Seamless Integration of the Total Force Marine Corps: Myth or Reality?

CSC 1997

Subject Area - General

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Seamless Integration of the Total Force Marine Corps: Myth or Reality?

Author: Lieutenant Colonel Paul K. Durkin, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: Although the Marine Corps has attempted to broadly and seamlessly integrate the Marine Forces Reserve into the "Total Force Marine Corps," the resulting integration is anything but broad and seamless.

Background: The United States Marine Corps is our Nation's force in readiness or 9-1-1 force, capable of rapidly responding to myriad contingencies around the globe. Earning this title leads to a host of responsibilities not the least of which is continued forward presence and high operational tempo. General Charles C. Krulak, the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps, recognized this challenge in his Commandant's Planning Guidance of 1 July 1995 and directed the broad and seamless integration of our active and reserve components into an indivisible and balanced warfighting force. Further, General Krulak acknowledged the criticality of this realization to the future success of the U.S. Marine Corps. Initiatives to integrate the Reserve component into the "Total Force Marine Corps" are traced back to the mid- to late-1980's and include a number of options which are in varying degrees of implementation. Training and equipment procurement processes form the cornerstone of the Commandant's approach to broad and seamless integration of the "Total Force Marine Corps." Integrated training is now a goal and objective of every Marine Corps training event at the battalion/squadron level and above. Further, the Marine Forces Reserve shall be equipped to the same standards as their active component counterparts. Given the renewed and revitalized emphasis by the current Commandant on fighting as a total force, initiatives to seamlessly integrate the Reserve component into the "Total Force Marine Corps" continue to proceed slowly however. As General Krulak nears the mid-point of his Commandantcy, operational tempo experienced by the U.S. Marine Corps remains high and the goal of an indivisible fighting force remains elusive. In an effort to accelerate progress in this arena a "Reserve Integration Working Group" has been formed at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command with the goal to focus efforts toward a more rapid integration schedule.

Recommendation: That the Marine Forces Reserve be integrated into the "Total Force Marine Corps" by way of direct integration into the active duty component forming a seamless bond and unity of command. Further, innovative approaches to Reserve component members' military occupational specialty qualifications must be exploited to facilitate seamless integration of Reserve component Marines, as well as increase the readiness posture of the "Total Force Marine Corps."

" . . . there is only one Marine Corps--a Total Force Marine

Corps. The days of two Marine Corps are gone . . . forever.

our active and reserve components will be broadly and

seamlessly integrated, and indivisible as a balanced

warfighting force. The full acceptance of this reality is

critical to our future."¹

Introduction.

Our 31st Commandant's words reflect a vision of "a Marine Corps for the 21st century."² However, today's global, lethal battlefield and American domestic economic indicators may intervene in the meantime; they are on a crash course. In a quest to marry the two together, our military services are under siege to balance operational effectiveness with resource efficiencies. "'Total Force,' a concept first advanced in the 1970s to maintain an all volunteer military,"³ is a pillar designed to balance the effectiveness versus efficiency equation. Today's "Total Force" refers to the integration of active and reserve components to form a seamless warfighting force. The "Marine Corps Total Force," Marine Forces, Atlantic; Marine Forces, Pacific; and Marine Forces, Reserve (MarForRes); advances the integration concept. However, initiatives to buttress the three entities into one seamless whole fall short of the mark. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, this paper will examine "where we are" in implementing the "broad, seamless integration"⁴ referred to in our 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG). Second, concrete options of institutional changes required to optimize use of the Marine Corps Reserve component are explored. The underlying issue is to harness and exploit the full capabilities of the MarForRes as an integral partner in the "Total Force Marine Corps."

General Background of Marine Forces Reserve.

Before proceeding, a cursory background of the MarForRes sets the stage for developing several ideas. First, the mission of the MarForRes provides a starting point. Next, capabilities of the MarForRes will be introduced to show how the Force dovetails with its active component counterpart.

The mission of each reserve component (MarForRes) is to "provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such times as the national security requires...to achieve ...more units and persons...than are in the regular components."⁵ The primary wartime reserve mission includes augmentation to and reinforcement of active forces. Thumbnail definitions of the two terms involve: augmentation--forces ordered to a zero manned or cadre unit; reinforcement--additive to existing force structure. Now with an overview of the reserve component mission stated, let us turn our attention to the capabilities inherent in the reserve establishment to carry out this mission.

