Military

Organizing Command Echelons For Joint Warfare

CSC 1997

Subject Area - National Military Strategy

 

ORGANIZING COMMAND ECHELONS FOR JOINT WARFARE

By LtCol Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR

Student, Marine Corps Command and Staff College

 

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. armed forces entered World War II with no real doctrine for joint operations, although the services had conducted some training exercises together.^[1] The initial campaigns of the conflict highlighted this shortcoming, especially when it came to creating a joint command structure. Through trial and error and interservice debate, the nation subsequently created a workable system that led its forces to victory. Surprisingly, we never permanently incorporated all the lessons of the war. A half century later (and a decade after the Goldwater-Nichols Act), the U.S. still lacks an adequate joint command structure at the operational and tactical level of war. In this respect, we are as ill-prepared now as we were at Guadalcanal in 1942. If we are ever to achieve the full synergies of jointness, we must establish standing joint task force headquarters (JTF HQs) organized along functional component lines to lead our forces into combat.

WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE

At the start of the war, problems with jointness ranged from the strategic level of war down to the tactical. At the highest echelon, the Navy and Army squabbled over which service would exercise supreme command in the Pacific. The members of the fledgling Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) each believed that their service should get it and President Franklin Roosevelt was apparently uninterested in imposing a decision, so the result was a compromise. Admiral Chester Nimitz became commander in chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas (CINCPOA) and General Douglas MacArthur took control of the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). This did not end the problem, as the two theater headquarters fought for the remainder of the war over strategy, resources, and control of operations. As one modern commentator has justifiably noted, "the division of Army and Navy forces in the Pacific was more a solution to satisfy interservice rivalries and personal egos than an example of sound military practice."^[2] MacArthur himself thought it was a mistake: "Of all the faulty decisions in the war perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command in the Pacific....the failure to do so in the Pacific cannot be defended in logic, in theory, or even in common sense. Other motives must be ascribed. It resulted in divided effort, the waste of diffusion and duplication of force, and the consequent extension of the war with added casualties and cost."^[3] (Of course, he might have felt differently if the sole command had gone to Nimitz.)

The difficulties at the operational and tactical level of war were potentially more dangerous. In mid-1942 the JCS ordered CINCPOA to seize the island of Guadalcanal. The theater commander temporarily assigned many of the forces for the mission to Rear Admiral Robert Ghormley (Commander, South Pacific Area--the equivalent of today's sub-unified command), but initially gave his subordinate little operational authority over these units.^[4] They included Task Force 61 (Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes' carrier group) and Task Force 62 (Rear Admiral Richard Turner's amphibious group), both of which were under the tactical command of Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher. The landing force (Major General Alexander Vandegrift's 1^st Marine Division) was an element of Turner's force. Task Force 63 (Rear Admiral John McCain's multi-service land-based aviation force) was already in the South Pacific and reported directly to Ghormley. Major General Millard Harmon (Commander, South Pacific Area Army forces) played no significant role in the campaign, as he had only administrative control over his service's units. Ghormley's own headquarters was almost purely naval in character--he had just three army officers on his staff. Thus the South Pacific Area had a mixed command structure: a uni-service headquarters, a service component (Harmon), a functional component (McCain), and a temporary task force headquarters (Fletcher) in tactical command of the offensive and most non-aviation naval forces.^[5]

