Military

 

 

PREFACE

 

Within the framework of the post Cold War geopolitical scenario, and with further reduction to defense expenditures, the Italian armed forces will establish an amphibious operational arm with greater capability than the existing one. Thus, a joint Army-Navy marine amphibious brigade will be formed. Later, cooperation with the Spanish amphibious forces will commence.

The most likely employment of such force will be in humanitarian and other military operations other than war, such as the one that will soon be established in Albania. In fact, to face the recent crisis in Albania, the United Nations Security Council in March 1997 authorized the creation of a multinational military force under European auspices to intervene in the strife-torn nation and to protect the distribution of humanitarian aid to victims of the anarchy sweeping Albania. The force will rely on troops from southern European countries, led by Italy.^[1]

The author focused this MMS on the Joint Amphibious Brigade, particularly on its general configuration, and those considered critical requirements to the formation the of JAB. He has not focused, in detail, on such important issues such as air combat element, artillery, engineer combat support, which could be treated in future detailed studies. This is partially due to the lack of published works dedicated, or even related specifically, to either the expansion of the Italian amphibious force, or the cooperation with the Spanish amphibious forces.

For possible historical precedents from which lessons could be learned, the author has concentrated particularly on two joint experiences in the amphibious history: the British 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines, and the U.S. Army-Marine Corps cooperation in World War II. The paper has been deliberately written at the unclassified level.

CONTENTS

   

                                                                                                                                     Page

Preface..............................................................................................................................ii

 

Map.................................................................................................................................. 45

 

Chapter

  

1.   Introduction                                                                                                                 1

The Italian Defense Model.

Scope and Methodology of Research.

 

2. The Breakdown of Order.......................................................................................... 5 Chaos in the Littorals.

   The Mediterranean.

   Italy's National Areas of Interests.

   NATO's Role in Peacekeeping. International                                                             Initiatives in

   Mediterranean: Italian Contribution.

 

   3. The Previous Experiences                                                                                        13    

   General.

   3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines Cooperation.

   29 Commando Light Regiment, Royal Artillery.

   59 Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers.

   Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines.

   Training.

   U.S. Army-Marine Corps Experience.

   Amphibious Warfare in World War II.

   Conclusion

 

   4. The Joint Amphibious Brigade's Configuration...................................................24

   Pure Amphibious Brigade.

   Ground Oriented Brigade.

   Unit's Configuration: The Pure Amphibious Brigade.

   JAB's Formation Factors.

 

   5. Critical Requirements..............................................................................................27

   Training, Formation, and Doctrine.

   Weapons, Logistics, and Materials.

   Infrastructures.

   Command and Control.

   Conclusion.

 

   6. Critical Points............................................................................................................31

   Joint Helicopter's Group.

   Amphibious Shipborne Sea-lift Capability.

 

   7. Conclusion/Recommendations................................................................................ 42

 

   Appendixes....................................................................................................................42

 

   Bibliography..................................................................................................................56

 

 

 

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Italian Defense Model

            The world's geopolitical scenario has been characterized by rapid change, with associated uncertainty and instability as two of the prevailing elements. Traditional tasks assigned to military forces have extended wherever new risks to international security appear. The role of multinational organizations has gained in importance and is now widely recognized.

            These and other important elements led to the drafting by the Italian Defense General Staff (IDGS) of a policy paper titled The Defense Model (DM). It was then presented by the Minister of Defense to Parliament. As the Minister stated in a later interview:

Our goal is to achieve an integrated force structure which is technologically advanced and capable of external projection, in order to respond to new threats to international security and stability.^[2]

            The DM outlines a defense posture which calls for a reduced in number, high quality military forces capable of safeguarding Italian national security and the nation's interests wherever required, and to foster international order and stability in close association with the nation's allies.

            Within this framework, Italian naval forces (maritime-amphibious) will be called upon to support three principal strategic functions:^[3]

            x Peacetime presence and surveillance in areas of strategic interest.

            x Protection of national interests and contribution to international security in periods of tension and crisis.

            x Integrated defense of national/allied territory in case of direct aggression.

            These functions are also based on direct experience gained during the last two decades real-world employment of Italian military and naval forces. Examples are the Lebanon crisis of 1982, two Arabian Gulf crises, three peace-keeping operations in Somalia, naval embargo operations in the Adriatic, the Implementation Force (IFOR)/Supporting Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, and the evacuation of nationals from Rwanda and Albania.

            The needs for upgrading the national amphibious force is receiving renewed attention and priority.^[4] The San Marco battalion, which is based in Brindisi (see APPENDIX A), is the Italian navy's amphibious unit. Its landing operational group, until recently 300 strong, now numbers about 900 men. The marines who form part of the landing teams are long-term draftees who volunteer for service periods of two or three years (normally, service is for 12 months). They are well-trained professional troops who, although limited in numbers, have proved themselves in the international arena.^[5] The Navy has recently established a helicopter detachment specifically fitted for supporting amphibious troops, improved its aircraft carrier's communication fit for amphibious operations, and is envisaging a greater amphibious capability with Command and Control and airlift via a second carrier. However, the Italian defense program intends to move further. Staff work is in progress with the Army to create a light Joint Amphibious Brigade (JAB) based on the existing Navy marine regiment.^[6]

 

            Scope and Methodology of Research

            The purpose of this MMS is to provide a rationale for the expansion of the Italian amphibious force, specifically with regard to the formation of the light joint Army-Navy marine amphibious brigade. From this thesis, several key questions arise:

(1)  Why is the existing Italian amphibious force to expand?

(2)  What will be the most effective JAB's configuration?

(3)  Are there any examples in other countries' amphibious forces which the Italian armed forces can draw upon when configuring the new force?

            To achieve the objective of this MMS, search of available literature related to this topic has been conducted, and a series of interviews with officers who have previous experiences in Britain's 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines; the US Marine Corps; and U.S. Army. The initial search has been focused on books, articles, and Defense Technical Information Center (DITC) assets available at or through the Marine Corps University's Research Center. From this research, a suggestion for the most appropriate general configuration of the amphibious force is given. Conclusions and recommendations then follow. It is noted that all sources used in this paper are unclassified, hence this paper is unclassified.

 

 

CHAPTER 2

THE BREAKDOWN OF ORDER

 

            Chaos in the Littorals

            At the NATO Ministerial meeting of the Council in Athens in June 1993, and again at the January 1994 summit in Brussels, Alliance leaders reiterated their conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean.^[7] Hence, as a Mediterranean country, Italy in the future is likely to face a number of very different risks to her security and interests.^[8] Many of these risks will be associated with the littorals.

            Littorals are defined in the U.S. Marine Corps doctrinal document Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) as "those areas characterized by great cities, well-populated coasts, and the intersections of trade routes."^[9] While representing a relatively small portion of the world's surface, littorals provide homes to over three-quarters of the world's population, locations for over 80 percent of the world's capital cities, and nearly all the marketplaces for international trade.^[10] Thus, littorals are also the places where most of the world's important conflicts are likely to occur.^[11]

            Also, with the end of the Cold War, governments are losing their monopoly on organized violence. The result, as seen in Somalia, Lebanon, and Los Angeles, will be chaotic, non-war situations in which ethnic groups, gangs, and other nonstate actors wage conflict or war of various types against various foes.^[12] Armed forces have recently been tasked to face these situations by conducting Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW focuses on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises.^[13] On past experience, MOOTW will probably be conducted by coalitions of multinational naval forces, but not necessarily all the time. There may be need for a state to act unilaterally, or as the dominant force in a coalition of two or more countries.^[14]

            Naval forces, with their characteristics of flexibility and responsiveness, are the most appropriate to face the new range of risks from overcoming devastated infrastructure to assisting friendly people in need of disaster relief to countering other armed threats.^[15] For a country like Italy, extended into the Mediterranean and dependent for her survivability on the maritime trades, her naval-amphibious force has a natural priority.

 

 

            The Mediterranean

            The Mediterranean constitutes a relevant economic and geo-political entity. It is a junction and bridge among three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. A complete evaluation of the strategic importance of this maritime area, however, should also take into account the Red Sea, the Arabian Gulf, and their surrounding countries. Thus, the Middle East is included.^[16]

            The Mediterranean is intersected by the Italian Peninsula, which reduces it at its narrowest to a passage approximately 80 miles wide near Sicily. This constricted passage divides that 2,500 mile sea into almost two parts. Although these dimensions are relatively small compared with other sea areas of preeminent strategic importance in the world, this maritime area is known to exert a great influence on global political, economic and military relations.

