chinese intent. A critical future indicator of Chinese resolve to defend the outer islands may be renewed efforts to purchase or build an aircraft carrier. Of note, the Su-27 fighter, which China bought from Russia and may soon build domestically, is the only conventional Russian aircraft with a version capable of carrier based landings.[170] Other indicators of a shift in PLAN capabilities and intent include: additional purchases of Russian built submarines and surface combatants; fielding of improved air defense systems on surface ships; the development of airborne early warning aircraft; successful inflight refueling of aircraft and the renovation of shipyards to construct logistic and amphibious shipping able extend China's maritime reach.

            China's armed forces do not represent more than a regional threat at present. Just as economic improvement has become critical to the legitimacy of the ruling regime in China, economic profit has become critical to the People's Liberation Army and Navy. Thousands of officers and men are living better than at anytime in the history of the PRC. The business of war is reputed to be viewed by the individual soldier as impeding the conduct of commerce. In the last decade, the PLA and the Chinese defense industry have taken on economic ventures ranging from farming to pirating compact discs and building luxury hotels. The individual members of the PLA are purported to be more interested in making money than being the guardians of Chinese national interest. The Chinese military has been described as "the world's first genuinely entrepreneurial military force."[171] Outside business activities have become entrenched in the PLA. Chinese unit commanders must earn one third of their own budgets, so they cannot afford to shed these outside businesses.[172] In October 1996, General Chen Tianlin, Chief of Guangzhou Military Region Logistics, bragged to an army newspaper that "every regiment, every brigade and every company under his command had established production bases to raise vegetables, fish, pigs and chickens for the general market or export. One of his artillery brigades made over $40,000 selling pigs last year and another unit made $36,000 selling chicken feed and eggs.[173]

            While generally distracted by competing interests, China continues to hold a quantitative military advantage in the region; with pockets of proficiency emerging in its forces. In the interim, China is too large a power to be challenged by its neighbors. As the result of China's military modernization program, the PLAN is now better able to defend itself in the absence of land based air cover; as in the South China Sea. Since 1980 the PLAN has upgraded submarines and surface combatants with a Chinese version of the Exocet missile and begun to purchase sophisticated Russian platforms. Surface combatants have also received surface-to-air missiles systems for greater protection against air and missile attacks further at sea.[174]

           Prior to China's expansive claims to territory in the South China Sea, Asian-Pacific states tended to discount "the Chinese threat," believing that disputes with the PRC could be settled through negotiation. Several ASEAN navies, including Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, have a qualitative advantage over China in terms of sophisticated vessels equipped with modern anti-ship missiles. But it is unlikely the ASEAN states could combine to resist a PRC bent on hegemonic expansion. The likelihood of ASEAN assistance to Taiwan is even more remote as these states do not diplomatically recognize Taipei.[175]

            Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is also qualitatively superior to the PLAN. Its officers and men are highly competent, with modern ships, armed with state-of-the-art weaponry. The JMSDF also possesses double the underway sustainment capability of China.[176] Like the ASEAN states, however, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which Japan would unilaterally challenge the PLAN for fear of the overwhelming force of the 2 million man strong PLA. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution forbids "the threat or use of force" to solve international disputes.[177] Political opposition to taking on a greater military role is well-organized and strikes a resonant chord with a Japanese populous that the Ashai Shimbun newspaper has described as "a conscientious objector nation." However, 80 percent of Japan's oil imports flow through the South China Sea. Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is a leading advocate for a change in the interpretation of the Japanese constitution. He anticipates a future amendment to allow an enlarged military role in the Asian-Pacific for Japan.[178] In view of the lingering distrust which remains as the result of Japan's behavior in World War II, the ASEAN nations are also unlikely to join an alliance with Japan against China. In this environment of fear of a Chinese threat and mutual distrust among the nations of the region, the role of the U.S., as an honest broker of peace and stability, has become doubly important.[179] Chinese assertiveness in the context of Japan's large defense budgets and a possible U.S. withdrawal could uncork a rivalry in the Asian-Pacific. It is difficult to envision a scenario in which a long term contest of this nature would not threaten vital U.S. interests and force Washington to chose a side. Entering or deterring hostilities in this environment would force a transoceanic surge of men and equipment on the scale of the Gulf War; at considerable risk and expense.[180]     

            The implication of China's current military status vis-a-vis U.S. capabilities is clear: The PRC is not a military or economic peer of the United States--yet. Two decades of increasing Chinese defense budgets and five Quadrennial Defense Reviews from now that may not be the case. America should proceed with caution in reducing military presence in the region. The rise of nationalism in the wake of reunification between North and South Korea may force the removal of U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. In anticipation of peace on the Korean peninsula, a new theoretical foundation must be built and public support fostered in the U.S., Japan and Korea to support continued regional security cooperation.[181] Factions already calling for withdrawal of America's 47,000 troops in Japan can be expected to redouble their effort if that nation becomes the lone Asian state to host U.S. forces.[182] While most countries in Asia


encourage the United States to remain actively involved in the region as a counter weight to increased Japanese power and the ambitions of China,[183] there is a growing voice in America which warns of U.S. strategic over extension and cites the need for a domestic focus on reduced budget deficits, rejuvenation of civilian infrastructure and the withdrawal of foreign based American forces. In view of current Japanese and Korean cost sharing, the savings from a cutback in overseas forces would be small; while the political costs of a conflict in the Pacific could be very high indeed.[184] In the event of Korean and Japanese pressure to reduce U.S. Asian-Pacific presence, and in view of domestic concerns over geopolitical withdrawal, it may not be possible for President Clinton, as a Vietnam War objector, to accept Hanoi's reputed offer of basing at Cam Rhan Bay. But it may be in the best interest of the U.S. and the nations of the region to look toward Vietnam as an expedient co-traveller in a strategy of engagement in the Asian-Pacific, and a promising prospect for the enlargement of democracy.

 

U.S. Policy Choices in Dealing with China

 

[T]he question is not whether China will be a major player in global as well as regional security affairs, but rather when and how. China's rapid economic development, its growing military capabilities, and its historic international role will make it a major power in the coming century. The challenge we face is to assure that as China develops as a global actor, it does so constructively, as a country integrated into international institutions and committed to practices enshrined in international law.

                                Winston Lord, Assistant U.S. Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, October 11, 1995.

