Assuming Away History: A Critical Analysis of Forward ...From the Sea by Sir Julian S. Corbett
CSC 1997
Subject Area - History
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Assuming Away History: A Critical Analysis of Forward ...From the
Sea by Sir Julian S. Corbett
Author: Lieutenant Commander Y.B. Lindsey, United States Navy
Thesis: Forward from the Sea attempts to provide everyone (i.e., soldier, sailor, politician and civilian alike) an understanding of the reasoning and purpose with which the U.S. employs its naval means to gain its national policy objectives. However, it appears to be a confounding collection of maritime and naval strategic theories, strategies and missions that intends to develop and position the Naval Service as a capable and readily available tool of foreign policy, while assuming that such a "tool" can continue to perform historic naval functions now and in the future.
Discussion: Sir Julian S. Corbett was a British Naval Historian of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He is a recognized scholar of naval history, wrote numerous books and articles on maritime and naval strategy and has had a profound effect on British naval thought and theory. His analysis of Forward From the Sea can provide the Mahanian U.S. Navy a fresh look based on principles derived from history.
Conclusion: Sir Julian S. Corbett provides an insightful analysis of the U.S. Navy's strategic concept by defining strategy, maritime strategy and naval strategy; as well as, analyzing and comparing Forward From the Sea's (FFTS) view of naval functions, roles and missions against naval history. Corbett offers more questions then answers and appears to be more concerned with what FFTS doesn't address than with what it does. He concludes that FFTS is a combination of strategic theory, maritime strategy and naval strategy, but since it most closely resembles a theory of naval warfare, he decides to analyze it in that context.
Corbett repeatedly emphasizes the limitations of naval forces in the areas of power projection, forward presence and strategic deterrence, which FFTS appears to overlook. He believes FFTS places an over-reliance on the inherent flexibility of naval forces to execute what he calls "command of the sea" and "control of the sea" with a fleet composition similar to that used by the U.S. to fight the Cold War. Finally, Corbett stresses that command of the sea (much less maritime supremacy) cannot be assumed and that it is merely a means to an end.
ASSUMING AWAY HISTORY
A Critical Analysis of Forward From the Sea by Sir Julian S. Corbett
History makes men wiser, if not wise.
Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age
I have to admit that I am quite impressed with the United States Navy's attempt to write a naval strategic concept.[1] The fact that the concept exists and is available for all to read is indeed a great accomplishment and definitely one with which the Navy should be extremely pleased. For it was not long ago that the U.S. Navy was but a handful of coastal defense frigates barely capable of defending the smallest of harbors . . . and now it's the world's naval Superpower. It is interesting to note that even as late as my tenure as Lecturer at the Royal Naval War College, the British Navy, after several hundred years of fleet operations around the world, was still attempting to define its strategy and role in Great Britain's world affairs. And although the U.S. Navy's strategic concept will continue to evolve, as it undoubtedly has in the past, Forward from the Sea (henceforth referred to as FFTS) attempts to provide everyone (i.e., soldier, sailor, politician and civilian alike) an understanding of the reasoning and purpose with which the U.S. employs its naval means to gain its national policy objectives.
Before analyzing FFTS, I would be remiss if I did not provide a brief biographical sketch of myself to enable you,[2] the reader, to understand my perspective and the influences that may have affected my historical theories and conclusions regarding strategic theory and strategy. Without a context, historical or otherwise, it is extremely difficult to constructively evaluate a writer's judgment or objectivity. It is not my intent to attempt to justify my abilities as a naval historian or strategist. Rather, this sketch should be used in much the same manner as a theory of war is used by the warrior, as a guide to self-education[3] and an aid to acquire a broad outlook[4] concerning your strategic concept.
I was born in London on November 12, 1854 to an affluent and influential family. My father was a successful architect and as the second of six children (five boys and one girl) I chose not to follow in my father's footsteps; choosing instead to study law during my college days at Cambridge. I dabbled as a barrister and was involved in legal work until 1882, at which time I decided to devote my time to the arts and began to travel extensively throughout the world. My travels took me to Egypt, India, Canada, and the United States, to name a few places, and it was in these then far-off-lands that I began to appreciate the reach and power of British naval might. It was actually in my leisure time that I began to write, my work taking the form of mainly novels with historical settings.[5] Of course, my first few attempts at prose were not widely read; in fact, it wasn't until 1889 when I published my non-fictional works on the lives of Admiral George Monk and Sir Francis Drake that my abilities at in-depth historic research and objective writing began to be appreciated.
Then, in 1898, I published my first exhaustive study in naval history, titled Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power. This is the work which many claim placed me in the "front rank of naval historians."[6] But more importantly, my research for this work gave rise to a wonderful working relationship between myself and the recently created Navy Records Society (est. 1893): a relationship that would last throughout the remainder of my lifetime. However, I still was not completely devoted to naval history until my young wife, Edith Alexander, convinced me otherwise and set me on the path my life would take. From this time forward my writings would be predominantly naval and historic in nature and I would begin to associate with the British Navy and its officers, especially Admiral Sir John Fisher, appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1904.
I also lectured at the recently created Royal Naval War College (est. 1900) and from there many of my theories and ideas were spread throughout the fleet. I have to admit that it was difficult, as a civilian, to gain the trust of naval officers, who rarely listen to or read those who have not stood on the bridge of a warship and tasted the brine from a wind-whipped sea. However, my ability to present in-depth, accurate research in a clear and graceful, yet authoritative style enabled me to convince many in my audiences that lessons and strategy from the age of sail were relevant in the age of steam. And, in fact, many of those lessons would have utility well into the future. It was my writing ability, however, that led to my appointment as Great Britain's Official Naval Historian of the First World War. I found official historical writing rather restrictive, in that it deviated from the historical analysis and scrutiny that I had come to enjoy. In fact, most of my writings found controversy in one circle or another, and constant interference, innuendo, and disagreement during my efforts as an "Official Historian" eroded my health and led to my premature death at the age of 67.[7]
The above is but a brief biography of some of the events that led to my love of naval history and strategy. For further information you can consult the few papers and biography that have been written about my life, which are listed in the bibliography of this paper. I believe that the more you read about my life and history the more you'll understand my profound interest in naval history and strategy and my struggle to uncover the lessons of history that are of use to modern-day Navies. It is true that I have never worn a military uniform, but my hope is that you will read this analysis with an open mind and use the questions it raises to either verify or solidify your strategic concept.
