Accessing The Army National Guard To Support National Military Contingencies

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - Warfighting

 

 

          ACCESSING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

TO SUPPORT NATIONAL MILITARY CONTINGENCIES

 

       Viable Legal Parameters or Limitations

           to Post Cold War Requirements?    

 

 

 

                        by

 

 

 

                     Forrest B. Hendrick

               Major, US Army National Guard

                          USMC CSC

 

 

 

 

 

 

                  Paper submitted to the Faculty

              of the USMC Command and Staff College

          to fulfill the requirement for the Military

        Issues Paper. This document represents the views

        of the author and is not the official Department

                       of Defense position

        

                          February 1997

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

               THE RELUCTANT LONE SUPERPOWER

 

     The international events of the last eight years have

 

declared the United States the winner of the Cold War and

 

the lone remaining superpower. As in previous post conflict

 

periods, the American people have placed increasing emphasis

 

on domestic programs and reduced emphasis on National

 

Security needs. Today, this situation poses a significant

 

dilemma for the U.S. military, as forces are pared down

 

and operational requirements continue to increase.

 

     Domestic pressure to control government discretionary

 

spending (where the Defense Budget is derived) is

 

particularly acute as domestic entitlement spending

 

continues to increase. This pressure on the Defense

 

Department budget will continue to force reductions in

 

defense spending, while the geostrategic environment

 

requires increased U.S. military involvement to meet defined

 

National Security objectives. This resource reduction for

 

the U.S. Army, has translated into 35 percent fewer forces,

 

38 percent less funding, and a 300 percent greater mission

 

increase from 1988 to 19961.

 

     This situation and the American people require the

 

Defense Department to truly become innovatively efficient in

 

it's approach to the development and employment of military

 

forces. This approach will require utilization of all

 

forces in the most efficient and complementary fashion

 

possible. A key part of this force that has not

 

traditionally been integrated to meet operational

 

requirements is the Army National Guard. Historically,

 

during the Cold War the Army National Guard focused on

 

mobilization training to meet the Warsaw Pact and domestic

 

needs. As identified by Secretary of Defense William Perry,

 

the Army National Guard can provide compensating leverage to

 

relieve resource pressure and the intense Active force

 

operational employment rate, while gaining beneficial

 

training and experience. Those that would oppose this

 

concept would certainly argue that the Army National Guard

 

(ARNG) is not accessible under current law to support

 

Post Cold War national military requirements.

 

     The objective of this paper is to analyze the

 

statutes that define the "accessibility" of the ARNG,

 

and determine if the statutes provide adequate access to

 

ARNG units and members to meet the national security needs

 

of the United States in the post Cold War era.

 

              EVOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENT

 

     Since the passing of the 1916 National Defense Act, the

 

Army National Guard (ARNG) has remained the primary

 

reserve force of the United States Army. After 1916, under

 

intense budget pressure the Army attempted to redesign the

 

ARNG to support active Army initiatives. The argument

 

about the statutory "accessibility" of the ARNG to support

 

national military requirements was invariably raised as a

 

shortfall of the ARNG that caused an inefficient expenditure

 

of scarce military funding.   

 

     After 1916, despite these discussions Army National

 

Guard units and members were called-up to support

 

non-domestic emergencies during World War I, World

 

War II, the Berlin Crisis, the Korean Conflict, the Cuban

 

Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and Desert Shield/Storm2.

 

Throughout these security threats and the intervening years

 

the question of availability or the statutory

 

"accessibility" of the ARNG has caused significant concern

 

amongst defense planners and military strategists. This

 

concern has resulted in misperceptions, underutilization and

 

attempts to eliminate or redesign the ARNG into an

 

organization more resposive to perceived national

 

security requirements.

 

     These misperceptions were still prevalent during the

 

coalition war led by the United States against Iraq in

 

1990-1991, which required 62,411 Army National Guard

 

soldiers, 398 Army Guard units, 63 Army Guard Colonel and

 

Lieutenant Colonel commands. This misperception continued

 

despite the mobilization to deployment time for ARNG units

 

averaging 31 days3. This fact coupled with lessons learned

 

from Guard unit mobilization and the changing nature of U.S.

 

security requirements, illuminated the need for improvements

 

in the statutes and regulations governing National Guard

 

force employment.

