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Sub-Sahara Africa, A Historical Perspective And A Look Into The Future

 

CSC 1997

 

Subject Area - History

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.   PURPOSE. In response to recent military operations conducted

in sub‑Saharan Africa, this paper highlights the difficulties

associated with implementing a coherent national security

strategy for this region of the world. From an historical

perspective key areas within this expansive issue are addressed

to illustrate the current plight facing this continent.

Potential U.S. military intervention actions are provided as a

conclusion.             ‑1

 

2.         BACKGROUND. The following areas are addressed to illustrate

the complexity of the African scenario:

 

a.   Political History. Colonialism exploited the African continent; rapid decolonization with no planned transition to free rule provided a vacuum which has been filled in many cases by corrupt and incapable governments. The end of the Cold War further contributed to this problem; the lack of bipolar financing has widened the void and additional unsavory elements are taking hold.

 

b.   Famine, Disease, Population Growth, and Economics. These problems are endemic to many regions of sub‑Sahara Africa. In most instances these are the symptoms of the political problems identified above; governments and relief organizations have tended to treat these symptoms sometimes fueling the root causes.

 

C.           U.S. Interests. Events in Africa south of the Sahara do not threaten our national security. There are however, economic and sentimental reasons for remaining engaged. The heritage of American people with their roots in Africa have a loud voice within our government, and as much as is practical, "It's the right thing to do."

 

3.   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. The future of sub‑Saharan

Africa hinges on its ability to create stable governments that

support and protect the general populous. Current boundaries do

not  necessarily support cultural/ethnic diversity and should be

open for modification by the African leadership. Afro‑pessimism

and  "Donor Fatigue" requires the advent of African solutions;

this is consistent with our NSS, and the African Crisis Response

Force is one means to that end. While the U.S. desires to work

primarily with democracies and friendly nations, because the

potential for friendly governments to easily collapse from

refugee spill‑over brought on by neighboring instability, we will

have to remain engaged with even those more hostile nations. The

U.S. military will continue to be involved in OOTW in the region.

NEOs, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and similar missions

will prevail.

 

INTRODUCTION

    On a typical evening in early October of 1993, countless Americans were unexpectedly glued to their television sets; they looked-on with horror and contempt as the savagely brutalized body of a U.S. servicemen is dragged down a nameless street in a city few had heard of a few months prior, in a country and continent even fewer had ever visited. A humanitarian mission, designed to aide those less fortunate, transitions to one of peacemaking, and ultimately, into a battle for survival and remorse for the American military and public. A flash back to Vietnam? Perhaps... A future Ambassador to Somalia, Daniel H. Simpson, will later comment:

"Although in terms of impact on our population the losses incurred in Somalia October 3, 1993, were not in the range of impact of Vietnam two decades ago, we felt real pain watching what occurred in the streets of Mogadishu."^[1]

In all, operations in Somalia cost 44 American soldiers their lives, another 175 were injured or wounded, and over $2 billion dollars were expended by the U.S. alone.^{[2] [3]} What started out as a goodwill mission, to the credit of American values, went sour in the worst way. Why? A question which many have surely asked themselves. It is probably safe to say that this operation was ended due to a lack of willingness on the part of the American public to make any such further "investment." The cost became too high a price to pay, and for what? A country too ungrateful, or maybe undeserving, or perhaps the best phrase is unprepared. The answer to this question is not in Somalia any more than it is in Rwanda or South Africa. U.S. policy in sub-Saharan Africa is a complicated issue. What are our vital interests in this region? How is our national security threatened by events there, and when should the military be used as an arm of our national policy? The purpose of this article is to explore, and encapsulate, an expansive issue for the interested reader. We will explore the history of U.S. policy; the plight of sub-Saharan Africa, past and present; and discuss potential strategies for future dealing with this region.

POLITICAL HISTORY

    Sub-Saharan Africa, like the United States some 200 years ago, is inwardly struggling to gain political stability following decades of colonial rule. Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, and Italy, to name a few, contentiously and arbitrarily carved-up the African continent, and since the last quarter of the 19th century to as late as 1993, have self-servingly supported, governed, and exploited their holdings. Decolonization and independence for these 50 odd "nation-states" in the sub-Sahara came rapidly in succession starting around 1960; this wide spread turmoil is without comparison (Table 1).

