Military

 

 

 

 

     "Mine Warfare, perhaps more than any other single littoral warfare mission area, is the 'key' that will unlock the 'door' to the littoral battlespace."

Admiral J.M. Boorda

Chief of Naval Operations

13 December 1995

 

Introduction

     It is difficult these days to review a professional publication such as Proceedings or the Marine Corps Gazette and not find an article on the Revolution in Military Affairs, Information Warfare, or New Sciences. Technology is again affecting the way we as professionals look at and conduct the art of war. With talk of the "system of systems," shaping the battle, and battlefield dominance, it is not difficult to see in the mind's eye a sleek gray warship slicing through the water, with a "bone in her teeth." Visualize the Tactical Action Officer and Commanding Officer continuously monitoring the situation on their overhead displays as she nears the littoral; with her crew at general quarters, weapons systems ready, sailing into harm's way, perhaps the finest warship and most highly trained crew the navy has ever produced. In the next instant, picture the same ship engulfed in smoke and flame, dead in the water, her gas turbine engines knocked off their mounts, the victim of a naval mine that cost only a few thousand dollars laid covertly by an obsolescent submarine.

     For generations of naval officers, the mine threat was a relevant element of naval warfare that impacted on their plans and ability to perform missions. Today, the issue of mines and mine countermeasures (MCM) has increased in relevance and should be at the forefront of naval planning. Traditionally the U.S. Navy has been, and remains, a high technology navy and a pioneer at adapting new technologies and methodologies in naval warfare. Yet this has only been true in the more glamorous aspects of naval warfare such as naval aviation, nuclear submarines, and surface combatants. Just as traditionally, the lessons learned about neglecting the mine warfare and the mine countermeasure forces are soon forgotten after hostilities have ceased and are not remembered until the MCM force is needed again.

     Once again, known adversaries are developing and integrating mine warfare capabilities that may influence the national security strategy of the United States. The intent is to provide the reader with a broad review of U. S. naval mine warfare history in order to analyze the current mine warfare effort to determine if it is focused on the elimination of historical and doctrinal deficiencies that have plagued the mine warfare community. Additionally, the current threat and nature of mine warfare will be discussed in order to provide a foundation to analyze current mine warfare initiatives.

 

The Mine Warfare Cycle

     early efforts

     The history of U.S. naval mine warfare is one of a proud tradition of ingenuity, determination, and courage in overcoming a prolific enemy that has threatened U.S. fleets around the world. However, it also has a traditional pattern of neglect and reaction, which can be identified through a historical review.

     Even in its infancy, mine warfare proved hazardous to naval forces. In 1777, David Bushnell cabled together a double line of contact mines to attack British warships off Connecticut. These mines were easily spotted and avoided. However, in an attempt to gather intelligence on the mines, a British schooner was destroyed and her crew lost when hauling in a mine.^[1]

     During the 1800's, the famous inventors Robert Fulton and Samuel Colt continued to develop Bushnell's naval mine. These advanced mines were demonstrated to both the United States and foreign governments, generating very little interest. Mine countermeasures at the time consisted of bow watches or personnel in small boats looking for mines.

     The Civil War

     In July 1861, attitudes about mining and mine countermeasures would change markedly when the first Confederate mines were found in the Potomac River. The ingenious use of mines by the Confederacy forced the Union to develop "torpedo catchers," "torpedo rakes," or "devils" to clear the path in front of Union vessels as they transited the inland waterways of the south. During the war, 27 Federal ships were lost to mines, compared to nine by artillery fire.^[2] One of the most famous chapters in the history of the U.S. Navy occurred on 5 August 1864, when Admiral David Farragut led his forces into Mobile Bay and after watching his lead ship, the sloop Brooklyn, slow down, he spoke those often misquoted but immortal words "Damn the torpedoes, Captain Drayton, go ahead!"^[3] The picture of Admiral Farragut charging into the bay, boldly disregarding the Confederate minefields, would fill any Surface Warfare Officer with bravado. What is rarely pointed out however, is that from 28 July to 3 August, Farragut's aide, Lieutenant John C. Watson had surveyed the Confederate minefields and had charted or neutralized many of the mines.^[4] When Farragut gave his order, it was more out of frustration with a subordinate than from bravado. Farragut knew the location of the minefields, yet despite this, a ship of his squadron, the USS Tecumseh, was sunk after drifting off course and traveling into a charted minefield.   

     After the Civil War, the government of the United States was preoccupied with matters of reconstruction and expansion, and therefore, spent little effort in maintaining a large naval force. A few dedicated naval officers would continue to develop mine warfare innovations. In 1869, Rear Admiral Porter managed to open a torpedo station to study underwater ordinance and countermeasures, however by 1885 all study of MCM ceased. Resources were scarce and in 1886 Admiral Porter took the Navy and Congress to task for not adequately funding mine warfare.^[5]

     Mining and mine countermeasures would remain virtually the same until the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The Russians and the Japanese successfully used both offensive and defensive mining methods during the Port Arthur campaign, which led several nations to commence active mine countermeasure development. Unfortunately, the United States was not one of them.

     World War I

     Prior to World War I, mine warfare developments in Europe included the introduction of magnetic influence mines and sweep obstructers such as wire cutters, snags, and explosive moorings as several countries developed methods in an attempt make mines unsweepable. The United States, with little research and development, relied on the British to provide them with information on mine warfare research.   

