Peace Operations in an Insurgency Environment

CSC 1997

Subject Area - Operations

Executive summary

Title: Peace Operations in an Insurgency Environment

Author: Drs. P.A. Grootendorst, Major Royal Netherlands Marine Corps

Problem: Can a conceptual model be developed for examining and better understanding peace operations in an insurgency environment?

Discussion: In the last ten years, terrorists, guerrilla groups, well-armed irregular groups and warlords have obstructed peace forces and made their peace operations into failures. Important UN members are starting to question the capability of the UN to perform as a global peacekeeping organization. The effectiveness of the UN will further decline if the UN peace forces do not manage to cope with the violent challenges that are part of contemporary peace operations. In order to reach success in future UN peace operations, one must better understand these hostile environments and have the ability to identify the limitations of and the threats to peace forces operating in a hostile environment.

From the theory of Kotler a basic model was build and used as a starting point for developing a conceptual model for examining and understanding peace operations in an insurgency environment. This basic model showed the main actors of the macro environment and the micro environment in an operation area before a peace force or insurgent was operating. By introducing a peace force in the basic model and using the theory on peace operations of Mackinlay and Chapra, it became possible to examine and better understand the macro and micro environment of a peace force. By introducing an insurgency movement in the basic model and using O'Neill's theory on insurgency and terrorism, it became possible to examine and better understand the macro and micro environment of an insurgent. Finally both the peace force and the insurgent were introduced in the basic model. This made it possible to examine and better understand the relationship between a peace force and an insurgent. A relation that determines the threats and limitations to the peace force caused by the insurgent and can determine the success or failure of the peace operation.

Conclusions: Three conclusions can be drawn from the research. 1) The final model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment gives insights in the relationships between the main actors in the macro and micro environment of a peace force operating in a hostile environment. 2) The final model is a tool that can assist planners of peace operations to organize, equip and mandate future peace forces better. It can also help officers of peace operations to improve their understanding of the complex situations they are operating in. Finally it can be used as a tool for evaluating incidents or operations. 3) Peace operations in insurgency environments can be successful if the peace forces are equipped, organized, mandated and executed based on good understanding of the complex relationships between the actors in micro environment of the peace force.

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE, INCLUDING THE AUTHOR'S NAME, PAPER TITLE, AND STATEMENT: "WRITTEN IN FULFILLMENT OF A REQUIREMENT FOR THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE."

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEW OF THE ROYAL NETHERLANDS MARINE CORPS, THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY US OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY.

Table of contents

List of figures and tables

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Peace operations and insurgency: An unworkable combination?

1.2 Problem analysis, research objective, restrictions and research design

Chapter 2: The theoretical framework

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Theory of Kotler

2.3 Basic model for examining environments

Chapter 3: Peace operations

3.1 Introduction

3.2 Theory on peace operations

3.3 Model for examining the environment of a peace force

Chapter 4: Insurgency and counter insurgency

4.1 Introduction

4.2 Theory of insurgency and counter insurgency

4.3 Model for examining the environment of an insurgent

Chapter 5: Model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment

5.3 Relation between a peace force and an insurgency

Chapter 6: Review

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Theory versus practice

6.3 Insights gained

Bibliography

List of figures and tables

Figure 1.1 Research design

Figure 2.1 Kotler's model for the marketing environment

Figure 2.2 Basic model for examining environments

Figure 3.1 Linear approach to peace operations

Figure 3.2 Non linear approach to peace operations

Table 3.1 Categories of peace operations

Figure 3.3 Model for examining the environment of a peace force

Table 4.1 Type of insurgency

Table 4.2 Insurgent strategic approaches

Table 4.3 Insurgent means

Figure 4.1 Summery of the Theory of O'Neill

Table 4.4 Insurgent-counter insurgent means

Figure 4.2 Model for examining the environment of an insurgent

Figure 4.3 Relation between the insurgent and the population

Figure 5.1 Model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment

Table 5.1 Goal conflicts

Table 5.2 Strategic approach conflict

Table 5.3 Comparison of the means available to a peace force and an insurgent.

Figure 6.1 Model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment

Chapter 1: Introduction.

"Despite its shortcomings, there is still a vital role for the United Nations and its agencies to play in the world. The important point is to have a clear understanding of the UN's capabilities and how best to operate within them."^[1]

Yasushi Akashi, Special Representative of the UN

Secretary-General for Cambodia and former Yugoslavia

1.1 Peace operations and insurgency: An unworkable combination?

The close of the Cold war era has changed UN peace operations in a number of ways. First, the cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council has increased in the Post Cold War political climate, which resulted in a dramatic growth of the amount of UN peace operations. A second change is the increased number of Eastern European countries providing contingents to UN peace operations. The third and maybe the biggest change is the change in character of the latest UN peace operations. The peace operations of the Cold War era were traditional peacekeeping operations; with the consent of all parties, the UN based impartial peacekeeping forces in between contending parties or states (Cyprus). The peace operations in the New Era consist of a much wider spectrum of operations including interventions to protect human rights or to prevent genocide or starvation (Somalia). These New Era peace-operations are often taking the UN peace force into areas where there was no agreement among all parties, or where the governments have limited authority. In many cases terrorists, guerrilla groups or well-armed irregular groups and warlords have obstructed these peace operations. Due to the recent failures of the UN in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, important members of the UN have criticized the UN's capability to perform as a global peacekeeping organization. As an organization made up of 185 sovereign member states and based on universal values, the UN will stay unchallenged. However, its effectiveness will further decline if UN peace operations do not manage to cope with the violent challenges that are part of the peace operations in this New Era. Are the recent failures the result of poor execution or the result of poor understanding of the complexity of UN peace operations in insurgency environments?

1.2 Problem analysis, research objective, restrictions and research design.

Problem analysis. UN peace operations in a hostile environment are becoming more and more common as practice. At the same time UN forces clearly have problems accomplishing their mission in an environment of insurgency. Because there is no real alternative for the UN as, "the primary global peacekeeping organization," this failure can have a negative effect on regional and world stability. A better understanding of these hostile environments and the ability to identify the limitations of and the threats to peace forces can contribute to future success of peace operations. The central question for this study is as follows: How can we better understand and anticipate hostile environments of peace forces, in order to be more successful in the future?

Research objective. The objective of this study is to attain insight into the actors and their relations, both from a theoretical point of view as well as an empirically based point of view. Both play an important role in determining the success of a peace operation in an insurgency environment. Having a theoretical framework on peace operations on one hand and one for understanding insurgency and counter-insurgency on the other hand, makes it possible to integrate and combine the two frameworks into one. This combined framework results in a conceptual model, a useful tool, to examine and understand peace operations in an insurgent environment. The primary interest of the model is on the actors and their relationships which limits the success of peace operations in an insurgency environment. On the basis of the formulated central question, the following research questions were formulated:

1. What peace operation theories exist in the present literature?

2. What insurgency theories exist in the literature?

3. Can a model be constructed that gives insight in the hostile environments in which peace forces have to work?

Research design. This masters paper on peace operations in an insurgent environment follows a clear systematic approach. Chapter 2 addresses the theories used. Chapter 3 and 4 contain theories on peace operations and insurgency and counter insurgency. Chapter 5 shows the results of the previous chapters, combined into a model. Chapter 6 is the closing chapter and gives the conclusions and recommendations. (Research design see figure 1.1)

Figure 1.1 Research design.

Chapter 2 : The theoretical framework.

Understanding change and staying alive means adapting to and influencing the specific environment within you operate.^[2]

Liz Clarke, 1994

Consultant specializing in change management

2.1 Introduction.

This chapter offers the theoretical framework, on which the next three chapters will build. It is a step by step development into a model for examining and understanding peace operations in an insurgency environment. This chapter can be seen as the start of the building of a model that can assist planners of and officers working in a peace operation to better understand the complexity of peace operations in an insurgency environment. In this chapter Philip Kotler's theory of the marketing environment is introduced and used to explain the actors and forces in an organization's environment that directly affect the way the organization operates.

2.2 Theory of Kotler.

Philip Kotler defines the marketing environment as the environment that is comprised of the "non controllable" actors and forces that affect the company's ability to develop and maintain successful transactions and relationships with its target customers.^[3] In his theory Kotler makes the distinction between the "controllable" and "non controllable" actors and forces. In this outside-inside approach the "controllable" actors are within and part of the company and the "non controllable" actors are part of the company's environment. In order to be successful, and because the actors in the environment cannot be controlled by the company, the company must monitor the environment for changes and continuously adapt to them. The company's environment can be divided into the company's micro environment and the macro environment. Kotler's basic model is shown in figure 2.1.^[4]

Figure 2.1 Kotler's model for the marketing environment.

Macro environment. The macro environment is made up of those actors and forces that are outside the company's control and influence. The forces in the macro environment according to Kotler are: demographic, economic, physical, technological, political and cultural forces. These forces influence all actors in the company's micro environment and should therefore be monitored closely by a company to be successful.