 

            The United States exerts multifaceted strategic influence in Asia and the Western Pacific; is a leading economic power in the region; has a strong influence in the international financial and political institutions which China must access for its continued development and is the only nation able to pose an obvious danger to China's influence in global affairs, military security, access to world markets and finance. With dominant military strength and intelligence capabilities, Washington can reassure Asian states over China's growing military power and reassure Beijing of regional accommodation to China's rising economic and military strength. Or, the United States can marshal combined opposition to Chinese regional influence and confirm predictions of a U.S. containment strategy. China's neighbors are unwilling to overtly challenge the PRC on major issues. Many ASEAN nations, however, tacitly encourage U.S. efforts to breach discriminatory trade barriers in China's markets and provide a military counterweight to the PRC's quantitative regional advantage. The leadership in Beijing also recognizes the necessary role of the U.S. in balancing the questions affecting Chinese well-being. But, Chinese leaders continue to harbor suspicions of U.S. motivations. Hard-liners persist in projecting a U.S. conspiracy to undermine the Chinese leadership and impede China's progress toward a greater role in world affairs.[185] While the ASEAN states, Japan, India and Russia, have accommodated China to preclude provocation, U.S. policy intrudes across a broad spectrum of issues sensitive to Beijing.[186] This makes the U.S. role in the Asian-Pacific critical in determining how China chooses its future outlook: truculent pariah or participant in an interdependent global economy. By exercising the multifaceted strengths of a superpower, the United States is better positioned than any other state to exert influence on China and lead world consensus over a broad spectrum of areas: political and economic practices, values and ideals, and modern culture. Though Chinese leaders may resist pressure for greater economic reform, market access and budgetary transparency, the PRC needs continued access to foreign markets to build foreign exchange reserves, purchase commodities and obtain high technology. The regime is left with pragmatic choices in needing growth to hold China together, while balancing nationalism against and entropic forces which tear at the nation's stability . This provides the U.S. with significant leverage to influence China.

           Because of perceived fundamental weaknesses requiring a moderate approach, the Clinton administration now favors a less confrontational and more "engaged" posture toward China. The concern is that to do otherwise may promote divisions and a possible breakup of China; with disastrous consequences for U.S. interest in Asian- Pacific stability and prosperity. In a press conference announcing the 1996 Human Rights report on China, President Clinton called for continued close and "constructive" U.S. engagement as the most appropriate way to guide the emerging power into channels of international activity compatible with American interests. While admitting the failure of "constructive engagement" to bring about progress on human rights, President Clinton expressed the opinion that trends in China are moving inexorably in the "right" direction.[187] He highlighted increasing economic interdependence with China's neighbors and the countries of the West making Beijing less likely to take disruptive action that would upset these advantageous international economic relationships.

I believe that the impulses of the society and the nature of the economic change will work together, along with the availability of information from the outside world, to increase the spirit of liberty over time...I don't think that there's any way that anyone who disagrees with that in China can hold that back. I just think it's inevitable, just as inevitably the Berlin wall fell.[188]

            The President sees greater individual wealth pushing China to develop a more erudite and sophisticated population which will compel the Communist regime to become more responsive; leading to political pluralism and eventual transition to democratic government. Although many U.S. officials would see any declaration of a U.S. policy goal of changing China's system of government as counterproductive, there is an underlying presumption that greater U.S. "engagement" will enable positive changes and the "enlargement" of world democracy.[189]


Statements by the Clinton administration indicate U.S. policy will, therefore, continue to seek to work closely with China in order to encourage positive long-term trends. President Clinton has also stated:

 

I still believe that over the long run being engaged with China, working with them where we can agree...and continuing to be honest and forthright where we disagree, has the greatest likelihood of having a positive impact on China.[190]

 

            There are those in America who favor a tougher approach towards China and question the argument that global interdependence will curb China's proclivity for contrary and provocative behavior. They stress that in Beijing, officials still view the world as a state-centered, zero-sum competition, where interdependence provides little advantage, while dangerously compromising sovereign strength. China's leaders are seen as inflexible and committed to using all resources at their disposal to increase the PRC's wealth and power. Despite The regime's recent statements to the contrary,[191] this group believes that China sees the U.S. as the principle obstacle to its regional and global ambitions. Under cover of a conciliatory and pragmatic approach to global affairs, they warn that China is acquiring the economic, political and military wherewithal "to back its aspirations toward Taiwan and beyond with real power."[192] China is seen biding its time and conforming selectively with international norms while building its strength. Once it succeeds with economic modernization, they argue, Beijing's nationalistic and territorial ambitions will not be inhibited by interdependence or concerns for normative international behavior. They urge that America's primary role in the Asian-Pacific "is to derail China's quest to become a 21st-century hegemon."[193] Their contention is that the ascendance of an authoritarian superpower more economically competent than the Soviet Union is not to be aided.[194]

           


             Washington has within its power to impose trade sanctions or protectionist measures able to imperil PRC access to markets and endanger China's economic development plans. The U.S. also retains the prerogative to incite or mitigate regional tensions over China's burgeoning power; significantly complicating the PRC's ability to obtain a benign security environment in which to grow.[195] The U.S. also has the military power and world influence to spoil PRC's aspirations in the South China Sea and complicate territorial questions such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet. Failure could expose the Chinese leadership to fatal challenge from within the communist hierarchy, or set the stage for further loss of central authority; forceful challenge to communist rule; expansion of provincial independence movements, or widespread civil unrest within China. Regardless of the fate of communist rule in China, it is in the best interest of the United States, and Asian security, for China to remain intact as a sovereign nation-state and territorial whole. A fracturing of China would result in unprecedented human suffering, social dislocation and destabalizing refugee flows throughout the Asian -Pacific.[196] China's view of territorial sovereignty issues and insistence on expansive claims to idealized historical territories will continue to be a determinant in the PRC's willingness to engage in cooperation with foreign powers and constructively participate in global relations. As a nuclear power and the home of a quarter of the world's population, flexibility in America's China policy is required: a pragmatic balancing of the need to keep China engaged against the desire to change China, or enforce adherence to norms of international "good" behavior.

