"Hue, The Mirror On The Pole View Around The Corner To Future Urban combat"
CSC 1997
Subject Area - History
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION PG 1
CHAPTER ONE THE LOTUS FLOWER PG 5
CHAPTER TWO THE YEAR OF THE MONKEY PG 7
CHAPTER THREE CHAOS IN THE LITTORALS PG 10
CHAPTER FOUR THE LONG WALK DOWN LE LOI STREET PG 14
CHAPTER FIVE TAKE AWAYS FOR THE FUTURE PG 28
CONCLUSIONS PG 35
ENDNOTES PG 38
BIBLIOGRAPHY PG 41
MAP OF VIETNAM PG 45
MAP OF HUE, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM PG 46
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Hue, the Mirror on the Pole View Around the Corner to Future Urban Combat
Author: Major Jonathan P. Hull United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The United States Marine Corps has adopted Operational Maneuver From the Sea, and in conjunction with this revolutionized means of power projection, is evaluating small, highly mobile "Killer Team" organizations, heavily reliant on technology and indirect firepower, as the executor of operations ashore. The preponderance of the world's population, cities, and market centers are located on the littorals, where naval forces will find themselves engaged. This being the case, Marines must expect to fight in urban areas. An examination of the Battle for Hue in the Republic of Vietnam during the Tet Offensive of 1968, serves to illustrate that these small conceptual Killer Teams would be greatly pressed, and most likely fail in urban combat.
Discussion: The Department of the Navy's "Forward....From the Sea", coupled with the Commandant of the Marine Corps' "Operational Maneuver From the Sea", have served to highlight and make vital the capability of United States Naval Forces to rapidly project influence and power into foreign littorals. The Commandant has further directed the examination and development of conceptual units, which are small Killer Teams, vice the traditional force organizations to be incorporated into this new maneuver doctrine. These small teams will rely upon unprecedented firepower, technology, mobility, and elusiveness, to defeat an equally elusive enemy employing guerrilla tactics, in a manner "conceptually" expected to be far more successful than current Marine conventional forces.
By the year 2000, between 40 and 44 percent of the world's population is expected to be living in urban areas, with more than 17 of the world's largest 25 cities being in Third World nations. Most of these nations will not possess the ability to handle the social, infrastructure, cultural, and associated problems inherent to these cities. Though littoral represents a relatively small area, 80 percent of the World's national capitols are found there alone, and they contain an estimated 75 percent of the total population of the world. Additionally, nearly every significant world market place can be found in the littorals. This being this case, and with the link between naval forces and the littorals, United States Marines will find themselves deployed to and engaged in the cities and urban areas of the world.
Though nearly thirty years ago, the battle to recapture Hue during the Tet Offensive of 1968, in the Republic of Vietnam, was the last true military operation in an urban area the Marine Corps has been involved in. An examination of the actions of one infantry battalion during a portion of that battle offers great insight into combat in a city, and the difficult lessons learned there must play a part in the development of any future operational concept. The city offered an environment, terrain, tactical situation, and rogue enemy much like one which can be expected to arise on the littorals of present day. Further in the absence of the technological advances expected to fully support Operational Maneuver From the Sea and the conceptual Killer Teams, Marines entering Hue to recapture it in 1997, would be organized and equipped much like those who fought there in 1968. The events in Hue serve to cast great doubt over the ability of any small independent units, regardless of the technological advances they possess to succeed in an situation such as that presented by Hue.
Conclusions: Operational Maneuver From the Sea is a flexible and dynamic doctrine that possesses great potential to serve the Marine Corps upon the littorals of the world. Likewise the small conceptual Killer Teams have great merit which must be fully explored. However, these teams, based on the lessons at Hue, would not have succeeded in regaining the city, and containing the challenges that arose there. As the Marine Corps is driven toward urban combat based on the organization's littoral prowess and the shift of world demographics, effort and procurement must be directed toward improving the vitality of the infantry battalion in this costly and difficult type of operation. Additionally, the greatest scrutiny must be applied to limited monetary resources to ensure the application of technological advances across the full spectrum of war, on both urban and non-urban battlefields.
INTRODUCTION
"Tactical doctrine stresses that urban combat operations are conducted only when required and that built-up areas are isolated and bypassed rather than risking a costly, time-consuming operation in this difficult environment."
U.S. Army Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain
Dated 15 August 1979
The United States Armed Forces are increasingly likely to engage in combat operations in
cities. Urban warfare's characteristics of high casualty rates, short engagement ranges, denseness,
and rapid ammunition consumption, coupled with the constraints to minimize non-combatant
casualties and collateral damage, make it an environment avoided by commanders when at all
possible. However, the potential of avoidance diminishes with each passing day, as the
demographics of the world constantly change. In 1920, the only nation with more than 50 percent
of its population in towns of over 20,000 was the United States. By 1993, the world had 286
cities of over one million inhabitants. Current estimates have between 40 and 44 percent of the
world's population will reside in urban areas by the year 2000.[1] By 1990, seven of the world's
ten largest cities were in Third World, vice developed nations. Only three years later, in 1993, the
number had grown so that seventeen of the twenty five most populous cities of the world were in
Third World nations.[2] Worst, the inability of most Third World governments to handle the social,
infrastructure, cultural, and associated problems inherent to congested urban areas make them
potential sources of great unrest.
As the population of the world increases and a disproportionate distribution of this
growth move to urban areas, the deployment of American forces into these areas becomes very
likely. Our current national strategy centers on a theme of advancing our efforts through selective
engagement and enlargement. Beyond addressing the ability to win two nearly simultaneous
major regional conflicts, it specifically highlights the exercise of global leadership, as the world's
premier economic and military power.[3] Beyond the employment of Armed Forces in response to
threats to American vital national interests, the strategy specifically discusses engagement when
the well-being and character of our current world order is threatened, as well as action in
response to humanitarian interests.[4] This encompassing strategy is established at a time when the
American government finds itself wrestling with possibly the greatest economic and budgetary
challenges in the nation's history. These challenges and the end of the Cold War has forced the
Armed Forces into a period of critical self-examination. Required to support the national strategy
and faced with reduced resources, each service component strives for vitality in the 21st century.
The dynamics of the current national strategy, diminishing budgets, and the need for
consistent operational success, call loudly for adaptable naval forces able to project power and
influence across the seas into foreign waters and shores, in both war and peace. " Forward
....From the Sea," published in 1994 by the Department of the Navy specifically addresses the
unique capabilities of Naval Expeditionary Forces to rapidly influence events in the littoral
regions of the world.[5] In his Planning Guidance of August 1995, the 31st Commandant of the
Marine Corps, General C.C. Krulak amplified and redefined the Marine Corps' contribution to
"Forward ....From the Sea," as "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," a philosophy for current,
as well as future power projection ashore. [6] This concept couples maneuver doctrine with
technological advances in speed, mobility, firepower, communications, and navigation to achieve
a seamless transition from ship to shore, and rapid movement inland to exploit enemy
weaknesses.[7] Included in this guidance, the Commandant directed the Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia to develop the Operational
Maneuver From the Sea concept with an orientation toward the littorals.