Micro environment. The micro environment consists and is made up of those actors that are outside the company's control but inside the company's influence. The actors in the micro environment are directly affecting the company's ability to conduct its business successfully. Kotler identifies the following actors in the micro environment: the company, suppliers, market intermediaries, customers, competitors and public. Note that the company is part of its own environment. The actors in the micro environment have intensive mutual relations and are influencing each other constantly. To be successful, the company should examine the relations in the micro environment continuously and influence other actors if needed.

Kotler's marketing environment offers a good framework for all kinds of companies and organizations to examine and monitor in order to understand the complex environment they are operating in. Of course every company should tailor this basic framework to its own special situation by identifying the main or relevant actors in its micro environment. Military organizations and peace forces are also organizations.

Therefore Kotler's basic framework can be used as a starting point to develop a tailored model for monitoring and understanding the complex environment in which a peace force must operate.

2.3 Basic model for examining environments.

The "basic model for examining an environment," that will be used as the starting point to develop a "model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment," is described below. A model has two components in it: the model or framework itself as the design and the elements or actors in the model and their mutual relationships. The basic model, to be further developed into a model for understanding peace operations in an insurgency environment, is based on Kotler's marketing environment model as described above. The actors in the basic model are those actors that are already present in a state or area prior to a peace force or insurgency movement. Figure 2.2 shows the basic model for examining environments and the main actors and forces before a peace force or insurgent is introduced in the area.

Figure 2.2 Basic model for examining environments.

There is a clear distinction between the micro environment and the macro environment in the basic model for examining environments. Both environments have their own actors, relations and characteristics.

The macro environment: The macro environment consists of the larger forces that are outside the control and influence of the actors in the micro environment. However, the macro environment affects all the actors in the micro environment.

These forces are:

- Demographic: size of the (world, region, state) population, its geographical distribution and density, mobility trends, age, dead rates and racial, ethnic and religious structure.

Algeria is a country about three times the size of Texas, yet 5/6 of it is desert. Only 10 percent of the 26 million people live in this wasteland.

- Economic: consist of factors that effect the economic power and growth within a state.

Today 95% of Algeria's foreign-exchange comes from the petroleum and natural gas. If the price of oil would fall, the economy and the Algerian society will be in

a crisis.^[5]

- Nature: shortage of raw material, increased cost of energy, pollution,

One cannot examine the situation in a Middle East country without taking into account the water situation in the region.

- Technological: new technology can effect both the macro as well as the micro environment. Technological revolutions especially, should be detected early on.^[6]

- Political: Political decisions are influencing all actors. Regional treaties but also UN resolutions are affecting sovereign states.

Laws made by the EU are binding for the government and the people of a

member state.

- Cultural forces. The basic beliefs, values and norms of the people.

Egalitarianism is in character for the Dutch, who allow euthanasia and abortion, legally recognize homosexual partnerships and once let their conscripted soldiers wear their hair unprofessionally long.^[7]

In order to be successful, a UN peace force or an insurgent has to monitor and examine the macro environment carefully and identify the most important, most likely or most dangerous trends. The tools for examining the macro environment are outside the scope of this paper. (Kotler and Wissema^[8] provide excellent tools.)

The micro environment: The micro environment consists of all the actors that are outside the control but inside the influence of the actors in the micro environment. The actors have mutual relationships with each other within a state or area. These actors will influence and will be influenced by a peace force or an insurgent from the very moment they start operating in the area. The situation will develop as the result of the characteristics of and the relations between the actors.

Actors in the micro environment. The following actors will be used in this paper:

- Government: the government is the authority in a country or state and possesses all the power and authority. External and internal defense (army), law and order (police), and taxation are exclusive for the government. On the other hand the government may have the obligation to provide protection, education, public services and medicare to its people.

- The people: the population in the operation area.

- Other UN agencies: other (non military) agencies of the UN, like UNDP or UNHCR are working in the most troubled countries in the world. Their goals are humanitarian and not directly linked to the presence of a UN force. They are often already working in the area before a UN force arrives and will stay after the "Blue" soldiers have left. The other UN organizations are mostly working together with the local governments in fields like education, development, medicare and disaster relief.

- Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs): the NGOs are international relief organizations working in most of the third world countries. The NGOs generally have universal or humanitarian values and are based in and financed by the western societies. The NGOs are mostly working independently from the local governments but their work contributes directly to the government's effort to solve the marginal situation in education, development and medicare.

Relations in the micro environment. Using the framework we have identified the actors in the micro environment. To complete the basic model we now have to describe the six relations that exist between the actors in the micro environment.

- People and Government: The relation of the government is one of authority over the people, but given by the people. This gives the government the authority within national boundaries to make laws and regulations, but it also gives the government the obligation to protect its people, including minorities.

Operation Uphold Democracy was conducted to restore the relation between president Aristide and the Haitian people.^[9]

- People and NGOs: The NGOs are providing assistance to the people out of humanitarian or religious motives. Some NGOs have longtime structural aid programs while others specialize in disaster relief. The people are depending on these NGOs who have become part of the economy and society of most third world countries.

Memisa is an example of a religious NGO, based in Rotterdam, that focus on long term structural aid programs, where Medicins Sans Frontiers is a well known NGO that has specialized in disaster relief.

- People and Other UN agencies: Other UN agencies are providing assistance to the people in a country or area. Some UN agencies have longtime structural aid programs or programs for special groups while others specialize in disaster relief. The people are depending on these UN agencies who have become part of the economy and society of most third world countries.

UNICEF is an example of a UN agency working for the children, UNHCR is the UN agency that deals with disaster relief.

- Government and NGOs: The relation between Government and NGOs is in most cases very good. The NGOs are supporting and in some cases completely taking over the medical assistance to the people. However, medical care remains a government responsibility.

- Government and Other UN agencies: The relation between government and other UN agencies is in most cases very good. The activities of other UN agencies are aimed mainly focused on the support of the population. In some cases the other UN agencies are completely taking over the medical care for the population from the government. The relation between the government and controlling UN agencies, most of the times forced upon the government by a UN resolution, is completely different and creates a mostly hostile relationship which can be the source of a lot of trouble.

The verification missions by the UN in Iraq after the Golf War is an excellent example of a hostile relationship between a UN agency and a government.

- NGOs and Other UN agencies: The NGOs and other UN organizations have the same focus ( the local population) and generally they are working very good together in human relief and development. The UN also sponsored many NGOs or UN projects that are executed by the NGOs.

In this chapter we have, using the theory of Kotler, built a basic model that can be used to examine and understand environments. We have distinguished the micro and macro environment, both with their own characteristics and actors or forces. The macro environment consists of the larger forces that will influence all actors in the micro environment but cannot be influenced by them. The macro environment should be monitored carefully. The micro environment consists of the actors that are mutually influencing each other. For the basic model that will be expanded in the next chapters, we identified the government, the people, NGOs and other UN agencies as relevant actors and characterized their mutual relations. In the next chapter (chapter 3) we will expand the basic model by introducing a peace force as one of the actors into the micro environment. In chapter 4, an insurgency movement will be introduced into the basic model. Finally, in chapter 5, we will introduce both a peace force as well as an insurgent into the basic model. This will result in the final model of this paper. This model can be used by planners of and officers working in peace operations in an insurgency environment.

Chapter 3: Peace operations.

"A principle of the United Nations which is absolutely binding upon all is the maintenance of peace, in order to protect human life."

Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General 1961^[10]

3.1 Introduction.

Peace operations are not limited to Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," but also include Chapter VII peace enforcement operations which can include war (Korea 1950), "Actions With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, [and] Acts of Aggression."^[11] In the post Cold War era not only was peacekeeping conducted but also a variety of other peace operations took place. Authors introduced terms such as peace building, peacemaking and Chapter VI+ operations to describe these new forms of peace operations.^[12] In this chapter, a "model for examining the environment of a peace force," will be developed by introducing a peace force as a new actor in the "basic model for examining an environment." Before constructing the new model, I will first look at the peace operations using a theory that distinguishes nine different categories of peace operations. By using the same framework and method in the next chapter to look at insurgency and counter-insurgency, it is possible to combine both peace operations and insurgency into a final model that can help planners of and officers executing peace forces to better understand and anticipate the hostile environments of peace forces, in order to be more successful in the future.

3.2 Theory on peace operations.

Peace operations are military operations in support of a diplomatic effort to maintain or restore the peace in an area of (potential) conflict.^[13] Peace operations are part of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and includes both combat and non-combat military operations.^[14] Different authors have divided peace operations in different ways. I have chosen to use the nine categories of John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra. The future-oriented view of the two writers favored this choice. In their "Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993,"^[15] they have arranged the categories of peace operations in three levels.

Level One. Level One consists of the traditional observer and peacekeeping missions conducted in support of a solution after a conflict between states has ended.