            China takes particular umbrage at accelerated world efforts to enforce standards of human rights which China has never known. Democratic ideologies of representation and the unassailable rule of law have no precedent in Chinese history. Western pressure on these issues is seen by the communist hierarchy as an affront to China's national sovereignty, and a challenge to communist legitimacy. In essence, an attempt to sunder China. Even many Western and Asian-Pacific countries differ with Washington over how much emphasis to place on human rights in dealing with China. Western standards of human rights have their root in the Magna Carta signed under duress by England's King John in 1215; but they are comparatively new to Asia. In particular, China's history is replete with examples of a propensity for Chinese to treat their fellow Chinese badly.[197] The need for pragmatic exception to behavioral norms is not unique to


China. As recently as the 1980's Washington routinely overlooked criticism of Thailand, Taiwan, South Korea , Singapore and the Philippines over human rights violations based on their importance as allies and trading partners. Just 50 years ago, Japanese General Yamashita was executed as a war criminal for the brutal treatment of allied prisoners of war by troops under his command.[198] While China's totalitarian rulers include many of the trappings of human rights in their 1982 constitution, they fail to understand either the legal or cultural basis for the western conceptualization of human rights. Instead, outside pressure on human rights and issues of this nature are viewed as a destabalizing affront to Chinese sovereignty. Japanese Consul-General to Boston, Akio Kawato, provides an Asian perspective on attempts to impose Western values and customs on developing countries:

[I]ndustrialized nations should realize how unwise their practice is of pushing developing countries into rapidly adopting new policies, how unwise it is to imply that to advance economically they must adopt modern values and new social systems before they embark on economic development. In Western Europe, it took more than 300 years between the dawn of economic expansion in the 17th Century to the granting of universal suffrage. In the United States, civil rights issues were the cause of much debate until very recently. A sudden change in values and social systems can increase tensions within a society. We cannot forget that, as an economy develops, social conflicts become milder, values change and a gradual reform of the system becomes possible. [199]

           

            Here-in lies the danger of the growing influence of those arguing that the U.S. should adopt policies to more strongly promote U.S. views of world political, military, and economic order. The advocates of normative American values urge that Washington press countries that do not conform to the U.S. view of appropriate world order. They expect America to avoid compromises that could diminish the impact and strength of its world leadership. The proselytizing of idealized U.S. values of democracy and human rights by this group and their avocation of a more activist foreign policy has led some countries, including China, to view U.S. policy as illegitimate interference in their internal affairs. The state-run Xinhua News Agency carried official response to U.S. human rights criticism in early 1997 which observed that the United States "is not a government of the world, nor does it have the status or right to spread irresponsible comments and accusations against others."[200] Advocates for greater U.S. forcefulness in promoting human rights and democracy want Washington to threaten China with serious economic or other sanctions to bring about Chinese conformity to U.S. norms of behavior.[201] What this view fails to see is the metaphorical replacement of gunboats on the Yangtze with economic saber rattling in the South China Sea. The similarity, however, is not lost on China's obdurate leadership.[202]

By its pretension to superpower and very real potential to achieve that status in the next century, China, like Russia, merits an exception to U.S. moralistic "bullying." Exception should not be in the form of appeasement, but in recognition that China is a nuclear power and the most populous nation on the planet; a nation with excellent potential to become a world power.

 

Summary and Conclusion

            This paper has examined China's impressive economic future--assuming current trends hold true--as well as issues which suggest the PRC's ascent to global military and economic power may proceed at a slower and more erratic pace. As the communist regime struggles to preserve its power, the prospect for government intervention in the economy, increased domestic repression, emergence of regional independence movements and the uncontrolled spread of hyper-nationalism point to the potential for China to stumble or even fracture.   Lacking a conceptual basis to justify its monopoly on power, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become dependent on growth to bolster its exclusive rule. China's leaders have resorted to nationalistic appeals to invoke a unifying vision for the Chinese people: The emotionally charged vision of a China restored to its pre-Opium War boundaries; resuming its rightful place as "a great nation." The intrinsic conflict between China's need for growth and the expansive posturing of nationalism also presents the world with an increasingly powerful, but contradictory China.

            While China's overarching need to maintain economic growth has translated into an imperative to avoid conflict and preserve regional stability. The leadership in Beijing has also shown a determination to stretch economic might into military power. With Deng's death, the PLA has become increasingly influential in Chinese policy decisions including China's stance on Taiwan, the South China Sea, human rights and response to a perceived U.S. containment policy.   A long term military modernization program, supplemented by recent purchases of advanced equipment from Russia, has also allowed China to increase its military power projection capabilities in pace with its increasing participation in international economic and security organizations. Growing nationalism may soon allow China to expand its sphere of influence well beyond the littorals of the South China Sea--into areas of increasing U.S. national interest in the coming decades. In response, U.S. policy intrudes across a broad spectrum of issues sensitive to China; making America's role pivotal in determining China's future path in international relations.

            The United States is better positioned than any other state to exert influence on China and lead world consensus over a broad spectrum of areas: political and economic practices, values and ideals, and modern culture.  Though Chinese leaders resist pressure for greater economic reform, improved human rights protection and increased access to Chinese markets, the PRC needs continued access to foreign markets . China's leadership is left with pragmatic choices between growth and the demands of nationalism to hold China together against the entropic forces engendered by its economic development . Taken together, China's circumstances provide the U.S., as an economic, military and influential superpower, with significant leverage over PRC's stability and inclination to either remain cooperatively engaged in world affairs or withdraw behind a bulwark of absolute sovereignty and frustrated nationalism. U.S. policy can accommodate China's emergence into an increasingly interdependent world economy, or turn China toward confrontation and destabilizing aggression.

            If predictions of a resurgent China bent on assuming hegemony over the Asian Pacific are true, the U.S. would be well advised to consider the long memory of a nation and a regime still bristling over indignities committed upon it a century ago. The U.S. strategy of "Enlargement and Engagement"[203] sets political stability, regional peace, and the maturation of market economies in Asia as policy goals of the United States. While China's economic growth is the enabling force behind the PRC's eventual emergence as a 21st century superpower, the need to sustain economic growth has become central to China's stability. Dependence on access to foreign markets and financial investment has forced pragmatic choices on China's leadership; in direct conflict with China's inclination toward state centered zero sum politics and insistence that China is not afforded the respect due an emerging superpower. The key to Asian-Pacific security is economic. As we have recently seen in the emergence of pluralistic systems in Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines, a robust market economy is a prerequisite for political stability and the growth of democracy. Political stability, however, is itself a key element to ensure continued economic development.[204]

            Just as the U.S. overlooked repression and authoritarian control in its Asian allies, China must be handled with "kid-gloves." In the medium-term China and the U.S. share a mutual interest in maintaining regional stability and the political status-quo in the Asian-Pacific. In this context, U.S. policy must seek incremental changes in China rather than pressing for a republican metamorphosis.   

