THE SON
TAY RAID: A STUDY IN PRESIDENTIAL POLICY
"Freedom is the sure possession of
those alone
who have the courage to defend it."
- Pericles[1]
The raid force approached the hamlet of Son Tay in North
Vietnam at 0230 hours on 21 November 1970. Flying over the hills at treetop level, the helicopters and their
escorts could see the yellow lights of Hanoi winking in the cool night air. Suddenly, they were over the camp at Son Tay
and the sky, which had been bathed in the pale light of a waning moon, exploded
in brilliant light as flares and muzzle flashes filled the night sky. The escort aircraft fired on preselected
targets and dropped fire-fight simulators in several locations near the camp. Simultaneously, the lead helicopter passed
over the camp and destroyed two guard towers with a laser beam like stream of
bullets. Seconds later, another
helicopter executed a planned crash-landing into the middle of the camp as its
blades chewed into a high tree. The
helicopter hit the ground with a thud and fourteen heavily armed raiders burst
from the crippled machine with chainsaws, axes, and bolt cutters in tow. The fourteen liberators began fighting their
way to the prisoners' cells. Amid the
confusion of combat a blaring bullhorn announced that Americans had landed and
were here to rescue POWs. The prison
came alive, cracking with fire of automatic weapons. A large explosion blew a hole in the prison wall as the raiders
from a third
helicopter which landed outside
of the camp made their entrance. Meanwhile, another helicopter landed at a location that looked very
similar to the Son Tay POW camp. Within
seconds of touchdown, the disembarked raiders found themselves in a huge
fire-fight unfolding all around them. Four violent ground battles were now raging within the Son Tay area: one
at the prison, another at an undisclosed location, and two faked by air
delivered fire-fight simulators. However, before the helicopter could get back to pick up the force
deposited by mistake, the raiders had killed approximately 150 enemy soldiers
without any raider casualties, while the location burned like a roman
candle. Back at the prison camp, nearly
60 enemy guards lay dead or wounded as the raiders swarmed over and through the
camp like robots. As the raiders broke
into one cell after another, they were reporting "negative items" (no
prisoners). After the last cell was
opened and the other cells checked again, the mission commander was informed
that the search was complete with no items. The raiders were stunned to find that the prison was totally empty of
POWs. The raid force departure was as
quick and ghost-like as their arrival, leaving behind a wake of death and
destruction as their calling card. However, they left empty-handed. The Son Tay Raid was over. What
had gone wrong? Had the mission been
compromised? Had the raiders fought
their way out of a poorly executed trap? Was the mission really designed to rescue POWs or was there some other
motive? What political intentions and
ramifications did the current Administration seek? Was the war in Vietnam about to take a dramatic turn from the
stated policy of Vietnamization? In an
attempt to answer these questions, this paper will examine the
political/strategic goals and
intentions of the
Administration's policies regarding the war in Vietnam. More specifically, was the policy reflected
in the actions taken at Son Tay?
SETTING THE STAGE: NIXON'S POLICY
During the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon, well
known as a hard-line anti-Communist, proposed a plan to end the war and ran his
campaign based on a peaceful withdrawal
from Vietnam. Nixon did win the
Presidency and many believed he won it by his stance on ending the war.[2] Upon assuming office in January 1969, Nixon
ordered an internal governmental survey of American involvement in
Vietnam. The results, published as
National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM-1),[3] noted
"emphatic differences" among the various agencies on how to defend
and withdraw from Vietnam. Perhaps the
largest area of disagreement was over the bombing strategy employed, then later
stopped by President Johnson. It
appears that the division over the bombing arose not because it was a bad way
to ensure a peaceful withdrawal, but because of the manner in which the Johnson
Administration used the bombing campaign. Specifically, targets were selected by the President and his staff in
Washington. If Nixon were to employ
such a tactic, many of his supporters feared that this might also lead to a
perceived escalation of the war, resulting in another round of public
demonstrations. Since NSSM-1 had
confirmed the divisions between government agencies and bureaucrats on the
overall conduct of the war, Nixon would use this confusion among the
established system of governmental "checks and balances" to his own
advantage by freely acting without the concurrence or nonconcurrence of those
agencies in his policy decisions. In
other words, organized internal governmental opposition (Democratic Party,
Republican in-fighting, etc.) to his policy would be almost non-existent. However, Nixon had several major
considerations, both domestic and international, which would affect the development
and execution of his policy.
The first issue was the growing anti-war movement. Many Americans were ready for an end to the
war because measurable gains at any level (political and military) were far
outweighed by the rising cost in American lives and economic resources during the
previous five years of the conflict. Secondly, and inextricably linked to the first issue, was America's
long-standing investment in and commitment to the protection of South Vietnam. This issue would inherently cause conflict
and contradiction in the face of establishing a withdrawal policy when
considering the billions of dollars of aid and thousands of lives expended for
an apparently futile effort. Additionally, Nixon was concerned that the USSR and China would view
this "retreat" and change in American policy as a victory for world
communism. If America failed to stop
communist aggression, then the "Communist Revolution" was sure to
succeed. In a July 1969 speech, Nixon
would sum up these concerns by saying:
The
way the war ends in Vietnam will have an enduring impact upon events, although
the domino effect is not necessarily valid. It is easy to feel that we should get out of Asia at all costs. The war plagues us at home, is costly in our
relations with the USSR, and offers all kinds of temptations to our
politicians. Yet if the Vietnam war
goes sour, there would be an escalation of not just "get out of Vietnam
sentiment" but "get out of the world sentiment." And this would
be disastrous. Should we abandon Vietnam, there would be far more blood spilled
than if we remain steady in our purposes.[4]
Nevertheless,
Hanoi continued to stall at the Paris negotiations in hopes that the American
anti-war movement would force the Administration to withdraw almost
unconditionally from Vietnam. Aware of Hanoi's
diplomatic tactics, Nixon would have to establish his policy quickly in an
attempt to strengthen his position and bargaining power. For several months, Nixon tested the waters
by maintaining a policy towards the war which was not significantly different
from that of his predecessor. However,
now the time had come to implement his style of leadership through actions
regarding the war in Vietnam that
differed significantly from that which the world had come to expect of
Washington. This change would catch
many governments off guard, especially those of Hanoi and other leading
communist states.
First, Nixon would adopt Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's
term of "Vietnamization" by officially establishing the policy of
turning the war over to South Vietnam to prosecute as "their" fight
with assistance from the U.S., much like what America provided during the early
days of the conflict prior to 1964 (military equipment and advisors). Nixon believed this first step would appease
congressional critics and stifle the anti-war movement. By taking this unilateral action, Nixon was
"placing the ball in Hanoi's court" as a sign of good faith, hoping
that this initiative would produce meaningful negotiations in future sessions
at Paris. Second, he put Vietnam at the
center of American foreign policy. Any
international policy activity would include some stance or action favorable to
an independent South Vietnam. In other
words, negotiations with any country or government would not be conducted or concluded unless some aspect of
support concerning South Vietnam was part of the final settlement. Nixon exploited this aspect to his
advantage since China and the USSR were looking to expand trade agreements and
begin talks on limiting strategic weapons with America. Thus he used both countries to put pressure
on Hanoi to cooperate through negotiations. Finally, Nixon would reinforce his policies of Vietnamization and
international diplomatic pressure through an honorable settlement of the war by
"massive military retaliation" if Hanoi did not negotiate in good
faith or attacked American forces in the South.[5] It seems as if Nixon was declaring and
perhaps even establishing an unofficial cease-fire with the implementation of
Vietnamization. However, would Hanoi
receive the same message, and if so, would they be motivated or compelled to
cooperate?
Anticipating that Hanoi would elect to
"misinterpret" or not "fully understand" his actions, Nixon
would back up the threat of massive military retaliation through his
"madman theory." H.R.
Halderman, Nixon's Chief-of-Staff, would recall how this theory was to be
employed. Nixon said, "We'll just
slip the word to them (directly referring to Hanoi and indirectly to the USSR
and China) that, "for god's sake," you know Nixon's obsessed about
communism. We can't restrain him when
he's angry, and you know he has his hand on the nuclear button."[6] A very risky theory indeed. However, Nixon believed he could keep China
and the USSR at bay on such an issue, considering the upcoming negotiations on
limiting strategic weapons. This author
could not conclusively determine if either country ever directly
"called" Nixon's threat of a nuclear strike or how his "madman
theory" affected the outcome of future negotiations. Nevertheless, would Nixon have really
"nuked" North Vietnam or any other country for that matter if his
"madman theory " had been put to the test? A most interesting question indeed, but beyond the scope of this
paper.