            From a political point of view, the importance of the Mediterranean is essentially based on the number of nations which border it: more than 300 million people belonging to 18 nationalities, with many different ethnic, historical, and religious heritage, and quite often with divergent economic and cultural interests. This situation embraces many potentials conflicting factors; its main features are instability and an uncertain dynamism of events and they call for a constant and flexible political and military commitment.

            The economic importance extends well beyond the trade flow amongst bordering countries. It is in fact primarily linked to the traffic of goods and raw materials bound to western nations (but also for the former USSR, Bulgaria, and Romania in the Black Sea), most of which passes through this sea. While about 75% of Italian imports and about 60% of exports cross the Mediterranean,^[17] the average daily presence of merchant vessels in it numbers 2,500. This makes the Mediterranean not only a vital area for Italy and for the other bordering countries, but also an extremely important sea line of communication for the whole world.

 

            Italy's National Areas of Interests

            Italy's national interests are extended well beyond its traditional regional geopolitical areas. Their management requires close linkage between defense, foreign, and economic policies. The Mediterranean is the centerpiece of the Italian strategic scenario, but national interests are encompassed in the so called "enlarged Mediterranean", a vast area extended beyond the traditional borders of the former mare nostrum.^[18] Notwithstanding the broader European perspective, Italy's interests are projected along two major maritime directions. The first is eastbound, through the Adriatic Sea, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucases, while the second is southbound, consisting of the North African littoral, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf.^[19]

 

 

            NATO's Role in Peacekeeping.

            The Alliance's strategic concept adopted at the Rome summit^[20] in November 1991 recognized that the potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts. NATO heads of state and government announced that to this end they would support the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and its institutions. They also recognized that other bodies, including the European Community and the Western European Union could have important roles to play.^[21]

            The political basis for the Alliance's role in peacekeeping in support of the CSCE was formalized at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway, in June 1992. There, NATO Foreign Ministers announced their readiness to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE. This included making available Alliance resources and expertise for peacekeeping operations.^[22]

 

            International Initiatives in the Mediterranean: Italian Contribution

            Recent international events have demonstrated that western nations are daily called to win or maintain the peace. Hence, at the military level, Europe needs military forces with extremely high levels of flexibility and mobility. This includes a relevant maritime component to ensure operational effectiveness and power-projection capabilities. Amphibious forces may be one of the instruments at the disposal of European countries when they confront a chaotic scenario, conduct a dissuasive or deterrent action, or proceed directly toward an intervention. These forces have a unique persuasive value in a crisis. They provide political authorities with a menu of suitable responses, without violating national boundaries. They can be intrusive or out of sight, threatening or non-threatening, easily dispatched but just as easily withdrawn.^[23]

            Furthermore, frequent commitments of military forces have been required in the Mediterranean to ensure order, security, and international legitimacy. As seen in Bosnia and Albania, the southern basin is already very turbulent and the areas of crisis are multiplying.

            The growing importance of amphibious forces in the Mediterranean is a reality.

            As a result, Italy, Spain, France, and lately Portugal, have developed a quadripartite initiative called EUROMARFOR.^[24] It will contribute to the development of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), especially in the Mediterranean Region,^[25] while NATO has recently activated the Combined Amphibious Force for the Mediterranean (CAFMED).^[26]

            Within the structure of a balanced Navy (see APPENDIX B), the Italian amphibious force for decades had been undersized with respect to its commitments. With less than three hundred men in the landing team, the San Marco Battalion was able to conduct a limited amphibious raid, but little else. Recently, the situation has changed. According to the global scenario envisioned in the DM, the Italian Navy has already started a reorganization of its manpower. The basic concept has been a force reduction (from 49,000 personnel in 1988 to 43,000 in 1994, with a final strength figure of 40,000 personnel in 1999-2000), coupled with a marked increase in proficiency required by the Navy to deal with new missions. These new tasking can range from crisis management and peacekeeping operations, to humanitarian assistance and related activities. The final goal is a more flexible and capable structure in which people are required to reach higher levels of professionalism.

            In this context of general reduction, the amphibious force has been the only growing component in the Italian military. "Our goal is to increase the landing component to 900 men."^[27] This would mean an overall strength of 1,600 to 1,700 men for the San Marco Battalion, taking into account the training and logistic component. However, even with a full-strength landing battalion, the Italian amphibious component would have limited capabilities to face all the risks associated with the littorals and the role the nation has to play in the European security.

            This is why Italian defense policy will approach the problem in a joint way. Discussions are under way with the Italian Army to build jointly an amphibious brigade. The Italian Ministry of Defense is thinking in terms of a light brigade of about 3,000 men, a target that, due to the actual general reduction, would not be realistic for the Navy itself but could be reached together with the Army.^[28] The JAB will allow the nation to meet the requirements of the increasingly frequent out-of-area missions, and to participate fully in the European security structure. With the establishment of this organization, is there experience from other nations from which Italy can learn?

 

 

CHAPTER 3

PREVIOUS experiencES

 

            General

            For the purpose of this MMS paper, two joint Army-Marines experiences have been studied. The first is that represented by the British Army-Royal Marines relationship within 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. The second is related to the U.S. Army-Marine Corps amphibious cooperation during World War II.

            These examples have been carefully selected with regard to the role played by the Army component in each of these experiences, and other issues associated with such cooperations. Within 3 Commando Brigade, the British Army provides the unit with combat service support and fire support. The American experience has been different: the Army has provided the amphibious force with combat service support and fire support, but also as appropriate it has conducted amphibious assaults itself, both as part of a joint Navy-Marine Corps-Army force, and independent of an association with the Marine Corps, i.e., Europe and North Africa in World War II.

 

 

 

3 Commando Brigade. BRITISH Army-ROYAL Marines Cooperation

            The Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade and British amphibious operations are supported by two significant attached elements from the British Army. Because of its size, the Corps cannot provide adequate manpower nor funding for artillery support and the many roles of combat engineers. To cover this, the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers have specialist units dedicated to the Commando Forces order of battle.^[29] These combat support units provide 3 Commando Brigade with additional combat capability, which can be deployed to tie down or fix enemy forces while the Commando Units maneuver to strike them.

Logistic support, on the other hand, is provided by a dedicated joint logistic unit composed of both Royal Marines and British Army personnel.

 

            29 Commando Light Regiment, Royal Artillery

            British Army support for the Royal Marines includes a commando-trained artillery regiment which was the successor to a distinguished unit of Second World War fame.^[30] During the post-War reorganization of the British military, 25 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, was redesigned 29 Field Regiment for service in such trouble spots as Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus, before being based permanently at Plymouth's Royal Citadel.

            Since 1961, when the then War Office agreed to a request to provide supporting artillery for the Royal Marines Commandos, this Regiment has been closely associated with the Corps. After 29 Regiment was selected for the commando-support task, it was regrouped into detached batteries for actions in Kuwait and Aden.

            Commando training followed during January and February 1962 and the coveted green berets were presented by the then Commandant General Royal Marines in May 1962. When conflict with rebels in Brunei and then Indonesia broke out, a battery was flown to Brunei to support commando operations with its 105mm pack howitzers; this was the first time that the Regiment had used its guns in anger in support of the Royal Marines. Later, elements of 29 Commando Regiment RA, were to support parachute regiment operations in Bahrain and Aden, the Royal Marines in Hong Kong, Sarawak and Malaya, and in the Falklands during the South Atlantic War in 1981.^[31]   

            Today, 29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery, directly supports the force with three batteries of 105mm light guns. Each battery has six guns and reinforces each of the three Commando Units (40, 42, 45 Commandos). A further six guns are available from a Territorial Army Commando Battery.^[32]

            Also, part of 29 Regiment is 148 (Meiktila) Cdo Forward Observation Post Battery, whose role is to direct Naval Gunfire Support (NGS). The battery co-operates in this work with various other operational arms, including the Special Boat Squadron. This is necessary because much of the battery's work would be behind enemy lines.