- An observer mission is defined as: a operation where military officers or civilian officials, whose principle task is to observe and report on a developing situation or on the execution of a peace agreement between previous conflicting parties, are deployed with the consent of all parties in the area.

- A peace keeping mission is defined as: a military or paramilitary operation that is undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.^[16]

Level Two. Level Two describes five categories of operation that can occur in a conflict between communities within a state, rather than between states and consists of the following five categories of operations:

- Preventive deployment is defined as: interpositioning or protecting operations at an interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising between parties.^[17]

- Internal conflict resolution measures are defined as: operations to restore and maintain order and stability within a state or area where competent civil authority has ceased to function.^[18]

- Assistance to (interim) civil authority is defined as: operations to maintain a workable level of peace and security which allows the humanitarian, human rights and civil administration elements, of a UN force or government, to function effectively.

- Protection of human relief operations is defined as: operations of a UN or multinational military relief protection force to ensure the delivery of supplies in an area where the normal process of lead agency negotiation is inadequate.^[19]

- The guarantee and denial of movement is defined as: operations that guarantee or deny movement by air, land or sea in a particular area or routes. The objective is to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population by the use of combat aircraft or to ensure that goods can reach a besieged city or community.^[20]

Level Three. The third level consists of operations in which UN forces use their heavy weapons capability to counter an inter or intra state conflict that causes a major threat to human rights or international or regional peace and security. Level three consists of the following two categories of operations.^[21]

- Sanctions are defined as: operations in support of a UN resolution and consist of the denial of supplies, diplomatic and trading privileges, and freedom of movement of an identified aggressor (Article 41 of UN Charter).

- High intensity operations are defined as: operations to enforce the ultimate sanction of the UN Security Council to counter a serious threat to the international peace and security. These operations can involve a major operation or war against an identified aggressor state (Article 42 of the UN Charter).

During the Cold War period peace operations were approached in a linear manner using a continuum as is showed in figure 3.1.^[22] Mackinlay and Chapra, like many authors, emphasize that there are no longer clearly defined boundaries between the three levels or the nine categories of operations. Rapid and nonlinear changes in the character of a peace operation is a major challenge to a UN force (see figure 3.2). In this approach, it is from a military point of view only possible to move from one category of operation to the next, after the peace force has been reorganized, re-equipped and re-mandated.^[23] Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda have taught us that a UN peace force can find itself in a situation in which the character of the operation changed or in which it suddenly has to execute more than one category of operation simultaneously.

Figure 3.1 Linear approach to peace operations.

It is clear that to be successful, a UN peace force should be structured, equipped and mandated for the most difficult category of mission it has to execute. One should not expect an observer mission to successfully protect a Human Relief operation.

This lesson was relearned by the Dutch UNPROFOR force. The Dutch peace force was organized and equipped for peacekeeping but was tasked to protect the "safe area" of Srebenica, Bosnia against an heavy armored Serbian aggressor.^[24]

Figure 3.2 Non linear approach to peace operations.

The nine categories of military operations in which UN multinational peace forces may be used are listed below in Table 3.1, in approximate order of military intensity, ranging from Observer Missions (UNTSO) and Peacekeeping (UNIFIL) to Sanctions and High Intensity Operations (Korea 1950). Table 3.1 shows the aim, the tasks, the means and examples of the different categories used by John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra in their "Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations." In their concept, Mackinlay and Chapra focus internally on the UN forces and the controllable actors and factors like: tasks, characteristics, operational concepts and the legal provisions of a UN peace force. However, the UN force is not the only one that determines the situation in the operation area as was found out the hard way by the UN forces in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. These experiences showed that they were only one of the actors that were determining the situation. The basic model from Chapter 2 will be further expanded by introducing a peace force into it. This expanded model makes it possible to study the environment of a peace force including the other relevant actors and their relationship to the peace force. It is this relationship along with the environment of a peace force that can determine the success or the failure of a UN peace operation.

Table 3.1 Categories of Peace operations.

Kind of operation	Aim & Missions	Task	Means	Examples
observer mission LEVEL I	to maintain the peace	observe, supervise, inspect, investigate, negotiate, liaison and provide early warning	unarmed officers with consent parties	UNTSO Lebanon
peacekeeping LEVEL I	to help maintain and restore peace	supervise withdrawals, separate combat forces, establish neutral zones, presence	only use of force as for self defense, small and lightly armed,	UNFICYP Cyprus
preventive deployment LEVEL II	to prevent a conflict when tension is rising	interposition, protect human relief efforts, assist local authorities or the people, law	use of force for protective tasks and self defense	Somalia
internal conflict resolution measures LEVEL II	to restore and maintain a level of peace and security in an internal conflict	to liaison, construct cease-fire, disarming cantonment, custody of weapons, supervising, reconstruction	number of parties, parties hard to identify, no consent, area of ops vague, more danger for UN personal as third party	IFOR former Yugoslavia
assistance to interim civil authority LEVEL II	to supervise and police a internal peace agreement, assist in rebuilding incl. elections	to assist in: security maintaining law and order, essential services, elections and mine clearing	max. strength but min. force, mobile, civil tasks, instability and potential violence	UNTAC Cambodia
protection of human relief ops LEVEL II	to protect the relief organizations and the people	to organize and coordinate, NEO's, providing area and transport security	speed, use of force to enable and self protection, limited duration	PROVIDE COMFORT N-Iraq
guarantee and denial of movement LEVEL II	to enforce a UN Security Council resolution	to monitor, control and deny sea and air space	no fly zones, restricted sea-areas, use of force authorized	SHARP GUARD Adriatic
sanctions LEVEL III	to enforce sanctions to deter and influence an aggressor	to patrol airspace, and close all land and sea approach	art 41 UN charter heavy weapons, use of force authorized	SHARP GUARD Adriatic
high intensity operations LEVEL III	to win and meet political objectives	all military task as in war	art 42 UN charter	DESERT STORM Iraq

3.3 Environment of a peace operation.

By introducing a peace force into the basic model that was developed in Chapter 2, we have constructed a model that can be used to understand and examine the environment of a peace force. Figure 3.3 shows the model for examining the environment of a peace force. The model includes the main actors and the forces that both influence and are being influenced by a peace force while it is conducting a peace operation. Analogous to the basic model, the environment of a peace force can be divided into the peace force's micro environment and its macro environment of a peace operation.

Figure 3.3 Model for examining the environment of a peace force.

The macro environment: As in the basic model, the macro environment is outside the control and influence of individual actors, the peace force. Because a UN force cannot influence the macro environment it is up to the UN Security Counsel to create a favorable macro environment for its forces. This can be done by isolating the operation area from unfavorable outside interference.

The operations Sky Monitor and Sharp Guard are examples of supporting operations to the UN force on the ground in the former Yugoslavia.^[25]

The micro environment: Figure 3.3 visualizes the peace force, the other actors and their mutual relations in a peace operation. Using the insights from the Chapter 2 and the above model for examining the environment of a peace force we can characterize the mutual relations within the micro environment shown above. (Relations already described in the basic model are not described again.)

- UN forces and Government: A UN force will (when possible) deploy with the consent of all parties in support of a peace agreement. In Level 2 and 3 operations it is possible that the UN force will act without consent or cooperation.

The peace operation in Cambodia was based on the Paris Accord; all parties agreed on the UN presence and a fixed timeline. Even the present relation between IFOR and the Bosnian Serbs government in Pale is one of cooperation based on the Dayton Accords.

- UN Forces and People: The people in an operation area will judge the peace force on their actions and the improvements of their own situation. Because all peace operations have humanitarian aspects, helping and protecting the people, this relation is generally friendly.

The population of both Mogadishu and Sarajevo were depending for survival on the UN food convoys. However, the relation between the UN forces and the population of Sarajevo was friendly and the relation between the UN force and the population of Mogadishu was hostile. The difference between the two was the result the non humanitarian actions conducted by the UN force in Somalia (hunt for Aideed).

- UN Forces and NGOs: Although both actors have the same humanitarian goals, there is very little coordination and cooperation between. The NGO workers will only go to the UN force for protection in emergency situations.

In Rwanda a NGO fieldhospital and a UN water installation were, for security reasons, co-located and protected by a Royal Netherlands Marine Unit after the death of two NGO workers.

- UN Forces and Other UN Agencies: These actors have the same humanitarian goals and are sometimes part of the same UN effort. The cooperation between both actors is good but the coordination needs improvement.

An example how good coordination can be established is the UNTAC mission in Cambodia. In Cambodia the UN military sector commanders provided the coordination between UN military and other UN agencies working in their sector.

The above description of the relations and the number of relevant actors can change from one category of peace operation to the other. For example: level 1 operations are normally conducted between states, observers and peacekeeping missions, so the model will contain two government actors.

Application of the model. The model for examining the environment suitable for a peace force can be used in planning, preparing, executing and evaluation of a peace operation.

