The
Navy currently employs two types of forward deployed entities, the Aircraft
Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) and the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). The CVBG with its composite air wing (F-14,
F/A-18, S-3, E-2C, EA-6, and SH-60), surface combatant escorts (cruisers,
destroyers, and frigates), direct support attack submarines, and logistics ship
is clearly a blue-water dominant battle group. The ARG consists of an amphibious assault ship (LHA, LHD, or LPH), a
Dock Landing Ship (LSD), an amphibious transport dock (LPD), and a Special
Operations Capable Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU(SOC));
by itself, except in the most benign
battlespace, the ARG is neither a blue-water dominant group nor a littoral
dominant group. The only littoral
dominant group is a combination of the ARG and elements of the CVBG.
There
are two clear points in the Navy's strategic vision: (1) the Navy must retain
its ability to dominate the blue-water regions of the world (i.e., keep
sufficient Aircraft Carriers to accomplish that mission), and (2) the Navy must
improve its ability to provide decisive crisis response in the littoral regions
of the world. This thesis suggests an
alternate and fiscally responsible way to improve decisive crisis response
capability in the littoral battlespace. It will address the who and what of decisive operations in the littoral
battlespace.
EMPLOYING
A LITTORAL DOMINANT BATTLE GROUP
Background
The
United States Naval Service--the Navy and Marine Corps--operates in the oceans
and littoral regions of the world to "project power and influence of the nation
across the seas to foreign waters and shores in both peace and war."[7] For most of the twentieth century, the
United States Navy was mostly interested in blue-water operations. During the Cold War, the Navy's strategic
focus was on achieving global maritime dominance. Due to the demise of the Soviet Union and with it the only global
fleet seen as a potential adversary, the United States Navy's strategic focus
shifted to littoral operations and power projection from the sea. That shift in strategic focus was
articulated in the Department of the Navy's publications--"From the
Sea" and "Forward...From the Sea."
Currently,
the Navy contributes combat power to theater commanders in the form of Aircraft
Carrier Battle Groups, Amphibious Ready Groups, and Independent Deployers
(e.g., Maritime Patrol Aircraft Detachments and one or more surface
combatants). Those forces are trained,
organized, and equipped to conduct a wide range of tactical evolutions
including peacetime engagements (e.g., port visits and exercises), maritime dominance
(e.g., protection and denial of sea lines of communications), and power
projection from the sea (e.g., amphibious demonstrations and forced entry
operation). Because forward deployed
Naval forces are available to respond quickly, require minimum support, and are
less constrained by potential diplomatic restrictions that could be imposed on
land-based forces by their all too necessary host nations, naval forces enjoy
far greater employment options as compared to the Army and Air Force. This means that the naval services can
respond to most crisis situations quicker than other services and with a wider
range of tactical options.
The
congressionally mandated roles of naval forces are maintaining maritime
superiority, contributing to regional security, conducting operations from the
sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land
operations as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns.[8] The management of those naval campaigns is
the job of navy staffs. During the
early days of a crisis situation the Navy has basically two staffs and their
associated forces readily available to respond to the crisis: (1) the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group (CVBG)
commanded by a Carrier Group Commander (CARGRU) or a Cruiser Destroyer Group
Commander (CRUDESGRU) both Rear Admirals (O-7 or 8 grade officers), and (2) the
Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with its embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)
commanded by an Amphibious Squadron Commander (PHIBRON) and a MEU commander,
both O-6 grade officers, respectively. If the crisis situation is too large in scope or has the potential for
escalation, then those forward deployed staffs and assets become the "building
blocks" for follow-on naval forces.
Building on normally deployed forces, the
Navy can mass, if the situation requires, multiple Aircraft Carrier
Battle Groups into Carrier Battle Forces, Amphibious Ready Groups with embarked
Marine Expeditionary Units, and as needed project those naval expeditionary
forces ashore using the afloat Maritime Prepositioning Force. Such massing of naval units can be
complimented
by the deployment of Army and Air Force units to provide a joint
force capable of the full range of combat operations that may be required.[9]
Those
follow-on naval forces of the littorally focused future will likely include a
Marine Expeditionary Force Forward (MEF Forward), which is a Marine Air Ground
Task Force (MAGTF) whose size is variable but somewhere between a MEU-sized
force and an entire MEF. A MEF Forward
will typically be commanded by a Marine Corps Brigadier General. It is safe to assume that if a MEF Forward
sized force is dispatched overseas to respond to a crisis, then Maritime
Preposition Force (MPF) ships will also be routed to that crisis area to
provide sustainment for the MEF Forward. Therefore, per current doctrine, the Navy will send an Amphibious Group
(PHIBGRU) commander (Rear Admiral) and staff to the area to coordinate the
off-load and marrying-up of the MEF Forward and the MPF assets. Once in theater, that PHIBGRU commander and
staff will most likely stay to command, as Amphibious Task Force Commander
(CATF), any MEF Forward-sized amphibious operation, as was the case during the
Gulf War. This is due in part to the
limitations of a PHIBRON staff to effectively coordinate much more than an ARG
sized Amphibious Task Force (ATF). However, there is one flaw with that practice which has to do with the
organization and employment of the PHIBGRU staff.
Key Issue
A
PHIBGRU staff is primarily organized for administrative functions (i.e.,
managing maintenance, basic training, and other non-operational functions such
as personnel issues for the amphibious ships that are not on deployment or
working-up for a deployment) rather than tactical operations. The PHIBGRUs, 2 in the Atlantic, 3 in the
Pacific, and 1 in the Western Pacific, own all the amphibious ships and the
nine PHIBRONs (four each assigned to PHIBGRU 2 and 3, and the remaining one
assigned to PHIBGRU 1). Three ship ARGs
are assigned to a deploying PHIBRON approximately six months prior to
deployment. The PHIBRON oversees the
operational employment and training of the ships throughout the work-up phase
and the deployment while maintenance and administration are still the
responsibility of the PHIBGRU staff.