As I mentioned upon accepting your Naval War College's generous grant, my intent in this analysis is to provide an objective critique of FFTS. And since Mr. Eric Grove believes that I am "less than rigorous in citing . . . sources or quoting them accurately,"[8] I will attempt to satisfy his surreptitious request by submitting a complete bibliography and properly footnoting all quotations, including those from my own books. My initial impression upon reading FFTS was one of confusion and I couldn't help but wonder how it conforms with your country's National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy: two documents with which I am somewhat familiar. I commend the authors of FFTS for aggressively attempting to prepare U.S. naval forces technologically, strategically, and geographically for their role in foreign policy. However, FFTS appears to be a confounding collection of maritime and naval strategic theories, strategies and missions that intends to develop and position the Naval Service as a capable and readily available tool of foreign policy, while assuming that such a "tool" can continue to perform historic naval functions now and in the future. Therefore, my analysis will begin by discussing strategic theory, strategy, maritime strategy, naval strategy and the value of history to create a basis of understanding between us. Next, I will analyze the FFTS view of naval functions, roles, and missions and how these do or do not agree with naval functions and strategy that have been required of Navies throughout history. I will undoubtedly leave you with more questions than answers, but that is appropriate from a naval historian and theorist, since "history provides insights and questions, not answers."[9] My intent with this paper is that "it be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience, but as a means of fertilising [sic] both."[10]
FFTS, as a result of your government's "expanded guidance on the role of the military in national defense"[11] was written to amplify the scope of your "strategic concept"[12] previously published in From the Sea in 1992. This amplification in scope "underscores the premise that the most important role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises."[13] The basis for this amplification is a shift in "focus to new dangers-chief among which is aggression by regional powers."[14] FFTS does not claim to change the purpose of U.S. naval forces, however, it does reorder the "coordinated priorities of the Naval Service"[15] away from "operations on the sea toward power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea."[16] The majority of FFTS addresses "the unique contributions of naval expeditionary forces in peacetime operations, in responding to crises, and in regional conflicts,"[17] and it concludes by listing the Navy Department's budget history and the "five fundamental and enduring roles"[18] of naval forces. Perhaps my greatest concern with FFTS, in view of its message, is not necessarily what it says or proposes, but what it doesn't say. It's often in the omission that greater understanding resides.
Therefore, your Navy is shifting its focus to "new dangers," while assuming that some old dangers (e.g., a global maritime threat) either no longer exist or have paled. The basis for your shift in focus seems to suggest a threat-based naval force, vice a force based on capabilities and historical truths. I'm not endorsing either approach-I'm merely highlighting this point so you may understand the impetus of FFTS. In addition, based on this shift in focus, have you seen any significant changes in fleet composition, tactics, or capabilities? Do you believe these "new dangers" warrant any changes in fleet operations? And if you deem changes are required, upon what will you base them? Fiscal resources available? The politico-diplomatic position of your country? Naval history? Allied or sister Service capabilities? According to FFTS, these new dangers are here today-Desert Storm apparently proved that. Does FFTS prepare you for "the entire range of military operations in support of our [i.e., your] national strategy"?[19] And if so, does it prepare you theoretically or literally? These are just some of the questions whose answers are vital to drafting a pragmatic and precise strategic theory, maritime strategy, or naval strategy. But, before putting pen to paper you must understand the definitions of strategic theory, maritime strategy and naval strategy.
STRATEGIC THEORY AND STRATEGY
Why am I defining a strategic theory and not a strategic concept? Well, for one reason, I'm not quite sure what a strategic concept is or what it is designed to do. As I said earlier, I believe you intend FFTS to provide an understanding of the reasoning and purpose behind the future employment of naval forces. Assuming this to be true, then it would appear that FFTS closely resembles theory. If you don't agree with me, then compare what you believe the essence of FFTS to be with what the preeminent military theorist of all time, Carl von Clausewitz, says about theory.
It is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry.[20]
Isn't FFTS designed to explain how naval forces (i.e., the means) will be employed and the nature of the objectives (i.e., the ends) they will be employed to attain? Thus, I believe FFTS is an attempt at publishing strategic theory and the authors of FFTS used the term "concept" because of a "mistrust of theory [that] arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do,"[21] which I will discuss later. Therefore, FFTS deviates from theory both in what it addresses and what it doesn't address.
FFTS bills itself as a strategic concept, but yet, in addition to the reasoning and purpose of naval forces, it discusses and proposes capabilities and missions that seemingly attempt to justify the Navy's very existence. I certainly hope that your Navy's existence is not in danger; that would be a failure of monumental proportions. While it is true that strategic theory can lead a country to produce capabilities and identify missions (i.e., functions) for its naval forces, this is not the true essence or purpose of theory. To describe in basic terms what a strategic theory is, I will use an analogy, similar to one I used in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.[22] Only at the end of their exploration did your famous explorers, Lewis and Clark, arrive at a complete map of their travels. However, for those that followed Lewis and Clark, this map was the first thing with which they began to increase their knowledge of the journey ahead. Strategic theory provides just such a map for the study of strategy with history (specifically, for our purposes, naval history) providing the basis for theory. And since war is inherently complex, then any map, no matter how incomplete or limited it may be, is of use to the strategist as he attempts to direct his force toward the ends in view. Therefore, it is theory with which you begin to understand and mold the shape you want your Navy to take.
As for the purpose of strategic theory and the theory of war in general, I must again defer to Clausewitz. He said that theory's purpose is "to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield."[23] Is this the purpose of FFTS? Does it guide and educate the mind of the naval commander? Strategic theory is not a rule book or a list of principles with any practical utility, nor does it change in relation to perceived threats or dangers as FFTS would have you believe. Theory can even help determine the normal,[24] but only if it's derived from the study of history. For like those that disregarded Lewis and Clark's map, if you and your fellow naval officers disregard history and the knowledge you can derive from it, then you become explorers yourselves. And in the complexity of military operations and war, especially those that require coordination between the Services, you, as a naval commander, must make use of every available resource in your quest for victory. With an understanding of strategic theory we can move on to the definition of strategy.