 

TABLE 1^[4]

An analogy to provide a frame of reference would be to imagine the U.S. today with no federal authority and each of its 50 states trying to form new governments independent of one another. The prospect for failure is enormous, and the issue is further complicated by reasons inherent to the African culture. The boundaries of the African "nation-states" were formed in large part by bargaining amongst and the economic/diplomatic pursuits of the European powers.^[5] These geographic constraints were imposed on an extremely social people. People who held the sociological importance of family, villages, tribe, and lineage over any form of imposed political system or state boundaries. Prior to colonization, central authority meant little in the sub-Sahara; people would simply move along or "vote with their feet" if times got bad or authority became too obtrusive.^[6] Colonization formed boundaries which grouped rival ethnic groups together and separated others.^[7] The realization or consequences of this phenomenon is on center stage today in places like Burundi (i.e., Hutu vs Tutsi), and in Somalia.

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, the Associate Editor for Foreign Affairs, forecast in 1978 the political instability discussed above

"The colonial glue which held things together for a time after Independence, both within states and at the boundaries between them is gradually dissolving. Its replacement by a new balancing of indigenous forces will be accompanied by a good deal of upheaval."^[8]

    Is the political outlook for sub-Saharan Africa grim? One would be naive to think otherwise, but progress has been made since the previous quote was published. Autocratic rule and military regimes are being replaced by elected governments, and in some cases those involving multi-party elections. Map 1 provides a snapshot of the current state of political affairs in the region.^[9] Of particular note are the number of countries which have installed elected governments since 1990. Many of these recent contests were indeed flawed and the resulting governments installed were fragile, but there are signs of hope for the future.

    The change will be gradual and neither the United States, United Nations, or African leadership can expect it to come without cost.            

FAMINE, DISEASE, POPULATION GROWTH, AND ECONOMICS

    The political instability prevalent through most of the sub-Sahara is further complicated by disease, famine, overpopulation, and generally poor economics.

The United States Mission to the United Nations in its most recent report estimated there are as many as 19.5 million individuals within the sub-Sahara in need of humanitarian aide; this regional total exceeds that for the remainder of the world.^[10] Poor health care within the region magnifies the impact of diseases like AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and meningitis; their impact on workforce productivity and the GDP is devastating. AIDS in particular is having, and will continue to have, a drastic impact on the sub-Sahara. Spread along transportation routes, within population centers, and in conflict areas, AIDS is endemic to the regions of the sub-Sahara. More than 13 million cases were confirmed in 1996 and this is expected to rise by 200-300% by the year 2015.^[11] By the year 2000 there will probably be more than 10 million AIDS related orphans.^[12] The impact of AIDS in the sub-Sahara is astronomical. In addition to creating an immense drain on financial and labor resources, the continent's already debilitated and archaic healthcare system will be paralyzed; exploited orphans, hopeless and homeless, will devastate the urban infrastructure and create an environment ripe for crime and instability. International and government relief organizations will be forced to divert their meager funds to address AIDS related issues. Likewise, the military must grapple with the complexity of working side by side with African military forces infected with the virus as well as dealing with AIDS infected casualties.

    Agriculture, which accounts for one third of the GDP, two thirds of the employment, and 40% of the regions export value, has been crippled by political actions and environmental conditions. Recent droughts, especially in the Horn of Africa, have caused wide spread famine which has plagued world relief organizations. Additionally, at the expense and neglect of rural economies, governments have tended to pursue economic policies designed to maintain high urban wages and living conditions.^[13] These governmental policies have led to the neglect of trafficable roads and railroads required to move agricultural commodities and create a viable market. Because there is no incentive to do more than subsistence farming, farmers routinely produce only enough for their own survival and yields consistently fall short of the lands true potential. In Zaire for example, only 3% of the arable land was cultivated in 1996. Who is attempting to make-up the difference?^[14] Of course, world relief organizations misguidingly supply food instead of addressing the true causes of these problems.