            Each of the operational gun batteries is equipped with six Royal Ordnance 105mm light guns, each with towing tractor, usually a 1 1/2 tonnes Land Rover, and other support vehicles. Each battery's equipment is air transportable by Sea King HC-4 helicopter, as an underslung load.^[33]

            Naval Gunfire Forward Observation (NGFO) spotting teams consist of an officer, a bombardier, a lance bombardier, a naval communications rating, and a driver/operator. To fulfill the various optical functions required, the team is trained in small boat insertion, and parachuting. In addition, for Advance Force Operations (behind enemy lines), two parties are diver trained to enable them to be inserted by submarine or other craft for covert operations alongside the Special Boat Squadron.

            Every man in the 148 Cdo FO Bty has to be Commando and parachute trained, and must pass the pre-parachute selection course. Every officer is a qualified Forward Air Controller, and every soldier has successfully completed a 12-week Naval Gunfire Assistants (Basic) course which introduces him to all aspects of NGS. This includes the use of Morse code and other communications techniques.^[34] After the basic course, soldiers are selected for the advanced course which includes completing the Signals Advanced course at the Royal School of Artillery, Larkhill. Naturally every officer and soldier is physically fit and training is undertaken every day.

            Teams are deployed away from the base of 148 Commando Forward Battery at RM Poole (Dorset) on a regular basis, including the work-up of the Caribbean Guardship in NGS when the hand-over is completed between the respective ships at Belize. Work is also undertaken with the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (a multi-national NATO force) in Norway and Turkey.^[35]

 

            59 Independent Commando Squadron, Royal Engineers

            Formed as 59 Field Company in 1900, 59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers, provides engineer support for 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines. It is responsible for all engineer work within the brigade area. In Royal Marines and Commando Forces terms, this work includes booby-traps, mine laying and clearance, route maintenance and denial, bridging, rafting, water supply, snow clearance and support to 29 Commando Light Regiment Royal Artillery.^[36] The squadron is also responsible for setting up bulk fuel installations as part of the Beach Support Area (BSA); for this purpose, as well as for the reconnaissance of beaches, the squadron maintains a full diving team. Included in the Squadron strength of nine officers and 253 soldiers there is a workshop from the former Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME, now part of the Royal Logistic Corps, RLC).

            The Squadron has a history of support to Commando Forces. This includes the period 1968-71, when as 59 Field Squadron RE, it was based in Singapore.^[37] The Squadron reformed at Plymouth in April 1971 and became an integral part of the Royal Marines Commando Forces. During the Falklands conflict, the Squadron provided engineer support to all Commando units. In so doing, it fought in every major battle.^[38]

            59 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers consists of a headquarters, three field troops, a reconnaissance troop and a support troop - the field troops providing combat engineer support. Mobility tasks include bridge building, route clearing, minefield clearance, and the preparation of beach landing sites. Counter-mobility tasks consist of the building of obstacles, the demolition of roads and bridges, and the laying of minefields to channel the enemy. Survivability tasks include assisting in the preparation of field defenses and fortifications.

            Reconnaissance Troop of 59 Commando Squadron is trained to operate forward with the Brigade Patrol Troop (BPT). It may deploy with them in the pre-assault phase of an operation. The troop is trained in all BPT insertion methods, including parachuting.^[39]

            The Support Troop controls the Squadron's vehicles and the plant machinery, used in survivability tasks, and the boats and divers, who carry out underwater engineering tasks. These include welding and demolitions.

            131 Independent Commando Squadron Royal Engineers, a Territorial Army squadron, is responsible for general engineer support in the Brigade rear area. Its tasks include the provision of drinking water, the establishment of the bulk fuel installation, construction of field ablutions, and reinforcement of the close support squadron where necessary.

            Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines

            3 Commando Brigade has a dedicated logistic unit which provides all second line Combat Service Support to the force, supporting it with a constant re-supply chain from the initial assault through to the final phase of the operation.^[40] It is unique in that its source of stores for the initial 60 days of operations is generated from amphibious ships offshore; this allows it to operate as a totally self-sufficient force, without requirement for a major airlifted re-supply. This forms, in effect, the formation's own limited third line support.^[41]

            The Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines, is Britain's sole amphibious logistic unit. It has demonstrated its operational role in combat re-supply during the Falklands War and in Northern Iraq on Operation HAVEN. The unit is based on five squadrons which provide specialist support to the Brigade. The Regiment is manned by 700 personnel drawn from the Royal Marines, the Army, and the Royal Navy.^[42] The command of the unit alternates between British Army and Royal Marines. Its primary task of ensuring the resupply of combat supplies (ammunition, water, fuel and food) to forces on the ground is enhanced by its ability to provide specialist services to sustain the Brigade's operations.^[43] In addition, the Commando Logistic Regiment can integrate its procedures with the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and execute a coordinated logistic plan with 3 (UK) Division (British Army), when operating with it.

            Formed in 1971, today's Commando Logistic Regiment can deploy specifically-configured Logistic Task Groups (LTGs) to support any sized force from a company group to a full brigade anywhere in the world.^[44] The Regiment is required to provide responsive support to the assault units from a sea base or, if necessary, develop a shore base for subsequent operations.

 

            Training

            The United Kingdom Secretary of Defense, in the White Paper on the lessons of the Falklands, identified the most important factor in the British task force as the "skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual servicemen."^[45] In the Royal Marines, all officers and men, from pilots through vehicle mechanics and signalers to swimmers canoeists, are all trained as infantrymen at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, at Lympstone. This demanding course is 30 weeks for recruits and 15 months for young officers, including the Commando Course.^[46] Furthermore, Royal Navy and Army officers and men assigned to 3 Commando Brigade must complete the Commando Course to earn the Green Beret, that they wear while serving with 3 Commando Brigade RM.^[47]

            3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines is a joint force in nature. The fundamental aspects of its jointness are the training of personnel and the colocation/integration of the Brigade HQ in Plymouth alongside the HQ of the Navy's Commodore Amphibious Warfare. A common standard of training produces a standard ethos, which binds the formation and promotes professionalism and high morale. The colocation and integration of the Brigade HQ in Plymouth, of British Army, Royal Navy and Air Force personnel, provide the Force with an integrated command and control organization that reflects the jointness inherent in the Force itself.

 

The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Experience

            These two Services have fought in conjunction in numerous campaigns around the globe. This associate pre dates First World War, hence Marines and Army personnel served together in the Second Seminole War, the Boxer Rebellion in China, and the Philippines Insurrection, and then through World Wars I and II, the Korean War, Vietnam, and then in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Arabian Gulf. This cooperation, though, has not been limited to fighting alongside each other in land operations ashore.^[48] It has also extended to the conduct of amphibious operations.^[49] This emphasizes the importance of two aspects that played a fundamental role in the successful cooperation in such operations: amphibious doctrine and amphibious training.

            Army units have constituted the planned follow-on forces since the development of the Marine Corps amphibious warfare doctrine in the 1930s. In fact, the 1947 National Security Act that established the Department of Defense with four separate Services also set into law the amphibious nature of the Marine Corps and designation of Army forces as the follow-on forces in amphibious campaigns. It specifically noted that the Marine Corps was assigned "primary interest in the development of those landing force doctrine, tactics and equipment...of common interest to the Army and Marine Corps."^[50]

            The Army does have significant historical experience in conducting both unilateral and joint amphibious operations with and without the Marine Corps. Amphibious operations in the European theater were conducted solely by the U.S. Army, who received the benefit the Marine Corps development of amphibious doctrine in 1930, of early training with the Corps, and experience derived form the Marine Corps' (and Army's) experiences in assaulting heavily defended beachheads in the Pacific theater.^[51]

            Amphibious Warfare in World War II

            Numerically, the majority of the Army's amphibious operations were conducted in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. The SWPA's Marine Corps forces, the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, participated in several joint Army-Marine Corps amphibious assaults in SWPA's portion of the Solomon Island campaign until they were transferred to Adm. Chester Nimitz' Central Pacific Area (CPA). The 2nd Marine Division fought at Guadalcanal, but was primarily in the Central Pacific in 1943 and 1944.

