Strategic Mobility in Support of a CONUS Based Army
CSC 1997
Subject Area - General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Strategic Mobility in support of a CONUS based Army.
Author: Christopher L. Johnson, Major, U.S. Army.
Thesis: Since the Gulf War, the United States has developed a credible strategic mobility program. When this program is completed in FY 2001, the United States will have sufficient strategic transport to support two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies.
Background: Following the Gulf War, the United states reassessed its strategic mobility capabilities and found them wanting. It was clear that the uninterrupted six month build up during Operation Desert Shield was an anomaly. Besides the lessons from Desert Storm was the fact that U.S. forces were becoming increasingly CONUS based and needed a credible strategic mobility platform to remain viable as a strong deterrent force. Following a series of policy reviews and studies, the Department of Defense devised an intense Joint effort to improve the nation's strategic mobility posture. This program outlined required improvements in terms of CONUS infrastructure, sealift, and airlift. These improvements are supported by both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, as well as ongoing budget resolutions.
Conclusions: Both the NSS and NMS support a strategy that relies on few forward deployed forces. The current and future cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy is one of power projection. To facilitate this strategy, the U.S. must have a credible strategic mobility program with robust capabilities. While it does not currently have the assets, the U.S. clearly has a viable plan to meet its strategic mobility requirements. Continued support for upgrading strategic lift programs is expressed in national policies as well as the Fiscal Year 1997 Budget. If the current procurement programs for strategic lift remain as scheduled, the U.S. will have the required mobility assets to meet two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.
STRATEGIC MOBILITY IN SUPPORT OF A CONUS BASED ARMY
Introduction
One of the central aims of the 1996 United States' National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) is "to enhance our security with military forces that are ready to fight and with effective representation abroad."[1] Embedded in the NSS is the ability to win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC).[2] Inherent in the two MRC strategy is the fact that the same assets will be used to support both contingencies. To meet these goals, the U.S. must be able to project its power from an increasingly CONUS based force. According to the NSS, "we must have forces that can deploy quickly and supplement U.S. forward-based and forward deployed forces."[3]
In support of the NSS, the National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS), places further emphasis on strategic mobility. The NMS says that credible power projection acts as a deterrent to potential adversaries, provides greater flexibility in employing military force, and is essential for performing the required tasks of all components of the NMS.[4]
Since the Gulf War, the United States has reassessed its strategic mobility capabilities and found them wanting. During the Gulf War, the United States had an obliging enemy who allowed us six uninterrupted months to build sufficient combat power prior to the start of hostilities. After the war, this uncontested long buildup phase was recognized as an anomaly. In response to this, defense policy makers sought to develop a program that will allow military forces to rapidly respond to a major regional contingency.
Through a series of studies and policy reviews, the Department of Defense (DoD) has devised a plan to give our predominantly CONUS based force a viable rapid response vehicle to deploy our forces world wide when needed. Although the DoD is not yet fully capable of meeting its mobility requirements to respond to two major regional conflicts, it is well underway and will likely meet its goal of being ready by the year 2001. The Persian Gulf war, combined with the changes in Eastern Europe drastically changed the way the United States Army thinks. United States' military doctrine revolved around one central idea: containing communism with a focus on defending and reinforcing Western Europe. For forty years the Army maintained a third of its active force in West Germany.
Simply stated, the Army prepositioned everything it needed for sustained combat on or near the proposed battlefield. The Army maintained multiple divisions worth of supplies and equipment in a war-ready status. The only thing missing was the soldiers. In the event of a conflict, the plan was simple. Rally all available Military Airlift Command and Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) aircraft and transport the troops from the Active Army to Europe. Once there, the soldiers would draw their equipment and supplies and move into their assembly areas, ready for combat. These forces would then be reinforced by other units from the Army National Guard.
Current doctrine is one of power projection. The Army no longer maintains massive numbers of troops and equipment next to the battlefield. Today, prepositioning consists of what can be maintained on the prepositioning ships. The Army maintains itself primarily in the Continental United States. With the rapid pace of modern combat the Army needs rapid strategic mobility. Future conflicts will not guarantee the luxury of six months, as in the Gulf War, to build an offensively capable force in a theater of operations.
It is ironic that President Bush made this quotation the day Iraq invaded Kuwait.