Regardless, Nixon believed that he must send a strong signal
to Hanoi that he was serious about his new policy and that Hanoi should be
equally serious. Nixon's eagerness to
send a signal was obvious since, according to Roger Morris, a staff member of
the National Security Council (NSC), "He (Nixon) was obsessed with the
idea that the other side was trying to push him around. Hanoi would not negotiate if the U.S. could
not convince them that they could not win on the battlefield."[7] However, determining what signal to send
would be somewhat difficult. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommended resuming the bombing campaign of North Vietnam but
Nixon initially refused due to the similarity of this option with that of the
Johnson Administration. A plan to
attack into Cambodia and destroy Hanoi's "known" sanctuaries located
there soon surfaced through the Joint Chiefs. Although not a new idea, the military leadership still believed that if
Hanoi retained staging areas in Cambodia and could not be soundly defeated
there, regional stability and the governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam
were at greater risk of collapse than in previous years of the war. Nixon bought the idea totally. The attack into Cambodia fit perfectly into
his policy because it was something completely unexpected by Hanoi. The option could accomplish two things; one,
catch Hanoi by surprise and two, destroy critical war supplies. The signal would be clear; not even Hanoi
could misinterpret this action. On 18
March 1969, a secret bombing campaign commenced into Cambodia.[8] Without a doubt, Hanoi now knew that the new
American President would carry on the war in a different manner and was serious
about his policy plan for ending the war. Although effective, the bombing of Cambodia backfired on Nixon because
of the manner in which it was revealed to the American public. Nixon wanted to keep the bombings secret
until the effects felt by Hanoi resulted in a new round of meaningful
negotiations in Paris. If successful,
Nixon would appear as a powerful President, making good on his political
promise to quickly end the war. Instead, the American public was made aware of the bombings by the media
even before the operation was over. As
a result, many believed that the policy of Vietnamization was really a policy
of escalation and Nixon had betrayed their trust and broken his campaign
promise of withdrawal.[9] Thus, a new round of anti-war
demonstrations, public confusion, and distrust of the government's handling of
the war began. Perhaps this situation
was avoidable. Laird disagreed with the
President that the bombings should be kept a secret until the operation
ended. He understood that once the
first bomb dropped, thousands of people would immediately know about the new
bombings. No one could keep something
like that secret, especially when the operation would take several months to
complete. Consequently, when the news
broke, Laird was accused of leaking the attack since he opposed its secrecy. Laird vehemently denied the White House
accusation.[10] Nonetheless, the Administration had egg on
its face. Realizing the deteriorating
situation, Nixon quickly shifted political focus and began repairing the
domestic damage to his reputation and policy. In hindsight, it is apparent that Nixon could have been the hero if before
the bombing he had informed the public of his policy and his intentions instead of waiting to demonstrate his
political prowess after the fact. Notwithstanding, the signal received by Hanoi was clear since the
bombings were unexpected and effective in destroying supplies and disrupting
military activity. Hanoi now knew that,
"at will" the U.S. could severely impede their war efforts. Perhaps the time was right for Hanoi to
begin serious negotiations. Otherwise
they might risk defeat at the hands of a new and obviously determined American
President. With Nixon having firmly
established a new policy towards Vietnam, fresh diplomatic attempts to settle
unresolved issues (peace talks, troop withdrawal, military aid, POW/MIA, etc.)
began to surface. In order to maintain
pressure on the Hanoi government, the next step in Nixon's policy would need to
be as assertive and surprising as the previous measure.
LINKING THE POLITICAL STRATEGY TO SON TAY
Of all the issues involving the war, maybe none was more
emotional and controversial than that of the POW and Missing in Action (MIA)
situation. The White House realized
this issue could have considerable positive political ramifications for the
Administration if strengthened negotiations could quickly bring a solution
leading to a POW release. However,
since taking office, the Administration's efforts on this issue had produced no
results despite the activity by domestic and international groups on the behalf
of POWs and MIAs (see Appendix
A). On 3 February 1970, believing that
the time had come to
increase efforts on this issue,
Nixon ordered the creation of a small, action-oriented team to,
"Concentrate full-time on all possible ways, conventional and
unconventional, to bring to bear on the Hanoi government pressure sufficient to
revert its view of American captives as an asset to one in which they are
considered a liability."[11] This decision was the genesis for a study
later conducted to examine the feasibility of a POW rescue. However, according to Secretary Laird, the
original concept of a POW rescue was his idea, as he initiated low-level
internal Department of Defense (DOD) planning for such a raid in late 1969
following Hanoi's release of three POWs. At the time, Laird directly controlled a special group in the Pentagon
assigned to locate POW camps and track movement of POWs. Most of this activity was accomplished
through the use of aerial reconnaissance.[12] Regardless of authorship, the importance of
establishing a POW action-team cannot be underestimated. First, it gave the organizers of the raid
the needed political power to study, establish, train, and finally execute such
a mission. Secondly, it allowed the
development of policy options which the President could initiate through his
continuing efforts to end America's involvement in the war.
Having sent Hanoi a clear message with the attack into
Cambodia, Nixon focused on his policy of peace through negotiations from what
he believed to be a stronger diplomatic position. From this stronger position, pressure concerning POW/MIA issues
was applied through all available diplomatic channels. Nixon realized that Hanoi's treatment of
POWs could be put in the "spotlight" of not only domestic, but also
international concern. Perhaps this
single issue, once elevated and given the appropriate diplomatic priority,
would cause a dramatic outcry in world
opinion, thereby pressuring Hanoi to release all known POWs and provide
information on MIAs. Nonetheless, Hanoi
would fight Nixon's attempts step by step because Hanoi had stated repeatedly
that the release of American POWs would be part of the final negotiated
settlement to end the war. The POWs would not be treated as a separate issue.[13] In other words, Hanoi would use the POWs as
bargaining chips until the U.S. was "fully committed" (a term Hanoi
never publicly defined) to withdrawal or even perhaps until all U.S. forces had
departed South Vietnam.
During the spring and summer of 1970, efforts to gain release
of the POWs intensified as Nixon continued to apply pressure on Hanoi through
diplomatic means. He was aware that if
diplomatic pressure could not bring about the release of the POWs, then he
would most likely have to use some type of military action as he had done in
Cambodia. His decision on what type of
action would elude him until the plan to raid a POW camp surfaced in July 1970.
As military planners continued to collect information and plan
for a POW rescue, Nixon kept pressure on Hanoi by keeping the POW/MIA issue at
the front of all negotiations (formal/informal to include secret meetings) in
Paris. In July of 1970, Nixon received
a briefing for a possible POW rescue attempt at the Son Tay camp. He was ecstatic about the raid, giving full
authority and control of its conduct to Laird.[14] Nixon now had a military means to
effectively back up his policy of negotiations if Hanoi could not be convinced
diplomatically to release the POWs. He
would make one more attempt at negotiating a POW release before sending another
"signal" to Hanoi.
On 7 October 1970 Nixon proposed "The immediate and
unconditional release of all Prisoners of War held by both sides."[15] This offer appeared to be extremely generous
since Saigon held approximately 35,000 POWs to Hanoi's 3000.[16] Hanoi refused the exchange. Once again, Hanoi would not recognize any of
its POWs held in South Vietnam because they had stated on numerous occasions
that North Vietnam had no forces in the South, be they regular army or Vietcong.[17] As far as Hanoi was concerned, Saigon only
had suspected Vietcong in their
prisons. Once again, the use of military force to
forward Nixon's policy on the POW/MIA issue took center stage. The only decision remaining would be when to
execute the raid in order to achieve the best possible political effect. After all, the target camp had been
identified and the raiding force was nearing completion of their training for
the mission.