            In Adm. Nimitz' Central Pacific Area (CPA), Marine Corps forces were the predominant ground forces. However, in every one of the Marine Corps' most celebrated CPA campaigns the Army provided ground combat, combat support, and combat service support elements which performed a variety of roles in fighting alongside and supporting the Marine Corps (and sometime Army) assault forces.

            On Guadalcanal, the Army's 164th Infantry Regiment served under 1st Marine Division command during the darkest hours at Henderson Field.^[52] Later, the Americal Division and 25th Infantry Division assumed the operations ashore when Marines were withdrawn from the island to prepare for future operations, and provide General McArthur with a division having amphibious training.^[53]

            In 1943, the Central Pacific drive commenced. In Operation GALVANIC, the 2d Marine Division assaulted Betio Island in the Tarawa Atoll,^[54] while a regimental combat team from the Army's 27th Infantry Division conducted a simultaneous supporting amphibious invasion of Makin Island of the atoll.^[55] In the Marshall Islands, Kwajalein Atoll^[56] was seized by a joint amphibious assault by the 4th Marine Division and Army 7th Division, while the elements of the 22d Marines and the Army 106th Infantry Regiment seized Eniwetok Atoll.^[57]

            This association continued as the war neared its end.

            In the Palau Islands, the Army's 81st Division conducted a supporting amphibious assault on Angaur^[58] while the 1st Marine Division assaulted Peleliu.^[59] Later, infantry battalions from the 81st division were brought in to complete the destruction of Japanese forces on Peleliu when 1st Marine Division units became combat ineffective due to heavy casualties.^[60] On Okinawa, the Army's XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Infantry Divisions) and Marine III Amphibious Corps (1st and 6th Marine Divisions) assaulted the beaches together, while the Army's 27th, the 77th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Marines Division waited in reserve.^[61]

            After World War II, the U.S. Army has participated in only one major combat amphibious warfare operation. In September 1950, a landing at Inchon was conducted by the X Corps. Units from the Marine Corps' 1st Division, the Army 7th Infantry Division and 187th (Regimental) Combat Team, and a South Korean Marine Corps Regiment comprised this Corps. The landing occurred on the Republic of Korea's extreme northwest coast, south of Seoul, with the purpose to outflank the North Korean Army. Ninety percent of the North Korean Army was in the far south near the small allied perimeter at Pusan. By outflanking the enemy, an offensive initiative was seized by United Nations Forces, and the North Korean invasion of South Korea repulse, operations north of 38th parallel commenced.^[62]

 

            Conclusion

            Several important themes arise from the study of these experiences. Their analysis can help in defining the Army's role within the Italian JAB, the configuration of the major components, and thus a sound configuration of the entire force. Also they can help in identifying some important issues that must be taken into consideration in forming such a joint brigade. However, due to the dimension (brigade-size) of the future Italian joint amphibious unit, the author has focused more on the British experience to deduce important lessons for the formation of the JAB.

            The British experience is a rich field from which much can be harvested. The most important aspect is that 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines is a joint force in nature. Clear examples of this are the colocation/integration of the Brigade HQ in Plymouth and the structure of the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines. Both factors provide the Force with a coherent jointness. However, maybe the fundamental quality of

3 Commando Brigade's jointness is the training of its personnel. All officers and men do their basic training as infantrymen at the Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, at Lympstone. This common training is a fundamental requirement for developing the necessary cohesion amongst all personnel. A common standard of training produces a standard ethos and promotes professionalism. With such a strong common commitment the Army elements are able to be employed to fulfill support missions (artillery, engineer, and logistic support) within an amphibious force. Training is a recurring theme. U.S. Army-Marine Corps World War II cooperation demonstrated that with proper amphibious training and by adopting amphibious doctrine, the Army can indeed be employed in the landing assault role.

 

 

CHAPTER 4

THE Joint Amphibious Brigade's configuratioN

 

            The JAB's most likely configurations could be essentially two: (1) a pure assault amphibious force of light brigade size (2,500-3,000 men), with the central element being two reinforced Marine battalions; or (2) a tactical combined arm configuration with one pure amphibious unit, and one or more conventional, mechanized and/or armored, units (5,000 men).^[63]

 

            Pure Amphibious Brigade

            The first option assures the ability to execute the typical assault from the sea, and to accomplish the traditional difficult operations which require the commitment of more than a single battalion. In normal conditions the JAB may be deployed with one of its battalions, or at maximum, with an equivalent strength of one and a half battalions. Other personnel may not be combat ready and/or be committed to other taskings. In case of crisis the JAB may immediately make active a task force based on a reinforced battalion, which may be later augmented with the remaining personnel.^[64] This also permits the deployment of the two battalions, simultaneously, into two different operational theaters.

            Ground Oriented Brigade

            The second option is based on the theoretical approach of a lean combined arms brigade, composed of one amphibious battalion, one or two mechanized/armored battalions, and one reduced logistic unit. It could accomplish a series of missions typical for an Army unit, with the added advantage of reaching the theater of operations by sea. The amphibious portion of the unit could secure the beachhead, thus allowing the follow-on force free entrance inland for the continuation of the conventional mission.

            In reality, the single amphibious battalion would be insufficient to conduct effectively an amphibious assault to secure the beachhead. The weak point of such a structure, with a small amphibious unit and conventional Army units, is that if the former can not seize the beachhead then the latter are constrained to land in a benign site. Thus, there would be no need to constitute a permanent amphibious brigade.^[65]

 

            Unit's Configuration: The Pure Amphibious Brigade

            The solution of a JAB, characterized by a reduced structure but with a full amphibious capability, with two identical, and robust full-strength units is more acceptable, feasible, and consistent with Italian strategic requirements. It also will constitute a better option in terms of defense expenditures, especially if one compares the budgetary implications of the shipborne sealift associated with the larger "ground oriented brigade" option. The pure amphibious brigade could be easily integrated into multinational amphibious forces - as demonstrated by the role that the San Marco Battalion played as theater reserve in the Bosnia-Herzegovina operations with the USMC MEU/SOC.^[66] In addition, it can be used in response to the many MOOTW ranging from peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and non combatant evacuation up to peace-enforcing and local conflicts.

            For transporting the personnel, the brigade will utilize fast naval craft and light Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs); the latter allow both a reduced signature and a sufficiently long arm.^[67] At least one third of the assault infantry will also be projected via vertical assault, thus necessitating an air element within the Brigade based on a specialized helicopter group. The vehicles will be transported by the LCUs directly to the beaches, or near them. With helicopters, MTPs, and RHIBs, the unit will be able to operate from Over The Horizon (OTH).^[68]

 

            JAB Formation Factors

            Building such a JAB, will be a step by step process. It will be necessary to look carefully at important critical requirements such as those related to personnel, training, doctrine, weapons, logistics, materials, and infrastructures which are examined in the next chapters. They are only part of the critical requirements which are to be taken into consideration for the formation of the JAB. Other such issues, such as artillery, engineer, aviation element, are not discussed in this MMS paper. Each of them is so important that separate studies devoted specifically to them is warranted. However, artillery and engineer issues seen within the perspective of the British experience can be the ones to use as models for the formation of the JAB.

 

 

CHAPTER 5

CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS

 

            Training, Formation, and Doctrine

            The San Marco Battalion has been trained in tactics used by the Special Forces rather than those typical of the infantry units. That is why the smallest operational nucleus in it is formed by two to four men, while the basic team is composed of eight men.^[69] The expansion to the JAB should not modify this typical San Marco configuration, proven by experience and characterized by the high quality of its personnel. This is a quality that the Navy considers extremely important.

            With the transformation to the larger unit, the purpose is to maintain, and if possible to improve, the quality level of the personnel to obtain a Special Operations Capable (SOC) unit. Therefore, it is essential, as seen in 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines experience, that all men in the JAB attend the same courses and training. Thus, cohesion amongst the unit is enhanced through both the foundation training and shared common "landing" experience. Associated with this, it is essential that the JAB's units train and exercise together, seek continuous occasions to embark aboard amphibious ships, and train with the specialized helicopter group. Hence, it is "conditio sine qua non" to locate the JAB, with all its components, physically in the same geographical area.^[70]

            The JAB fundamental configuration should not be that of a simple landing force, but rather that of a task force complete in all its components. To have a JAB of this type, without accepting any compromise on the quality of the men, will necessitate a major effort.  At the beginning, the Army unit can be employed with the San Marco Battalion but without any "amphibious tasks." However, by ensuring that the unit conducts the same courses, training, and operates in an amphibious environment and under the command of the JAB's Commander, the cohesion of the personnel will be catalyzed and improved.