The operations order made no provision for alterations in command relationships after the initial landing on the island and this subsequently resulted in considerable confusion and controversy. Following the amphibious assault and the Navy's defeat at Savo Island on 7-8 August, Turner withdrew his ships, leaving Vandegrift in immediate command of forces in the Guadalcanal area. Things grew more complicated when land-based air arrived on the island (the Marines on 20 August, the Army on the 22^nd, and the Navy on the 24^th). Marine Major General Roy Geiger reported aboard and assumed control of this mixed aviation force. There is no apparent record of Geiger's chain of command, but nominally he probably was under McCain, although in practice he took orders from Vandegrift.^[6] As time passed, the Marine ground general found himself also in charge of an Army division and assorted sea and shore-based Navy units. Turner attempted to exercise command over Vandegrift from afar, particularly with regard to the employment of reinforcements, but the general warded off much of this interference. (Their squabbles eventually led to establishment of doctrine governing the relationship between the commanders of the amphibious task force and the landing force.) In effect, Vandegrift commanded a large, multi-service task force with a small division headquarters staffed almost entirely by Marine ground officers. This bastardized setup did not prevent U.S. forces from achieving victory, but it easily could have if less cooperative personalities had been selected to execute it.

Things did not go any better under MacArthur at first. He organized his Southwest Pacific theater forces in a mixed manner akin to Ghormley's arrangement. He had functional air and naval components, but purposely fragmented control of his ground forces. An Australian general nominally commanded the latter, but MacArthur also created Alamo Force, a dual designation of General Walter Kreuger's U.S. Sixth Army. As Sixth Army, Kreuger worked for the Australian, but when wearing his Alamo Force hat he reported directly to MacArthur. Under this setup joint coordination often fell far short of the ideal.

The December 1943 landing on New Britain illustrates the problems with MacArthur's scheme. In this evolution, Alamo Force commanded the ground echelon (1^st Marine Division again), but not the supporting sea or aviation forces. Whenever the Marines wanted air or naval support they had to make a request to Alamo Force (located in the rear in New Guinea), which then tried to coordinate it with the theater functional-component commanders. When there was a dispute between these senior leaders, they had to refer it to MacArthur, the first officer in the chain of command with authority over all the air, naval, and ground forces involved in the battle. At the same time, MacArthur and his staff were commanding other major operations in New Guinea and seeing to the administrative and logistical requirements of the entire theater. As a result, the 1^st Marine Division was less than happy with the support it received.^[7]

Nimitz learned to run things in a much different manner. He never took direct control of combat evolutions, but instead assigned missions to task forces organized along functional lines. Service-component commands existed, but only at the theater level, where they took care of the administrative and logistic requirements of their respective units. This system did not end interservice disagreements during combat evolutions, but it provided a clear chain of command capable of coordinating all arms at the operational and tactical levels. It also allowed combat elements to focus on warfighting while the theater headquarters shouldered all other concerns. This approach reached its zenith in the spring 1945 campaign against Okinawa.

Admiral Nimitz assigned responsibility for the Okinawa operation to Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet, designated as the Central Pacific Task Forces for this offensive. Spruance personally commanded TF 50 (naval covering and support forces), while his subordinate, Turner, led TF 51 (the amphibious units and the landing force responsible for seizing the island). Army Lieutenant General Simon Buckner commanded TF 56 (Expeditionary Troops), composed of his Tenth Army (the Army's XXIV Corps and the Marine's III Amphibious Corps), the Tactical Air Forces (a joint land-based air outfit under a Marine general), and Naval Forces Ryukyus (Navy units that would remain with him after the major fleets departed the area).^[8] While Buckner's TF 56 command echelon was essentially his dual-hatted Tenth Army headquarters, it boasted more than 60 Navy and Marine officers and had assumed its joint character well before the operation. As an example, Marine Brigadier General O. P. Smith, the TF 56/Tenth Army deputy chief of staff, assumed his duties on 8 November 1944, nearly five months prior to the 1 April 1945 D-Day.^[9] Turner's command element was also joint. In an October 1943 letter he explained to the Commandant of the Marine Corps: "In this new job of mine, there are a smaller number of Marines on the staff, solely because I have felt that the Army had also to be represented."^[10] Thus at the point where multi-service forces were employed as a team, they were led by multi-service command elements. Perhaps the only shortcoming in the system was that TF 56/Tenth Army had two duties--commanding the entire task force and directing its two corps. (The requirement for improved inter-service coordination was not lost on MacArthur. As his headquarters prepared for the invasion of Japan, it took on a joint flavor, as well.^[11])