For brevity sake, the MarForRes generally possess similar capabilities to its active counterparts. More importantly, the capabilities of our Marine Corps to respond to the ever-increasing number of global contingency operations are enhanced by the commitment of reserve forces that provide staying power to the "Total Force Marine Corps." Reserve component organizations play a crucial role in America's ability to project and sustain military force. The Reserve component's role is crucial regardless of the national military strategy, whether that be the two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies envisioned in our current National Military Strategy⁶ or a derivative thereof. A recent news article refers to a potential shift in our National Military Strategy to reflect the continued "demand to participate in peace operations and other 'small scale contingencies'," such as humanitarian relief operations.⁷

All this said, many may be inclined to smirk with a sheepish grin saying, "Oh yeah, I have heard this story before or 'been there, done that.'" Truth be told, the leverage, synergy, and reality of the "Total Force" will be relied upon more in the future to make up for increased operational tempo and flat line or negative growth in military structure.

One only need to refer back to the National Military Strategy or consider the potential stark reality of the future defense posture to recognize the importance and significance of working as a total force defense team. The price we pay now by proactively integrating the MarForRes into active duty training evolutions and contingency support operations in peacetime may be worth their weight in gold (blood) in a real world conflict.

Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG)--MarForRes Marching Orders.

Immediately upon assumption as Commandant of the Marine Corps on 1 July 1995, General Charles C. Krulak disseminated his Commandant's Planning Guidance (CPG). One of several underlying warfighting themes woven within the CPG is the "Total Force Marine Corps," the way we will respond to future contingencies. Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM reflects one past case of successfully integrating the Marine Forces Reserve into the Total Force in a real-world crisis. However, future contingencies involving the United States will likely be painted on a sharply divergent canvas. In particular, future adversaries will not likely allow the build-up of American combat power to go unchecked. The essence of this concept and its importance to our future Marine Corps is best captured in the opening quote. The linchpin to the seamless integration envisioned by our Commandant is training and equipping reserve components to active component counterpart standards.⁸

Before continuing, it may be helpful to put into context a key phrase found within the CPG and used throughout this paper--"broadly and seamlessly." The desire to define the terms within the phrase must not limit the discussion strictly to matters of relative broadness or seamlessness. Rather, consider the phrase in terms of the metal gold. Pure gold is soft, falls apart, and is not of much practical use. Whereas, gold mixed with other metals is harder, stronger, and more durable.⁹ Broad and seamless should therefore be considered relative in nature and thought of as an overarching goal but not a pure proposition. The realization of seamless integration is that it will never be totally seamless but rather a matter of two linked parts working together in unison with minimal disturbances.

Training.

"MarForRes integration will be a goal and objective of every training event above the battalion/squadron level."¹⁰ Integration of training among active and reserve counterparts provides battalion and higher level commanders with a mechanism to balance operational tempo and train the way that we will fight our future battles. Reserve forces add flexibility and agility to the total force and therefore enable the total force with enormous potential. While nay-sayers could argue with this assertion, reserve forces constitute what many law-makers feel is a cost-efficient alternative to active military forces. The costs avoided by employing a partial reserve component philosophy versus the expediency and perceived higher readiness of a full-time, active military force remains a contentious issue.

Integrated training is currently reflected in the Marine Corps-wide Training Exercise and Employment Plan (MCTEEP) and is carried out by Marine Forces. However, a number of training and employment challenges continue to exist. First and foremost is establishing a coherent concept for reserve employment. This requirement transcends the MCTEEP and forms the basis upon which the reserve component is committed. Second, the challenge of optimizing the scheduling of reserve component augmentation and or reinforcement remains. Many opportunities are lost due to insufficient scheduling lead-time to allow reaction time (normally 60 plus days) to order reservists onto active duty. Because of current paradigms in the training process, complete integration as intended above is likely two to five years away from fruition.¹¹

An adjunct to training is unit cohesion. Unit cohesion has long been a desired force multiplier albeit somewhat as a silent partner. Our Commandant has recognized this fact and has recently instituted a program to build unit cohesion starting at the small unit level. Training and fighting as cohesive units vice splintering units builds teamwork, esprit de corps, and familiarity, which in turn is a recipe for success.

Equipment.