In June 1996, the Marine Corps concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea was
published, and has revolutionized power projection ashore. This new direction demands that the
Marine Corps critically evaluate the manner in which it conducts combat operations in an urban
environment. Though the littorals represent a relatively small portion of the earth's surface, over
75 percent of the world's population, more than 80 percent of the world's national capitol cities,
and nearly all the market places to international trade reside there.[8] Clearly, naval forces must
expect to fight in the littorals. Specifically, Marines must expect to be deployed to the urban
areas found there, prepared to fight and win, while minimizing non-combatant casualties and
collateral damage.
In developing this concept, the Marine Corps believes that new technology
providing unprecedented firepower, coupled with small, highly mobile units operating in a
manner elusive of detection, will be far more successful in the urban environment than the
organization and equipment of current forces. The thought being that our current mobility and
fire support capabilities available to conventional forces would fail against the elusiveness of an
enemy employing guerrilla tactics.[9] For the purpose of this examination, these small conceptual
units will be referred to as "Killer Teams."
As the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, in concert with the
Commandant's Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Virginia, develops and tests new concepts and
technologies, Marines today must be able to fight in the urban areas of the littorals, organized
and equipped as they currently find themselves. This in mind, an examination of the Corps'
most recent combat engagement in an urban littoral is warranted. That engagement, fought
nearly thirty years ago in the city of Hue, Republic of Vietnam, offers great insight into urban
warfare along with several considerations and combat applications which remain as crucial today
as then. The timeless illustrations of this epic battle remain constant and provide a resource
which could serve to shape the development of technology and force organization, such as Killer
Teams, adapted to support Operational Maneuver From the Sea. My study will focus on Marine
Corps actions in the southern portion of the city of Hue, during the period 31 January 1968 to 10
February 1968, specifically focused on the experience of Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First
Marine Division. Using this battalion's actions to identify key considerations for urban combat
operations, I will discuss the lessons learned, their current application, and the impact they
will have on the Killer Team concept applied in future urban conflict. Because this epic battle
became known as Operation Hue City, I will occasionally refer to this imperial city Hue as Hue
City, throughout the paper.
Chapter One....The Lotus Flower
Located approximately fifty miles south of the 17th parallel dividing North and South
Vietnam, Hue lies on the littoral roughly five miles from the South China Sea. Throughout
the many years of the Vietnam War, the city had remained the intellectual and cultural center of
the country.[10] Leaders from both sides, including former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
President Ngo Dinh Diem, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) President Ho Chi
Minh, and General Vo Nguyen Giap, had been educated in the city's famed Quoc Hoc High
School.[11] As the former imperial capitol, Hue's intellectual and religious leaders advocated local
autonomy and traditional national values which led to a distrust of the Communists in the north
and the centralized government supported by the United States of the south. Aloof from active
participation in the War, the city's population of 140,000 lived in relative peace, while the war
raged on just miles away.[12]
As the city the war forgot, Hue was divided it into two distinct areas by the Perfume
River. To the north, a medieval walled city fashioned during the Nguyen Dynasty, composed of
moats, ramparts, and towers, forming a three square mile Citadel.[13] While on the south bank of
the river, the modern city of Hue thrived. Influenced by the French Colonial period, it was made
up of modern facilities dominated by two to three story detached structures, and covered an area
roughly half the size of the Citadel. [14] This portion of the city was bordered to the south by the
Phu Cam Canal, running from the Perfume River, and was triangular in shape, broadest to the
east and narrowing to the west at the intersection of the canal and the river. Linking the old and
new portions of the city across the Perfume River was the Nguyen Hoang Bridge, while the An
Cuu Bridge crossed the Phu Cam Canal, and linked the city to Highway One, the coastal road.
With the exception of the 1966 Struggle Movement in protest of the government, and
beyond being considered a bastion of dissent, Hue City engrossed serenity and peace amidst
chaos. Its immaculent gardens and groomed streets lent truth to the Vietnamese legend that the
city was symbolic of the lotus flower rising from the mud.[15] The beauty of Hue City, despite the
conflict throughout the country, was intoxicating to even the non-Vietnamese. James R.
Bullington, who served in the city as the American Vice Consulate from 1965 to 1966 described
Hue City as "Camelot."[16]
Although described as it was thirty years ago, the Battle of Hue City offers an example of
population, structures, political/religious climate and determined, comparably equipped enemy,
employing non-conventional tactics, very similar to that which Marines will undoubtedly find
themselves engaged in during any action in the current world environment.
CHAPTER TWO....THE YEAR OF THE MONKEY
To fully appreciate the situation Marines going into Hue City faced, the significance of
the Lunar holiday must be examined. The Lunar holiday, or Tet, is a three week celebration, and
is represented by an animal. It is the most important of all Vietnamese holidays. Transcending all
levels of Vietnamese society, the new "Year of the Monkey" would commence on 30 January
1968.[17] With Tet had commonly come truces on the part of both North and South Vietnamese
forces. This adherence, at least to some limited extent, was expected to be the case for 1968.
Since 1965, the I Corps region of South Vietnam, consisting of the five northern
providences, had been know as "Marine Land."[18] III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF)
controlled all military operations in the region.* Over 100,000 American service men, a quarter
of all American forces in the country were deployed there. Commanded by Lieutenant General
Robert E. Cushman, Jr., III MAF was spread over 220 miles of coastal plains to the east and
mountain ranges to the west. It was headquartered at Da Nang.[19] Army General William C.
Westmoreland was overall commander of the American effort. Since late 1967, Westmoreland
had become focused on the northern region of I Corps, concerned with the enemy's ability to
infiltrate forces southward through the Demilitarized Zone. Westmoreland saw the American
mission as the destruction of enemy main forces, while Cushman was focused on pacification
______________________________________________________________________________
* The Marine command entered South Vietnam in 1965 as the III Marine Expeditionary Force.
To avoid comparisons to the former French Expeditionary Force, the Marines changed the name to III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF).
and small unit war in the villages. In time Westmoreland grew apprehensive of the Marines
ability to be successful in I Corps. However, both Generals shared a common concern as the Tet
holiday approached.[20]
Intelligence and all other indicators at the time were of a massive enemy force build up
along the Demilitarized Zone and the Laotian border.[21] Enemy actions commencing on 20
January 1968 around the Marine firebase at Khe Sanh lead Westmoreland to believe the decisive
battle of the war was near at hand. An enemy attack appeared to be imminent, as Khe Sanh's
6000 defenders faced an estimated 40,000 North Vietnamese. Cushman ordered the shift of
forces toward Khe Sanh, reorienting against attack from the north. Westmoreland provided
additional support in the form of a South Vietnamese Airborne Battalion, while a brigade of the
United States Army's 1st Air Cavalry reinforced areas south of Khe Sanh as Marine units moved
northward.[22] As the Year of the Monkey began, Khe Sanh and the surrounding region was the
absolute focus of the allied effort. On 30 January 1968, throughout South Vietnam, communist
forces launched their attack, however not as expected at Khe Sanh.
In a two day period, 30-31 January 1968, the Communists sent approximately 74,000
troops into action throughout South Vietnam. Among the areas hit were 36 provincial capitols,
five of the six autonomous cities, 64 of the 242 district capitols, and over 50 hamlets.