INTELLIGENCE AND THE DECISION
Intelligence collection was essential because the decision to
execute would be based almost entirely on the surveillance data. As a result of the surveillance, enemy
strengths in the area were known, so most of the collection centered on POW
activity at Son Tay. From May to
November of 1970, collection revealed that the camp was "active," but
hard evidence (photos of POWs at the camp or other definite signs) was never
uncovered by any fly-overs prior to mission execution. Intelligence analysts believed that this
camp housed POWs based on the observed activity and conditions of other POW
camps positively known to contain prisoners.[18] Additionally, secondary confirmation on the
presence of POWs at Son Tay could not be achieved. Apparently the intelligence agencies involved in the mission had
no other collection means (ie., human intelligence) in the area specifically
tasked to provide confirmation of the primary collection sources. Furthermore, it is unknown if special units
(government or military) were "delivered" into the area at any time
prior to mission execution for surveillance and confirmation. It is highly unlikely that any such attempt
was made because enemy detection of such a unit would compromise the
mission. Based on intelligence
collected during this time frame (May-November 1970), Generals Blackburn (Special
Assistant for Counter-Insurgency and Special Activities (SACSA)) and Bennett
(Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)) and Admiral Moorer
(Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)) recommended a "Go" and
forwarded their decision to Laird for approval. Blackburn, Bennett, and Moorer were members of the Pentagon
action/decision group for the raid. This recommendation, followed by Laird's approval, allowed the raid force
to deploy forward and await the execution order.
Meanwhile, no new developments had occurred in negotiations
since Hanoi refused Nixon's offer on 7 October. However, on 13 November 1970, peace activist Cora Weiss was given
the names of six known POWs who had died in captivity. The information was considered extremely
reliable because it was provided by the North Vietnamese front organization
known as The Committee of Solidarity with the American People.[19]
Justification for action was perhaps clearer now than ever before. Nonetheless, a final decision was needed
since the tentative date for mission execution was 20-21 November (How the date
was selected will be discussed later). At the urging of Blackburn, Laird finally decided to brief the President
on 18 November, recommending execution of the mission. As Commander-in-Chief, Nixon was the only
person who could approve mission execution. Admiral Moorer briefed Nixon, Kissinger, Laird, Richard Helms (Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)), and Secretary of State William Rogers
on all information and details concerning the raid on Son Tay. Nixon was very receptive and took few notes
during the meeting (Nixon was famous for carrying a yellow note pad; the more
notes he took the less pleased he was about the topic). Moorer ensured that the President understood
the raid was required and would be successful. Nixon did understand this and informed Moorer that he would give him his
decision very soon.[20] The "Red Rocket" (NCA's execution
message) needed to go out as soon as possible in order to give the raiders time
to make final checks and be ready to execute by the 21st of November. As an indication of approval, Nixon asked,
"How many more POWs will we find dead if we wait much longer?" This question was an obvious reference to
the 13 November information provided through Cora Weiss. After several moments with no response,
Nixon stated, "How could anyone not approve this?"[21] Needless to say, the briefing as presented
was an overwhelming success. If Hanoi
would not negotiate on the POW/MIA issue willingly, then Nixon would take
direct military action. One way or
another, Nixon would force Hanoi to the negotiating table under conditions
favorable to the U.S. and South Vietnam. Nixon was undoubtedly confident that the raid would bring success to his
overall policy and specifically towards the POW/MIA issue. Nixon made the decision quickly. Within hours of the briefing, the "Red
Rocket" message went out from the Pentagon to the mission commander at
1730 hours, 18 November 1970.[22] As if confirming the decision to execute,
photo imagery taken on the evening of 18 November was interpreted as showing
"increased activity" at Son Tay.[23] Perhaps if only for a moment, a "warm
and fuzzy" feeling contented the decision makers. However, within hours this feeling would be
shattered. Once again, timing was
everything!
During the evening of 18 November, General Bennett received
information from a reliable source[24] that Son Tay
was not an active POW camp and no POWs were currently held
there. The next day Bennett and
Blackburn hastily attempted to confirm this information with additional
unscheduled reconnaissance overflights of the target area. Bennett was convinced that this new
information was accurate and correct, regardless of previous photo
reconnaissance of the camp. Blackburn
was somewhat critical of the new information, preferring to believe the results
of past intelligence collection. So
emphatic was Bennett's belief that he classified the information as B-3
(foreign source and usually reliable with direct access to the informant and
information). Blackburn was still not
convinced and would wait for the results of the unscheduled overflights. As fate would have it, weather and equipment
problems would prevent any additional flights. Around mid-day (19 November), Bennett and Blackburn met with Admiral
Moorer and relayed the latest developments. Moorer, aware of these developments, was obviously concerned and asked
for their opinions on a "Go" or "No-Go" decision. Bennett was cautious, leaning towards a
delay. Blackburn, on the other hand,
still believed that "someone" was at Son Tay and the mission should
go. After all, Blackburn had a stack of
information which indicated POWs were at Son Tay and now there was only a
single piece of paper that indicated otherwise.[25] Blackburn also saw the bigger picture in
this decision. He would later recall,
"With a 95 to 97 percent confidence factor that the raiders could get in
and out safely, it was worth the try even if the POWs were not there."[26] At least they would have tried to do
something on behalf of the POWs. Little
did Blackburn know at the time, but he and Nixon shared the same thought
process on this issue. Having heard the
opinions of both men, Moorer decided to brief Laird the following
morning. Hopefully, the additional time would allow
for reconsideration and/or confirmation regarding to the new information. If confirmed to be accurate, enough time would be available on the morning
of 20 November to brief the NCA and
deliver any changes to the raid force prior to their scheduled launch time.
The following morning, Moorer, Bennett, and Blackburn again
met to discuss the new developments. As
it turned out, Bennett had a change of opinion. He had reconsidered his position based on all the information collected
to date on Son Tay. Bennett arrived at
the same conclusion Blackburn did on the day before. Therefore, Bennett recommended a "Go." That recommendation was enough for Moorer to
agree that the mission should be attempted, since he also believed that the
POWs were still there. It was good that
all three "confirmed" what they wanted to believe because the raid
force mission commander had given the final preparation and execution order to
the raid force earlier that morning. It
is apparent that Moorer's decision to wait had paid off because anything less than a unified
recommendation from his office probably would have led to an abort by the
NCA. However, there was still enough
time to do just that with another "Red Rocket" if Nixon or Laird
deemed it necessary in light of the Hanoi source information. Therefore, with Bennett at his side, Moorer
went to brief Laird on the recent developments.[27]
Laird did not hesitate in agreeing with Moorer's
recommendation to proceed despite the new developments. Laird was committed and fully understood
Nixon's policy and to what extent the President would go to make his point once
diplomatic efforts failed or produced insufficient results on a specific issue. Laird's resolve and conviction over the
POW/MIA would be
reconfirmed in his eyes because,
within an hour of Moorer's departure, Richard Helms arrived to discuss the
information obtained from the Hanoi source and also brought additional news
concerning the POW issue. The CIA had
intercepted recent "traffic" and confirmed that as many as 11 more
POWs had died in captivity in addition to those reported on 13 November.[28] Laird knew he must immediately inform the
President of these developments. However, exactly what and how he told the President is an issue which is
still debatable.
Laird did, in fact, brief Nixon around mid-morning on 20
November, still several hours prior to the scheduled departure time of the raid
force. Research indicates that at least
four other sources believe that Laird did tell Nixon about all of the new
developments and that they both agreed without much discussion that the mission
should continue. However, according to
Laird (see Appendix B), he denied briefing Nixon that a source from Hanoi two
days earlier had indicated there were no POWs at Son Tay. He did admit to informing Nixon about Helm's
information concerning the deaths of 11 more POWs. Laird stated that, "Nixon had already approved the mission
in July 1970 and authorized its execution on 18 November 1970. I was placed in charge of the mission,
responsible to brief the President as updates were required or requested."[29] Laird called Nixon several hours prior to
the launching of the force for any last minute Presidential concerns, much as
he had always done on previous occasions. As far as Laird was concerned, the decision to execute was final and the
new information concerning the POWs, regardless of accuracy, would not change
that decision.[30] At this point, apparently the execution of
policy was more important than "cluttering" the decision with new
information, regardless of its potential impact. Would the President have aborted the raid had he known about the
real possibility of no POWs at Son Tay, especially when that information was
coming from the Secretary of Defense?
Research indicates, and it is the judgment of this author,
that the President would not have aborted the mission in light of this
information. Whether or not the
President was briefed about the Hanoi source information is irrelevant. After all, the final decision to carry out
the raid had been made. In other words,
there was no political "smoking gun" (any Presidential "wrong
doing" associated with the decision to execute or continue) to be found on
this specific issue. However, if the
Hanoi source information proved to be true, Laird would take all the blame if
the mission turned out to be a total failure. Apparently Laird's decision not to brief Nixon would provide
Presidential "plausible deniability" in case the mission met with
tragic results. Having established
Nixon's policy towards ending the war in Vietnam and what part the raid would
play in that policy, let us review the leadership, execution, and reaction to
the mission in order to understand the complexity and significance of the Son
Tay Raid.
