CHAPTER ONE
A Joint Vision of Information Superiority
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John M. Shalikashvili published in
July 1996 his personal vision of how U.S. forces will fight in the next
century.[2] Entitled Joint
Vision 2010: Force of the Future, his vision is a conceptual template
articulating the ways U.S. forces will realize new levels of effectiveness in
joint warfighting in the next century. The document envisions joint forces achieving dominance across the spectrum
of military operations through the synergistic integration of new operational
concepts. The goal is for a small(er
than now), high-quality force to win in the next century by leveraging new
concepts to achieve the effects of mass without massed forces and sequential
operations. Dominant maneuver,
precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics are the
key concepts of the vision. Linking
these concepts is the enabling concept of information superiority.[3]
Joint
Vision 2010 (JV 2010) fundamentally has an operational perspective. Technological advances guiding weaponry over longer ranges to precise
targets and improved command, control, and intelligence capabilities are
harnessed synergistically. U.S. forces
benefit from increased awareness of both the enemy and friendly situation in
the battlespace as a result of improved, all-source intelligence fusion
efforts. Dominant maneuver follows as
the simultaneous application of decisive force against enemy centers of gravity
(COG) at all levels. COG identification
is enabled by increased battlespace awareness. The sum goal is the multi-dimensional application of information,
engagement, and mobility capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.
The
ability of dispersed U.S. forces to control the breadth, depth, and height of
future battlespaces inherently pivots on an improved, 'real time' awareness of
what is going on in the battlespace superior to that of any adversary. This is the soul and the purpose of the
concept of information superiority.
JV
2010, therefore, pivots on information superiority. Recognizing that throughout history "...gathering,
exploiting, and protecting information have been critical,"[4]
JV 2010 anticipates the effects of increased access to information and the
enhanced speed, precision, and accuracy of its transmission. Defined in JV 2010 as "the capability
to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting
or denying an adversary's ability
to do the same,"[5]
information superiority is the keystone upon which the success of JV 2010
rests. Information superiority is the
high ground that provides the asymmetrical advantage sought by commanders
through history. Having it is essential
to achieving the full scope of JV 2010.
The Search for Information Superiority
The
search for information superiority is not new. Sun Tzu's observation to "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a
hundred battles you will never be in peril"[6] is well-known
and timelessly accurate. Scouting the
enemy in order to gain advantage from knowing his dispositions (and
simultaneously protecting against his scouts) is likewise ancient. Intuitively, this task is also the essence
of practicality. In this age-old quest
for knowledge of the enemy, history abounds with examples of commanders who
either gained or lost the race for information superiority to decisive
effect. Prominent American examples
include the Gettysburg campaign of 1863, where General Robert E. Lee lost his
picture of the Union Army and blundered into a meeting engagement without a
battle plan and on inferior ground. Operation Desert Storm presents a recent example of the decisive effect
of achieving information superiority. We will examine
this conflict in greater detail later
in this paper. However, before reaching
that juncture, we must first discuss what is new about the quest for
information superiority that makes it different and relevant for today's
warfighter. That difference is in the
character of the dawning 'information age.'
The Information Age
A
new age is upon us. In this new age,
information flows like water. In some
form it is everywhere, and like water, it is essential. Information as a concept is old, but how we
manipulate, transfer, collate, store, and use it is changing with the force of
a tidal wave. Information as water has
become a raging torrent. This change is
revolutionary in impact and scope. Increasingly, theorists note that modern times are transitioning to what
is being hailed as 'The Information Age.'
Home
computers, home satellite dishes, the Internet, cellular phones, etc., are all
examples of how accessible information is to the common citizen. Due to the world-wide media, we can watch
live events unfold in real-time, or watch satellite images of weather patterns
across the globe. LtCol T.X. Hammes
USMC observes that, "Hierarchical structures are breaking down as
information systems are connecting people in new ways. The world is organizing into webs tied
together by the
Internet and meshes tied together
by powerful personal computers."[7]
The
'information superhighway' of popular rhetoric is real. On-ramps, off-ramps, as well as spur,
connector and ring roads are appearing overnight and continually moving off in
unexpected directions. Additionally,
the information superhighway is an autobahn
with no posted speeds. Dominating this
highway are advanced-technology, high-performance machines that inherently
realize that the race is to the swift.
Ultimately,
the dawning of the information age represents acceptance of information (and
all that it entails in this sense) as a tangible medium of human exchange, akin
to earth, water, and sky. Like those
familiar settings, it can not help but be an arena for human conflict. This conflict is emerging under the rubric
of information warfare. Information
superiority must and will be the result of successful information warfare.
Warfare in the Information
Age
The
intellectual roots of information war thinking lies in the work done by noted
futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler. Their thesis is that the way we make wealth is the way we make war and
that in the future, the manipulation of information is the way we will make
wealth.[8] Building on their earlier work, The Third Wave (1980), they offer a
corresponding emerging third wave of warfare. In the Tofflerian view, third wave warfare will supplant our current (or
second wave) industrial way of warfare by harnessing information technology
much as third wave economies will eventually supplant second wave economies.[9] We will make war by manipulating
information.
The change from second wave to third begins
with the technological ability to gain and exchange rapidly--and therefore more
efficiently use--information on a wide scale. Increasingly, dispersal (the opposite of mass), systems integration,
networks, fiber optics, miniaturization, and other innovations now being seen
in commercial applications are being translated into military applications with
unprecedented effects on how we organize and wage war. For example, networked computers massage a
common data base (specifically, the Time Phased Force Deployment Data or TPFDD)
to plan and monitor the world wide deployment and redeployment of U.S. forces. On the ground and at sea, we are gaining
continuous and precise understanding of where our troops are through the Global
Positioning System (GPS). Enhanced
information gathering capabilities (satellite imagery, laser range-finders,
etc.) are improving our certainty on where the enemy is. Couple all of this with precision weaponry
and you get an "If I can sense you, I can kill you" paradigm. The fog of war is lifting--if perhaps only for a short while--through
technological means.[10]
Tofflerian
thought on information warfare found ready acceptance in the U.S. Department of
Defense, most notably in the Air Force and Army. Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan cited them
repeatedly in a 1994 article on war in the information age.[11] R.L. DiNardo and Daniel Hughes detail the
influence of the Tofflers in a cautionary article on information warfare.[12] A review of the literature suggests the
highest level of acceptance resides in the Air Force.[13] Much of Air Force acceptance seems the
result of Operation Desert Storm, a perspective addressed later in this work.
Information
war at the strategic level is the employment of all the tools of national power
to gain information superiority over the enemy. Today, the cybernetic loop connecting sensor to shooter is
dominated by technology. Intrinsically
information warfare at all levels is associated with information systems
(Admiral William Owens'
"system-of-systems"[14])
and the struggle between opponents for control of the information realm.[15] Our focus here is on the operational level
of war. On this level, information
war's basic premise hinges upon: (1) the rapid collection and processing of
information to gain accurate understanding of a given situation; (2) the
following rapid transmission of 'intelligent' (processed information equals
intelligence) direction to forces that can speedily act with precision and
effect.[16]
JV
2010's measure of success as an operational vision hinges on the ability to use
the information advantage (asymmetric battlespace awareness gained through
superior speed of transmission from sensor to shooter) in a decisive way--that
is, dominant maneuver.
The Significance of Information Warfare
Fundamentally, information warfare is not a
change in the nature of warfare; war is still Clausewitz's "... act of
force to compel our enemy to do our will."[17] Information war is instead a way to conduct
warfare that intrinsically recognizes the changing
nature of the
modern world. For the military, the
most immediate and tangible aspect is the significantly increased speed in
which military information travels the path from a force's sensory organs, to
its brain, and on to the muscle. To
demonstrate this, we must first look deeper into the path that military
information inevitably follows. This is
relevant to our inquiry, as in truth, information does not flow merely from
'sensor to shooter', but instead makes an intermediate--and critical --stop
along the way.