     During World War I, the Germans made effective use of both the U-boat and naval mines to hamper the flow of war supplies to Europe. The U-boats planted mines along both the English and American sea ports to interdict commercial shipping, resulting in the closure of several vital ports until the mines could be cleared.^[6] Unfortunately for the Americans, at the beginning of the war, the mine sweeping force consisted of only three converted fleet tugs and a few fishing trawlers. During World War I over 300,000 mines were used resulting in the sinking or damaging of 966 Allied and Central Power warships, merchantmen, and submarines.^[7] Even the British Secretary of War, Lord Kitchner, was lost when the cruiser HMS Hampshire struck a mine.^[8] However, as the success of German mining efforts increased, so did the Navy's interest in mine warfare. As a result, a capable MCM force was in place by the war's end, one that had been equipped with the latest technology, including 55 new "Bird" class minesweepers. They also learned many lessons from actual practical experience. Yet, within weeks of the war's end, mine warfare units were disbanded, minesweepers decommissioned, and all mine warfare expertise scattered throughout the Navy. Career officers saw no future in mine warfare and interest in the subject waned.^[9]

     After the war, The Navy's Bureau of Ordnance was able to open up a small mine building, later renamed the Naval Ordnance Laboratory (NOL), to develop and research mine warfare applications. However by 1929, "Promotion of personnel was almost unheard of, new employees were out of the question, machine tools were largely discarded by other shops in the (Washington Naval) Yard, and purchases of experimental equipment were nil."^[10] Additionally, during the inter-war years the mine warfare force was reduced to a paper tiger, a theoretical force on paper that would be fleshed out during a war. In almost every case where mine warfare was included in fleet exercises, both the mines and mine countermeasures were simulated. Meanwhile our adversaries were developing new influence mines, both magnetic and pressure activated, as well as new methods of delivery. These new influence mines could also be bottom laid, which rendered paravanes and other mechanical sweeping gear useless, catching the U.S. unaware since research and development of mine warfare in the United States had been once again left to a few dedicated individuals.

     Also, during the inter-war period the Navy maintained the position that mines were a defensive weapon of weaker navies, which the powerful need not fear and American ingenuity would overcome.^[11] Consequently, mine warfare and MCM readiness slid into the backwater of U.S. naval thinking.

     World War II

     From 1919 to 1940 funding for mine warfare development was hampered by peacetime budgets and arms control agreements. Career officers still thought of mine warfare as a dead-end assignment and the navy in general considered the mine a weapon for inferior navies.^[12] Of the original 55 "Bird" class minesweepers built at the end of World War I, by 1928 only two remained and all others were stripped of their gear and turned into tugboats and service craft.^[13]      In 1940, with the specter of war lurking on the horizon, the Navy again started to build its outdated mine warfare forces to face the new threat of German naval mines off the eastern seaboard. By early 1942 German U-boats had laid over 300 mines off several east coast ports, shutting down maritime traffic for days.^[14]

     World War II would provide yet another opportunity for the United States to practice crisis management at improvising mine countermeasures in response to the new technology. In response to German magnetic mines that were given to the U.S. by the British, degaussing was ordered on a priority basis to U.S. Navy ships. During the war nearly 13,000 ships were outfitted with degaussing at a cost of $300 million dollars.^[15] The personnel level of scientists working on mine warfare at the Naval Ordinance Laboratory increased from 20 to 800, normally 20% of the NOL effort was devoted to mine warfare. In 1944 a new threat, the pressure influence mine developed by Germany four years earlier, appeared but was not deployed until Adolph Hitler ordered 4,000 pressure mines sowed off the coast of France to prevent an invasion.^[16]

     An effective countermeasure was never developed for the German pressure mine, but the invasion of Europe was set in motion despite the threat. Only after the landing did Allied forces realize how lucky they had been, when minesweepers revealed minefields containing hundreds of pressure and combination pressure-acoustic mines. Allied forces off Cherbourg, France had to sweep eight times a day for 85 days to clear the harbor.^[17] In addition, the U.S. Navy used offensive mining during the Pacific campaign to attack Japanese shipping with great effectiveness; it is estimated that one of every eight mines laid by U.S. submarines found a victim. During the last five months of the war alone, more than 1.25 million tons of Japanese shipping were sunk or damaged by mine action and a virtual blockade of the Shimonoseki Straits and the Inland Sea was effected. As a result of the proliferation of mines in World War II, the use of over 700,000 mines culminated in the sinking or damaging of 3,200 Allied and Axis warships, merchantmen, and submarines.^[18] The Allied mine countermeasure forces at war's end consisted of 3,230 ships, 950 of which were American.^[19]

     Following World War II the Navy failed to focus its mine warfare force on the costly "lessons learned." Instead the Navy reveled in its successes and the mine warfare capability once again slipped into the backwater of naval thought and planning. After the war, 90% of the mine warfare force was released from active duty, successful developments in MCM were shelved, and capabilities not pursued.^[20] By 1946 the number of minesweepers in the Pacific had dropped from 374 to 14. Finally, the funding for a new class of minesweeper was cut in 1950 due to fiscal constraints.^[21]

     Korea

     During the Korean conflict mine countermeasures hit an all time low. After the successful amphibious landing at Inchon on 15 Sep 1950, General MacAurthur ordered a two prong attack to cut off the army of North Korea which was retreating from Pusan. One prong would drive overland from Seoul, while the second prong would complete an amphibious landing at Wonsan and then drive inland trapping the North Koreans. United Nations' forces were unable to successfully complete the mission due to the inability of MCM forces to clear a channel in a timely manner. The amphibious landing was delayed for eight days while the MCM forces were struggling to clear a channel. Additionally, the initial minesweepers that were brought into theater were too large for sweeping the moored contact minefields planted by the North Koreans. In effect, the delay caused by the lack of MCM capabilities allowed the North Korean Army to escape before an amphibious landing could be made.^[22] Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith, commander of the amphibious task force at Wonsan, Korea put it succinctly after the failure to trap the North Korean Army:

 

We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.^[23]

 

     Again, after the failure at Wonsan, Vice Admiral Turner C. Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East, stated:

 

The main lesson of the Wonsan operation is that no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service, such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or relegated to a minor role in the future.^[24]

 

     Sharing Vice Admiral Joy's concerns, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman , Chief of Naval Operations, added;