If
a PHIBGRU commander is called on to conduct tactical operations (normally
large-scale operations), standard procedures call for the PHIBGRU commander to
subsume one of his or her PHIBRON commanders as the chief of staff for the
tactical operation while PHIBGRU's billeted chief of staff and other selected
members stay behind to perform the PHIBGRU's administrative functions. In contrast, nothing like that happens in
the CVBG structure: CARGRU, CRUDESGRU,
and even Destroyer Squadron (DESRON--the equivalent of a PHIBRON) staffs retain
all administrative and tactical duties at all times. The CARGRUs, CRUDESGRUs and DESRONs have, since August 1995,
permanently assigned ships. Their
staffs are organized and manned to enable them to manage simultaneously and over
the life-cycle of the ships both the administrative and operational employment
of their assigned ships
The
subsumption of a PHIBRON commander also includes subsumption of the rest of the
PHIBRON staff to help perform the tactical planning and execution functions of
the PHIBGRU. The subsumption of a
PHIBRON builds an ad hoc amphibious staff that has a great deal of individual
operational experience but lacks operational experience and cohesiveness as a
tactical staff. That potentially
promotes unnecessary friction within the staff. It also promotes unnecessary external friction, as the ad hoc
PHIBGRU staff inter-operates with other staffs and ships that have had little
tactical experience working with and for the PHIBGRU staff. Those internal and external frictions are
potentially magnified if an amphibious operation, often deemed the most complex
type of military operation, is being employed.
The
Navy, if truly committed to its littoral and maneuver warfare focus, must
promote the understanding of the land battle from its inception well out to sea
through its transition of command ashore. The littoral battlespace and maneuver warfare are far different from
Alfred Thayer Mahan's massed fleet theory of seeking out and destroying the
enemy's fleet to gain unimpeded use of the sea. Tomorrow's coastal defense threat (mobile, lethal, and
survivable) will require the Navy to build and train forces to employ maneuver
warfare from over the horizon. The
Arsenal Ship, a strike and fire support platform, goes a long way towards
building the required forces. What is
needed are littoral warfare experts trained and experienced employing maneuver
warfare.[10] They must be able to understand how the Navy
can best maneuver and shape the enemy while optimizing force protection and
sustainability of naval forces at sea and ashore. They must also be equipped with the best command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(C4ISR) systems available in order to maximize their ability to operate on the
increasingly fast-paced and widely dispersed battle field.
The
Navy faces some challenges developing commanders and their staffs to be capable
of planning and executing operational maneuver from the sea. Currently, the only navy staffs getting
tactical experience in littoral warfare and ground operations in the overseas
operating areas, where crises are likely to occur in the future, are the
PHIBRONs: CARGRUs and CRUDESGRUs have
little to do with ARG operations overseas, and PHIBGRUs do not deploy nor do
large-scale amphibious exercises occur frequently enough, due to their high
costs, to provide them with high quality at-sea training. To borrow a phrase from the Marine Corps,
the MEF or MEF Forward commander is the "warfighter." Who is the Navy's littoral "warfighter?" The answer is not the CVBG staff due to
experience and knowledge limitations in amphibious and ground combat
operations. The answer is not the
PHIBRON staff due to their size limitation and lack of strike warfare
experience to coordinate the Navy's shaping assets. More than likely, the Navy will turn to the PHIBGRU commander who
suffers from staff limitation foremost in readiness because of the staff's low
operating tempo and manning that is not focused on tactical littoral
operations. The PHIBGRU commander also
suffers in the area of C4ISR capabilities. It is not very often that a PHIBGRU commander conducts amphibious
warfare exercises from the decks of a Amphibious Command Ship (LCC), a ship
designed specifically to serve as the command ship for the Commander,
Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF). LCCs have become the home of the numbered
fleet commanders. LHAs and LHDs have
good C4ISR capabilities but they have not received the same priority for
upgrades as the navy's premier capital ship, the aircraft carrier.
Proposed Littoral Dominant Staff
To
rectify the problems that plague the Navy's ability to develop littoral warfare
dominance, I propose the creation of deploying PHIBGRU staffs, two per coast,
organized more along the lines of the CARGRU and CRUDESGRU staffs. Furthermore, the PHIBGRUs must redistribute
custody of amphibious ships and have PHIBRONs assume the permanent ownership of
their ARGs, a concept recently proven in the DESRON community. That will require some minor changes to the
PHIBRON's organization and manning, and
a reduction in the number of PHIBRONs from nine down to eight in order to keep
one staff for each deploying ARG.
The
reorganization of the PHIBGRU staff bears some additional comments. The flag support (N0x personnel that work
for the Chief of Staff), administration (N1), and intelligence (N2) departments
are adequately structured and do not need to be changed. Specifically, the PHIBGRU's intelligence
department works out of the amphibious
flagship's intelligence center, therefore, the intelligence center becomes the
focal point for all-source intelligence fusion through the combined efforts of
the flagship, PHIBGRU, and MEU(SOC) intelligence personnel.
The
operations department should have the following divisions to support execution
of maneuver warfare from the sea: surface, ground, air, and submarine. Heading up the operations department should be a navy captain or a
marine colonel. The surface operations
division should be led by a post-commander command navy surface warfare officer
with strong amphibious warfare experience. The surface operations division should be staffed with an appropriate mix
of supporting personnel, such as operations, combat systems, or deck
experienced officers. The air
operations division should be led by a post-commander command aviator with
strong air assault experience. The air
operations division should be staffed with appropriate supporting personnel, such
as strike warfare specialists in tomahawk and attack aircraft communities, and
assault support aviators. The ground
operations division should be led by a field grade ground combat officer. The ground operations division should be
staffed with an appropriate mix (infantry, artillery, or armor) of company
grade or junior field grade ground combat officers as well as a marine
logistician. The submarine division
should be led by a post department head submarine officer. Also, the operations department requires a
host of talented enlisted personnel to support the management and execution of
the departments responsibilities.