THE
STORY: ORGANIZING, PLANNING, EXECUTING
By the spring of 1970, more than 1400 Americans were listed as
POW or MIA. Of the 1400, approximately
500 were being held in North Vietnam.[31] With the war in Southeast Asia changing
hands through the policy of Vietnamization, political and military concern grew
as North Vietnam began to use the POWs as "bargaining chips" more now
than in previous years. In other words,
Hanoi would use the POWs at the Paris Peace Talks to ensure America continued
its scheduled withdrawal from South Vietnam.
By the spring of 1970, American and international awareness of
the plight of the POWs had grown substantially and was perhaps at an all time
high since the outbreak of the Vietnam War. Reports from the few POWs released or interviewed while in captivity
revealed the harsh conditions, cruelty, and death threats that most of the POWs
were subjected to on a daily basis. Anxiety, concern, and anger
among the families and military/government leaders was more than evident as
massive letter writing campaigns were directed at both Hanoi and the U.S.
Congress in attempts to pressure both
governments into action on this issue. After all, two years of talks had produced no POW exchanges or releases
and in light of recent negative POW reports, something had to be done.
The military establishment was convinced what actions had to
be taken in order to maintain the American fighting spirit for the remainder of
the Vietnam War and future conflicts. Military intervention on behalf of the POWs would be required. Perhaps a successful rescue mission could
provide a rallying point, giving the country an overdue and sorely needed
positive perspective on the war. Perhaps the final "straw" justifying a rescue came with the
release of three POWs in late 1969. The
information they provided about their treatment served to solidify the concept
of a rescue as the only means to end the suffering of POWs. Therefore, Admiral Moorer directed General
Blackburn to study the feasibility of a POW rescue mission.[32] If viable, a raid would raise POW morale,
act on the POW/MIA concerns of the American public, and hopefully convince
Hanoi to release or improve the overall condition and treatment of all
remaining POWs. Finally, it would
demonstrate American resolve by solving/addressing all POW/MIA issues prior to
America's departure from Southeast Asia.
In May 1970, Blackburn had concluded that a POW rescue was
highly practical based on current military capabilities and could be successful
provided strict secrecy concerning the mission was maintained. This proposal became known as Operation Polar Circle.[33] JCS was delighted over the prospects, but
their excitement was tempered by the likelihood of a negative American
political reaction, especially in light of the established troop
withdrawals. Due to this initial
perception, approval to organize such a mission was delayed for several months
until the idea had the appropriate political backing. Finally, in late July 1970, a Joint Contingency Task Group was
formed and the operation received the code name Ivory Coast.[34] Moorer briefed Laird on Ivory Coast and Laird immediately approved formation, training, and
support of the rescue group. Within
days, Laird briefed Nixon on the details of Ivory
Coast. As previously discussed,
Nixon agreed with the concept and placed Laird in charge of overseeing the
mission while keeping Nixon informed on its progress prior to deployment. General Leroy Manor was selected to be the
mission commander and Colonel "Bull" Simons was appointed deputy
commander and ground raid force commander.[35]
Based on the previous feasibility study, a helicopterborne
raiding force augmented by fixed wing fire support under the cover of a deception
plan designed to draw Hanoi's attention away from the selected POW camp could
be successful. The primary raid group
would consist of: one H-3 and five H-53 helicopters for transport of the raid
force, two MC-130's for navigation and objective area support, two HC-130's for
aerial refueling, five A-1E's for fire support, ten F-4's to provide MIG CAP
(combat air patrol), and one F-4 (Wild Weasel) to draw the SAM's
(Surface-to-Air-Missile) away from the raiding group.[36] The ground raid force consisted of 59
hand-picked Green Berets. All raiders,
including the aircrews, were volunteers. Approximately 500 personnel requested assignment to the force. Additionally, none of the volunteers knew
exactly what they were going to do or where they were going to do it until
several hours prior to the actual launch.[37] Eglin Air Force Base was selected as the
training sight; specifically, Auxiliary Field 3 was the location of their
training. Coincidentally, some 28 years
earlier Auxiliary Field 3 had hosted yet another daring group, known as
"Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders".[38] However, prior to commencement of training,
a POW camp had to be identified.
Selection of a camp was no simple matter. The camp would have to be accessible by air
assault, contain POWs, and be located in an area that would entail the least
risk to the raiding force yet provide the greatest amount of surprise, all
within the range and capability of the mission assets and personnel (see
Appendix C). With the aid of in-theater
and national assets, several camps stood out as possible targets. These camps had been under previous
surveillance based on signs of POW activity. Following rigorous evaluation of the camps most closely adhering to the
above criteria, Manor and Simons settled on Son Tay with the selection known
only to them and the Washington planners/decision makers. The decision on Son Tay was by no means an
easy task. A few details about Son Tay
highlight the difficulty of this decision. The camp was located 23 miles west
of Hanoi, multiple air defense batteries were located in the area, an estimated
12,000 North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops were dispersed within 5 miles of the
camp, an estimated 70 POWs were currently held there, and a one way trip from
the departure base at Udorn Thailand to Son Tay was approximately 240 nautical
miles.[39] Finally, if the above facts concerning the
Son Tay area were not enough to cast doubts about a successful operation, the
entire mission would be conducted at night. Additionally, a massive deception plan was employed which was designed
to draw North Vietnam's radars away from the Son Tay area. The deception plan fit perfectly into
overall mission execution. This deception
was very plausible due to an earlier shootdown of an unarmed reconnaissance flight
over North Vietnam. This shootdown
violated an "agreement" (more of an unwritten understanding) made
with the Johnson Administration which allowed U.S. overflights for
reconnaissance collection. In return,
the U.S. would stop bombing North Vietnam. Additionally, North Vietnam would not shell any major population centers
in the South and refrain from using the established Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
for Southern infiltration.[40]
The raid commanders knew that for the mission to be successful
several months of intense, realistic training were required. Therefore, commencing in early August 1970,
the raid force began its training on a mock up of the prison with all training
occurring at night. During the day, the
reconstructed camp (known as "Barbara") was "rolled up" to
ensure that detection from Soviet "systems" would not occur.[41] As the raiders continued to train, all raid
force members improved their skills. After nearly two months of preparation, Laird personally received a
briefing from Manor and Simons on 24 September 1970 whose conclusion was that,
based on training to date, the mission could be executed successfully.[42] During the first week of October, the White
House received a briefing on the status of the raid force. The National Security Advisor, Dr. Henry
Kissinger, and selected members of his staff, to include General Al Haig, were
present at the briefings given by Manor and Simons. All were extremely receptive to the plan. Manor also wanted immediate approval of the
mission in order to execute the raid by 21 October. Kissinger advised Manor that the President was not available
(Nixon was out of the country attending a conference and it is unclear why
Kissinger could not reach him) for such an approval but he would be available
to approve an approximate mission date of 21 November.[43] The 21st of October and November were the
two established windows of opportunity, based primarily on the illumination of
a full moon. October 21 was desirable
because the raiders were ready and the time delay associated with the second
window could compromise the security of the mission. Since Kissinger could not or would not brief the President in
time for the October date, 21 November became the approximate target date for
the mission. On the positive side, the
extra 30 days would allow for additional training and intelligence collection,
although the possibility of a breach of security weighed heavily on Manor and
Simons.