In an era when threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and our agility. And we will need forces that give us a global reach. No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water. And in many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with prepositioned material. We'll have to have air and sealift capacities to get our forces where they are needed, when they are needed. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility must guide our efforts. [5]
As a result of recent world events, the Army changed its focus from a Eurocentric strategy to one of CONUS based power projection. Following the Gulf war, the Army conducted an extensive study concerning its strategic mobility requirements. The result of this study was the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP). The Army first outlined its strategic mobility program in a July 1992 memorandum entitled the Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) Management/Action Plan. The ASMP clearly outlined the need for additional sealift and preposition afloat ships, the C-17 cargo aircraft, and upgrade of all CONUS based elements necessary to move forces to and outload from the air and sea ports. The plan also called for improvements in rail and road networks on military installations and ports.[6]
The ASMP management plan described the Army's strategic mobility goals: "The credibility of our new strategy depends on our ability to deploy in a timely manner, an appropriate military force that is versatile, lethal, and sustainable. The Army must be prepared to deploy rapidly up to a five division contingency force in support of national military objectives."[7]
The ASMP mentioned four preconditions that must exist for the program to work. First, the Army has to reconfigure its structure to make it more deployable. Second, DoD must buy adequate sealift and airlift assets. Third, military installations and ports must be restructured to support a massive overseas deployment. Finally, DoD requires an enabling joint doctrine to prepare all the services to conduct a no-notice strategic deployment.[8]
Recent world events illustrate the unstable international climate and the need for rapidly deployable forces. General (RET) Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently made this statement concerning strategic mobility: "Deterrence is only credible if we possess a robust means of power projection and the mobility to deploy and sustain our forces".[9]
As stated earlier, the Army's goal is to provide an adaptable corps of up to five divisions, with a forcible entry capability. A light brigade must be on the ground by C+4, a light division by C+12, two armored/mechanized divisions from CONUS by C+30, and the full corps and COSCOM by C+75.[10] Sufficient supplies, properly sequenced to arrive and sustain the force until establishment of lines of communication, must be prepositioned afloat.[11]
In order for the ASMP to work, the Army requires an increase in prepositioned supply ships, acquisition of additional Roll-On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ships, strategic airlift, containers, and rail cars, as well as enhanced port facilities. The program is dependent on the Navy's continued procurement of additional sealift and the Air Force's acquisition of the C-17.
Following the Army's lead, DoD thoroughly reviewed the strategic mobility requirements for all the services. The analysis, known as the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS), was completed in late 1992. In 1995, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved a study that combined the MRS with the results of the 1993 Bottom-up Review (BUR). The combined study is called the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-up Review Update or MRS BURU.
The MRS BURU recommended the major improvements needed to increase our strategic mobility capacity in support of the two major regional contingency strategy. The study recommended that the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) improve its RO/RO ship fleet from 17 to 36 ships, that 19 large, medium speed roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs) be procured, that 16 ships be prepositioned in Southwest Asia with Army equipment, and that a total of 120 C-17 aircraft be procured. The capacity for airlift requirements was set at 49 million ton miles per day (MTM/D), and the surge sealift was set at 10 million square feet.[12] Defense budgets through the year 2001 will include provisions to purchase these new capabilities.
To put this in perspective, it requires 304K MTM to move an armored division by air, which equates to approximately 1900 C-141 and 1000 C-5 sorties. The same division can deploy on 6.2 LMSRs. Each LMSR has more than 300K square feet of cargo space.[13]
Additionally, the study recommended major improvements in the infrastructure of the railheads of CONUS bases and sea and air ports be made to improve the deployment time of CONUS based units. The study also recommended procuring an additional 1,000 railcars and 16,000 shipping containers.[14] DoD plans to buy all of these additional assets by the year 2001. The key recommendations of the MRS BURU include:
- Nineteen LMSRs for preposition afloat and surge sealift (8 PREPO, 11 Surge)
- Two leased container ships for Army sustainment stocks.
- Expand the RRF RO/RO fleet to 36 ships.
The strategic mobility enhancements recommended by the MRS BURU, when realized, will allow the U.S. to deploy a five division corps anywhere in the world in the 75 day timeframe first established in the ASMP. In addition to the deployment goals stated in the ASMP, the MRS BURU calls for a heavy brigade to be deployed anywhere in the world within 15 days.[15] This brigade will fall in on equipment prepositioned afloat. The DoD has fully embraced the concept of CONUS based power projection.