Stripped to its bare essentials, all combat
significant information moves along a path from sensor to decision-maker to shooter (Figure A). Information is valueless until it is processed into
intelligence. This is to say
information must be analyzed and placed into context in order to have full
value. This of course is the
intelligence cycle. Further, the value of intelligence is that it drives
operations. Together, intelligence
and operations comprise the thinking and creative parts of the loop, the end
product of which are decisions and direction (orders).
In this model, something is seen (sensor)
and is reported to a 'decision-maker.' The decision-maker decides what it is and
what ought to be
done about it. There may be hierarchies
of decision-makers (the chain of command), but ultimately, if action is to be
taken, it is directed by the decision-maker to the shooter. 'Shooter' reflects the concept that
intrinsically military forces are designed to kill people and break
things. Shooter represents some unit,
weapon, system (or a combination of the three) that takes action in response to
the decision-maker's interpretation and use of the sensed information.[18] All of these steps--'sensor to
decision-maker to shooter'--are taken relative to the enemy. The model cycles back on itself through the
sensing of new information about the result of its previous action (battle
damage assessment) or some new enemy action.
The
military information path is Colonel John Boyd's "OODA"[19]
loop through Alice's looking glass. Like information itself, the path is old. Scouts report enemy movement to their command post and, as a
result, a force is dispatched to counter or take advantage of an (unexpected)
opportunity. While information age
capabilities do not change the stations along the path, the changes do have
several impacts on the process that
are relevant.
The information age causes four
fundamental changes in the conduct of war at the operational level, each with a
corresponding impact. The four changes
are: (1) a dramatic increase in sensor capability and output; (2) a volume of
data that stresses the functional (or Napoleonic) staff model; (3) a dependency
on systems to wage war; and (4) an increased speed of data transmission. The related impacts are: (1) an overwhelmed
decision process due to information overload; (2) an information-organization
mismatch; (3) identification of information systems as a critical
vulnerability; and (4) the potential for real-time awareness of the situation,
leading to information superiority and dominant maneuver. As each of the changes and impacts are
linked, we will discuss each duality in turn.
The
first change is that new technologies greatly increase the capabilities and
outputs of the sensory organs. Satellites, as well as systems such as Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and a
host of sophisticated radars, infrared devices, sonars, etc., are the new high
ground. As a result, more facts are
added into the decision formula. Logically
it follows that since we see so much more, the brain has much more to think
about. The related impact is a
potentially overwhelmed decision process.
For example, during Operation
Desert Storm, the Marine Corps local area network processed 1.3 million
electronic mail messages in the first 36 hours of the ground war.[20] At a bare minimum, just the human sorting of
the messages--some of which were undoubtedly important--consumed time and
delayed decision.
Second,
the new technologies--created by industrial age societies--tend to serve
masters in hierarchical organizations. As
a result, the data collected by sensory organs have but one destination--the
top--and one road to it. Information in
Napoleonic command and staff structures is owned, not shared. Staffs collect, collate and analyze
information principally for their commander. The second change therefore, is that the volume of data stresses
functional staffs and causes friction in the decision process. Important data can be obscured in a haystack
of white noise and inconclusive or false reporting. Marine Commanders in Beirut "...received a great volume of
intelligence warnings about potential terrorist threats..."[21]
prior to the terrorist attack of 23 October 1983, yet were unable to pick the
real threat out of the pile. The impact
is a mismatch between information and organization where the current staff
structures can not bear the weight of the data pouring in. Until command structures implement the
lattice potential of networked information age technologies, and make information
a shared asset, much of the potential of increased information gathering is
wasted.
Third,
the ever growing use of inter-connected information systems causes a concurrent
dependency on them. Dependency breeds
vulnerability, perhaps a critical vulnerability. Brigadier General Robert F. Dees of the Joint Staff maintains
that, "Information systems may very well be an Achilles heel."[22] As an example, consider the U.S. TPFDD
system. Earlier, this system was cited
as the system by which the U.S. plans and monitors the world-wide deployment of
forces. Imagine then, the impact on
U.S. capability to project power rapidly if that system were to be shut down,
degraded or disrupted. Time Magazine reported that Belgian
hackers offered (for a million dollar fee) to disrupt U.S. deployment to
Operation Desert Shield; post-war investigation supported their claimed
capability.[23]
The
point follows then, that as hierarchical management nodes are commonly found at
road junctions along the information path, they become key terrain to be
attacked and defended. This notion has
its own logic: capture the intersection, block the road, degrade the force.
Threats
of this nature can only be expected to increase as new technology appears. They must be guarded against, lest
information superiority be surrendered.
Fourth,
and perhaps most importantly, when unimpeded, information is capable of moving
to the decision-maker at unprecedented speeds. The impact of this change is that near real-time battlefield awareness
is available. Real-time awareness is just around the corner. Real time awareness--electronically leading
from the front--can engender better decisions.[24] Optimally, this enhanced battlespace
awareness is shared, creating common battlespace awareness. The potential synergy from common
battlespace awareness will increase execution proficiency by an order of
magnitude. This is the motive for
embracing the potential of organizational structures that allow information to
flow rapidly to all that need it. The
failure to do so will be at the cost of information superiority. Without information superiority, the
dominant maneuver envisioned by JV 2010 is not attainable.
Achieving Information Superiority: C2W
Superior
situational awareness is the end product of information superiority, and,
throughout history, a force multiplier of decisive effect. Information superiority accrues
to those who can get the
information quickest from sensor to decision-maker to shooter. Adversaries will use the new technologies to
enhance their efforts and to attack each other's systems. Therefore, information systems and
information itself are increasingly centers of gravity in the classic
Clausewitzian sense. Attacking and
defending those centers of gravity are intrinsic functions of information
warfare. In this light, two specific
military tasks accrue as a result of the information age.
First,
the information path of the enemy must be attacked and degraded. Second, but equally important, one must
protect one's own military information path, specifically the technologically
sophisticated version characteristic of the information age. These tasks are not simply centered on the
destruction or protection of systems hardware or software. Information systems are dependent on the
quality of the inputted information ('garbage in is garbage out'). Attempts to attack information will also be
based upon feeding systems--and decision-makers--bad data.
The
tasks are not new. However, as shown,
they are of central importance given the nature of the information age. At the operational level of war, the
military aspects of these tasks are captured in the concept of Command and
Control Warfare (C2W). We will look
into C2W in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TWO
For it is by upsetting the enemy's "balance"
that the victory is won; the concentration of fire and the opening of the
breach are only the means to the true end -- the psychological destruction of
the enemy's will to continue resistance.
David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon[25]
Command and Control Warfare
In
the previous chapter, we discussed the impact of the information age on the
age-old quest for knowledge of the enemy. Information age technologies change the dynamic of this ancient quest by
increasing the coverage of data gathering sensors and the speed by which
information travels from sensor to decision-maker to shooter. Reliance on the technological systems that
animate the information age mark the information sphere as a battleground. Consequently, two tasks accrue in the
information war: protect one's own
information systems and attack the enemy's.
The
military aspect of this struggle is called command and control warfare
(C2W). C2W is a strategy and a target
set; combined are both ancient concepts and modern capabilities. Like much of war, C2W is heavily dependent
on intelligence and communications. In
this regard, it is a subset of information war; information war in full battle
array is the use of all the tools of national power to create a competitive
advantage at the national strategic level.[26]
Air
Force LtCol Norman Hutcherson describes C2W as an implementing strategy that
attacks, "...the command and control (C2) decision-making capabilities of
an adversary while protecting friendly C2."[27] C2W is a military tool to be employed
against opposing commanders and forces. It is applicable at all levels of war and in all spectrums of conflict.