The CIA, DIA, and the National Security Agency (NSA) continued
to receive surveillance reports from Son Tay and the surrounding area. Since there was no established inter-agency
collection plan and no specific agency tasked to coordinate and provide
intelligence information
to the raid force, information
was delivered directly to the raid commanders as each agency collected from its
own sources. Needless to say,
information requests and resulting data were duplicated and at times led to
confusion during planning and training. However, since General Bennett (Director of DIA) was a member of the
Pentagon planning/decision team, all information collected was
"funnelled" through the DIA. Nonetheless, surveillance to date had shown "activity" in the
area of the camp and even as late as July had shown that the Song Con River,
just north of the camp, had flooded and water was only several feet from the
walls of the prison (an interesting point reviewed in a later footnote). Additionally, recent collection was a bit
spotty because of poor weather conditions and the detection and shootdown of
reconnaissance drones scheduled to overfly the area. However, what was collected still indicated POW
"activity" at Son Tay.[44]
In order for the mission to have the greatest chance of
success, strict adherence to the established timeline was critical. Deployment to Thailand began on 12 November
and by 17 November all raiders were assembled at Udorn Air Base. The following day, Nixon approved the
mission and released the "Red Rocket" message authorizing Manor to
execute as planned. Thus Operation
Kingpin, the last phase of the raid was activated and takeoff of the raid
force was set for 2300 hours, 20 November 1970.[45] However, it seems that when good news arrives, bad news is usually not too far
behind. This mission was not to be the
exception. As previously discussed, on
18 November, information received from a Hanoi source indicated that Son Tay
was not currently occupied by POWs.[46] Attempts to confirm or deny this information
met with little success. Apparently the
information had come too late to have any impact on reversing the execution
order. By now, all personnel involved
in the raid, to include the political leadership, were "leaning well
forward" into the mission. However, for unclear reasons (some speculate operational security and an
established communications "black-out" to the raid force), the
raiders were not informed about the most recent development. Apparently, everyone in the raiding force
chain-of-command knew about the possibility of no POWs at Son Tay except for
the raid force and its leaders. According to one of the raid force pilots, Marty Donohue, Colonel USAF
(Ret.), this belief was highlighted by the "official" mission patch
created after the raid. The patch
contains a caricature of a mushroom and at the bottom of the patch are the
letters KITD/FOHS: "Kept In The
Dark, Feed Only Horse S___!" The decision to continue was quite difficult because the
information passed from the Hanoi source identified other "active"
POW camps where the former Son Tay POWs were possibly being held (Later
verification placed the Son Tay POWs at Dong Hoi, also known as Camp Faith,
located 10 miles west of Hanoi).[47]
Since August, the raid force had been training for a mission
without knowing the exact location and purpose of their mission. Several members of the force believed they
were going to Cuba to end the current dictatorship in one way or another.[48] Due to the requirement for strict secrecy,
the raiders would be "kept in the dark" until several hours prior to
the launch of the raid. Moments before
the final mission briefing, Colonel Simons told the assembled group that,
"We are going to rescue as many as 70 American POWs, something American
prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers. The target is located just 23 miles west of
Hanoi."[49] For several seconds after the Colonel's
remarks, an eerie silence fell over the room only to be followed by a loud
standing ovation. One of the boldest
military missions in history was about to unfold.
At approximately 2300 hours on 20 November 1970, all elements
of Task Force Ivory Coast began
departing on their assigned missions.
Over 100 aircraft launching from bases and carriers flew missions in the
vicinity of the Tonkin Gulf (east and southeast of Hanoi in the Haiphong harbor
area, see Appendix C) where they dropped flares and chaff (used to disrupt and
"blind" radar scopes). Bombing missions were not allowed due to the previously discussed
"agreement." The deception
plan worked perfectly as all "eyes" were turned eastward, allowing
the low flying raid package to attack the camp undetected.
The raid force entered the Son Tay objective area below 500
feet. Suddenly, the MC-130's broke-off
and dropped illumination flares over the camp area and then proceeded to a
location approximately seven miles west of Son Tay where they dropped
fire-fight simulators followed by a pallet of napalm, thus effectively
illuminating the area and creating yet another diversion/deception. The A-1's attacked and destroyed a nearby
bridge which would slow any reinforcement attempts made by local forces. Simultaneously, the lead H-53 crossed over
the Son Tay prison and eliminated two occupied guard towers with its 7.62mm
mini-guns (known as a GAU-2/B, a six barrel Gatling gun capable of firing
either 2000 or 4000 rounds per minute). Behind the lead H-53, the H-3 made a controlled crash landing into the
center of the camp. All personnel in
the H-3 were unharmed with the exception of one of the crewmen who broke an
ankle. The 14 raiders on board were the
designated assault group and they immediately attacked the building containing
the cell blocks, eliminating any remaining enemy personnel. These raiders were assigned to actually remove
the POWs from their cells and guide them
out of the compound through a hole in the prison wall created by a planned
demolition. Once outside the camp, the
POWs would be escorted to a nearby pick-up point and evacuated with the raid
force.[50]
Meanwhile, the second and third H-53's, which contained the
second assault force, assigned to search and defend the surrounding camp area,
began their landing. The only error
made during the entire execution of the mission was about to occur. A compound located several hundred meters to
the south of Son Tay was identified during the planning phase of the mission as
a "secondary school." Upon
this determination, the compound was immediately designated "off
limits" to the raiders. However,
this compound was very similar in shape and size to Son Tay. Because of this similarity, all aircrews and
assault members were thoroughly briefed on the differences between the two
locations. But due to the fog and friction of combat, the third H-53 containing
Colonel Simons' assault force landed in the middle of the secondary school
compound. The second H-53 did not land
there because the aircrew saw the attack occurring at Son Tay at the last
minute and corrected their course. For
undetermined reasons (most likely for radio silence), the second H-53 did not
relay this information to Simons' aircraft which was in trail of the second
H-53. As Simons' assault force unloaded
the helicopter, they came under immediate attack from the direction of the
secondary school. The helicopter lifted
off as planned, to await a later extract call from Simons. For the next five minutes an intense
fire-fight developed at the secondary school compound. Realizing that the compound was not the
prison camp and the school was not a secondary school, Simons ordered the H-53
to return for an emergency extract. Within minutes, all raiders were back on the helicopter heading for the
prison camp. Remarkably, only one
raider received minor wounds during the fight. As a result of this "error", over 100 enemy soldiers lay dead
at the compound. Perhaps unknowingly,
this mistake may have prevented a disastrous reinforcement of the Son Tay camp
which would have been completely unexpected by the raid force. Additionally, the soldiers encountered at
the school compound looked (uniforms and physical features to include language)
and reacted differently than expected, raising the question whether the only
enemy soldiers in North Vietnam were North Vietnamese.[51] Simons immediately began asking questions of
himself as to who they were and what they were doing in a secondary school
which obviously was not being utilized as a school, or was it? Most people familiar with the raid believe
that the soldiers encountered at the school compound were either Chinese or "Eastern"
Russians providing "technical assistance" to North Vietnam's new and
improved integrated air defense system (IADS), furnished by one or both of the
communist superpowers.[52]
At the Son Tay compound the prison assault force had completed
its mission. At least 12 enemy had been
killed, but more importantly, no POWs were found in or around the
compound. A message of "negative items" was soon relayed
to General Manor at his command-post located in South Vietnam. The only remaining tasks were to ensure that
all raiders were accounted for, board the helicopters, and leave the area in
the direction from which they arrived. The prison wall was breached and the H-3 was intentionally
destroyed. The assault forces linked up
with the H-53's and began their long trip back to Udorn.[53] Three and a half months of intense training
culminated in less than 30 minutes at Son Tay. The raid had taken 29 minutes to execute, one minute less than
scheduled.[54] Mission surprise was complete and
undeniable. All the raiders who went in
came out, with only two sustaining minor injuries. As the raiders returned to Thailand, their thoughts soon
refocused as questions began to emerge. Why were there no POWs at Son Tay? Had Hanoi known they were coming? How would their efforts be perceived? The answers to most of these questions came soon enough, although
several questions still remain unanswered.
Over 150 aircraft launched as part of the task force. Only two were shot down, but both pilots were recovered successfully by
the egressing helicopters. As a result
of the mission, American forces had suffered only two minor personnel injuries
and the loss of two aircraft while Hanoi (China? USSR?) lost approximately 150
soldiers and sustained a huge blow to its sense of security. After all, the Americans had just conducted
an operation at will in Hanoi's own backyard, catching them completely by
surprise. A special "wake up"
call had just been delivered. Nevertheless,
most raiders initially felt dejected since they had not rescued any POWs. They believed the raid had been a failure
even though they were highly praised and personally decorated for their efforts
by President Nixon. It would take
several months for many of the raiders to realize the overall importance of
their mission. On the other hand, Hanoi
publicly denounced the overall attack but made no initial mention of the Son
Tay portion of the operation. Perhaps
Hanoi was still confused or embarrassed over the Son Tay action. To many,
Hanoi's response was its typical rhetoric which could never be publicly proven
as fact. Except in this case, the
raiders could testify to the actions taken at Son Tay. Furthermore, reaction to the raid and its
results would have far reaching consequences not only for the raid force but
also for both country's governments, the POW/MIA issue, and world opinion. Perhaps none was more significant and
diverse than the impact on the American government and its military
establishment.