 

     The senior defense leadership addressed this need and

 

in September 1993 established the DOD Senior Level Working

 

Group On Accessibility to analyze the issue and make

 

recommendations for improvement. This group included senior

 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the

 

Assistant Secretaries of the services responsible for

 

Reserve Affairs, representatives from the Joint Staff,

 

Forces Command, the U.S. Transportation Command, the Chief

 

of the National Guard Bureau and the chiefs of the seven

 

Reserve Components4. Simultaneously, additional legislation

 

was being considered to improve support and readiness of

 

Guard forces that would be required to support the Post Cold

 

War National Security Strategy.      

 

     Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense initiated

 

action in to improve access and utilization of

 

National Guard forces in support of national military

 

operational requirements. This action resulted in some of

 

the most significant changes to the regulations governing

 

employment of National Guard units and soldiers since the

 

1916 National Defense Act.

 

 

   

                 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

 

    The National Guard of the United States derives it's

 

origin from Article I, section 8 of the Constitution and the

 

success of the "militia" during the Revolution. This same

 

article provides the power to raise taxes and "to raise and

 

support Armies". This article also provides for "organizing,

 

arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such

 

part of them as may be employed in the service of the United

 

States, reserving to the States respectively, the

 

appointment of the officers, and the authority of training

 

the militia according to the discipline prescribed by

 

Congress"5.

 

     The Second Amendment passed on December 15, 1791 also

 

enforces the militia concept or in current lexicon "National

 

Guard" by stating "a well regulated militia, being necessary

 

to the security of a free State, the right of the people to

 

keep and bear arms shall not be infringed6." The Second

 

Amendment was endorsed by "anti-Federalists" who feared

 

elimination of the militia by "Federalists" that desired a

 

strong standing Army. The ratification of the Second

 

Amendment eliminated the potential threat of a large

 

standing Army so feared by the anti-Federalists of the time.

 

     As a prior militiaman, George Washington endorsed the

 

establishment of a strong militia system in the United

 

States. He also desired to improve the organization and

 

training of the militia. The limited resources of the

 

fledgling United States did not allow paying for a large

 

Army and he believed the United States should rely on the

 

militia to meet a large part of the security needs of the

 

early United States7.

 

     In May 1792, Congress passed the "Militia Act"

 

providing for two categories of militia. The "volunteer

 

militia",similar to the Minutemen of 1776 would be the ready

 

reserve and the "common militia" would be the vast majority

 

of individuals, primarily ununiformed and unpaid. The 1792

 

Act established the idea of organizing the militia into

 

standard divisions, brigades and the like, but left

 

compliance up to the states. Modifications in 1795 and 1808

 

allowed the President to mobilize the militia by calling for

 

units or volunteers, thus firmly establishing the militia

 

under Article III, Section 2. This section states "The

 

President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

 

of the United States; and of the militia of the several

 

states, when called into the actual service of the United

 

States8."   Thus, Article III, Section 2 provides the legal

 

foundation for access to the National Guard when called into

 

service of the United States to confront a national

 

emergency.

 

    The 1792 "Militia Act" remained largely intact until the

 

1903 "Dick Act", which reaffirmed the National Guard as the

 

nations primary reserve force. This act provided increased

 

federal control over the National Guard if the state agreed

 

to accept federal funds to equip and train units. The

 

acceptance of federal funds also opened National Guard units

 

to inspection by "Regular Officers" and facilitated payment

 

for "annual training9."

 

     The 1916 National Defense Act, guaranteed state

 

militias status as the Army's primary reserve force and

 

mandated the term "National Guard". This act also

 

stipulated that: (1)officer qualifications are determined by

 

the War Department, (2) each unit will be federally

 

recognized, (3) units will be organized in accordance with

 

Army tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and (4) a

 

number of fiscal provisions and training requirements. The

 

President also received authority to mobilize the National

 

Guard for the entire duration of an emergency. The growing

 

specter of World War I and Pancho Villa's raid into the

 

southwest certainly increased support for this

 

legislation. Fifteen days after passing this act, President

 

Woodrow Wilson called up the entire National Guard to

 

suppress the perceived threat from Mexico10. Less than one

 

year later the United States declared war on Germany and

 

ultimately deployed 43 divisions to Europe, 17 of which were

 

National Guard Divisions11. Thus the National Defense

 

Act of 1916 firmly established the National Guard as the

 

nations primary reserve force and eliminated the initiative

 

by the "standing Army" to have a reserve composed of

 

individuals with no state affiliation.