These rapidly deployable forces, along with those forward deployed, give the geographical CINCs a potent force package in the event of a major regional contingency.
SEALIFT
Sealift is the foundation of the DoD's strategic mobility structure. It encompasses the assets needed to project CONUS as well as forward based forces to a contingency location and the supplies and equipment prepositioned afloat. In protracted conflict, 95 percent of the dry cargo and 99 percent of bulk petroleum requires transport by sea.[16] The capacity differences between sealift and airlift are such that ten cargo ships deliver the equivalent of a full month's supply lifted by airlift.[17] Sealift cannot stand alone in supplying a conflict, but it is by far the most important method.
Sources of Sealift
Currently, the United States has three sources of strategic sealift available. Those owned by the U.S. Government, commercial ships under long-term lease, and commercial trade ships. Government owned ships are divided into two categories: the Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled fleet and the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF). The MSC fleet now stands at 70 vessels (43 cargo and 27 tankers). These numbers include the afloat prepositioned force, 16 of which contain supplies for the Army and Air Force. Current policy requires the afloat prepositioned ships to respond immediately when ordered to sail. The centerpiece of the MSC controlled fleet is the eight Fast Sealift Ships (FSS). At top speed, these ships require two weeks to travel to Southwest Asia from CONUS.[18] These ships are important because they are Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) type ships. This means that wheeled or tracked vehicles can drive directly onto the ships without the aid of material handling equipment.
MSC maintains the FSSs at a reduced operating state, requiring them to sail four days from notification. The FSSs are being supplemented by the acquisition of 19 Large Medium Speed RO/RO Ships (LMSR). Eight of the LMSRs will be used for prepositioning and eleven will be used for surge sealift. The surge sealift ships will be stationed in CONUS and will be required to arrive at the port of embarkation within four days of notification to be loaded with supplies and equipment. Five of the LMSRs are scheduled for delivery in FY 96-97; MSC will use these five ships for the Army's preposition afloat program.[19]
The second source of government owned strategic sealift is the RRF. The RRF consists of former commercial ships modified to meet DoD requirements. The current RRF consists of 96 ships including: 17 RO/RO, 48 breakbulk, and assorted tankers and barge carriers. Because the RO/RO ships are so important for rapid deployment the MRS BURU calls for the RRF to expand its RO/RO fleet to 36 ships.
The second source of strategic sealift is commercial ships under long-term lease to the DoD; currently 10 dry cargo ships and 15 tankers. These ships are used for Army afloat prepositioning and to transport supplies to locations not serviced by regular commercial ships.
The third source of strategic sealift are regular commercial ships. These ships come from two sources, the United States Merchant Marine (USMM) and ships considered to be under effective United States control (EUSC). The USMM consists of ships that sail under the U.S. Flag. Currently the USMM has 132 ships with military utility. The last and least reliable source of commercial shipping is the EUSC. These ships belong to U.S. businesses but have registry in foreign "flags of convenience" (FOC) nations. These ships operate using foreign crews and require the permission of the FOC nation for use in a military operation. This could create a problem because the FOC nation could deny use of these ships if it did not support the operation they were being used for. There are a total of 116 military useful EUSC ships.[20] Because they are not responsive enough to be used for initial surge operations commercial ships will be used for sustainment operations. The current commercial fleet is more than sufficient to meet the sustainment demands of two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.[21]
Desert Shield /Storm Sealift
The sealift effort in support of Operation Desert Shield/Storm proved to be the largest sea deployment since the Vietnam War. The contribution of the various forms of sealift to this effort was tremendous. During the entire operation, over 2.8 million short tons arrived in Saudi Arabia. All told, 344 ships participated in the operation.[22]
The sealift operation consisted of two phases. Phase I, the defense of Saudi Arabia, began on 7 August 1990 and ran through November. Three of the four army divisions, two heavy and one air assault, deployed during this phase and arrived by sea. Additionally, the preponderance of sustainment supplies as well as a Corps Support Command arrived via sea lines of communications (SLOC).
Phase II began in early December and ran through the end of the war. The mission of phase II was to transport the combat and combat support forces necessary to conduct offensive operations in SWA. Phase II sealift operations delivered the equipment and supplies for an additional three heavy divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, and a corps support command.