 

When you can't go where you want to, when you want to, you haven't got command of the sea. And command of the sea is a rock-bottom foundation of all our war plans. We've been plenty submarine-conscious and air-conscious. Now we're going to start getting mine-conscious beginning last week.^[25]

 

     The problem experienced at Wonson opened the Navy's purse strings. The new construction of 65 minesweepers and 22 coastal mine hunters was authorized. This response was short lived, by 1958 construction funding for minesweepers was regularly cut, leaving no follow on platform available.^[26]

     Vietnam

     In the 1960's, during the Vietnam Conflict, North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces coordinated mining with gunfire and rocket attacks to achieve significant results along South Vietnam's inland waterways and the Mekong Delta. Using tactics similar to the Confederates during the Civil War, the Vietnamese would coordinate mining with gunfire and rocket attacks. Most often MCM forces faced homemade controllable mines, drifting mines disguised as garbage or a basket, and limpet mines put in place by divers.^[27]

     The United States, aware of the psychological effect of naval mines, mined Haiphong harbor. Using only 36 mines, the United States closed down Haiphong harbor to commercial traffic for 300 days and influenced the North Vietnamese to resume peace talks.^[28] The Navy's experiences in Vietnam relegated mining and mine countermeasures to the small unit and riverine warfare level. As a result the Navy came to consider mine warfare a small scale mission vice a major warfare area.^[29] The high monetary cost of Vietnam prohibited the replacement of the aging mine warfare force. By 1965 MCM ships were in complete disrepair with problems in their engines and hulls. As the Vietnam Conflict escalated, so did the cost; as MCM ships failed mechanically they were decommissioned and crews assigned elsewhere. This resulted in the development of the mine sweeping helicopter as a replacement for the aging MCM fleet. When Admiral Elmo E. Zumwalt, Jr. became Chief of Naval Operations in 1970, he recognized the importance of mine warfare and the lack of integration:

 

I think that we in the U.S. Navy ... have frequently been accused of not giving sufficient interest to the field of mine warfare, and in part, I believe, this is the result of the fact that our Navy is made up of three unions: the Aviation union, the Submarine union, and the Destroyer union and I therefore made myself the head of the Mine Warfare union to try to get an equal balance of interest within the United States Navy in this very important field.^[30]

 

     The advertised success of the mine sweeping helicopter led to the cancellation of the follow on minesweeper class in 1971 and by the mid 1970's the number of active duty MCM ships had been reduced significantly from 200 ships in 1966 to three in 1976.^[31] In 1976, a new class of minehunter was proposed to augment the current fleet, but the Carter administration delayed the program, the ships were never built. In later years, then CNO Admiral Hayward was able to convince the Reagan administration and naval leadership that a new class of minesweeper was required to replace the Korean era minesweepers. The Avenger-class minesweeper was authorized in 1981, but due to technical problems the lead ship was not commissioned until September 1987.

     The Gulf Wars

     In 1983, prior to the Gulf Wars, the Navy published the Lessons of the Falkland, Summary Report^[32] that conveyed the lessons learned from the British experience during the Falkland campaign. When those lessons were applied to the 1983 mine warfare force, the following conclusions were related:

 

The limited mining capabilities of the Argentine Navy, if used in a timely and effective manner, could have created major problems for the British force. The U.S. Navy had learned the implications of a minor or a nonexistent power using obsolete naval mines during the Korean War. The U.S. Navy MCM capability built up in the 1950's has been allowed to deteriorate. Today the Navy has 21 mine sweeping helicopters and three active minesweepers, plus another 18 outdated minesweepers in the Naval Reserve Force. major programs are underway to revitalize the U.S. Navy's MCM capability .... Unfortunately, MCM forces tend to be particularly vulnerable to budget reductions.^[33]

 

     These results were soon to be tested during the Persian Gulf Wars. During the last year of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) struck a floating mine and nearly sank. Iran sowed approximately 150 mines in an effort to impede the oil flow through the Straits of Hormuz. Designated as M-08/39 moored contact type mines of World War I vintage, they were invented in Czarist Russia in 1908 and modernized in 1939.^[34] Iran did not succeed in its objective of closing the straits, but did point out to many the lack of U.S. MCM capabilities, which for the most part went unheeded.   

     The Gulf War further demonstrated that a low-cost sea mine makes an effective sea denial weapon. In mid February 1991, the USS Tripoli (LPH 10) and USS Princeton (CG 59) struck mines off the coast of Kuwait. At the time, Tripoli was the command ship for the aviation mine countermeasure forces in the area. Further helicopter mine countermeasure actions were discontinued so Tripoli could dry-dock in Bahrain for repairs.^[35] Due to the threat of mines and the inability of coalition forces to clear the waters of Kuwait, a planned amphibious landing (Abu Musa Island) was not attempted during the Gulf War.^[36] Captain J.M. Martin, an expert in mine warfare, stated after the Gulf War:

 

From a strategic point of view, the Persian Gulf region is an ideal mining target. It has favorable water depths and the bottom is soft all along its 500 mile length. Its sea routes are traveled by some of the largest ships afloat. A much larger force than that contemplated would be required if mines were planted throughout the Gulf. Fortunately, Iraq was not able to exploit this inherent advantage for sea mines; either before or during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Had it done so, the mining consequences would have been more severe, if not catastrophic.^[37]

 

The Navy again failed the test of mine warfare readiness.        After the Gulf War, Congress conducted an investigation into the Navy's ability to conduct mine warfare and concluded that the Navy was "woefully short of mine countermeasures."^[38] The U.S. provided only 13% of the mine countermeasure forces committed to the Gulf War and most of the U.S. minesweepers were about 35 years old.^[39]

     Historic Cycle

     When macroscopically examining the history of mine warfare, there appears to be a basic cycle that can be discerned. This mine warfare cycle correlates to possible indicators for the future of mine warfare. This cycle includes four basic stages:

     1. Crisis. In every case there has been an event to force the Navy into action, be that a war on the horizon or new technological developments by potential enemies. From Union forces discovering mines in the Potomac River to the discovery of Iranian mines floating in the Persian Gulf, a dramatic event occurred to alter the thought process of naval leadership to accept mines as a real and dangerous threat to maritime operations and drives the Navy into the next stage.