            What is needed is a U.S. strategy for dealing with China which is consistent, coherent and shared with the Chinese. The PRC must understand U.S. desires and motivations. Actions in Washington must be consistent with the articulation of U.S. objectives. Ideally, a plan is needed to aid China in becoming the trading and security partner we want and the economic and military power they desire. Achieving this end requires the articulation of a clear set of objectives in consultation with China's leaders. A shared blueprint which encompasses both U.S. and Chinese expectations for the relationship--developed through diplomatic exchange at the highest level. Washington has an obligation to diplomatically address Chinese political transgressions and flagrant human, religious, civic and political rights abuses. When necessary, the U.S. should publicize and criticize Chinese trespasses. When time and circumstance permit, Washington must involve international organizations and its Asian and European friends and allies in addressing China's excesses. Judgment and diplomatic skill will be required to disagree with the Chinese when we must, but in the nature of fostering an amicable relationship without bluster, bullying and public threats. America may have to coax and encourage a recalcitrant China, but the best means to achieve a stable relationship is to focus on the long term objective of facilitating China's integration as a full and cooperative member in the world community. A mutually understood Sino-American framework will impose discipline on U.S. response to Chinese transgressions, allow tough response if required, and provide China with a clearer appreciation for the political and economic consequences of its actions.

            Above all however, U.S. policy should recognize that it must deal with the existing leadership in China; a regime struggling with legitimation, devolving central control, rising nationalism and the centripetal forces of its own economic revival. While it does not forebode an imminent melt-down, the economic weaknesses which have been highlighted point to a very real potential for China to suffer setback, even domestic conflict in the near term. With a population of 1.3 billion--five times that of the United States--the potential exists for monumental refugee flows and mass starvation to result from turmoil in China. As one of China's favorite targets for accusations of imperialism, the U.S. must tread carefully, but it would be prudent to conceptualize a multinational framework for contingency response, including warning indicators, in the event China begins to unravel. American policy toward China must recognize that near-term engagement and "exception," in the interest of economic reform and internal stability, benefit both U.S. and Chinese objectives. Economic reform, greater interdependence and openness are the best hope for leveraging long-term political evolution while preserving the stability of China.[205]

            When formulating policy toward the PRC, U.S. policymakers must also consider the potential for a China confounded by unending demands which threaten its legitimacy and frustrated in its aspiration to superpower, overcoming these challenges and becoming a major power in global economic and security affairs--ascendant without undergoing quantum political reform. China's potential strength and long memory should not inhibit the United States in formulating policy consistent with the protection of its national interests. The U.S. should not be "soft" on China, but cautious and engaged at the highest levels. While pressing concern over economic competitiveness, security, and cultural issues have increased their prominence in U.S. policy making during the last decade, strategic vision is required to balance domestic and global imperatives. The possibility of facing an antagonistic pariah-state, equal in economic and military strength, three decades hence, requires such vision. America's leaders must resist unmoderated urgings from those interest groups calling for hegemonic imposition of American values and those proposing neo-isolationism.

            The United States has an obligation to support its treaty commitments throughout the world. To disengage into isolationism would abandon long term allies and provide a vacuum in world affairs. To adopt a proselytizing crusade to remake the world in America's image jeopardizes America's role as an even-handed advocate of pluralism and free market economics. It has been said that nature abhors a vacuum. History shows that in the affairs of nations, powers arise to fill the voids left by fallen empires and broken republics.[206] To back away from the role of military, economic and influential superpower would create a void in the balance of power in several regions of the globe including the Asian-Pacific. To go beyond "engagement" to the point of escalating trade and cultural differences into open hostility in the belief of some higher moral legitimacy, is foolhardy. As the United States begins a long series of Quadrennial Defense Reviews, the question which must be addressed is not whether the United States should pattern its force structure to fight two major regional conflicts against an asymmetrically weaker opponent,[207] but how the U.S. can field a force structured to fight a war of attrition against an economic, military-- even technologic peer--in the middle decades of the next century.[208] The price of American superpower is that our historical pattern of disarmament and disengagement cannot be repeated. To do so, risks England's fate, in which the Falklands War was almost beyond Britain's strategic reach and opposition to a Chinese countermarch on the future of Hong Kong is beyond its unilateral capability.

            Today, China has strong incentives to adhere to a cautious foreign policy marked by a pragmatic balancing of cooperation and economic competition with the West. Yet, in view of the intrinsic contradictions present in the process of liberalizing an authoritarian collective system into a free market economy, there is no guarantee that a more antithetical form of Chinese external action, including military intervention in politics, or exaggerated nationalism in foreign policy, will not emerge.[209] Improper U.S. handling of China policy in today's atmosphere of strategic stability, combined with any lapse in America's grasp upon the multiple facets of its superpower, risks strategic collision with an ascendant authoritarian power more economically competent than its predecessor.[210] Increased tensions in Sino-U.S. relations over vaguely defined or imprecisely targeted, but punitive, economic or diplomatic sanctions, could force Japan, South Korea, Russia and Australia, as well as ASEAN and key international actors like the UN, IMF, World Bank and WTO to polarize between Washington and Beijing. This polarization has the potential to confirm the PRC's suspicions of a U.S. led attempt at containment and bring about adverse changes in China's inclination toward cooperative global relations--even a new cold war in the Asian Pacific. A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement states that a "stable and open China is more likely to work cooperatively with others and to contribute positively to peace in the region and to respect the rights and interests of its people."[211] The U.S. must stay-the-course in comprehensive and constructive engagement, establishing cooperative protocols with China at the very highest levels, while taking a longer view toward policies, like the enlargement of democracy, which cannot avoid being perceived as intentionally destabilizing in Beijing. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated during a February 1997 visit to Beijing, " There is no question our relations with the Chinese are a key to stability as we go into the 21st century."[212]

 

 

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[1]      Maria H. Chang, "Greater China and the Chinese 'Global Tribe"

Asian Survey , 25, no. 10 (October 1995): 955-967.

[2]      Robert J. Samuelson, "The Next Evil Empire? "The Washinton Post, 19 February 1997, Sec. A-21.

[3]      Ulysses O. Zalamea, "Eagles and Dragons at Sea: The Inevitable Strategic Collision between the United States and China" Naval War College Review, 99, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 62-74.

[4]      David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War? "Current History 94, no. 593 (September 1995) 241-247.

[5]      Eric A. McVaddon, "China an Opponent or an Opportunity?" Naval War College Review, 99, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 92.

[6]      Patrick E.Tyler, "Why China Has No Ears for American Demands"  The New York Times, 2 November 1996

[7]              World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries," (Washington DC: World Bank,1994). This report predicts that by 2020, Asia will contain seven of the world's ten largest economies in terms of purchasing power: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Only two such economies will exist in Europe: France and Germany. This report also predicts that by 2020, China's economy would surpass that of the United States by forty percent.

[8]      Sean P. Murphy, "A Sweet and Sour Relationship:Interview with Winston Lord," Current History, (September 1995): 248.