Ships from each of the four major sources participated. MSC controlled ships included eight fast sealift ships and twenty five afloat prepositioning ships. The RRF activated seventy of its ships. Because MSC and RRF ships could not transport all required supplies and equipment, the United States chartered 241 ships, both dry cargo and tankers. The chartered vessels consisted of sixty U.S. Merchant Marine or EUSC ships and 181 of foreign ownership.[23]
During Desert Shield, Military Sealift Command used chartered ships for several reasons. The first reason is that the majority of the Army's equipment will not fit into sealift containers. For this reason, the Army prefers RO/RO ships. The RRF only had seventeen RO/RO ships available. Secondly, the RRF activation did not go according to schedule. Of the 45 ships the RRF had on ten-day standby when the deployment began, only 14 arrived at their designated ports on time. Sixteen arrived one to five days late. Six were six to ten days late, and four were ten to twenty days late.[24] In contrast, 24 of the first 49 ships chartered arrived at their respective seaport of embarkation within ten days.[25] Finally, the cost of commercial charters is less expensive than activating a RRF ship. For example, a chartered RO/RO costs $23,000 per diem and a RRF ship costs $1.6 million to activate.[26]
The 24th Infantry Division, the first heavy division to deploy to Saudi Arabia, required ten FSSs to transport it. Seven of the eight FSSs responded to the initial alert notice. (The eighth was undergoing scheduled maintenance) The first ship loaded and was underway by C+6 the remainder by C+15. Six of the FSSs arrived by C+31, the seventh suffered from maintenance problems and never arrived . The initial surge of FSSs arrived in Saudi Arabia within one day of the ASMP standard of C+30, but they only transported 50 percent of the division.[27] The entire division did not arrive until C+47, a full two weeks beyond the current goal of thirty days.
Several factors contributed to the late arrival of the 24th Infantry Division. Due to the haste involved in the outload, the ships were poorly loaded. This resulted in an inefficient use of space and created an unbalanced load. These problems combined with ship maintenance problems slowed the crossing from fourteen days to twenty.
Lessons learned from Desert Shield
The Desert Shield sealift operation provides many lessons learned that apply to future operations. The two key sealift programs of the 1980's proved to be a success. They are the fast sealift ship procurement and the afloat prepositioned ships. Both of these programs proved invaluable during the deployment to Southwest Asia. The first FSS arrived at the port of Savannah within six days of notification. All seven FSSs departed for Saudi Arabia by 22 August 1990.[28] The afloat prepositioned ships began arriving within ten days of notification. All prepositioned ships arrived and had off-loaded their cargo by 6 September.[29] Clearly these two programs contributed significantly to the success of the deployment.
Based on the success of the FSS, which are RO/RO type ships, the DoD is purchasing 19 LMSRs. When the last LMSR is delivered in 2001, the surge sealift capacity will reach the 10 million square feet of surge cargo capacity called for by the MRS BURU. To exercise the deployment of these ships, CONUS based units regularly conduct Sea Emergency Deployment Exercises (SEDRE), to exercise this surge sealift capability. Units participating in these exercises deploy from their home station via rail to a sea port and are loaded onto a sealift vessel.
Since the Gulf War, the DoD has purchased hundreds of railcars and thousands of containers. These assets will facilitate transportation to seaports and ease the loading of unit equipment onto cargo ships.
There have been a number of deployments since the Gulf War. Although these deployments were not as large, they demonstrated that strategic mobility has improved since 1990. For example, during Desert Shield, it took over two weeks for the first mechanized forces to arrive in Saudi Arabia, but less than 24 hours for the 1994 deployment of a mechanized brigade to Kuwait, in response to Iraqi troop movements. In 1994, elements from the 24th Infantry Division deployed to Kuwait via airlift and fell in on the prepositioned brigade equipment set located there. This demonstrates that the prepositioning aspect of our strategic mobility program is viable as a crisis response mechanism.
Current Status of Sealift
The RRF has increased its RO/RO fleet from 17 to 31 since the Desert Shield deployment and is scheduled to procure five more.[30] The increased RO/RO fleet will significantly decrease the load and off load time during a deployment.