 

           REQUIREMENT vs. CAPABILITY DILEMMA

 

     The current international security environment finds

 

the United States with many possible adversaries and the

 

smallest military since WW II12. To support the National

 

Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement the U.S.

 

military must be prepared to expand and project combat

 

power, possibly in a much more rapid fashion, than

 

previously planned for during the Cold War. U.S. forces

 

must also be prepared to respond to a much broader spectrum

 

of conflict ranging from Humanitarian Assistance to mid to

 

high Intensity Conflict. As postulated before, in times of

 

declining military budgets and uncertainty many today

 

believe that ARNG forces are not "accessible" and do not

 

provide a critical component to our national security.

 

However, an analysis of the competencies and capabilities of

 

ARNG forces reveals that many of today's peacetime

 

engagement requirements could be met by ARNG units.

 

              LONG STANDING LEGAL FOUNDATION

 

     The 1916 statutes of Title 10 United States Code which

 

govern mobilization and access to National Guard units

 

remained largely unchanged until 1976. This change commonly

 

referred to as the Presidential Selected Reserve Callup

 

(200,000), focused on the emerging need for Guard and

 

Reserve forces in lesser regional contingencies during an

 

ongoing major regional contingency. These statutes served

 

the United States well when the focus of the National Guard

 

was to mobilize quickly to confront a Warsaw Pact

 

threat in Europe. These statutes governing ARNG

 

mobilization under Title 10 of the United States Code are:

 

· Section 672(a) FULL MOBILIZATION: gives access to the

    total reserve force, but requires a declaration of War

    or national emergency by Congress.

· Section 672(b): authorizes involuntary activation of any

    number of Reservists for not more than 15 days per year.

    Although the purpose of this paragraph is generally

    thought to be for training, there is no stated purpose

    in the text. (Title 10, Section 270(b) states the annual

    active duty training requirements for Reserve

    component members).

 

· Section 672(d): authorizes the Service Secretaries to

    activate members of the Reserve components with their

    consent ("volunteers"). This authority was used by all

    Services in mid-August 1990 to support the initial U.S.

    response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

 

· Section 673 "READY RESERVE": is generally referred to as

    the PARTIAL MOBILIZATION statute. In time of national

    emergency declared by the President or otherwise

    authorized by law it authorizes ordering to active duty,

    without their consent, up to 1,000,000 members of the

 Ready Reserve for up to 24 consecutive months. This

    authority was used by President Bush on 18 January 1991

    to support Operation DESERT STORM.

· Section 673(b): Orders to active duty other than during

    war or national emergency and gives access to 200,000

    members in the selected reserve and would only require

    the President to notify Congress of the call-up. This

    provision passed in 1976 does not require consent of the

    reserve component member. This provision has a 90 day

    activation, plus 90 day extension limitation. This is

    known as the PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP

    (PSRC) and is what President Bush used on August 22,

    1990. State governors must provide approval for

    call-up of State National Guard Forces. (Title 10,    

    United States Code, and House Armed Services

    Subcommittee on Military Forces April 21, 1994)

 

    TITLE 10, Chapter 15 - "Insurrection"

 

· Section 331 "Federal Aid for State Governments": is

    authorized upon request by the legislature or governor

    of a state whenever there is insurrection against the

    state government. The President is authorized to call

    into Federal service the number requested by the state

    and use them to suppress the insurrection.

 

· Section 3332 "Use of militia and armed forces to enforce

    Federal authority": enables the President to call the

    militia into Federal service whenever he decides that

    there exists unlawful obstructions, combinations or

 assemblages or rebellion against the authority of the

    United States in any state or territory. The President

    may call into Federal service the militia of any state

    and use the armed (active) forces to enforce those laws

    and suppress the rebellion.

 

· Section 333 "Interference with State and Federal Law":

    authorizes the President to use the militia or the armed

    forces or both in any state to suppress insurrection,

    domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy

    if necessary to ensure equal protection under

    Federal Law.

· Title 10, Chapter 341, Section 3500 "Active Duty":

    authorizes the President to call into Federal service

    any members and units of the Army National Guard

    whenever the United States, the U.S. Territories,

    Commonwealths or possessions are invaded or in danger of

    invasion by a foreign nation; whenever there is a

    rebellion or danger of rebellion against the authority

    of the United States; or, when the President is unable

    with the regular forces to execute the laws of the

    United States13.