RAID REACTION
Despite the successful execution of the raid, public response
was varied. World opinion[55]
seemed to focus on a heroic effort for a noble cause, yet questioned the true
motivation of the operation. War
escalation seemed to be the hot topic of conversation in most international
media circles. However, the American public
appeared to react with indifference to news of the raid. Apparently, the news of the raid was just
another day in a war which seemed to have no end. No new or significant public demonstrations were reported as news
about the raid began to surface. Most
of the country's media praised the attempt but questioned the results. Perhaps this cool response was due to
several years of efforts by a host of groups which worked publicly to bring the
suffering of POWs to the forefront of a war weary population. Most families of POWs approved of the raid
despite the risks of reprisals against remaining POWs. During a debate on the Senate floor
concerning the raid, Senator Bob Dole (R-Kanasas) related a story from three
wives of current POWs. When he asked their
opinion about the raid and its possible
implications, their response was,
"It is better to have our husbands die in a rescue attempt than rot to
death in a prison camp."[56] Furthermore, thousands of telegrams praising
the attempt were sent to the White House. Many were from the families of POWs and MIAs and contained responses
such as, "Thanks for trying to get our daddy out of that camp. Please keep trying."[57] Still others stated, "This type of
action should have been tried before and should still be attempted in future
actions. Keep trying Mr.
President."[58] Additionally, Opinion Research Corporation, a nationally recognized and respected
group, sampled 208 next-of-kin of personnel listed as either missing in action
or prisoner of war. Eighty one percent
approved of the rescue attempt and 84 percent would approve of another
attempt. Also, 60 percent indicated
that future raids would be successful and were an effective means of gaining
information and release of POWs and MIAs.[59] These opinions quickly overshadowed others
who believed that the raid and any future attempts would only endanger POW
lives and make information on MIAs more difficult to obtain. Perhaps the mother of a POW best summed up
the American public reaction to the raid, "Finally something had been done
to relieve their suffering and focus attention to their situation."[60]
The reaction by the U.S. military establishment was perhaps
best summed up by Admiral McCain as he received a debriefing from Manor and
Simons shortly after the raid. "Don't let
anyone tell you that this mission
was a failure. We will learn, as the
results develop, that many benefits will accrue as a result of having done
this."[61] A true statement, but the results of the
raid would not be fully known for several years to come. Pride in execution was obvious for military
members who knew about the raid. This
was especially true at the highest levels of command as senior members took
note of the Communist military reaction to the raid and actions immediately
implemented by those countries.[62] Their reaction gave American military
leaders a much needed "shot in the arm." By flexing its muscles, the U.S. demonstrated its ability and
will to strike unhindered any target in North Vietnam at the time and place of its
choosing. Undoubtedly, the raid
contributed to a new found respect for American military skill and resolve.
Admiral McCain's prediction would prove
to be correct. As a result of the raid,
conditions did change for the POWs. Hanoi began consolidating the POWs into fewer locations. Their harsh treatment eased
dramatically. They were allowed to
"socialize" freely at designated times and most were finally housed
with roommates. Most began regularly
receiving letters and packages from home while medical and health care
improved. Finally, the POWs were
allowed to hold organized physical training, administrative meetings and
religious services on a much more regular basis.[63] Needless to say, morale of the POWs
soared. Apparently Hanoi got the message
that America and the free world would never forget about the POWs and their
suffering. On the basis of these
improvements alone, many believed that the raid was worth the effort and was
highly successful. However, at the same
time, most POWs were not sure what triggered the sudden improvement in their
treatment. Perhaps nothing would
improve the morale and spirits of the POWs (short of being released) more than
if they had knowledge of the attempted rescue at Son Tay. This opinion was confirmed following the
release of the POWs several years later. A POW debriefing given by then Air Force Captain Sam Johnson (currently
serving as a U.S. Congressman from Texas) perhaps best describes this fact. In 1966, Johnson was shot down over North
Vietnam and became a POW at the "Hanoi Hilton." During the early hours of 21 November 1970,
he recalled watching aircraft drop flares over Hanoi. He had not seen any activity like this since the bombing raids
over North Vietnam had stopped nearly two years ago. Watching this attack did raise his hopes of liberation but it
would not be until the summer of 1971 that the significance of the attack would
be fully appreciated. He had recently
received a box of hard candy from his wife.
I
plopped one in my mouth and sucked on it. I felt something stiff, like a tiny plastic sliver, stick against the
roof of my mouth. When I picked it out,
I found it to be a tiny brown speck, about the size of a pinhead. I rubbed it between my fingers, and it began
to unfold. Amazed, I rubbed some
more. In seconds, it had opened to the
width of 16mm film. It was microfilm of
the front page of the New York Times telling all about the Son Tay raid. The young guys with good eyes could read it
and give us the details. We knew then
that our country had not forgotten us.[64]
However,
the reaction to the raid on the political home front was less popular. Political division over the raid served to
further confuse not only the American public's understanding of the policy
regarding Vietnam, but also highlighted the dissension between the two parties
over the President's policy towards the war. Approximately half of the Washington law-makers apparently disapproved
of the rescue attempt as political attention was focused on a hearing held by
the politically powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
On 24 November 1970, Senator J.S. Fulbright (D-Arkansas),
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, invited Secretary Laird to
testify on the Son Tay raid and associated diversionary attacks. Fulbright believed a major escalation of the
war had just occurred and no one was supplying the stated goals or desired
outcome of the most recent military actions. The 15 members of the committee met to determine the intent of the
administration's policy and the political implications of the raid. Fulbright personally believed that the only
way to end the war was through a negotiated peace as the French had done in
ending their involvement in Vietnam a decade and a half before. He was alarmed, as were most of the
committee members, due to what now appeared to be very similar policies between
the Nixon and Johnson Administrations on the conduct of the war. After all, Nixon had pledged to withdraw
from Vietnam even though the recent military actions generated by his policy
appeared to indicate otherwise. Specifically, Fulbright was concerned about the military actions which
appeared to be contradictory to stated policy. Furthermore, this contradiction in policy seemingly confirmed his
personal belief that neither President (Johnson and Nixon) wanted to be the one
in the White House to "lose" America's first war.[65] However, Fulbright's motives for the hearing
appeared to be more political and personal than anything else. Little did Fulbright know at the time, but
the spectacle created by the public hearing would generate a backlash of
general criticism against him and the committee. Apparently the hearing served to further alienate the American
public from its Washington leadership, ultimately sending conflicting signals
of resolve to Hanoi and the rest of the world.
Secretary Laird, having served in the Senate for 17 years, was
well prepared for the hearing. Laird
was able to keep the hearing focused on the emotional issue of the POWs. He provided long answers to the committee's
questions and always started with or returned to the POW/MIA issue. This tactic also demonstrated how unfamiliar
and ill-prepared the Senators were on this issue (contributing to the belief
that the hearing was nothing more than a political and media-hyped
sideshow). In his testimony, Laird
perfectly articulated and defended the President's policy on Vietnam and
focused the nation's attention on a highly explosive and emotional issue that
even the staunchest anti-war activist would support. Nevertheless, the committee (predominantly Fulbright) still
believed a major escalation had occurred and this might jeopardize any
possibility of a quick end to the war. Moreover, the committee believed that no POWs were rescued due to an
intelligence failure. Laird did not
agree with these perceptions. Furthermore, of all the questions asked of Laird, perhaps the ones asked
by Senator Al Gore did hit at the center of the intelligence issue. First, Gore asked about the authorization
and execution order. Who gave them and
when? Secondly, he inquired about the
quality and type of intelligence used to determine which camp to hit and when
to hit it? Gore's first question was
easy to answer. The President
authorized the raid in the summer of 1970 and gave the execution order on 18
November 1970. The answer to the second
question was not provided because the response was classified. However, the committee later received the
answer in a classified supplement to the hearing.[66] If Gore had pursued his questions more
forcefully, maybe information provided to the legislators would have been more
forthright and less confusing, perhaps resulting in less political turmoil over
this issue. However, the political
activity on this issue was far from over as the following day saw a heated
debate on this topic on the Senate floor between "pro" Senators Bob
Dole, John Stennis, and Henry Jackson while Senators Edmund Muskie, Edward
Kennedy, and Robert Leggett disagreed with the rescue attempt and Nixon's
policy towards Hanoi.[67]
As a final and rather amusing note on the political reaction
to the raid, Senator Fulbright gave a complete explanation in his own words as
to why he called the hearing on Son Tay. In the Congressional Record of
4 December 1970, Fulbright explained that he believed the raid would only
escalate the war and jeopardize a negotiated settlement as the withdrawal from
Vietnam continued. He further stated
his resolve on the POW/MIA issue by reviewing several letters he had written to
highlight his personal concern to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong (Premier of North
Vietnam), The International Red Cross, and finally to The National League of
Families of POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia.