MarForRes will be "equipped...to the same standards as their active counterparts."¹² Table of equipment and training allowances, the tools used by reserve components to account for required equipment, nearly mirror active component counterparts. In those cases where there is not an exact match, questions of appropriateness surface. For example, does the reserve component organization possess the manpower and skill level to maintain a particular item of equipment? When answered in the negative, alternative solutions are explored such as temporary loan of equipment from other nearby Marine Corps organizations. While arguable, one could make the leap that such a solution makes good sense (dollars).

Concerted efforts to horizontally field principal end items in both active and reserve components has led to a closer realization of the Commandant's vision of an indivisible balanced warfighting force. However, several issues prevent across-the-board horizontal fielding of equipment. First, the cost of such an undertaking by the Marine Corps is prohibitive. Secondly, using a common sense approach to the fielding challenge, horizontal fielding is not practical. Maintenance of the equipment and its associated funding alone for such an initiative serves to point out the steep impasse of such a venture. With approximately 191 MarForRes sites geographically spread throughout the United States maintenance services may be located several states away from the owning unit organization.

Across-the-board, mirror imaging of equipment in the active and reserve components is a goal but nothing more. Given limited resources, the Marine Corps has established a workable solution to the equipment integration challenge. With reserve component infrastructure now built into the Marine Corps Systems Command approach to equipment fielding a clear course now lays ahead.

On Course, On Speed?

Eighteen months have passed since the CPG was promulgated. The latest report card on CPG initiatives, while recognizing "much remains to be done,"¹³ leads one to believe all is well. I argue that inasmuch as reserve affairs are concerned, initiatives are disjointed, incoherent and incomplete; we are adrift, yet land is in sight.

Although the Commandant's "On Course, On Speed" article in the September 1996 Marine Corps Gazette fails to specifically mention the reserve component directly, a major step towards a more seamless integration of our active and reserve components lies in the designation of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) as the single structure sponsor for the entire Marine Corps.¹⁴ This single initiative has unlimited potential, which will be addressed later in exploring options and navigating the course to further enhance our Corps' course to a "Total Force Marine Corps."

Navigating the Course Corrections

The course to a "Total Force Marine Corps" started long before our 31st Commandant's CPG. Major General James E. Livingston, then Commanding General, Marine Reserve Force co-authored an article in March 1994 listing a dozen innovations either implemented or in development stages.¹⁵ Many innovations have since been completed while several still linger unfinished. Thus the journey toward a total force took its initial steps.

An initiative currently under consideration to accelerate progress in the "Total Force Marine Corps" arena is the establishment of a Reserve Integration Working Group. The establishment of this group appears to focus effort in the correct direction--a coordinated/concerted effort to remedy the slow progress of implementation "efforts" and provide momentum toward the realization of the "Total Force Marine Corps." A word of caution, however. Team dynamics and personal agendas must not be allowed to impede the working group's progress. The group's composition and charter are expected to be promulgated during March or early April 1997.

A number of concrete options exist to enhance the "Total Force Marine Corps" integration, options that span the spectrum. There are no "silver bullet" options with a guarantee to cure the myriad challenges of integrating such a diverse Force. Mindsets must be checked at the door and a new set of lenses or filters placed on before considering the options noted below. Some options may have been tried in the past. Other options include minor changes to on-going initiatives. Truly there are no new options, only options with different dynamics and different settings.

Option #1. First, and arguably the most audacious option, strong consideration to integrate the reserve component directly into the regular establishment should be revisited. The short answer "been there, done that"¹⁶ and its reference to costs outweighing benefits during a 1988 trial does not address the synergy of cohesive units vice the splintered approach used, as well as it does not address the current defense climate. This option clearly represents the greatest potential for the "broad and seamless integration" addressed in the CPG. It also comes with the added baggage associated with such a monumental challenge.

A case can be made that our situation has civilian industry correlation. One of big businesses' recent initiatives to become more efficient and therefore more profitable has been to flatten management hierarchical levels and shorten lines of reporting to increase responsiveness, accuracy, and efficiency. While not all private business practices may be transferable to the public sector and specifically the military, one could argue that this is one such case that warrants serious consideration. By placing the MarForRes structure directly under/into the active component, lines of communication are shortened and made clearer, and integration is significantly enhanced.

Benefits of placing the reserve component directly under the active component appear quite clear. First, reduced overhead for both personnel and facilities, becomes apparent. The effectiveness of reserve structure operating directly under the active establishment is also reflected in the potential streamlining of MCTEEP execution and the increased proactive vice reactive approach toward training and operational employment.