- Planning and preparation. During the planning and preparation of a peace operation, the model can assist officers in identifying and characterizing the relevant actors that influence their operations. Understanding the character of the present relations within the area, the expected changes in these relations and the future characteristics of these relations with the peace force (friendly or hostile) can assist planners to organize, equip and mandate the peace force in the right way.

- Execution. During execution the peace force should monitor the relationships within the micro environment. By doing so, the peace force will detect changes early on and can prevent surprises. By detecting early that the relationship with one of the actors is declining, measures can be taken to improve the relationship or to take other appropriate actions such as, changing organization, equipment, force protection measures or changing the ROE.

- Evaluation. The model can be used to evaluate an incident or to determine why one peace operation (Cambodia) was a success and why others have failed (Bosnia or Rwanda). It can help to explain the actions or reactions of one or all the actors involved in the peace force.

The attack on the US Marines in Beirut can be better understood by using the model for examining the environment of a peace force. The US saw themselves as an impartial peace keeping force but they were training one of the actors, Lebanese Armed Forces . The Marines' relations with the Christian population were much better than their relations with the Muslim population. On the 4th of September the most powerful actor that dictated the character of the environment in Beirut, the Israeli forces, were withdrawing from Beirut. This created a vacuum and the US Marines were forced into the role of the most powerful actor, but there organization, equipment and mandate did not change as the environment changed. In the perception of the Muslim actors (PSP and PLO) the US naval gunfire bombardment on Muslim targets in the September was inevitable, given the US Marines-Muslim relationship. But so was the October 23th bombing of the marine barracks. ^[26]

In the present era peace operations involve much more than observer missions and classic peacekeeping. To understand contemporary peace operations one must understand the difference between the different categories of peace operations and their missions, tasks and available means. The character of a peace operation can change instantly as a peace force often has to conduct more than one category of operation simultaneously due to changing circumstances. To understand and anticipate these changes one must understand the environment influencing these peace operations. The environment of a peace force consists of a macro and a micro environment, both with their own characteristics. The peace forces cannot control or influence the macro environment, but they should be alert to the changes that can influence the micro environment. The UN Security Council should try to influence the macro environment in order to make it favorable to the UN peace operation. The micro environment can be influenced, but not controlled, by a peace force. The micro environment consists of all the actors including the peace force who are constantly interacting and trying to influence each other. The mutual relations between the main actors and changes in these relations determine the environment in which a peace force must operate. This is a very important factor that determine success or failure of a peace operation. The model developed in this Chapter, "the model for examining the environment of a peace force," can be used by planners and officers conducting a peace operation to better understand the complex environment. The improved understanding will result in a better organized, equipped and mandated peace forces at the start of the operation capable of adjusting and reacting to changing circumstances.

Chapter 4: Insurgency and counter-insurgency.

"As a product of the interaction between the guerrilla fighter and the people, a progressive radicalization appears which further accentuates the revolutionary characteristics of the movement and gives it a national scope."^[27]

Che Guevara, 1961

4.1 Introduction.

This chapter introduces a theoretical framework to look at an insurgency movement and counter-insurgency operations. A "model for examining the environment of an insurgent" will be constructed using the basic model from Chapter 2. The same method was used in Chapter 3 to develop, "the model for examining the environment of a peace force." In this way, the opportunity is created to build a model in the next chapter that gives insight in the combination of peace operations and insurgencies. In this chapter "a model for examining the environment of an insurgent," will be developed by introducing an insurgent as a new actor in the "basic model for examining an environment." Before constructing the new model, I will first look at insurgency and counter-insurgency using the theory of O'Neill. O'Neill's theory distinguishes different categories and characteristics of insurgency movements. When examining the insurgencies in history and the different insurgencies that are currently going on in the world, one will notice that all insurgencies are different in regard to their environment, aim, strategic approach and means. This complex mix of variables makes it hard to understand or to predict the actions or success of an insurgent. In order to better understand an insurgency one must first try to identify the goals of the insurgent, their strategic approach, and the means they can choose from. Second one must understand and the environment in which an insurgent is operating.

4.2 Theory of insurgency and counter insurgency.

In the contemporary literature there are many definitions of relevant terms as insurgency, revolution, guerrilla warfare, terrorism and freedom struggle. Some authors use these terms imprecisely and many times interchangeable. According to JCS Pub 1, an insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.^[28] Another definition of insurgency which focuses more on the political aspect is from Andrew M. Scott: "Insurgency refers to efforts to obtain political goals by an organized and primarily indigenous group using protracted, irregular warfare and allied political techniques."^[29] Depending on which definition is used, the amount of categories will vary. For this MMS paper, the definition and categories of Bard O'Neill are used. O'Neill defines insurgency as, "a struggle between a non ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.^[30]

O'Neill defined seven types of insurgencies based on the insurgent's ultimate goal and the aspects of politics the insurgent focuses on:^[31]

Table 4.1 Types of insurgency. (O'Neill)

Type of insurgency	Goal	Example
Anarchist	To eliminate all institutionalized political arrangements; they view authority relationships as unnecessary and illegitimate	Black Cells in Germany
Egalitarian (communist and socialist)	To impose a new system based on distribution equality and centrally controlled structures to mobilize the people and radically transform the social structure within an existing political community	Shining Path in Peru
Traditionalist	To displace the political system; the values they articulate are primordial and sacred ones rooted in ancestral ties and religion	Hezbollah in Lebanon
Pluralist	To displace the political system in favor of individual freedom and liberty	UNITA in Angola
Secessionist	To withdraw from the present political community and constitute a new and independent political community	Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka
Reformist	To gain autonomy and reallocate political and material resources within the present political system	Kurds in Iraq
Preservationist	To maintain the existing political system by engaging in illegal acts against non ruling groups/the authorities who want to change	Ulster Defense Assoc. in N-Ireland

All the above types of insurgencies can, depending on the environment and strength of the insurgent, choose from several strategic approaches to reach their political goals. Although some types of insurgencies generally prefer a particularly strategic approach, they all can be useful. All have been used by the different types of insurgencies throughout history. The following strategic approaches are defined by O'Neill:^[32]

- The Conspiratorial Strategy. In this strategy a small and well disciplined conspiratorial group form a party to exploit grievances that have largely alienated elements of the population from the government. The insurgent does not seek to bring the general population against the government but it will mobilize segments for mass support in riots and demonstrations. When the government is no longer sure of the loyalty of the military and police, the government can be collapsed by terrorism and mass demonstrations.

- Protracted Popular War Strategy. This strategy is the most successful and written about (China and Mao, Vietnam and Giap). This strategy assumes that the government is in a superior position of power and is unlikely to fall without a protracted and significant effort. Success will be reached by a phased battle in which the government is attacked in areas and with means in which the government is not strong. In the first stage, political organization-terrorism, the organization and infrastructure of the insurgent is put in place. The focus of the first phase is on building a structure and isolating the government from the people. In the second phase, guerrilla warfare, violent military action are aimed at the government. This makes the government to defend and militarize the country. The last phase, mobile conventional war, is started when the balance of power is in favor of the insurgent and the government can be defeated by overt military actions. The transition from one phase to another is seamless and stepping back into a previous phase is done if needed.

- Military Focus Strategy. This strategy is a variation of the protected popular war strategy introduced by Che Guevara and Fidal Castro in Cuba. Instead of relying on a revolutionary condition to arise, this strategy is based on accelerating this (political) process by an armed revolt by a core of guerrillas. This strategy is easier to initiate and requires less organizational work, less popular support at the start and less time.

- Urban (terrorist) strategy. This strategy employs terrorism within urban areas of a society to destabilize it and its government. The object is to create a crisis in both the government's inactivity or over-reaction decreases the government's credibility. The strategy uses the complexity, freedom of movement and anonymity of urban areas. The growing world population and urbanization makes the urban strategy the strategy of the future.