RECENT EXPERIENCE

Following World War II, the services engaged in a hot debate over the future of jointness. The compromise National Security Act of 1947 initiated a joint structure at the highest level by creating what would become the Department of Defense (DOD) and formalizing the JCS, while a Presidential order established the first peacetime unified theater commands. Subsequent legislation, culminating in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, furthered jointness at these upper echelons, in part by strengthening the geographic commands.^[12] But Congress and the DOD have done little to address the operational and tactical levels of war, in spite of the fact that problems at that plane (as demonstrated at Desert One and Grenada) served as the catalyst for Goldwater-Nichols. Admiral Joseph W. Prueher (CINCPAC) has acknowledged this shortcoming: "Although unified command staffs benefitted from Goldwater-Nichols, joint task force staffs did not."^[13]

In the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, we have employed three alternatives in commanding joint operations: 1) the CINC assigns the task to a subordinate uni-service operational headquarters and it assumes the role of a JTF HQs, 2) the CINC and his staff take direct control, or 3) the CINC creates a JTF HQs from scratch. The first method is becoming the preferred option and CINCs have begun to dual designate subordinate elements as contingency JTF HQs. Under this "two-tiered command and control" system, Third Fleet in the Pacific, for example, must stand ready to act both as a purely Navy headquarters and as the potential leader of a multi-service operation.^[14] A few examples highlight the problems with these approaches to heading up a joint team at the point of the spear.

There are a number of drawbacks in using the service headquarters model. First and foremost, these commands are not joint since they contain at best a few liaison officers from other services. The principal staff officers for XVIII Airborne Corps, for instance, will always be Army officers. They may have some knowledge of the capabilities of the other services from their days at a staff college or they may ask their liaison officers for ideas, but what they really know best is the Army way of doing things. The same would be true if the service headquarters were Air Force, Navy, or Marine. Given this lack of experience in commanding a joint force, a uni-service command element often is reluctant or unable to develop a coherent plan of action that properly integrates the capabilities of its subordinate units. The result will most often be what Colonel Mark Cancian has observed in "joint" exercises, each service component allowed to do what it wants to do instead of "operating as a unified whole with a common vision."^[15]

This problem has appeared in real operations. In Haiti in 1994, the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters served as the base for the JTF HQs, while the head of Second Fleet filled the role of the deputy JTF commander and provided naval expertise. Of course, the deputy was not co-located with his nominal boss during the planning stages and the senior Marine liaison officer to the JTF/XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters did not report aboard till after the planning was largely complete. Thus there was little in the way of true joint direction--in essence XVIII Airborne Corps planned the eventually-discarded air assault while Second Fleet was in charge of the seaborne echelons. The Marine liaison officer felt that "XVIII Airborne Corps ran and organized their JTF staff like an Army staff and the airborne plan and amphibious plan were not well coordinated."^[16] Other knowledgeable observers in similar settings have come to the same conclusion. One CINC has commented that a "single-service staff cannot masquerade as a joint staff."^[17] Participants at a conference on "Standing Up a Joint Task Force" conceded that "forming JTFs with service components as foundations means changing the mindset of component staff members, which normally does not occur easily or rapidly."^[18]

The situation is even worse when the JTF is built around a lower echelon headquarters, as happened with JTF Somalia (created in October 1993 to reinforce the U.S. contingent in the U.N. operation). In this case the nucleus was the 10^th Mountain Division. Colonel Kenneth Allard has pointed out the inherent problems in such a scenario: "Because of its tactical orientation, no division--and especially not a light infantry unit--has either the staff structure or the cadre of experienced personnel needed to conduct joint operations. Necessarily, staff procedures are 'Army' rather than 'joint.'"^[19]