[9]      Joseph W. Prueher, "Ready, Forward, Engaged" Armed Forces Journal International, (January 1997): 55.

[10]     Robert G. Sutter, "Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The U.S. Role," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 11.

[11]     World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries," (Washington DC: World Bank,1994).

[12].            " How poor is China," The Economist, 12 October 1996, 35-36. Cites World Bank, "Poverty in China; what do the numbers say?" October 1996.

[13].            " How poor is China," 35.

[14].            Joseph W. Prueher, "Ready, Forward, Engaged" Armed Forces Journal International, (January 1997): 55.

[15].            Prybyla, 277.

[16]             .Samuelson, A-21.

[17]             Samuelson, A-21.

[18]             Prybyla, 275.

[19]             Keith B. Richburg, Hong Kong Restrictions Approved," The Washington Post, 2 February 1997, Sec. A-29.

[20]             Thomas L. Friedman, "Speed Bump Ahead" The New York Times, 10 July 1996. Downloaded from America Online. Vienna, VA: Quantum Computer Services, 30 November, 1996.

[21]             Shambaugh, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC Perspectives," 8.

[22]             Uli Schmetzer, "Russia-China Alliance? Seeds Are There," The Chicago Tribune, 22 December 1996. Downloaded from America Online. Vienna, VA: Quantum Computer Services, 2 January 1996.

[23]             Patrick Taylor, "Why China Has No Ears for American Demands," The New York Times, November 2, 1996. pg 4.

[24]             Steven Mufson, "Premier Li Smooths Over Divisive Issues with U.S. as China's Congress Winds Up," The Washington Post, 15 March 1997, A-24. In a report to China's National Peoples Congress, (NPC) Procurator General Zhang Siqing said prosecutors   corruption charges. The article asserts that 40 percent of theincreased arrests by 17 percent in 1996, but violent crime, narcotics trafficing, gang and mafia style activity remain rampant. The government has also targetted several high-ranking figures including former Beijing party secretary Chen Xitong with NPC failed to endorse the procurator's report over frustration with street crime and corruption. Another third abstained or opposed a similar report by the supreme court. The NPC has never rejected a government proposal and usually delivers favorable endorsement on all issues. The disent is notable as it highlights both a potential increase in the independence of the NPC and because of the message of frustration which it sends to the Party leadership.

[25]             "Politics this Week (January 24 - January 30, 1997)" The Economist Online www.economist.com. President Jiang Zemin called upon Communist Party memebers not to forget their socialist traditions of struggle and frugality. 116,000 Chinese were punished for graft in 1996; a 14 percent increase over 1995.

[26]             David Hoffman, "The Russian Economy's Big Black Hole," The Washington Post, December 9, 1996: Sec A 1.

[27]             Uli Schmetzer, "Russia-China Alliance? Seeds Are There," The Chicago Tribune, 22 December 1996. Downloaded from America Online. Vienna, VA: Quantum Computer Services, 2 January 1996: pg 2.

[28]             Shambaugh, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC

Perspectives," 8.

[29]             Reuter New Service "Selected Quotes from Deng," The Washington Post Online, 19 February 1997. //www.washington post.com//.

[30]             "Dengism After Deng: China reconsiders the colour of cats" Far Eastern Economic Review (22 August 1996): 5.

[31]             Gregory R. Copley, "China: Politics By Any Means"Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 24, no. 3 (March 1996): 1. Like Mikhail Gorbachev in Russia, Jiang may be the first leader of the People's Republic to ascend by "peaceful means."

[32]             Ken Gause, "Factionalism in China's High Command-part 1 "Jane's Intellegence Review (December 1996): 558. While Jiang has been publicly acknowledged by Deng as his hand-picked successor, the author speculates that Jiang was raised to CCP Party Secretary and President from Shanghai party chief in a Quid Pro Quo for his mentor, Chen Yun's, support of Deng following the Tiananmen Crisis of 1989.

[33]             Gause, 558.

[34]             Ross Terrill, "Chairman Mao's Sacred Cow 'One China' Doesn't Make Sense Anymore" The Washington Post, 22 September 1996, Sec C1.

[35]             Edward Cody, "Striving to Be 'Spiritual' Chinese Campaign Seeks to Combat Western Values," The Washington Post, 30 January 1997, Sec. A-13. "Chinese leaders have frequently cited fear of chaos as a reason for continuing their authoritarian style of government.... China's rapid economic growth--and the potential to grow even more--have given rise to a newly assertive nationalism in which traditional values and Chineses history also have a place."

[36]             Shambaugh, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC Perspectives," 12.

[37]             Copley, 1.

[38]             Gerald Seagal, "China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy," Adelphi Paper 287 (London: Brassey's, 1994), 4.

[39]             Maria Hsia chang, "Greater China and the Chinese 'Global Tribe," Asian Survey, 35, no. 10, (October 1995), 958.

[40]             Gerald Seagal, "China's Changing Shape," Foreign Affairs, 73, no. 3 (May/June 1994), 46.

[41]             "China's Li says state firms reform to be caustious," Reuters Information Service, 5 February, 1996.

[42]             Samuel Kim, "China's Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 2.

[43]             "China's Li says state firms reform to be caustious," Reuters Information Service, 5 February, 1996.

[44]             "China's Li says state firms reform to be caustious," 1.

[45]             David Parker and Weihawa Pan, "Reform of the State-owned Enterprises in China" Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 8, no. 1 (1996): 123.

[46]             "China's Li says state firms reform to be caustious," 2.

[47]             Jan S. Prybyla, "All That Glitters? the Foreign Investment Boom," Current History, (September, 1995): 275.

[48]            "China's Li says state firms reform to be caustious," 1.

[49]             "China's Grassroots Democracy," The Economist, 12 Nov 1996, pg. 1. The Economist Online //www.Economist.com//.

[50]             Joseph Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position in the Post-Deng Era" Current History, (September 1995): 254.

[51]             Tyler, "Why China Has No Ears for American Demands."

[52]             "Progress On Human Rights and Trade in China Linked To Expanded U.S. Contacts" Reuters News Service, 30 November 1996.

[53]             Reuter News Service "U.S. Hails textile Pact With China" The Washington Post, February 3, 1997; Sec. A-6.

[54]             Robert D. Hershey, Jr., "China Has Become Chief Contributor To U.S. Trade Gap" The New York Times 20 August 1996, Sec. A1.