As I stated in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, "strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view."[25] Clausewitz defined strategy as "the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war."[26] Many of you would argue that Clausewitz was referring to strategy at what you've termed the "operational level of war." However, do not be limited by strict definitions of terms. Clausewitz's definition of strategy is applicable at all "levels" of war and thus strategy is present at all levels. For example, doesn't a platoon commander deploy and engage his rifle squads to ensure he obtains his objective (i.e., the end)? And isn't that platoon's objective a critical piece of a larger operation, which has its own objective(s)? And it follows that gaining the operation's objective(s) will ultimately lead to attainment of the objective(s) for which the war is being fought. Thus, strategy exists at each level of war, since each level directs force toward the ends in view and is inextricably tied to the ultimate policy objectives that military action intends to attain. This is especially true when you consider the ease with which modern news organizations broadcast to the world audience a platoon's movements and actions on the battlefield. I've observed the diagram (see below) you like to use to describe these so-called "levels of war."
This diagram and the identification of different levels of war appears to have utility in the academic realm and for assigning command responsibilities and understanding objectives. However, as many of you observed in Somalia, a "tactical" error can have strategic consequences. Thus, the consequences (i.e., the ends, whether desired or not) of directed force at each level of war produce effects and cause reaction not only at the level where the force is directed but also at the other levels as well. Therefore, when considering the ends (i.e., the objectives, whether in view or not) a diagram similar to that below is more suitable for illustration.
This view of the levels of war is a result of the U.S.'s grasp of Clausewitz's dictum that "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means."[27] And since, as Clausewitz stated, "the political object is the goal [i.e., the end], war [i.e., the directed force] the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose,"[28] it follows that the means and ends at each level of war directly affect every other level. And I believe that the constant improvements in technology you continue to experience will keep these circles on converging courses. But that is a subject for another time and place. Based on the above argument, you must conclude that strategy exists at and must address each level of war to ensure the force it directs at each level has the desired effect to gain the political object for which the war exists. But there are different types of strategy that should be of importance to you: maritime and naval.
Maritime and Naval strategy
Maritime strategy concerns "the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor."[29] It does not concern itself solely with fleet operations or even operations upon the sea, but it regards the fleet and army as one weapon, which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must move to realise [sic] the full power of both."[30] To think of naval and military (i.e., land force) strategy as separate is to disregard the theory of war, "which brings out their intimate relation."[31] History of the Russo-Japanese War provides an excellent example of the importance of a sound maritime strategy. Both the Russians and Japanese realized from the beginning "that the issue of the war must turn on the just co-ordination of the sea and land arms . . . . [however] it was the Japanese alone who attained it with any measure of effectiveness."[32] And, in fact, Japanese effectiveness enabled their numerically inferior army and navy to defeat the Russians. Be careful not to confuse maritime strategy with "grand" strategy, which is "various military strategies working each within their own element, complementing diplomatic and economic affairs,"[33] or with your National Military Strategy. Once again, maritime strategy considers the army and navy as "one weapon" in "a war in which the sea is a substantial factor."[34]
You may argue that FFTS is a maritime strategy because it addresses operations with your other Services (i.e., joint operations), which from my viewpoint is definitely a step in the right direction. However, it does so only in a cursory manner, and it characterizes the naval force's role in joint operations as a "protective cover," an "operational linkage,"[35] and a "transition force."[36] These roles do not convey the
higher learning which teaches us that for a maritime State to make successful war and to realise [sic] her special strength, army and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately connected than are the three arms ashore."[37]
Therefore, to consider FFTS a maritime strategy, it would have to
direct us to assign to each its proper function in a plan of war . . . enable each service to realise [sic] the better the limitations and the possibilities of the function with which it is charged, and how and when its own necessities must give way to a higher or more pressing need of the other.[38]
As you can see, maritime strategy obviously embodies much more than what FFTS contains. I might also add that your lack of a maritime strategy leaves each of your Services wondering how they will integrate with the Naval Service when a war or regional conflict requires their participation and significantly involves the sea. I'm not suggesting that your Navy is responsible for drafting U.S. maritime strategy, however, one needs to be written at the earliest convenience and your Service appears to have taken the first step. Once you understand your country's maritime strategy, you can then compose your naval strategy.
Naval strategy is that part of maritime strategy which determines the movements of the fleet (i.e., fleet operations), which have as their object "passage and communication."[39] Naval strategy must complement and integrate with continental (i.e., land) and air strategy since, as history and your recent operations in Iraq, Haiti, Somalia, etc. attest, any military operation your country undertakes will undoubtedly involve two or more of your Services and almost assuredly will not be decided by naval action alone. In the early part of this century this was difficult to grasp for British naval officers, "whose main concern," as Mr. Bryan Ranft so eloquently states,
was the ever increasing technological complexity of the ships and weapons they would use in war, and whose whole view of strategy centred [sic] on the conduct of fleet actions in which numerical superiority, skill in gunnery and the fighting spirit of the British sailor would annihilate the enemy and end the war at sea.[40]
These officers were still under the influence of Nelson and his heroics on the high seas during the Napoleonic wars, which resulted in their attitudes ranging anywhere from antagonistic to resistant toward a civilian (i.e., me) telling them that destruction of the opponent's fleet could not always decisively end a war. Upon reading FFTS, I sense that many of your officers may have beliefs similar to these British officers when I see terms such as "preventing conflicts" and "controlling crises."[41] If you glean nothing else from this paper, please understand that naval strategy is derived from maritime strategy, which is based on sound strategic theory, and conflicts will rarely, if ever, be decided by naval action alone. While it is good and right to concern yourselves with technological change and the way in which it can enhance and influence naval strategy, you must not allow that change to minimize or ignore sound maritime and naval strategic theory.
I've tried to explain why I believe your "strategic concept," FFTS, is neither a strategic theory, a maritime strategy, nor a naval strategy. It does, in fact, have bits and parts of all three. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to accurately analyze its view of naval functions, roles, and missions using any single group of criteria, much less history, as a guide. However, that is what I intend to do. And, since FFTS most closely resembles a theory of naval warfare, my analysis will be based on that theory. Throughout the remainder of this paper, when I refer to theory, I'm referring to the theory of naval warfare derived from historical research, and when I refer to a concept, I'm referring to FFTS.