     2. Reaction. Once the event occurred, the reaction of naval leadership was to throw resources at the problem. Whether it was money, manpower, new mine warfare assets, or additional research, the key to correcting the short term problem has been flood it with resources. When the short term problems were solved, the Navy advanced into the next stage.

     3. Follow Through. It is this stage of the cycle where the critics of mine warfare reflected on how and why mine warfare was allowed to deteriorate. Recommendations and corrections to easily solved problems were made and taken for action. Naval leadership vowed not to let mine warfare forces slip into the backwater of naval thinking and planning; the buzz word "mainstream" circulates.

     4. Deterioration. After the crisis was over, the short term problem corrected and the soul searching complete, the Navy allowed the mine warfare forces to wither on the vine. Fiscal resources were cut, manpower decreased, mine warfare assets decommissioned or allowed to deteriorate, and research on mine warfare returned to a few dedicated professionals. Mine warfare forces were not integrated into fleet exercises and operations.

     Constants

     There are also constants that run throughout the mine warfare cycle. First, throughout its history, a dedicated group of both military and civilian professionals have been and are working the problems of mine warfare. These include: Admiral Porter and the Torpedo School, the Bureau of Ordinance, the Naval Ordinance Laboratory, and former Chiefs of Naval Operations such as: Admiral Sherman (1950), Admiral Zumalt (1970), and Admiral Boorda (1990). Today there is a similar body of dedicated professionals addressing the problems of mine warfare. These include: Director, Naval Expeditionary Warfare; Commander, Mine Warfare Command; Naval Doctrine Command; Naval Post-graduate School; and individual mine warfare units. The above mentioned are all striving to ensure that Navy mine warfare capabilities stay at the forefront of naval thinking and planning.

     Second, it is apparent when reviewing mine warfare history that mine countermeasures are reactionary to the imposed mine threat. In a constant "tail chase," the Navy rushes to adapt existing technology to counter today's threat vice planning for tomorrow's threat. The progression of mine development from contact mines to pressure mines to magnetic mines to acoustic mines caught MCM forces unaware and resulted in the crisis development of countermeasures and necessitated dependence on Allied assistance.  

     Korean, Vietnamese, and Gulf War mines were not vastly improved over those mines used during World War I and World War II, yet the mine countermeasure forces were taxed on each occasion because mine countermeasures had not significantly improved during the 41 year time span. The same basic technology used to sweep mines in 1950 was used in 1991. However the threat has evolved beyond the use of just simple mines; and if the approach to the threat is the same as in the past, then MCM will once again be found lacking.

   A third constant has been that mine warfare is slow, tedious, and demanding. Completing a clearance mission in a reasonable time requires a large number of MCM assets. In 1945, a 350 ship task force was assigned clearance operations in Japan's coastal waters. After 26 years of sweeping, Commander, Naval Forces Far East reported more than 2,000 influence mines remained in shallow waters as of 1971.^[40]

     Another example occurred in 1984 when one shipload of mines was laid in the approaches to the Red Sea and an international task force was formed to complete mine clearance operations. The task of mine clearance took several weeks and during that period the Italian mine force detected and investigated 480 mine-like contacts; all proved to be metallic junk on the ocean floor.^[41]

     Finally, no matter how hard dedicated professionals have worked, no matter how many Chiefs of Naval Operations declare mine warfare to be a primary concern, the mine warfare cycle remains unbroken.

THE NATURE OF MINE WARFARE

     The Environment and Challenge

     Forward ...From the Sea reaffirms the Navy's commitment to the littoral regions of the world as the focus for Navy power projection, attempting to influence events in support of the national security strategy. The littorals have inherent natural challenges that hamper mine countermeasure efforts such as rock formations, muddy bottoms, and coastal detritus. Additionally, mine warfare operations in the littoral engage that region of the world which contains 70% of the world's population and the majority of the world's sea lanes. This population has used the littoral for a traditional dumping ground for debris^[42] which hamper mine countermeasures. Discarded refrigerators, automobiles, and other metal debris can confuse or hide the sonar signatures of mines.^[43]

     Adding to the difficult environment, the future of mine countermeasures now appears even more complex with the deployment of new innovations that include: crawling mines, burying mines, mines with noise reduction coatings and composite materials, and mines that can sense MCM activity to deactivate and then reactivate after the minesweeper has left the area. These modern mines are all finding their way into potential antagonist's arsenals, such as the modern Italian Manta mine that severely damaged the Princeton.^[44] To compound matters, more countries are developing, building, or buying diesel submarines which provide an excellent covert delivery platform for mines.^[45] Thus, the mine, which has traditionally been viewed as a primitive or obsolete weapon, has survived and adapted to modern naval warfare.

     The Threat

     Naval mines are the sea denial weapon of choice for many third world nations due to their:

     1. Cost effectiveness. It cost $52.1 million dollars to transport and repair the Samuel B. Roberts, where as the cost of the sea mine she struck was less than $1,500. The cost of the influence mine that caused an estimated $15 million^[46] damage to Princeton was perhaps $3,000.^[47]

     2. Availability. There are 49 countries possessing mining capabilities. At least 30 countries have demonstrated a mine production capability and 20 have attempted to export their mines. Russia has continued to sell mines as part of its foreign sales market and the People's Republic of China has entered the market place as a supplier of mines and mine technology.^[48]

     3. Versatility. Mines can be used to attack both military and economic targets. In addition, enemy forces can be channeled into more favorable areas for other methods of attack, and blockading an enemy's port places an increased burden on the mine countermeasure and transportation infrastructure.^[49]

     4. Ease of use. Special platforms are not needed to sow or lay mines. Mines can be laid by submarines, aircraft, or surface craft.