Additionally, unit cohesion would be demonstrably increased since a seamless bond would form between active and reserve components. Finally, resource allocations (e.g., funding, equipment, etc.) would likewise be streamlined and warfighting component commanders would own the warfighters and associated resources which they would fight with.

However, this option does come with its own set of monstrous challenges. "Planning and coordination requirements apparently outweighed the benefits"¹⁷ of such a proposal in the past. However, members of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) have been tasked with looking at all potential options associated with the size, strength, and responsibilities of the military services.¹⁸ Absent the proverbial crystal ball, the Marine Corps would be well-served to prepare for the worst (i.e., a further reduction of military end-strength) and brace for the QDR results.

The first and perhaps most vexing challenge involves the decision after the difficult, analytical process of measuring cost versus benefit or value-added of the approach. Objectivity is a key factor and is recognized to be of the highest order of difficulty.

Second, the enormity of the proposal and the long-term paradigms so ingrained in our perception of the reserve component must be overcome. In order to overcome the inertia, leaders and subordinates alike must buy into new and potentially radical approaches to solving our problems. Likewise, a long-term versus short-term view must be undertaken.

Third, infrastructure requirements must be considered. Can bases support the additional "MarForRes headquarters staff personnel" at respective major subordinate commands? How will command relationships be structured? These and many more difficult questions must be satisfactorily answered prior to agreement.

Finally, fair share resource apportionment and allocation would likely cause great consternation due to the requirement to realign reserve forces to Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. The key challenge involves the current location of reserve organizations and the employment plan--that is, how reservists will be "reassigned."

Option #2. A second option involves maintaining current MarForRes structure but establishing closer operational relationships with Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific. Major subordinate command tables of organization currently include a Reserve Liaison billet or Reserve Support Unit to facilitate training and generally be the reserve establishment proponent within the active component. However, these billets belong to the active duty Force Commander and coordination between active and reserve components needs improvement. I argue that a potential conflict of interest exists and that Marines must be allowed to exercise their responsibilities and talents in order to facilitate "Total Force" integration. The in-place reserve proponent adds significant "eyes and ears" to training opportunities and potential operational employment and leverage lead time against requisite reaction time. This approach is proactive, facilitates seamless integration, and its potential payoff is exponentially greater than its cost.

Option #3. A third option to assist in the "Total Force Marine Corps" implementation involves military occupational specialty (MOS) imbalances, their effect on readiness, and current training options. Qualified Marines, able to perform their assigned missions, are a vital cog in the "Total Force Marine Corps."

One way that MarForRes measures its readiness is via the unit performance report. Unclassified unit performance reports¹³ are a tool designed to provide readiness indicators based on drill attendance and MOS qualifications. These reports provide Inspector-Instructor Staffs and higher headquarters with baseline information with which to take action to ameliorate noted deficiencies. In order to harness the full capabilities of our talented Marines, innovative approaches are required to balance MOS imbalances (T/O MOS versus Marine filling billet MOS). This process involves breaking the parochial training mindset and an investment in resources--primarily time and money. Formal schooling for reservists in a new MOS is currently difficult at best. Most drilling reservists do not have the luxury of several weeks sabbatical to attend Marine Corps MOS training.

A number of options which break from the traditional training pipeline are available but will require approval by MCCDC. These options include use of tuition assistance to attend a program of study in similar civilian equivalent professions; the ability to test out (e.g., "CLEP") at MOS school based on experience or previous MOS training (e.g., Marine Corps Institute courses, on-the-job training, etc.), and passing an examination; development of MOS specific correspondence or distance learning courses; and finally, working with the formal MOS schools to break the curriculum paradigm that prevents many reservists from attending formal MOS schools and receiving a new MOS. The Training and Education Division, MCCDC is encouraged to work with formal MOS schools to tailor curriculum schedules to meet Reservists' needs and provide flexibility for Marines to attain a given MOS. For example, the Marine Corps Service Support Schools (MCSSS) have broken 3043, Supply Administration School into modules which facilitates MOS assignment in approximately one year. Reservists spend two consecutive annual training periods (normally conducted during the summer of each year) at MCSSS to complete the curriculum.

So What?

All of this leads us to the question--where do we go from here? The options noted above provide a starting point to further integrate the Reserve component seamlessly into the Total Force Marine Corps. So...where do we go from here?