    The impact of these humanitarian issues is further compounded by, and directly impacting on, the size and median age of the African population. Despite disease and famine the population is growing by 2-3% annually, the highest in the world, and is expected to double in 25 years. The median age is plummeting; one half of the population is 15 years or younger.^[15] The combination of these two factors is adversely effecting the ratio between those producing resources, (the size of the available workforce is decreasing), and those consuming resources, (the number of mouths are increasing). An already desperate economic situation is predicted to worsen.

    The chronic nature of these problems has led to "Donor Fatigue" and "Afro-pessimism." The United Nations has seen a consistent decline in nations responding to assistance appeals.^[16] President Clinton himself, in his most recent State of the Union address, specifically addressed the United States' obligation to repay its debt to the World Bank and the United Nations. He emphasized that a lack of U.S. resolve can, and will, impact on the dedication of other nations/organizations in their endeavors to pursue world troubles, such as those associated with the African relief effort.   

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE SUB-SAHARA

    So what are, or have been, the United States interests in this region torn by economic, political, and humanitarian strife.       U.S. security concerns in colonial Africa were minimal to nonexistent. Colonial rule by the European nations posed no threat and provided an adequate environment for our political, diplomatic, and economic agendas. Following decolonization however, and an increased Soviet/Cuban interest in the region, a more viable and direct threat to our nation was acknowledged. This threat was both continental and maritime. Similar to our interests in Asia, the U.S. acted to blunt the spread of communist influence on the Sub-Saharan continent. This bipolar competition was conducted both overtly and covertly; the US supporting the ruling party, while the Soviets a rival insurgent movement, or the opposite as the case may be. Ambassador Simpson, recalls this policy as being "tragicomic," and for illustration provides the following example:^[17]

For years, Cuban troops on behalf of an African Marxist government guarded American oil production installations in Angola. Angolan oil was subsequently exported to the U.S., so both U.S. companies and the Marxist government made money. The Angolan government paid for Soviet and Cuban forces, (with American oil revenues), to fight the pro-Western guerrilla movement UNITA, which was being funded in part by the U.S..

The maritime security interest involved maintaining open Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) between North America, Western Europe, and the Persian Gulf region. The ability of the Soviets to interdict or control these SLOCs was perceived to be of vital interest to our economic well-being and as a threat to the mobility of our military should there be a conflict. The principle threat to U.S. national security was seen as any major Soviet presence in the bulge of Western Africa, the Cape, or the Horn of Africa.^[18] This era facilitated arms buildup, and the formation of armies in the sub-Sahara far in excess of requirements.

    So what are our current interests in the sub-Sahara? The Soviet Union has dissolved; its presence and influence no longer threaten our security within the region. There are no military forces within the sub-Sahara that pose any significant threat to our survival or well-being as a nation.        

    To evaluate our current policy toward the sub-Sahara it "may" prove beneficial to first define some terms and look at the basic tenants of our National Security Strategy (NSS). According to the NSS there are three types of interests, which if threatened, could result in the employment of military forces:^[19]

vital interests - those involving the survival, security, and vitality of our nation.

important interests - those not effecting our survival but important to our well-being and the character of the world in which we live.

humanitarian interest - while the military is not the best solution, its unique capabilities can be brought to bear to address humanitarian concerns.

We additionally seek engagement in world affairs and the ENLARGEMENT of the democratic community to: protect our interests, promote our values/ideals, and provide for our security. Needless to say, the NSS is inexplicit in its description of the parameters for possible employment of military forces, and while this intentional vagueness provides our government sufficient leeway in which to operate, it makes it extremely difficult to select among alternatives when resources are limited. It is readily accepted that there are no vital interests for the U.S. in sub-Saharan Africa^[20]; our survival, vitality, and security are not threatened by events in this region. It is equally apparent that we cannot feed every child, resolve every conflict, and stabilize every government in an attempt to address our important and humanitarian interests. Even Huntington in his description of future clashes between "civilizations" appears skeptical in terms of an African civilization emerging on the world stage. He confidently lists and discusses the importance of seven culturally distinct groups, (i.e., Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, and Latin American), but notes, "possibly an African civilization," and provides little mention of Africa south of the Sahara.^[21]

    We will continue however to be actively engaged in sub-Saharan Africa for three reasons: "heritage", a large portion of our population have their roots in Africa and a loud voice in the formation of our national policy decisions; "economics", both current, and potential, financial gain; and the "sentimental" aspect of the American people, "It's the right thing to do."^[22]