     Integrated Minefields

     Any country willing to use mines to support strategic, operational, and tactical objectives will find that mines are certainly affordable, available, versatile and simple to use. During a briefing at Naval Doctrine Command, with Navy, Marine Corps, and civilian contractor participation, all agreed that the future minefield will be integrated with moored mines, influence mines, and command detonated mines.^[50] During the Gulf War, as many as 16 varieties of mines were reported, eight each of the contact and influence type mines.^[51] These mines will be integrated with other defense systems such as shore based anti-ship missiles and diesel submarines. Integrated minefields have exacted a toll on many navies that attempted to bypass or sweep these integrated systems.

     A classic historical example of the effectiveness of an integrated approach to mine warfare can be found in the Turkish mining and integration of shore based artillery in the Dardanelles in 1915. In response to a Russian request to relieve the German pressure being placed on Russia, the British planned an operation to transit the Dardanelles with a naval force. Anticipating the British challenge, the Turks, with the help of German advisors, laid a series of defensive minefields consisting of contact and shore detonated mines, in a perpendicular fashion from the Gallipoli Peninsula to Kaphez. These minefields were protected by a series of shore batteries and mobile howitzers that could range the minefield. In addition, the Turks had the ability to use spot lights to illuminate the minefields at night, countering night MCM efforts and enhancing their ability to reseed swept areas of the channel. Consequently, the British failed to clear the channel.

     British minesweeping forces were demoralized by the constant bombardment from the shore batteries. They were frustrated that the Allied Commander tried to force the straits with all the units of his command. On 15 March 1915, 18 battleships steamed into a newly laid Turkish minefield, resulting in the loss of the French battleship Bouvet and the British battleships HMS Ocean and the HMS Irresistible. In addition, the British battleships HMS Inflexible, HMS Agamemnon, and the French battleship Suffren were damaged by mines or shore based gunfire.^[52]

     The Allies were never able to run the Dardanelles because the shore based artillery consisting of forts and mobile howitzers prohibited the Royal Navy from sweeping the channel, while the defense minefields kept the naval forces from running through the straits to the Sea of Marmara. The neutralization of the superior British fleet forced the Allies to expend an enormous amount of manpower and resources, which they could not afford, on the ill-fated amphibious landing at Gallipoli.

     During World War II, the German invasion of Norway was handed a small setback when German naval forces tried to transit the Oslo Fiord. As part of a six pronged naval force, the Oslo invasion group consisted of the heavy cruiser Blucher, the pocket battleship Lutzow, the light cruiser Emden, and some smaller craft, carrying 2000 troops. Admiral Kummetz led his flotilla up Oslo Fiord with little resistance until they reached the Drobak Narrows.

     At Drobak, the Norwegians had a battery of eight and eleven inch guns, as well as shore mounted torpedo tubes guarding the 600 yard narrows. When the Blucher was at point blank range the batteries opened fire setting the Blucher aflame. The torpedo tubes joined in striking the Blucher twice. The Blucher succumbed to the fires, exploding and taking with her over 1000 men, including most of the staff of General Engelbrecht, who was to command the troops occupying Norway's capital.

     The Lutzow escaped with minor damage landing troops farther up the fjord to by-pass the shore batteries. Unfortunately, because of Norwegian neutrality, the minefield planned for the fjord was delayed. Otherwise, German casualties would have been much higher. In this case, while not decisive, the integrated defense allowed the legal Norwegian government time to escape.^[53]

     In a recent Proceedings article^[54] it was noted that the combination of minefields and shore batteries can make the integrated mining threat decisive, as in the case of the Dardanelles. It states that four operational conditions which, if fully met, will lead to a fully integrated threat.

     1. Minefields must be complemented by other maritime components such as shore based missile systems, patrol boats, submarines, or coastal batteries.

     2. Minefields must be massed in locations that inflict the greatest injury on an enemy in a given theater of war.

     3. Mines must be deployed in a clandestine way.

     4. Operational designs must incorporate a command and control system capable of relaying targeting information while monitoring an adversary's MCM activity.^[55]        Rogue nations such as Iran have acknowledged the importance of mine warfare and the precepts of an integrated mine threat and are developing their mine warfare capabilities accordingly. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iran tried to block the Straits of Hormuz by seeding the waterways in a rather indiscriminate fashion with no thought of integration. Although some damage was done to a few oil tankers and the Samuel B. Roberts was nearly lost, the waterway remained opened to oil tanker traffic.

     Since 1993, Iran has conducted a series of advanced maritime exercises and has demonstrated a capacity to conduct joint coordinated action under centralized control.^[56] Once Iran tested its command and control function, Teheran introduced sea denial mining scenarios in the Nasr 1 naval exercises, the objective of which was to improve the interoperability of Republican Guard units (Iran's mining forces) with regular naval units.^[57] It now appears that Iran has also integrated its mining efforts with anti-ship missiles. Iran possesses significant numbers of Chinese C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and is working to install them on fast patrol craft. The C-802's are complemented by numbers of older CSS-3 Seersucker missiles and are deployed on shore based mobile launchers.^[58]

Iran also introduced into its naval inventory three Kilo-class submarines which are capable of both torpedo attacks and covert mine laying. It now appears that Iran has satisfied the four requirements that need to be met in order to provide a decisive integrated threat. This integrated approach to future mine warfare operations will require air, surface, and sub-surface force protection for MCM forces as they carry out their duties. In the past the naval mine has been considered a stand alone weapon, today it is a element of a complex weapon system designed to hamper, deny, or delay naval forces ability to control the seas. Even if we break the mine warfare cycle, are we capable of defeating the new threat?
MINE COUNTERMEASURES

   Mine Hunting vs Mine Sweeping

     For further discussion the differentiation between two operational terms, mine sweeping and mine hunting must be made. Mine sweeping is the use of towed equipment to either mechanically cut mooring cables allowing a mine to float to the surface for destruction, or to produce a magnetic, acoustic, pressure, or combination signature to detonate a mine at a safe distance. Mine hunting is the active search of the ocean using advanced mine hunting sonar to locate mines for identification and neutralization.