            The improvement of the JAB will require some time. An important step will be achieved when the Army element will have reached the training standards typical of amphibious units. In the meantime the Army battalion should commence the changes to mirror the San Marco Battalion organization, albeit an Army unit.

            As far as the doctrine is concerned, the San Marco Battalion adheres to NATO amphibious doctrine. It is essential that the elements of Italian Army that will form the JAB learn and utilize the NATO amphibious doctrine. Marine Corps and Army experience in World War II illustrates the value of this.

 

            Weapons, Logistics, and Materials

            The two units will have to have the same weapons system, equipment, and materials. In practice, for some years, they will have partially separated logistic support, but eventually the JAB will be fully operational only when support for the two components will be perfectly integrated in a joint logistic unit, using the same materials. The process to build the integrated and joint logistic support must commence soon. The model to follow could be that of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, and its joint amphibious logistic unit, the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines.

            However, at present, the Army and Navy are working together on issues related to materials, combat and transport vehicles.^[71] The San Marco Battalion is looking for a substitute for its VCC-1 (the Italian combat version of the M113), but will adhere to the Army choice to ensure sustainability and standardization. The importance of the latter became clear in Somalia during the redeployment phase there, when San Marco troops operated with Army vehicles.^[72] Another collaboration is in the procurement of a wheeled personnel carrier.^[73]

 

            Infrastructures

            The Brindisi area, where the San Marco Battalion is based, represents a sound site for the NATO/WEU Southern European forces in general. Because of the larger number of allied ships and aircraft deployed in the Adriatic during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Italy has been called upon to provide port availability, refueling facilities, storage areas, shipyard services, general assistance, and sea-shore airlift for personnel and equipment. Thus, a Forward Logistics Site (FLS) was established at Grottaglie Naval Air Station (between Taranto and Brindisi) in early December 1993, and Taranto and Brindisi naval bases have fully integrated logistic support to NATO/WEU naval forces.^[74] Also, the amphibious ships, the dedicated helicopter group, and the AV-8B Plus aircraft group, the San Marco Battalion, the amphibious schools, and the training facilities, are all located in the vicinity of Brindisi. Furthermore, to respond to the actual commitment, the Italian Navy has established a standing Command Amphibious Task Force (CATF), building it around the staff of the 3rd Naval Division, based at Brindisi.^[75] This would allow the future joint commander to have at his disposal a standing structure from which to take over the lead of the JAB. With such an extensive, existing infrastructure it is both logical and necessary that the Army unit, and the JAB Headquarters, be stationed in the same area.

 

            Command and Control

            Naturally, with the expansion of the existing amphibious force to the JAB, its staff must be augmented by Army personnel. In part they could come from the Army unit identified to form the JAB. However, the staff must be established without draining the JAB's operational elements. As seen in the British experience, the colocation and integration of the Italian Brigade HQ in Brindisi, of Army and Navy personnel will provide the Force with a continuing jointness. The command of JAB must be joint in nature. Therefore, it should be assigned in rotation to Army and Navy flag officers. When the commander is a Navy admiral, the deputy should be an Army officer, and "vice versa." The governing principle being a staggered changeover, to ensure the command team does not all change at once. The short period of "Single Service Rule" thus produced should not be viewed as problematic compared to the benefit of the rotating command.

 

            Conclusion

            The solution of a JAB, characterized by a full amphibious capacity, with two identical, and specially trained full-strength units is consistent with Italian strategic requirements. It also permits the deployment of the two battalions, simultaneously, into two different operational theaters, or together as one force if the brigade is sent into an area as a full entity.

            The JAB must be joint in nature and the colocation/integration of Army, and Navy personnel in the Brigade HQ in Brindisi will provide the Force with a coherent jointness. Therefore, to enhance the cohesion of personnel amongst the force, it is essential, as seen in 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines experience, that all men in the JAB attend the same courses, receive the same training, and adhere to the same standards.

            It is also important to locate not only the HQ, but most of the JAB's components, physically in the same area (Brindisi-Taranto), where they can train and exercise together, seek continuous occasions to embark aboard amphibious ships, and work with the specialized helicopter group.

            However, the JAB will be fully operational only with a sound joint logistic unit. It is suggested one model to follow could be 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines' joint amphibious logistic unit, the Commando Logistic Regiment Royal Marines.

            The purpose is to maintain, and improve the quality level of the personnel, to obtain a Special Operations Capable (SOC) unit.  

 

 

CHAPTER 6

CRITICAL POINTS

 

            Joint Helicopter Group

            A point that appears to be critical is related to the helicopter assets capability. The Navy has formed a specialized helicopter branch at Grottaglie (naval aviation's main base for Italy's AV-8B Plus aircraft), the infrastructure of which is the closest to the San Marco's location. Helicopters assigned to the unit are SH-3Ds and AB-212s (see APPENDIX C for information on these aircraft) taken from the existing flight line; these have received minor modifications, such as night-flight capabilities, global-positioning and C-map systems. The Navy is also considering replacing the 7.62mm machine-guns with 12.7mm weapons and providing them with rocket launchers similar to those used by Army helicopters.^[76]

            The Navy and Army are working to enhance operational capability flying Army helicopters from ships' flight decks. At the staff level, talks are being held between Navy and Army representatives concerning the establishment of an aviation cross-training program. Army helicopters (See APPENDIX D) have operated from the aircraft carrier Garibaldi in Somalia, and lately for the evacuation of nationals from Albania. The main problem in operating Army aircraft on Navy ships is that its aircraft are not equipped with folding-blade rotors. This is a major handicap for Chinook CH-47s, but some 20 A-129 Mangusta attack helicopters could soon receive the folding blade kit designed by Agusta. AB-205s are a lesser problem, as they have a two-blade rotor.

            The USMC concept of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conceives a tight synergy between the Air Combat Element, the Ground Combat Element, and the Combat Service Support Element, all under the command of the Command Element. Like the other components, the presence of a sound air component is "conditio sine qua non" for the successful conduct of the operations.

            Thus, the next step for the Italian JAB has to be the formation of a joint Army-Navy helicopter group. At present, the Italian Navy can not fulfill the transportation requirements that will derive from the formation of the amphibious force. Therefore, there is the need to form a joint Army-Navy helicopter group trained to operate from ships in support of amphibious operations. Each of the two armed forces can bring a fundamental contribution for experience and means.^[77]

            Some of the machines are currently utilized by one service. The Army utilizes the MANGUSTA attack helicopter, the AB-206 utility helicopter, and the Chinook CH-47 transport helicopter. The Navy utilizes the new EH-101 transport helicopter, and the SH-3D -- Sea King -- transport helicopter.^[78] However, there is already a certain level of standardization with the family of utility helicopters.

            These are the AB-212, AB-205, and AB-412, and the capability will grow with the NH-90.^[79]

            A joint Army-Navy helicopter group is not going to be inexpensive and requires a considerable logistic effort.^[80] Nevertheless, from the operational viewpoint, the group would increase the cohesion, experience, and specialization in complex amphibious operations. On the other hand, the joint helicopter group would not be an exclusive asset of the JAB; when not utilized by the JAB it could be employed for other requirements, thus improving the cost-effectiveness of the group.^[81] The joint helicopter group should be located at Grottaglie air station. It should be assigned to the JAB, under the command of the JAB Commander, as the Air Combat Element of the joint force.

 

            Amphibious Shipborne Sea-Lift Capability

            Another critical point is represented by amphibious shipborne sea-lift capability. Without ships the JAB is a land based amphibious force which cannot operate "from the sea." At present, the Navy can count on three San Giorgio class LPDs (See APPENDIX E). With the three LPDs and the Garibaldi aircraft carrier (See APPENDIX F), it is possible to project ashore an amphibious force of 1,000-1,500 men. The Italian Navy deploys three San Giorgio class LPDs, based at Brindisi, and the Garibaldi aircraft carrier, based at Taranto. The LPDs can also be used in the Ro-Ro (roll-on roll-off) role to augment their transport capacity, while the light aircraft carrier Garibaldi can be used both as a helicopter operating platform and as a command ship. However, the Garibaldi was not designed for amphibious command-and-control duties; add-ons have therefore been made, especially in the field of ship-to-shore communications, to enhance her amphibious role capabilities.