    Economics provides a very pragmatic rationale, and some may argue our principle reason, for remaining engaged with the sub-Saharan. Today we import a considerable amount of oil from Nigeria and Angola, and with 25 billion barrels of proven oil reserves these two countries alone will become more strategically important as time passes. To complement the vast mineral resource base of the continent, the 500 million people of the sub-Sahara present enormous potential as a future consumer market for U.S. exports.^[23] Understandably however, financial engagement requires a certain degree of political and financial stability. U.S. investors, entrepreneurs, and banking institutions will be extremely hesitant to become involved in countries that may implode or, as a result of external pressure, degenerate without warning. Political stability within this continent must become more extensive and far less fragile if our economic endeavors are to have any remote chance for success.

    So what should our policy be in this regard. Dr. Geoffery Kemp, Associate Professor on International, Policy at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, states:

"In a word, a pragmatic policy is called for, one that signals American concerns for projects, policies, and countries according to their ability and willingness to produce results ... Such a policy will be useful .. in showing recipients and observers alike that aid and assistance go with independence and self-reliance, not with dependence and clients."^[24]

Many would side with Dr. Kemp; it seems only practical to provide aide and assistance exclusively to those "nation-states" that have demonstrated a willingness to institute fair, viable governing and monetary practices. Others argue that this has been attempted in the past with little success. Attaching economic and political criteria to aide requires: establishing sound and measurable criteria that be evaluated to judge sincere performance; actually monitoring each country's progress toward meeting this criteria; and a willingness to withhold aide in the event standards are not achieved. A difficult process unless the criteria is easily measured and the number of requirements kept to a bare minimum.^[25] With the exception of funds subsequently allocated for crisis management, U.S. funds appropriated for specific countries is distributed to most every Sub-Saharan nation in slightly different amounts. Those countries hostile to the U.S. or in complete disarray receive nothing, (e.g., Sudan, Zaire, Nigeria, and Somalia).^[26]

  Heritage and sentimental motivators on the other hand are very idealistic in nature; personal and public opinion weigh heavily on the extent of U.S. involvement and especially those decisions involving the use of the military as an arm of national policy. What rationale influenced President George Bush in his decision to commit U.S. troops to Somalia? Was he primarily influenced by such things as U.S. vital interests, national security, and the Weinberger Doctrine, or instead, did he react from the heart? It is hard to imagine him not being effected by the recurring and always graphic portrayals of countless women and children suffering and dying from disease and starvation. Perhaps like so many other caring Americans he felt compelled or obliged to act, and as the LEADER of the world's undisputed super power, President Bush possessed the capability to make a difference for those nameless faces who would collapse and die in the sub-Sahara. The likelihood of the U.S. reacting similarly to an African crisis in the near future is doubtful.

 

 

    Despite our accomplishments in maintaining the peace in Eastern Europe, there are numerous reasons to explain away our unwillingness to become reengaged in a similar turmoil in the sub-Sahara. The primary of these being, Frustration. Frustration with the African "leadership", and frustration with a lack of appreciation for past efforts (e.g., relief workers killed and brutalized). This growing apathy, Afro-Pessimism/ Donor Fatigue, as mentioned previously, is not felt solely within the American public. The international community is losing interest as well. The majority of experts on the subject agree, this is an African problem that needs to be solved primarily by the Africans. Where must they go, and how can the U.S. and its military be of assistance?

THE FUTURE OF THE SUB-SAHARA

    First and foremost, African leadership must come to grips with the obstacles in maintaining the current geographic divisions. This is summarized effectively by Michael Chiege, as follows:^[27]

Where a people's allegiance to their own ethnic group supersedes that given to the state, it is time to let them secede of fuse with another state. For what does a country benefit if it secures its own boundaries yet suffers perennial bloodshed among its own people. Like those of Europe, African leaders must accept that fission and fusion of national borders is a political and historical inevitability.

The deep rooted clashes between tribal factions and ethnic groups must be resolved with the objective of creating governments formed to support and protect the African people. The African community must additionally assume the primary role in its own peacekeeping and conflict resolution.