[55]             "U.S. May Block China's Entry to World Trade Organization," The New York Times, January 30, 1997, 1. China also suffers from growing income inequity between urban and rural workers and a "floating population" of 100 million migratory workers living in poverty. Agricultural weakness makes conciliation by Beijing dangerous to economic stability with 300 million employed in farming. This may prevent actual reduction in agricultural barriers.

[56]             "China's Financial Evolution: An Interview with People's Bank of China deputy Governor Zhu Xiaohua," US-China Business Magazine, 3 June 1996, 1.

[57]             Parker, 127.

[58]             Parker, 117.

[59]             Scott Hillis, "China's Coal Sector Needs Foreign Funds and Technology to Modernize" Reuters News Service, 3 December 1996.

[60]             Keith B. Richburg, "Hong Kong Restrictions Approved," A-29.

 [61]            Richburg, "Hong Kong Restrictions Approved," A-29.

[62]             David G. Timberman, ed., "The Prospects for Political Change in China: A Conference Report," (Washington , DC: International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1994), 3. //www.ned.org/page_6/china.html//

[63]             Samuelson, A-21.

[64]             Xu Xiaojun, "China's Grand Strategy for the 21st Century," in Michael D. Bellows, ed., Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Priorities, (Washington DC: NDU Press, 1994), 27. The author, a PLA Colonel, is a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Military Science. She states that Chinese leaders have identified "stability at home" as China's supreme interest and goes on to observe China cannot afford chaos if it is to have economic development. China's current progress demonstrates the importance of stability and proves that a strategy focusing efforts on the economy is in the best interest of all Chinese.

[65]             Kim, 1-3.

[66]             Baogang He, "Legitimation and Democratization in a Transitional China", Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12, no.3 (September 1996): 316.

[67]             Fred Schwartz, "The Largest Remaining Communist Nation," Forerunner, (March, 1993). //www.forerunner.com//. See also Dmitri Volkogonov, "Lenin: A New Biography" (New York: Simon and Schuster, inc, 1994), 66-67. William G. Rosenberg, "Lenin, Vladimir Ilich," 1996 Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia (Danbury CT: Grolier, 1996).

[68]             Sutter, 11.

[69]             "The Communist Party of China," (New York: People's Republic of China Consulate). //www.nyconsulate.prchina.org. This theme first appeared in the Third Plenium of 11th Central Commitee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978.

[70]             Kim, 3.

[71]             Joseph Fewsmith, "Jockeying for Position in the Post-Deng Era," Current History, (September 1995) , 252. In 1978 the average per capita income of urban Chinese was 316 Yuna, rural peasants earned just 134 yuan. Foreign trade totalled only $21 billion, and long term neglect of the military resulted in an embarrassing mauling of Chinese troops during a 1979 invasion of Vietnam. by 1995, urban Chinese per capita income had increased to 3,179 yuan, while rural dwellers earned 1,220 yuan. The foreign trade which supported this increase reached $324 billion dollars .

[72]             Chinese Finance Association, "Hong Kong - From the Opium War to 1997 and Beyond", downloaded from the Chineses Finance Association Web Site (www..io.org/%7Eyuan/hk.html) 6 January 1997. The first Opium war forced China to accept the humiliating Treaty of Nanking in 1842. This treaty permanently ceded Hong Hong to Britan in perpetuity. In 1856 the Treaty of Tientsin concluded the second Opium War and forced China to cede Stonecutters Island and Kowloon to Britan. When the Chinese governement refused to ratify the treaty because it legalized the importation of Opium, Britan and France sacked the city of Peking (Beijing) and burned the Summer Palace. In 1860 a humbled China was forced to sign the Peking Convention accepting the Tientsin Treaty. In 1884 france seized Taiwan (Formosa). China began to desintigrate under foreign exploitation. The author's position is that this condition worsened until the final expulsion of Japanese forces at the end of the Second World War. In 1949, Mao's "Patriotic Revolution" unified mainlaind China under a single government. Mao's heirs to power have continued to look with a covetous eye toward Taiwan, occupied in 1949 by fleeing Nationalist forces; the British Colony of Hong Kong, due to return to China in 1997; the Portugese Colony of Macao, due to return in 1999; the Senkaku Islands claimed by Japan, and its land borders with the Soviet Union, India and Vietnam.

[73]             Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, (September/October 1996),75, no. 5, 40.

[74]             Ron Montaperto, "Managing U.S. Relations with China" Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum 42. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 2.

[75]             Kim, 4.

[76]             Jiang Zemin, "Continue to Promote the Reunification of the Motherland", Address to the National Peoples Congress, January 30, 1995, 2. Text downloaded from the U.S. Department of State DOSFAN Website via America Online. Vienna, VA: Quantum Computer Services, 6 January, 1997.

[77]             Jiang, 3.

[78]             David Shambaugh and Senior Colonel Wang Zhongchun, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC Perspectives," (Carslisle PA: Strategic Studies Institiute, 1996), 7.

[79]             Shambaugh, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC

Perspectives," 3.

[80]             Kari Huss, "Against the Wind" Far Eastern Economic

Review, 9 November 1995, 26.

[81]             John Diamond, "Chinese Defense Chief Takes Hard Line On Tiananmen Square Actions, Taiwan" The Washington Post, 11 December 1996, Sec. A22. One China-two systems is Deng Xiopeng's modification of Mao's dictum originally aimed at reunification with Hong Kong, but later adapted to Taiwanese reunion.

[82]             Richard E. Hull, "The South China Sea: Future Source of Prosperity or Conflict in South East Asia?" Strategic Forum Number 60, (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1996), 3. Beijing has creatively redrawn China's historical possessions and territories to include virtually the entire South China Sea

[83]             Anita Singh, "India's Relations with Russia and Central Asia," International Affairs, 71, no. 1, (1995): 56.

[84]             Kim, 2. China claims sovereignty over three million square kilometers of maritime territory by extending its 320 kilometer Exclusive Economic Zone out 1600 kilometers to include the entire Spratly chain (and its potential oil wealth).

[85]             Sutter, 10.

[86]             Hans Binnendijk, "U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asia," Strategic Forum 68,   (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1996), 2.

[87]             Song Qiang, Zhang Zangzang, Qiao Bian, "China That Can Say No," (Beijing: Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe, 1996) as translated in Ming, Zhang, "The Shifting Chinese Public Image of the United States," Strategic Forum 89 (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1996), 2.

[88]             Ming, 2.

[89]             Ming, 3.

[90]             Chinese Youth Daily, May 1996, Quoted in Ming, 3.

[91]             U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, Testimony before the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee June 11, 1996. Downloaded from the U.S. Department of State DOSFAN Webpage.

[92]             Sutter, 7-11.