The
material department (N4) should be reorganized by decreasing the amount of navy
engineering influence, due to the reduction in ships assigned, and emphasize
more the logistics and sustainment at sea. The MAGTF forces that go ashore should look to the MEU(SOC) staff and
PHIBGRU's ground and air operations divisions for logistics support. An operational planning group (N5) should be
organized to support future planning. The personnel should come from the various departments and supporting or
associated ships and staffs (e.g., MEU(SOC) and DESRON). The communications department (N6) should
expand to take on a more robust command and control warfare posture. The training and readiness department (N8)
should decrease in size, due to the reduction in ships assigned, and come under
the control of the operations department or become the core of the operational
planning group.
In
order to achieve operational expertise in maneuver warfare and littoral
operations, the PHIBGRU commander needs to work throughout the work-ups and
deployment with the ARG and MEU. Therefore, the PHIBGRU's flagship should be the LHA or LHD, both very
capable command and control platforms. But, what happens to the CVBG and its commander because clearly the
three ship ARG is not such a significant command to warrant a flag officer and
staff? It does not seem reasonable to
assume that during a crisis situation the entire CVBG command could be
efficiently and effectively commanded by a PHIBGRU staff embarked on an
amphibious ship: it is a matter of the
very close relationship between the carrier air wing staff and the CVBG staff.
The alternative that I propose is to have the
Arsenal Ship take the place of an aircraft carrier as the centerpiece of what
used to be called the CVBG. But can the
Navy's mission still be accomplished effectively without the aircraft carrier forward
deployed? The answer to that question
is yes. During every recent
Mediterranean deployment, the aircraft carrier has spent at least one quarter
of its deployment out of the Mediterranean theater, and sometimes as much as
half of the deployment. The ships that
remained in the theater accomplished, in conjunction with other joint and
combined forces, all of the required theater missions. If a crisis situation had developed in the
theater, the remainder of the CVBG stood ready to provide TLAM strike support
and escort missions for the ARG to allow it to perform its mission. Would that strike and escort support have
been enough to accomplish maritime dominance in crisis area's littoral without
the aircraft carrier? Would there have
been enough strike assets to have a decisive or substantial shaping effect on
the enemy? Clearly that is all
situational dependent. This is where
the Arsenal Ship can play a key role. But, what is an Arsenal Ship, and what are its capabilities?
ARSENAL
SHIP--THE CENTERPIECE OF A
LITTORAL
DOMINANT BATTLE GROUP
The arsenal ship concept is a direct outgrowth of the Navy's Shift in
focus from
the open ocean to the littoral. It is fully consistent with "Forward...from
the Sea",
and
"Operational Maneuver from the Sea", and addresses current as well as anticipated future requirements for more
decisive, responsive and varied naval support to the land battle. Through concentration of massive firepower,
continuous availability and application of netted targeting and weapons
assignment, the arsenal
ship
will increase dramatically the scope and relevance of surface strike and fire support.[11]
BACKGROUND
The
concept of a modern arsenal ship is not a new idea. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, USN (retired), the former Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Surface Warfare first introduced the concept in
his 1988 article, "Revolution at Sea Initiative." In that article he foresaw the development of a new kind of
"dreadnought" based on the principle of maximizing a ship's ability
to deliver ordnance on target. He
surmised that the a ship would be built, a strike cruiser, to exploit vertical
launch and smart missile technologies.[12]
Arsenal Ship Requirements
Theater
Commander in Chiefs have identified capability requirements based on existing
shortfalls within their respective theaters. These requirements include:
. Conventional
Deterrence against regional aggression inimical to United States interests,
. Flexible
response for demonstration of power independent of diplomatic limitations'
. Credible
forward firepower support to joint and coalition land forces early in a
regional contingency if deterrence fails. The forward theater arsenal ship weapons load out will be robust,
flexible and tailorable to Commander in Chief requirements in order to expand
Commander in Chief options for use of assigned joint forces.[13]
Based
on the above requirements, the United States Navy has embarked on an
acquisition program to develop an arsenal ship to satisfy those
requirements. Additionally, the Navy is
looking to satisfy some of its long-standing warfare deficiencies and
predictable future shortfalls.
LONG-STANDING DEFICIENCIES
The
missions of naval surface fire support include: (1) suppression of enemy
artillery, (2) interdiction of enemy reinforcing elements, (3) area
neutralization and denial, (4) close support fires, and (5) protection for
evacuation operations. Those missions
must be performed in all weather, day and night, and from over-the-horizon.[14] Since the early 1960s, the navy has
seriously decreased its Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) capability by the
decommissioning of its Battleships and Heavy Cruisers with their multiple 16
inch (406mm) and 8 inch (203mm) guns respectively. Although re-activated
twice to truss up its surface fire support capability, once for the Vietnam
conflict and again during the mid-1980s through the Gulf War, the Navy's
Battleships were once again de-activated primarily because of their extremely
high operating costs and the fact that, at the time of their de-activation, the
Navy leadership had not shifted its focus from "blue-water" operations to power
projection ashore from the sea.
Combine
the decommissioning of Battleships and Heavy Cruisers with the post-Cold War
era military drawdown, which is not yet complete, and the results are an
all-time paucity of naval surface fire support in this century. In fact, the current inventory of United
States. Navy gun weapon systems and ammunition is inadequate to meet naval
surface fire support requirements.[15]
PREDICTED DEFICIENCies
A
forward deployed aircraft carrier battle group has a finite number of vertical
launch missile cells and large caliber naval guns. The load out of those cells and gun magazines is a question of
theater requirements. Those
requirements are driven by theater commanders and naval doctrine.
Vertical
Launched Ordnance. Theater
commanders recognize the flexibility provided by sea-based ordnance operating
in international waters. They demand
that a large percentage of the vertical launch missile cells available to a
battle group commander are loaded with theater level weapons such as the
Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile.
Another
potential theater level weapon carried by ships is the Theater Ballistic
Missile Defense (TBMD) surface-to-air standard missile that is being developed
by the Navy. It is reasonable to assume
that theater commanders will require additional battle group vertical launch
cells be reserved for TBMD missiles.