     The complex nature of the environment and future threat negates mine sweeping as a viable option for mine clearance. Mine sweeping is mine specific; the type of mine threat must be known prior to commencing sweeping operations. If not, repeated sweeps are required using different mechanical and influence sweeping gear to ensure a swept area of operation. Any sweeping operation would only be a cursory attempt at mine clearance since there is no assurance that all mines have been cleared. As an experienced British Naval officer stated: "It would require a mix of bravery and ignorance to accept a sweeping operation as ensuring a mine-free channel."^[59]

     Mine hunting is now the preferred method of mine countermeasure, because it provides a more reliable and complete search and is effective for both contact and influence mines. However, mine hunting sonar may not detect buried mines and is less effective in areas with poor acoustic conditions. It is a false assumption to believe that mine hunting sonar will detect every mine in front of a ship.

     With the difficult conditions mentioned earlier, a minesweeper could easily maneuver over a mine without detection while performing mine hunting or mine sweeping duties. At Wonsan the USS Pirate (AM 275), USS Pledge (AM 277), and Republic of Korea minesweeper YMS 516 were the victims of mines while conducting mine sweeping operations.^[60] The probability of detecting a mine in a single pass is doubtful, so that the risk remains high for the mine hunter in a demanding environment.^[61]

     Today a typical mine hunting scenario might look like this: Mine hunters would be ordered into an area that is suspected of being mined. Proceeding slowly, the mine hunters use their sonar to hunt mines and mine-like objects. Once a suspect object is identified in the water the mine hunter would stop and send either a remote operated vehicle (ROV) or Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) diver to inspect the object. If the object is a mine, it can be neutralized or marked for later neutralization. The former Commanding Officer of the USS Osprey (MHC 51) stated on a good day an MHC could hunt, identify, and neutralize a mine every "60-90 minutes not counting transit time and time allowed for the water to settle after destroying the mine."^[62]

     Hunting mines on a day with a good sea state, favorable underwater acoustics, and easily found targets is laborious, monotonous, and tiring to a ship's crew. The additional stress of being under the threat of attack from shore or ship based cruise missiles and enemy submarines, and the demoralizing effect of repeated mine hunting in mine fields that were reseeded by the enemy shortly after they had been cleared, will require rigorous training and crews of the highest caliber.

     Changing Mission Requirements

     During the Cold War the mine countermeasure mission focused on the use of MCM assets for the breakout of the fleet from U.S. ports and establishment of Q-routes.^[63] Built into this mission were two assumptions. The first was that there would be sufficient reaction time to any crisis so that dedicated MCM assets could be brought into the theater of operations. The second, assumption was that the Naval Reserve Force was more than capable to carry out the assigned MCM mission.^[64]

     However, post Cold War requirements have called for a shift in the mine countermeasure mission. To support its strategic concept, Forward ... from the Sea, the Navy must develop the ability to control the littorals. MCM forces concentrate on three primary missions: maintaining open sea lines of communications (SLOC), keeping the carrier battle group operating area clear (CVBG OPAREA), and leading port break-in assaults. The new mission is based upon the assumptions that future operations will be integrated in nature and that a critical reaction time will be associated with the mission.^[65] Lessons learned from the Gulf War including MCM capabilities must be timely, responsive, and covert.

     In August 1987, during the Iran-Iraq War, it required three months to ready and tow six minesweepers from Seattle and Norfolk to the Persian Gulf. In 1990, three minesweepers were transported to the Persian Gulf onboard a Dutch heavylift transport at a cost of 1.6 million dollars; the voyage required one month.^[66] Unlike Iraq, the next potential foe may not allow the United States six months in which to build up combat forces. Future operations will require organic and dedicated MCM assets which are available to the Battle Group that can be utilized in a real or near-real term in order to carry out its mission. Former President Bush commented at the 1990 Aspen Institute Symposium that "In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend upon our speed and agility."^[67]

 Additionally, minesweeping operations not performed covertly, identifies to the enemy cleared areas so that their submarines may reseed the minefield.

     Additional drivers affecting mine warfare today are shrinking force levels, maneuver warfare, joint and combined operations, the diverse and changing threat previously stated, and the increasing role of technology.           Today's current MCM capabilities are characterized by MCM assets with very limited or non-organic^[68] availability to the battle group commander. These capabilities include: a U.S. continental based dedicated MCM force, four forward deployed Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships, an environmental data base in its infancy, and an aging, deep water, open ocean mine stockpile.

CURRENT DIRECTION

     The Mine Warfare Plan

     After the Gulf War, Congress noting that the Navy in the past allowed mine warfare capabilities to fall to the wayside included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992, (Public Law 102-190), giving the Secretary of Defense responsibility for developing and testing naval mine countermeasure systems during fiscal years 1993-1997. The Secretary of Defense may waive the primary responsibility if the Secretary of the Navy in consultation with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, submits a mine warfare master plan that includes reports on new promising mine countermeasure technologies and programs to place those technologies into production. Secondly, A budget must be submitted which provides sufficient funds to execute the plan, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must determine that mine countermeasure funding supports the plan.^[69]

Currently the proposed budget for mine warfare does meet the requirements of the law. In FY 1995, the total obligation authority for mine warfare $235 million dollar this figure is programmed to increase to $300 million in FY 1997 and peak at $410 million in FY 2003.^[70]        In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, (Public Law 102-484), Congress established the Office of the Director for Expeditionary Warfare. The duties of the Director of Expeditionary Warfare include supervising the performance of all staff responsibilities of the CNO regarding expeditionary warfare, of which mine warfare is a primary concern.^[71]

     The Navy has responded to the Secretary of Defense by maintaining funding for mine warfare at a constant level as other warfare communities have received funding cuts.^[72] Additionally, the Director, Expeditionary Warfare began to publish a series of Mine Warfare Plans in 1992.