In 1996 there were 34 ships used for afloat prepositioning. Thirteen of the ships are used to carry the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), thirteen carry army equipment and supplies, and seven carry ammunition, medical supplies, and fuel for all the services.[31] The MPS and the Afloat Prepositioning Ships (APS) do not compete for resources. "In reality, APS ships carry equipment that, when combined with soldiers to man it, form units that complement the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) which is comprised of MPS and Marines who support it. The programs can be used by the joint force commanders (JFCs) either together for synergistic effects or separately." [32]
AIRLIFT
Of the elements of strategic mobility, airlift is the most responsive. Due to its rapid response, airlift provides the first link in the overseas deployment of U.S. forces. While airlift provides an initial rapid response, it cannot sustain forces for a long period. Airborne and light forces are the only forces with the capability of deploying exclusively by air. In a large scale operation, these type of units will most likely secure a lodgment and await the arrival of heavy forces. Airlift is also used to link forces up with prepositioned equipment. In October 1994, elements of the 24th Infantry Division flew via strategic airlift to Kuwait, in response to Iraqi force deployments along the Kuwaiti border. In the event of a contingency operation, airlift provides 100% of the personnel and cargo until the sea lines of communication are established.
Sources of Airlift
There are two sources of strategic airlift. The first source is organic U.S. Air Force aircraft, which includes those assigned to the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The second is the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).
The workhorse of the current airlift fleet, the C-141, is becoming increasingly vulnerable to maintenance problems due to its advanced age. During Desert Shield, the C-141 could only carry 68 percent of its carrying capacity due to wing cracks.[33]
The C-141 is being replaced by the C-17. Currently there are 18 C-17s in use by the U.S. Air Force. The total buy of 120 aircraft will not be complete until 2006.[34] The C-17 is important because is can carry nearly as much as a C-5 and can take off and land on short unimproved airfields.
To maximize its fleet of aircraft, DoD relies on civilian aircraft to transport 95 percent of its passenger airlift requirements. These civilian assets are the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). The CRAF is a voluntary operation. Civilian airline companies participate in the program to gain access to lucrative military contracts. In peacetime, airlines participating in the CRAF program have priority for military transport contracts.
The CRAF program consists of three stages. In stage one, participating airlines provide up to forty- one long-range passenger and cargo aircraft. The commander of USTRANSCOM can activate the initial stage of the CRAF program. Stage two and three provide up to 181 and 580 aircraft respectively. The Secretary of Defense has the authority to activate these two stages.[35]
Current law requires that United States citizens own 75 percent of participating airlines' stock. However, in a move to improve the financial posture of U.S. airlines, recent policy changes tolerate up to 49.9 percent foreign investment.[36]
Desert Shield Airlift
The Military Airlift Command's aircraft, combined with the CRAF, proved invaluable during Desert Shield. Airlift provided the only link with CONUS until the first fast sealift ship arrived on 27 August 1990. Before the first ship's arrival, airlift delivered 53,000 short tons of cargo and transported 72,000 personnel.[37]
Throughout the operation, the CRAF program proved to be a success. On 17 August, the Commander of USTRANSCOM activated stage one of CRAF. This was the first activation of CRAF in its thirty-eight year history. On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense activated CRAF stage two in anticipation of the upcoming offensive.[38] During the entire operation, CRAF provided 117 aircraft, and transported eighty percent of the personnel and 17 percent of the airlifted cargo.[39]
Current Status of Airlift
There are currently 227 C-141s in the USAF inventory. The projected inventory in the year 2000 is 136 aircraft. The airlift capacity lost by the retirement of the C-141 is being replaced by the C-17. The C-5 inventory is 109 and will remain constant through the year 2000.
The CRAF program proved to be a success during Desert Shield. Use of these aircraft allowed MAC to concentrate its efforts on transporting cargo. The units transported by sea send their soldiers via CRAF aircraft and have them arrive just in time to off load the ships. This allows units to conduct training until the last possible moment.
Based on full mobilization of all military and CRAF aircraft, current airlift assets can lift the 49 MTM/D required by the MRS BURU. The military airfleet, both active and reserve, can lift 31 MTM/D. The remaining 18 MTM/D are provided by CRAF.[40]
CONCLUSIONS
Today, the U.S. lacks sufficient strategic mobility assets to support the requirements outlined in the MRS BURU. The MRS BURU requires 10 million square feet of surge cargo space. Current capacity is approximately 6.5 million square feet.[41]
Shortfalls in sealift assets are especially significant because sealift moves so much of the required supplies and equipment during a regional contingency operation. Airlift assets, both military and civilian, can meet the required lift capacity of 49 MTM/D.