Table 4.2 Insurgent strategic approaches. (O'Neill)

Insurgent strategic approach	Characteristics	Example
Conspiratorial strategy (Lenin)	To remove the ruling authorities through a limited but swift use of force.	Russia 1917
Protracted popular war strategy (Mao)	To displace the present authorities using a sequential "stages" strategy based on popular support, organization and environment. Organisational/Terrorism stage, Guerrilla warfare stage, Mobile conventional warfare stage.	China 1923-1949 Vietnam 1954-1975
Military focus strategy (Che Guevara)	To remove the ruling authorities by defeating the government forces on the battlefield. Although popular support is believed to be of value but not decisive.	Cuba 1958
Urban (terrorist) Strategy (Carlos Marighella)	To turn political crisis into armed conflict by performing violent actions that will force those in power to transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. The aim is to create havoc and insecurity which will lead to loss of confidence in the government.	N-Ireland Peru 1997

These different strategic approaches can all be implemented using violent or non-violent means or a combination of both types. The insurgent will choose an approach depending on its own strength and the other players in the environment. Although some strategies focus more on violent means and others on nonviolent/political means, they all have been used throughout history. The following means are defined by O'Neill:^[33]

Table 4.3 Insurgent means. (O'Neill)

Non Violence/ Political activities	Propaganda	To influence national and international opinion and gain national and international support. Pamphlets, media broadcasts
		To influence regional/national government. Media broadcasts, meetings, protest demonstrations
	Organization	Recruiting cadres, training, raising money, creating groups
Violence	Terrorism	Bombing random or aimed, kidnapping, hijacking and sabotage
	Guerrilla warfare	Terrorism, small scale hit and run attacks, ambushes on military targets
	Conventional warfare	All military operations, excluding NBC

An insurgent can have different goals and can use different strategic approaches and means. When examining an insurgent one must pay equal attention to all three characteristics. Often the focus is on the violent incidents and the violent means that are used by an insurgent. To understand an insurgent one must examine the insurgent's goals and the insurgent's strategic approach and the means used by the insurgent. As a summary the theory of O'Neill is presented in one picture using the "Anatomy of an Insurgent."^[34]

Figure 4.1 Summery of the Theory of O'Neill.

Counter Insurgency.

In military literature there is no common definition of counter insurgency. The best definition is by NATO: "Counter-insurgency are those military, paramilitary, political, economical, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency."^[35] This definition makes very clear that a counter insurgency is more than only military actions but involves a wide range of violent and non violent actions and measures.

One of the best counter insurgency forces at this moment are the British Armed Forces, trained and experienced in the battle with the IRA in Northern Ireland.

In their doctrine, force has to be applied selectively and in a controlled and measured fashion. Physical destruction of the enemy is a means and not an end in a counterinsurgency campaign. The doctrine seeks to contribute to creating the conditions for political success with less force, more quickly and with reduced costs.^[36]

Counter-insurgency should be based on good knowledge and understanding of the insurgent and it must counter all the efforts of the insurgent movement. Governments can only be successful if they react or pro-act all the insurgency's actions with defensive or/and offensive actions. If the government cannot or will not fight in one of the areas the insurgent is fighting, the insurgent will automatically be successful in this area. Depending on the situation a government can choose the following counter-insurgency means.

Table 4.4 Insurgent-counter insurgent means. (O'Neill)

Insurgent means	Counter insurgent means
Propaganda, winning popular support	Public relations, Mil Civic Action, Psy-ops, population control, political/social reforms
Organization	Destroy insurgent organization and arrest cadres and replace with own organization
Terrorism*	Antiterrorism: defensive measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts. Counterterrorism: offensive measures to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism
Guerrilla warfare	Defeat insurgent forces, undermine morale, deny/destroy his bases and resources, counterintel
Conventual warfare	Conventual warfare based on movement and superior firepower
Outside support	Cut outside support, isolate

*Terrorism can be used by the insurgency to achieve its goals in all levels of conflict from a state of peaceful competition to general war. Terrorism creates an environment of fear from which the insurgent is trying to gain advantage. The techniques of terrorists are only limited by their own imagination and resources. Well known techniques are: bombing, assassination, kidnapping, hijacking, hostages and bank robberies.

4.3 Model for examining the environment of an insurgent.

By introducing an insurgent into the basic model that was developed in Chapter 2, we have constructed a model that can be used to understand and examine the environment of an insurgent. Figure 4.2 shows the "model for examining the environment of an insurgent." The model includes the main actors and forces that are influenced by and influencing an insurgent and its activities. Analogous to the basic model, the environment of an insurgent can be divided into the insurgent's micro environment and its macro environment.

Figure 4.2 Model for examining the environment of an insurgent.

The Macro Environment. The insurgent cannot influence the macro environment, although it is very important to him. The chances of success become much greater when the insurgent receives outside support. This outside support can be moral support, political support or military support.

Micro Environment. By introducing the insurgent into the basic model, the following main actors will be used; the insurgent, the government, the people, other UN agencies and NGOs. (See Figure 4.2) The following relations are formed.

- Insurgent movement and the Government: The government and the insurgent movement are basically at war. The government can only be successful if they immediately react or are pro-active to all the insurgency's actions. The government must have a good defensive and/or offensive campaign plan to implement. If the government cannot or will not fight on the same playing field as the insurgent, the insurgent will be automatically be the victor.

Since 1975 the government of Indonesia has been fighting a counter insurgency war in East Timor. The Indonesian approach untill 1994 was purely military and didn't solve the problem. Jakarta came under great outside pressure after the massacre at the Santa Cruz cemetery in 1991. In this incident government soldiers killed between 150 and 200 demonstrators. In 1994 the government changed its counter insurgency strategy into a civic military strategy. Active combined hunter units worked together with security forces and civic action units (these units build bridges, irrigation systems, roads and schools) in East Timor. All that now remains of the East Timor insurgency are perhaps 100 guerrillas in the hills. The Indonesian government has nearly solved the problem and believes that civic action will turn the East Timorese into their friends.^[37]

- Insurgent movement and the People: The strategic approach used by the insurgent determines the importance the insurgent gives to this relationship. In a protracted popular war strategy the relation with the people is the main focus. In a Military focus strategy or the Urban terrorist strategy the relation with the people is considered less important. The support of the population can be voluntarily or forced. This aspect of the relation between the insurgent and the population is visualized as a continuum (see figure 4.3). The insurgent will strive to move the relation to the right.

Figure 4.3 Relation between the insurgent and the population. (Scott)[38]

- Insurgent movement and the NGOs: This relation is sometimes a contradiction. On the one hand the insurgent uses the humanitarian and medical support given by the NGOs to supplement its own logistics. On the other hand the insurgent views NGOs as an outside interference that supports the government which makes the NGOs a target for attacks or hostage by the insurgent.

Examining a situation in a country in which an insurgent movement is operating and in order to predict the future success of the insurgency, one must focus on both the macro and micro environment of the insurgency. The macro environment gives the insurgent the possibilities of external support. The complex interrelationship between the actors in a country, the micro environment, determines whether the insurgency will be successful or not. The lack of public support or a good counter-insurgency policy by the government are major factors, as shown in the model. The insurgent itself is the main player in the environment and can be better understood using the theory of O'Neill. Based on the goals of the insurgent, O'Neill distinguishes seven categories of insurgency. As far as strategic approaches are concerned, O'Neill sees four general approaches: the conspiratorial, the protracted popular war, the military focus and the urban warfare. The means used by the insurgent can be divided into non-violent activities (propaganda and organization) and violent means (terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventual warfare).

An examination and understanding of the goals, the strategic approach and the means of the insurgent, as well as the micro and macro environment the insurgent is operating in, is required in order to predict success or failure of the insurgent movement.

Chapter 5: Model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment.

5.1 Introduction.

In this chapter, the theory and models of the previous three chapters will be used to construct "a model to analyze peace forces in an insurgency environment." This model will give insight into the relationship between a peace force and an insurgent that can assist officers planning and executing peace operations. It provides a better way to understand and anticipate the hostile environments in which peace operations are conducted. By introducing both a peace force and an insurgent as new actors in the "basic model for examining environments" it is possible to use the results of the previous two chapters and focus primarily on the relationship between the peace force and the insurgent. In this manner, the threats to and limitations of a UN force, caused by the insurgent, can be made clear. The "model for examining a peace force in an insurgency environment" will answer the central question posed in the first chapter, "How can we better understand and anticipate the hostile environments of peace forces caused by an insurgent, in order to be more successful in the future?"

5.2 A model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment.

The problems of the UN peace operations are not limited to one single operation but have occurred in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. A solution must be found in order to let the UN progress as a world peace organization. The problems of the recent UN peace operations are about UN soldiers and the problems they engage while trying to accomplish their mission. To examine peace operations in an insurgency environment another model can be used. This model is an abstract of reality and helps us focus on the elements that are part of the present problems in UN peace operations. The use of this model also leads us to a more focused collection of information and direct questions towards the defined parts of the model, the elements. This model or framework consists of the elements, the characteristics of those elements and their mutual relations.

The environment of a peace force and an insurgent. The environment, both macro and micro, in which a peace force and an insurgent are operating and working to reach their goals can be constructed by introducing the peace force and the insurgent as new actors into the "basic model to examining environments" from Chapter 2.

Figure 5.1 Model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment.

The macro-environment: Understanding and constant monitoring of the macro environment is necessary for all leaders within a peace force as well as within an insurgency movement. A UN Peace Force cannot influence the macro environment, so it is up to the UN Security Counsel to create a favorable macro environment for its forces. On the other hand, the chances of success for the insurgent are becoming greater when the insurgent manages to get outside support. This conflict of interest, between the peace force and the insurgent, can influence the mutual relationship from the start of the operation.

Micro environment. When the peace force and the insurgent are introduced in the basic model they become part of the micro environment. The following main actors occur and will be used as the elements of the "model for examining a peace force in an insurgency environment": the peace force, the insurgent, the government, the people, other UN agencies and NGOs. (See Figure 5.1.)