C2W
in its offensive mode is called C2-attack.[28] C2-attack assails decision-making by
attacking information and the path that information travels from sensor to
shooter. It blinds the eyes and clogs
the ears. It confuses the brain through
false information. It dulls or cuts the
nerve connections between sensory organs and brain, as well as between brain
and muscle. It fosters bad decision
making and contributes to inaction, indecision, and mental paralysis by
disrupting the opposing commander's OODA loop.
C2W's
defensive mode is C2-protect.[29] C2-protect shields decision processes and
command and control capabilities. It
works to maintain friendly balance while shoving the enemy off balance. C2-protect activities include electronic
signature
reduction, proper command post
sighting, and the coordination needed to ensure that friendly C2-attack efforts
do not adversely effect friendly operations.
C2W
has five pillars: military deception, operations security (OPSEC),
psychological operations (PYSOPS), electronic warfare (EW), and C2W physical
destruction.[30] All serve the functional C2-attack and
C2-protect roles of C2W. Combined they
render C2W as an integrated, synergistic strategy designed to "decapitate
the enemy's command structure from it's body of combat forces."[31]
C2W's
pillars can be viewed in two groupings. The first is through the relationship of C2W to truth. The C2W pillars of OPSEC, military
deception, and PSYOPS deal with different aspects of the truth of friendly
dispositions, capabilities and intentions. Accordingly, OPSEC hides truth, military deception tells 'untruths', and
PSYOPS (truth-based) presents half-truths. Individually or combined they attack understanding, and consequently,
decision. The focus is a soft-kill on
the moral heart of decision-making.
The
second grouping includes EW and C2W physical destruction. Physical systems receive attack from both
electromagnetic energy and kinetic energy weapons. The
intent is to control the systems
(including, in a broad
sense, the electromagnetic
spectrum) that collect and
transmit information. The focus is a hard-kill on the ways and
means of decision-making and information handling.
Clausewitz
spoke of the "remarkable trinity" of war and the impossibility of
fixing an arbitrary relationship between the government, the army and the
people.[32] All three remain perpetually in a balanced
tension. The pillars of C2W are the
same. Viewing the pillars either
individually, functionally as C2-attack or C2-protect, or through moral or
physical lenses, does not obscure that all are inexhaustibly combinable in
pursuit of the larger goal-- achieving information dominance over the enemy.
Each of the pillars of C2W bear deeper
exploration. We will address each in
turn, grouped by the moral and physical. We will begin with military deception.
Military Deception
Though fraud [deception] in other activities be
detestable, in the management of war it is laudable and glorious, and he who
overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who does so by
force.
Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses, 1517[33]
Military deception is as old as war. Sun Tzu's twenty-five century old
observation that "all warfare is based upon deception"[34]
articulates the timeless presence of deception in war. Marine Major John LeHockey concurs when he
begins a contemporary paper on strategic and operational military deception
with a review of the art of military deception in the ancient and classical
worlds.[35] Although it has been argued that deception
has not been a pre-eminent U.S. stratagem due to Clausewitz's disdain for using
deceit to generate military surprise,[36] it is now
fully recognized as a vital part of C2W.
Military deception requires little
definition. It is trickery and deceit
to create a picture that does not accord with the facts. Deception creates false information so as to
skew the enemy's decision path. (Figure B) It leads the enemy to an incorrect estimate of the situation.[37]
His false situational
awareness is the
poisonous tree, the disaster of his related operations its bitter fruit. The
object of military
deception under C2-attack is the enemy commander and his decision process.
A classic example of military deception is
a World War
II British effort
code-named "Operation Mincemeat." Mounted
in early 1943,
Mincemeat supported Operation Husky--the planned July 1943 Allied invasion of
Sicily. Sicily was an obvious next
operational objective for the Allies on the heels of the successful North
African campaign. Mincemeat was born to
deceive the Germans that the invasion would be elsewhere.[38]
Mincemeat revolved around the placement of
a briefcase containing documents detailing "Operation Brimstone"--an
entirely fictious invasion of Sardinia--into Spanish hands. Once there the Allies were certain it would
be shared with the Germans. The same
documents would let slip that Husky was to be the deceptive cover for
Brimstone--to include pre-invasion bombardment of Sicilian airfields. Mincemeat's lie--that Husky was deception
and Brimstone was real--was a big one.[39]
The key documents were delivered to the
Spanish at the correct time and place by a Major William Martin, Royal
Marines. Major Martin was a corpse--an
officer courier seemingly washed
ashore in Spain
after a plane crash at sea. He was a
"mule" and the insert was staged--but the briefcase containing the
essential documents was chained to his wrist. The "art" of Mincemeat
was in the British presentation of the deception story, supported by the
invention of the myriad details concerning Major Martin to convince the Germans
that the courier, and therefore the information he carried, was valid. The "man who never was" was a
persuasive liar and the Germans believed him.
Mincemeat was stunningly successful. Post-WW II examination of German records
indicated that prior to Mincemeat, the Germans had correctly deduced that
Sicily was to be the location of the next Allied invasion. Their perception showed an immediate shift
away from Sicily after the arrival of
Major Martin. Once Sicily was
eliminated as an option, other options received support and serious
discussion. Hitler, for one, believed
the true effort would be in Greece and sent Irwin Rommel to command the effort
there. German defensive efforts and
force dispositions were disrupted by the Mincemeat documents, and the shifts
aided the successful prosecution of Husky.[40]
As shown, military deception seeks to give
the enemy a false understanding of friendly situation and intentions and by
such, adversely effect his decisions and actions. Relatedly, efforts
are also taken to
ensure that an adversary does not gain a correct portrait of the friendly
situation. Efforts taken to deny
critical information about friendly forces are called OPSEC. Accordingly, it is the next pillar of C2W we
will examine.
Operations
Security
The ultimate in disposing one's troops is to be
without ascertainable shape. Then the
most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War[41]
OPSEC is vital because as assiduously as we
watch the
enemy, the enemy
watches us. OPSEC is the epitome of
C2-protect. Its goal is to ensure that
the enemy does not gain an accurate read on friendly operation, dispositions,
and intent. Much as military deception
seeks to create a false estimate of the situation, OPSEC seeks to ensure an incompletely accurate version. Deception and OPSEC work hand in glove;
OPSEC protects the truth while deception fills in the blank spaces in the
enemy's curiosity with believable lies.
Certain actions, when taken in context to
the situation and the capabilities of the force, telegraph intent
prematurely. The eye is attracted to
movement; a savvy enemy can detect--and therefore sometimes deflect--the blow
before it lands. Often it is little
indicators, puzzle pieces, that when combined with other indicators, loudly
shout "Here I am!" to the enemy. OPSEC's task is to sort through the possible puzzle pieces, determine
those that are most ruinous to our scheme if exposed, and obscure them.
OPSEC (Figure C) begins with an
understanding that the enemy can see and hear; that is, gather information
about us. OPSEC is 
therefore
concerned with camouflage and concealment, dimming the light and muffling
footsteps. It is a process of
identifying and analyzing those items of critical information the enemy would
most like to obtain, factoring which of these are observable through his
collection means, and instituting measures to reduce friendly vulnerability to
collection.[42]
OPSEC's biggest challenge lies in the area
of unclassified or open source materials or actions. The global village connectivity of the information age heightens
the difficulty of OPSEC. A free press
operating in an open society can be a fountain of information for the
enemy. In August 1870, during the
Franco-Prussian War, Prussian Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder)
learned of the whereabouts of the French Army courtesy of the Paris press. French general MacMahon's Army of
Chalons was caught
executing an unexpected operational movement to relieve the
city of Metz. Surprise was lost and he was fell upon by
Moltke's
numerically superior force, and defeated.[43]
Imagine if von Moltke could have watched
his counterpart MacMahon on CNN. What
could he have discerned? How fast could he have discerned it? Factor in retired generals giving analysis
and 'color commentary' and the challenges of OPSEC in the information age
become staggering.