    

            POST COLD WAR ERA REQUIREMENTS

 

    During and immediately following the Cold-War era, the

 

main challenge posed by the above statutes was "assured

 

early access" of Guard forces to meet an ambiguous threat or

 

contingency. (Title 10, United States Code (USC) 101(a)(13)

 

defines a contingency as "a military operation that (a) is

 

designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in

 

which members of the armed forces are or may become involved

 

in military actions, operations or hostilities against an

 

enemy of the United States or against an opposing military

 

force; or (b) results in the call or order to, or retention

 

on, active duty members of the uniformed services under

 

section 672(a), 673, 673(b), 673(c), 688, 3500 or 8500 of

 

Title 10 USC, Chapter 15 of Title 10 USC, or any other

 

provision of law or during national emergency declared by

 

the president or Congress)14 .

 

     While threats to U.S. security evolved, the

 

U.S. military decreased to it's smallest size in 50 years.

 

This 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR) force operated at an

 

increasingly higher operational tempo and personnel tempo.

 

This BUR force increasingly required augmentation from the

 

National Guard and Reserve to provide compensating leverage

 

against the high active component operational requirements.   

 

The declining active military force structure of the early

 

1990s combined with the diverse ambiguous threats facing the

 

United States reinforced the need for increased early use

 

and access to National Guard forces. To face these

 

challenges, the Defense Department tasked the National

 

Guard with a broader range of responsibilities to face

 

this new threat.

    However, gaining access to the National Guard or Reserve

 

without their consent to confront these ambiguous security

 

threats set a precedent and posed a potentially sensitive

 

political issue. Activation of Guard or Reserve forces has

 

a significant impact on the lives of individual soldiers

 

and the economic well-being of their families and

 

communities.

 

     The strategic military focus of the United States also

 

evolved to focus on the new dangers of: regional conflict;

 

proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass

 

destruction; threats to democratization; transnational

 

dangers of terrorism and drug trafficking; reform in the

 

former Soviet Union and dangers from a weak U.S. economy15.

 

With the increased need for National Guard forces

 

in peacetime contingencies, the long standing Title 10

 

statutes and support programs came under increasing

 

scrutiny by the Senior Defense Leadership.

    

     The primary concerns of Senior Defense leaders,

 

the Service Chiefs and Commanders in Chief (CINCs) in the

 

post Cold War era relating to ARNG and reserve component

 

access were: (1) the limitations on activation and

 

early assured access (90 days initially, plus 90 additional

 

days) Title 10, Section 673(b) PSRC, (2) early assured

 

access to key reserve component capabilities to support

 

mobilization (Defense Secretary authorization to call-up

 

25,000 key reservists), (3) domestic emergencies that exceed

 

individual state ARNG capabilities (4) expanded access to

 

Reserve Components for peace operations to satisfy Defense

 

Planning Guidance and (5) the international implications and

[i]

sensitivity that must be addressed by the President before

 

calling up the National Guard or the Reserves16. Certainly

 

many more issues could influence the decision to access the

 

ARNG into any contingency. The focus of this analysis will

 

be the five concerns identified above.

 

 

         LIMITATIONS OR NECESSARY PROTECTIONS?

 

· ISSUES 1 AND 5 - 90 PLUS 90 DAY LIMITATION AND THE

                    INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS:

 

     The existing 90 day, plus 90 day extension

 

mobilization for reservists limitation under Section

 

673b prevented the CINCs from relying on ARNG combat forces,

 

due to the time required to make them available for a

 

contingency and the short remaining time they would be

 

available to operate during the contingency requirement.

 

As a result, the CINCs did not seriously consider

 

employment of the ARNG unless a partial or full mobilization

 

occurred to confront a contingency in their geographic area.

 

This limitation also did not provide National Guardsmen a

 

realistic expectation of the duration of their service.

 

     The Senior Defense Working Group (SDWG) found that the

 

Presidential decision making process in an evolving crisis

 

is not conducive to time sensitive access to the National

 

Guard. This process requires consideration of international

 

implications, coordination with Congress and other potential

 

impacts. Activating any or all ARNG forces would reveal to

 

our potential adversaries our intentions and may cause an

 

inadvertent escalation of hostilities or threat to other

 

U.S. military forces or civilians.