Value of History
You may be asking yourself, why this beginning lesson in basic strategic theory and strategy. Well, after reading FFTS it became clear to me that the drafters of that document did not understand some of the differences between strategic theory and strategy, nor did they understand the role strategic theory plays in the development of strategy. Without these basic understandings it is impossible to formulate a coherent, effective strategic theory or strategy, much less put either into practice. For example, your Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps state in FFTS's cover letter that FFTS merely "amplifies the scope"[42] of From the Sea (published in September, 1992), which originally changed the Naval Service's strategic focus "away from operations on the sea toward power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea to influence events in the littoral regions of the world."[43] This is an interesting proposition, but I cannot find any proof, consistent throughout naval history, that supports the concepts that naval forces should focus on projecting power ashore or that they can consistently influence events ashore. Thus, I must conclude that these concepts may not be sound, because they do not appear to be based on naval history. If these concepts are intended to be naval strategy, then they are strategy of the most perilous type: that which is unfounded on sound strategic theory. Another "fragile web-spinner,"[44] Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, had a similar approach; in that, he devised his naval strategic theory prior to searching history for its proof. And I believe we all understand the limitations of many of his conclusions.
I, and certainly Clausewitz would, approve of the Naval Service modifying its strategic concept and strategy based on the roles and missions that the U.S. Government foresees it performing. These modifications are to be expected for, as Mr. Geoffrey Till writes, "there are many new features of the world scene today which may revolutionize traditional ideas about how navies should be used and what functions they can perform."[45] While this is and always has been true, it is important that these modifications are not at the expense of basic functions that history has proven a Navy must always be prepared to perform: these are prevention and securing of alliances, protection or destruction of commerce, and furtherance or hindrance of military operations.[46] As U.S. naval strategists struggle to position the fleet for the future in a dynamic, unpredictable world, the lessons of history can provide a sound frame of reference, which will guide strategists to some of the questions they must answer and some of the issues they must address in their strategic theory.
At this point you may be wondering why I continually refer to history as an aid in analyzing your strategic concept. One reason is that I am a historian, but I also believe history contains a wealth of knowledge that naval officers, such as yourselves, must take advantage of in order to position your Service for the challenges of the future. I am encouraged to discover
officers no longer look upon history as a kind of dust heap from which a convenient brick may be extracted to hurl at their opponents. They no longer go to it to prove some empirical view of tactics or material, or to show that some battle or other was fought in the way they think it ought to have been fought. They go to it as a mine of experience where alone the gold is to be found, from which right doctrine-the soul of warfare-can be built up.[47]
And this has had a positive effect upon your Navy and your country as a whole. You have access to the writings of many great naval historians, theorists, and strategists, some of which are still alive today. They can help you use history to understand naval strategic theory and strategy. However, in drawing conclusions from history, you must be wary of historians who attempt to apply "historical solutions to the solution of modern technical problems."[48] For this is not in the realm of scholarship and impinges on the role naval experts (i.e., you) play in developing sound naval strategy.
You probably agree that most U.S. Navy officers consider Admiral Mahan a foremost authority in naval history and naval operations. And I would admit that he continues to lure a devout following to his vision of a grand fleet's decisive battle at sea. However, as a historian, I find his ability lacking, in that he did not "go to history to search for principles," but to prove principles that he had already created.[49] And while some of his conclusions are sound, you have undoubtedly found many that are not. It is important then to leave the job of scholarship to historians and the job of seamanship to naval officers. "A free collaboration between the historical expert and the naval expert"[50] is the best method to arrive at sound historical conclusions that are applicable to present-day Navies. The value of historical study, as stressed by Mr. Bryan Ranft,
lay in bringing to light the permanent characteristics of sea power and the specific nature of its contribution to national strategy; what it could achieve and what were its limitations. Equipped with these insights, the contemporary naval commander would have a pattern of past experience; what had succeeded, what had failed, against which to assess his present situation and desirable course of action.[51]
Thus, as I mentioned before, history cannot provide all the answers, but it can provide relevant, timely questions and act as an aid to judgment in "this highly dynamic world."[52]
It amazes me to find that the U.S. Navy, after all the wars it has fought and the numerous books that have been written on combined operations, drafts a strategic concept devoid of integrating principles that would link it to Army and Air Force strategies. You know as well as I do that the role of naval forces in combined warfare isn't solely as a "transition force,"[53] a "protective cover," or as "critical operational linkages between peacetime operations and the initial requirements of a developing crisis or major regional contingency."[54] Concentration on these roles with a declining budget and increasing commitments could build a Navy that is unable to contribute to full-scale war, or regional conflict as you like to call it. It is incumbent on you as Naval officers to ensure you form a Navy that is not only capable of performing as a continuation of policy by other means, but also as an integrated member of the U.S. military. Desert Shield and Desert Storm were eye-opening experiences for your Navy and country. The lessons learned there will continue to affect your Navy for years to come. But do not discard history merely because technology appears to have significantly changed the nature of warfare. "A great war does not kill the past, it gives it new life."[55] As the Navy shifts its focus ashore it must also ensure it gives the correct precedence to fleet operations and the historic, indispensable value of sea power outside of the littorals. As Geoffrey Till observed,
In the debate over the nature and significance of Desert Shield and Desert Storm it has proved necessary for navalists to argue . . . that the long, slow, and often
undramatic processes of sea power are still crucial, even in an age of aircraft,
missiles, and brilliant weaponry.[56]
It also concerns me that you've published at least two strategic concepts, albeit complementary ones, since Desert Storm. Does your theory of naval strategy need to be modified or "amplified" that frequently? Changes in technology surely cannot explain the differences between From the Sea (henceforth referred to as FTS) and FFTS. The differences have nothing to do with technology. They have everything to do with policy and the use of military forces as an extension of that policy. By now you should be aware that I agree naval forces are instruments of war with their operations being a continuation of policy by other means. However, "in time of war or of preparation for war, in which the Empire is concerned, arrangements must always be based to an exceptional degree on the mutual relation of naval, military, and political considerations."[57] Thus, naval considerations should carry at least as much weight as diplomatic considerations; not in choosing an objective or purpose for war, but in making the arrangements necessary to fight the war. This is your prerogative.