Both the NSS and NMS support a strategy that relies on few forward deployed forces. The current and future cornerstone of U.S. defense strategy is one of power projection. To facilitate this strategy, the U.S. must have a credible strategic mobility program with robust capabilities.
The U.S. clearly has a plan to meet its strategic mobility requirements. Continued support for upgrading strategic lift programs is expressed in national policies as well as the FY 1997 DoD Budget.[42] If the current procurement programs for strategic lift remain as scheduled, the U.S. will have the required strategic mobility assets to meet two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Addams, John F., et al. "Sealift in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: 7 August 1990 to 17 February 1991." Memorandum prepared by the Center for Naval Analysis. 11 June 1991, Alexandria VA.
Bash, Brooks L. "CRAF: The Persian Gulf War and Implications for the Future." Naval War College Report, 19 June 1992, Newport RI.
Bond, David F. "Troop and Materiel Deployment Missions Central Elements in Desert Storm Success." Aviation Week and Space Technology 22 April 1991.
Beyer, Alfred H., et al. "Review of DoD's Strategic Mobility Programs; Commercial Sealift Support." Logistics Management Institute report, January 1992, Bethesda, Maryland.
Bush, George W. From a speech delivered at the Aspen Institute, 2 August 1990.
Chilcoat, Robert A. and Henderson David A., "Army Preposition Afloat". Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 94. pp 51-57.
Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 1996. Washington, DC.
Collar, Leo L. "Desert Storm and its Effect on U.S. Maritime Policy." Defense Transportation Journal, June 1991, pp 67-70.
Dille, Mark W. "Improving our Strategic Mobility Posture for the XXI Century." Army War College Report, June 1996, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
Elan, Fred E., and Mark Henderson. "The Army's Strategic Mobility Plan." Army Logistitian May-June 1992, pp 2-6.
Gibson, Andrew E. "After the Storm." Naval War College Review Summer 1992, pp 22-27.
Gibson, Andrew E. and Jacob L. Shuford. "Desert Shield and Strategic Sealift." Naval War College Review Spring 1991, pp 6-19.
Hura, Myron and Richard Robinson. "Fast Sealift and Maritime Prepositioning Options for Improving Sealift Capabilities." A RAND Note The RAND Corporation, 1991, Santa Monica, California.
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Cont.)
Johnson, Duane C. "Strategic Airlift and Sealift: Both Have Long Suffered From a Capabilities Versus Requirements Disconnect." Air War College Report, April 1990, Maxwell AFB.
Johnston, Mark F. "Strategic Mobility: An Assessment". Army War College Report, 1996, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Kelley, Kenneth. "Deployment Planning Guide: Transportation Assets Required for Deployment." MTMCTEA Report OA 90-4f-22 Military Traffic Management Command, August 1991, Newport News VA.
Matthews, William. "Lack of Lift Symies War Plans." Army Times, 6 March 1995.
Peay, J. H. Binford III., "Building America's Power Projection Army." Military Review July 1994, pp 4-15.
Pires, Mark R. "Can The United States Conduct Two Nearly simultaneous Regional Contingencies." Army CGSC Report, 1995, Fort Leavenworth, Ks.
Rutherford, Robert L. Defense Issues, Volume10, Number 30, prepared statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 23, 1995.
Schmidt, Eric. "U.S. Cargo Fleet Found Wanting." New York Times 27 Sept 1990, p A10.
Shalikashvili, John M. National Military Strategy of the Unite States of America. 1995, Washington, DC.
Tow, Sheila L. "Airlift-Delivered Victory." Defense Transportation Journal June 1991, pp 47-53.
"Desert Shield/Desert Storm: USTRANSCOM's First Great Challenge." Defense Transportation Journal June 1991, pp 14-19.
Department of the Army, Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff For Logistics. Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) Management/Action Plan 17 July 1992, Washington, DC.
Department of the Army, Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff For Logistics. Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) Management/Action Plan 12 January 1993, Washington, DC.
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Cont.)
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-17; Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization. 28 October 1992, Washington, DC.
Department of the Army, The Army Strategic Mobility Program, Undated Information Briefing.