The
requirement for a certain number of those two types of theater weapons reduces
the number of vertical cells available to a battle group for defensive ordnance
such as surface-to-air missiles and vertical launched anti-submarine
rockets. Additional ordnance that will
be competing for space within the vertical launch missile cells are the
self-defense surface to air Evolved Sparrow Vertical Launched Missile and the
naval version of the Army Tactical Artillery Missile that is compatible with
the current vertical launch weapons system.
Naval
Gun System. Maneuver
warfare from the sea requires shaping by lethal and non-lethal fires, and
robust fire support capabilities. The
navy which relies on a 5 inch 54 caliber (127 mm) gun system has severely
limited shaping and fire support capabilities due to the range (maximum range
of 13 nautical miles) and lethality of that weapon system's ordnance. Planned improvements to the existing
inventory of 5 inch naval guns will not of itself meet NSFS requirements.
Although
a 62 caliber upgrade to the 5 inch 54 caliber gun and an associated Extended
Range Guided Munition (ERGM) are being programmed, for every 5 inch ERGM that
is put into the magazine of a surface ship, two existing rounds are
removed. That is significant because
shipboard gun magazines have a standard 600 round capacity; approximately 40 percent of that capacity is
taken up by rounds specifically designed for air defense, surface ship
engagement, training, and special purpose ground support ordnance such as white
phosphorus and illumination rounds. Thus,
either the multi-purpose capability of the 5 inch gun system will be sacrificed
by reducing the amount or types of ordnance within its magazine or the amount
of ammunition available for NSFS missions will be reduced by 50 percent. Perhaps the accuracy of ERGM will off-set
the reduction in the amount of NSFS available, and then again, less than 200
five inch ERGMs per shipboard magazine does not seem to be a lot of fire
power. Conversely, the benefit of those
gun systems on escort ships is the ability to re-arm them at sea.
There are other trade-offs associated with
the improved range (approximately 63 nautical miles) offered by the 62 caliber
and ERGM upgrades to the 5 inch gun, those include: less destructive power of
ERGM due to ordnance weight restrictions that require the use of submunition
technology; increased potential for fratricide based on the failure rate of
submunition technology; decreased responsiveness due to rate of fire decreases
associated with gun loading procedures; and extended times of flight due to a
high-altitude fly-out phase of an ERGM.
SPECIFICATIONS
Arsenal
ship is designed to be a "fly before buy" acquisition program. The Navy has provided industry with a
Concept of Operations and a Ship Capabilities Document. Industry teams take the functions described
in the ships capability document and treat them as goals when conducting trade
studies against the cost threshold. The
goal is to leverage commercial technology and manufacturing processes with
existing Department of Defense investments to rapidly (i.e., in less than half
of the time of a typical major acquisition program) produce a functional and
cost effective prototype arsenal ship for operational evaluation and
testing. This prototype will be capable
of being converted into a fully mission capable ship.[16]
The following is
a synopsis of the relevant operational concepts and specifications that the
Navy is asking industry to deliver in the Arsenal Ship:
. The
Arsenal Ship's launching system should have approximately 500 vertical launch
cells, and room for an extended range gun system. The ship must be capable of firing the following weapons in
support of the land campaign: Tomahawk
Land Attack Cruise Missiles using off-ship targeting and mission planning,
Standard Missiles using Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a vertical
launched naval surface fire support weapon using digital call for fire
technology.[17]
. Optimize
the Arsenal Ship's survivability in the littoral environment using
passive means. If survivability evaluations dictate, then provide the Arsenal
Ship
with limited active self defense systems to
augment passive defenses.
. Make
Arsenal Ship a "remote magazine" that will receive all targeting, mission planning,
and command and decision functions from off-ship through Cooperative Engagement
Capability or an equivalent data link. Make the remote connectivity
with other navy assets reliable, rapid, and secure over both satellite and line
of sight media. Make it jointly
interoperable with minimum impact. Successful employment of the Arsenal Ship will rest on effective command
and control systems both internal and external.
. The
Arsenal Ship will be designed for 35 years of service with an overall
availability rate of 95 percent. It
will be capable of underway refueling and vertical
stores replenishment. Underway
re-arming of vertical launch cells is not required. Provide it with the ability to store 90 days consumable and
maintenance stores.
. Make
Arsenal Ship capable of at least 22 knots and sufficient fuel to conduct a 90
day mission at the most economical fuel consumption speed. The ship shall have precise navigation
capability independent of location, weather, or visibility.
Advantages
"The
protection
of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early
entry operations. Therefore, early
entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities
to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment.."[18] The Arsenal Ship enhances force protection
because its vertical launch cells free up cells on cruisers and destroyers to
be loaded with weapons that can be used to protect friendly forces. Also, Arsenal Ship's long-range firepower
can weaken potential counterattacks against joint forces by disrupting enemy
C4ISR capabilities with standoff unmanned strikes and provide substantial
capabilities to suppress enemy defenses (e.g., air and coastal), damaging
logistics infrastructure, and attrite some of the enemy's long-range offensive
weapons.
The
Arsenal Ship's striking power is increased as the ship moves closer to the
shore where its NSFS ordnance can effect the enemy. If designed properly (signature reduction and armored), Arsenal
Ship may not need to worry about anti-ship cruise missiles. The primary threats that it will face are
mines, diesel-electric submarines, and manned attack aircraft.
With
the exception of counter-mine warfare, the aircraft carrier airwing is a vital
element of subsurface (anit-submarine) and air (anti-air) warfare. Therefore, if battle group strike can be
taken over by the arsenal ship and tomahawk loaded escorts, then carrier
aviation assets can focus on air superiority missions and maritime patrol. This would strengthen defense in depth
around the battle group and minimize the exposure of manned aircraft to
integrated enemy air defenses over the beach.