NAVAL FUNCTIONS, ROLES, AND MISSIONS
FFTS lists three areas in which the Navy's contributions support national strategic objectives: strategic deterrence, sea control and maritime supremacy, and strategic sealift. It is difficult to tell if these roles are in order of priority or merely a list, each element of which carries equal weight of importance and value to the nation. In an attempt to clarify this dilemma, I referred to Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1. According to NDP 1, the naval forces' basic roles are to
promote and defend our national interests by maintaining maritime superiority,
contributing to regional stability, conducting operations on land from the sea, seizing or defending advanced naval bases, and conducting such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of naval campaigns.[58]
It goes on to list deterrence operations, continuing forward deployed presence, and a robust sealift capability as the methods for accomplishing those roles.[59] At this point, I had yet to discern a clear ordering of priorities, which would obviously have to exist since FFTS clearly states that "reductions in fiscal resources . . . dictate that we must focus our more limited naval assets on the highest priorities and the most immediate challenges."[60] FFTS does list "[d]efending the United States and controlling its seaward approaches"[61] as your naval force's first requirements with "[g]aining and maintaining control of the sea and establishing our forward sea lines of communication"[62] as your next priorities. However, FFTS states the Navy's fundamental wartime priority is "to fight and win wars,"[63] and its priority in situations short of war is "to be engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing conflicts and controlling crises,"[64] How do these requirements and priorities relate to the objectives listed above? Priorities is definitely an area where FFTS needs to clarify the U.S. Navy's stance to ensure that the decisions its personnel make are focused in the proper direction. Let's discuss some of the functions, roles, and missions FFTS expounds beginning with naval diplomacy, which I believe encompasses a great many of them.
Naval Diplomacy
As mentioned earlier, Clausewitz summarizes his theory of war in the statement that war is a continuation of policy by other means. And, I believe we can substitute "military operations," whether in peace or war, for the word "war" in Clausewitz's statement and maintain his intent. FFTS accurately portrays the Naval Service as a contributor to and supporter of national security policy, and it appears to position it as a seamless and effective instrument of policy, during both peace and war. It is obvious that the modern-day Navy aligns itself with Clausewitz's theory as evidenced by the common use of the word "diplomacy" throughout much of the contemporary literature available on naval theory and strategy. The idea of naval diplomacy should come as no surprise for it is a historical role of naval forces; as noted in my book, England in the Seven Years War, one of the three functions of the fleet is "to support or obstruct diplomatic effort."[65] Or you may be more familiar with "the prevention and securing of alliances,"[66] which I use in my Green Pamphlet.[67] Either way, the role of naval forces as an extension of diplomacy is a valid and meaningful use for them. This leads to a misnomer contained in FFTS; that is "preventive diplomacy."[68]
I was puzzled by the term "preventive diplomacy" and especially by its billing as a historical role of naval forces. I could find no definition, either in FFTS or NDP 1, of naval or preventive diplomacy, which left me wondering if U.S. Navy Officers are having the same problem. Without a clear definition, how is the Navy supposed to prepare for or execute this mission? Unfortunately, preventive diplomacy appears to be another of the confounding missions listed in FFTS and I don't intend to dwell upon it.
As for naval diplomacy, I believe Mr. Geoffrey Till offers one of the best definitions.
Naval diplomacy is a relatively new phrase covering maritime activities at the less dangerous end of the spectrum of procedures which one country may use to influence the behaviour [sic] of another. The full spectrum ranges from uninhibited military attack at one extreme to routine diplomatic persuasion at the other, and it has no discontinuities; diplomatic activities merge imperceptibly into threats and acts of war.[69]
FFTS would have us believe that where naval diplomacy is involved there is a definitive division between peacetime and wartime actions. It states that the U.S. Navy is engaged in "preventive diplomacy and otherwise supporting our policies overseas" until "deterrence fails . . . and conflict erupts."[70] There are two conclusions that one could make concerning that statement. First, that preventive diplomacy is a form of deterrence, which I will discuss later. And, secondly, that there is a clear-cut distinction between naval operations that support diplomatic efforts and those that occur as a result of a failure of deterrence. However, in the final line of the quotation above, Mr. Till accurately portrays naval diplomacy and its activities as imperceptibly merging from peace into war. And I believe the object of your diplomacy may perceive your efforts as merging into an act of war long before you do. Therefore, while the U.S. Navy may view the role of naval forces in diplomacy as a continuation of foreign policy (i.e., a peacetime activity) by military means, the object of your diplomacy may very well view these forces as what they truly are, namely instruments of war, and act or react accordingly. Thus, you must ensure that FFTS positions your Navy for this seamless transition from peace to war and the possibility that your enemy's perception may differ from your own. Under this rubric of naval diplomacy, there are some additional issues that I would like to discuss as they relate to FFTS. They are power projection and forward presence and strategic deterrence.
Power Projection and Forward Presence
Your Government's "review of strategy and force requirements," mentioned earlier, recognized power projection and forward presence as two areas wherein the Navy and Marine Corps uniquely contribute to national security.[71] I believe you would agree those areas are probably listed in reverse order; in that, a naval force almost certainly must deploy forward (i.e., maintain a forward presence) before it can project any power. Unless, of course, it is projecting power toward a belligerent's military forces, which are near your own borders or coast. Nevertheless, the emphasis of FFTS is clearly on the requirement for U.S. naval forces to project power "from sea to land."[72] . . . From the Sea, FFTS's predecessor, goes even further in defining that "power projection from the sea means bombs, missiles, shells, bullets, and bayonets."[73] There are, of course, some assumptions that have to be made before your Navy can focus on power projection of the form . . . From the Sea (henceforth referred to as FTS) defines. First, you must assume you have some type of command or control of the sea. Second, that the only type of power you want to project is threatening or destructive naval power. And third, that by using this type of power projection, your naval forces have moved from attempting to resolve the issue diplomatically to solving it by coercion or force. Since I will discuss command of the sea at length later in this paper, let's look at the second and third assumptions.