            With these four ships, it would be possible to transport and land the San Marco Battalion at full battalion strength. However, as it would be rare to have all four ships available, two LPDs and the Garibaldi would tactically be able to land two-thirds of a full battalion. The rest of the troops and vehicles would have to land via chartered Ro-Ro ship.

            With the joint brigade, the Navy will have to augment its amphibious shipping capabilities. To transport the whole brigade the Navy will obviously need to charter civilian ships.^[82] It has also considered a fourth LPD, as well as the acquisition of civilian Ro-Ro units, to be based at Brindisi. There could be given a mating capability with the LCUs (landing craft utility), thus being be able to transfer vehicles at sea from Ro-Ros ashore.

            Also, the construction of a second V/STOL aircraft carrier for the Italian Navy is being given serious consideration. This New Major Unit (NMU) would be a 22,000-ton enlarged version of the Garibaldi with added amphibious warfare features and may be completed around 2004.^[83] The NMU would have better amphibious capabilities than the Garibaldi. It would be able to host a large staff dedicated to amphibious operations (that is, to host the Commanding Amphibious Task Force - CATF - and the Commander Landing Force - CLF) and accommodate a larger air component to augment helo-assault and air support capabilities. Finally, it would have the capacity to transport men and light vehicles, which would be landed either by helicopter or LCUs carried on board.^[84]

 

 

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion/RECOMMENDATIONS

 

            In the new global scenario, it will not be possible to consider an analysis of international policy disconnected from geostrategic and economic factors. Strong economies must be supported by strong policies. That is why, in terms of security, it will be necessary to look for integrated solutions at the regional level, but without renouncing an effective national military instrument. The more the armed forces are effective, the more effectively they will be integrated in supra-national organizations.

            This MMS paper has examined several key questions concerned with the formation of an Italian JAB. It has been demonstrated that Italy is destined to provide a major contribution to the Mediterranean region security policy. The expansion of the existing Italian amphibious force is therefore a necessity. It is also recommended that the future unit, a JAB, be characterized by a pure amphibious capability. An amphibious option ensures the ability to execute both the typical assault from the sea, as well as accomplish MOOTW taskings.

            Depending upon the situations, the JAB may be deployed with one of its battalions or, in case of major crisis, it might immediately make active a task force based on a reinforced battalion, or be activated as one entity. Also, this specialized unit gives policy makers more latitude or options by the possibility of deploying the two battalions, simultaneously into two different operational theaters.

            The JAB must be joint in nature. Therefore, as seen in 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines experience, it is recommended that all men in the JAB attend the same courses, receive the same training, and adhere to the same standards. Moreover, to provide the Force with a coherent HQ element, it is essential to colocate and integrate the JAB HQ with Army and Navy personnel. Also, as emphasized in the analysis of the American World War II amphibious cooperation, it is recommended that Italian Army personnel must learn and adhere the NATO amphibious doctrine adopted by the San Marco Battalion.

            Another recommendation is to locate the JAB, with all its components, physically in the same geographical area (Brindisi-Taranto). Here, all elements of JAB can train and exercise aboard amphibious ships, and with the specialized helicopter group.

            The JAB will be fully operational only with a sound joint logistic unit. One model that the Italian armed forces can draw upon in structuring the logistic support of the JAB could be the Commando Logistic Regiment of 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines.

            Finally, there are two critical recommendations associated with the formation of the JAB. The first is related to the formation of a joint Army-Navy helicopter group, which should be located at Grottaglie air station. It should be assigned to the JAB under the command of the JAB Commander.

            The second is related to the shipborne sea-lift capability. To transport the JAB, the Navy will obviously need to charter civilian ships. It also needs to consider a fourth LPD, as well as the acquisition of civilian Ro-Ro units to be based at Brindisi. The construction of a second V/STOL aircraft carrier is being given serious consideration. It is recommended that the New Major Unit be able to host a large staffs dedicated to amphibious operations and accommodate a large air component to augment helo-assault and air support capabilities.

 

ENLARGED MEDITERRANEAN

 

 

APPENDIX A: STRUCTURE OF THE ITALIAN NAVY AND ITS MAIN BASES

 

 

 

APPENDIX B: ITALIAN NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE

 

NAVAL ORDER OF BATTLE

       The main body of the Italian naval forces are a result of process of modernization commenced on compliance with the naval law passed in 1975.

 

Main Surface Combatants

-          aircraft carrier Garibalsi, includes fixed wing aircraft (AV_8 Plus);

-          cruiser Veneto, with embarked helicopters;

-          2 new AAW destroyers, de la Penne and Minbelli;

-          2 AAW destroys, Ardito and Audace, updated during the first half of 80s;

-          8 Maestrali class frigates, primary mission ASW, commissioned in the 80s;

-          4 Lupo class frigates with emphasis on AsuW;

-          4 Artigliere class fleet patrol ships, (frigates);

-          8 Minerva class coverttes;

-          6 Astore class hydrofoils;

-          4 Cassiopea offshore patrol vessels for control and surveillance of the economic maritime areas, like the fishery protection near Sicily and the Adriatic sea.

 

Special Units

-          amphibious forces: San Marco battalion (900 men) and 3 LPDs able to embark 300 men each with vehicles and helicopters.

-          8 Sauro class submarines;

-          4 Lerici class minehunters equipped with ROVs;

-          8 Gaeta class minehunters equipped with ROVs; and

-          the Divers and Raiders Group, heir of the past Commando Special Forces.

 

Auxiliaries

-          the divers and submarine support ship Anteo;

-          hydrographic ships;

-          school sailing ship:

-          2 Stromboli class logistic ships; and miscellaneous patrol boats and support ships.

 

Naval Aviation

-          29 SH-3D (Sea King) Medium-size helicopters

-          51 Agusta AB 212 light helicopters mainly embarked on major or frigate class ships;

-          16 AV 8B Plus V/STOL airplanes: the line of which will be completed by the year 1997, plus two TAV 8B trainers; and

-          18 MPA Breguet Atlantic airplanes.

 

 

 

APPENDIX C: SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT

 

 

EH 101

Numbers/Type:                                      2 Agusta/Westland EH 101 Merlin.

 

Operational speed:                                 160 kts (296 km/h).

 

Service ceiling:                                   15,000 ft (4,572 m).

 

Range:                                             550 nm (1,019 km).

 

Role/Weapon systems:                               Primary anti-submarine role with

secondary anti-surface and troop carrying capabilities. 16 planned: 8 ASW/ASV, 4 AEW and 4 Assault. Sensors: Radar, dipping sonar, sonobuoy acoustic processor, ESM, ECM. Weapons: ASW; 4 Whitehead torpedoes. ASV; 4 Sea killer or replacement, capability for guidance of ship-launched SSM.

 

 

 

AB 212

 

Numbers/Type:                                       59 Agusta-Bell 212.

 

Operational speed:                                  106 kts (196 km/h).

 

Service ceiling:                                    17,000 ft (5,180 m).

 

Role/Weapon systems:                                ASW/ECM/Assault helicopter;

mainly to escorts, but also shore-based for ASW support duties and four used for assault. Five more acquired Artigliere class. Sensors: Selenia AOS 705 (APS 707 in five Artigliere class aircraft) search/attack radar, AQS-13B dipping sonar or GUFO (not in Artigliere class aircraft) ESM/ECM. Weapons: ASW; 2 x Mk 46 torpedoes. Assault aircraft have an armored cabin, no sensors and are armed with 2 x 7.63 mm MGs and 2 x 70 MRLs.

 

 

 

 

 

SEA KING

 

 

Numbers/Type:                                  35 Agusta-Sikorsky SH-3D/H Sea King.

 

Operational speed:                             120 kts (222 km/h).

 

Service ceiling:                               12,200 ft (3,720 m).

 

Range:                                         630 nm (1,165 km).