Following the hearing, Fulbright received hundreds of letters
criticizing his actions. Several of the
letters sent to Fulbright read like this:
As
citizens of the State of Arkansas, we are writing to inform you of the shame we
now feel that you have brought upon us. Your socialistic views which have been flaunted before the entire
country have not reflected the beliefs which are basic to all of us
Arkansans. Your recent actions and
public expressions against the POW campaign were humiliating to us as U.S.
citizens, and especially as residents of the great State which you so poorly
represent. Be assured that our votes,
though they went to you in the last Senatorial election, will not be cast for
you in the future.[68]
Still
another said:
Since
you are such a hack for negotiation I have a suggestion which you might pass on
to the negotiating "team" in Paris. Let's offer one Senator from Arkansas for just one of our prisoners of
war. I'll bet after 30 minutes you'd be
happy for someone to send in a rescue mission. In fact, I'll bet you won't even follow my suggestion, even though you
seem to think the commies are just a nice little peace loving group.[69]
Fulbright could not understand
why he had gotten so much "hate-mail" over the hearing and his
actions therein. He was truly miffed
that most Americans did not share his opinion on this issue. Therefore, he felt compelled to fill the Congressional Record with six pages of
his "explanation." Fulbright
had to explain (a political apology) himself again since the televised hearing
had shown him and the committee "playing politics" with an emotional
and humanitarian issue where politics had no business. The raid had proven to be an explosive issue
and a mission overdue in its execution. Considering all of the previously discussed information, did the
President make the right decision by selecting Son Tay as the next milestone in
his policy of Vietnamization? In other
words, what political and military risks did Nixon take in conducting the raid?
A "WIN-WIN" FOR NIXON
Within the context of Nixon's policy towards Hanoi and those
actions taken by the Administration in carrying out that policy, the raid was
just another step in the implementation of his strategy to end the war
honorably for America. It is true that
the impetus for the raid came from several years of activity by certain groups
on behalf of the POWs, but Nixon realized he could use this issue to gain
public support and exploit it in any way he saw fit. This not only benefits the POWs but, his Administration and his
policy as well. In other words, the
raid was a "win-win" proposition for Nixon. First, he had taken action on behalf of the POWs, thereby showing
his resolve to the world on this issue. Second, Nixon, along with the rest of his staff and planners, was
convinced (they all fell in love with the plan) that the mission would be a
military success. In keeping true to
his strategy, Nixon's policy of negotiation would be followed by an operational
application of that policy. If Nixon
could not get Hanoi's attention through negotiations, then he would get it
through military action as he had demonstrated once before in Cambodia. The first half of this "win-win"
proposition was political in nature. The second half focused on the military execution of the raid and the risking
of American lives. Obviously, the
second "win" involved much more risk than the first. The first "win" does not require
much of an explanation. The political
aspects and ramifications seem clear in light of previous discussion. However, less clear is the second portion of
the "win-win" proposition. In
an attempt to evaluate and understand the risks associated with the military
"win", two scenarios may serve to highlight this conclusion.
With the first scenario, there are POWs at Son Tay. With this assumption, military risks are
inherently greater. As a part of the
previously conducted raid study, a high probability existed that some POWs
would be killed by their guards during the rescue attempt. Furthermore, it was likely that any reprisals
against all remaining POWs in North Vietnam would be severe as a result of the
mission. Thus, the decision to act
required careful deliberation among the
planners and the NCA. However, everyone
from Nixon down to the individual raider believed the raid was worth the risk
even if only one POW came out alive (this opinion was shared by most of the
POWs and their families although many congressional leaders would publicly
disagree). After all, the raiders were
all volunteers, willing to risk their lives or even become POWs
themselves. How could anyone belittle
such a courageous and honorable attempt to rescue American servicemen under
severe duress regardless of the risk or chances of failure? Ultimately, this scenario saw a
"win" even though American lives would most likely be lost during the
raid. The risk was worth the effort and
the President made his final decision based on this risk assessment.
With the second scenario, there are no POWs at Son
Tay. This scenario also assumes that
the White House and the Pentagon knew beforehand (exactly when they knew is
irrelevant) that there were no POWs at the camp. Moreover, one must also realize that the true intent of the
mission had changed. The raiders were
not going to rescue POWs, instead they were delivering a political
message. From the standpoint of risk
assessment, the second scenario would seem to possess less risk when compared
to the risk associated with the first scenario. In other words, if the raid was going to be
"successful" with POWs at the camp as proposed in the first scenario,
then would not the overall risk be reduced if no POWs were at Son Tay? After all, wouldn't Hanoi get the same
political message through the actions of either scenario? With this rationale, both scenarios do
appear to give a political and military "win" situation providing the
raid force was not completely destroyed during the mission (see Appendix D for
an opposing view). With either
scenario, Nixon could have his cake and eat it too. However, in the second scenario, the only thing missing would be
the icing.
IN CONCLUSION: A QUESTION TO CONSIDER
Having explored both the humanitarian and political origins of
the raid, perhaps a final thought provoking question remains, was the Son Tay
Raid a rescue mission or an attack? In
the opinion of this researcher, it was both! A noble and honorable attempt had been made by a gallant force to
relieve the suffering of their brothers-in-arms, but the raid also possessed
the elements of a deliberate attack to carry out Presidential policy. Undoubtedly, had POWs been rescued at Son
Tay, immediate success would have been acknowledged by all, perhaps even
resulting in uniting a divided America. Yet, at the same time, but unfortunately out of public view, the raid
was an immediate success because Hanoi quickly began direct negotiations and
took rapid action to correct their past transgressions regarding the treatment
of POWs. By linking military actions to
strategic goals, as was demonstrated by
the raid on Son Tay, it is evident that President Nixon emerged from the latest
round of "negotiations" as a winner, although not immediately
recognized as such.
Perhaps there will always be speculation concerning the
raid. For example: Prior to the
mission, did the NCA or any other planner/decision maker know that there were
"in fact" no POWs at Son Tay? Perhaps some did, but for unknown reasons elected to remain silent on
the issue. Additionally, did Colonel Simons' raid group land at the secondary
school on purpose and if so, who ordered it and why?[70] Furthermore, when were the POWs actually
moved from Son Tay?[71] And finally, why were the POWs moved?[72] All of these questions call for additional
research. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to argue with positive results like those which occurred after the raid. Hanoi's response was to break off official
peace negotiations in Paris and publicly denounce the U.S. for escalating the
war. Unofficially, Hanoi, China, and
the Soviet Union were shaken by the raid. All tightened security at their military compounds and other sensitive
locations. Additionally, previously
classified White House documents revealed that Hanoi began responding to
official requests concerning POW issues as early as 26 November 1970, something
they had rarely done before. Hanoi was
also concerned that American public opinion was now focused on the POW/MIA
issue, especially since confirming that many POWs had died in captivity. Hanoi finally got the message and began to
fear a change in international and American public support for the war since
the raid had highlighted such a sensitive issue.[73] In light of these and other developments,
the raid was an overwhelming success as both a rescue mission and an extension
of policy. The President's decision to
support his policy through military activity directly resulted in forcing Hanoi
to treat POWs more humanely and forced Hanoi back to Paris in a more humble
negotiating position.
Without a doubt, Hanoi now knew it was dealing with a new
Administration determined to see an end to the war, but only in an honorable
manner. On two occasions the President
had shown Hanoi his resolve and to what lengths he would go to ensure that his
style of diplomacy should not be misinterpreted. Hanoi knew it had better pay attention lest it risk waking a
lethargic giant with a new attitude.
APPENDIX
A: POW POLITICAL TIMELINE UP TO SON TAY
(Nixon Administration)
Chronology of
Events
January 1969 President asks Ambassador Lodge to call for
prompt POW talks at his first session in Paris.
March 1969 Administration undertakes review of POW
policies.
May 1969 Secretary Laird news conference setting
forth in detail the treatment accorded our men and expressing the deep concern
of President and Administration regarding the POW situation.
June 1969 Administration spokesmen begin meetings with
families to inform them of efforts on behalf of POW/MIA.
November 1969
President proclaims November 9,
1969 a National Day of Prayer and Concern. Also, U.S. makes major statement of concern in United Nations (UN) Human
Rights Committee.
December 1969 President meets with representative group of
POW/MIA family members.
February 1970
President signs Public Law 91-200
removing limits on savings program for POW/MIA.
March 1970 At President's direction, Paris Delegation
begins weekly pressure on enemy regarding POW/MIA problem.