Communists thrusts were primarily against South Vietnamese forces, with Saigon being the
exception. The American Embassy, the Tan Son Nhat airfield complex, and the base at Long
Binh were the key American facilities subjected to violent attack.[23]
The North Vietnamese decision to launch the Tet Offensive was made in July 1967.[24]
Willing to gamble that the offensive, coupled with a general uprising of those loyalists in the
south sympathetic to the communist cause would result in bringing the war to a conclusion, or
even be only partially successful, Ho Chi Minh ordered the attack. The resolution directing the
offensive was founded on these simple tenants:
-Such an offensive could only occur every 1000 years
-It would likely decide the fate of the nation
-It would end the war
-It constituted the wishes of both the party and the people[25]
Many incidents illustrate the overwhelming commitment of the Communists to the
success of the offensive and general uprising. None better illustrates this determination than
events at the Ba To district headquarters in Quang Ngai providence. There, a 2,000 man Viet
Cong guerrilla force, armed only with knives, spears and a few carbines successfully attacked the
headquarters and burned the district chief's home.[26]
Responding to the call to uprise, Viet Cong and sympathizers in the south, along with
attacking regular communists forces from the north, brought in the Year of the Monkey,
shocking allied forces with the size and breadth of the offensive, and the seemingly undetected
build up and infiltration of forces. This significant intelligence failure on the American's part,
resulted in a disoriented defensive posture and, initially, great confusion and inadequate
responsive actions.
CHAPTER THREE....CHAOS IN THE LITTORALS
As the Tet holiday approached, Hue City residents characteristically prepared for the
holiday. The First Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division was headquartered in
the Mang Cu Military Compound, located in the northwest corner of the Citadel.[27] Commanded
by Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, most members of the division were on holiday leave.
In response to events throughout the country on 30 January 1968, Truong had canceled all
leaves and placed all available units on full alert. These units composed of the division staff,
headquarters company, and the division's elite Black Panther company were positioned to defend
the compound and the Tac Loc airfield located within the Citadel.[28] The American Military
Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) in Hue City was composed primarily of advisors to the
1st ARVN Division, and was located in a walled compound in the southern portion of the city.[29]
Allied intelligence reported elements of two North Vietnamese Regiments in the Thau
Thein Providence, which contains Hue, but no indications that these elements, believed to be at
least 20 kilometers from the city, threaten to attack. In actuality, sappers had infiltrated well
before the Tet holiday, disguised as peasants and South Vietnamese soldiers. The Sixth North
Vietnamese Regiment was assigned to the northern portion of the city, with the objectives of
capturing the 1st ARVN Division headquarters in the Mang Cu Compound, the Tac Loc Airfield,
and the Imperial Palace, all located within the walls of the Citadel. The 4th North Vietnamese
Regiment was assigned to seize the southern portion of the city, with the MACV Compound, the
Provisional Capitol Building, and the Prison as their specific objectives.[30] This was the
organization Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (2/5) would soon face. In addition to these primary
objectives, the two regiments had a specific target list of over 200 facilities, government
officials, and individuals. The list was so accurate that it included the location and names
of occupants at an American Central Intelligence Agency facility in Hue City, which officers at
the MACV Headquarters knew nothing about.[31] Despite the report by an ARVN reconnaissance
unit to the west of the city that large groups of North Vietnamese were headed toward the Hue,
the warning went unheeded and no response was mounted, nor the MACV personnel advised.
At 0233 on 31 January 1968, the North Vietnamese attack on Hue began. By
morning the 6th North Vietnamese Regiment held 60 percent of the Citadel, but had failed to
capture the Mang Ca Compound and the Tay Loc Airfield. The Imperial Palace had fallen into
Communists hands, and their victory was symbolized by the Viet Cong flag of blue and red,
with a gold star, that had been raised over the structure.[32] The focus of this study however is the
events in the southern portion of the city, attacked by the 4th North Vietnamese Regiment.
The 4th North Vietnamese Regiment, reinforced by the 804th North Vietnamese
Battalion, had launched their attack into southern Hue simultaneously with commencement of
actions in the Citadel. Divided into several separate attack groups, the assault forces focused on
the key civilian and military facilities. Because some groups became lost enroute to their targets,
a lack of cohesion of the assault existed, and the full potential of the attack was not realized.
Although they controlled the majority of the southern portion of the city by morning, the
attackers had failed to gain full control of the Prison, and had been repulsed at the MACV
Compound. Immediately improving their now defensive positions, the North Vietnamese
were positioned to bring fire upon the road entering the city from Highway One, but failed to
capture the boat ramp to the northeast of the MACV compound, on the Perfume River.[33] Whether
it was an objective the communists failed to gain, or a position never identified to capture, the
ramp, unprotected at the time of the attack, would play a critical role in the days ahead.
Throughout the 31st of January 1968, various ARVN units, supported by armor,
attempted to penetrate the city, only to be repulsed by the well equipped and entrenched enemy.
The day ended with the Americans at the MACV Compound holding on against repeated attacks
and constant bombardment with rockets and mortars. The attackers strengthened their positions
and established fields of fire making every corner in the city a killing zone. Meanwhile, the
Communists attackers began their round up of officials and citizens whom they felt were
"enemies of the people." A systematic execution followed. After the battle, the graves of over
2,800 residents of Hue City were found and an additional 3,000 were never accounted for.[34] This
round up was the catalyst behind a voluminous refugee movement from the city, as Hue citizens
attempted to find a route out of this maze of death.
Southern Hue City offers the example of a littoral city much like Marines may find
themselves engaged in during present day operations. Prior to Tet, its environment was one
similar to peacekeeping operations, with heavy reliance upon a coalition force. The
orientation northward in I Corps, the failure of intelligence to appreciate and accurately
interpretate enemy intentions, and the scope and surprise of the Tet offensive throughout the
country overwhelmed the resources and confused the response of American forces. The result
was that for a period of time, Hue City was an isolated crucible of defended urban terrain.
Because of poor weather conditions and an allied demand to minimize collateral damage, the city
would offer a unique stage for a nearly infantry pure engagement. A determined, prepared, and
well equipped enemy reinforced regiment, committed to holding their gains, faced off against
Marine Infantry units, unable to call upon any significant supporting arms, and charged to regain
the city. The subsequent days and actions of 2/5 would not only contribute a chapter in Marine
Corps history, but would offer lessons on leadership, the fighting character of the individual
Marine, weapons, and urban combat tactics. Further, the battle can serve to orientate the Corps
along an avenue of approach toward the future combat it will face when engaged upon the
world's littorals in Operational Maneuver From the Sea and employing of Killer Teams in such
an environment and situation. Hue City presented an urban arena for combat, which was truly
nonlinear and dynamic; an exceptional and rare insight into the battlefields of the future.
CHAPTER FOUR....THE LONG WALK DOWN LE LOI STREET
"Estimates of the enemy situation prior to 31 January did not indicate a divisional size attack against Hue; no reliable indicators of a large scale deployment of forces toward Hue. The enemy had tactical surprise. Throughout the first days of the battle, an amazing amount of misinformation was given the Marine Command, the U.S. High Command, and ultimately the American public."