[93]             Ming, 3.

[94]             Raymond Lau, "The Role of the Working Class in the 1989 Tiananmen Square Crisis Transition Politics, 12, no. 3 (September 1996), 343-373. The author contends that the demand for negotiations with the leadership was seen as threatening to legitimizing the Beijing Workers Autonomous Federation (BWAF) labor union as a new political party outside the control of China's communist hierarchy. The author also makes a convincing arguement that student dissidents had co-opted the BWAF and turned it into a political platform to further their pluralistic agenda which did not relfect the views of China's rank and file laborer. Labors participation in the Tiananman Square protests is attributed to a "big brotherly" desire to protect the hunger striking students, rather than support by labor for political liberalization in China.

[95]             Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Report on Human Rights Faults China, Nigeria and Cuba," The New York Times, 30 January 1997, 1.

[96]             Keith B. Richburg, "Hong Kong Restrictions Approved'" The Washington Post, 2 February 1997; Sec. A-29.

[97]             Keith B. Richburg, "Months Before Transfer, Hong Kong and China Already Closely Linked," The Washington Post, 26 January 1997, Sec. A-1.               

[98]            East Asian and PacificU.S. Department of State Country Report: "China." (Washington D.C.: Bureau of Affairs, 1995), 3-4. China is predicited to accrue economic growth rates of 8-10 percent annually until the year 2000 and reach an economic output of $10 trillion early in the next century.

[99]             Baogang He, "Legitimation and Democratization in a Transitional China" Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12, no. 3 (September 1996): 315.

[100]           Sutter, 8.

[101]           Sutter, pg. 8.

[102]           Jessica Mathews, "Conciliatory Steps From China," The Washington Post, 9 December 1996, Sec. A-12.

[103]           Barbara H. Franklin, "China: Friend Or Foe?" Heritage Lecture 566 (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation, 1996), 7. //www.heritage.org/heritage/library.html//

[104]           Mathews, A-12.

[105]           Mathews, A-12.

[106]           Mathews, A-12.

[107]           The text of the law was promulgated by Xinhua on February 25, 1992; see FBIS-CHI, February 28, 1992, 2-3. This law has not been repealed and could support future Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Also in 1992, China granted oil exploration rights in the disputed area of the Spratlys to an American company, the Crestone Energy Corporation.

[108]           June Teufel Dreyer, "China's Strategic View: The Role of The People's Liberation Army," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 16.

[109]           Hiroyuki Sugiyama, "PRC Likely To Increase Activity in Japanese Waters," Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), January 4, 1996, 3, in FBIS-EAS, January 23, 1996, 7.

[110]           GMA-7 Radio-Television Arts Network (Quezon City), January 30, 1996.

[111]           Wolf, Jim, "China Rehearsing Invasion of Taiwan" Reuters News Service 11 November 1996.

[112]           Jim Gomez, "Lessening of Spratly Island Tensions Seen at APEC Summit," The Associated Press, 27 November 1996.

[113]           David E. Sanger, "The U.S. Took-on China Over Intellectual Property in 1903," The New York Times,19 May 1996, 3.

[114]           Politics This Week (January 17- January 23 1997) The Economist Online Service, //www. economist.com//. See also John Goshko, "China Vetoes Use of U.N. Personnel to Supervise Peace Agreement in Guatemala'" The Washington Post, 11 January 1997, Sec. A-22.

[115]           "China asks Guatemala to end Taiwan Support," The Washington Times, 17 January 1997, 15.

[116]           Christensen, 46.

[117]           Richburg, "Hong Kong Restrictions Approved," A-29. and Lee, 1.

[118]           Jim Wolf, "China Rehearsing Invasion of Taiwan" Reuters News Service 11 November 1996.

[119]           Yossef Bodansky, "An Islamist Resurgence In Xinjiang Poses a Threat to PRC Leadership" Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 24, no. 6-7 (June-July 1996):30.

[120]           Swaran Singh, "China's Post-Cold War National Security Doctrine," Strategic Analysis, Vol. 28, no. 1, (April 1995): 49. Russian and Chinese leaders have not only engaged in serious "fence-mending," but have declared that they no longer view each other as a "threat," initiating a series of confidence-building measures such as military visits and an agreement to move the border fence itself by creating a 100 meter-wide demilitarized zone the entire length of the Sino-Russian border.

[121]           Oliver Wild, "The Silk Road," (Cambridge University, 1992):, pg .11. Available at //www.atm.ch.ac.uk/~oliver/silk.html.

[122]           Dianne L. Smith,"Central ASIA: A New Great Game?,"U.S. Army War College (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996),1. Available online at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/.

[123]           Graham Fuller, "Central Asia: The Quest for Identity," Current History, Vol. 93, No. 582, (April 1994): 148-149.

[124]           Smith, 29.

[125]           Smith, 29.

[126]           Reuters News Service "China Slaps Curfew on Xinjiang Town after Riot" Inside China, A Service of The European Information Service Inc., //www. insidechina.com// 10 February 1997. The article reports rioting by over 1,000 Uighur Islamists in the city of Yining in Northwestern Xinjiang on Feb. 3, 1997. The protestors called for Han Chinese to be driven from Xinjiang and for Xinjiang to be split from China. In response Chinese authorities imposed a curfew on the town despite the overlap of Ramadan and Chinese New Year clebrations.

[127]           Bodansky, 30-34.

[128]           Ross Terrill, "Chairman Mao's Sacred Cow 'One China' Doesn't Make Sense Anymore" The Washington Post, 22 September 1996, Sec. C1.

[129]           Chang, 958-9.

[130]           P. Massonnet, "1989 Poll Shows Chinese at Odds with Communist Party," Agence France Presse English Newswire, 1994. Republished by Zhaohua at //www.china-net.org/CCF($/ccf9443-1.html

[131]           Raymond lau, "The Role of the Working Class in the 1989 Tianamen Square Crisis Transistion Politics, 12, no. 3 (September 1996): 343-373.

[132]           Bruce Gilley, "Whatever You Say" Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 December 1995, 35-36.

[133]           Jackie Sheehan, "Is there another Tiananmen uprising in the offing?," Jane's Intelllignece Review, December 1996; pg. 556.

[134]           Lord, 3.

[135]           Ron Montaperto, "Managing U.S. Relations with China: Toward a New Strategic Bargain," Strategic Forum 42, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), 2.

[136]           Winston Lord, "U.S. Policy Toward China: Security and Miltary Considerations," Statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 11, 1995. excerpted from Dispatch Magazine, Vol 6, no. 43: 773-775 and available on the U.S. State Department Webpage.