Lastly,
'Red Cell' teams simulating a thinking enemy are a crucial component in
determining what critical truths must be hidden. The key to OPSEC is to combine knowledge of friendly situation
and intent with empathy for the enemy's perspective and of his information
gathering capabilities. Knowing what must be protected is the key first step in
formulating the entire C2W strategy. OPSEC is the base of the C2W effort. From it flows the integrated
efforts of the other pillars.
To
this point we have discussed both truth and untruth. In between lies the
shadowy world of half-truth. PSYOPS
uses bits of the truth to achieve its effect. We will discuss it next.
Psychological Operations
To seduce the enemy's soldiers from their allegiance
and encourage them to surrender is of especial service, for an adversary is
more hurt by desertion than by slaughter.
Vegetius, De Re Militari, circa 378 A.D.[44]
Clausewitz
observed that a war "...cannot be considered to have ended so long as the
enemy's will has not been broken."[45] The Chandler quote at the beginning of this
chapter reinforces the notion that the true objective is the psychological
aspect of the enemy's will. PSYOPS is
that portion of C2W aimed directly at the psychology of the enemy. Its lingua
franca is a pastiche of half-truths; we will return to this point
momentarily.
Joint
doctrine correctly asserts that "The employment of any element of national
power, particularly the military element, always has a psychological
dimension."[46] However, PSYOPS is more than the calculated
recognition of the psychological impact of operations. PSYOPS is a shaping tool where emotions and
attitudes are fostered in the enemy to our advantage.
PSYOPS
is defined in Joint doctrine as:
"Operations
planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to
influence their attitudes, emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
ultimately,
the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and
individuals."[47]
The key words are influence, attitudes, and behavior.
PSYOPS (Figure D) (under the C2-attack
function) seeks to create or strengthen enemy perceptions so that his actions
are 
affected
in a way favorable to friendly purposes. PSYOPS is a soft kill on the enemy's decision process and includes undermining of his forces by sowing
"dissidence or disaffection"[48] amongst his
ranks. PSYOPS seeks to convince the
enemy to do, or not to do, some action of his own volition; it is a persuasive
attack.
PSYOPS
is talking to the enemy. It is a
non-lethal way to multiply the effects of military capabilities through the
direct communication of information to the enemy. The military form of propaganda, an effective PSYOPS campaign
communicates our resolve and/or capabilities as superior to that of the PSYOPS target. A simple example is the appearance of a
well-equipped, highly disciplined body of troops in front of an assembled mob;
the bright flash of bayonets and the unitary crash of the manual of arms
conveys a psychological message: stand down or be crushed.
At
the strategic level of war, PSYOPS is very much an aspect of deterrence. During the Cold War the credible U.S.
nuclear threat buoyed our various retaliatory strategies. Deterrence is a form of PSYOPS in its
C2-protect mode. At the operational level,
classic naval presence missions or show of force operations directly
communicate national interest, resolve, and capabilities. Leaflet drops, radio broadcasts, and
loudspeakers blaring all manner of sounds from tank noises to Wagner's The Ride of the Valkeries are examples
of tactical level PSYOPS. The essence
of PSYOPS is presenting the enemy information (that is, entering into his
decision process) that causes him to react in a desired way.
Successful
PSYOPS campaigns and messages have specific characteristics. First, the intended outcome supports the
wider mission. Second, the PSYOPS
message is believable and verifiable by the enemy through his own means. Third, careful crafting is essential; PSYOPS
is a persuasive truth project. Cultural
intelligence and careful analysis of the adversary are necessary before the
fact. Effective PSYOPS campaigns
consider the enemy's viewpoint, observations, and issues. Fourth, constant feedback and analysis
ensure PSYOPS' continuous efficacy towards the mission.
The
believability of the PSYOPS message raises an important distinction between
PSYOPS and military deception. These
two facets of C2W are complimentary opposites. Distinguishing PSYOPS
is that it is truth-based, although
the whole truth is not always
used. PSYOPS aids military deception
operations by providing that part of the deception that is real. PSYOPS 'sets the hook'; deception
administers the sting. It can
"magnify and multiply the effects of deception."[49] PYSOPS, like all the pillars of C2W, is a
combinable arm.
The
psychological aspect of the enemy's will, the target of PSYOPS, is found both
in the mind of the enemy commander and in the individual minds of his
soldiery. At a minimum, each man
commands his own body, no matter how small his circumstances. While certainly convincing the enemy
commander that the cause is lost has more efficacy then convincing the lowest
private in ranks, the effect is the same. The enemy does not fight as efficiently. That loss of combat power aids the friendly cause. Achieving that point is the aim of PSYOPS.
Mass
media techniques are often used to convey the PSYOPS message, to include
broadcast media. Reaching the enemy's
ears through the electromagnetic spectrum is just one way to get the PSYOPS message
delivered. Many other military
functions use the electromagnetic spectrum. High use of this medium is a characteristic of modern operations and of
the Information Age. Not surprisingly,
modern war contains a contest for control of the electromagnetic spectrum. The battle is known as electronic
warfare and is the next component
of C2W we will address. This point also
marks our shift from truth-related C2W to C2W efforts that concentrate on the
physical portions of decision-making.
Electronic Warfare
In order to progress, radio only needs to go backwards
to the time... when radio was rather proud, alert and fast.
Edward R. Murrow, 1958[50]
The
prominent newsman Edward R. Murrow, whose career
saw the advent of both radio and
television journalism, was not
talking about electronic warfare (EW) when he offered the above
observation. He was talking about the
electronic media, yet from his words come two cogent observations about
EW. First, EW has been with us in some
form as long as we have used the electromagnetic spectrum--since the birth of
radio in the mid-1890s; and second, successful EW renders friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum "proud, alert and fast."
EW (Figure E) is defined as "any
military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed-energy to
control the electromagnetic spectrum
or to attack the
enemy."[51] EW has three subdivisions: electronic attack
(EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES).
EA
is the striking arm of EW. Formerly called
electronic countermeasures (ECM), EA employs electromagnetic or directed-energy
against adversary personnel, facilities and equipment that use the
electromagnetic spectrum. Yoked
to the C2-attack function, soft
kill expressions of EA
include jamming and electromagnetic
deception. Hard kill options include
antiradiation missiles or electromagnetic and directed-energy weapons such as
lasers and particle beams.[52]
EP
is the shield of EW. Answering to the
C2-protect requirement, EP defends friendly forces against adversary EA. Once called electronic
counter-countermeasures (ECCM), EP deconflicts communications frequencies so
that friendly EA activities (such as jamming) do not adversely effect friendly
C2.[53] EP is a factor included in EW planning when the
enemy possesses any EW capability.
ES
is the tactical expression of EW for the operational commander. Its purpose is immediate recognition of the
enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum. It is tied to signals intelligence, communications intelligence, and
electronic intelligence: it is a collector not a source of cogent analysis or
evaluation.[54] ES serves as electromagnetic 'eyes and
ears.' It is a sensor in the 'sensor to decision-maker to shooter' path
discussed in the previous chapter.
EW
efforts, composed as they are of EA, EP, and ES, are sophisticated and highly
technical, and are the aspect of C2W most related to hardware and systems. The fixed size of the electromagnetic
spectrum, shared by the three components of EW and by the enemy, further
complicates EW efforts. As proof,
consider the Joint Communications-Electronic Operating Instructions (JCEOI)
produced in over twelve editions by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) for
Operation Desert Storm. Ultimately, the
JCEOI totaled over a half million pages and weighed in at 85 tons.[55]
The
'science fiction or fact' nature of EW leaves many confused, yet the outcome of
the EW battle is the most directly measurable of the C2W pillars. Winners transmit, losers do not. Control of the 'electronic' line of
communications results.
Successful
EW, more then any other function of C2W, cuts the connective nerves of the
adversary body. It most directly
achieves the 'decapitation of the enemy's command
structure from its combat forces'
goal of C2W.