May 1970 President sends message in support of May 1
Appeal for International Justice, at which vice President spoke. President proclaims May 3 as a National Day
of Prayer and Concern.
June 1970 President signs Public Law 91-289
authorizing special compensation up to $5.00 per day for period spent in POW
status.
August 1970 President sends special representative,
Astronaut Frank Borman, around world to enlist support and assistance for
POW/MIA.
October 1970 President proposes immediate release of all
POWs in October 7 message.
APPENDIX A: POW POLITICAL TIMELINE UP TO SON TAY (CONT.)
(Nixon Administration)
November 1970 Postmaster General Winton Blount meets with
Ambassador David Bruce to discuss an appeal to the Government of North
Vietnam. Postmaster meets with
International Red Cross in Geneva. Postmaster
in Atlanta for commemorative stamp ceremony which honors POWs and MIAs. President Nixon authorizes rescue mission to
Son Tay.
This timeline was taken from a letter dated 1 December
1970, by Herbert G. Klein, Director of Communications for the Nixon
Administration. The letter and enclosed
timeline were found in the Charles W. Colson file under
"POW/MIA." Colson's file is
located at the National Archives II, within the Nixon Presidential Materials section.
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW WITH MELVIN R. LAIRD
(Secretary of Defense 1969-1973)
1. Question: Did the Son Tay Raid indicate a change in
the political decision process?
Answer:
Yes. Nixon's policy of withdrawal through negotiations would be
pursued by military action if those negotiations did not produce the desired
results. Nixon had done this with the
bombings in Cambodia and would continue this type of "strongman"
tactic throughout his Presidency.
2. Question: Could the American public have supported a
new war against Hanoi with the
POW/MIA issue as the focal point?
Answer: Yes. I was the first to bring the issue to the full attention of the American
public. We had been receiving
information about the harsh treatment and in many cases, POWs dying in
captivity. During 1969, three POWs were
released which highlighted my concerns so I began to take action. Many in Congress and in the Administration
disagreed with me because they did not want Hanoi to make a public issue out of
the situation if pushed, since they believed Hanoi had the upper hand in this
issue, thus putting the U.S. in a position to be dictated to in public. As it turned out, that is exactly what Hanoi
did and that is part of the reason why I and the Administration went to Son
Tay. We knew we had to do something.
3. Question: Was the Raid a "Win-Win" situation
for the President?
Answer: Yes. No POWs were killed and the raid force performed superbly through out
the mission. If POWs had been at the
camp we would have gotten them out. As
it was, no POWs were there but the effects the raid had on the enemy were noticed
almost immediately afterwards. Do you
understand? The President followed
through on his policy and the actual raid was a success. Do you understand? How could anyone not call it a success?
4. Question: How did the Raid affect future rescue
operations?
Answer: Did you read Schemmer's book? We had discussed and even did some planning
for another raid and you can bet this time we would bring POWs out. However, due to Son Tay, the POW/MIA issue
began to move as real progress was seen at the political level and it was
reflected in the overall peace talks. As a result of this progress, the idea of another raid gradually faded,
after all, two years later most of the POWs had been released.
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW WITH MELVIN R. LAIRD (CONT.)
(Secretary of Defense 1969-1973)
5. Question: What
message if any, did China and Russia receive as a result of the Raid?
Answer: The message was for Hanoi only. However, if China or Russia could bring
pressure to bear on Hanoi in regards to the POW/MIA issue, that was okay too.
6. Question: Did you know at anytime prior to the Raid
that no POWs were at Son Tay?
Answer: No. All the intelligence we had indicated that POWs were at the camp. I had been involved in this intelligence
collection for quite some time and I had seen several other camps which we had
been looking at for a long time. Son
Tay gave no indication that POWs were not there. We knew the camp was active and had been for several years. The decision to execute was based on this
intelligence. However, we knew that
there was a possibility that no POWs were there. After all, we had no hard evidence of their presence, only
indications from camps known to house POWs that were similar to the conditions
and activity found at Son Tay. The raid
force knew of this possibility also. Do
you understand? I know what you are
asking. The Hanoi information was
simply not believable.
7. Question: Did you brief the President on the Hanoi
source information?
Answer: No. The decision to go
had already been made. Do you
understand? I believed the information
to be inaccurate. I informed the
President about new information concerning the deaths of additional POWs being
held. The CIA passed that as many as 10
more POWs had died in captivity.
Additional Comments: Mr. Laird was very polite during
correspondence prior to and during the interview. This author was honored by Mr. Laird's attention, concern, and
thoughtfulness on this issue. Mr. Laird
also said that he had personal files concerning the raid and the period while
he was Secretary of Defense that would not be released until a future
date.
This interview was conducted over the telephone on 17
December 1996. The interview lasted
approximately 45 minutes. The answers
provided by Mr. Laird are summations of the questions asked. The answers are not exact quotes. Rather, they were reconstructed from notes
taken during the interview and at the best recollection of this author.
APPENDIX
C: SELECTED ILLUSTRATIONS
Reproduced from The Raid, p. 187.
APPENDIX
C: SELECTED ILLUSTRATIONS (CONT.)
Reproduced from The Raid, p. 188.
APPENDIX C: SELECTED ILLUSTRATIONS (CONT.)
Reproduced from The Raid, p. 190.
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW WITH BENJAMIN SCHEMMER
(Author of The Raid)
1. Question: Do you believe that President Nixon knew
there were no POWs at Son Tay prior to mission launch?
Answer: The Nixon tapes, obviously, are the best source for that
answer. Until you can check those out,
I think Laird gave you the best insight possible into whether or not President
Nixon knew there were no POWs in Son Tay just before the mission was launched (according to Peter Jeffrey, an archivist on the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff located at National Archives II, informed
this author that, during the period of the Son Tay raid, Nixon had not yet
installed his tape recording system in the White House and to his knowledge, no
other personal recordings exist which cover the raid period).
2. Question: Do you believe there was an overriding
political agenda associated with the raid?
Answer: No. I believe the overriding agenda was to free the POWs at Son Tay. I believe all other considerations were
secondary at best --- except in the case of General Donald Blackburn, who, as I
pointed out in The Raid, wanted to
"go" anyway because he thought it would really pull North Vietnam's
chain (and Russia's to a lesser extent, by showing them that if they didn't
"shape up," we could operate in their back yard with impunity).
3. Question: In your opinion, was the raid a
"Win-Win" proposition for the Administration regardless of
"risks" associated with its execution?
Answer: No. The Operation could have backfired badly in several ways. What if it had failed tragically --- many
POWs killed, or the raiding force annihilated? It was definitely not a "win-win" proposition, given all the
things that could go wrong in the fog of war.
4. Question: Do you believe that the military actions taken
in Cambodia, at Son Tay, and the resumption of bombing North Vietnam signaled a
policy change to Hanoi from that of the stated policy of
"Vietnamization"?
Answer: Did it signal a policy change? In a large sense, Yes --- that we were exasperated over North Vietnam's
intransigence on the POW issue and their treatment of our prisoners, and that
the game might get very rough if they didn't change. And it's clear the North got the message, given the haste with
which they rounded up all the POWs from the outlying camps and brought them
together in Hanoi and treated them so much better.
APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW WITH BENJAMIN SCHEMMER (CONT.)
(Author of The Raid)
5. Question: Could or would the American people support
an escalation of the war focused on the single issue of returning POWs and
opening dialogue concerning MIAs, and could this issue have been a rallying
point for changing the character of the war?
Answer: Would Americans have supported an escalation
of the war over the POW issue? I doubt
it. Look at the flak Laird and the
President took during the Fulbright hearings over Son Tay right after the raid,
a very humanitarian mission. That was
brutal! By then, after Cambodia, My
Lai, Lam Son, etc., I think the ONLY escalation of any nature that MIGHT
(though I doubt it) have won public support would have to deal DIRECTLY with
bringing the POWs home. It was simply
too late. Earlier, maybe; after 1970, I
doubt it.
Additional Comments: In addition to this interview, Mr. Schemmer
and this author had several telephone conversations where he seemed genuinely
concerned and interested by this research topic, not to mention the fact that
he was very professional and courteous. Mr. Schemmer's book, The Raid,
is highly respected by all those who took part in the mission. Several cited sources testify to this belief
and many share the opinion of retired USAF Colonel Frederic "Marty"
Donohue (commander of the lead H-53 on the raid and an acquaintance of this
author) that, "The Raid, is 100
percent accurate!"
This interview was conducted through electronic mail on 18
December 1996 between Mr. Schemmer and this author.
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