Colonel Charles Meadows USMC (Ret)
As the communists conducted their attack on Hue City, the Marines of 2/5 found
themselves thoroughly engaged on 30 and 31 January 1968, in the Phu Bai area of operations,
south of Hue City. Lieutenant Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham was directing the efforts of his rifle
companies(**) to relieve Combined Action Platoons (***) in the Troui River and Phu Loc
sectors, with the key Troui River bridge under attack and threatened to be lost.[35] The success
of the companies aggressive response, sent the enemy forces retreating in a direction which
would ultimately trap them at the river. Captain George R. (Ron) Christmas, commander of
Hotel Company, 2/5 recalls the situation as the first time since his tour in Vietnam had started
that the enemy was in a position to be fully engaged by the fire power the companies could bring
to bear. They had no where to retreat and were forced to stand and fight. It was the fruitfulness of
this situation which would lead to his great frustration, when directed to disengage the enemy
and assume defensive positions.[36]
__________________________________________________________________________
**During the Vietnam era, Marine Infantry Battalions had a Headquarters and Service Company and four infantry companies (colloquially called "rifle" companies. The companies in the Second Battalion were F, G, H, and I, (Fox, Golf, Hotel, and India under the phonetic alphabet.)
***Combined Action Platoons (CAP) typically consisted of a squad of Marines and a squad from the South Vietnamese Popular Forces, essentially an uniformed full-time militia, working closely with the local population.
Captain Charles L. Meadows, commander of Golf Company, 2/5 was in reserve at Phu
Bai, having just completed a security mission prior to the offensive.[37] At Phu Bai, the newly
formed Task Force X-Ray, commanded Brigadier General Foster C. LaHue, was task organized
and comprised of Fifth Marines with two battalions, and First Marines with just one battalion.
The two regimental commanders, as well as General LaHue, had been in the Phu Bai area less
than three weeks.[38] Receiving word of enemy action along Highway One and Hue City, Alpha
Company First Battalion, First Marines (1/1) was expeditiously deployed north on Highway One
toward Hue City at 0630 on 31 January. After several changes to the initial orders, the company
was directed to the Boat Ramp in southern Hue City, to investigate reports that the city was
under attack.[39]
As Alpha Company approached the city, reinforced by three Marine tanks they had
happened upon enroute, the company was engaged in a murderous cross fire. Upon receiving
reports from Alpha Company, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Gravel, Commanding Officer 1/1, asked
that he be permitted to reinforce his company.[40] His request approved, Gravel and his command
group departed, along with the only organized combat force available at Phu Bai, Golf Company
2/5. Meadows recalls that he received an order to mount up his company, head to Hue
City to relieve Alpha Company and the MACV Compound, and to escort the Commanding
General of the 1st ARVN Division out of the Citadel and back to Phu Bai. Higher headquarters
believed that no more than three hours would be needed to accomplish this mission. Based on
this guidance, Meadows directed that his Marines leave all non-essential combat gear at Phu Bai,
so packs were dropped as they moved out. With no intelligence on the situation, Meadows and
his Marines started their movement to contact under the command of a man Meadow's had met
just hours before.[41]
By 1445, the reinforcements had linked up with Alpha Company. Their casualties were
evacuated back to Phu Bai, and the remainder of the company, commanded by a gunnery
sergeant, joined the relief force and continued into the city.[42] Arriving at the MACV Compound
under enemy fire which had essentially shot his force out of their trucks and forced them to
proceed on foot, Gravel met with the senior Army advisor present , Colonel George Adkisson.
He advised Gravel that the situation in the Citadel was "fine."[43] On this point, some documents
and Meadows' recollection, relate differently and claim that Adkisson encouraged Gravel not to
attempt to enter the Citadel, but gave up his argument when Gravel was unable to persuade Task
Force X-Ray of the gravity of the situation.[44] The only map which offered the degree of detail
needed to navigate in the city had been taken off a gas station wall, when Meadows had noticed
it while taking cover in the building, trying to make his way to the MACV compound.[45] The
battalion commander, leaving Alpha Company to defend the compound, set out to locate and
evacuate the ARVN Commanding General.
With the tanks on the south side of the Perfume river providing direct support, Golf
Company 2/5 started across the bridge into the Citadel at approximately 1610. Despite a hail of
enemy fire, two platoons made it across the bridge only to be caught in a murderous crossfire.[46]
Private First Class Bill Tant caught in the fire, sought cover behind one of the trees lining the
streets. Pondering a move from the tree to aid his fallen comrades, he watch as small arms fire
from two directions literally chipped away his tree, threatening to drop it.[47]
Realizing his company's predicament, Meadows began the withdraw of his Marines back
to the south side of the river. Still under withering fire, the extraction proved as difficult as the
assault. They would be the last Americans within the walls of the Citadel until 11 February
1968.[48] After the refusal of MACV to provide vehicles to evacuate the casualties, Gravel, enroute
to the MACV Compound to find out what the "Hell was going on," happened upon a couple
Navy trucks with drivers. He directed the wounded and dead be gathered, and ordered the force
back to the MACV Compound.[49]
For a mission which was expected to take a few hours, it had been a costly day for
Golf Company. Captain Meadows had five Marines killed in action, and forty four wounded.[50]
Once back at the compound, defensive positions were established, and a brief lift in the weather
permitted a helicopter to land and remove the most seriously wounded. In all, over 100 Marines
of the thrown together battalion had become casualties. It was obvious to every American at the
compound that the enemy was clearly superior in numbers and firepower, and had a free run of
the city. It was still unclear to Gravel if his superiors at Task Force X-Ray, as well as theirs at III
MAF, fully appreciated the situation at Hue City.
During the evening, General Cushman at Da Nang, had come to agreement with the
South Vietnamese leadership, that American forces would be responsible for the southern portion
of the city, and the ARVN forces the Citadel to the north.[51] Further, attempting to minimize
collateral damage, the two agreed that neither air or artillery would be used in Hue City.
Cushman then ordered elements of the First Air Cavalry into a positions north and west of the
city in an attempt to isolate the enemy force. By mid-afternoon 2 February 1968, the Air Cavalry
began their move. Throughout the next several days they would have battalions fighting for their
survival in the area, while failing to ever gain a position to disrupt enemy activities and isolate
the city.[52]
On the morning of 1 February 1968, Gravel was ordered by Task Force X-Ray to attack
westward from the MACV compound to secure the Thua Thien Provincial Headquarters and
Prison. The non-linear "inside-out" battle, which would most likely be a common tactic of the
conceptual Killer Team, to secure the southern city had begun. Supported by tanks, the
understrength battalion started their assault to the facilities six blocks away. The force
was taken under fire less than a block from the compound, and lost a tank as they were stopped
cold. The battalion was driven back into defensive positions at the MACV Compound, at the cost
of two Marines dead and five wounded.[53]
At Phu Bai, General LaHue gave tactical control of the Marine actions in the southern
portion of the city to the First Marines commander, Colonel Stanley S. Hughes.[54] Despite
marginal weather with 200-500 foot ceilings and one mile visibility, Fox Company, 2/5,
commanded by Captain Mike Downs was flown out of Phu Bai and inserted near the MACV
Compound. Ordered to relieve a nearby MACV radio facility surrounded by the enemy, Downs
remembers nothing he was told at Phu Bai remotely prepared him for what he found in Hue City.