Exploitation
of the electromagnetic spectrum has been this century's addition to C2W. One aspect of C2W, C2W physical destruction,
employs the more traditional means of combat--physical destruction--to achieve
its aims. It is the next, and last,
pillar of C2W we will discuss.
C2W
Physical Destruction
Superior force is a powerful persuader.
Winston Churchill: Note to the
First Sea Lord, 15 October 1942[56]
C2W physical destruction is the use of
traditional modes of firepower in pursuit of C2W goals. As a target set, C2W physical destruction
(Figure F) generally concentrates on C2 nodes and sensors although it may be
employed in support of the other pillars of C2W. As a means, therefore, it is defined as "the use of 'hard
kill' weapons against designated targets as an element of the integrated C2W
effort."[57]
C2W destruction depends on the ability to
locate and identify targets that if neutralized, degrade the enemy's decision
process. This
includes attacking
hardware (sensors and communications systems) as well as command posts and the
actual decision-makers themselves. The
later point is simply demonstrated by recalling the age-old practice of aiming
for the enemy's officers first. Other
examples include cutting telegraph wires or raiding the enemy's command
post. C2W destruction captures the fact
that it is often of practical value to physically destroy, neutralize, suppress
and harass your enemy's C2.
C2W destruction belongs not as much to
information war
theory as it does
to traditional targeting. C2W destruct
targets serve C2W
much as preparatory fires serve maneuver.
The information
age's impact on how we organize and conduct war changes little the cogency of
knocking out your enemy's key capabilities. As the Churchill quote at the beginning of this section testifies,
sometimes force is a powerful
persuader.
To this point we have discussed the
individual pillars of C2W, yet the key to the successful implementation of C2W
is the integration of all its aspects. We will examine that next.
The
Greater Whole of C2W
The pillars of C2W are inextricably
intertwined. PSYOPS serves military
deception and vice versa, both
enhance OPSEC by distracting the enemy's attention. EW and C2W physical
destruction also
support each other--picture a HARM missile following the 'electrons' back to
their source to destroy the emitter--as well as supporting the other
pillars. In fact, it is difficult to
find examples of each of the pillars that do
not involve the other aspects of C2W. This is logical, for in the 'sensor to decision-maker to shooter' model,
it is impossible to separate truth (the moral) from the means that carry it
(the physical). An attack on one,
effects all.
C2W as a strategy demands the integration
of all its
parts in order to
reach its full potential. The pillars
are combinable in both design and function. The way of the past has been a haphazard appreciation for the way the
pillars inter-related, this will not be acceptable in the information age. Failure to deliberately plan and follow a
C2W strategy integrating all the pillars invites the loss of information
superiority and defeat. Let us consider
an example of the power of integrated C2W involving PSYOPS, military deception,
EW, and OPSEC. We return to WW II.
As
1943 became 1944 in the European Theater of Operations, Germany anticipated a
cross-channel invasion of France. The
location and date of the planned Overlord landings were the OPSEC jewel to be
protected, yet the Germans had the ability to gather information about the burgeoning
Allied invasion force and its preparations. Deception was called for in order to hide the real operational
objective--Normandy.
The actual effort combined PSYOPS and
deception and was carried on, in part, through EW. Several deception plans (Bodyguard, Quicksilver, and Fortitude)
painted a portrait that an invasion army under General George S. Patton was
forming in southeastern England opposite the most likely invasion site of Pas
de Calais. The location of the force
opposite the Pas de Calais (the closest point in France across the English
channel) seemed logical. Further, as in
the German view Patton was the likely commander, the deception story had
merit. An entirely fictious First U.S.
Army Group of more than fifty divisions, portrayed through false radio traffic,
completed the 'believable' picture. Patton himself--never without luster--made visible public appearances
and was often in the press, and was therefore "seen" to command an
army that did not exist.[58]
The sum effect was operational
surprise. The initial landings at
Normandy were considered by the Germans to be a feint. German operational reserves were held back
awaiting Patton's 'real' landing at Pas de Calais.[59] The successful deception confused the Axis
for several weeks; as a result
operational and
tactical surprise were achieved in Normandy.
The
whole of C2W exceeds the sum of each of the parts. Integrating the pillars of C2W is how to wage successful
C2W. Having laid out the pillars of C2W
individually and collectively, discussed their nature, and highlighted the
criticality of C2W in achieving information superiority, we will next examine a
case study. The purpose of our study
will be to analyze through historical example the effect of the integrated
pillars of C2W. In Chapter Three, we
will examine C2W in Operation Desert Storm.
CHAPTER THREE
...in Desert Storm, knowledge came to rival weapons and tactics in importance, giving
credence to the notion that an enemy might be brought to his knees principally
through destruction and disruption of the means for command and control.
Alan D. Campen, The First Information War[60]
Operation Desert Storm and C2W
Militarily,
Operation Desert Storm was a rout for the US and its coalition allies. The first major military conflict after the
end of the Cold War, Operation Desert Storm has been variously characterized as
"without precedent in the annals of warfare,"[61]
"inconsequential, even slightly ridiculous... a footnote, a conflict as
distant as the Boxer Rebellion of 1900,"[62] and "hollow".[63] Disputes over the character of the victory
aside, what is indisputable is that the fourth largest army in the world was
smashed in just six weeks and that US and coalition casualties were remarkably
low.[64] Iraqi forces, despite their battle hardening
in the Iran-Iraq War, were no match for the U.S. led whirlwind. Why? Part of the answer may be found in the U.S. use of a strategy of C2W to
decapitate the Iraqi war machine.
In
Desert Storm, C2W was a rousing success and a key factor in the swift nature of
the Coalition's triumph. This chapter will look at and analyze Operation Desert
Storm from a C2W standpoint. The intent
is to demonstrate C2W's criticality in
the rout of the Iraqis, and through specific historical example, confirm C2W's
value as a military strategy. Operation
Desert Storm is chosen as the example because it is, in my view, the first war
of the information age.
Alan
D. Campen, editor of a collection of essays concerning communications,
computers, and intelligence systems in ODS, first proposed that the outcome of
ODS, "turned as much on superior knowledge as it did upon performance of
people and weapons."[65] This contention supports the position taken
earlier in this work, namely that the collision of information age technologies
and the ancient quest for information superiority have produced a dramatic new
way to wage war. Using advanced
technologies--and the pillars of C2W--Coalition Forces created an informational
differential that was the key to rapid victory. U.S. Air Force Colonel Edward Mann does not disagree. Citing the increased relevance of the
struggle to dominate the enemy in terms of information and knowledge in modern
warfighting, he unequivocally links ODS with information warfare. Using Tofflerian terms, he credits "the
overwhelming defeat" of Iraq to the fact that "Saddam Hussein's
industrial-era armed forces ran up against a post-industrial [that is,
information age] military whirlwind."[66]
Our
central thesis of this work is that waging successful information war is how
wars will be won in the future and that winning the C2W battle is how military
forces wage successful information war. This said, let us now return to C2W in ODS. We will begin with an overview of strategic planning as Desert
Shield transitioned to Desert Storm.
Operation Desert Storm: The Plan
Once
the decision to intervene in the crisis was taken, the US National Command
Authority (NCA) recognized the potential need to forcibly dislodge the Iraqis
from Kuwait. Accordingly, General H.
Norman Schwarzkopf USA, Commander-in-Chief (CINC), US Central Command
(CENTCOM), was tasked by the NCA to develop an offensive strategy. On 25 August 1990, General Schwarzkopf
briefed the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS on
a four-phase campaign designed to provide a multiple axis, coordinated air,
ground and naval campaign.[67]
Phase
I was a strategic air campaign against Iraq. Phase II attacked Iraqi air forces
in Kuwait. Phase III changed the target
to Iraqi ground combat units (specifically the elite Republican Guard) with a
design of attriting enemy ground combat power and isolating the Kuwaiti
battlefield. Finally, Phase IV was a
ground offensive to expel Iraqi forces from the physical limits of Kuwait. These phases were to remain essentially the
same throughout the conduct of the Gulf War, minor semantic changes not
withstanding.[68] It was a blueprint for victory, a cogent way
of organizing Coalition effort.