     The first edition of the Mine Warfare Plan, published in January 1992, established the baseline for mine warfare. Focusing on lessons learned from the Gulf War, the plan highlighted major developments in shallow water mine countermeasures. The second edition was published in February 1994 and built upon the foundation of the first edition, outlining new developments in mine warfare. Unlike the first edition, the second edition was widely distributed to Congress, U.S. allies, and operational commands in an effort to bring mine warfare to the forefront.^[73]

     The current Mine Warfare Plan published in April 1996, contains the Concept of Operations for Mine Countermeasures in the 21st Century, which was initially published separately in September 1995. According to the concept of operations, forward deployed naval units will be the primary forces involved in shaping the battlespace. Naval forces would shape the battlespace using organic MCM capabilities to locate and clear mines as required. The concept outlines other operations that are included in the organic capabilities of the battle group such as preemptive strike operations to interdict and destroy mine stockpiles and mine-laying platforms, mine reconnaissance, and limited mine clearance operations by EOD divers.^[74]

     The concept further details the transition of MCM responsibilities from organic assets to dedicated MCM assets arriving in theater to perform the mission of volume clearance and neutralization in order to maintain the sea lines of communication (SLOC) and ports of debarkation open.^[75] Additionally, the current edition of the Mine Warfare Plan includes summaries of mine warfare technology, offensive mining capabilities, and mine countermeasure unit capabilities.

     The Mine Warfare Campaign Plan

     A byproduct of the Mine Warfare Plan is the Mine Warfare Campaign Plan (MWCP) 1996-2003+: An Investment Strategy for the Naval Forces, developed by the Director, Expeditionary Warfare Division (OPNAV 85). The MWCP, which is to be updated annually, has two purposes. The first is to provide Navy leadership with specific information needed to ascertain the status of mine warfare initiatives to address identified gaps and shortfalls. Secondly, it ensures continuity to achieve the vision of unencumbered maneuver of naval forces.^[76] The MWCP provides a defensible approach to the gaps and shortfalls associated with U.S. mine warfare capabilities; it is a chart or road map to the future.^[77] Requirements outlined in the MWCP include:            

     1. Near-term (1996-1997). In order for mine warfare to be viable in the near-term, improved command and control procedures and equipment must be developed for mine warfare units; the battle group commander must have an improved organic MCM capability; more forward deployed surface MCM's are needed; and the environmental database needs to be expanded.^[78]

     2. Mid-term (1998-2003). Requirements again call for the improvement of command and control functions; increasing organic MCM capability; updating the environmental database; and improving mine warfare intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities.^[79]

     3. Far-term (2003-2007). Future vision requirements include organic "in-stride" clearance capability, in which mine detection would be conducted on the way in from the sea as an integral element of the amphibious assault; seamless command and control connectivity with the total battle force; a full spectrum environmental database; and a robust intelligence and reconnaissance capability.^[80]

     In order for anyone to arrive at a destination, a map or directions are required. The MWP and MWCP point this direction for the Navy. These are both visionary and thought provoking documents, yet further analysis of the Mine Warfare Plan and the Mine Warfare Campaign Plan would tend to support the premises of the mine warfare cycle. The MWP states:

 

This Mine Countermeasures Concept of Operations requires support from all naval forces. Full implementation requires that naval forces be trained in mine countermeasures and that dedicated mine countermeasure forces be routinely included in fleet exercises. Mine countermeasures operations must become an integral part of naval force doctrine, education, and training.^[81]

 

     The MWCP is quick to add two primary caveats which are critical to the success of the MWCP: "Mine warfare must become part of the mainstream in the Navy; senior leaders must focus on this as a long-term necessity that cannot be compromised and the Navy and Marine Corps must adhere to the MWCP; the MWCP must drive the process."^[82]

 

     Indicators

     Where is the Navy currently located on the mine warfare cycle? Certainly, the realization of the mine threat after the Navy's evaluation of the Falkland Island War, the near loss of the Roberts, and the poor showing during the Gulf War gave impetus to the current cycle. The response, a rapid recapitalization of the mine countermeasure force with the commissioning of the Avenger-class minesweeper that had been planned and the later addition of the Osprey-class minehunter. In addition it led to a reorganization of the mine warfare command structure. Congress and the Navy have done their share of soul searching after the Gulf War, Congress by passing Public Law 102-190 has forced the issue of mine warfare to light, but has the deterioration stage been reached? If not, what indicators are present to alert us that the cycle is continuing? Certainly the Navy seems to be in that stage of the cycle between follow through and deterioration. How are we to know when the cycle shifts into the deterioration phase? Some historical indicators have been:

     1. Budgetary reductions that place fiscal constraints on the mine warfare force to modernize, develop, and maintain mine warfare assets.

     2. Failure to integrate mine warfare into the fleet training and exercise process, relegating the mine warfare problem to the mine warfare force vice a Navy problem.

     3. A shift in the mission manpower base from active duty base to a reserve base mission.

     4. Failure to adapt and train to new threats. In essence fighting the last war vice fighting the next war.

     5. Failure to "mainstream" the mine warfare force not only in exercises as mentioned above, but develop mine warfare professionals on par with the aviation, submarine, and surface forces.