First, option number one should be revisited. We are in a different environment from even two years ago. Integration of the Reserve component directly into the "Total Force Marine Corps" (or active duty component) makes sense if the goal is seamless integration. What better way to seamlessly integrate than to establish unity of command in the first place. Direct lines of communication and control are established or significantly enhanced as a by-product of such action. Further, implementation of option number one, while it has its challenges (costs), provides the greatest potential for truly seamless integration. All other options help facilitate integration but do not hold the promise offered by option number one.

Second, option number three should be exploited. The MarForRes should capture the lessons learned associated with MOS qualification in the 4th Supply Battalion and disseminate such to the Force. Innovative methods of training and qualifying our Marines to accomplish their tasks not only increases the numbers of our readiness reporting but more importantly undergirds and expands our ability to support the accomplishment of our military missions. If we are truly to fight as a Total Force, Marines must be universally qualified in their respective occupational specialties regardless of their component affiliation. Conclusion.

The MarForRes provide a potent, robust, cost-effective force multiplier capable of sustaining America's expeditionary forces. In order to optimize both the efficiency and effectiveness of the

"Total Force Marine Corps," previously noted recommendations should be considered for exploitation.

Current challenges and those of the 21st century, both domestic and international, require a concerted effort to refine the way we do business. In doing so, our goal should be to maximize the utility of all of America's defense forces.

Our Marine Corps must continue to lead the way and seek out more efficient, effective approaches to warfighting. The challenges of the past dim against the prospects of the future. The Marine Corps--the "Total Force Marine Corps," must fight as an indistinguishable Corps, capable of knocking down the door and holding it open long enough to facilitate the knock out blow to our adversary. Our nation's future freedom and our Corps' illustrious heritage may just depend on it!

ENDNOTES

¹General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, 1 July 1995, p. 9.

²Ibid. p. 1.

³Eric Minton, "No More Weekend Warriors," Off Duty, National Guard & Reserve, Fall 1996, p. 4.

⁴General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, 1 July 1995, p. 10.

⁵U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 262 identifies the purpose of each reserve component.

⁶Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 17.

⁷Bradley Graham, "Cohen Weighing Three Possible Courses for Shape of Future U.S. Military," The Washington Post, 4 April 1997, A4.

⁸General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, 1 July 1995, p. 10.

⁹Colonel Francis E. Gillespie, AC/S Requirements and Resources, Marine Forces Reserve described the terms "broad" and "seamless" in relation to the integration of the "Total Force Marine Corps" in terms of the metal, gold during a telephonic interview on 13 February 1997.

¹⁰General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, 1 July 1995, p. 10.

¹¹Colonel Francis E. Gillespie, AC/S, Requirements and Resources, Marine Forces Reserve interview response to question on definition of "broad and seamless" integration on 13 February 1997.

¹²General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, The 31st Commandant's Planning Guidance, 1 July 1995, p. 10.

¹³General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "On Course, On Speed," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1996, p. 25-27.

¹⁴Ibid. p. 26.

¹⁵MajGen James E. Livingston and Col Eric L. Chase, USMCR, "Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle for America's Post-Cold War Force-In-Readiness," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1994, p. 16-17.

¹⁶MajGen James E. Livingston, "Reserve Vision Revisited," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1995, p.47.

¹⁷Ibid. p. 47.

¹⁸Jack Weible, "Proposed Reserve Budget Still Up In The Air," Marine Corps Edition, Navy Times, 17 February 1997, p. 22.

¹⁹Unit performance reports were changed from monthly to quarterly reporting, effective calendar year 1997.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Briggs, Fergus P., Colonel USMC, Title, Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA (Former G-5, Marine Forces Reserve). Interview by author, 18 February 1997.

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Department of Defense, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Commandant's Planning Guidance (Washington, D. C.: 1 July 1995).

FMFM 4-1, Combat Service Support Operations, dated 12 July 1993.

Gillespie, Francis E., Colonel USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff, Requirements and Resources, Marine Forces Reserve, New Orleans, LA. Interview by author, 13 February 1997.

Graham, Bradley "Cohen Weighing Three Possible Courses for Shape of Future U.S. Military." Washington Post, 4 April 1997, Sec. A4.

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Trujillo, Nick, Major USMC, Aviation Structure Officer, Reserve Affairs Coordination Branch, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Division, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Interview by author, 13 February 1997.

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