He questioned the sensibility of the order he had been given, but attempted to carry it out. After
several hours of effort, three dead and thirteen wounded, Fox company was ordered back to
MACV Compound.[55] After having a request for air support denied, Gravel was ordered to remain
in his defensive positions for the night.
On 2 February 1968, Gravel's force made some measured headway against the enemy.
After three hours the Hue University building, near the MACV Compound was secured . Though
the North Vietnamese had dropped the railroad bridge to the west, they failed to destroy the An
Cuu Canal bridge.[56] With it in place, Hotel Company, 2/5, commanded by Captain Ron
Christmas, was able to fight into the city, reinforcing the Marines at the MACV compound. As
Hotel Company entered the city, supported by Army trucks with quad fifty caliber machine guns
and two Marine Ontos vehicles with six 106 mm recoilless rifles each, they drew sniper fire from
the area near the MACV Compound. Rapidly responding, the inbound Marines engaged the
enemy targets, as well as Marines in defensive positions near the compound.[57] Though no serious
friendly casualties resulted, the incident serves to illustrate that the difficulty of target
acquisition, even in the case of direct fire weapons, was not limited to the jungled areas of
Vietnam, but was a challenging reality in urban terrain as well. The Marine force in the MACV
Compound had grown significantly in size, and Hotel Company took up positions in the Hue
University building for the night.
At Phu Bai, General LaHue directed Colonel Hughes to Hue City to take charge of the
tactical effort in the southern portion of the city. With three of his companies in the city,
Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham was also directed to Hue to take control of the preponderance of
his battalion. Rifling through the Regimental Combat Operations Center, Cheatham found a
reference publication on urban warfare and began preparing himself for the task ahead. Still, the
situation was unclear at Hue City, and as Cheatham prepared to depart the next morning he knew
they were going in "blind."[58]
On 3 February 1968, the command groups of Hughes and Cheatham arrived at the
MACV Compound via convoy, receiving sporadic sniper fire as they approached.[59] As Hughes
established his command post in the MACV Compound, the weather continued to worsen with
rain, dropping temperatures, and fog. It was shortly thereafter that he directed Gravel, with
Alpha Company, 1/1 to keep the route into the city open, and returned control of the 2/5
companies to Cheatham.[60] At this point, Hughes issued a mission type order to Cheatham, if
ever a mission type order has been issued. He told Cheatham to move up to the university
building, and with the Perfume River and Le Loi Street being the battalion's right flank, attack
through the city and clean the North Vietnamese out, all the while with an exposed left flank.
After a brief pause, Hughes told Cheatham, "If you are looking for anymore you are not going to
get it....Move out!"[61]
From his command post in the university, with Golf Company in reserve, Cheatham
directed Fox and Hotel Companies to attack the Public Health, Post Office, and Treasury
facilities nearby. Armed with Light Antiarmor Weapons (LAAW), the Marines could not
effectively penetrate the walls surrounding the facilities. The inability to breach the walls,
coupled with murderous fire from well prepared defensive positions, resulted in the attack
making no head way. It became obvious as the afternoon wore on that two companies attacking
simultaneously was not successful. Returning to defensive positions in the university, 2/5 studied
the lessons of the day and resupplied for the next morning's attack.[62]
At 0700 on 4 February 1968, Marines of Hotel Company breached the walls of the Public
Health Building with 3.5 inch rockets and secured the facility.[63] It was during this assault that
Hotel learned a lesson which would serve them throughout the remainder of the battle. When
trying to use smoke to cover movement across streets, the Marines were quickly taken under fire
from their left flank, despite the low visibility. Christmas recalls that it seemed the North
Vietnamese had read the our Fleet Marine Force Manuals, whereas as soon as smoke was
thrown, enemy fire erupted down the street. A solution arrived from the "Lance Corporal
ingenuity and PFC power," which Christmas believes makes the Corps "Go round." A suggestion
of the Marines manning the 106 mm recoilless rifle supporting Hotel Company was to take the
mule mounted weapon out into the street and fire a single round at the enemy position firing
from the flank. The round would cause the enemy gunner to draw down to safety, while the back
blast cloud of dust would cover the Marines movement across the street. The tactic worked
particularly well, allowing platoon sized units to cross the street and immediately turn and
engage the enemy position from their improved vantage point. Christmas remembers to his
surprise, that despite the volume of fire the 106 team came under each time they entered the
street, the Lance Corporal in charge of the gun, along with this PFC assistant gunner, went
through the entire gun drill before firing, seemingly impervious to the hail of fire they faced.[64]
Throughout the battle the 460 pound weapon system would prove itself priceless in breaching
walls, creating exits where none had existed, and destroying hardened enemy positions.
Meadows recalled some walls were so thick that it took over a dozen 106 rounds to punch a
hole, while some were never penetrated. He added that an occasional 106 round from the 2/5
area of action in the southern city could be observed crossing the Perfume River, attempting to
knock down the North Vietnamese flag flying over the Imperial Palace.[65]
Once Hotel Company was in a position in the Public Health Building to support the
assault, Fox Company launched its attack to gain the Treasury Building. Despite the 106's and
tank support, the intense enemy fire and unbreachable walls of the facility stalled the attack. At
this point, the battalion executive officer, Major Ralph Salvati suggested to Cheatham that they
use CS gas against the enemy defenders. Salvati had seen E-8 launchers in the MACV
Compound, each firing 16 canisters of the tear gas variant.[66] The gas worked well and the
Treasury defenders exited the facility under the fire of the attacking gas masked Marines of Fox
Company. 2/5 consolidated its gains and moved into defensive positions for the reminder of the
day.
That night, communists sappers succeeded in destroying the Phu Cam canal bridge,
cutting Highway the supply route. With weather preventing any sort of air support, the Landing
Craft Utility (LCU) ramp near the MACV Compound remained as the only logistical line into the
southern portion of the city. Because of the courageous actions of the LCU's Navy crews, that
supply line remained open throughout the battle.[67] Despite ammunition being expended at nearly
ten times the normal combat rate experienced in the country side, the assault never slowed due to
any shortage, though some items such as grenades were in short supply.[68] As was the case with
the Army Cavalry units to the west, the communists had failed to isolate the American forces
operating south of the Perfume River. This failure to isolate the city, yet ultimately secure it, is a
positive consideration toward the Killer Team concept, who limited by size could not expect to
physically isolate any significant sized area.