 

Role/Weapon systems:                           ASW helicopter; embarked in larger

ASW ships, including CVL; also shore-based for medium ASV-ASW in Mediterranean Sea; nine are fitted for ASV, 12 with ASW and EW equipment, nine transport/assault, and five are in reserve. Sensors: Selenia AOS 705 search radar, AQS-13B dipping sonar, sonobuoys. ESM/ECM. Weapons: ASW; 4 x Mk 46 torpedoes. ASV; 2 x Marte 2 missiles. Assault aircraft have armored cabins, no sensors, and are armed with 2 x 7.62 MGs.

 

 

 

HARRIER

 

 

Numbers/Type:                                   16/2 AV-8B Harrier II Plus.

 

Operational speed:                              562 kts (1,041 km/h).

 

Service ceiling:                                50,000 ft (15,240 m).

 

Range:                                          800 nm (1,480 km).

 

Role/Weapon systems:                            Two trainers delivered in July 1991

plus 16 front line aircraft by June 1994. Eight more may be ordered. Sensors: Radar derived from APG-65, FLIR and ECM. Weapons: Maverick ASM; AMRAAM AIM-120; bombs and cannon.

 

APPENDIX D: ARMY AIRCRAFT

 

AB 412

 

 

 

Type:                                                  Agusta-Bell 412.

 

Operational speed:                                     125 kts (232 km/h).

 

Service ceiling:                                       17,000 ft (5,180 m).

 

Role/Weapon systems:                                  Developed for direct fire

support, scouting, assault transport, equipment transport, SAR, and maritime surveillance. Wide variety of external weapon option include swiveling turret for 12.7mm gun, two 25mm Oerlikon cannon, four or eight TOW anti-tank missiles, two launchers each with nineteen 2.75in SNORA or twelve 81mm rockets, 12.7mm machine-guns (in pods or door-mounted), four air-to-air or air defense suppression missiles, or for attacking surface vessels, four Sea Skua or similar air-to-surface missiles.

 

 

 

 

A 129 MANGUSTA

 

 

 

 

Type:                                                  Agusta A 129 MANGUSTA.

 

Operational speed:                                      159 kts (294 km/h).

 

Hovering ceiling:                                       10,302 ft (3,140 m).

 

 

Role/Weapon systems:                                   Attack helicopter. A 129

has full day/night operational capability, with equipment designed to give both crew members a view outside helicopter irrespective of light conditions.

Four underwing attachments stressed for loads of up to 300 kg (661 lb) each; all stations incorporate articulation which allows pylon to be elevated 2 and depressed 10 t increase missile launch envelope; they are aligned with aircraft automatically, with non need for boresighting. Initial armament of up to eight thermal tracking TOW 2 or 2A wire-guided anti-tank missiles (two, three or four in carriers suspended from each wingtip station), with Saab/ESCO Heli TOW aiming system; with these can be carried, on inboard stations, either two 7.62, 12.7 or 290 mm gun pods, or two launchers each for seven air-to-surface rockets. For general attack missions, rocket launchers can be carried on all four stations (two 19-tube plus two sen-tube); Italian Army has specified SNIA-BPD 81 mm and 70 mm rockets. Alternatively, A 129 can carry up to eight Hellfire anti-tank missiles with autonomous laser spot tracking capability; eight HOT missiles; AIM-9L Side-winder, Matra Mistral, Javelin or Stinger air-to-air missiles for aerial combat; two gun pods plus two 19-tube rocket launchers; or grenade launchers. Lucas 0.50 in self-contained gun turret qualified, but not used by the Italian Army. A 12.7 mm turret has also been fired and 20 mm or 12.7 mm Gatling turrets have been investigated. Optional upgrades offered for export include an autotracking sight, a laser designated for Hellfire and an MMS for scouting.

 

 

 

CH-47

Type:                                                   CH-47

 

Operational speed:                                      120 kts (222 km/h).

 

Service ceiling:                                        10,150 ft (3,095 m).

 

Range:                                                  613 nm (1,136 km).

 

Role:                                                   Transport helicopter.

APPENDIX E: AMPHIBIOUS TRANSPORT SHIP

SAN GIORGIO (LPD) CLASS

 

Dimensions, feet (metres):                     437.2 x 67.3 x 17.4 (133.3x20.5x5.3)

 

Flight deck, feet (metres):                    328.1 x 67.3 (100 x 20.5)

 

Main machinery:                                2 Fincantieri GMT A 420.12 diesels;

16,800 hp(m)(12.35 MW) sustained; 2 shafts; cp props.

 

Speed, knots:                                  21.

 

Range, miles:                                  7,500 at 16 kts; 4,500 at 20 kts

 

Complement:                                    170

 

Military lift:                                 Battalion of 400 plus 30-36 APCs or

30 medium tanks. 3 LCMs in stern docking well. 3 LCVPs on upper deck. 1 LCPL

 

Guns:                                          1 OTO Melara 3 in (76 mm)/62; 85

elevation; 60 rds/min to 16 km (8.7 nm); weight of shell 6 kg or 1 OTO Melara 3 in (76 mm)/62 compact (San Giusto); 85 rds/min to 16 km (8.7 nm); weight of shell 6 kg.

 

                                                2 Oerlikon 20 mm. 2-12.7 mm MGs.

 

Countermeasures:                               ESM: SLR 730; intercept.

 

  ESM/ECM:                                      SLQ 747 (San Giusto).

 

Combat data systems:                           Selenia IPN 20 (San Giusto).

 

Weapons control:                               Elsag NA 10.

 

 

Radars:

 

Surface search:                                SMA SPS 702; I band.

 

Navigation:                                    SMA SPN 748; I band.

 

Fire control:                                  Selenia SPG 70 (RTN 10X); I/J band;

range 40 km (22 nm).

 

Helicopters:                                   3 SH-3D Sea King or 5 AB 212.

 

Programs:                                      San Giorgio ordered 26 November

1983, San Marco on March 1984 and San Giusto 1 March 1991. Launching dates of the first two are slightly later than the 'official' launching ceremony because of poor weather and for the third because of industrial problems.

 

Structure:                                     Aircraft carrier type flight deck

with island to starboard. Three landing spots. Bow ramp (except San Giusto) for amphibious landings. Stern docking well 20.5 x 7 m. Fitted with a 30 ton lift and two 40 ton traveling cranes for LCMs. San Giusto is 300 tons heavier, of similar design except for more accommodation, a slightly longer island and different LCVP davit arrangement. Also no bow doors and therefore no beaching capability, and her davits are placed in a sponsion on the port side, freeing the whole flight deck for cargo and flight operations.

 

Operational:                                     San Marco was paid for by the

Ministry of Civil Protection, is specially fitted for disaster relief but is run by the Navy. All are based at Brindisi and assigned to the Third Naval Division. San Giusto is attached to the Naval Academy at Livorno during the annual three month Summer cruise.

 

Opinion:                                          An imaginative but cheap and

versatile design which has applications in Amphibious, ASW support or disaster relief operations. Being studied by a number of other navies.

APPENDIX F: AIRCRAFT CARRIER

 

(CVS) GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

Displacement, tons:                             10,100 standard; 13,850 full load

 

Dimensions, feet (metres):                      591 x 110.2 x 22 (180 x 33.4 x 6.7)

 

Flight deck, feet (metres):                     570.2 x 99.7 (173.8 X 30.4)

 

Main machinery:                                 COGAG; 4 Fiat/GE LM 2500 gas-

turbines; 81,000 hp (60 MW) sustained; 2 shafts

 

Speed, knots:                                   30. Range, miles: 7,000 at 20 kts

 

Complement:                                    550 ship plus 230 air group

(accommodation for 825 including Flag and staff)

 

Missiles:                                       SSM: 4 OTO Melara Teseo Mk 2 (TG

2); active radar homing to 180 km (98.4 nm) at 0.9 Mach; warhead 210 kg; sea-skimmeer for last 4 km (2.2 nm).

 

                                                 SAM: 2 Selenia Elsag Albatros

octuple launchers; 48 Aspide; semi-active radar homing to 13 km (7 nm) at 2.5 Mach; height envelope 15-5000 m (49.2-16405 ft) warhead 30 kg.