On
the surface, Schwarzkopf's four phases were not revolutionary. Strategic air campaigns, the intial phase,
were fought during World War II and continued on after as a hallmark of Cold
War planning; embodied, of course, in the U.S. Strategic Air Command. The middle two phases, gaining air
superiority and attriting the enemy's ground forces, also were not departures.
They are traditional measures taken prior to any ground campaign--Schwarzkopf's
fourth phase. To understand how C2W was
integrated with ODS strategy, we must peer inside General Schwarzkopf's intent.
Commander's Intent and C2W
At
the same 25 August briefing, General Schwarzkopf
presented his intent for the
offensive campaign. It included what we
now call C2W concepts as integral to his
scheme, as noted in bold [emphasis
added]:
"We
will offset the imbalance of ground combat power by using our strength against
his weakness. Initially, execute deception operations to focus
his attention on defense and cause incorrect organization of forces. We will initially attack into the Iraqi
homeland using air power to decapitate
his leadership, command and control and eliminate his ability to reinforce
Iraqi forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq. We will then gain undisputed air superiority over Kuwait so that we can
subsequently and selectively attack Iraqi ground forces with air power in order
to reduce his combat power and destroy reinforcing units. Finally, we will fix Iraqi forces in place by feints and limited objective
attacks followed by an armored force penetration and exploitation to seize
key lines of communication nodes, which we will put us in a position to
interdict re-supply and remaining reinforcements from Iraq and eliminate forces
in Kuwait."[69]
C2W
concepts are prominent in Schwarzkopf's intent. The military deception and C2W physical destruction pillars of
C2W leap from the page. The inclusion
of decapitation of leadership and C2 systems as goals intrinsically embrace
C2W. C2W pillars were to be used to
shape the battlefield environment in a decisive way; from this would come
information superiority.
Information Superiority in ODS
In
JV 2010 terms, General Schwarzkopf was seeking information superiority. As further proof, consider this unclassified
extract from his operations order:
"(u)
The basic targets are...the enemy's
command and control capability and all supporting information. In broad terms these include the equipment,
people perceptions, functions and processes which facilitate the enemy commander's decision making and
control of forces. [emphasis added]"[70]
Schwarzkopf's
intent was realized and the Coalition attained information superiority in
ODS. Coalition planners benefited from
remarkably clear pictures of the enemy's dispositions, gained mostly through
dominance of both the air (enabling platforms like JSTARS and AWACS to perform,
as well as photo-reconnaissance assets) and the electromagnetic spectrum. Contrastingly, no Iraqi aircraft ever
overflew U.S. forces. Further,
successful EW prevented Saddam's ears from compensating for the blindness of
his eyes. U.S. satellite systems, aided
by the desert conditions, produced exceptional imagery throughout the
conflict. Divination and analysis of
Iraqi intentions, especially at the strategic level, experienced difficulty due
the lack of human intelligence sources, however the Coalition generally knew
where the enemy was in excellent detail.[71]
Coalition
attacks on Iraqi C2 using both hard-kill and soft-kill means further widened
the information gap. What Iraqi sensors
perceived could not always get through to the decision-makers for analysis and
decision; transmission to shooters was likewise degraded. What the sensors percieved--those sensors
left operating--was often false,
leading to an incorrect estimate of
the situation and bad
decisions. The resulting asymmetrical battlespace
awareness led to decisive defeat
for Iraq.
How
decisive? Beside the blinding rapidity
of the 100-hour ground campaign, Coalition casualties were remarkably low. Stephen Biddle tells us:
"In
less than six weeks, 795,000 Coalition troops destroyed a defending Iraqi army
of hundreds of thousands, losing only 240 attackers. This loss rate of fewer then one fatality per 3,000 soldiers was
less then one tenth of the Israeli's' loss rate in either the 1967 Six-Day War
or the Bekaa Valley campaign in 1982, less then one twentieth of the Germans'
in their blitzkrieg against Poland or France in 1939-40, and about one
one-thousandth of the U.S. Marines' in the invasion of Tarawa in 1943."[72]
In
short, by the measure of cost as compared to scale, the Gulf War was amongst
the most lopsided in history. This
occurred despite the survival of Iraqi armor in significant numbers prior to
the start of the ground war.[73] Opinions and observations over
the quality of the Iraqi forces and
commanders aside,[74]
there is a direct linkage between the stunning success and the employment of
C2W concepts to gain information superiority.
Let
us now turn more specifically to how C2W concepts contributed to the rapid
decision and one-side victory over Iraq. The next section offers the historical evidence.
C2W in ODS
The
objective of this section is two-fold: 1) to demonstrate the operational
lethality of integrated C2W; and 2) to demonstrate that the successful
execution of C2W strategy--leading to information superiority--was a primary reason
for the Coalition's speedy and lopsided victory over Iraq.
To
demonstrate the above, only selected examples will be discussed. The interwoven pillars of C2W were in
harness continuously throughout the Gulf War[75], and it is
beyond the scope of this work to catalog them all. Therefore, to demonstrate my points, I have chosen two major
examples of decisive C2W in ODS. The
first is physical: the 'anti-head' and 'anti-neck' strategic air campaign. The second is moral: the elaborate military
deception campaign that completely mystified the Iraqis as to where the
Coalition land forces would strike. The
first example attacked the brain and nervous system of the Iraqi war machine,
the second dizzily spun its attention about, causing it to be off-balance and
maloriented--ripe for the knockout punch. Their interaction was decisive. We will begin with the strategic air campaign.
Douhet's Dream Refined: Airpower in ODS
No
discussion of ODS would be complete if it did not recognize the dramatic effect
of Coalition airpower. A world-wide
audience sat entranced in front of their televisions as the first bombs fell on
Baghdad just before 3 a.m. local time on 17 January 1991. Desert Storm had begun.
The
initial airstrikes were part of a dedicated campaign to "silence Saddam --
to destroy his ability to command the forces arrayed against ours."[76] Code named "Instant Thunder", the
strategic air campaign's first objective was to "isolate and incapacitate
the Iraqi regime" by attacking its leadership command facilities,
electrical production infrastructure, telecommunications, and C3 systems.[77] It was the brainchild of Air Force Colonel
John Warden and his 'Checkmate' planning staff. Instant Thunder
was based upon Warden's vision of
the enemy as a system of
five rings. The center ring in his vision is the
leadership of the enemy--the center of gravity to be attacked with airpower.[78]
Forty-five
'Leadership command facilities' were in Baghdad alone, with others scattered
throughout the country. The desired end-state was the fragmentation, disruption
and degradation of the enemy's decision process.[79] Targets struck the first night, in
demonstration of their importance, included the Baghdad International Telephone
Exchange (dubbed the AT&T building), the Presidential Palace command center
and bunker, the Ministries of Defense, Intelligence and Propaganda, as well as
the headquarters of the Iraqi Air Force, Secret Police, Republican Guard, Baath
party, and National Air Defense.[80]
The
strategic air campaign was nothing less then a dedicated attack on the central
nervous system of Iraq.[81] It was C2W physical destruction employed at
both the head of the enemy, but also at its 'neck'; that is to say, its ability
to receive information and transmit direction. Other pillars of C2W were
employed--especially EW--at the tactics, techniques, and procedures level. A U.S. Army attack helicopter raid on Iraqi
air warning radars on the first night of the war, credited with "cutting
the keyhole" for the air campaign, is an example of C2W aimed at sensors.[82]
The
destruction of the Iraqi Air defense system ('Kari' or Iraq backwards in
French) is an example of C2W destroying the enemy's capabilities from the
inside out. By breaking the connections
between air defense sites, the entire system was burdened. The strike at the central node was designed
to paralyze the overloaded system by incapacitating the decision-maker at the
moment of greatest need. The result was
an ineffective and uncoordinated air defense effort, and ultimately, the
surrender of the contest for air superiority before it had begun.[83]
Some
debate lingers over whether Instant Thunder was fully effective. The U.S. Air Force Institute believes it
was, and that it effectively cut Saddam off from his forces, blinded him to
Coalition moves, and silenced him from providing active
strategic, operational or tactical
direction.[84] Dr. Herman Gilster believes the impact was
questionable, noting that although Iraqi C2 was degraded, the dedicated air
attacks did not succeed in either toppling the regime or completely severing
communication with forces inside the KTO.[85] This critiscm misses the point, for neither
was an objective of the campaign. The
real objective was to degrade--not destroy--the enemy's decision loop, thus
allowing the Coalition to "OODA" faster then the Iraqis.