Beginning on 5 February 1968, the Marines of 2/5 had begun to adapt to fighting in the
city, and the tactics of their enemy. According to Christmas, street fighting was the
dirtiest type of warfare, but beat fighting in the mud. A point made by more than one Marine of
2/5 was they could see the damage they were inflicting on the enemy, particularly because the
enemy could not drag away their dead as they did in the jungle.[69]
On entering the city to fight, the lack of maps of the necessary scale to navigate the
streets made orientation and movement difficult. The needed maps were eventually received and
the commanders in 2/5 developed a numbering system that assisted in providing position reports
and the coordination of fires in support of each advancing company. The battalion had an area of
operations roughly 11 blocks wide and 8 to 9 blocks deep.[70] Attacking with two companies
abreast, with the third in reserve attempting to protect the western flank, Cheatham repeatedly
had to commit his reserve company to cover the advance. He later reflected that the area was just
too large for an infantry battalion of only three rifle companies.[71] Unable to attempt any flanking
attack against the enemy, 2/5 was forced to fight building by building, block by block, assaulting
one strong point at a time and exploiting each success as it was gained. By this time, 2/5 had
recognized that the North Vietnamese were fighting every other block, with spider holes around
the base of buildings and communist gunners throughout the structure. According to Christmas,
you would take a strong point under fire for no particular duration. He stated that whether it was
a slight decrease in the volume of enemy fire, or some other minute indicator, you quickly
developed a "sense" for the moment to breach the wall and launch the assault into the structure.[72]
Then the building would be cleared room by room.
Supporting arms played a minimal role in the battle. Poor weather conditions coupled
with the close proximity of the engaged forces ruled out close air support. Artillery was used
with little success. The structures of the city prevented the adequate observation of rounds.
However, if on target in an urban environment, the effects of artillery can be amplified because
of the containment of the blast by structures. Equally, structures tend to lessen the effects when
the round is off, even if only by one courtyard, as was the case in Hue City. In fact, the rubbling
effect can even serve to strengthen enemy defensive positions. Christmas recalled that he "Tried
like hell," to use artillery, but that was only by selecting targets such as assembly areas and later
in the battle enemy escape routes, from a map study.[73] Beyond the exceptional effectiveness of
the 106 recoilless rifle and 3.5 inch rockets in breaching walls and knocking out enemy positions,
the mortar used with a disregard for "danger close" proved to be a workhorse. Downs', company
used 81mm mortars to engage targets within 35 meters of his position.[74] As the wearforall of the
enemy became apparent, the mortars were used more freely with little regard to damage of city
structures. The 81mm rounds were used to literally sledgehammer the tops of buildings until the
roof fell in. Tanks were effective on occasion, but in the narrow streets of the city were quickly
taken under fire and often disabled. Cheatham found that as soon as a tank rounded a city corner,
the street lit up like the fourth of July. He recalled one tank absorbing over 120 hits and another
going through several crews before being completely knocked out.[75] The highly mobile Ontos
with its six recoilless rifles, though thin skinned and easily knocked out, proved to be the most
effective weapon not organic to the battalion. Protected in defilade positions, their tubes reaped a
great toll on the Communists.
Against tanks and their attackers, the Communists used B-40 rockets with great success.
Cheatham recalls an engagement from a mere 50 meters apart, where Communists and Marines
exchanged "Hundreds and hundreds," of rockets. The deciding factor in the exchange was that
the Marines had more ammunition than the North Vietnamese; the unheralded LCU ramp and
line of communication it provided made the difference.[76]
The morning of 5 February 1968, found 1/1, now with two rifle companies starting its
attack into southern Hue City, on 2/5's left flank.[77] The Hospital and the Provincial Headquarters
were the key objectives. From nearly the point of crossing the line of departure, the battalions
moved at different paces, neither contributing significantly to the others flank protection. With a
two block front caused by the reduced size of the battalion, 1/1 gained only 75 yards that day
with a cost of 19 casualties. Ultimately, the battalion would fight a pitched battle of
over two days for a single building.[78] 2/5's attack moved forward, with Golf company capturing
structure surrounding the Hospital. The battalion had accounted for 70 enemy dead and 30
prisoners.[79]
On 6 February 1968, with his three companies on line, Cheatham moved 2/5 forward to
clear the entire Hospital Complex. Fox company on the left flank met stout resistance, falling
back to use mortars and artillery on the entrenched enemy. The event marked one of the few
successful uses of artillery in Hue City, killing over 20 North Vietnamese. Simultaneous to Fox
company's use of supporting arms, Golf company moved on the Provincial Prison Complex.
Again using CS gas, the company killed 36 communists, while losing one Marine. Hotel
company had pushed through the Hospital and started its assault on the Provincial Headquarters.
Meeting a hail of rockets and automatic weapons fire, the company using mortars, recoilless
rifles, CS, and supported by tanks finally gained the Headquarters by overwhelming the
defenders with firepower.[80] This building, unknown to the Marines at the time, had been the
Headquarters of the 4th North Vietnamese Regiment, and its capture would greatly deminish the
Communist effort to coordinate his defense of the southern portion of the city in the days ahead.[81]
Two events occurred with Hotel company at this point which serve to illustrate the
character and fighting spirit of those Marines. Quickly, the North Vietnamese flag was drawn
down and replaced by an American flag. This was done in disregard to the standing MACV
directive on such events, and under the close eye of correspondents covering the battle. Evening
approached shortly after the flag went up. According to Christmas, while Cheatham was trying
to turn a deaf ear, the command at the MACV compound directed the flag come down. With
no response, two Army majors were dispatched to get the flag taken down. Upon their arrival,
Christmas expressed his "disagreement" with the MACV position, but told the majors that they
were welcome to pull it down, but added that there was no way he could insure the majors' safety
in the open courtyard. Whether their concern was with the communists who continued to snipe
and shell the area or the Marines of Hotel company remains unclear, but the majors departed,
requiring the MACV commander to sent a Marine from his staff to talk to Christmas. Sharing
Christmas' opinion about the directive, the two agreed the flag would continue to fly until the
company moved out in the attack the following morning. (This same flag would be the first
raised over the Aegis Cruiser CG 66 Hue City at its commissioning ceremony over two decades
later.)[82] The significance of this minor victory played a role in maintaining the morale of the
company, but the arrival of the battalion chaplain would play a role in lifting it. Arriving in the
company's defensive position, the chaplain, with Christmas' approval shouted over exploding
enemy mortar rounds, moved from position to position providing the Marines with a quick but
uplifting word or pat on the back. According to Christmas, there was a place for god in the heat
of combat.[83]
With the capture of the Provincial Headquarters, the following days of 7 to 10 February
1968 reflected a distinct shift in momentum from the Communists to the Marines. Coordinated
enemy defensive started to erode, and Communists bodies and abandoned weapons littered the
trail of the enemy's retreat. Though still encountering several isolated pockets of staunch
resistance and sniper fire, 2/5 moved forward securing objectives and clearing the southern
portion of the city.[84] On 7 February 1968, North Vietnamese sappers had dropped the main
bridge across the Perfume River. Likewise Marine engineers had earlier destroyed the Le Loi
bridge in an attempt to isolate the western approach into southern Hue, but not in time preclude
the escape of numerous Communist units.[85] By the tenth, Cheatham and the Marines of 2/5 had
accomplished their mission to attack through the city and clear it of the enemy. With the Citadel
still in the hands of the North Vietnamese, 2/5 prepared to cross the Phu Cam canal and continue
the attack to the west. The battalion's effort had resulted in over 1,000 enemy dead and 6
confirmed prisoners, as well as 89 suspects. The cost had been great. The battalion had nearly
400 hundred casualties, to include 38 dead. Hotel company had lost the bulk of its officers and
staff noncommissioned officers.[86] As he was evacuated with serious wounds, Christmas turned
command of the company over to his remaining senior Marine, a staff sergeant.[87]
Though reasonably secure, southern Hue was far from orderly. South Vietnamese
authorities quickly attempted to reestablish order, establishing a refugee center at the university,
and actively trying to prevent the wide spread looting which was taking place. Still isolated from
Highway One, Marine engineers constructed a pontoon bridge across the Phu Cam canal to
facilitate the delivery of supplies to not only the American military forces and, most importantly,
critical food for the refugees.