 

Guns:                                           6 Breda 40 mm/70 (3 twin) MB; 85

elevation; 300 rds/min to 12.5 km (6.8 nm) anti-surface; 4 km (2.2 nm) anti-aircraft; weight of shell 0.96 kg.

 

Torpedoes:                                      6-324 mm B-515 (2 triple) tubes;

Honeywell Mk 46; anti-submarine; active/passive homing to 11 km (5.9 nm) at 40 kts; warhead 44 kg. Being replaced by new A 290.

 

Countermeasures:                               Decoys: AN/SLQ 25 Nixie; noisemaker.

 

                                               2 Breda SCLAR 105mm 20-barrelled

launchers; rains and elevates; chaff to 5 km (2.7 nm); illuminants to 12km (6.6 nm).

 

ESM/ECM:                                      Elettronica Nettuno SLQ732;

integrated intercept and jamming system.

 

Combat data system:                           IPN 20 (SADOC 2) action data

automation including Links 11 and 14. SATCOM.

 

Weapons control:                               3 NA 30 electro-optical backup

for SAM.

 

                                                Dardo NA21 for guns.

 

Radars:                                        Long range air search: Hughes SPS

52C; 3D; E/F band; range 440 km (240 nm).

 

Air search:                                    Selenia SPS 768 (RAN 3L); D band;

range 220 km (120 nm).

 

                                                SMA /SPN 728; I band; range 73 km

(40 nm); TV indicator.

 

Air/surface search:                            Selenia SPS 774 (RAN 10S); E/F

band; range 155 km (85 nm).

 

Surface search/target indication:              SMA SPS 702 UPX; 718 beacon; I band.

 

Navigation:                                    SMA SPN 749(V)2; I band.

 

Fire control:                                  Three Selenia SPG 75 (RTN 30X); I/J

band; range 15 km (8 nm) (for Albatros).

 

                                                 Three Selenia SPG 74 (RTN 20X); I/J

band; range 13 km (7 nm) (for Dardo).

 

CCA:                                           Selenia SPN 728(V)1; I band.

 

IFF:                                           Mk XII; Tacan:SRN-15A.

 

Sonars:                                        Raytheon DE 1160 LF; bow-mounted;

active search; medium frequency.

 

Fixed wing aircraft:                           16 AV-8B Harrier II.

 

Helicopters:                                   18 SH-3D Sea King helicopters (12 in

hangar, 6 on deck). The total capacity is either 16 Harriers or 18 helicopters. In practice a combination is embarked.

 

Structure:                                      Six decks with 13 vertical

watertight bulkneads. Fitted with 6.5 ski-jump and VSTOL operating equipment. Two 15 ton lifts 18 x 10 959 X 32.8 ft). Hangar size 110 x 15 x 6 m (361 x 49.2 x 19.7 ft). Has a slightly narrower flight deck than UK Invincible class. Two MEN class fast personnel launches (capacity 250) can be embarked for amphibious operations or disaster relief.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

            An Insight into Operational Capability. 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marine. David Reynolds Associated. Plymouth, 1996.

 

            Baker III, A.D., "World Navies in Review, Italian Navy." The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1997.

 

            Beaver, Paul, Today's Royal Marines. B. Stephens. Wellingborough, 1988.

 

            Cosentino, M., Cdr., "The Italian Navy: A Major Role in a Sea of Troubles." The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March, 1996.

 

            FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.

 

            "Italian Naval Forces Today and Tomorrow." In Naval Forces, International Forum for Maritime Power. Special Issue. Monch Publishing. Bonn, 1/1997.

 

            Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1995.

 

            Joint Pub 1 Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1991.

 

            Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1996.

 

            Krulak, C. C., Commandant of the Marines Corps. Operational Maneuver From The Sea. A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore. Headquarters of the Marine Corps. Washington, D.C., June 1996.

 

            Mariani, A. Adm., CNO Italian Navy, "International Navies Special. Commanders Respond." The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March, 1997.

 

            Marina Militare Italiana, Rapporto 1995. Fusa Editrice, Roma, Gennaio 1996. (As referred to the Modello di Difesa, published by the Italian Defense General Staff in September 1995).

 

            Nativi A., "Una Brigata Anfibia per l'Italia." In Rivista Italiana Difesa (RID). Maggio 1995.

 

            Sarto, A. Capt., Italian Navy, "Italy's Navy Ready in the Med." The U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March, 1993.

 

            Valpolini,P., "Italian Navy Builds Amphibious Forces to Meet Future Threats." International Defense Review, June, 1994.

 

 

SECONDARY BIBLIOGRAPHY. US ARMY HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II

            Appleman, R.E., and others, Okinawa: The Last Battle. U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific.  Center of Military History U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1984.

 

            Crowl, P.A. and Love, E.G.,  Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls. U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific.  Center of Military History U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1989.

 

            Fisher, E.F., Jr., Cassino to the Alps. U.S. Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of the Operations. Center of Military History U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1989.

 

            Garland, A.N. and MC Gaw Smyth, H., Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. U.S. Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of the Operations. Center of Military History U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1986.

 

            Miller, J., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1949.

 

            Smith, R.R., The Approach to the Philippines.   U.S. Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1953.

 

 

USMC HISTORY. OF WORLD WAR II

 

            Frank, B.M. and Shaw, H.I., Jr., Victory and Occupation. History of the Marine Corps. Operations in World War II. Vol. V, Historical Branch, G-3 Division. Headquarters, USMC, 1968.

 

            Garand, G.B. and Strobridge, T.R., Western Pacific Operations. History of the Marine Corps. Operations in World War II. Vol. IV, Historical Branch, G-3 Division. Headquarters, USMC, 1971.

 

            Hough, F.O., LtC. USMCR and others, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal. History of the Marine Corps. Operations in World War II. Vol. I, Historical Branch, G-3 Division. Headquarters, USMC, 1968.

 

            Millett, Allan, R., Semper Fidelis, The History of the United States Marine Corps. Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.. New York, 1980.

 

            Shaw, H.I., Jr., and others, Central Pacific Drive. History of the Marine Corps. Operations in World War II. Vol. III, Historical Branch, G-3 Division. Headquarters, USMC, 1966.

 

            Shaw, H.I., Jr., Maj. USMC and Kane, D.T., Isolation of Kabul. History of the Marine Corps. Operations in World War II.  Vol. II. Historical Branch, G-3 Division. Headquarters, USMC, 1983.

 

 

OTHER SOURCES

 

            Bartlett, M.L., Lt Colonel, USMC (Ret.), Assault from the sea. Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare. Naval Institute Press. Annapolis, 1983.

 

 

            Bond, Brian, Liddell Hart. A Study of his Military Thought. Rutgers University Press. New Brunswick, 1976.

 

            Clifford, Kenneth J., Col. USMCR, Amphibious Warfare Development in Britain and America from 1920-1940. Laurens. New York, Edgewood Inc.. 1983.

 

            Evans, Col. M. H. H., RM OBE, "The Projection of Sea Power Ashore." In Amphibious Operations. Brassey's Sea Power. Royal War College, Greenwich, 1990.

 

            Fedorchak, Scott A., Maj., USA, "Roles and Missions: The Army's Role in Amphibious Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, March, 1995.

 

            Goshko, John, M., "U.N. Approves Italy-Led Force For Albania." The Washington Post. Washington, March 29, 1997.

 

            Jones, Archer, The Art of War in the Western World. University of Illinois Press. Urbana and Chicago, 1987.

 

            Keegan, John, A History of Warfare. Alfred A. Knopf. New York, 1993.

 

            Lind, William S., Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview Press. Boulder and London, 1985.

 

            Steen, Kent, O.W., Col., USMC, Trends In Amphibious Warfare Since The Falklands Campaign: Royal Navy & Royal Marines. James Carson Breckinridge Library. Marine Corps Education Center, Quantico, Virginia, 1986.

 

            Strange, J., Perspectives on Warfighting. Centers of Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities. Marine Corps University Vol. IV. Quantico, Marine Corps Association, 1996.

 

            The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1993-1994, Brassey's, London, 1994.

 

            Walter, David L., Maj., USMC, Amphibious Doctrine and Peacetime Contingency Operation. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1992.

 

            Whitehouse, Arch., Amphibious Operations. Doubleday and Co. Garden City, New York, 1963.