Communication is another major problem, since the command echelon will have to establish links with its new higher headquarters and other-service subordinates in addition to its own organic forces. The necessary equipment and personnel are often not part of the headquarters and must join at the last minute and adapt to the procedures of the headquarters and the subordinate units.^[20] There is also the potential for a primarily single-service JTF HQs to adopt a parochial outlook. Some Army officers in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia felt that the JTF HQs built around the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) favored the unloading of Marine prepositioning ships to the exclusion of vessels supporting the Army.^[21]

In an ongoing attempt to improve jointness, these service headquarters are supposed to become joint by assimilating "deployable augmentation cells" from the CINC whenever they receive a JTF mission.^[22] But the last-minute assignment of officers from other services does not solve the problem, instead it merely compounds it. The original staff members do not know these new additions or their capabilities nor are they prepared to work smoothly with them. While Pacific Command has made efforts to exercise the contingency JTF HQs with the same augmentation cells they will use in actual operations, no part-time organization will ever be a match for one that always works and trains together. At a time when all the services acknowledge the need for speedier and more effective decision-making to implement the tenets of maneuver warfare and information warfare, the cobbling together of a joint staff only slows down the process and increases the probability of faulty outcomes. Admiral Preuher has admitted that contingency JTF staffs "remain predominantly single service-manned" and that exercise after-action reports have "highlighted a need for resident sister-service expertise to complement the infusion of joint personnel they receive during crisis augmentation."^[23] Admiral Paul David Miller has opined that "joint training and readiness could be measurably enhanced by permanently assigning sufficient personnel from each service to make the JTF staffs truly joint."^[24]

Another shortcoming lies in the focus of a service staff. Although dual designation theoretically allows them to prepare for joint missions, in practice they will spend most of their time doing what they are primarily charged with accomplishing--commanding their subordinate uni-service units in peace and getting ready to lead them in war. And an increasing emphasis on joint duties will not solve the problem. Filling billets with officers from other services and spending more time running joint exercises or working at the Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center will only make them less ready to execute their normal missions.^[25] They simply cannot be masters at planning and executing both joint and service operations.

Dual designation creates an additional problem because a headquarters will have to lead the joint force while still trying to fulfill its service mission. That task will become even thornier if some of its normal subordinate units do not join in the operation, leaving it with concerns at the front and in the distant rear. If the headquarters is split to meet both its obligations as a joint and service entity (and possibly a third time to create a rear echelon), it will sustain further loss in speed and effectiveness. The inability to focus is even more glaring for organizations not closely aligned with a particular contingency. XVIII Airborne Corps, for instance, could find itself in a major war in the Middle East or conducting operations other than war (OOTW) in the Caribbean, a serious enough challenge without adding the requirement to do so while controlling forces from other services.

The CINC model has its own set of shortcomings. Although unified commands are responsible for the conduct of combat evolutions, they are not necessarily well suited to directing execution at the operational and tactical level of war. They have wide ranging duties that have grown over the years, especially since Goldwater-Nichols "advanced their role in budgetary and programmatic processes."^[26] They also must tend to the maintenance of coalitions, oversee the flow of forces and logistics into the theater, and look after the rest of their domain. They thus have one hand engaged in warfighting at the front while the other deals with the myriad of non-combat concerns in the rear.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-91 is a case in point. The authors of The Generals' War felt that the Central Command (CENTCOM) staff was "burdened with the job of managing the deployment of forces to the Gulf" and thus unable to plan the offensive operations necessary to free Kuwait. As a consequence, General Norman Schwarzkopf brought in handpicked officers from outside his command and created an Army planning cell (later dubbed the "Jedi Knights"). Likewise, the Air Force element in the CENTCOM staff drew in personnel and ideas from Washington and elsewhere as it created the air campaign plan.^[27] Nor could Schwarzkopf focus entirely on the challenge of freeing Kuwait. In January 1991 he had to dispatch a task force to conduct an evacuation of Americans from Somalia, and he also had to concern himself with the fate of Israel, a nation not even in his region.