The
Arsenal Ship will have substantial on-scene sustainment capabilities; much more
robust than any other surface combatant. Her ordnance load should fulfill any current CINC's strike requirements
with room to meet requirement growth. The remaining cells will improve the Navy's ability to meet fire support
ordnance requirements and augment air defense and TBMD missions.
"Maneuver
warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seek to shatter the enemy's cohesion
through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a
turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope."[19] Those actions must be viewed across both
time and space.
From
a maneuver warfare perspective, the implications of the Arsenal Ship seem very
favorable: with its massive amount of unmanned, long-range precision firepower,
effectively double the amount nominally available to a standard aircraft
carrier battle group, critical enemy targets over a vast area can be attacked
simultaneously or in a specific time sequence developed in the joint
commander's campaign plan. Striking
multiple critical Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) nodes in a rapid fashion will promote achieving
dominant maneuver by impacting the enemy's ability to fight his forces in an
organized and effective manner. The
shock created by this kind of attack in theory would paralyze an enemy.
Likewise,
the Arsenal Ship will enhance mobility because of the suppressive effects of
naval surface fire support and the potential to decrease the criticality of
getting field artillery and the logistics footprint that it requires ashore to
support ground combat elements. Amphibious operations of the past were typically ushered in by massive
naval gunfire and aviation dropped ordnance evolutions. Future amphibious operations, whether they
are under-the-horizon linear assaults or over-the-horizon highly maneuver
warfare oriented assaults will likely require even greater naval gunfire
support, especially in the over-the-horizon type assault.
Seemingly
gone are the days when a host of massive naval guns (8 to 16 inches) would
"soften-up" an enemy, prepare a landing area, and provide supporting arms for
ground forces until their organic artillery and its logistics footprint were
established ashore.
Arsenal
Ship seems to be the only effective answer for the future because the Navy is
not likely to commit to re-activating the battleships or to building a large
caliber gun ship and the short-term gunfire deficiency solution that the Navy
is pursuing to upgrade the current fleet inventory of escort ships with a 5
inch 62 caliber gun mount is not going to provide enough firepower to solve the
problem. For example: using each two-gun escort (nominally 6) of
two aircraft carrier battle groups in fire support areas, a total of 12 guns
and 2,700 light-weight 127mm (5 inch) rounds would be simultaneously available
to provide 120 rounds per minute for twenty minutes of landing area preparation
and ground forces fire support. The
Arsenal Ship with one twin 155mm Vertical Gun Advanced Ship (VGAS) systems
(currently under development) would provide 1,200 light-weight 155mm rounds at
a firing rate of 40 rounds per minute for thirty minutes. Thus, one Arsenal Ship with only one VGAS
could provide roughly half of the explosive weight at a third of the firing
rate of six dual gunned surface combatants. This is very significant because when a surface combatant is engaged in
NSFS operations, the ship's capabilities in other warfare areas is seriously
degraded. The development of digital
NSFS command and control systems may mitigate the performance degradation in
other warfare areas while a ship is engaged in NSFS.
The
forward deployed Arsenal Ship will allow the vertical launch cells of battle
group escorts to be loaded with more defensive weapons. That load will enable the surface combatants
to better fulfill their primary role as an escort. It will also allow the escorts more versatility to be able to go
to critical maritime areas of the battle field and more effectively influence
that battlespace through presence, capabilities, and ordnance. For example: theater ballistic missile defense may require an Aegis ship to be
stationed away from battle group operating areas. That escort will require sufficient self-defense missiles (e.g.,
Standard Missiles and Antisubmarine rockets) and TBMD missiles to accomplish
the mission at acceptable risk.
Limitations
The
limitations of the Navy's proposed requirements are technological and doctrine
related. The Arsenal Ship will not have
a high volume of inexpensive ordnance available to support shaping and NSFS
operations. Nor will it have a large
caliber weapons system capable of delivering two million pounds of ordnance to
support the close battle space like the two battleships, USS MISSOURI and USS
WISCONSIN, were able to provide during the Gulf War.[20] It would take more than 17 VGAS systems to
deliver that amount of ordnance. The
navy probably will never employ 17 VGAS systems simultaneously during a crisis,
however, in theory the accuracy of the ERGM round should compensate for some
the tonnage differential between the 16 inch guns and the VGAS. To compensate for the difference in
destructive power of the 16 inch shells and the ERGM, the navy is conducting
research in advanced ordnance systems that will have improved warheads for
better destructive effects as well as significant ordnance speed increases (up
to mach eight) to enhance target penetration.[21]
Other
limitations include the extensive mission planning that is required to deliver
the over-the-horizon ordnance planned for the Arsenal Ship. Current versions of Tomahawk require
detailed planning for both the over-water and over-land portions of the
missile's flight path.
Planning
the over-land flight path is a highly complex, labor intensive, slow process
that requires a significant amount of information support. That portion of the missile's flight path is
primarily planned by planning experts located within the continental United
States. Although an Afloat Planning
System (APS) does exist; that system only gives a commander a limited ability
to build, or more likely modify, a tomahawk mission to enhance strike
flexibility because of the highly complex, labor and information intensive,
slow mission planning process. In
either circumstance, however, the new missions are not likely to be responsive
enough nor developed on a large enough scale to be a significant flexible fire
power capability.
With
future GPS equipped versions of the Tomahawk missile, the APS should provide
significant speed and flexibility in planning the over-land portion of a
missile's
flight path. The drawback to this capability is the potential future vulnerability of
GPS to Command and Control Warfare (C2W) and interdiction.
Planning
the over-water portion of the flight path is critical for a variety of
reasons. The issue of airspace
deconfliction must be considered because of our own air defense capabilities
and friendly air assets operating between the launcher and the target. The over-water portion of the Tomahawk
missile's flight path is also planned to safely avoid surface contacts to
prevent having the missile clobber into a ship or obstacle, and to minimize
potential early warning and counter-targeting by third-parties and enemy
surveillance assets. Also, the
over-water portion of the Tomahawks flight path is critical to ensuring that
the missile gets to the beginning point of its over-land flight path on time in
order to ensure that the missile achieves its designated time-on-top of the
target, if specified.