Elements of the working model. The situation for the UN force will develop as the result of the characteristics and relationships between the actors. The following actors, their characteristics and relationships are parts of the model.

- The peace force. A multinational UN Peace Force structured and equipped to execute a peace operation. The nine categories of peace operations from Chapter 2 are used.

- The insurgent. An insurgent movement with its own goals, strategic approach and means. The theory of O'Neill from Chapter 3 is used.

- NGO. These are international relief organizations working in most of the countries. The NGOs generally have universal values and are based in and financed by the western societies.

- Other UN agencies. These other UN agencies, like UNDP or UNHCR , are working in many troubled countries around the world. Their goals are not linked to a UN operation and are often already working in the area before a UN force arrives and will stay after the forces have left.

- The government. The government is the authority in the country with all the power- army, police, laws and taxes. They also have the obligations to protect and provide services or Medicare.

- The people. The population in the operation area.

Relations between the elements of the model. The six actors have mutual relationships, which gives a total of 15 relationships within this model. In the previous three chapters, with the exception of the relationship between the insurgent and the peace force, all relations within the "model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment" have already been described and are not described again in this chapter. All these relationships influence the environment in which a UN peace force and an insurgent are operating. The relationship between the UN force and the insurgent is the most important in the context of this paper.

5.3 Relationship between a peace force and an insurgent.

The relationship between the peace force and the insurgent is important because it determines the safety of the UN peace force and possible obstruction to the UN peace operation. A good understanding of threats and limitations, resulting from this relationship is only possible if one understands both peace operations and insurgency/counter insurgency. Hostilities or obstructions can be the result of conflicting goals (goal conflict) or opposing strategies (conflict in strategic approach). The threat or limitations that these conflicts will cause can be determined by a comparison of means (means comparison).

Goal conflict. One can compare the goals of the different types of insurgencies and the goals of the different levels of peace operations to determine "goal conflicts." When there is a conflict between the goals of the peace force and the goals of the insurgency movement, it provides the insurgent with a "motive" (a why?) to target or obstruct the UN force. To determine if or in which way this threat will be effected, one needs to further examine the strategic approaches and means of the insurgent.

The goals of the nine types of peace operations from Chapter 3 and those of the seven types of insurgencies from Chapter 4 will be repeated and compared.

The following goals were distinguished for the nine different types of peace operations in Chapter 3 (see table 2.1): Level 1. In Level 1 we have distinguished the observer mission and peacekeeping. The goal of Level 1 peace operations is to maintain and support the peace or a solution reached between rival states. Although Level 1 operations are conducted with the consent of all parties, the insurgent can still have a "motive" to target the peace force. An attack or obstruction will be less likely when the insurgent is a party in the agreement in which a UN Level 1 operation is based. Level 2. Level 2 consists of five categories of operations that usually occur in a conflict between the parties within a state. Preventive deployment (to prevent a conflict ) and internal conflict resolution measures (restore and maintain peace and security) are aimed at preventing conflict and maintaining the status quo. Assistance to an interim civil authority (assist in an orderly transfer of power) is aimed at enabling change. Protection of human relief operations (to protect relief personnel and goods) and guarantee or denial movement (to enable/prevent mobility) are aimed at helping and protecting the population. Level 2 operations are preferably, but not necessary, conducted with the consent of all parties. Level 3. The goal of Level 3 operations is to counter intra or inter state conflicts that cause a threat to international human rights, peace and security. The goal of a Level 3 operations has been the same as in Level 1 and 2 operations but the operation is executed with all necessary force.

Comparing the goals of the different types of peace operations and the different types insurgencies gives the following result: Anarchists are normally not taking part in any negotiations and therefore seldom a party in a peace agreement . The anarchist wants to eliminate the arrangements the peace force is supporting and opposes the UN organization itself. The goal of the anarchist and the goals of all types of peace operations are conflicting. As a result of this the anarchist has "a motive" to target or obstruct all types of peace operations with the exemption of protecting humanitarian relief operations and the guarantee/denial of movement. These last two types of operations are aimed at protection and helping the population. Egalitarians, traditionalists, pluralists, secessionists and reformists are all opposed to the present system and want to change it. The only difference between these different insurgencies is the character of the new system. The following peace operations are in support of maintaining the present situation: observer missions, peacekeeping, preventive deployment, internal conflict resolution measures, sanctions and high intensity operations. As a result, the insurgencies have "a motive" to target or obstruct a peace force during the above mentioned six types of operations. These six types of insurgents have no conflicting goals with the following types of peace operations: protection of human relief operations, guarantee/denial of movement and assistance to interim civil authority. The first two types of operations because they are aimed to protect and help the population and the last type because it facilitates change (if the change favors the insurgent). The goal of the preservationist is to maintain the present situation/system and as a result the preservationist has "a motive" to target or obstruct assistance to interim civil authority, sanctions and high intensity operations. The goals of all the others are not conflicting. Table 5.1 gives a overview of the possible conflicting goals. It shows that the majority of the goals of the different types of peace operations are in conflict with the goals of the different types of insurgencies. The main reason for this is that the goal of insurgencies is to change the present situation and create a new one based on their political beliefs. The goal of a peace operation is to prevent hostilities or human disasters by maintaining the present situation/system.

Table 5.1 Goal Conflicts.

TYPE OF	anarchist	egalitarian	traditionalist	pluralist	secessionist	reformist	preservationist
Level 1
observer mission	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
peacekeeping	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Level 2
preventive deployment	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
Intern conflict resolution measures	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no
assist to intrim civil authority	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes
protection of human relief ops	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
guarantee/denial of movement	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
Level 3
sanctions	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
high intensity operations	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

*In the above matrix the UN operations are separately compared with the categories of insurgencies. As stated in Chapter 3, an UN force can be tasked to conduct two or more categories of operation at the same time. In these combination-situations one should always compare all executed types of operations to find out if there is a goal conflict.

Conflicting approaches. The second comparison one can make in order to better understand the relation between the UN force and the insurgent is the comparison of the approaches used by both peace forces and insurgents. If the approaches used are in conflict with each other, the UN force will hinder the insurgent in reaching its objectives and is likely to become a target. In this chapter, the threat to a peace force is divided into low, medium and high, depending on how much the approaches of the peace force and the insurgent are conflicting. To determine in which way this threat will be executed by the insurgent, further examination of the means available to both actors is needed Below the approaches of the nine types of peace operations from Chapter 3 and the four strategic approaches available to an insurgent (Chapter 4) will be repeated and compared.

The following approaches were distinguished for the nine different types of peace operations in Chapter 3 (Table 2.2): Level 1. Level 1 will be executed with the consent of all parties. We have distinguished the observer mission and peacekeeping operations. The observer mission uses observation, supervising, inspections, investigations etc. to support the peace or agreement between parties. A peacekeeping force uses supervision, separation of combat forces, presence and establishment of neutral zones to maintain or restore the peace or agreement between parties. Level 2. Level 2 operations consist of five types of peace operations that usually occur in a conflict between parties within a state. These operations are preferably, but not necessary, conducted with the consent of all parties. Preventive deployment (interpositioning and maintaining law and order), internal conflict resolution measures (construct cease-fire, disarming, cantonment, custody of weapons and reconstruction) and assistance to an interim civil authority (maintaining law and order, enable elections and mineclearing) are aimed at maintaining or restoring peace and security. Protection of Human relief operations (provide security for an area or transports and neo's) is aimed at the protection of relief personnel and goods. Guarantee or denial movement (monitor, control and denial to operation area) are aimed to enforce UN resolutions to influence a hostile situation. Level 3. High intensity operations consist of all military tasks, as in war, and are aimed at solving the problems in the operation area. Sanctions ( patrol and close approaches to operation area) are aimed to enforce UN resolutions to influence a hostile situation.

The nine categories of insurgents, depending on the situation and their own strength, will choose from one of four different strategic approaches. These strategic approaches will be described briefly and compared with the approaches used by a peace force. The way the approaches used by the insurgent and the peace force are in conflict, determines the level of threat to the peace force to be targeted by the insurgent. The conspiratorial strategy uses a limited but swift use of force to remove the ruling authorities. The level of threat to observer missions, peacekeeping and protection of human relief operations is low because both of the Level 1 operations are conducted with the consent of all parties to maintain an agreement and level 1 operations possess little or no military capabilities to obstruct the conspiratorial strategic approach. Protection of human relief operations are aimed at the protection of relief operations and goods but not at the conflicting parties. Preventive deployment, internal conflict resolution measures and assistance to an interim authority are aimed at maintaining or restoring peace and security. The activities of the peace force and the increased military capabilities of the peace force can hinder a success by the insurgent. As a result there is a medium threat to Level 2 peace operations. Guarantee/denial of movement, sanctions and high intensity operations directly obstruct the conspiratorial strategy by limiting the insurgent's resources, movement and countering his military activities. As a result, the level of threat to peace forces executing this type of operations will be high.