To assume that power projection will always take the form described in FTS belittles your naval force's flexibility and power and its role as an extension of your national policy. In fact, to maintain that definition it would be more appropriate to label this area "firepower projection." It is true that in many cases, naval forces must employ their destructive might to meet national policy objectives; however, my research shows that to be the exception, not the norm. In fact, you accomplish the majority of your successful missions without ever firing a shot. You may argue those successful missions I refer to do not require power projection. However, I would argue that they do and for this reason; your definition of "power" is wrong. It should not be limited to the destructive tools of naval warfare, especially since the power you are projecting is actually U.S. power. Your naval forces, as an extension of your national policy, merely represent and project that power, which I believe you would agree is multi-faceted and applied both destructively and non-destructively all over the world. The forward-deployed and flexible nature of your naval forces is what makes them readily available to project U.S. power-examples of which are listed in FFTS.[74] As you can see, your Navy has many forms of power that it can project, since that power is U.S. power. Be careful not to limit your view of power projection to the employment of destructive force, and ensure your naval forces are prepared mentally and physically to project power in all your mission areas.
The third assumption, based on the FTS definition of power projection, is that naval forces will project power following the failure of non-lethal, diplomatic efforts and not as a continuation of those efforts. Here there are two points you must understand: (1) that lethal naval operations are merely a part of the policy continuum and (2) that both naval operations and diplomacy play a role throughout the continuum. For example, whenever the U.S. is enforcing its policies or protecting its vital interests around the world, the fact that it has a credible naval capability lends credence to those policies, whether the forces are actually present or not. Thus, the mere existence of your Navy and other Services indirectly supports your foreign policies. This is true for all foreign policy issues. And, if non-lethal diplomacy fails to adequately protect U.S. vital interests, then certain naval operations, both lethal and non-lethal, may be required to display U.S. resolve to enforce its foreign policy. During these naval operations, diplomacy continues to work at convincing the belligerent that compliance with U.S. foreign policy is in its best interests. So we see that naval forces do play a role throughout the policy continuum, with lethal naval operations merely one part of that continuum. Therefore, the third assumption is false and I reiterate your need to reconsider your definition of power projection.
FFTS lists forward presence as one of your Navy's "five fundamental and enduring roles in support of the National Security Strategy."[75] The British recognized the importance of forward deployed naval forces long ago. As British naval operations began to expand in the Mediterranean in the 17th century, "Cromwell had seen that the possession of a port would enormously improve England's position by making her independent of uncertain neutrals and doubtful allies."[76] Thus, the decision was made to secure a naval base in the Mediterranean, from which naval forces could be maintained and supplied. This forward base enhanced the ability of British naval forces to maintain their forward presence in the Mediterranean and enabled Great Britain to significantly influence events that either directly or indirectly affected her interests. The question with forward presence is with what frequency and level of force must naval forces be deployed to adequately perform their mission(s). This is, of course, dependent on national policy, one dimension of which is the friction that exists between "the politico-diplomatic position of the country" and the country's "commercial and financial position."[77]
I call this friction "the deflection of strategy by politics."[78] You can substitute the word "policy" for politics to help in clarifying the phrase. This deflection exists whenever policy dictates a course of action that is not militarily or financially expedient. For example, your aircraft carriers departed the Arabian Gulf during Desert Shield because of concern for their safety. However, they were eventually ordered back to their position of forward presence in the Gulf as a show of force to support U.S. diplomatic efforts in that region. Thus, since your naval leadership's initial strategy was superseded by diplomatic considerations, it had to reevaluate its strategy to comply with national policy. Your naval leaders will continue to struggle against this friction as it concerns the forward presence mission. As "reductions in fiscal resources" require you to "refocus our [i.e., your] more limited naval assets on the highest priorities and the most immediate challenges"[79] your country's naval and civilian leadership must be aware of this friction and account for it in the strategy and employment of naval forces. Perhaps there are more efficient methods for gleaning the benefits of the naval forward presence mission without constantly executing it.
Strategic Deterrence
Another sub-unit of naval diplomacy that FFTS presents is strategic deterrence,[80] which it further divides into conventional and nuclear deterrence. For my purposes, I intend to address naval conventional deterrence only. I have not the time or energy to research and reach conclusion on strategic nuclear deterrence. However, from what little I do know, it would seem that from the U.S.'s perspective, strategic nuclear deterrence deters only nuclear threats. FFTS intends deterrence to protect U.S. "vital economic, political, and military interests"[81] around the world. It further defines "vital interests" as those for which you are "willing to fight."[82] Thus, FFTS proposes that the mere presence of capable, ready naval forces "can influence events ashore in support of our [i.e., U.S.] interests."[83] Not surprisingly, this concept has its roots in naval history.
I cite an example of deterrence in my book, England in the Mediterranean, where the presence of British naval forces under the command of Admiral Robert Blake deterred France's Atlantic naval forces from entering the Mediterranean to join with Duc de Guise's forces for a combined attack on Naples, then a Spanish dependency. Blake's presence attained his objective, the failure of Duc de Guise's expedition, without military engagement, becoming another significant event in the course of the Thirty Years War. In this example, Blake was exercising deterrence against an enemy's fleet operations, in that his presence made the risks of France's actions outweigh their expected benefits. And, although a fleet's ability to influence events ashore is well documented, its ability to project deterrence inland is limited. Thus, the concept of deterrence is not new and I could cite numerous historic instances where it was effective and where it failed. My concern is that FFTS exaggerates the deterring capabilities your naval forces possess.
The limited ability of naval forces to execute deterrence across the full range of national security requirements is forgotten when they are "particularly well-suited to the entire range of military operations"[84] and "ready and positioned to respond to the wide range of contingencies."[85] Are naval forces, operating unilaterally, really able to perform these functions? Can they threaten and, if required, militarily effect all aspects of a belligerent's national life; economic, political, social, military, etc.? The obvious answer to these two questions is "NO." The only means available to naval forces that can reach inland are weapons, aircraft, and the Marine Corps. And the military effects required by national policy are rarely destructive and are oftentimes out of reach of or scope for Marine Corps forces. Because "men live upon the land and not upon the sea," deterrence works as a national security concept "by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do."[86] FFTS would do better to concentrate on the naval force's role, in concert with the other Services, in the realm of strategic conventional deterrence.