Because
the Arsenal Ship will not be manned to conduct any mission planning, an extra
burden is placed on the mission planners onboard other ships. As already witnessed, human and
technological errors in the complex world of mission planning have caused one
ship to fail to meet its assigned mission (USS MONTEREY's September 1995
failure to launch assigned Tomahawk missions against targets in Bosnia).[22] How much more complex is having another ship
do its own jobs and also plan all of the missions for the Arsenal Ship? Combine that with the additional burden of
ensuring command, control, and communications connectivity between the itself
and the Arsenal Ship, and potential fragileness with the Arsenal Ship concept
begins to surface. The solution to the
command and control challenge of total off-ship mission planning and launch may
be solvable through a high degree of redundancy in the Arsenal Ship's
communications architecture, an increase in the number of communications paths
that are capable of sending the required data to the Arsenal Ship, and by
increasing the number of mission planners and "trigger pullers" that
are able to launch the Arsenal Ship's weapons.
The
theater level weapons planned for the Arsenal Ship are less time of flight
critical than are the NSFS weapons. The
NSFS weapons that are planned for the Arsenal Ship are assisted in achieving
their extended ranges by a boost phase which is marked by a steep vertical
assent to high-altitude, followed by a fly-out phase in the thin upper
atmosphere, ending with a GPS controlled descent phase onto the target. For
targets requiring that type of flight profile, the ordnance's time of flight
could be as long as five minutes. Against moving targets or time-sensitive targets, that may be
unacceptable. The navy is working on
developing a variety of next-generation ordnance that will have dramatic
increases in speed for example: Fasthawk--a surfaced launched missile capable of a 700 mile range at
mach four; and Scramshell--a hypersonic ballistic round capable of mach 5 or greater.[23]
"Outstanding
weapons won't be effective without the ability to accurately designate targets
and ensure fires are coordinated over an extended and fast-paced battlefield."[24] The Navy plans on providing responsive and
accurate fires for the rear, close, and deep land battlefield through the
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC). CEC already exists to support rear and to a large extent close area air
defense including TBMD. CEC allows for
the remote selection, initialization, and remote launch orders of TBMD and
standard surface-to-air missiles. That
capability allows an Aegis combatant that is equipped with the CEC upgrade to
remotely launch and control surface-to-air missiles within the limits of its
fire control director's terminal guidance range limitation.
The
Advanced Tomahawk Weapons Control System (ATWCS) coupled with CEC
communications data links should solve the deep battlefield strike mission
planning, coordination, and command and decision functions. An Arsenal Ship's TLAM missions for
strategic and operational level targets will be issued to an Aegis combatant
for over-water mission planning and launch control. Aegis ships with CEC and ATWCS to CEC upgrades would then
remotely select, initialize, and launch TLAMs from an Arsenal Ship to execute
ordered missions.
Close
and deep area fire support target designation and weapons coordination is a
critical requirement for all services. The Army is the lead agent for developing a joint artillery command and
control system; that digital command and control system is the Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).
It is scheduled for fielding in early 1997, and has programmed upgrades
to make it more interoperable with other services command and control systems. "AFATDS provides integrated, automatic
support for mission planning, coordinating and controlling fire support
assets...for close and deep operations."[25] With programmed upgrade that will link it to
the Air Force's Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS) and the
Marine Corps Fire Support System (MCFSS), AFATDS has the potential to
deconflict all air and ground battlefield coordination and clearance issues for
supporting fires from the Arsenal Ship.[26]
The
Navy, recognizing that it must move into the digitized fire support arena, has experimented with AFATDS in a major
Joint Task Force Exercise. A lot was
learned from that experiment but clearly the Navy is committed to overcoming
its shortfalls in this area through common operating environment systems and
communication architectures to tap into AFATDS from over the horizon.
The
impact that the Arsenal Ship has on the future battlefield will be largely
dependent on the command and control system that is developed for it. As a remote magazine for navy weapon
systems, the command and control challenges presented by the Arsenal Ship do
not seem insurmountable because of the Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC). On the other hand, if all of the
strike and NSFS ordnance is called for through one or a few designated "Arsenal
Control Ships," then those control ships could very rapidly become overwhelmed
trying to do their own potentially vital role while being responsible for
command and control of the Arsenal Ship's vast array of long-range lethal
firepower. Furthermore, using
exclusively navy ships as the command and control link from sensor to shooter
would be placing a middleman in the loop which only provides another critical
link that could fail.
The command and control
architecture appears to rely on digital over-the-horizon connectivity. The ability to secure the use of satellite
channels during a crisis may
prove untenable. If acquired, the ability of those satellite links to remain
functioning
are also in doubt thus jeopardizing
reliability. No back-up connectivity
systems have been proposed yet.
The overall responsiveness of the
Arsenal Ship's ordnance to tactical calls for fire will depend largely on the
ability to develop a robust information support system to perform airspace
deconfliction and manage ground fire coordination and control measure in the
dynamic and fast paced operational environment of the future battlespace.
In order to achieve its place
among the capable warships to the United States Navy, the Arsenal Ship will
have to do more than just communicate with the Navy: it will have to be
accepted by the Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force. Theater CINCs will have to demand that their forces are capable
of and trained in automated command and control of the ordnance stowed in the
Arsenal Ship.
The
Arsenal Ship, like all current VLS surface combatants, will not be capable of
at-sea ordnance replenishment. The only
way to reload it will be to take it out of the operation and send it to a
suitable port. Due to the likelihood
that it will be loaded with a mixture of ordnance, especially NSFS ordnance,
the Arsenal Ship will probably be kept on station thereby precluding it from
retiring to a port for reloading its depleted ordnance.