The Protracted popular war strategy uses sequential stages to displace the present authorities. It is based on popular support and uses three sequential stages.^[39] First is the strategic defensive in which the insurgent concentrates on survival, organization and low-level violence or terrorism. Second is the strategic stalemate, which is characterized by guerrilla warfare. Third is the strategic offensive, in which the insurgent uses mobile conventional attacks on a large scale to defeat or collapse the government. In the first stage, the accent will be on organization, gaining popular support, and limited (terrorist) actions. All peace operations are aimed at improving the general situation in the operation area and the situation of the people. This counters the insurgent's activities to gain popular support. Peace operations that are also supporting the government's efforts to maintain law and order, will obstruct the first stage of the insurgent's strategy even more. This is the case with preventive deployment, internal conflict resolution measures, assistance to an interim authority , guarantee/denial of movement, sanctions and high intensity operations. In the guerrilla warfare stage and mobile warfare stage the peace operations can obstruct the strategy of the insurgent in two ways. The first is the activities of the peace force to improve the general situation and the situation of the population. This is in competition with the insurgent's ongoing efforts to gain popular support. The second is the military activities that are conducted in Level 2 and 3 peace operations that hinder or prevent an insurgent's success on the battlefield. As a result, the level of threat, based on all the three stages of a protected popular war, is high for all peace operations with the exception of the observer mission (very limited influence on population and no military power), peacekeeping (limited influence on population and limited military power) and protection of human relief operations (great influence on population and limited focus of the military power).

The Military Focus Strategy seeks to remove the ruling authorities by defeating the government's armed forces on the battlefield. Popular support is believed to be important but not decisive to success. The military capabilities and activities conducted in Level 1 are limited and have little obstruction to the Military Focus Strategy. The same limitation applies to the protection of human relief operations. The military activities of a peace force conducting a Level 2 and 3 peace operation hinders and can even prevent the insurgent in defeating the military forces of the government on the battlefield. The level of threat to a peace force caused by an insurgent using the Military Focus Strategy will be the same as with an insurgent using the Protracted Popular War Strategy.

The Urban (terrorist) Strategy tries to turn political crisis into an armed conflict by performing violent actions that will create havoc and insecurity in a society. This crisis will lead to an increasing loss of confidence in the government. There will be a medium level of threat to a peace force regardless the kind of operation it is conducting, as the crisis and loss of confidence in the government will increase once "blue helmets" are targeted. The security operations being conducted in support of the mission in the operation area are even more likely to become a target. With the exception of observer mission and the protection of human relief operations the level of threat is high.

The different strategic approaches used by insurgents and those of peace operations have now been compared. For the Level 1 operations and the protection of human relief operations the threat is generally the lowest because these type of operations are limited and are normally conducted with the consent of all parties. The level of threat for the Level 2 and 3 operations is high because they are directly obstructing or preventing the success of an insurgent. For all peace operations the threat is the highest if confronted with an insurgent that uses the urban terrorist approach. A successful terrorist attack on a UN peace force is high profile and will further increase the crisis and insecurity in the society and will contribute to the loss of confidence in the government by both domestic and foreign actors.

Table 5.2 Strategic approach conflict.

TYPE OF STRATEGIC APPROACHES	Conspiratorial strategy	Protracted popular war strategy	Military focus strategy	Urban terrorist strategy
Observer mission	low	low	low	medium
Peacekeeping	low	medium	medium	high
Preventive deployment	medium	high	high	high
Internal conflict resolution measures	medium	high	high	high
Assistance to civil authority	medium	high	high	high
Protection of human relief ops	low	medium	medium	medium
Guarantee and denial of movement*	high	high	high	high
Sanctions*	high	high	high	high
High intensity operations	high	high	high	high

*In above matrix the UN operations are separately compared with the different strategic approaches of an insurgent. As stated in Chapter 3, a UN force can be tasked to conduct two or more categories of operation at the same time. In these combination situations one should always prepare for the highest threat.

Comparison of means. The insurgent can limit a peace force in successfully accomplishing its mission by using its means against the peace force. The peace force shall try to limit the effects of the insurgent's obstructive or hostile actions with all the means it has available. The comparison of the means to both the peace force and the insurgent gives insight in the limitations an insurgent can cause to a peace operation.

The criteria for comparison is the availability of active and passive counter insurgent means and the violent/non-violent means used by an insurgent from Chapter 4.

Means of an insurgent. The means available to an insurgent are violent and non-violent. The non-violent means available to an insurgent are propaganda, organization and gaining popular and outside support (pamphlets, media, demonstrations, recruiting, raising money and creating groups). The violent means are terrorism (indiscriminate bombing, kidnapping, sabotage and hijacking), guerrilla warfare (terrorism, hit and run attacks and ambushes on military targets) and conventional war (offensive and defensive military operations).

Counter insurgency means. The counter insurgency means available to a peace force are passive and active counter insurgency means. The capabilities of Level 1 operations are very limited. The unarmed observer missions have no active and no real passive counter- insurgency capability (i.e. bulletproof vest and a helmet) to counter both the violent and non-violent means of the insurgent. The small and lightly armed peacekeeping forces are especially vulnerable to ambushes and terrorist attacks because of the dispersed way of operating. The passive counter insurgency capabilities are limited for protection (weapons for self protection, limited armored personnel carriers, personal protection and fixed shelters) but are still inadequate to protect effectively against terrorism, guerrilla or conventional warfare by the insurgent. The Level 2 peace forces are organized, equipped and mandated more robustly to carry out tasks without the consent of the parties (the use of force is not limited to self defense). Psyop units can counter the insurgent's propaganda. Psyop units, anti and counter terrorist units, APC's, limited airsupport and firepower assets can be part of a Level 2 peace force to provide better, but still limited, active and passive counter insurgency capabilities against all means of the insurgent. The Level 3 operations have good capabilities to counter the passive and active means of an insurgent because they are not limited in organization, equipment or mandate. Level 3 forces are organized and equiped to win the war and accomplish a mission.

The capabilities of a UN Force, active as well as passive, to limit the obstructive or threatening actions of the insurgent, are good in Level 3 operations. A Level 2 operation lacks the overwhelming force that is part of Level 3. However, the capabilities are still considered limited. Level 1 operations have no active and limited passive capabilities to counter the violent means of an insurgent. Peace forces in Level 1 and 2 are especially vulnerable to ambushes and terrorist attacks because of their dispersed way of operating. The big differences in capabilities between the three levels of peace operations indicate that a peace force structured, equipped and mandated to execute a certain level of peace operation, is limited in its capabilities to execute a combination missions involving a higher level peace operation. On the other hand, a force structured and equipped to conduct in a high intensity operation can easily perform peacekeeping missions, as was clearly demonstrated by IFOR.

Table 5.3 Comparison of the means available to a peace force and an insurgent.

MEANS	Political propaganda	Organization	Terrorism	Guerrilla warfare	Convential warfare
Level 1	no active or passive means	no active or passive means	no active and very limited passive means	no active or passive means	no active or passive means
Level 2	limited active and passive means	limited active and passive means	limited active and passive means	limited active and passive means	limited active and passive means
Level 3	good active and passive means	good active and passive means	good active and passive means	good active and passive means	good active and passive means

*In the above matrix the UN operations are separately compared with the different strategic approaches of an insurgent. As it was stated in Chapter 3, an UN force can be tasked to conduct two or more categories of operation at the same time. In these combination situations one should always prepare for the highest threat.

Opportunities. The relationship between the peace force and the insurgent is sometimes directly influenced or is influenced by the other actors. This can offer some opportunities to the peace force to change the environment to its favor. Other actors that directly influence the situation for both the UN force and the insurgent are: the UN force and the other UN agencies, the UN force and the NGOs, and the relationship of the people with the other actors. Other UN agencies are active in most of the peace operation's areas. At this moment, the UN force and the other UN agencies like UNHCR, UNDP and UNFOOD are working independently and with little or no coordination. From the insurgent's perspective all UN actors are perceived as one big outside threat to them. The UN agencies countering their non-violent means and the UN military force countering their violent means make targets of all the UN workers and soldiers alike. These other UN agencies are working in the most troubled countries in the world and are often already working in the area before a UN force arrives and will stay after the soldiers have left. Coordination of goals at the policy level and coordination of operations and protection at the executing level is required. The coordination will enhance the protection of the UN workers and will offer the peace force an excellent source of intelligence and the combined efforts are more effective against the insurgent's non violent means. NGOs are currently operating in many of the possible future operation areas of a UN force. Some have been working there for years, while others are there for instant humanitarian relief operations. NGOs work within or very close to the local population and often even make use of the local work force. The NGOs, as the other UN agencies, are a valuable intelligence source available to a UN force working in the same area. However, not all NGOs are willing to cooperate with any military. On the other hand, the NGOs are often using military transport for distribution and military protection when things go wrong. Most NGOs are western based and financed. Using the common goal and the interdependency of the NGOs and a UN force, it is possible to increase the mutual cooperation between the UN force and the NGOs. This cooperation will enlarge the possibilities of the UN force to take better active and passive actions against an insurgent based on improved intelligence. Government. The lack of passive and active counter insurgency means of the peace force can be neutralized by the government's armed forces and police. Close cooperation with the local authorities can decrease the vulnerability of a peace force; however, safety and force protection always stays an unit responsibility. (The bombing of the Khobar Towers on the 25 June 1996 is an example of both). People. The people should be the focus of the whole situation. This is often forgotten by most of the other actors. The presence of the UN force, especially in Level 2 operations, is because of humanitarian relief or human rights violations. The insurgent often sees the support of the people as a condition for success. The government needs the support of its people but also needs to protect them. The people of a country or area must never be looked upon as being a subject of the power struggle between the actors. The people are an actor as are the others and can influence the entire situation by their actions.