CHAPTER FIVE....TAKE AWAYS FOR THE FUTURE
"It's up close and personal......you see the guy you kill."
Lieutenant General Ron Christmas USMC(Ret)
Combat operations in an urban environment present unique and complex challenges,
which can change with each city block. The use of supporting arms, both air and artillery
consistently the U.S. Forces greatest advantage in war to include present day, was restricted
initially because of the desire to minimize collateral damage to southern Hue City. Even when
restrictions were lifted, weather, buildings obscuring observation, and the terrain prevented their
effective use. The structures of a city tended to depreciate any technological advantage, and
impacted weapon effectiveness. The city and the environment in which 2/5 operated offers
numerous lessons which can significantly influence the development of the Operational
Maneuver From the Sea "Killer Team" described in the introduction, which conceptually is
heavily reliant on supporting arms.
Force Organization
2/5 was at 90 percent of its chargeable strength when the Tet offensive of 1968
commenced. The extent to which the offensive overwhelmed a misdirected allied intelligence
effort, as well as enemy actions in the Phu Bai area, lead to 2/5 being piecemealed into Hue City.
Although the efforts of Golf and Fox companies were exceptionally heroic, the effective clearing
of the southern portion of the city did not get underway until Hotel company and the command
element of 2/5 arrived, creating unity of command. The piecemeal deployment of 2/5, perhaps
understandable under the circumstances and level of situational awareness, undoubtedly resulted
in casualties which may not have occurred had the battalion arrived as a single organization. Unit
commanders placed into a situation as desperate as Hue will normally perform more effectively
when sent into harms way by a commander they are familiar with and fully trust. Based on the
mission and size of the battalion's zone of action in Hue, the personnel strength, and ultimately
the mass provided by an infantry battalion city provided the minimal punch that was needed to
prevail.
As previously indicated, Golf company lost over a third of its strength the first day in the
city, while on another occasion later 2/5 lost 25 Marine casualties in a single enemy mortar
barrage. Limited as it might be, reinforcement was critical. At one point, Hotel company
received cooks to fill the voids in its ranks. Illustrating the importance of the ethos that "every
Marine is a rifleman first", Christmas remembered that one of the bravest acts he observed
during the battle was performed by one of the cook replacements. Although the Marine was
evacuated before his name became known to Hotel company Marines, the cook, shortly after his
arrival, saved the life of a Hotel company Marine. After the lead Marine went down wounded in
a hail of fire while attempting to cross a street, the cook, with no regard for his personal safety,
went into the street, and though seriously wounded himself, retrieved the Marine and pulled him
to safety.[88]
Though mass was not a common requirement to physically breach into a facility,
numbers were needed to provide adequate covering fire to assaulting units and room to room
clearing capability. Gravel's concerned expression of lacking sufficient numbers to conduct urban
clearing operations with only the two reduced companies of 1/1 is obvious, but even with three
full companies, 2/5 was pressed.
While the battalion lacked any current training or experience in urban warfare, the
company, platoon, and squad organization typical to infantry battalions proved effective and
readily adaptable to the situation they faced. Sound small unit tactics and actions facilitated the
decentralized control needed to succeed. Cheatham's keen ability to quickly determine what was
proving to be effective, relay it to his company commanders, and direct and control its
implementation was key during the battle. His nightly meetings and discussions with the
company commanders enabled them to overcome shortfalls, such as maps, determine common
enemy tactics and methods, and ultimately facilitate a rapid, though steep, learning curve.
Likewise, the confidence Cheatham held regarding his company commanders and their decision
making abilities is evident. 2/5 demonstrated that the infantry battalion, organized as it currently
is, provides a flexible and capable unit, with the manpower and organic firepower to engage
an enemy successfully in high, as well as low, intensity urban combat.
WEAPONS
Throughout the battle, the Rules of Engagement played a significant role. The use of both
indirect fire and direct fire weapons against the many historic, religious and civic building in the
city was restricted severely initially. Slowly, these restrictions were lifted, even to the point
where religious pagodas being use by the communists could be engaged.[89] Unfortunately, even
with this freeing up, weather and the terrain of the city prevented accurate and effective
employment of air and artillery assets.
Mortars provided the most reliable source of fire support for 2/5, and were employed
with little regard to "danger close" considerations. They were accurate and useful in suppressing
enemy fires, sealing flanks, and covering kill zones. As the battle progressed, 2/5 began using a
barrage of white phosphorous followed by high explosive rounds to preface assaults. Noting that
the enemy seemed to be defending every other block, as an assault was made and mortar fire
shifted, it was targeted upon the second open street behind the objective to catch retrograding
enemy in a kill zone.[90]
The weapon which appears to have played the most vital and diversified role in the battle
was the 106 mm recoilless rifle. It proved to be effective in breaching walls, sometimes
requiring several rounds, and was highly accurate and destructive against enemy targets. It was
the true work horse for 2/5 and its performance lead to Cheatham to comment that in urban
combat, the Marine Corps needs a weapon which fires a round "slightly smaller than a trash
can."[91] The 3.5 inch rocket launcher, which was organic to 2/5, likewise proved itself as a
highly lethal asset.
Tanks were found to be effective support to attacking infantry, but only when employed
from covered positions, directly coordinating the targets engaged with ground forces. Once on a
street uncovered, they became quick targets for Communist gunners.
Regardless of the weapon employed, the survivability of a building and its defenders was
not necessarily linked. Rather, the arrangements and deposition within the building were more
vital to survivability, and in some cases rubbling caused by weapon systems served to strengthen
enemy positions vice soften them. The situation in southern Hue city, complicated by weather,
restrictions, diminished observation, and the inherent difficulty associated with controlling fires
in an built up area, served to neutralize the advantage of American forces had in supporting
arms. The current Killer Team concept being explored by the Marine Corps as indicated will be
heavily reliant on supporting arms systems.
TACTICS AND CONTROL
2/5 exhibited the adaptability afforded by their task organization. Although further
training in the urban environment would have been greatly beneficial, sound small unit
leadership at the fire team and squad level proved critical and prevailed against a determined
enemy. The battalion's ability to adapt to the enemy's tactics and continue to use what was
working illustrates the value that the size of an infantry battalion organization provides in urban
conflict.
Throughout the battle, 2/5 fought with an exposed western flank. Though at times
slowing their assault, they responded by fighting companies in a manner which allowed them to
support each others attack, and place suppressive fire on the flanks. Almost as a matter of
routine, the reserve company was employed early in an assault.
Interestingly, no night operations were conducted by either side in southern Hue.