The U.S. has initiated a concept to assist Africa in this endeavor. The African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), composed of African military forces operating under the aegis of the United Nations and in coordination with the Organization for African Unity, would be capable of providing a more rapid and effective response to crisis on the African continent. There are two parts to this equation. First, African forces capable of such operations, and secondly, donor nations willing to fund the stand-up expenses and recurring costs associated with maintaining such a force. An initial group of African military forces has already been selected "based on a demonstrated willingness and capability to engage effectively in peace operations, (e.g., Uganda, Ethiopia, and Senegal)." Preexistence of these demonstrated capabilities is crucial to reducing the stand-up costs of the ACRF; principally expenditures will go to the purchase of equipment, and associated training, required to facilitate inter-operability between the military's of participating nations. Response among prospective donor nations has been cautious, but positive; the U.S. continues to sell other nations on the potential of the ACRF.^[28] Will the ACRF come into being, and if so, will it be effective? While no one can answer these questions with any degree of certainty, this initiative goes a long way in placing the burden for internal crisis management on those most greatly effected. One can only hope it contributes to a better future.

    So what will the U.S. military's role be in the future of sub-Saharan Africa? The NSS of Engagement and Enlargement identifies Africa as being "one of our greatest challenges and opportunities to enlarge the community of market democracies."^[29] For this reason, the military, as well as the other means of U.S. strategy, will remain engaged in sub-Saharan Africa. It is unlikely however that U.S. military involvement will move outside the arena of Operations Other Than War, (OOTW). The problems in Africa principally require diplomatic, political, and economic solutions, and correspondingly, the military will play a secondary role in these efforts. However, should the security of the U.S. be threatened by forces or governments operating within the region this could change.

The U.S. military will conduct preventative "engagement operations." A forward presence will be maintained, and units will participate in multi-national operations to demonstrate U.S. resolve. The U.S. military will continue to be involved in the International Military Education program, (IMET). Through formal and on-the-job training IMET strives to encourage effective relationships with African nations, improve the civil/military functioning of these nations, and improve the effectiveness of these forces in dealing appropriately with internal instability. In 1996 the U.S. expended 6.5 million dollars and provided formal training for approximately one thousand individuals in the sub-Sahara.^[30] Training and education are key to the long term stability of the region; the U.S. military will be required to play its part in training the African military forces.

The U.S. military will react to crisis in the sub-Sahara; the fragility of African governments if they collapse and anarchy begins will surely necessitate future Noncombatant Evacuation Operations to safeguard Americans. What about humanitarian missions? The unique aspect of the sub-Sahara is nations rarely fight amongst one another. This on the surface would seem to simplify U.S. actions and policies; support democracies and those friendly to the U.S., and work peripherally to move others in that direction. The problem is refugees. Map 2 depicts the sub-Saharan movement of refugees in 1995 as a result of conflict.^[31] We in the United States exacerbate over the movement of illegal aliens across our borders, but in contrast, our economy and government are far more capable of assimilating these individuals. The fragile African economies and governments are often incapable of handling the problem. Consequently, the U.S. military must be prepared to render assistance to democratic governments threatened by unstable neighbors. So did Somalia signal the end to U.S. involvement in such operations? No. We will again find ourselves in Africa stemming violence and suffering, especially when such events threaten stable governments. Hopefully though, the U.S. military, political bodies, and American public have learned from the Somalia experience, and apply those lessons in the future.

 

CONCLUSION

As a nation we cannot afford to disengage ourselves from the African sub-Sahara, or lose patience with the relatively long period of time required for stability to grab hold of this region. Within our means we must continue to protect those who cannot protect themselves. The Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, with the following comments, effectively illustrates America's own difficulties in forming our democracy:^[32]

"American's own experience should make us patient, persistent, and respectful with those that are in the early stages of transition from colonialism and autocracy. After the United States became a "new independent state" in 1776, it took 11 years to draft a constitution, 89 to abolish slavery, 144 to give women the vote, 188 to extend full constitutional protection to all citizens.  And four score and seven years along the way, we were in the midst of a civil war."

The U.S. military must be prepared to evacuate American citizens in the more unstable countries, assistant in the development of African forces that are capable of dealing professionally with African problems, and in the event that the political leadership so directs, participate in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and other military operations.

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