     Taking the five indicators and applying them to mine warfare today, along with the four constants:

     Congress has taken the first indictor by the horns by requiring the Navy to maintain its funding levels for mine warfare in Public Law 102-190. The "proof of the pudding" will be post FY 99, when the Navy is no longer restricted to DOD and Congressional oversight. Will mine warfare funding be slashed once Congress is no longer providing oversight?

     Has mine warfare been integrated into fleet exercises? At the Fall 1996 Mine warfare Symposium held at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Commander of the Marine Forces in the Pacific, Lt. Gen. Jefferson Davis Howell Jr, admits to "fairy-dusting" Pacific war games in order to avoid the difficult problem of mined harbors, beaches and land objectives.^[83] The acting superintendent of the Naval Post Graduate School, Capt. James Burin, also remarked that "I've noticed in war games no one wants to play with mines. It's a lot like nuclear war: it's a show stopper."^[84] With remarks such as these from senior officers it should come as no surprise when a junior naval officer formerly assigned to a fast attack submarine stated:

 

The only time we worried about mines was for our mining certification. Then we all gathered around, figured out what we were supposed to do, then did it. Afterward we never worried about mines.^[85]

 

     The preponderance of the mine warfare force currently     consists of active duty forces. However, recently the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jay Johnston, announced that the Navy will cut its active duty strength by 14,000 sailors to provide cost savings so that the Navy could transfer the funds for modernization of the fleet.^[86] What this means for the mine warfare force, remains to be seen.

     It would appear historically that the Navy focuses on their latest success and forgets the hard learned lessons from failures and near failures. Rarely does the Navy prepare mine warfare forces for the future, instead the Navy tends to celebrate success and the threat changes. The future threat is changing and if the Navy approaches the mine as a stand alone weapon in the future it will once again start the cycle anew.

     Doctrinally the MWP calls for numerous changes in the way mine warfare is conducted and planned, to "institutionalize" planning and training throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. Yet today, the 1996 graduates of the Surface Warfare Officer Department Head course in Newport, Rhode Island will receive only four hours of mine warfare and mine countermeasure instruction during their six months of study.^[87]

     Mid and top-level schools such as the USMC Command & Staff College underestimate the effects of a serious mine threat. In the 1996-1997 USMC Command & Staff College class, students were provided with a practical application scenario that was prepared by the National Defense University that included the task of maintaining open SLOC's in the Mediterranean Sea against a threat capable of covert mine laying activity. The students were allocated five carrier battle groups to perform this mission. Unfortunately, the dedicated MCM resources allotted to the U.S. forces to complete this task were only two minesweepers,^[88] an unrealistic projection of the resources required to accomplish the task.

     Certainly, mine warfare is not considered mainstream by many. In general, discussions with several of today's Surface Warfare Officers, including a former MHC commander and a mine warfare instructor at the Surface Warfare Officer School in Newport, R.I., substantiate the premise that the mine countermeasure force lacks status and appeal. Many junior officers do see assignment, as a Lieutenant Commander, to command an Avenger-class minesweeper (MCM) or Osprey-class minehunter (MHC) as an accelerated path to command or a stepping stone to a combatant command.

     Yet this command tour may be the one and only time these officers are exposed to mine warfare. However, many officers would accept assignment to a MCM or MHC only as a last choice, feeling that promotion opportunity in the long term would be better served if they were assigned to a surface combatant.    So, where is the Navy on the mine warfare cycle? Given the information presented, where would you place the Navy on the cycle?

         Conclusion                 

     The Navy is at a critical junction in the mine warfare cycle. At the end of fiscal year 1999, the Navy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will no longer be constrained by Public Law 102-190 at a time when the Navy is coming to closure on the follow through stage. Taking the traditional four constants of mine warfare and projecting into the future: there will always be dedicated personnel working the mine warfare issue; the nature of mine warfare will continue to be slow, demanding, and tedious; technology will advance the mine before advancing mine countermeasures; and no matter how hard individuals work, the cycle will continue. The key is how does the Navy break the last constant? If the cycle can be broken, maybe the nature of mine warfare and the trailing technology constants can be solved by the mine warfare professionals.

     As the year 2000 approaches, dedicated people are working the mine warfare problem just as they did in the 1700's, 1800's, and early 1900's. However, their work must be supported by the Navy, their ideas integrated into fleet training, and all sailors made aware of the dangers of the threat to future operations.

     In order to break the cycle, a dramatic event needs to occur to raise the mine warfare awareness throughout the Navy before a crisis occurs to restart the cycle. This event hopefully will be the establishment of a mainstreamed mine warfare force that is realistically integrated into fleet operations as a participant at the table with the other warfare communities.

     However, to fully integrate mine warfare will require changes to the Navy's service culture, attitude, and warfare specialty rivalries. This task that may take decades, due to the need to re-educate the force and the retirement of personnel who resist change. Certainly, when compared to aircraft that fly at 400+ knots, submarines that slip silently into enemy waters, and destroyers that deliver Tomahawk missiles to the enemy, minesweepers plodding along at bare steerageway, searching the ocean floor lack glamour.      Time is not on the Navy's side. If the integration of mine warfare is not taken seriously by all hands then the mine warfare cycle will once again repeat itself. The next crisis may be a ship falling prey to the future unconventional naval threat such as an integrated mine field consisting of moored, bottom, contact, and influence mines; supported by shore based artillery, along with surface-to-surface missiles, fast attack patrol boats, and diesel submarines that will increase their lethality.

     As the title of Gregory K. Hartmann's book, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy,^[89] suggests, mines once laid are very patient. There is a joke that makes its way around the waterfront on occasion that goes: "Name the three most proficient minesweepers in the U.S. Navy!" The answer is the Roberts, the Tripoli, and the Princeton.

     For those who travel the seas of the world, mine warfare must be fully integrated to avoid adding a fourth warship to the list, because various types of mines and new defense systems are now and will still be waiting in the future.

 

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