It can be assumed that with the advanced night fighting capability of today's forces, it easily
could have been undertaken. However, the primary reason for 2/5 not engaging at night was
based on a conscious decision by Cheatham. It had become apparent to him that though moving
through the city was easier than mud and brush of the jungle, the intensity and proximity of the
combat in Hue was far more taxing on his Marines.[92] Meadows remembers that crossing a single
street under intense fire, resulted in such a great rush of adrenaline and emotion, that once safely
to the other side, most Marines dropped for several minutes exhausted[93] By restricting his efforts
to the daylight hours, Cheatham went into the attack each morning with a reasonably well rested
force. The communist defenders did much the same throughout the course of the battle.
Concerning command and control, radios played an important role, but sometimes failed.
Couriers and various signals were also used in an effective manner.[94] Christmas remembered that
Hue offered his Marines an unique opportunity to observe the enemy, take him under fire, and
see the effectiveness of their actions first hand. Further, despite the intensity they faced, his
Marines responded with zeal, and one of his control challenges was not getting his Marines to
attack, but rather to stop their assault after securing a facility rather than continuing into the next
block of buildings.[95]
The value of decentralized control and the small unit leadership in Hue City played a
key role in success. 2/5 realized that the commander on the scene was most aware of what
was happening, and allowed him to act on this first hand knowledge. Decision making was
maintained at the lowest level, and as a result timely and effective actions were taken. The
momentum once gained was held in 2/5's grasp because of decentralized control. Cheatham
conducted the battalion in concert with its companies, which were cohesive and very familiar
with each other, and he possessed confidence in his subordinate leadership. However, although
Cheatham decentralized control, he never decentralized command, and positioned himself
forward in his battalion's assault formation, providing him with keen situational awareness he
would not have had from any other position.[96]
LOGISTICS/SUPPLY
The experience of 2/5 serves to illustrate the great logistical concerns in urban combat.
Granted the American forces never isolated the enemy or his lines of communication, it was only
through his failure to do the same that the Marines of 2/5 were able to prevail. When the bridge
was dropped which connected the Marines to Highway One and their supplies at Phu Bai, the
LCU ramp at the MACV Compound and the courageous efforts of the sailors operating the
small and essentially defenseless boats out of Da Nang provided the vital link.
Upon entering the city, 2/5's expenditure of ammunition multiplied many fold. Typical
daily planning figures which had proved adequate in the bush, in some cases did not come close
to hourly consumption rates in the city. A 60 mm mortar of the battalion on a busy day in the
jungle would use approximately 33 rounds. In a single day in Hue, two 60 mm tubes expended
over 1,000 rounds. Likewise, breaching elevated 106 mm and 3.5 rocket ammunition
consumption, while limited grenade stocks were quickly used and a shortfall throughout the
battle.[97] Clearly, Killer Teams could not expect to succeed with any organic weapons system,
which such a small group could carry and keep sustained over a long period of employment.
Casualties took a drastic and rapid climb on the urban battlefield. Beyond the associated
medical supplies, casualty evacuation drew on 2/5's already taxed personnel strength. To get
wounded and dead to collection points, civilian vehicles were confiscated in several cases to
assist in the effort.
CONCLUSIONS
"Man is the foremost instrument of war."
Ardant du Piaq
In Hue, the Killer Team conceived in conjunction with Operational Maneuver From The Sea would have failed to recapture the city.
As the Marine Corps faces the future, its crucial role in executing the nation's strategy
upon the littorals of the world is clear. As world demographics continue to shift, and urban areas
continue to rise upon the littorals, the Marine Corps must expect to find itself engaged there.
Though the effort is underway to capture technology and employment concepts which place
small, highly mobile units, "Killer Teams", in control of overwhelming firepower, in urban areas
to fight the non-linear battle, one element of today's reality of smaller budgets for the
development and procurement of technology and force structures remains. If the Marine Corps
fought the battle of Southern Hue City today, it would do so with an infantry battalion organized
and equipped very similar to the battalion Cheatham fought there nearly thirty years ago. This
fact is reassuring, considering the likely result had Killer Teams been employed. The absence of
2/5's fourth rifle company from Hue City, resulted in it being very similar to an infantry battalion
of today. Further, armed with only the Shoulder Launched Assault Weapons (SMAW), today's
battalion lacks a breaching capability comparable to that which 2/5 had with the 106 recoilless
rifle and 3.5 rocket launcher.[98]
Granted, many items in the current inventory, to include Global Positioning Systems,
laser guided weapons, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and precision delivered munitions would have
greatly contributed to the effort. It can likewise be expected that concerns toward collateral
damage and non-combatant casualties would only be greater in the real time news coverage
environment of today's world. Undoubtedly, Marines would again be using car mirrors tied to
poles to look around corners much as they did in Hue City.[99]
Facing a determined enemy, entrenched in a city, zealously committed to maintaining
control is a very realistic situation which the United States will face in the world's littorals in the
future. Accordingly Marines, along with the Navy, will be involved; they have little choice. The
concept of Operational Maneuver from the Sea appears to be the appropriate approach in such a
situation, because it facilitates force projection flexibility and a selective surge of logistics
needed to succeed. But, to face and defeat an enemy determined to defend a city, block by block,
regardless of any technological advantage and degree of stealth-like mobility, no small unit will
readily succeed. Such combat requires that an enemy essentially be dug out and destroyed, a
costly operation in itself. Further, once gained, this area must be physically occupied or
constantly surveyed in the non-linear battlefield of the city. 2/5 was successful, but had neared its
culminating point when southern Hue was secured. A smaller unit would not have succeeded,
even in most Operations Other Than War, where rogue enemies we face today on the lower end
of the conflict spectrum recognize the value and advantage of controlling urban areas, if only by
isolation.
The value of developing concepts and technology is vital. To remain content with current
standards and equipment, and to not explore future technological breakthroughs would be
criminal. However, though the battle of Hue City and the experience of 2/5 is nearly thirty years
old, the valuable lessons they provided are fundamentally sound and important to the concepts
being developed for the future. No technology or Killer Team concept will ever provide the
capability or mission execution that a disciplined Marine infantry battalion, schooled in sound
but basic tactics, utilizing the full spectrum of subordinate leadership, and competently lead from
the front brings to combat in an urban environment. Its company, platoon, squad, and fire team
organization permits it to quickly adapt and execute on a stage of decentralized control and utter
chaos. Any technological advance, concept, or tactic explored must have application across the
spectrum of the infantry battalion mission. It would appear that removed from the urban
environment, and unrestricted with collateral damage concerns, the Killer Teams would prove
highly effective, much as the similar organizations used in Operation Stingray during the
Vietnam Conflict.
From any view point, but most particularly manpower, urban combat will always be a
costly and difficult undertaking. This battlefield calls for small unit actions, but casualties,
logistics, and fatigue require great redundancy. However, all indications point to the need for the
Marine Corps to train, equip, and focus on this demanding environment. Despite the difficulty
and stress characteristic to urban combat, Marines will find themselves there, and any stride
made toward improving capabilities must focus on the infantry battalion, easily cross the
spectrum of conflict, and prove beneficial in non-urban combat as well.
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