Perhaps
the best proof may come from the Iraqis themselves. At the Safwan cease fire talks at the end of the ground war,
Iraqi generals were shocked at the amount of POWs taken and at the extent of
the territory captured.[86]
Their surprise does not suggest an accurate understanding of the
situation. Alan D. Campen cites Iraqi
POWs revealing that "...intelligence officers used Radio Saudi
Arabia...and the Voice of America as sources to brief Commanders."[87]
In the final measure, the numerous instances of uncoordinated and ineffective
Iraqi military efforts at levels from highest to lowest, speak eloquently about
the decisive
success of the C2W attack on the
head and neck of Iraq.
Italian
air power theorist Giulio Douhet dreamed of fleets of bombers attacking enemy
population centers, government, and industry. Sailing over the horrors of the trenches, airpower would be the decisive
arm of warfare.[88]
In Desert Storm, through the
targeting philosophy of C2W, his dream may have been finally vindicated."[89]
This explains the U.S. Air Force's embrace of Information Warfare as a
Revolution in Military Affairs, as their ODS experience attacking the C2W
target set validates their service ethic, derived from Douhet and Mitchell,
concerning the primacy and decisive character of airpower.
In
the first example, we have discussed the physical destructiveness of C2W. The Air Force is justifiably proud of their
performance in ODS, yet C2W encompasses more then C2W physical destruction. Next we will review a decisive
example of C2W's moral aspect.
Tricking the Devil: Military Deception in
ODS
As
shown earlier in this chapter, Schwarzkopf's intent statement called for
deception to "focus his attention on defense and cause incorrect
organization of forces."[90] What CINCENT wanted was Saddam Hussein's
incorrect estimate of the situation as it pertained to Coalition ground attack
options. If achieved, the subsequent
Iraqi force disposition plan would expose Saddam's flank to the left hook of
the ground campaign. Schwarzkopf needed
to focus Saddam's attention away from the west. The danger was real; if the repositioning of the U.S. XVIII
Airborne and VII Corps--over 100,000 thousand troops and 1,200 tanks an average
distance of 200 miles--was to be observed, the planned ground scheme of
maneuver would be compromised and operational surprise lost. A properly executed deception plan would
make Saddam look in the wrong direction--away from where the hook would be
launched--and position his defense accordingly. From this need came a plan that integrated all the pillars of C2W
in the service
of deception.
The
deception effort was multi-faceted. In
the Persian Gulf, a series of large, well-publicized, amphibious exercises
entitled 'Sea Soldier (I-IV)' and 'Imminent Thunder' showed Saddam Hussein a
creditable threat on his eastern flank. Involving over twenty-one thousand Marines and sailors embarked in forty
amphibious ships, it was the largest amphibious force afloat post-Inchon. Aiding the cause, Newsweek magazine dedicated a feature article to a planned
amphibious invasion in the middle of February.[91] U.S. Navy SEALS conducted beach
reconnaissance in Kuwait and got into firefights with Iraqi coastal defenders.[92] Also, air and surface battlefield
preparatory fires remained concentrated in the KTO until just prior to 24
February.
All
this activity could not be ignored and Saddam did not ignore it. His focus stayed to the east and to the
coast, including the "shifting of several divisions and hundreds of heavy
guns to reinforce Kuwaiti beaches."[93] Somewhere
between 8 to 11 divisions stayed oriented on the coast, their attention fixed
in the wrong direction.
The
amphibious deception looked real because for a while it was real. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor have
classified it "deception by default" because it was not until early
February, 1991 that the real amphibious option was dismissed.[94] This characterization may be harsh. It is likely Schwarzkopf retained an
amphibious option for any of a combination of practical, political, and
deceptive purposes. However, the
truthful aspect of the amphibious option--springing from whatever
source--speaks to PSYOPS, and the combination of PSYOPS with deception, even
deception by default, proved very effective.
Ashore,
in the blank spaces of the Iraqi's attention, XVIII Airborne and VII Corps were
meanwhile moving west into their eventual attack positions. A Potemkin Village built electronically
through false radio traffic, electronic emissions, and run by a small force at
Forward Operating Base Weasel, signaled the false presence of both Corps due
south of Kuwait. Computers routed
messages, loudspeakers offered sound recordings, smoke generators made dust
clouds. The message for the Iraqis was
that the Coalition intended an attack into Kuwait from the South.[95] Stringent OPSEC protected the real plan,
despite a published Newsweek
projection of the likely ground war that depicted the actual ground scheme of
maneuver with astonishing veracity.[96]
In
support of the deception plan, XVIII Airborne Corps feinted in divisional
strength into the likely attack avenue of the Wadi al Batin, made contact and
took casualties before withdrawing. The
fixing attack, paid for in blood, supported the overall ruse that the Coalition
was coming straight into the Saddam Line in southern Kuwait. The attack was credible because of the
casualties; the Iraqis perceived it as a probing attack for the expected main
thrust. As a result, four Iraqi
Divisions
were re-positioned to block
the Wadi.[97] The deception was successful as "false
sensing" led to shifted forces.
The
combined effect of the deception effort was to render the Iraqi offense
off-balance and poorly positioned. PSYOPS, EW, OPSEC, and C2W physical destruction combined to make the
deception believable and effective. When the left hook launched, the boxer was looking the wrong way and his
guard was down. C2W materially enhanced
the effect of the blow. The armored
fist was a first round haymaker because the enemy never saw it coming.
C2W in ODS: Decisive
In
ODS, the Coalition's information superiority gained through successful C2W was
decisive. The Iraqis were rendered
off-balance and susceptible to dramatic defeat. The conduct of the culminating ground campaign was not a fair
fight, nor were the preceding three phases. From the very beginning, C2W concepts animated Coalition planning and
execution. The C2W target set, attacked
as a first priority with both hard kill and soft kill means, caused an
information differential between the adversaries that could not be
overcome. The C2W strategy, supported
by superior technologies, leadership, and soldiery operating under an umbrella
of information superiority, produced the most lopsided victory in modern
history. At the operational and
tactical level, it is a model of successful warfare in the information age.
CHAPTER FOUR
What to Make of All of This
Building
on the three previous chapters, four main points thrust themselves
forward. These points are: 1) The new
battlespace; 2) The impetus to change; 3) The prize; and 4) The key to
victory. Each point builds on the
previous one and combines into a single argument for war is a seamless web. All serve the jealous mistress of
victory. We will address each in turn,
beginning with the new battlespace.
The New Battlespace
The
arrival of the information age is irreversible. Information age trends--increased sensor output and capability,
speed of transmission, stress on the Napoleonic staff model, and dependency on
information systems to wage war--will continue their sine wave climb. New capabilities will rise from trough to
the wave top to achieve the potential of new technologies. The adverse impacts of the information age
on military operations will be negated. A way will be found to prevent overwhelming the decision process through
volume, hierarchies will flatten to more efficiently share information. Real time awareness will be
increasingly available.