Airspace
coordination issues resulting from tactical fires will get more complicated
because the Arsenal Ship will be providing fire support to widely dispersed
tactical elements. Although the steep
boost and high altitude fly-out phases are less coordination intensive, the
descent phase and the flatter trajectory ordnance (i.e., sea SLAM and ATACM)
from a central location to dispersed targets causes significant airspace
coordination versus on-target responsiveness challenges. Improvements in automated systems to
coordinating airspace usage over the battle field and in the ability to get
information concerning on-call fire missions into the cockpit of aircraft
already over the battle field will help mitigate the potential for fratricide.
Arsenal
ships may have an adverse effect on the operational mobility of naval forces do
to their self-defense limitations. As
described above, because of the requirement to defend the Arsenal Ship, the
ability of escorts to project power and conduct needed missions elsewhere in
the battlespace may be jeopardized. Conversely, maximizing the range of the Arsenal Ship's weapon systems,
low-detectability, and survivability may prove sufficient to allow battle group
escorts to perform other missions than direct escort for the Arsenal Ship.
Potential Operational Effects of the
Arsenal Ship
Consider
for a moment the potentially decisive effects that the presence of a battle
group made up of an Arsenal Ship, two Cruisers, three strike destroyers, one
frigate, two submarines, and the ARG, augmented by the forward stationed
Arsenal Ship (three of the proposed six will be permanently operated overseas
one each in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Western Pacific) could have on
an adversary: the numbers of vertical launched missile cells alone would be
close to 1500. It is reasonable to say
that at least half of those would be armed with TLAM. How many sorties (at what sortie rate) would it take for an
aircraft carrier to generate 50 percent of those 1500 potential strike cells? That kind of firepower could stand off an
enemy's coast at least 500 miles and deliver wave after wave of shaping fires
while follow-on forces were massing for decisive ground operations, if
necessary. At the stand-off range
provided by TLAMs, the battle group escorts could be very effective at force
protection by combining speed, maneuver, and deception with defense in
depth.
The
disadvantage of relying on Arsenal Ships is that they might lead to a "use
of lethal force" quandary. The
presence of two Arsenal Ships, safely over the horizon at 150 miles, may not
have any influence on a crisis situation. An aircraft carrier, on the other hand, operating safely over the
horizon can project its power by non-lethal means: flying strike aircraft over
a target without committing to firing ordnance at the enemy. To overcome that limitation, aircraft from
the amphibious ships could be sent over enemy territory to demonstrate
presence. The drawback to that approach
is the lack of defense in depth that an aircraft carrier's air wing can provide
for ships operating in the littorals. In certain circumstances, joint forces, such as United States. Air Force
assets (AWACS and overseas based fighters), and/or planned multi-purpose
organic fixed and rotary-wing aircraft (Joint Strike Fighter and SH-60R with an
airborne early warning radar variant) could provide defense in-depth for
maritime power demonstrations. The
development and fielding of those organic aircraft, mentioned above, are
scheduled prior to the planned completion of the six Arsenal Ships by
2007.
Dominant Maneuver Enhanced by Naval
Surface Fire Support--Arsenal Ship
It
must be remembered that, as long as TLAM are considered the theater CINC's
weapon, the Arsenal Ship will be viewed first as a strike asset. The other significant role that the Arsenal
Ship will perform is that of the Navy's premier Naval Surface Fire Support
asset, with its array of weapons under development such as:
.Navy Tactical Missile System (NTACMS)--a
supersonic, global positioning system guided, 150 nautical mile, submunition
carrying missile. Successfully fired in
its Army version from a ship. Successfully launched from a vertical launch cell
located at a test sight.
.Sea SLAM--a subsonic, electro-optical
guided, digital data link controlled, 75 nautical mile, liquid fueled, 500
pound warhead missile. An existing Navy
weapons system requiring human-in-the-loop control usually from a airborne
control platform (organic to the battle group).
.Land Attack Standard Missile--a supersonic,
global positioning system guided, 100 nautical mile, fragmentary or possibly
submunition armed missile. Standard
Missile is a proven weapon, land attack variant is under development.
.Vertical Gun Advanced System--a twin 155
millimeter, smooth bored gun, automated magazine with 1200 or more ready
service rounds. Using Extended Range
Guided Munitions (ERGM) technology that incorporates global positioning system
guidance and submunition technology currently under development. Technology demonstration is expected to
yield a 10-15 round per minute system that delivers the 155mm round in excess
of 100 nautical miles.
As the Navy produces the above systems, and
fields upgrades to the Tomahawk missile system, those upgrades will make
Tomahawk more of a navy asset than a CINCs weapon, the Navy will be taking a
giant leap towards making Operational Maneuver From the Sea possible. But with those possibilities come further
responsibilities, like the responsibility to effectively maneuver naval assets
and shape the battlefield for success in follow-on land operations, and the
responsibility to provide protection fires on demand to a wide range of units
dispersed throughout the battlefield. And finally, the responsibility to help the ground forces capitalize on
the sustainment benefits provided by having those supporting fires based at sea
rather than having to be moved ashore in the early stages of an amphibious
assault. Because of those
responsibilities I proposed that a PHIBGRU staff, in conjunction with the
MEU(SOC) command element, take the lead in becoming the operational planning
and executing experts of decisive littoral operations with the Arsenal Ship
Battle Group.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Navy, like the other services, has been
struggling with force structure issues since the end of the cold war. The 1993 "Bottom Up Review" defined the
Navy's need for ten aircraft carrier battle groups to fight and win two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts. It also validated the need to retain 12 aircraft carrier battle groups
to meet the peacetime forward presence missions while still maintaining a
satisfactory deployment rotation.[27] The Navy is standing firm on the issue of
twelve aircraft carrier battle groups. The projected aircraft carrier force structure bears that out. Unfortunately, the budget reality is likely
to only get more austere while the price of a nuclear powered Nimitz-class
aircraft carrier does not get any cheaper (approximately six billion dollars a
copy).