In several other areas, FFTS is either deficient or lacks necessary clarity of thought. These are sea control and maritime supremacy; fleet composition; and littoral warfare. I chose these three because I believe they represent the essence of the remainder of FFTS and history has much to say about them. I regret that we haven't the time and space to exhaustively dissect each of these areas, but I hope to raise some thought-provoking issues and questions that will help you to better understand them.
Sea Control and Maritime Supremacy
Although only briefly mentioned in FFTS, there is no doubt that sea control (i.e., command of the sea) and maritime supremacy are uppermost in any Captain's mind and remain the enabling objectives that allow a fleet to carry out its mission(s). These two concepts, however, are as different as night and day and their understanding is vital; not only to a ship's Captain but also to any maritime or naval strategist. You may believe the terms "sea control" and "command of the sea" can be used interchangeably without any loss in meaning; however, to the knowledgeable historian and learned naval officer their meanings differ significantly especially with respect to fleet composition, which I will explain later. I'm not familiar with the term "maritime supremacy," and I find it extremely interesting that FFTS specifically emphasizes the distinction between the Navy and Marine Corps when using it.[87] Also, NDP 1 uses the term "maritime superiority," [88] which to me appears to more accurately portray your naval force's capability.
Using common sense and in the absence of a valid definition, I assume that maritime supremacy depicts a Navy that can literally dominate maritime operations to the point that no other Navy can inhibit or restrict its operations in any way. If this is true, then you don't accurately comprehend the lessons of naval history, and it appears to indicate that FFTS is attempting to apply continental (i.e., land) strategy to the sea. If this is not the true meaning of maritime supremacy, then FFTS must be careful to define terms that are not universally known or held. Continental strategy dictates that one can occupy and control territory, exclude others from it and subsist upon it.[89] Thus, there is the possibility of continental supremacy, although by using it here I do not propose nor condone its proliferation. And, it would seem that FFTS's intent in using maritime supremacy is that one can occupy and control the sea and exclude others from it. If this is your belief, then how does a Navy completely exclude neutrals from the sea? Or how does it possess the sea? These are questions for which their is no answer. I ask them here to point out the futility of maritime supremacy.
The entire idea of maritime supremacy is false. "You cannot conquer the sea because it is not susceptible of ownership."[90] In fact, if there is one lesson that history has taught us it is that "the most common situation in naval warfare is that nether side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea."[91] As you are not entirely clear in your understanding of command of the sea, I intend to give you the theory behind command of the sea, as well as some of the strategy related to it. You then must decide if FFTS effectively prepares your Navy for this vital concept.
History proves that "the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it."[92] Once this object is gained then the object of naval strategy, that of passage and communication as mentioned earlier, can be attained. Therefore, we see that command of the sea is not an end in itself, but it is merely a means to an end. Its true power is in what it does or does not allow your naval forces to do. Mr. Geoffrey Till states it succinctly: "The value of command of the sea lay not in any fact of its physical conquest or possession-an idea which only makes sense in land warfare-but in the use to which it could be put."[93] And as history bears out, that use is passage and communications. NDP 1 also recognizes this relationship between means and ends. It states that command of the sea "is fundamental to accomplishing our naval roles."[94] There are several other issues related to command of the sea that I would like to discuss here so that you may reflect on them as they relate to FFTS. They have to do with the different types of command and some methods of securing command, disputing command and exercising command of the sea.
Mr. John B. Hattendorf, whom I greatly admire as both a scholar and insightful maritime theorist, states that "command of the sea may be secured by removing the possibility of a rival or potential rival naval forces from effectively using the common sea lanes to interfere with one's own use of the sea."[95] This, of course, is applicable in times of war[96] or regional conflict. I believe that most of you would agree that command of the sea can only be gained through destruction of the enemy's means to resist that command (i.e., the destruction of the enemy's naval and air forces). However, history proves that there are other methods as well. Mr. Bernard Brodie states that "the destruction of the enemy fleet was just one means by which . . . [command of the sea was] accomplished, not the sole object of maritime forces."[97] Therefore, since FFTS doesn't specifically address the strategy your Navy will use to gain command of sea, how is it done?
Methods for securing command of the sea differ in regards to the type of command you seek. Permanent general command "can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions."[98] Since FFTS uses the terms sea control and maritime supremacy in the same sentence, I assume permanent general command is the type to which it is referring. If not, then perhaps FFTS needs to be re-written to clarify this point. However, even seeking out and destroying the enemy fleet does not assure permanent general command of the sea. From 1939 to the end of 1941,
Great Britain was superior to her enemies in naval fighting power, and she used that superiority to good advantage by sweeping Axis ships from those wide seas, particularly the Atlantic, in which her own continued to ply. Yet her tremendous losses in shipping during that period reflected a woeful insufficiency of fighting craft for convoy escort duty and patrol.[99]
Therefore, even though Britain sought out and destroyed a majority of the enemy's naval fleet, the enemy was still able to interfere with her seaborne supply lines. You may argue that technology (i.e., the airplane, submarine, etc.) will greatly aid the surface fleet in gaining command of the sea. And you are probably correct. However, they are only an aid and history has shown that if your fleet is superior, you will probably find the enemy fleet in a location where it is either impossible or extremely difficult to destroy it. A good example is from Desert Storm, where Iraq flew many of its aircraft to Iran; thus, not allowing the Navy to destroy them.
If you desire local or temporary command of the sea, then there are four methods: a defensive "containing" action, "forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion)," "superior concentration so as render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing),"[100] and blockade. I will not discuss all of these here. Each of them, used effectively under the right circumstances, can enable a Navy or naval force to command the sea to the degree necessary for successful, politically-acceptable operations. I list them to stress the point that since FFTS does not address command of the sea to any depth, you must ensure it is addressed elsewhere in your Navy. For it is too important of a subject to leave to chance or to assume that the naval forces designed for forward presence and projecting power ashore can, through their flexibility, adequately perform this vital role. Your Navy cannot afford to make the assumption that the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Owens, made: "since there will be no significant challenge to the U.S. Navy's control of the seas for the foreseeable future, U.S. naval forces will focus primarily on influencing events ashore."[101] Perhaps this is an assumption the British Navy made in the years leading up to the Falklands war? I believe you are aware of the difficulty they had in commanding the sea against the Argentineans.