All
the above trends are underway now. We
will embrace them or suffer the consequences. Information has become a fifth dimension, taking its place along earth,
sea, sky, and time. As we embrace its
possibilities, we will not be able to avoid our increasing dependence--and
therefore vulnerabilty--on information systems and 'system-of-systems' to wage
war. From this dependence flows the
first point: the battlespace of the information age will be information systems
and the military information path of 'sensor to decision-maker to
shooter.' The struggle in this new
battlespace will be to protect one's own information systems and path while
attacking the enemy's. We will have to
continue to change to win this struggle. The reason to do so is our next point.
The Impetus to Change
The
impetus to change is simple. Operation
Desert Storm points out the one-sided outcome of the military collision between
industrial age forces and those with information age technologies in harness. The impetus to change therefore is the
opportunity to gain asymmetric real-time situational awareness, or simply,
information superiority. Failure to do
so is dangerous folly and invites defeat in ODS-like magnitude. "Adapt or die" is Darwinian truth in any survival
situation. This truth resonates on battlefields through history
and applies fully as the information age arrives.
The
author of Joint Vision 2010 intrinsically
understands this, and for this
reason the vision's epistemology begins with information superiority. Information superiority is correctly the enabling
architecture for JV 2010's principal concepts. Without the foundation stone of information superiority, dominant
maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection and focused logistics
are not attainable.
JV 2010 seeks the extra-sensory advantage of
the sighted boxer over a blind opponent. Cursing not the darkness, JV 2010 relies on the candle of information
superiority to reveal the true prize. That prize, flowing from information superiority, is addressed in our
next section.
The Prize
The
prize accruing from possession of information superiority is the ability to
influence the enemy commander's decision loop while maintaining the sanctity of
our own. When achieved, the enemy
commander sees only what we wish him to see, and further cannot distinguish
between what is real and unreal. His
decisions therefore are adversely impacted and intrinsically faulty. Bad decisions flow from bad data and/or
incomplete information. The enemy
commander unconsciously adopts a false situational awareness. This false awareness deserts him faithlessly
when friendly forces impose reality at a time and place of
our choosing. At that juncture, the game is lost.
When
the prize of information superiority is achieved, the enemy commander is
transformed by his own decisions into an obliging opponent. His mistakes support our plans. His degraded systems further exacerbate his
inefficiency. His efforts in opposition
to our will lose focus and cohesion. At
a very minimum, his decision loop is slower than ours, granting us advantage.
Given
the new battlespace of the information age, the impetus to embrace the changes
needed to be successful on that battlespace, and the prize of information
superiority, what is the key to achieving this vision? The answer is found in the next section.
The Key to Victory
The
key to victory is the adoption of the strategy and target set that is Command
and Control Warfare. Successful C2W is
how military forces gain information superiority in the information age. Achieving this posits successful information
war and information war is how wars will be won in the future.
Achieving information superiority will be a
mandatory precursor to victory in the information age. As margins of error will consistently
continue to shrink opposite the growth of technological capabilities, the
danger of 'second-place' situational awareness and decision loops is
precipitous. Operation Desert Storm
revealed just how steep that precipice can be. Saddam Hussein--considered an industrial age power--faced only
the embryonic avatar of a truly information age force and was dramatically
routed.
Joint
Vision 2010 is the road map to that information
age force. To realize JV 2010, a concurrent embrace of
C2W must also occur. This embrace is
needed to give JV 2010 an organizing focus and strategy to illuminate its trek
into the future. To be effective at the
operational level of warfare, C2W must encompass more than its strategic
dimension, a dimension that has dominated most of the discussion to date. Several specific recommendations along this
line follow below.
First,
C2W must be seen as a discrete operational strategy, one that is superior to
the sum of its parts. Appreciation of
individual pillars and a haphazard approach to their combination (e.g.,
"deception by default") will not meet the standards of the new
battlespace. C2W guidance spread out
over four annexes and various appendixes, as was the case in CENTCOM's ODS
operations order, does not fully provide the full potential of C2W pillars
welded into a decisive whole. C2W must
be an up-front, integrated strategy that flows smoothly from Commander's intent
through execution. Moral and physical
expressions of C2W must be employed in harmony. In this strategy, all the pillars must
be fully integrated in order to
achieve synergy.
Second,
to achieve this end, an adaptation of how we plan operations is
recommended. C2W must be viewed as a
distinct battlefield function, much as maneuver, shaping, support, and force
protection are viewed today. Further,
C2W must be seen as co-equal to these
functions and completely integrated in the future planning process. This entails establishing a proponent for
C2W in each planning cell, responsible for integrating C2W concepts and target
sets throughout the envisioned actions of the force.
Currently,
C2W considerations are more often than not a subset of 'shaping', although its
interplay with force protection, support, and maneuver are readily
apparent. Any subordination of C2W to
other functional concepts fundamentally misses its importance in the
information age. The nature of the
information age battlespace demands--at a very minimum--the elevation of C2W as
a functional proponent on par with the existing proponents. Further, given the baseline requirement to
gain information superiority--and the dramatic results when it is not
achieved--C2W arguably is the lead concept. This step is also consistent with JV 2010's view of information
superiority as the key enabling concept.
Absent
C2W, shaping reverts more to traditional roles,
oriented on the enemy's means,
position in the battlespace,
logistics, and other physical
expression of his power. Shaping will
serve C2W (and the other proponency concepts), analogous to the way C2W
physical destruction serves the other pillars of C2W. Integrating and combining still occur in the name of generating
synergy.
Last,
C2W must continue its movement into the realm of the operational art. It can not remain solely at the strategic
level where its 'science fiction' reputation causes many to miss its cogency
and powerful effect for the information age. C2W--as a warfighting approach--is central to successful warfighting in
the information age and is thus of practical interest to the operational
warfighter. This paper (as an open
goal) hopes to facilitate the understanding and acceptance of C2W by
warfighters.
Miles
to Go Before I Sleep
Just
as a raging torrent will cut new and unexpected channels for the riverbed, so
does the application of C2W to the operational art raise more questions then
answers. Unanswered issues yet to be explored include how C2W will apply in the
likely Military Operations Other Then War (MOOTW) challenges of the
future. If the center of gravity in
MOOTW is the civil populace, then C2W is a superb vehicle to "win hearts
and minds." Central to this
observation is determining what is the military's proper role in C2W aimed at a
civil populace. Does the military lead
or follow civilian agencies such as the Department of State? What of international organizations and
non-governmental organizations such as the Red Cross? Can war be 'conducted' by civil agencies? What are the legal ramifications of the
non-consensual co-opting of the media to serve C2W? Where does propaganda, military public affairs, and deterrence
based upon the moral aspects of C2W separate? Do they ever?
Related
to the above and yet unanswered are the links
between C2W and recent ideas on the
merging levels of war and the concurrent expansion of the battlefield.[98] Effective C2W at the operational level
likely will begin in peacetime. Does
waging "information operations"--the doctrinal expression for C2W in
peacetime[99]--blur
the distinction between peace and war?
What can we make of merged levels, expanded battlefields, and no clear
distinction of peace and war. What
happens to our basic understanding of war? Is the targeting of an adversary for "peacetime C2W" an act of
war? What then of the distinction
between combatant and noncombatant?
Organizations
change as the wave crest of military revolutions crash upon them. The introduction of firearms caused the
transition from mass formations to those of line and column. So does the information age posit changes to
the way we organize for war. Already
highlighted are the likely flattening of hierarchies. We must ensure that our staff and force structures adapt to
information war and C2W instead of the reverse. Grafting C2W onto existing staff and command structures will in
time be inferior to those purpose-built to wage C2W. The point is we must fundamentally review whether we are
organized correctly to wage C2W to its full potential.
These
are issues for future exploration, study and analysis;
they are illuminative not exhaustive. This much we know: C2W is how we will achieve information
superiority in the information battlespace at the operational and tactical
levels of war. It is the key to Joint
Vision 2010. Embracing it takes us one
step deeper into the dawning information age. It is a step we must take.
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