 

     The delay caused by the presidential decision process

 

prevents mandatory callup of ARNG units required to prepare

 

the CONUS mobilization pipeline to move forces to react to a

 

rapidly evolving crisis. This delay was mitigated by the

 

use of ARNG volunteers under Title 10, 672(d) during DESERT

 

SHIELD/STORM17 . These selected volunteers provided needed

 

capability, but not the total unit capability required by

 

the CINCs.

 

     To prevent or deter the escalation of a crisis in

 

today's difficult geostrategic environment requires rapid

 

action. However, the framers of the Constitution and

 

subsequent Congressional leaders understood the necessity of

 

Congressional support before committing U.S. military

 

forces. This process ensures the commitment of the will of

 

the American people, thereby ensuring the moral support for

 

employment of the total force. Without this Congressional

 

approval process, active or reserve component forces run the

 

risk of uncertain moral/psychological support, exposing a

 

critical vulnerability and decreasing the likelihood of

 

success. Illustrating this fact the Commander of Forces

 

Command, Army General Edwin Burba recently told a reserve

 

audience "When you come to war, you bring America with you."

 

(Reserve Justice on Leave, Harry Summers, The Washington

 

Times, 6 Feb 1997).     

 

To alleviate this problem, in 1993 the President proposed

 

to extend reserve activations under 673(b) to 180 days plus

 

an 180 day extension. This resulted in development of a DOD

 

Directive 1235.10 in July 1995 which under a Presidential

 

Selected Reserve Call-up Section 673(b) allows "ordering any

 

unit and any member not assigned to a unit organized to

 

serve as a unit of the Selected Reserve to active duty

 

(other than for training) for not more than 270 days,

 

without consent of the member concerned to augment active

 

forces for an operational mission other than during war or

 

national emergency." Selected Reserves refers to those

 

units and individuals identified by their respective

 

services and approved by the CJCS as essential to initial

 

wartime requirements18. This 270 day extension required the

 

recission of DOD Directive 1215.6, "policy on Active Duty

 

Training and Active Duty for Special Work which formerly

 

required individuals to be counted against active duty end-

 

strength if their assignment exceeded 180 days.

 

Additionally, recent legislation under Section 168,

 

Title 10 USC provides relief by allowing Reservists on

 

active duty more than 180 days for military-to-military

 

contacts or comparable activities to be excluded from being

 

counted against active component end-strengths19 18.

 

     Section 8130 of the DOD Appropriations Act for

 

1995 allowed funds appropriated for operation and

 

maintenance of the military departments, Unified and

 

Specified Commands and Defense Agencies to be used to

 

reimburse pay, allowances and other National Guard and

 

Reserve personnel appropriations when Reservists provide

 

intelligence support to Unified Commands, Defense Agencies

 

of Joint Intelligence Activities. This provision currently

 

only applies to military-to-military contacts and

 

intelligence-related activities20.     

 

     This DOD directive effectively allows the President to

 

order units or members of the selected reserves (ARNG) to

 

duty to support peacetime contingency operations for an

 

adequate period to support national military requirements.

 

For ARNG units this provision still requires the consent of

 

the State Governor under Title 10, Chapter 341, Section 3500

 

of the United States Code. During recent operations in

 

Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia, State Governors readily endorsed

 

sending their ARNG units and soldiers to support those

 

peacetime contingency operations.

 

     With the implementation of the 270 day activation

 

provision,additional consideration was also given to support

 

programs designed to protect Guard soldiers, their families

 

and their employers from hardships caused by this extended

 

timeperiod.

 

 

· ISSUES 2 and 4 - EARLY ASSURED ACCESS AND EXPANDED ACCESS      

                   TO RESERVE COMPONENTS:

 

     Access to the ARNG is key to supporting an evolving

 

national military crisis or lesser regional contingency.

 

Particularly acute is the need for National Guard soldiers

 

to establish the infrastructure to prepare units for

 

movement, open seaports, open aerial ports and overseas

 

movement support. The Army, defense agencies, other

 

services and the supporting commands require early access to

 

National Guard and Reserve units and members to set up and

 

operate crisis action teams, deploy civil affairs, deploy

 

Special Operations forces, establish mobilization stations

 

and surge logistics and medical support. The 1976 amendment

 

to Title 10,673(b) was intended to support this requirement.

 

However, this statute does require the President to notify

 

Congress and has only been invoked once during DESERT

 

SHIELD21.