The CENTCOM commander further increased the difficulty for himself and his staff by creating an awkward chain of command. He had a joint force air combat commander (JFACC) to oversee air operations and he left the Navy in charge of maritime forces, but he acted as his own ground component commander, with the Third Army, I MEF, and the Arab coalition command all reporting directly to CINCCENT. Schwarzkopf not only had to referee disputes between these competing entities, but deal with the National Command Authority as well. In the end he and his headquarters could not keep up with the demands. He was surprised the day before the air war kicked off to find that the JFACC had not set aside sufficient aviation assets to support his ground scheme of maneuver. And he never resolved the basic disconnect between the independent plans of the Jedi Knights and I MEF. Third Army expected the Marines to conduct a fixing attack, but I MEF saw itself mounting a full-fledged offensive to seize Kuwait City. The result was a mismatch in execution, with the Marines acting as a "piston" pushing the Iraqis out of the trap before the Army's envelopment could close the back door.^[28] And Schwarzkopf's focus on warfighting in the final days of the conflict left him unprepared to deal with the complications of war termination.

The final model is the most obviously flawed alternative. Any headquarters that is put together shortly before an operation is bound to experience severe problems. The commander and his staff do not know each other and there are no standing operating procedures to smooth the process; much effort will be expended simply on establishing working relationships, both within the headquarters and with subordinate elements. The speed and quality of decision making will suffer and the situation is ripe for serious errors. A primary example of this method of joint command is the headquarters echelon for the U.S. task force in Somalia from May 1993 through March 1994. The Army general in charge first met his staff when he landed in the Horn of Africa and assumed responsibility for the operation. The group had been "brought together in some haste" with officers coming direct to Somalia from other assignments around the world.^[29] Although this arrangement was not the primary reason for the subsequent failure of the task force in Somalia, it almost certainly was a major contributor.

THE SOLUTION

The answer to the problem of joint command over combat forces is to implement a system similar to that used by Nimitz. Theater commanders and their organic service-component command echelons would take care of matters of strategy and support, while standing JTF HQs organized along functional lines would control multi-service forces at the operational and tactical level. The permanent JTF command elements would focus their entire energy on training and planning for joint warfare and leading joint forces in exercises and contingencies. They would bring to the table a cohesive staff of officers and enlisted personnel from all services, steeped in joint doctrine, familiar with the capabilities of all potential subordinate elements, equipped to do the job, and capable of coordinating the actions of all service elements at the closest possible level to the action. To enhance their effectiveness, they should be dedicated to a particular spectrum of missions in terms of geography or type of operation (e.g. a headquarters focused on operations other than war or on a major conflict in the Persian Gulf). The number of JTF HQs need not be great, since not every contingency requires a multi-service response. A fleet headquarters, for example, could still run a largely naval campaign such as a blockade.

Perhaps as important, they must be organized along functional lines. This would ensure unity of effort and efficiency and avoid the problems that arise when JTFs have both functional and service-component chains of command. As an example of the latter, some observers feel that Lieutenant General Walter Boomer and his staff were overtaxed in Desert Shield/Storm by their dual role as a warfighter and a service component.^[30] Creating a separate entity to assume the service-component duties is a less than optimum solution, since it establishes a confusing dual chain of command (one service and one functional) and bloats the JTF headquarters echelon. Many of those involved in joint operations readily concede that "the more complexity that is built into the chain of command, the more difficult successful command and control becomes."^[31]

While a purely functional arrangement may sound dangerous to those who believe that every service element should have direct access to the JTF commander to emphasize its needs and capabilities, such concerns would be addressed adequately in a truly joint headquarters since all services would be fully represented on the staff. In fact, the task force commander would be much more likely to give a favorable hearing to members of his staff than to an unfamiliar service- component element thrust upon him just prior to an operation. Most important, if we want to fight as a team, we need to organize our combat forces according to the role they play on the battlefield, not by service source. It makes no sense to use a JFACC and at the same time split command of forces on the ground or at sea. (This arrangement would not be a threat to the Marine Air Ground Task Force, which would operate within the land or maritime component as a combined-arms force in the same manner as an Army corps or a Navy fleet.) At the same time, the service components at the theater level would be in position to advise the CINC whenever they felt there was an interservice problem with a subordinate JTF.