[137]           Kim, 1.

[138]           Kim, 1.

[139]           Montaperto, 4.

[140]           Montaperto, 4

[141]           Patrick Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," The New York Times, 3 December 1996, 2.

[142]           Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," 4.

[143]           Montaperto, 2.

[144]           Hans Binnendjik, "U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asis," Strategic Forum 68 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1996).

[145]           Tyler,"China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," 2.

[146]           Montaperto, 4.

[147]           Montaperto, 4.

[148]           Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as its Power Grows," 7.

[149]           Binnendjik, 2.

[150]           Nick Cook, "Lifting the Veil on China's Fighters," Jane's Defence Weekly, 31 January 1996, 52.

[151]           Binnendjik, 2.

[152]           Cook, 52.

[153]           David A. Fulghum, "China Buys Su-27 Rights from Russia,: Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 February 1996, 60. Flying from this base, the Su-27's combat radius encompasses Okinawa and the U.S. Air Base at Kadena.

[154]           Bill Gertz, "Chinese arms buildup increases attack range," The Washington Times, 12 March 1996, A-12.

[155]           Bill Gertz, "Pentagon Says Russians Sell Destroyers to China," The Washington Times, 10 January 1997, A-1.

[156]           Dreyer, 13.

[157]           Montaperto, 3.

[158]           Dreyer, 7.

[159]           The Military Balance 1995-1996, (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 271.

[160]           U.S. Department of State Country Report: "China," (Washington D.C.: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1995), 3-4. Based on annual growth of 8-10% to 2000.

[161]           USMC, "Operational Manuever From the Sea," (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), 3.

[162]           Kim , 2. See also Hull, 4. China has published maps with boundary lines enclosing almost the entire So. China Sea. What is unclear is whether China is claiming the entire area as historic waters or sovereignity over the entire land area.

[163]           World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries," (Washington DC: World Bank, 1994). As quoted in Sam Bateman, "Sea change in Asia-Pacific" Jane's Navy International (October 1996): 28.

[164]           Bateman, 30.

[165]           Richard Hull, "The South China Sea: Future Source of Prosperity or Conflict in South East Asia?" Strategic Forum Number 60 (Washington D.C.: Natinal Defense University, 1996): 3.

[166]           Bateman, 29.

[167]           Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia 1996 (Danbury CT: Grolier, 1996) (modified).

[168]           Nicholas D. Kristof, "Finally Japan May Have a Future in the Military," The New York Times, 21 April 1996.

[169]           Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy," Naval War College Review, 97, no. 3 (Summer 1994), 18.

[170]           The Russian version is designated the Su-33 which flys from the Russian carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and is capable of in air refueling.

[171]           Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," The article quotes an unnamed U.S. intellegence officer.

[172]           Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," 8. The Article quotes an unnamed former military attaché to China.

[173]           Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," 6.

[174]           Larry M. Wortzel, "China Pursues Traditional Great-Power Status," Orbis, Vol 38 No. 2. (Spring 1994): 164.

[175]           Dreyer, 18.

[176]           Dreyer, 18.

[177]           Kristof, 2.

[178]           Kristof, 3.

[179]           Edward Cody, "China Not a U.S. Rival, Beijing Officials Say," The Washington Post, January 18, 1997; Sec. A-26. The article quotes Lee Kuan Yew, former prime minister of Singapore as describing regional comfort with the benign presence of U.S. military forces since 1945 as a counter to an industrializing and strong China and an economically and potentially more assertive Japan.

[180]           Shinn, 24.

[181]           Binnendijk, 2.

[182]           Kristoff, 3.

[183]           Cody, A-26.

[184]           Sutter, 26.

[185]           Sutter, 18-34.

[186]           James Przystup, "The United States and China into the 21st Century," Heritage Lecture No. 551 (Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1995), 2. Available at //www.heritage.org/heritage/library//

[187]           R.W. Apple Jr., "Clinton Defends China Policy Despite Lack of Rights Progress," The New York Times, January 29, 1997; 1.

[188]           Apple, 1.

[189]           Sutter, 37.

[190]           Sutter, 1.

[191]           Cody, A-26. Qiao Shi, Chairman of the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee is quoted as stating, "Our country currently does not pose a threat to any other country, and it will not do so even when it is fully developed and when its overall national strength has increased...China has always pursued an independent foreign policy of peace. It is diametrically opposed to both hegemonism and power politics in any form, and never seeks hegemony. Naturally, there does not exist the question of contention between China and any other country for so-called leadership."

[192]           Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, no. 2 (March-April 1997); pp 18-32.

[193]           Bernstein, 18.

[194]           Sutter, 37.

[195]           Sutter, 28.

[196]           Shambaugh, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC Perspectives," 20.

[197]           McVaddon, 10.

[198]           A. Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago, 1949) excerpted in Michael Walzer, War Crimes: Soldiers and Their Officers (New York: Harper Collins, 1977): 196-197.

[199]           Akio Kawato, "Beyond the Myth of "Asian Values," Chuokoron, (December 1995). Available at http://ifrm.glocom.ac.jp/DOC/k02.001.html.

[200]           Elaine Kurtenbach, "China to U.S.: Back off on human rights," the Associated Press, February 7, 1997.

[201]           A.M. Rosenthal, "Naked in the Square," The New York Times, 13 December 1996.

[202]           Tyler, "Why China Has No ears for American Demands," 3.

[203]           A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement (Washington D.C. : U.S. GPO, 1996) , 40.

[204]           Smith, 18.

[205]           Shambaugh, "China's Transition Into The 21st Centruy: U.S. and PRC Perspectives," 19.

[206]           Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York: Random House, 1989).

[207]           Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Cueing the QDR: Reconsidering the 2 MRC Strategy and Targeting Infrastructure Savings," Armed Forces Journal International, (February 1997): 12. Retired Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, William Owens is quoted as stating " So is '2 MRCs' the best characterization? ...Some people say [it's not]....I agree with that [critique]. But the real issue is, how do you draw a line under some acceptable force structure that is enough? What I worry about is...there will be this continued erosion of procurement dollars that will go even further in putting us in trouble in 15 or 20 years."

[208]           Hans Binnendjik, "A Strategic Assessment For the 21st Century," Joint Force Quarterly, (Autumn 1996): 67-68.

[209]           M. Swaine and D.P. Henry, "China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy," (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1995).

[210]           Shinn, 21.

[211]           A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement (Washington D.C. : U.S. GPO, 1996), 40.

[212]           Robert Burns, "Gore, Gingrich set missions to woo China," The Associated Press, 21 March 1997.



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