 

     The infrequent use of this statute has caused it to

 

become viewed as a de-facto mobilization authority.

 

Consequently, this raises sensitive domestic and foreign

 

policy issues that require resolution before the President

 

or Congress can proceed, extending the time required to

 

implement the call-up under 673(b).

 

     To address this deficiency, the Department of Defense

 

in 1994 requested the authority to call-up to 25,000

 

reservists to accomplish those time sensitive

 

requirements22. Congress soundly denied this request under

 

the belief that this would delegate a degree of mobilization

 

authority to the Secretary of Defense. It was Congress's

 

view that this would clearly contradict war declaration

 

powers under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.

 

     This situation results in the United States having to

 

rely on the availability of volunteers with the proper

 

specialties to meet the requirements of a less than declared

 

national emergency or contingency. In response to this, DOD

 

Directive 1235.12 states that for planning and programming

 

purposes "for lesser regional conflicts, domestic

 

emergencies, and other missions, where capabilities of the

 

Reserve components could be required, maximum consideration

 

will be given to accessing volunteer Reserve component units

 

and individuals before seeking authority to order members

 

of the Reserve components to active duty without their

 

consent. When Reserve component augmentation of the active

 

force is required for major regional conflicts and national

 

emergencies, access to the Reserve components and

 

individuals through an order to active duty without their

 

consent will be assumed23."

 

     The Air Force has been particularly successful in

 

accessing their Air Guard and Reserve components during

 

contingencies to augment active forces. This is

 

accomplished through the use of Memoranda of Understanding

 

or Agreement (MOUs or MOAs) with states, units or

 

individuals. This requires detailed prior planning with the

 

supported CINCs, Major Commands and units. This prior

 

planning results in providing 2,000 man-years of

 

augmentation annually to support ongoing operational

 

requirements24.

 

     In contrast, the Army in 1995 programmed only 45

 

man-years to support the use of volunteers. After the

 

release of the Senior Defense Working Group results, the

 

Army increased planned funding in this category to 500

 

man-years. Prior to this reprogramming effort, the ARNG had

 

developed the "PROJECT STANDARD BEARER" program which

 

sought to improve access to selected units. This program

 

identifies 53 Army National Guard units that sustain the

 

highest state of deployability and are available in a

 

volunteer status to support any contingency the President

 

directs. These units come from the Contingency Force Pool-1

 

and can deploy within seven days25.

 

     Secretary of Defense, William Perry on April 7,

 

1995 released a guidance memorandum for the Chairman of the

 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Secretaries and DOD Agencies

 

which urges increased use of Reserve forces in total force

 

missions. This memorandum identified three areas that

 

would improve success of Reserve Component integration: (1)

 

better identification of and planning for requirements (2)

 

flexibility in the training and employment of Reservists;

 

and (3) programming the funding to meet these requirements

 

including the use of already funded training26.

 

     A matching fund program to augment the costs to the

 

Services and CINCs of Guard and Reserve deployments was

 

established concurrently to encourage Reserve component

 

utilization. This program alters the Cold-War era model of

 

utilizing programmed ARNG funding to meet solely

 

mobilization and mission essential task training and allows

 

focus on recurring CINC or national requirements.               

      

 

ISSUE 3: EMERGENCIES ISSUES THAT EXCEED INDIVIDUAL

         STATE NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITIES

 

     While under state control the National Guard is and

 

will continue to be the first line of defense against

 

emergencies that occur inside of a state. This capability

 

provides the individual states the time tested ability to

 

respond to natural or civil emergencies. The concern of the

 

SDWG was when the capability of a state's National Guard is

 

overwhelmed by requirements and the statutory limitation on

 

use of other National Guard or Reserve components inside of

 

that state. Under current statutes, a Guardsmen can only be

 

activated by the state which he/she is assigned, to confront

 

an emergency inside of that state's boundaries. The

 

statutes governing employment of Reserve components other

 

than the National Guard are controlled by Title 10, USC

 

672(d), Title 10, USC 673 (Partial Mobilization) or possibly

 

Title 10, USC 672(b) which allows access for up to 15 days.

 

     The governors of 19 Southern States recognizing this

 

problem developed a compact which would allow utilization of

 

National Guard soldiers/airmen across state lines to address

 

a specific crisis or emergency. A recent report by the

 

General Accounting Office recognized the value of this

 

idea after review of operations during Hurricane Andrew27.