The greatest potential drawback to the creation of standing JTF HQs is the additional cost in personnel and equipment. There are several possible sources for cuts to offset this new requirement. Perhaps the best one is the theater commands. We fought World War II and employed more than ten million men and women in uniform with just three such entities (Nimitz and MacArthur in the Pacific and Eisenhower in Europe), but now we have five of them. We could afford to scale back the number of these commands if standing JTFs assumed the entire warfighting burden. One possible arrangement would be two geographic CINCs (east and west) supported by a functional CINC responsible for the readiness of CONUS-based forces and JTF HQs. There would be several benefits to such a design. Many geographic fault lines would disappear, as would some of the artificialities and difficulties of forces switching from one theater commander to another as they move about the globe. With broader regional responsibilities, CINCs likely would provide more realistic input into the budgeting process that determines the mix, readiness, and operational tempo of the fighting forces. And relieving them of day-to-day concerns regarding operations and tactics would improve their performance at the strategic level. It also would reduce some of the competing demands on other command echelons; the head of Marine Forces Atlantic, for instance, is the Marine component commander for three theaters. This concept is not as revolutionary as it might sound; echoing the sentiments of MacArthur, Admiral J. Paul Reason, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, has recently voiced his opinion that "Maybe we have too many CINCs."^[32]

Another prospect for offsetting reductions is the joint arena at the national level. At present, the Joint Staff and the DOD have shrunk much less than the combat forces and many of the personnel assigned to these two entities have little direct involvement in warfighting responsibilities.^[33] While jointness does require someone in the rear to accomplish tasks such as rationalizing procurement, it would seem equally important to emphasize service integration at the level where it will most likely affect combat capabilities. Standing JTF HQs would focus a slice of the armed forces on the details of actually fighting joint and these officers and enlisted personnel would become the true Jedi Knights of joint warfare. They and the readiness CINC would be best fitted to handle some of the tasks now performed by the Joint Staff and the DOD. Key areas would be the development of joint doctrine and the oversight of joint training. As an added benefit of this redirection of joint billets, joint duty would be more closely associated with warfighting, which would make it more attractive to those so assigned and reemphasize the rationale for creating the joint specialty track in the first place--to enhance the effectiveness of forces in contact with the enemy.

          A third source would be excess operational headquarters within the services. Although a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) can command multiple divisions and wings, the Corps presently maintains three such headquarters for its three active divisions and wings. Since our forces are supposedly manned at a level to fight only two major contingencies at once (and even that possibility is remote), the Marines could get by with just two MEF command elements. Likewise the Navy maintains four amphibious squadron commands each on the west and east coasts, even though only one such force at a time is forward deployed from the respective fleets.^[34] In comparison, the Marine forces they support maintain a one-in-three rotation, so the Navy should be able to stand down two of these squadron headquarters. The Army and Air Force assuredly could find similar sources for reduction.

The other area of concern with a system of standing JTF HQs is that they might not have the same close association with CINCs enjoyed by service headquarters which routinely operate under one of the theater commands. This would not be a significant problem, however, especially if the number of geographic commands is reduced. The JTF staffs would get to know CINCs and their regions (and their potential subordinate commands) through frequent exercises and planning conferences. If anything, standing JTF HQs will spend more time working with the CINCs because they will have no service responsibilities competing for their time and attention. In any case, our present system does not ensure that CINCs and the fighting forces know each other. Central Command has almost no fulltime forces and many of the main players in other major contingencies, such as XVIII Airborne Corps and I MEF, are not routinely forward deployed under the CINCs for whom they might fight.