Fleet Composition
The gaining and maintenance of command was the work of the Battle Fleet, under whose cover the Control Fleet operated. The point of emphasising [sic] the difference between these two functions was that they had different requirements in warships, tactical procedure and so on. Only with a properly 'balanced fleet' could a navy hope to perform both functions.[102]
Another area not addressed in FFTS concerns the difference between the types of ships required to command the sea and the types required to exploit that command. A sound strategic theory and strategy must account for and ensure an adequate balance exists between both types of ships. The command fleet, or "battle fleet," consists of the ships that can compete for, gain, and maintain command of the sea for successful exploitation by the "control fleet." FFTS "amplifies the scope" of FTS, which "signaled a change in focus . . . away from operations on the sea toward power projection and the employment of naval forces from the sea."[103] This would seem to suggest a change in emphasis within the U.S. Navy from the battle fleet to the control fleet. FTS appears to support this notion by stating that your
ability to command the seas in areas where we anticipate future operations allows us to resize our Naval Forces and to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the 'littoral' or coastlines of the earth.[104]
I believe this change in emphasis is in the proper direction provided the command fleet is maintained in sufficient strength to perform its function under all operational possibilities.
I find it interesting, however, that although FTS announced this change in emphasis, the composition of your fleet has appeared to remain the same, even while its size has diminished. In fact, FFTS states that Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups remain your "basic presence building blocks,"[105] which, if I'm not mistaken, are the same building blocks you were using before FTS. In addition, the majority of your control fleet (I like to call them cruisers) is assigned duties with or is directly supporting your command fleet (i.e., capital ships such as your aircraft carriers). Without modifications to your fleet's building blocks how are you able to shift its priorities and missions? If you're relying on the inherent flexibility of naval forces to accomplish both command and control missions, then, at least from a historical standpoint, your reliance is unfounded. It is unfounded on the basis that as command of the sea is a means to an end, then relying on the battle fleet to perform both command functions and control functions is a confounding of means and ends. There is not a sequential relationship between the means (i.e., command of the sea) and the ends (i.e., exploitation of that command). One does not end when the other begins-and therein lies the dilemma. If you use the same fleet for command and control, then in contributing to one mission you're detracting from the other. You, the U.S. Navy, must give this issue more thought and ensure your strategic concept and strategy are sound in this area; my analysis indicates they're not.
Littoral Warfare
The final area I would like to discuss is littoral warfare. And I place it here, following command of the sea and fleet composition, because according to FTS "mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from command of the high seas. It is an objective which requires our focused skills and resources."[106] I would state further that command of the "high" seas should not be presumed either, but I've already addressed that above. I agree with the assumption that since a formidable global maritime threat no longer exists, a majority of your emphasis must shift to fleet operations in the littorals. Notice that I said "a majority"; for there are still foreign Navies afloat that could threaten you on the open ocean. However, as you shift your emphasis, I would once again caution you to look to history for the questions and conclusions that can aid your judgment concerning littoral operations. There is at least one unique characteristic concerning "littoral" warfare that I believe history has been gracious enough to provide. It is related to one of the historic functions of the fleet, that of furthering or hindering military operations ashore,[107] and again concerns the separation between the fleet provided to protect the army or marine landing and the fleet required to command the sea.
FFTS discusses "Carrier Battle Forces"[108] and "Naval Expeditionary Forces,"[109] but it doesn't clearly define the composition or the roles of these forces in combined operations. Are they different names for the same force or two different forces with differing missions? Reading FFTS would have me believe that Carrier Battle Forces are the result of combining carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups. This "force" would then "project our naval expeditionary forces ashore"[110] to execute required combat operations. However, it goes on to state that naval expeditionary forces result from naval forces that are "tailored with specific capabilities . . . to provide a highly flexible force for a wide range of missions."[111] Thus, my dilemma-are these forces "combined" or "tailored"? And, more importantly, is there a clear delineation of function between the forces assigned to command the sea and the forces (i.e., the covering squadron) assigned to protect the control fleet? The precedent of assuming that a large naval force can perform both functions is dangerous and can lead to failure. This point can be illustrated by an event that occurred at the end of the Austro-Italian War of 1866. The Italian fleet (i.e., Admiral Persano) commanded the Adriatic wherein the Austrian fleet (i.e., Admiral Tegethoff) had been on the defensive awaiting the opportunity for a counter-offensive. Precipitated by the failure of the Italian Army, Persano was required to capture the Austrian island of Lissa.
Without any attempt to organise [sic] his fleet . . . he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force. Practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon as Persano was thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. Persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to meet the attack [and] . . . was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy.[112]
If, in littoral warfare, the carrier battle group is required to exercise the functions of the control fleet, then what forces will maintain command of the sea. History has proven that
no matter what fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility of a covering squadron being let free for independent naval action.[113]
You may see the importance of this point with additional study of the World War II Marine Corps' landing at Guadalcanal.
I think you now understand why I stress that command of the sea should be the number one priority of your naval forces. It allows them to perform their strategic deterrence and strategic sealift roles, as well as, project power and maintain a forward presence as required by national security policy objectives. To think of the means on the same level as the ends is out of order. The means allows the ends to be attained, not vice versa.
CONCLUSION
I must reiterate that I am quite impressed with the U.S. Navy's attempt to write a naval strategic concept. And although I've found fault with many of the areas it addresses, the document's existence in and of itself should be looked upon with pride. I am also thankful that your Chief of Naval Operations has seen fit to place my book, Some Principles, on his "advanced" reading list. However, I hope you can find my book in your local library because the Naval Institute's 1988 reprint is out-of-print.
At this time I would like to stress several of the points I hope I've made clear in this paper; (1) as you redraft FFTS, make sure you delineate what you are trying to write-a theory or a strategy, (2) don't get confused by the levels of war when discussing strategy, (3) become a committed student of Carl von Clausewitz, (4) use terms that are well-known and recognized, (5) consult reputable historians to help draft your next theory or strategy document, (6) never assume you will have command of the sea, (7) strive for a balanced fleet, and (8) beware of operating in the littorals with a Cold War structured and equipped fleet. I trust that these conclusions will aid you in your future endeavors.