 

     The SDWG also recommended that: (1) the Assistant

 

Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs seek clarification

 

of the ambiguity of Title 10, USC 672(b), ordering

 

reservists to active duty without their consent and (2) the

 

reserve components other than the Guard will develop plans

 

for expanded use of volunteers to meet this threat28.

 

IMPROVED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK vs. INSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS

 

   With the recent improvements in the statutory and

 

regulatory guidance, there are minimal issues

 

relating to access to the ARNG during an declared national

 

emergency. The Department of Defense has made significant

 

improvements to accessing ARNG forces by modifying statutes

 

and regulations to meet future national security needs.

 

These changes provide a significant opportunity to achieve

 

both economic and DOD wide organizational efficiencies

 

previously not possible. However, these same changes

 

present the Army with the dilemma of utilizing trained and

 

capable ARNG units as opposed to active Army units.

 

     In this time of dwindling federal budgets and military

 

force structure these regulatory improvements may not be

 

enough to achieve the intended efficiency, if they pose a

 

threat to active force structure. The use of ARNG forces in

 

a peacetime operational role, much like any other force is

 

to a certain degree an educational process. In some

 

echelons of the Army, many believe that the ARNG is not and

 

will not be capable of performing peacetime operational

 

missions. Other segments of the Army also do not understand

 

the flexibility options provided by use of ARNG forces in

 

peacetime or the alternatives provided by the combinations

 

of inactive duty training, annual training or active duty

 

for special work on a sustained rotational basis.

 

     The Army began to make progress in 1994. For the

 

first time the Army requested the unconstrained

 

requirement for Reserve component support from the

 

operational CINCs for fiscal year 199529. If the Department

 

of Defense initiative to improve ARNG utilization is to

 

succeed, those that do not understand this asset must become

 

aware of it's capabilities and limitations. A necessary

 

first-step is the integration of ARNG and Reserve components

 

on a day-to-day basis, similar to the Air Force model.

 

Possible other steps to increase ARNG integration into the

 

Total Army mission are: (1) increase the limited military

 

personnel funding available to ARNG active duty for special

 

work and increase authority to transfer funding between

 

accounts30 (Service Secretaries recently received the

 

authority to reduce the number of scheduled drill periods

 

for selected lower priority Reserve units in order to

 

increase the scheduled drills for higher priority units, by

 

up to 10 percent 31), (2) improve long range planning to

 

integrate ARNG units and individuals into recurring

 

operational requirements, (3) consider changes to allow more

 

flexibility in utilization of programmed drill and training

 

time, and (4) develop a requirements determination and

 

programming model similar to the Air Force. Legislative

 

action has also begun that would permit active duty

 

for special work tours that exceed 180 days without

 

impacting on active Army end strengths 32.

 

     Nevertheless, recent regulatory modifications provide

 

the Services, CINCs and Defense Agencies increased latitude

 

and flexibility in utilizing of ARNG forces to support

 

peacetime or regional contingency requirements. Without

 

proactive initiative to incorporate ARNG forces into

 

contingency requirements or peacetime operations, the

 

improved regulations will be ineffective.

 

     As each component is currently attempting to validate

 

force structure needs and budgeting requirements for the

 

Quadrenniel Defense Review (QDR). ARNG units operating at

 

36 percent of the annual cost of similar active Army

 

units provide the country a cost effective asset to meet

 

many national security requirements33. However, this

 

concept is often viewed as reducing the relevance of the

 

active force. To utilize ARNG units in ongoing peacetime

 

contingencies in lieu of active component units presents a

 

dangerous dilemma for the Army during this time of force

 

structure justification. This fact will restrict the use of

 

ARNG units in recurring operational requirements or

 

peacetime contingencies.

 

     Accessing the ARNG and the Reserves for peacetime

 

contingencies and operational requirements will require

 

innovation and an improved Army planning process. The need

 

to elevate active Army awareness of ARNG capabilities and

 

availability is equally important. Finally, to ensure

 

achieving efficient utilization of U.S. tax dollars and

 

"Total Army" capabilities, the cultures inside of the

 

active Army and ARNG will have to change to meet the

 

resource constrained peacetime engagement challenges of the

 

21st Century.

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House Armed Services Committee Hearing. Accessibility of

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Barry, Donald D., Whitcomb, Howard R., The Legal Foundations

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Wright, Robert K. Jr., A Brief History of the Militia and

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