The serious issue that needs to be raised
regarding the Arsenal Ship is the Navy's ability to afford building another
power projection ship without realizing infrastructure savings elsewhere,
specifically in the area of strike warfare. The Arsenal Ship concept should center around having industry build a ship
that could be the centerpiece of a littoral dominant battle group. The Battleships Battle Groups (BBBG) of the
1980s were an integral part of the 600 ship navy and arguably a potent power
projection force. Their primary mission
was again focused on the blue-water battle as a surface action group designed
to meet and defeat Soviet ships on the high seas with an additional mission of
conducting long-range missile strikes or power projection against land targets.[28] The aside benefit of the BBBG was that the
Navy knew where it would go to get the fire support required for amphibious
operations.
Although there were some drawbacks to BBBGs,
such as a lack of organic air power, the Navy had worked out a joint and
combined solution to the problem of lack of layered defenses. "Tactical Air Support for Maritime
Operations" (TASMO) was the title of NATO doctrine that was worked out between
the air forces and the Navy to provide airborne assets to improve layered
defenses for the BBBG while it was transiting through or operating in a threat
area. The scheduling and management of
the aircraft tasked to fly TASMO was the responsibility of the theater CINC's
staff where the BBBG was operating.[29] Also, TASMO fostered better joint air
defense training by forcing the Navy and the Air Force to work together.
An Arsenal Ship Battle Group's ability to
start to maneuver and shape a battlespace from over 500 miles away could cause
a potential aggressor to rethink his use of force options because at those
stand-off distances, only a skilled blue-water adversary could pose a serious
challenge. The mere fact the United
States has shifted its focus away from the blue-water threat seems to justify
the case that a blue-water battle group recapitalized with better littoral
warfare assets (e.g., Arsenal Ship and F/A-18E/F) does not always need to be
present to provide substantial power projection. If the adversary does have a significant blue-water navy and air
force, then even with the combined power of the forward deployed CVBG and ARG,
a theater CINC would probably be unwilling to commit to any early, aggressive
naval campaign until a massed fleet could be assembled for a Mahanian style
naval campaign. Adding one Arsenal Ship
to the combined power of the CVBG and ARG would not likely change the theater
CINC's options. Therefore, just as the
traditional battle groups will be the building blocks for naval campaigns, so
can a non-traditional battle group like an Arsenal Ship Battle Group be the
building block for naval campaigns.
But building a littoral dominant battle group
is only part of the equation: the
doctrine necessary to effectively operate an Arsenal Ship Battle Group must be
developed. Since the Navy will likely
forward deploy at least three of its proposed six Arsenal Ships, it can be
deduced that they will be predominantly loaded out with theater level weapons
like the long-range Tomahawk missile and TBMD missiles. From this proposal, the remaining Arsenal
Ships would deploy as the centerpiece
of a forward presence battle group. So
what should the deploying Arsenal Ship be loaded out with? The deploying Arsenal Ships need to
address the Navy's critical shortfall in NSFS capabilities. They would clearly carry a significant
number of TLAM missiles, perhaps as many as 150 to 200. The rest of the ordnance should consist of
VGAS modules and a preponderance of vertical launched fire support rockets and missiles such as ATACMS. The deploying Arsenal Ship would likely need
at least four VGAS systems unless vertical launched fire support rocket or
missile technology realizes significant reductions in cost per round. Four VGAS systems would likely provide
adequate redundancy and sufficient number of rounds to meet short term maneuver
warfare fire support requirements. It
must also be recognized that the Arsenal Ship will likely be the only ship in
the short term that will be able to carry the VGAS system without major
structural or weight distribution modifications to active ships.
That type of ordnance load would make the
deploying Arsenal Ship clearly a navy asset to control and employ in the most
advantageous way. Under the control of
an experienced littoral warfare group commander, the Navy and Marine Corps
team would be able to take littoral
warfare to new levels of effectiveness through rapid and violent application of
force if needed.
CONCLUSION
In
conclusion, the Navy is bringing a very powerful new strike and fire support
ship to the fleet inventory. More than
ever before, the Navy will have the ability and responsibility to support the
land battle effectively and efficiently. Supporting the land battle and amphibious operation will require a new
level of expertise by the Navy. Building that expertise will not be easy because it requires a
significant amount of change from a large bureaucratic system that has been
extraordinarily successful for the past 55 years. But there exists a rare opportunity to make significant changes
that will not only better prepare the Navy for future littoral operations but
at the same time, allow it to achieve dramatic cost saving by substituting
three 50-personnel, 500 missile, less than 500 million dollar a copy, Arsenal
Ships for three 5,000 personnel, 80 aircraft, 6,000 million dollar a copy,
aircraft carriers.
The
Navy cannot afford to pass up the potential savings made possible by the
Arsenal Ship. It must work hard now to
develop doctrine, force structure, and organizational changes to complement
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS).
2007 is fast approaching; it will soon be time to marry-up the Amphibious
Ready Groups (ARG) with a striking battle group centered around an Arsenal
Ship. The savings alone from retiring
just two aircraft carriers would easily pay for the command and control
modifications necessary to allow the chosen LHD(s) and LHA(s) to have basically
the same capability to run a battle group as that of an aircraft carrier. That would capitalize on the Arsenal Ship's
primary mission as a strike warfare asset and secondary mission as a NSFS ship. The net result would be the optimization of
the striking power of the Arsenal Ship by having it employed as a maneuver and
shaping asset by an on-scene amphibious warfare (littoral) experienced admiral
in close coordination with an on-scene land warfare commander (Commander of the
Landing Force (CLF)) starting at ranges upwards of one thousand miles from the
enemy's coast. This would also provide
the theater CINCs more flexible options to respond to crises in their theaters
than currently available with a traditional CVBG.
The
Arsenal Ship Battle Group is a viable forward presence option. The PHIBGRU as a deploying battle group
commander is a key improvement that the Navy must make if it has truly shifted
its focus to the littoral battle. The
best way to realize the potential of the Arsenal Ship is to take it out from
under the umbrella of the aircraft carrier, just as aircraft carriers were
taken out from under the umbrella of the battleship dominated Navy almost 60
years ago. The key to unlock the potential
of the Arsenal Ship is to demand littoral and maneuver warfare expertise from
the amphibious community.
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