 

CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps would never countenance the idea of throwing together a scratch command element for a Marine Expeditionary Unit just days before it deployed, nor would it send a few aviation and logistics representatives to the infantry battalion headquarters and give it the responsibility of running the entire air-ground-service support team. Likewise, no other service would consider heading up a combined-arms force with a command echelon composed almost entirely of officers from a single specialty. Yet we routinely assign similarly inadequate lashups to command much more complicated multi-service entities. General Colin Powell was fond of saying that "We train as a team, fight as a team, and win as a team."^[35] After a half century of slow and sometimes misguided progress toward jointness, it is high time that we take the ultimate step and also employ a dedicated coaching staff to direct the effort of the team. Only then will we be truly ready to fight joint.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Allard, Kenneth, Col, USA. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995.

 

Appleman, Roy et al. Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington: U.S. Army, 1948.

 

Atkinson, Rick. Crusade Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1993.

 

Cole, Ronald H. et al. The History of the Unified Command Plan. Washington: Joint History Office, 1995.

 

Frank, Richard B. Guadalcanal. New York: Random House, 1990.

 

Hoffman, Jon T. Once A Legend. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994.

 

Hough, Frank O. LtCol and Crown, John A. Maj USMC The Campaign On New Britain. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1952.

 

Miller, John J., Jr. Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul. Washington: U.S. Army, 1959.

 

Morison, Samuel E. Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950.

 

Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years. Washington: U.S. Army, 1962.

 

Trainor, Bernard E., Gen, USMC(Ret) and Gordon, Michael R. The Generals' War. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1995.

 

ARTICLES

"Are CINCs the Problem?" Navy Times, 17 Mar 1997, 6.

 

Barlow, Jason R., LtCol, USAF. "Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific." JFQ, Spring 1994, 76-81.

 

Burton, James G., Col, USAF(Ret). "Pushing Them Out the Back Door." USNI               Proceedings, Jun 1993, 37-42.

 

Cancian, Mark, Col, USMCR. "The Revolution Is Incomplete." USNI Proceedings, Sep 1996, 70-73.

 

Donley, Michael B. "Problems of Defense Organization and Management." JFQ, Summer 1995, 86-94.

 

Flores, Susan J., LtCol, USMC. "JTFs: Some Practical Implications." JFQ, Spring 1995, 111-113.

 

Howell, Jefferson D., LtGen USMC and Gershaneck, Kerry K. LtCol, USMC(Ret). "Componency: The Path to Operational Success." Marine Corps Gazette, Feb 1997, 64-70.

 

Hurley, Marcus, MGen, USAF. "JFACC: Taking the Next Step." JFQ, Spring 1995, 60-65.

 

Macke, Richard C., Adm, USN. "A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia." JFQ, Spring 1995, 8-15.

 

Miller, Paul David, Adm, USN. "A New Mission for Atlantic Command." JFQ, Summer 1993, 80-87.

 

"Naval Amphibious Forces." Marine Corps Gazette, Mar 1997, I1-I4.

 

Nunn, Sam. "Future Trends in Defense Organization." JFQ, Autumn 1996, 63-68 .

 

"Pacific JTF." JFQ, Spring 1996, 128.

 

Prueher, Joseph W., Adm, USN. "Warfighting CINCs in a New Era." JFQ, Autumn 1996, 48-52.

 

Shalikashvili, John M., Gen, USA. "A Word From the Chairman." JFQ, Autumn 1996, 1-6.

 

Sheehan, John J., Gen, USMC. "Next Steps In Joint Force Integration." JFQ, Autumn 1996, 41-47.

 

"U.S. Marines Land in Haiti." Marine Corps Gazette, Nov 1994, 4-6.

 

DOCUMENTS

Browning, Darrell A., Col, USMC. E-mail to LtCol Jon T. Hoffman, USMCR, 27 Feb 1997.

 

Smith, O. P., LtGen, USMC "The Tenth Army on Okinawa," Box 22, Smith Personal Papers, Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA.

 

 

ENDNOTES