Examples of situations changed as the result of the position of the local population are: The way the Somalian people turned on the UN peace force after all the food that was brought. The way the people of Peru protected themselves and fought against the guerrillas. The way the population of Sarajevo continued living regardless the siege of their city.

Use of the model. The model can be used in three different phases of a peace operation: the preparation, the execution and the evaluation of a peace operation. During the preparation phase, the model can be used to provide insight into the present relations between the actors and the influence the introduction will have on them. The future relation between the insurgent and the peace force can be studied. By using this information the UN peace force can be structured, equipped and mandated to meet the requirements (also of combination operations). This model suggests to the UNSC which supporting operations to neutralize the influence of the macro environment (stop external support) might be initiated. During the executing phase of the operations the model can be used to keep track of changes in the micro environment of the UN peace force. The relation between the peace force and the insurgent needs special attention and can be studied using the model. A change in the relations with one of the actors can be detected early on so that the proper actions can be taken in a timely manner.

The environment in which the UN force was operating in Somalia changed dramatically when the decision was made to neutralize warlord Aideed. The C2 and force structure stayed the same which resulted in a costly raid by the 10th Mountain Division. The Rangers, light Infantry executed the raid without the support of US tanks or APC's.^[40]

In the post operation phase the model can be used to evaluate why operations went right or wrong (why was Cambodia a success and Bosnia a failure?). The model can be used to generate lessons learned.

In this chapter, the "model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment," was introduced based on the theory of Chapter 3 and 4. Using this model, it was possible to present an abstract picture of the complex reality a UN peace force faces while executing a peace operation. The model can be used during the preparation, the execution and for the evaluation of a UN operation. Using the model, the threats (including motive and threat level) to the UN peace force were made clear by comparing the goals and approaches of the UN force and the insurgent. By comparing the means of the insurgent and the counter insurgent means of the UN peace force one has more insight into the limitations an insurgent can cause to a peace operation. Finally some opportunities based on cooperation with the other actors in the model to increase the capabilities of a peace force to counter an insurgent were addressed.

Chapter 6: Review.

6.1 Introduction.

The results of the research will be evaluated in this chapter. The main result of this masters paper is the developed model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment (see model 6.1). This model that can be used as a tool in the planning for, the execution and the evaluation of peace operations. The use of the model can help future peace operations be more successful. The model makes officers participating in the planning and execution of peace operations more aware of the macro and micro environment of a peace force and the way both are determining the success of the peace operation.

Figure 6.1 Model for examining a peace operation in an insurgency environment.

More results are gained from both building the model as well as from the completed model itself. Two facets will be highlighted: the theory versus the practice, and, the general insights gained.

6.2 Theory versus practice.

The complexity of UN peace operations in the modern era makes it difficult to understand why recent operations in Somalia, Bosnia or Rwanda have failed. This complexity makes it hard to improve future UN peace operations in a way that they can cope with the violent challenges that have become part of peace operations in the New Era. The use of a theoretical model can serve as a starting-point to help to better understand this complexity by identifying the most important actors influencing the UN peace operations and their mutual relations. The basis for the introduced model was the theory of Kotler, which made it possible to construct a basic model to examine situations and environments. By introducing the theory of Mackinlay and Chapra into this basic model, it became possible to examine and better understand peace operations. The introduction of O'Neill's theory into the basic model made it possible to examine and better understand the situations of insurgency and counter insurgency. The last step in the paper was to combine both the model for peace operations and insurgency into one. This final product, "a model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment," can be of practical value for people working in the every day reality of peace operations. The model can assist planners by organizing, equipping, preparing and mandating a future peace force. It can help officers participating in peace operations to better understand the complex situations they are confronted with, and finally, it can be used as an evaluation tool for incidents or operations for lessons learned. The theoretical "model for examining peace operations in an insurgency environment," can be a useful tool to assist in improving future peace operations and as a result increase the safety of soldiers involved.

6.3 Insights gained.

During the building of the model, the following insight was gained:

The model proved to be an useful tool for officers to analyze the peace operation they participated in. It gave them insights into the hostile environment in which they worked. The model gives insights in the relationships of a peace force conducting a peace operation; especially in the relationships with an insurgent. The environment of a peace force can be divided into a macro and a micro environment. Both are important to success of the peace operation; but, because of the different characteristics of the two environments, they should be treated differently. The macro environment is outside the direct control and influence of the peace force. Therefore the peace force should monitor it for changes. It is up to the Security Council to provide a favorable macro environment through supporting operations. The micro environment is outside the control but inside the influence of the peace force. The peace force is part of the micro environment. The micro environment should be monitored by the peace force for change and also influenced by it when required. The most important relation within the model is the relation between the insurgent and the peace force. Limitations and threats to the peace force are a direct result of this relationship. By comparing the goals of the insurgent and the peace force, one can determine possible "goal conflicts" that give the insurgent a motive to target or obstruct the peace force. The majority of the goals in the nine categories of peace operations distinguished by Mackinlay and Chopra were conflicting with the goals of the seven categories of insurgency distinguished by O'Neill. The main reason for this is the fact that most insurgencies aim to directly change the present situation in an area, while the peace force is aimed at preventing hostilities and maintaining the present situation. Comparing the approaches used by the insurgents and the peace forces gives insight into the conflicting approaches. Conflicting approaches could obstruct or even prevent the insurgent's success. The insurgent's reaction, the threat to a peace force, is the direct result of the conflicting approaches. For Level 1 operations and protection of human relief operations the threat level was considered low. For Level 2 and 3 operations the threat level was considered high because they directly can obstruct the insurgent. The threat level for all types of peace operations was the highest when the insurgent used the Urban Terrorist Strategy. By comparing the means available to both the insurgent and the peace force, one could determine the possibilities for the different types of peace operations to limit the threat or obstruction caused by an insurgent. The Level 1 operations had no active and passive counter insurgency capabilities. In Level 2, these capabilities were increased but still considered limited. Only in Level 3 were the passive and active capabilities adaquate to counter the violent and non-violent means of the insurgent.

During the building of the model the following insights were gained about peace operations. Peace operations can be divided into nine different categories of military peace operations. These peace operations have their own characteristics and range in military intensity from UN Observer Missions to High Intensity Operations, like the Korean War of 1950. To understand contemporary peace operations, one must understand the differences between the different categories and their missions, tasks and available means. The character of a peace operations can quickly change because of the sudden change in the environment or circumstances. Peace forces can suddenly be tasked to execute more than one category of peace operation simultaneously as part of the same mission. These changes in the environment and of the peace operation will be non-linear. Peace forces should been given the capabilities to adapt to these sudden changes by integrating these capabilities from the start or by rapid augmentation. Peace operations can work in an insurgency environment and do not have to be failures from the start. However, the planners and executing officers of future peace forces should pay attention to the relationships with the actors in the micro environment and organize, equip and mandate the peace force accordingly. The capabilities of all the peace operations to counter the insurgent would be increased by better coordination with the other actors in the micro environment. Better cooperation with NGO and other UN agencies would be especially favorable.

During the building of the model the following insights were gained about insurgencies: To better understand an insurgency movement, one must examine and identify the goals, the strategic approaches used and the means available to the insurgent. All seven types of insurgencies can choose from the four strategic approaches by O'Neill. Within these strategic approaches a mix of violent and non-violent means can be used. The growing world population and urbanization makes the urban terrorist strategy the strategy of the future. Counterinsurgency can be only successful if both the violent as well as the non-violent means of the insurgent are countered. An insurgency movement will automatically be successful in and gain strength from those areas where the government will not or cannot counter its activities. The importance of public support for an insurgent depends on the strategy used by the insurgent. For the protracted popular war strategy, the public support is an essential element of success, but, this is not the case for the conspiratorial, military focus and urban terrorist strategy. Therefore counterinsurgency does not automatically means "hearts and minds."

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